



Greater Manchester Response

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Contact Officer:

David Maloney
Greater Manchester Joint Road Safety Team
0161 455 2138
d.maloney@manchester.gov.uk

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Executive Summary

1. Introduction

This joint response was compiled by the Greater Manchester Joint Road Safety Team on behalf of the ten Greater Manchester local authorities.

2. General comments

We support many of the measures outlined in the consultation, and welcome its evidence-based approach, its intention to promote the sharing of knowledge rather than creating it, and the increased support promised from DfT to road safety professionals.

3. Visions and targets

We agree with the *spirit* of the vision of having “the safest roads in the world,” but we have questions about how it will be measured. We would welcome guidance from the Office of National Statistics regarding the statistical validity of any targets agreed, particularly when local targets are derived from national targets, and around the use of casualty rates per kilometre travelled. Absolute targets are more appropriate for Greater Manchester rather than percentage reductions.

4. Context

We agree that better delivery is the key challenge from 2010, and would support a greater emphasis on partnership working, drawing on the wide and diverse experience of local authorities, and better use of data and data sources.

5. New performance framework

We welcome the proposed measures to support the effectiveness of the road safety profession, and agree with the role of the Road Safety Delivery Board as outlined.

6. Roads and local authorities

Changes to speed limits should be targeted based on need and projected impact on casualty reduction, rather than across the board. This applies equally to 50mph limits on rural roads and to 20mph in residential areas.

7. Vehicles

We think that making safer vehicles cheaper than less safe vehicles is the best way to encourage consumers to consider safety when buying a car.

8. Behaviours

Whilst tackling those that deliberately flout the law, it is important not to lose sight of those who are killed or injured through poor road skills and lapses.

A. Technical information

The proposed national KSI reduction target of 33% by 2020 should not be applied indiscriminately at a local level. We outline how this could affect the North West in this section.

1. Introduction

The Safer Way consultation sets out a series of proposals for the national road safety strategy from 2010 onwards. The full consultation is available online at:

<http://www.dft.gov.uk/consultations/open/roadsafetyconsultation/>

The Greater Manchester Joint Road Safety Team have worked with the ten Greater Manchester local authorities – namely: Bolton; Bury; Manchester; Oldham; Rochdale; Salford; Stockport; Tameside; Trafford, and; Wigan – to coordinate a joint response to this consultation. Individual road safety teams may also respond in their own right.

This document comments generally on the consultation document as a whole, and then answers each of the consultation questions in turn.

2. General Comments

The consultation document is comprehensive and is based on thorough research, including international comparisons.

The following aspects are particularly welcome and supported:

- The thorough appraisal of available evidence underpinning the strategy;
- The road safety system approach (supporting the approach already used in GM);
- The concept of the ‘geography of road safety’ (meaning in particular the consideration of where people live in determining interventions);

- The proposed road safety information management strategy so as to allow those involved in casualty reduction to easily find information on research, good practice and evaluation;
 - The intention to promote the sharing of knowledge rather than creating it (particularly if this is a recognition that there is too much knowledge already out there / research done already, but it's very difficult to be aware of it all);
 - The proposed creation of the accident / socio-economic database;
 - The priority to be given to rural roads in the current speed limit review of A and B roads, and that reductions to a 50 mph limit should not be by a blanket approach but targeted;
 - The intention of DfT to try to ensure that road safety is a key goal in regional strategies and LTPs.
 - The increased support promised from DfT to local authorities in several ways to do our job; and
 - Continuing with initiatives to seize untaxed and uninsured vehicles, and those of unlicensed drivers.
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3. Vision and targets (Chapters 3 and 8)

1. Do you agree that our vision for road safety should be to have the safest roads in the world? (Chapter 3)

We agree with *spirit* of this vision, but its detail is problematic.

To have “the safest roads in the world” may well be desirable, but there are questions as to how it will be measured. It can be measured only on the basis of fatalities, as this is the only common casualty definition internationally. Using fatalities alone would put too much emphasis on a tiny proportion of all casualties. Furthermore, there are complications around the idea of ‘safest’ – a system with total gridlock would be safest.

Also the goal implies that it is only the design of the roads that is important, whereas we need to also improve the skills, knowledge and abilities of road users of all types. It implies to road users that they don't have to do anything differently. Any ‘sound bite’ goal must recognise the contribution the reader must make to the goal, although it is recognised that this may be more difficult to compose. We acknowledge that a vision should be a simple, succinct and general summary of our overall intention. A vision should make sense to the public. Possibly a focus on ‘safer journeys for all’?

2. Do you agree that we should define a strategy running over twenty years to 2030, but with review points after five and ten years? (Chapter 3)

We agree that the DfT should define a long-term strategy over twenty years, subject to five-yearly reviews. This is especially relevant to setting targets in the context of devising better measures, for example to measure walking and cycling levels.

3. Do you agree that our targets should be to reduce:

Overview:

The targets appear onerous, bearing in mind the easiest interventions have been carried out already, and that levels of deprivation tend not to improve much, both of which mean that improvements will be more difficult to achieve in future. The 'headline' national KSI target is a 33% reduction, which doesn't seem too burdensome in itself, but those road user groups with a 50% target are sub-sets of the 'headline' group, so that the 'headline' target in reality may well be significantly above 33%.

All of the targets are KSIs, which at a local authority level consist of very small numbers annually, especially those relating to under-18's, pedestrians and cyclists, particularly the latter. Monitoring performance towards the target in each case annually by milestones would not therefore give a reliable picture in such circumstances and it is therefore suggested that *either* Borough-wide

- numbers of slights; *or*
- numbers of all accidents; *or*
- numbers of all casualties

are added to the list of KPIs to be used as a proxy for this purpose. The larger numbers would allow more accurate and informed conclusions to be drawn.

As a general point about targets, we would welcome guidance from the Office of National Statistics (ONS – see www.statistics.gov.uk) regarding the statistical validity of any measures agreed. This is particularly important when local targets are derived from national targets.

We would urge caution when considering how national targets are reflected at a local level. Greater Manchester currently has a KSI rate / 100,000 population that is very close to the national targeted rate for 2020 (see table 1 below). Is a 33% reduction an appropriate target for GM in this light?

Table 1

| Number of KSIs per 100,000 Population (based on 2007mid-year estimates), Proposed Base and 2020 National Target (33% reduction) | | | | |
|---|--------------------------------|--|--------------------------------|--|
| | KSI numbers | | KSI Rate per 100,000 pop | |
| | Base (2004-2008 average) | 2020 Target (33% less than base) | Base (2004-2008 average) | 2020 Target (33% less than base) |
| Greater Manchester | 966 | 647 | 37.69 | 25.26 |
| Great Britain | 31,528 | 21,123 | 53.24 | 35.67 |

The 33% reduction target would be more testing for GM than for GB as a whole, which presents a tremendous challenge and would require smart joined up working to achieve. We suggest an absolute target, rather than a percentage reduction. (See also pp 18-20 of this response, for more technical detail on reduction targets across the North West.)

Bearing in mind that motorcyclists are the only road user group where the numbers of casualties have increased on the 1994-98 base, perhaps this should also be considered for a target nationally.

At a GM level, there are some casualty classifications that have seen limited improvement since the 1994-1998 baseline (see pp 20-24). We would suggest local targets ought to reflect these changes.

Individual targets:

- **road deaths by at least 33 per cent by 2020 compared to the baseline of the 2004–08 average number of road deaths;**

We agree that this is a good target at a national level because it is easy to understand and to measure

However, we would not support this target at a local level (GM-wide) because the numbers are low, and fluctuate too much for it to be measured in a way that is statistically reliable.

We would seek supporting guidance from the ONS as to the suitability of this target at a regional level. (North-West)

- **the annual total of serious injuries on our roads by 2020 by at least 33 per cent;**

We agree that this is a good target at a national level because it is easy to understand and to measure.

Whilst numbers of serious injuries are higher than numbers of deaths, we would not support this target at a local level (GM-wide) because the numbers are still low, and subject to fluctuations that affect statistically reliable measurement.

With guidance from the ONS, at a local level we would support an absolute target (rather than a percentage reduction) that considers GM's relatively good performance in the baseline period.

- **the annual total of road deaths and serious injuries to children and young people (aged 0–17) by at least 50 per cent against a baseline of the 2004-08 average by 2020;**

We agree that this is a good target at a national level because it is easy to understand and to measure.

The total number of deaths and serious injuries for this age group are relatively low at a local level (GM-wide), and subject to fluctuations that affect statistically reliable measurement, so we would not support a % reduction target at a GM level. Instead, we would support an absolute target.

- **by at least 50 per cent by 2020 the rate¹ of KSI per km travelled by pedestrians and cyclists, compared with the 2004–08 average? (Chapter 8)**

We appreciate the spirit of this target, which is that we ought to consider growth in the volume of pedestrians and cyclists when we look at their casualty numbers. However, we're not confident in the systems that exist to measure the distances traveled. How does off-road cycling and walking fit into this measure, for example? We would like the DfT and ONS to collaborate on improving how we measure walking and cycling rates nationally. How do other countries measure this, for example? If an improved measure could be used from 2015, we would see results over the course of the twenty-year strategy.

4. We are proposing a set of indicators in order to help us to monitor performance (Appendix A). Do you believe these cover the right areas? (Chapter 8)

We believe that the indicators cover the right areas, if they are needed at all (see below), but that some of the units of measurement suggested require further attention, in collaboration with ONS. Indicators 1 to 5 are based on rates per distance travelled for different road user types; the earlier comments about walking and cycling rates also apply here. Indicator 8 depends the scale at which 'rural' is defined (output area, LSOA, MSOA).

¹ Expressed as a three-year rolling average

The purpose of the thirteen KPIs is not totally clear. Progress is theoretically best measured by references to milestones of the target groups themselves, rather than by inventing new areas. The large number of KPIs proposed, some involving the calculation of rates, would impose an unnecessary burden on local authorities, if that is what is intended.

We need a KPI measure of how we are doing in relation to casualty reduction *as a whole*, which can best be assessed by reference to the numbers of incidents from which casualties of any category arise. One option is that we use 'all personal injury accidents' (or crashes or collisions) as the sole KPI.

The use of only KSIs as targets means that there will be very little geographical clustering of relevant accidents, implying that engineering solutions will often not be appropriate. This suggests an ETP approach and an expansion of such activities in general, which the document should acknowledge and suggest ways in which this should happen. Also the use of specific road user groups for the targets also suggests that ETP will increasingly be more appropriate, rather than engineering.

There are considerable cost implications in the expansion of revenue-funded ETP work, which the post-2010 Strategy should recognise and explore.

As we have said above, we would welcome guidance from the ONS regarding the statistical validity of any measures agreed, especially when local indicators are derived from national indicators.

4. Context (Chapters 2, 3 and 4)

5. We have identified a number of factors that may affect our ability to deliver road safety improvements in the future world we are planning for. Do you think we have taken account of the key risks and opportunities? Are there others you would add? (Chapter 3)

Nothing to add.

6. We think that the key challenge for road safety from 2010 is better and more systematic delivery, rather than major policy changes. Do you agree? (Chapter 4)

We agree that better delivery is the key challenge, with a focus on the following areas:

Partnership working: We think that improved partnership working is at the heart of improved delivery, drawing on the wide and diverse experience of local authorities and other bodies at a local, regional and national level. We mean partnerships

between organisations – police, local authorities, other public bodies, the voluntary sector, formal and informal community groups, and private bodies – as well as partnerships among neighbouring equivalents at a regional and city-regional level. This would extend to liaising with, and seeking the co-operation of, very local groups in problem areas, such as individual mosques and mosque schools for example.

Data: We would support proposals 4.26 to 4.30 about developing and improving the quality of data sources, particularly in relation to using hospital data. We would also support improved access to insurance data. We understand that combining STATS19, hospital and insurance data would be a long and arduous task, but we should not ignore that each data source has independent value.

Increased enforcement: We would support increased enforcement across the road network, rather than just at hotspots, although the latter should clearly be given higher priority if shown to be a continuing problem over time.

STATS 19 audit: We would suggest an independent audit of STATS19 data and police systems on a regular basis to measure under-recording levels by the police, and under-reporting levels by the public. Such an audit could compare other data sources to STATS 19 data.

7. This consultation document sets out the current evidence on the key road safety challenges. Do you agree with our analysis? Would you highlight any others? (Chapter 2)

We broadly agree with the challenges that have been outlined in the report. There is a problem around some types of measurement. We have already discussed issues around casualty rates per vehicle kilometre for walking and cycling. Rates per head of population are also problematic – cities as net attractors of people have more people in them than reside in them. Again, we would defer to the ONS on this measure.

Education, Training and Publicity (ETP)

The document correctly recognises that such initiatives should generally be data-led. However, the document could say more on ETP in general. What would the DfT like road safety professionals to do differently at a local level, bearing in mind an implied expansion of such activities?

We have two basic points to make, which may appear to be contradictory but are not:

- Chapter 7 is mainly about drivers, with little emphasis on how to alter the behaviour of adult and child pedestrians; and
- The interventions for drivers, after initially learning to drive, will in practice not address those most in need of change with any impact.

With regard to drivers, the document deals with driving for work, national campaigns, which it says will be data-led, and learning to drive initially. Drivers are notoriously hard to reach after passing their test, compared to children where there is a captive

audience in schools. Notwithstanding the identification of vulnerable groups to which the targets are proposed to apply, drivers, and the occupants of their vehicles, are collectively the largest group of casualties, and are often at fault in pedestrian accidents as well. It follows therefore that, in order to significantly reduce casualties, we must pay more attention to this large group. The most dangerous behaviours have been identified (drink and drug driving, inappropriate speed, seat belts, mobile phones) and there has been some progress in many authorities in identifying which drivers are involved, or at least where they tend to live. This approach needs to be expanded and also applied to adult pedestrians.

References are made to the 'geography of road safety' that are not developed further. It is assumed that this term refers in particular to the geographical information that can be used to help define intervention activities, such as driver and casualty addresses.

Examples of previous or current ETP approaches, in which those identified as most in need are targeted, are:

- Speed awareness courses – see p15 below;
- The project at Hindley with young offenders by Wigan²; and
- The two Oldham RSPG projects, and the GM 17-25 project.

For children, the document talks of the DfT developing resources which are welcome, but what should be done differently at a local level? In areas with particular child pedestrian safety problems, their parents and drivers living in these areas need to be targeted as well.

The vast majority of the RSPG projects have been ETP-based, involving extensive partnership working. The DfT should be in a position to give some advice from the experience gained over recent years throughout the country, their monitoring of these projects and other work. Extensive experience has also been gained of partnership working which is essential for this type of project.

Finally these sections should be about the behaviour of all road users, not just drivers. This is generally the case, but parts of the text are only about drivers. For example, Para 4.4 and the start of Chapter 7 refer only to drivers. Also the questions at the end of Chapter 7 for the consultees refer only to drivers.

5. New performance framework (Chapters 4 and 8)

8. We are proposing a number of measures to support the effectiveness of the road safety profession. Do you think they will be effective? What else might need to be done? (Chapter 4)

² The project was initially funded as part of the GM 17-25 project, and is now supported by GM Casualty Reduction Partnership funding.

We support the measures outlined in proposal 4.41.

9. Do you agree that an independent annual report on road safety performance, created on an annual basis, would be a worthwhile innovation? (Chapter 4)

If performance will be measured against the targets discussed in Q3 and the indicators discussed in Q4, we would re-iterate our earlier suggestions respectively. Is this a national or a local report? Proposal 4.41 suggest that it would be local – in which case we would underline our preference for the ONS to verify the statistical validity of local derivations from national targets.

Whilst local authorities have the freedom to adopt the targets as their own or not, that DfT will monitor their performance against all of the targets anyway, both those adopted and those not – and more so if they publish local reports. This will inevitably involve comparisons between different authorities with regard to the targets (adopted or not), so the targets will thus be assigned to local authorities by default anyway.

10. Do you agree that the Road Safety Delivery Board should be tasked with holding Government and other stakeholders to account on the implementation of a new national road safety plan? (Chapter 8)

We agree. We also think there is a role for a data champion (perhaps as part of this board?) to ensure data is fit for purpose, as described above.

6. Roads and local authorities (Chapter 5)

11. Do you agree that highway authorities reviewing and, where appropriate, reducing speed limits on single carriageway roads will be an effective way of addressing the casualty problem on rural roads? Are there other ways in which the safety of rural roads can be improved? (Chapter 5)

At the consultation meeting in Manchester (16th June 2009), one speaker mentioned the enthusiasm in certain circles for a blanket approach to introducing 50 mph speed limits on single carriageway rural roads. We welcome a targeted approach to the implementation of 50 mph speed limits on single carriageway rural roads rather than a blanket approach.

The following are problems that would arise from a blanket approach:

- The category of single carriageway rural roads covers a large range of types of road. The character of the road would therefore be less likely to suggest the limit to you. In other words, a blanket approach would be against the ‘self-explaining roads’ concept that DfT promotes.

- There would inevitably be some roads with speeds well above 50 mph, but without an accident problem. The cost of the new signs here would therefore not be justified, but could be better spent elsewhere towards casualty reduction.
- With a blanket limit, we would effectively lose one item in our casualty reduction toolkit. We would not be able to deal with a particular accident problem length on a road with a blanket limit by dropping the limit over the problem length only – i.e. 60 mph limit as the norm, but a 50 mph limit with conspicuous signing on the problem length.
- A number of authorities have already adopted the targeted approach, including us. This seems to have been successful, although we only have a few examples. If the blanket approach was to redefine the ‘derestricted’ sign to mean a 50 mph limit on a single carriageway road, as opposed to 60 mph as now, this would mean that all the 50 mph signs (terminal and repeaters) would have to be taken down. This would give the impression to drivers on roads with implemented targeted 50 mph limits that the 50 mph limit had been removed and the speed limit had been raised to 60 mph, so speeds would increase.

An important issue with a blanket limit is how it would be signed. These appear to be the options:

- Sign as now – 50 mph terminal signs at changes from other limits and repeaters on all roads affected – expensive (see above) and much clutter in the countryside
- Redefine ‘derestricted’ sign to mean 50 mph on single carriageways, remaining to mean 70 mph on dual carriageways. It currently has two meanings, differing by 10 mph. The problems would increase if the same sign had two meanings that differed by 20 mph. However this is probably the cheapest option.

Finally, the ‘derestricted’ sign currently has two meanings depending on road type, which is confusing. Speed limit signs should show the speed limit on the road in numbers, to avoid any doubt. Drivers need simple rules if speed limits are to be observed, and a sign with two meanings isn’t a simple rule. There is a need to delete the ‘derestricted’ sign in any event, which should be taken on board.

12. How can we most effectively promote the implementation of 20 mph zone schemes in residential areas? What other measures should we be encouraging to reduce pedestrian and cyclist casualties in towns? (Chapter 5)

It is important to distinguish between advisory 20mph zones and mandatory 20mph limits, especially in un-engineered areas. We would push for type approval for

enforcement equipment effective at speeds below 30mph, and support subsequent enforcement, on a prioritised basis.

We would support community consultation as a method of promoting 20mph schemes in residential areas. Can evidence from the Portsmouth trial be used as a persuasive tool?

Home Zones, as in the Netherlands and Germany, give legal priority to pedestrians and cyclists: the driver is held responsible for collisions and must prove otherwise. This would require a legislative change to work in the UK.

We would support a THINK! publicity campaign that demonstrates the difference in survival rates for pedestrians at 20mph, 30mph, and 40mph.

There are significant concerns about the promotion of mandatory 20 mph speed limits in all residential areas. The statement does have a number of caveats, saying DfT will 'encourage LA to consider' their introduction 'over time'. The document also notes the comparative effectiveness of engineered and 'signs only' schemes. The impact assessment is of the former and a good rate of return is indicated.

However the headline message, particularly that which has appeared in the press, is 20 mph speed limits in all residential areas and that this should happen fairly quickly. This may well result in many demands by local people and politicians for 'signs only' schemes which they assume will work. This could cause problems for officers in LA in managing such aspirations. Any scheme which unfortunately results in speeds significantly above 20 mph will (a) give a false sense of security for local people which in itself constitutes a risk; and (b) increase the enforcement demands on the Police. Such schemes therefore generally need to be avoided.

Any area 20 mph scheme, even if 'signs only', would have a significant capital cost and involve a considerable number of signs, causing an increase in street clutter. Successful enforcement would depend on the signs always being correct, so the ongoing maintenance commitment would be significant.

Secondly many residential areas have little or no accident problem, particularly in the 'leafy suburbs'. Schemes in such areas could not therefore be cost effective in terms of casualty reduction. In some GM boroughs, about a third of residential areas are in this category.

Implementation of 20 mph speed limits in such areas on a blanket basis, as DfT suggest, would be inconsistent with another of the key messages in the strategy which is to target those roads most associated with deaths and serious injuries, by treating areas which do not need treating.

We therefore suggest that the document should be amended as follows:

- (a) a goal to *achieve average speeds of about 20 mph in all residential areas*, rather than 20 mph speed limits, although the latter would remain an option to always be considered; and

- (b) Whether the goal is 20 mph limits or average speeds, the DfT should recommend that prioritisation should be on the basis of accident records and / or maximising casualty reductions.

Prioritisation on this basis is recommended in Para 5.15 as a general approach, but emphasis is needed in the 20 mph limit section. Both of these suggestions are intended to promote the best use of scarce financial resources. With regard to the first suggestion, there are a good many instances, especially modern estates, where speeds are at this level due to the road layout, so no further action is needed.

Finally the DfT are asked for clear guidance on the use of part-time 20 mph speed limits, for example outside schools, or at least confirmation that this is in the pipeline. Communities often request these measures.

13. How can we provide better support to highway authorities in progressing economically worthwhile road safety engineering schemes? (Chapter 5)

Can the DfT offer support with evaluating the success (including the economic success) of engineering schemes paid for through Local Safety Scheme funding? Can we work together to develop a national toolkit for scheme evaluation (along the lines of the Home Office's Passport to Evaluation for crime reduction projects), for example?

Safety Cameras

The consultation document does not appear to mention safety cameras at all. They have achieved casualty savings and their emphasis has shifted from enforcement devices to ones that result in drivers needing training to select themselves for such training, by means of a speed awareness course.

The document should at least recognise these points and indicate how the DfT expects their contribution to casualty reduction to develop over the next ten years. Will they continue to be signed? Also what future do they see with regard to vehicle-activated signs?

7. Vehicles (Chapter 6)

14. What should Government do to secure greater road safety benefits from vehicles?

15. Do you agree that, in future, crash avoidance systems will grow in importance and will have the potential to greatly reduce casualties?

16. How can we best encourage consumers to include safety performance in their purchasing decisions?

We agree with the statements about potential over-reliance on technology by drivers in Para 6.9(c). If decision-making is reduced too much by such devices, drivers will find it more difficult to make decisions quickly when required to.

We suggest that the consumer thinks with their wallet or purse, and making safer vehicles cheaper than less safe vehicles is the best way to encourage consumers to consider safety when buying a car. This may be through subsidised purchasing price, reduced tax, etc.

8. Behaviours (Chapter 7)

17. We have highlighted what we believe to be the most dangerous driving behaviours. Do you agree with our assessment?

Whilst tackling those that deliberately flout the law, it is important not to lose sight of those who are killed or injured through poor road skills and lapses. From examination of the STATS19 plain language descriptions provided by GMP, more than half of all fatal accidents in GM in 2007 and 2008 appear to have been caused by poor road skills.

Notwithstanding the emphasis in the targets on young people, cyclists and pedestrians, the predominant casualty group is car drivers and occupants. This should be central in our planning. We support driver training schemes around improving driver skills, both on a voluntary opt-in basis, and as an alternative to penalty points for driving without due care and attention.

18. What more can be done to persuade the motoring public that illegal and inappropriate speeds are not acceptable behaviours?

We would support further THINK! publicity campaigns that demonstrate the difference in survival rates for pedestrians at 20mph, 30mph, 40mph. We would also support publicity campaigns about general speed limit awareness.

We would support increased enforcement of speed limits, especially around lower speed limits (20mph, 30mph, 40mph). This is particularly relevant with regard to 20mph zones – we would heartily welcome type approval for equipment to enforce at this speed.

We support Speed Awareness courses as an alternative to penalty points in accordance with the National Speed Awareness Course Model.

19. What more can be done to encourage safe and responsible driving?

We would ask the Department to explore random testing for drink and drug driving at particular times and locations. To be at risk of being tested, however 'carefully' you drive when intoxicated, offers a different deterrent. Certain routes could be signed as random testing zones, for example.

More enforcement, especially of poor manoeuvres etc by increased numbers of traffic police. In support of this, we would reiterate our support for driver training schemes around improving driver skills, both on a voluntary opt-in basis, and as an alternative to penalty points for driving without due care and attention.

20. Should more be done to reward good driving? If so, what?

Drivers are already rewarded for good driving with reduced insurance premiums, especially through no-claims bonuses. We would seek to support take-up for driver skills courses by offering further reductions in insurance costs for those who meet certain standards. Would the DfT support such a scheme, including overseeing liaison with the insurance industry?

Other notes

Although paragraph 7.38 suggests that Single / Double Summer Time will not be considered further in this proposal, we would continue to lobby for a trial at some point during the life of the next strategy.

a. Technical appendices

In the 'Safer Way' consultation, the Department for Transport propose a target for a reduction of both fatal and serious casualties by 33% by the year 2020 when compared to a baseline of the 2004 – 2008 annual average. These are national targets, and it is expected that local targets will be based on all KSIs, rather than separating out the fatal and serious categories.

1) Casualties per Head of Population

Table A shows the annual average number of casualties for the proposed baseline period (2004 to 2008) together with the population from the 2007 mid year estimates within each of the police force areas of the Northwest Region and the GB totals. Until Road Casualties Great Britain: 2008 is published in late September 2009, analysis can only be undertaken at a police force level.

| Police Force Area | Five Year Average by Severity | | | | | 100,000 Population |
|----------------------|-------------------------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|--------------------|
| | Fatal | Serious | Slight | KSI | All | |
| Cheshire | 64 | 642 | 4,599 | 706 | 5,305 | 10.03 |
| Cumbria | 47 | 313 | 2,151 | 360 | 2,511 | 4.97 |
| Lancashire | 69 | 961 | 6,713 | 1,029 | 7,742 | 14.52 |
| Merseyside | 48 | 592 | 5,816 | 640 | 6,456 | 13.5 |
| Greater Manchester | 85 | 881 | 10,779 | 966 | 11,745 | 25.62 |
| Northwest | 312 | 3,389 | 30,059 | 3,701 | 33,760 | 68.64 |
| Great Britain | 3,016 | 28,512 | 226,257 | 31,528 | 257,785 | 592.16 |

Table B shows the number and rate per 100,000 head of population of KSIs for each of the Northwest police force areas for the proposed base (average 2004 to 2008) and 2020 target. This assumes a standard target of 33% across all areas.

| Police Force Area | KSIs | | KSIs per 100,000 pop | |
|-------------------|-----------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| | Base (2004 to 2008 average) | 2020 Target | Base (2004 to 2008 average) | 2020 Target |
| Cheshire | 706 | 473 | 70.36 | 47.14 |
| Cumbria | 360 | 241 | 72.45 | 48.54 |
| Lancashire | 1,029 | 690 | 70.91 | 47.51 |
| Merseyside | 640 | 429 | 47.40 | 31.76 |
| Greater | 966 | 647 | 37.69 | 25.26 |

| | | | | |
|----------------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|
| Manchester | | | | |
| Northwest | 3,701 | 2,480 | 53.92 | 36.12 |
| Great Britain | 31,528 | 21,123 | 53.24 | 35.67 |

These figures show that the two northwest metropolitan area police forces (Greater Manchester and Merseyside) already have KSI rates per head of population that are below the national rate. In the case of Greater Manchester, the rate is only 5.7% above the rate implied national target for 2020 for Great Britain.

2) Casualties per Distance Travelled

Table C shows the annual average number of casualties for the proposed baseline period (2004 to 2008) together with the estimated vehicle kilometres for 2007 for each of the police force areas of the Northwest Region and the GB totals. It should be noted that the vehicle kilometres at this level of disaggregation are outside the scope of national statistics, and the figures in the following table are only indicative.

| Police Force Area | Five Year Average by Severity | | | | | 100 million Vehicle Km |
|----------------------|-------------------------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|------------------------|
| | Fatal | Serious | Slight | KSI | All | |
| Cheshire | 64 | 642 | 4599 | 706 | 5305 | 124 |
| Cumbria | 47 | 313 | 2151 | 360 | 2511 | 57 |
| Lancashire | 69 | 961 | 6713 | 1,029 | 7742 | 127 |
| Merseyside | 48 | 592 | 5816 | 640 | 6456 | 81 |
| Greater Manchester | 85 | 881 | 10779 | 966 | 11745 | 187 |
| | | | | | | |
| Northwest | 312 | 3389 | 30059 | 3,701 | 33760 | 576 |
| Great Britain | 3016 | 28512 | 226257 | 31,528 | 257785 | 5130 |

| Police Force Area | KSIs | | KSIs per 100 million Veh Kms | |
|--------------------|-----------------------------|-------------|------------------------------|-------------|
| | Base (2004 to 2008 average) | 2020 Target | Base (2004 to 2008 average) | 2020 Target |
| Cheshire | 706 | 473 | 5.70 | 3.82 |
| Cumbria | 360 | 241 | 6.33 | 4.24 |
| Lancashire | 1,029 | 690 | 8.10 | 5.43 |
| Merseyside | 640 | 429 | 7.89 | 5.28 |
| Greater Manchester | 966 | 647 | 5.16 | 3.46 |

| | | | | |
|----------------------|---------------|---------------|-------------|-------------|
| Northwest | 3,701 | 2,480 | 6.43 | 4.30 |
| Great Britain | 31,528 | 21,123 | 6.15 | 4.12 |

As the vehicle kilometre data is outside the scope of national statistics, not too much reliance can be placed on these figures. However, they do tend to support the view that it will be very difficult for Greater Manchester to achieve 33% reduction in KSIs.

At a regional level, the vehicle kilometres are more robust, and do not fall outside the scope of national statistics. It can be seen that the overall rate of KSI per 100 million vehicle kilometres is 4.5% higher in the northwest than the national average.

3) New Proposed Baseline 2004-2008 fare v Old Baseline 1994-1998

Highlighted in red are those areas where Greater Manchester has not performed as well at reducing accidents. These are the areas we need to target to continue reducing KSIs.

Unfortunately I can't produce any GB figures for comparison (except for total KSIs) until RCGB is released in September.

| District | Old Base 1994-1998 Annual Ave | New Base 2004-2008 Annual Ave | Change Old to New | %age Change Old to New |
|---------------------------|--|--|----------------------------------|---|
| <u>Bolton</u> | 136 | 101 | -35 | -25.7% |
| Bury | 72 | 64 | -8.2 | -11.4% |
| Manchester | 294 | 238 | -55.8 | -19.0% |
| Oldham | 109 | 82 | -26.8 | -24.7% |
| Rochdale | 107 | 75 | -31.2 | -29.3% |
| Salford | 126 | 91 | -35.4 | -28.1% |
| Stockport | 111 | 76 | -34.8 | -31.4% |
| Tameside | 106 | 69 | -36.4 | -34.5% |
| Trafford | 74 | 61 | -13.2 | -17.7% |
| Wigan | 147 | 108 | -38.6 | -26.3% |
| Greater Manchester | 1281 | 966 | -315.4 | -24.6% |
| Great Britain | 47656 | 31528 | -16128.4 | -33.8% |

| Table F Comparison of All Casualties Baselines by District | | | | |
|---|--|--|----------------------------------|---|
| District | Old Base 1994-1998 Annual Ave | New Base 2004-2008 Annual Ave | Change Old to New | %age Change Old to New |
| Bolton | 1673 | 1291 | -382 | -22.8% |
| Bury | 1026 | 856 | -169.6 | -16.5% |
| Manchester | 3652 | 2903 | -749 | -20.5% |
| Oldham | 1371 | 1004 | -367 | -26.8% |
| Rochdale | 1316 | 980 | -335.4 | -25.5% |
| Salford | 1815 | 1031 | -783.8 | -43.2% |
| Stockport | 1594 | 973 | -621 | -39.0% |
| Tameside | 1181 | 777 | -403.8 | -34.2% |
| Trafford | 1198 | 756 | -442.4 | -36.9% |
| Wigan | 1881 | 1173 | -708.4 | -37.7% |
| Greater Manchester | 16708 | 11745 | -4962.4 | -29.7% |
| Great Britain | 319928 | 257785 | -62143 | -19.4% |

| Table G Comparison of Child KSI Baselines by District | | | | |
|--|--|--|----------------------------------|---|
| District | Old Base 1994-1998 Annual Ave | New Base 2004-2008 Annual Ave | Change Old to New | %age Change Old to New |
| Bolton | 36 | 20 | -16 | -44.9% |
| Bury | 15 | 10 | -5.2 | -34.2% |
| Manchester | 71 | 36 | -35 | -49.2% |
| Oldham | 29 | 21 | -8 | -28.0% |
| Rochdale | 28 | 14 | -14.2 | -51.1% |
| Salford | 25 | 12 | -12.2 | -49.6% |
| Stockport | 16 | 10 | -5.8 | -37.2% |
| Tameside | 31 | 18 | -13 | -41.9% |
| Trafford | 18 | 10 | -8 | -45.5% |
| Wigan | 37 | 20 | -16.4 | -44.6% |
| Greater Manchester | 304 | 170 | -133.8 | -44.0% |

| District | Old Base 1994-1998 Annual Ave | New Base 2004-2008 Annual Ave | Change Old to New | %age Change Old to New |
|--------------------|--|--|-------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Bolton | 326 | 195 | -131.4 | -40.3% |
| Bury | 171 | 111 | -60.2 | -35.1% |
| Manchester | 542 | 331 | -211.4 | -39.0% |
| Oldham | 276 | 169 | -106.8 | -38.8% |
| Rochdale | 253 | 139 | -114.2 | -45.1% |
| Salford | 278 | 127 | -150.6 | -54.2% |
| Stockport | 223 | 113 | -110.6 | -49.5% |
| Tameside | 220 | 121 | -99.4 | -45.1% |
| Trafford | 171 | 86 | -85.2 | -49.7% |
| Wigan | 341 | 166 | -175 | -51.3% |
| Greater Manchester | 2803 | 1558 | -1244.8 | -44.4% |

| Casualty Type | <i>KSI Casualties</i> | | | |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------|
| | Old Base 1994-1998 Annual Ave | New Base 2004-2008 Annual Ave | Change Old to New | %age Change Old to New |
| All Casualties | 1281 | 966 | -315.4 | -24.6% |
| Child Casualties | 304 | 170 | -133.8 | -44.0% |
| Under 17 Years of Age | 371 | 236 | -134.8 | -36.4% |
| 17 to 25 Years of Age | 270 | 271 | 0.8 | 0.3% |
| Older People (60+) | 207 | 116 | -91 | -43.9% |
| Pedestrian | 587 | 382 | -205 | -34.9% |
| Pedal Cyclists | 108 | 86 | -21.8 | -20.2% |
| Bus Passenger | 19 | 7 | -12.8 | -66.0% |
| Pupils on School Journey | 51 | 23 | -27.8 | -54.9% |
| All TWPV Riders or Pillion | 127 | 176 | 49 | 38.5% |
| TWPV under 50cc Riders or Pillion | 5 | 19 | 14.4 | 300.0% |
| TWPV 50cc and above Riders or Pillion | 119 | 150 | 30.8 | 25.9% |
| Motorway | 56 | 55 | -1 | -1.8% |
| A Roads | 810 | 601 | -209.2 | -25.8% |
| B Roads | 175 | 136 | -39 | -22.3% |
| C & U Roads | 457 | 338 | -119 | -26.1% |
| Roundabout Junction | 34 | 29 | -4.4 | -13.1% |
| ATS Controlled Junction | 246 | 198 | -48.2 | -19.6% |
| Stop Sign Controlled Junction | 15 | 4 | -10.2 | -69.9% |
| Give Way Sign Controlled Junction | 857 | 621 | -236.6 | -27.6% |
| Roadworks | 23 | 14 | -9.6 | -41.4% |

| Table K Comparison of Greater Manchester Casualties Baselines by type | | | | |
|---|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------|
| Casualty Type | All Casualties | | | |
| | Old Base 1994-1998 Annual Ave | New Base 2004-2008 Annual Ave | Change Old to New | %age Change Old to New |
| All Casualties | 16708 | 11745 | -4962.4 | -29.7% |
| Child Casualties | 2803 | 1558 | -1244.8 | -44.4% |
| Under 17 Years of Age | 3512 | 2124 | -1387.2 | -39.5% |
| 17 to 25 Years of Age | 4309 | 3079 | -1229.6 | -28.5% |
| Older People (60+) | 1396 | 1013 | -382.6 | -27.4% |
| Pedestrian | 2939 | 1940 | -998.4 | -34.0% |
| Pedal Cyclists | 1188 | 773 | -415.2 | -34.9% |
| Bus Passenger | 485 | 349 | -135.8 | -28.0% |
| Pupils on School Journey | 510 | 223 | -286.8 | -56.3% |
| All TWPV Riders or Pillion | 581 | 695 | 113.8 | 19.6% |
| TWPV under 50cc Riders or Pillion | 40 | 109 | 68.8 | 172.9% |
| TWPV 50cc and above Riders or Pillion | 525 | 538 | 13.2 | 2.5% |
| Motorway | 942 | 920 | -21.2 | -2.3% |
| A Roads | 7931 | 5544 | -2387.2 | -30.1% |
| B Roads | 2201 | 1438 | -762.8 | -34.7% |
| C & U Roads | 5634 | 3843 | -1791.2 | -31.8% |
| Roundabout Junction | 912 | 687 | -225 | -24.7% |
| ATS Controlled Junction | 3107 | 2465 | -641.2 | -20.6% |
| Stop Sign Controlled Junction | 199 | 113 | -86.2 | -43.3% |
| Give Way Sign Controlled Junction | 9387 | 6200 | -3186.8 | -33.9% |
| Roadworks | 300 | 154 | -145.6 | -48.5% |

| Table L Comparison of Greater Manchester Accidents Baselines by type | | | | |
|--|--|--|-------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Accident involving | KSI Accidents | | | |
| | Old Base 1994-1998 Annual Ave | New Base 2004-2008 Annual Ave | Change Old to New | %age Change Old to New |
| Goods Vehicles under 3.5t | 69 | 38 | -31.8 | -45.8% |
| Goods Vehicles over 3.5t | 62 | 40 | -22.2 | -35.8% |
| Bus stopping or moving off | 3 | 2 | -1.2 | -35.3% |
| Cars turning right | 136 | 129 | -7 | -5.1% |
| Cars overtaking on offside | 68 | 27 | -41 | -60.3% |
| Cars overtaking on nearside | 7 | 5 | -2.2 | -32.4% |
| Cycles overtaking on nearside | 2 | 1 | -0.2 | -12.5% |
| U-Turn | 9 | 11 | 1.6 | 17.8% |
| Positive or Refused to provide Breath Test | 47 | 50 | 3 | 6.3% |
| Dark with Streetlights unlit | 7 | 2 | -5 | -67.6% |

| Table M Comparison of Greater Manchester Accidents Baselines by type | | | | |
|--|--|--|-------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Accident Involving | All Accidents | | | |
| | Old Base 1994-1998 Annual Ave | New Base 2004-2008 Annual Ave | Change Old to New | %age Change Old to New |
| Goods Vehicles < 3.5t | 863 | 366 | -497.4 | -57.6% |
| Goods Vehicles > 3.5t | 586 | 386 | -200 | -34.1% |
| Bus stopping or moving off | 58 | 43 | -15 | -25.7% |
| Cars turning right | 2091 | 1471 | -620.2 | -29.7% |
| Cars overtaking on offside | 539 | 210 | -328.2 | -60.9% |
| Cars overtaking on nearside | 105 | 66 | -39 | -37.3% |
| Cycles overtaking on nearside | 25 | 13 | -12.4 | -49.2% |
| U-Turn | 116 | 110 | -5.8 | -5.0% |
| Positive or Refused to provide Breath Test | 313 | 278 | -34.4 | -11.0% |
| Dark with Streetlights unlit | 48 | 20 | -27.8 | -57.9% |