

IS PEACE POSSIBLE?

israeli opinions borders settlements arab league plan palestine jerusalem importance of issues dixon plan refugees main problems

A report on a comprehensive survey of attitudes among Israeli Jews, Israeli Arabs, Palestinians in the Occupied Lands, Refugees in Lebanon, Refugees in Jordan, and Jewish Americans

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During the month of September, 2012, we conducted an extensive survey of public opinion among: Israeli Jews and Arabs; Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem; Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan; and the American Jewish community. The polls were conducted exclusively for the Sir Bani Yas Forum. Overall we surveyed: 1,061 Israeli Jews; 414 Israeli Arabs; 1,264 Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem; 497 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon; 489 Palestinian refugees in Jordan; and 500 Jewish Americans. We asked all groups the same questions in order to measure and compare their attitudes toward the problems and the prospects of reaching an Israeli-Palestinian peace accord.

A surface review of the results establishes the enormous challenges confronting peace-making efforts. Wide gaps separate Israeli Jewish and Palestinian opinion making it appear that, at present, no easy agreement can be reached on issues as fundamental as: the location of borders, the disposition of Israeli settlements and settlers, the resolution of the refugee issue, and the status of Jerusalem.

Israelis and Palestinians hold widely divergent views on most of these issues. For example, while one-half of Israeli Jews claim that it is their right to build settlements wherever they please, three-quarters of all Palestinians say that all of the construction in the occupied lands is illegal and they maintain that settlements should be evacuated.

Similar difficulties exist with regard to the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and villages, with majorities of Palestinians supporting that right and two-thirds of Israelis strongly opposed. An even greater gap in attitudes exists with regard to the proposition that Jerusalem is the “undivided capital of Israel.”

DEMOGRAPHICS DESCRIBED

In addition to the “top-line” findings in our report, the survey revealed several important demographic realities unique to each subgroup covered in the survey.

- 1. Israeli Jews** are deeply divided, not so much by party, but by demographics. Israelis who self-describe as secular (60% of the population) hold dramatically different views from their compatriots who are Orthodox or self-describe as “traditional or nationalist” (37% of the population). Secular Israelis are more willing to take risks for peace and to acknowledge Palestinian rights. Orthodox Israelis are not so inclined. Similarly, settlers who live beyond the Green Line in the West Bank and East Jerusalem have more hardline views than Jews living in Israel.
- 2. Palestinians from the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem**, interestingly, do not display these internal differences and this, itself, is important to note. In reviewing the responses to question after question, we find virtually no differences between young and old, university educated and those who have not received higher education, religious versus secular, men and women, etc. There are only slight variations in the attitudes of those who live in Gaza, the West Bank, or East Jerusalem. And on very few questions there are some very minor differences between those who are refugees and those who are not. Most importantly, we do not see differences on almost all issues between those who say they are supporters of Fatah and those who support Hamas. This is significant to note because unlike in Israel where the differences in attitudes of the political parties are driven by the demographic groups who form the base of each party, it appears the demographic and attitudinal make-up of the major Palestinian parties are virtually the same.

There is one final and troubling observation that must be made about the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza. What comes through in the polling data is that about one-third of these Palestinians appear to have lost faith in the peace process, and have become profoundly cynical and quite negative. In question after question this group makes it clear they no longer believe in promises, trust Israelis, or believe that any resolution is possible. It may be possible to get one more chance to move this group, but it would be wise to use that chance carefully.

- 3. Israeli Arabs** are often overlooked in discussions of peacemaking, but our polling indicates that this may be a mistake, since the size of the Israeli Arab community and their attitudes indicate that they could play a consequential role.

When asked to rate the importance of the opinions of various parties to the conflict, Israeli Jews and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza each overvalue their own importance and undervalue the importance of the “other side.” But both groups surprisingly agree that the opinions of Israeli Arabs are the second most important to be considered in any discussion of Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. And yet Israeli Arabs, who are 20% of Israel’s population, are almost never brought into the conversation by any side—and while hardline Israelis reject any role for this community, it is clear from our polling that other Israelis do not.

A review of Israeli Arab attitudes establishes that they are more moderate and more forward-looking on most issues than either Israeli Jews or Palestinians from the occupied lands. They are more open to a solution that says Jerusalem is the capital for both the Israelis and Palestinians. They are more willing to take risks for peace and more supportive of the Arab Peace Initiative and the Clinton Plan than any other group.

More than 40 years ago, Palestinian novelist Ghassan Kanafani stated that in his opinion the Arabs in Israel were the most interesting and politically advanced portion of the Palestinian community. Someday, he said, they will lead the way. From a review of the data, he may be right.

4. Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon and Jordan have also been sidelined in discussions about Israeli-Palestinian peace. Israelis refuse to accept them as a legitimate part of the Palestinian constituency, and after the PLO was forced out of Jordan and Lebanon and then relocated in Ramallah following Oslo, the refugees have been “out of sight, out of mind.”

Yet, as the survey demonstrates, the role of the refugees remains critical to a final peace arrangement. What comes through so clearly is how important the issue of “the right of return” of the refugees is to Israeli Arabs and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. The refugees may be ignored in peace talks, but they are not forgotten by ordinary Palestinians.

It is also important that Palestinian refugees be invested in the discussion so that they will be invested in the outcome. It would be a tragic mistake to assume that an agreement can be reached without them or at their expense, or that the Israeli-Palestinian issue is just, as the Israelis have insisted for decades, a West Bank and Gaza issue.

What the data makes clear is that despite the hardships the refugees have endured and despite not being directly involved in the peace talks, their thinking has evolved. They still cling to their rights and still desire to return home. But when confronted with the possibility that they may not be able to return and when given concrete options for the future, they are open to picking from among these options.

The bottom line is that better than ignoring the refugees or presenting them with a *fait accompli* it would be important to work with this community early in the process to get their ideas and get them invested in the proposed solution.

5. American Jews – Although not a direct party to the conflict, lobbies claiming to speak on behalf of American Jews play a critical role in Washington decision-making and so an examination of their attitudes is useful. Several observations can be made:

- a. On most issues American Jews are less hardline than Israeli Jews. They are, for example, more willing to see Jerusalem as the capital of two states, more willing to recognize the rights of Palestinian refugees, and less inclined to support settlement construction in the West Bank.
- b. They are not a monolith. In general, when American Jews think of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: 28% say that they “support whatever policies are advocated by the Israeli government”; 42% say that they “have their own views of what the Israeli government should do and support policies that agree with their own beliefs”; and 29% say that they “do not believe my views should play a role.” When asked to identify which organization they most support: only 23% say the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC); 33% identify with American Jewish groups that side with Israel’s peace camp; and 32% say that “this is not a matter of great concern to me.”
- c. This leads to a division in how American Jews see their role in U.S. politics. They are evenly divided over whether the U.S. government should side with Israel or steer a “middle course” between Israel and Palestine. And if the U.S. government were to pressure Israel to freeze settlement construction: 36% would support such a move, 28% would be neutral, and 32% would oppose it.

American Jews are not a single-issue constituency. They say that in an election for public office if they agreed with a candidate on most issues but disagreed with that candidate’s views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 49% would still vote for that candidate while only 33% would not.

WHAT WE LEARN

1. A Cautionary Note

As with any poll measuring opinion on a controversial topic, the data can be picked over and used in any number of ways. Opponents of peace-making on the Israeli side can point to the fact that only 25% of Palestinians are willing to “take risks for peace” or that 35% of Palestinians in the occupied lands see settlements as a serious impediment to peace. Likewise Palestinians can point to the 41% of Israelis who say that they are opposed to a “Palestinian state that is independent, sovereign, and contiguous” or the 47% of Israelis who insist that it is the right of Israel to “build anywhere it pleases in the land it currently holds.”

Looking at the responses to individual questions can provide “grist for the mill” of opponents of peace. But playing “gotcha” politics would be a misuse of the findings. To observe that there are deep divisions between the two sides – or that many Palestinians have lost hope and become cynical, while many Israelis have hardened their views—is simply to note the obvious. What is required is to probe more deeply into the findings. As the data shows, there are many areas where some common ground can be found or, at least, where impediments to consensus can be identified, providing ideas that can advance peacemaking efforts.

2. Two States: Still the Only Viable Option

The first and most telling point of consensus is that a two-state solution remains the only viable option that is acceptable, albeit with differences, to both sides.

The one-state solution is rejected by all parties, including Palestinian refugees. Other options like absorbing Palestinians into Israel where they

would have autonomy but not equal rights (which some would argue would be the outcome of the current path being pursued by Israel) is rejected not only by Palestinians, but by a substantial majority of Israelis. All parties also reject a Palestinian confederation with Jordan.

Israeli Arabs are the most supportive of the 1967 borders being used to define the boundaries between Israel and a future Palestinian state. A plurality of Palestinians in the occupied territories and refugees in Jordan also support the 1967 lines. Refugees in Lebanon say they reject this option. But when refugees in Lebanon and Jordan are asked to rate how important it is to them to see a Palestinian state located in “all of the West Bank and Gaza,” with a capital in Jerusalem, 97% of refugees in Jordan say it is important as do 77% of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.

The border Israelis least oppose is “the current location of the separation barrier”; it is opposed by 28% which is 14 points lower than any other option proposed. What is not clear, however, is whether it is the matter of the “barrier” itself, or the barrier’s “current route” that drives this response. If it is the security provided by the barrier, and not its route, then it should be possible to move this barrier making it more accommodating to Palestinian needs.

What is clear is that Israelis and Palestinians want separation. Israelis want security and Palestinians want independence and sovereignty. The polling data also shows that both sides agree with the notion that security arrangements that provide guarantees for both are important. Somewhat surprisingly, Israelis and Palestinians both agree that the future Palestinian state should have control of its borders so it can freely trade with other countries.

The task left for peacemakers will be to further test the possible combinations of borders, swaps, and the role of a security barrier or other forms of security arrangements that create the right mix for all sides.

3. Trust Is an Issue

After four and a half decades of occupation, including two decades of a failed Oslo peace process marred by dramatic settlement expansion and devastating violence, both Israelis and Palestinians have been shaken. Mutual trust has been broken.

This becomes especially clear when both sides are asked what issues are most important to them and what behavior they each want to see from the other side. What both ask for are signs of trust. For example, what Israelis most want is for Palestinians to recognize Israel as a “Jewish state” and what Palestinians most want is for Israel to recognize the rights of Palestinian refugees. Said another way, when asked what they identified as the biggest obstacle to making peace, both agreed that it was their “lack of trust in the intentions of the other side” and “the refusal of the other side to accept our right to self-determination.”

When asked what behaviors from the other side would make them believe that peace was more likely, Israelis responded with “renouncing violence” and “recognizing Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people.” What the Palestinians most wanted to see was Israel recognizing Palestinian self-determination and the right to an independent state, ending the siege of Gaza, and stopping settlement activity on the West Bank.

What is important to note, however, is that what the polling data shows in every instance is what the Palestinians most want from Israelis, the Israelis are least willing to give, and what the Israelis most want from the Palestinians, the Palestinians are least willing to give at the present time. This, however, should not be the end of the story. These “trust issues” can

be separated into behavioral matters (e.g., “renouncing violence and controlling violent elements” or “removing roadblocks, the blockade of Gaza, etc.”) and existential concerns (e.g., “recognizing Israel as a Jewish state” or “acknowledging responsibility for the refugee problem”). The behavioral issues can and should be addressed first. But since the existential concerns may create hurdles too high to climb at the beginning of the process, it might be advisable to put off addressing them until a later stage.

4. The Whole is More Acceptable than the Parts

Taken individually, attitudes are far apart and rigid. But when options are presented, “trade-offs” offered or issues paired, both Israelis and Palestinians display greater flexibility. For example, our survey finds that only 26% of Israeli Jews feel that it is possible that any Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement can be reached in the next five years. But should the “Palestinian leadership unify their ranks, renounce violence, and pledge to suppress elements that use violent means,” the percentage of Israelis who see peace as “more likely” doubles. Similarly, the numbers of Palestinians who see peace as more likely would increase significantly should Israel “freeze settlement construction and indicate a willingness to move a large number of settlers from the West Bank” or “remove roadblocks, the blockade of Gaza, and other restrictions to the travel and commerce.”

While most Palestinians accept the framework of the Arab Peace Initiative (API) offered by the Arab League, most Israelis reject it. When asked whether they support or oppose each individual part of the API, the Israelis register their opposition. But when all the pieces are put together and coupled with the Arab League’s commitment to normalize relations with Israel, Israeli opposition drops dramatically and support rises. Forty nine percent of Israeli Jews supported and only fifteen percent strongly opposed this proposition: “In exchange for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied

territories, the establishment of a Palestinian state, and an agreed solution to the refugee problem, the Arab states will consider the Arab-Israeli conflict over and will sign a comprehensive peace agreement and establish normal relations with the state of Israel.”

Much of the same may be true with regard to the other sensitive “final status” issues. For example, a majority of Israeli Jews and Arabs support the Clinton Plan approach to settlements: “A sovereign, viable Palestinian state coexisting with a secure state of Israel; Palestinians will have sovereignty over Gaza and a vast majority of the West Bank; settlement blocs in the West Bank will be incorporated into Israel with land swaps to compensate for such annexation.”

The same formula is rejected by Palestinians in the occupied lands and by an even greater number of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan.

When, however, the same issue is reframed to say “Several settlement blocs will be annexed by Israel; those that are not will be dismantled and settlers relocated either into the annexed blocs or within Israel” (even without a mention of “land swaps”), Palestinian opposition drops significantly.

Our findings demonstrate a remarkable flexibility on the part of Palestinian refugees as they work through the painful compromises dealing with the existential issue of their “right to return.” Israeli Jews, on the other hand, appear to demonstrate little interest in making any accommodation in this matter. They reject acknowledging any responsibility for the refugee issue and also deny any “right to return” for the refugee population. Israelis, however, do want the normalization provided by the Arab Peace Initiative—understanding that this includes the condition of “an agreed solution to the refugee issue.” This may provide an incentive easing the way to some accommodation.

Jerusalem is another difficult knot to untie, with no party (other than Israeli Arabs) indicating flexibility. Israelis want the city to remain “the undivided capital of Israel,” a position overwhelmingly rejected by all Palestinians. It is interesting to note that Israelis maintain this position despite strong majorities acknowledging that they see as unimportant or do not even know the location of Arab areas that are included in the Israeli annexed “greater Jerusalem.” For their part, the Palestinians reject not only Jerusalem as the undivided capital of Israel, but also its division into East and West and the Clinton formula for Jerusalem. What has not been tried is an approach that sees Jerusalem as an undivided city with two capitals. This idea would most likely be met with resistance, although our data suggests that this option may face somewhat less opposition than most other proposed solutions for Jerusalem.

The data clearly points to the difficulty in attempting to find separate solutions to each piece of the puzzle. But the Palestinian and Israeli Jewish responses to the Arab Peace Initiative and the Israeli acceptance of some of the Clinton parameters establish that a comprehensive vision that presents not only the compromise needed for a solution, but also makes clear the trade-offs and benefits and provides international backing may be the only way to proceed. Such a comprehensive approach must include a vision of the future so compelling that people are drawn to it, especially when it is contrasted with a portrait of what the future would look like if nothing is done. It will not be easy and as our data demonstrates between 15% and 30% will most likely oppose any proposal, either out of fear, lack of trust, ideology or cynicism. But with both a unified Palestinian leadership and an Israeli leadership committed to peace, and an international leadership not only presenting a comprehensive plan, but also willing to work to sell it, peace may be possible.

—Dr. James Zogby

whose opinions matter most

Using a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning very important and 5 meaning not important at all, please tell me how important the opinions of each of the following should be when it comes to addressing the issue of Israeli-Palestinian peace.

| | | Important | Not Important |
|--|---------------------|-----------|---------------|
| How important are the opinions of Israeli Jews? | Israeli Jews | 95 | 1 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 77 | 14 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 57 | 31 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 46 | 46 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 57 | 34 |
| | Jewish Americans | 81 | 10 |
| How important are the opinions of Israeli Arabs? | Israeli Jews | 68 | 15 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 69 | 15 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 67 | 18 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 55 | 31 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 59 | 31 |
| | Jewish Americans | 65 | 16 |
| How important are the opinions of Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza? | Israeli Jews | 59 | 24 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 89 | 7 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 83 | 7 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 75 | 13 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 96 | 2 |
| | Jewish Americans | 54 | 25 |
| How important are the opinions of Palestinian Refugees? | Israeli Jews | 32 | 43 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 71 | 21 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 83 | 7 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 78 | 12 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 95 | 3 |
| | Jewish Americans | 42 | 29 |

| | | Important | Not Important |
|--|---------------------|-----------|---------------|
| How important are the opinions of U.S. Government? | Israeli Jews | 58 | 17 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 64 | 28 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 44 | 39 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 47 | 44 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 60 | 27 |
| | Jewish Americans | 56 | 18 |
| How important are the opinions of Arab League? | Israeli Jews | 30 | 44 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 44 | 39 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 49 | 29 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 49 | 40 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 63 | 20 |
| | Jewish Americans | 30 | 43 |
| How important are the opinions of American Jewish community? | Israeli Jews | 45 | 21 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 19 | 70 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 28 | 56 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | - | - |
| | Refugees in Jordan | - | - |
| | Jewish Americans | 58 | 20 |

*Respondents were asked to rate the importance on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is "very important" and 5 is "not important at all." "Important" here is the aggregation of "1" and "2" responses, while "not important" is the aggregation of "4" and "5" responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded and the percentage responding "3" has not been included.

whose opinions matter most

Negotiations are not seen by any of the parties as a “two-way street.” When asked about how they rate the importance of various groups’ opinions when it comes to addressing the issue of Israeli-Palestinian peace, each side overvalues the importance of its own opinion and undervalues the importance of the other side. For example, Israeli Jews rate their own opinions 36 points higher than the opinions of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. In fact, they see Palestinian opinions only as important as those of the U.S. government. Further, Israeli Jews see little importance in including the voices of Palestinian refugees (32%), judging the opinions of American Jews as more important (45%).

Among Israeli Jews there is significant variation in their views based on age and religious affiliation, with those under age 25 and those identifying as Orthodox being far more likely to undervalue the opinions of Palestinians. For example, two-thirds of Orthodox Israeli Jews say that the opinions of Palestinian refugees are not important in addressing the issue of Israeli-Palestinian peace. But, Israeli Jews over age 36 are more likely to see the opinions of Israeli Arabs (73%) and Palestinians (63%) as important. The same is true of Israeli Jews that identify themselves as secular, with 76% seeing the opinions of Israeli Arabs as important and 67% seeing the opinions of Palestinians as important. These demographic groups are divided on issues throughout the survey, with younger respondents and those identifying as Orthodox being less inclined toward compromise or taking risks for peace.

Israeli Jews by Subgroup

| | | Important | Not Important |
|--|----------|-----------|---------------|
| How important are the opinions of Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza? | Under 25 | 49 | 46 |
| | Over 36 | 63 | 20 |
| | Secular | 67 | 17 |
| | Orthodox | 40 | 42 |
| How important are the opinions of Palestinian refugees? | Under 25 | 30 | 49 |
| | Over 36 | 34 | 38 |
| | Secular | 38 | 34 |
| | Orthodox | 16 | 66 |

continued... (8)

| | Important | Not Important | |
|--|-----------|---------------|----|
| How important are the opinions of Israeli Arabs? | Under 25 | 56 | 28 |
| | Over 36 | 73 | 11 |
| | Secular | 76 | 9 |
| | Orthodox | 47 | 31 |

Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza rate the importance of their opinions 26 points higher than the opinions of Israeli Jews (57%). Palestinians judge Israeli Jewish opinion at the same level of importance as Israeli Jews rate Palestinian opinions (59%). But note that about two-thirds of both Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza and Israeli Jews rate the opinions of Israeli Arabs as second in importance, right after themselves (Israeli Jews, 68%; Palestinians, 67%). Further, while Israeli Jews seriously undervalue the importance of the opinions of refugees, the opinions of these Palestinians are extremely important to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza (83%) and to Israeli Arabs (71%). The passage of time has not erased the bond.

A majority of Israelis, both Arabs (64%) and Jews (58%), as well as a majority of refugees in Jordan (60%) consider the opinions of the U.S. government to be important. The opinions of the Arab League, however, are considered far less important by all groups. Only refugees in Jordan rate the Arab League important on the issue of Israeli-Palestinian peace. Among all Palestinian groups surveyed, the opinions of the Arab League are considered equal in importance to the opinion of the U.S. government.

The opinions of the American Jewish community are considered important by 45% of Israeli Jews, but by just 28% of Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza. Although Israeli Arabs rate the importance of the opinions of Israeli Jews more highly than their own opinions (77% vs. 69%), they overwhelmingly dismiss the importance of American Jewish opinion with just 19% saying this community’s opinions are important and 70% saying they are not important.

importance of issues

The following elements are all discussed as a part of an Israeli-Palestinian peace. Using a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning you are completely opposed, 5 meaning you are in full support, and 3 meaning you are neutral, please tell me how much you support each of the following elements in the peace negotiations.

| | | Support | Neutral | Opposed |
|--|---------------------|---------|---------|---------|
| For there to be peace, the Palestinian state must be independent, sovereign, and contiguous. | Israeli Jews | 36 | 23 | 41 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 89 | 3 | 8 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 84 | 9 | 6 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 60 | 24 | 17 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 81 | 4 | 15 |
| | Jewish Americans | 31 | 36 | 28 |
| For there to be peace, Israel must be recognized by the Palestinians as a Jewish state. | Israeli Jews | 89 | 7 | 4 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 36 | 15 | 48 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 20 | 24 | 56 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 4 | 6 | 89 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 34 | 8 | 58 |
| | Jewish Americans | 73 | 9 | 17 |
| For there to be peace, both Israelis and Palestinians must agree that Jerusalem will be the capital of the two states. | Israeli Jews | 32 | 15 | 54 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 71 | 13 | 17 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 25 | 22 | 54 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 8 | 7 | 85 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 13 | 11 | 76 |
| | Jewish Americans | 43 | 27 | 27 |
| For there to be peace, the rights of the Palestinian refugees must be recognized. | Israeli Jews | 19 | 23 | 57 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 91 | 5 | 4 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 82 | 10 | 8 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 61 | 22 | 18 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 71 | 6 | 23 |
| | Jewish Americans | 36 | 29 | 29 |

| | | Support | Neutral | Opposed |
|--|---------------------|---------|---------|---------|
| For there to be peace, the agreement must be accepted and supported by the Arab League. | Israeli Jews | 24 | 31 | 45 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 50 | 18 | 32 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 54 | 25 | 21 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 39 | 27 | 34 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 33 | 37 | 29 |
| | Jewish Americans | 46 | 23 | 27 |
| For there to be peace, the Palestinian state must be demilitarized. | Israeli Jews | 62 | 21 | 18 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 12 | 16 | 72 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 12 | 17 | 71 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 3 | 4 | 93 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 24 | 4 | 72 |
| | Jewish Americans | 48 | 29 | 17 |
| For there to be peace, the Palestinians must be in control of their borders so that they are able to trade with the outside world. | Israeli Jews | 62 | 21 | 17 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 91 | 3 | 6 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 73 | 13 | 14 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 58 | 26 | 17 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 70 | 4 | 26 |
| | Jewish Americans | 48 | 27 | 22 |
| For there to be peace, there must be an international peacekeeping presence in the Palestinian state that provides security guarantees to both Israel and Palestine. | Israeli Jews | 66 | 21 | 14 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 35 | 26 | 39 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 36 | 24 | 40 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | - | - | - |
| | Refugees in Jordan | - | - | - |
| | Jewish Americans | - | - | - |

*Respondents were asked to rate their support on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is "completely opposed," 3 is "neutral," and 5 is "in full support." "Support" here is the aggregation of "5" and "4" responses, "neutral" are the "3" responses, and "opposed" is the aggregation of "2" and "1" responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded.

Israeli Jews and Arabs, Palestinians within the occupied territories, and refugees in Lebanon and Jordan were asked about their support for a variety of possible elements in Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. The results indicate that respondents on both sides give greater weight to the importance of having their own rights recognized and less weight to the importance of recognizing the rights of the other side. For example, while 84% Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza support an independent, sovereign, and contiguous state of Palestine, only 36% of Israeli Jews support this idea. Conversely, 89% of Israeli Jews support the recognition of Israel as a Jewish state by Palestinians (their top concern), while just 20% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza support this.

While their strongest support lies with the recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, Israeli Jews are most opposed to recognition of the rights of Palestinian refugees (57% oppose) and recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of two states (54% oppose). On the other hand, for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, the top concerns include the recognition of the Palestinian right to an independent state (84% support) and recognition of the rights of Palestinian refugees (82% support). And these Palestinians' main opposition lies with a demilitarized Palestine (71% oppose), recognition of Israel as a Jewish state (56% oppose), and Jerusalem as the capital of two states (54% oppose).

The gaps between Israeli Jews and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are clear. The main points that divide Israeli Jews and these Palestinians are recognition of Israel as a Jewish state (support: Israeli Jews, 89%, vs. Palestinians, 20%), the rights of refugees (support: Israeli Jews, 19%, vs. Palestinians, 82%), and a demilitarized Palestinian state (support: Israeli Jews, 62%, vs. Palestinians, 12%). Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are even more opposed to recognizing Israel as a Jewish state (4% support, 89% oppose) and to a demilitarized Palestine (3% support, 93% oppose). Refugees in Jordan tend to have more moderate

responses, particularly those who are university-educated. For example, 64% of university-educated refugees in Jordan support Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state.

However, some areas of agreement also emerge between Israelis and West Bank and Gaza Palestinians. Both sides reject Jerusalem as the capital of two states (support/oppose: Israeli Jews, 32%/54%, vs. Palestinians, 25%/54%). Both sides support ensuring that the borders of a Palestinian state are open for trade (support: Israeli Jews, 62%, vs. Palestinians, 72%).

Israeli Arabs are outliers on several issues. They express the strongest support of all groups surveyed for open Palestinian borders (91%), recognition of the rights of Palestinian refugees (91%), and an independent Palestinian state (89%). Among Arabs surveyed, they have the least opposition (and highest support) for recognizing Israel as a Jewish state (36% support, 48% oppose). And, most significantly, Israeli Arabs are the only group surveyed who support Jerusalem being the capital of two states (71%).

I am now going to read you two statements, please tell which of the two best represents your own view.

| | Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Pal. WB/Gaza | Refugees in Lebanon | Refugees in Jordan |
|--|--------------|---------------|--------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| Statement A. We should be willing to take risks and make sacrifices to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian peace. | 51 | 89 | 25 | 22 | 43 |
| Statement B. We should not have to give up any of our demands to achieve Israeli-Palestinian peace. | 49 | 11 | 75 | 78 | 57 |

| Israeli Jews | | |
|--------------------------------------|----|----|
| | A | B |
| Under 25 | 29 | 71 |
| Over 36 | 60 | 40 |
| Orthodox | 19 | 81 |
| Traditional/National/Other | 30 | 70 |
| Secular | 66 | 34 |
| Native Israelis | 47 | 53 |
| Veteran Immigrants | 68 | 32 |
| New Immigrants (post-1989) | 55 | 45 |
| East Jerusalem/outside of Green Line | 34 | 66 |
| Within Green Line | 55 | 45 |

| Palestinians in West Bank and Gaza | | |
|------------------------------------|----|----|
| | A | B |
| Under 25 | 26 | 74 |
| Over 36 | 24 | 76 |
| Fatah | 26 | 74 |
| Hamas | 25 | 75 |
| No University | 25 | 75 |
| University Educated | 27 | 74 |
| West Bank | 25 | 75 |
| Gaza | 24 | 76 |
| East Jerusalem | 32 | 68 |

Three-quarters of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza do not see why they should give up their demands to achieve Israeli-Palestinian peace. Israeli opinion, however, is evenly divided between not giving up their demands (49%) and seeing the need to take risks and make sacrifices for peace (51%). While Palestinian opinion is remarkably consistent regardless of age, education, political party, region, and other demographic factors, among Israelis, there is considerable variation based on age, religious affiliation, region, and immigration status. Those who are more likely to say that Israelis should not have to give up their demands to achieve peace include the Orthodox (81%), those under age 25 (71%), and those living in East Jerusalem or outside of the Green Line (66%). The groups more willing to take risks for peace include immigrants living in Israel since before 1989 (68%), secular Jews (66%), and those over age 36 (60%).

Israeli Arabs strongly believe that risks and sacrifice are necessary ingredients to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian peace (89%). Overall, a majority of Palestinian refugees in Jordan do not want to give up their demands for peace (57%); however, again, we see that among university-educated refugees in Jordan, 71% are willing to take risks and make sacrifices for peace. More than three-quarters of refugees in Lebanon (78%) say that they do not want to give up their demands to achieve peace.

Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded.

In your opinion, how likely is it that an agreement can be reached in the next five years to bring an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

| | Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Pal. WB/ Gaza | Refugees in Lebanon | Refugees in Jordan | Jewish Americans |
|-------------------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|---------------------|--------------------|------------------|
| Likely and Possible | 26 | 34 | 48 | 30 | 27 | 35 |
| Unlikely and Impossible | 70 | 49 | 46 | 58 | 68 | 61 |

| Israeli Jews | Likely & Possible | Unlikely & Impossible |
|--------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| Under 25 | 18 | 79 |
| 25-36 | 18 | 78 |
| Over 36 | 30 | 64 |
| Orthodox | 17 | 77 |
| Secular | 29 | 67 |
| Traditional/ National/Other | 23 | 74 |
| Native Israelis | 24 | 71 |
| Veteran Immigrants | 35 | 61 |
| New Immigrants (post 1989) | 28 | 68 |

| Palestinians in West Bank and Gaza | Likely & Possible | Unlikely & Impossible |
|------------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| Under 25 | 46 | 48 |
| 25-36 | 49 | 45 |
| Over 36 | 47 | 45 |
| Fatah | 51 | 44 |
| Hamas | 48 | 46 |
| No University | 48 | 45 |
| University Educated | 47 | 46 |
| West Bank | 50 | 44 |
| Gaza | 44 | 48 |
| East Jerusalem | 48 | 47 |

**Respondents were given the following options: "very likely," "possible," "unlikely," and "impossible." Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded and the percentage responding "don't know" has not been included.*

Israeli Jews, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan, and Israeli Arabs all view peace as unlikely in the next five years. Israeli Jews and refugees in Jordan show the greatest pessimism that an agreement can be reached in the next five years to bring an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (70% and 68%, respectively, saying peace is unlikely or impossible). Overall, 29% of Israeli Jews say it is impossible and 24% say it is possible that a peace agreement can be reached in the next five years. The most pessimistic views are held by Orthodox Jews (24% unlikely and 52% impossible) and younger respondents (under 25: 38% unlikely and 41% impossible; 25-36: 34% unlikely and 44% impossible). The most optimism is seen among veteran immigrants (35% say very likely or possible).

Palestinians in the occupied territories are the group most optimistic about the prospects for peace; though divided, they lean slightly towards peace being possible (48% say very likely or possible, while 46% say unlikely or impossible). Again, there is little or no variation among Palestinian demographic groups on this question; across age, political party affiliation, education, and region, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are almost evenly split between optimism and pessimism on the likelihood of peace in the next five years.

main problems

Using a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning it is not serious at all and 5 meaning it is very serious, please tell me how serious an obstacle to achieving an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement are each of the following.

| | | Serious | Neutral | Not Serious |
|---|---------------------|---------|---------|-------------|
| The willingness of the other side to make peace | Israeli Jews | 65 | 13 | 22 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 87 | 8 | 4 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 65 | 17 | 18 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 76 | 12 | 13 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 71 | 7 | 22 |
| | Jewish Americans | 75 | 10 | 13 |
| The willingness of my side to make peace | Israeli Jews | 49 | 23 | 28 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 89 | 7 | 5 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 74 | 15 | 12 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 78 | 10 | 12 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 74 | 6 | 20 |
| | Jewish Americans | 51 | 21 | 27 |
| The willingness of international leadership to assist in making peace | Israeli Jews | 32 | 39 | 29 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 79 | 16 | 5 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 63 | 21 | 16 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 79 | 10 | 11 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 66 | 9 | 26 |
| | Jewish Americans | 39 | 31 | 28 |
| Continued expansion of settlements | Israeli Jews | 41 | 23 | 37 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 87 | 4 | 8 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 46 | 19 | 35 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 80 | 10 | 10 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 63 | 6 | 31 |
| | Jewish Americans | 52 | 25 | 17 |

| | | Serious | Neutral | Not Serious |
|---|---------------------|---------|---------|-------------|
| The continued threat of violence from Palestinians | Israeli Jews | 79 | 12 | 8 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 64 | 18 | 17 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 43 | 26 | 32 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 57 | 21 | 23 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 42 | 8 | 50 |
| | Jewish Americans | 73 | 12 | 13 |
| The continued threat of violence from the Israeli military and settlers | Israeli Jews | 36 | 24 | 41 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 89 | 4 | 7 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 44 | 19 | 38 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 81 | 9 | 9 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 58 | 6 | 36 |
| | Jewish Americans | 41 | 22 | 32 |
| The hardship and polarization that result from the occupation | Israeli Jews | 42 | 25 | 33 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 85 | 8 | 7 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 43 | 22 | 35 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 77 | 13 | 10 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 63 | 11 | 26 |
| | Jewish Americans | 47 | 23 | 23 |
| Our lack of trust in the intentions of the other side | Israeli Jews | 71 | 16 | 13 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 72 | 19 | 10 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 46 | 22 | 31 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 79 | 17 | 3 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 62 | 15 | 24 |

continued...

main problems

| | | Serious | Neutral | Not Serious |
|--|---------------------|---------|---------|-------------|
| The compromises we are asked to make are too difficult | Israeli Jews | 63 | 22 | 15 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 79 | 15 | 6 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 49 | 21 | 30 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 91 | 5 | 4 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 64 | 12 | 24 |

| | | Serious | Neutral | Not Serious |
|---|---------------------|---------|---------|-------------|
| Refusal of the other side to accept our right to self-determination | Israeli Jews | 78 | 13 | 8 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 87 | 5 | 8 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 50 | 18 | 33 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 91 | 4 | 5 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 65 | 11 | 24 |
| | Jewish Americans | 50 | 29 | 14 |

**Respondents were asked rate the seriousness of each obstacle using a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is “not serious at all” and 5 is “very serious.” “Not serious” here is the aggregation of “1” and “2” responses, “neutral” are the “3” responses, and “serious” is the aggregation of “4” and “5” responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded.*

When asked to rate the seriousness of a number of obstacles to peace, all sides find fault in the other side’s willingness to make peace, with two-thirds or more of both Israeli Jews and all Palestinians saying this is a serious obstacle. Palestinians, whether from the West Bank and Gaza or refugees in Lebanon and Jordan, however, are more willing to fault themselves as well, with at least 74% “saying the willingness of my side to make peace” is a serious obstacle, compared to only 49% of Israeli Jews who see their own side’s reluctance as a problem. Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are more willing to equally find fault in the continued threat of violence from Palestinians (43% say it’s a serious obstacle) and the continued threat of violence from the Israel military and settlers (44% say it’s a serious obstacle).

Most serious to Israeli Jews are the continued threat of violence from Palestinians (79%) and “the refusal of the other side to accept our right to self-determination” (78%). Most serious to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are “the willingness of my side to make peace” (74%) and “the willingness of the other side to make peace” (65%). Both Israeli Jews and Palestinians in the occupied territories rate the following obstacles as equally problematic: settlement expansion (serious for 46% of Palestinians and 41% of Israelis); the hardships created by the occupation (serious for 43% of Palestinians and 42% of Israelis); and the lack of trust they have in each other (serious for 46% of Palestinians and 41% of Israelis).

Israeli Jews and Palestinian refugees are quite concerned with the refusal of the other side to accept their right to self-determination (serious for 78% of Israeli Jews, 65% of refugees in Jordan, and 91% of refugees in Lebanon) and with their belief that the compromises they are being asked to make are too difficult (serious for 63% of Israeli Jews, 64% of refugees in Jordan, and 91% of refugees in Lebanon). Palestinians in the territories are less concerned with both issues (self-determination: 40%; compromises: 49%).

Israeli Arabs and Palestinian refugees in Lebanon see all of the obstacles presented as serious barriers to reaching a peace agreement at higher levels than other groups. For refugees in Lebanon, the continued threat of violence from the Israeli military and settlers (81%) and the continued expansion of settlements (80%) are the most serious impediments to peace. Among Israeli Arabs, almost nine in ten respondents view the threat of Israeli violence and the willingness of both sides to make peace as serious problems. Settlement expansion (88%), and the Israeli refusal to accept Palestinian rights to self-determination (87%) are also significant concerns for Israeli Arabs. Finally, the most significant obstacles to peace for refugees in Jordan are the same as those for Palestinians in the occupied territories: willingness of their own side (74%) and the other side (71%) to make peace.

For each of the following scenarios, respondents were asked if the circumstances described would make them more or less likely to believe that a peace agreement could be reached, or if it could make no difference in their view.

| | | More likely | Less likely | No change in my view |
|---|---------------------|-------------|-------------|----------------------|
| If the Palestinian leadership were to unify their ranks and come forward willing to negotiate a two state solution based on the '67 borders with agreed land swaps and an end to the conflict, would that make you... | Israeli Jews | 46 | 37 | 17 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 60 | 24 | 16 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 46 | 39 | 16 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 61 | 21 | 18 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 52 | 23 | 25 |
| | Jewish Americans | 52 | 14 | 30 |
| If the Israeli leadership were to come forward willing to negotiate a two state solution based on the '67 borders with agreed land swaps and an end to the conflict, would that make you... | Israeli Jews | 44 | 38 | 18 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 58 | 29 | 13 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 51 | 34 | 15 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 49 | 30 | 21 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 57 | 18 | 25 |
| | Jewish Americans | 60 | 11 | 26 |
| If the US and European Union were to demonstrate a clear resolve to pursue Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and achieve a peace agreement in 5 years, would that make you... | Israeli Jews | 35 | 43 | 22 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 68 | 19 | 13 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 50 | 34 | 16 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 48 | 27 | 25 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 51 | 25 | 24 |
| | Jewish Americans | 50 | 7 | 42 |
| If the Palestinian leadership were to unify their ranks renounce violence and pledge to suppress elements that use violent means, would that make you... | Israeli Jews | 53 | 35 | 12 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 55 | 28 | 17 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 44 | 39 | 18 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 49 | 28 | 23 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 40 | 11 | 48 |
| | Jewish Americans | 67 | 5 | 25 |

| | | More likely | Less likely | No change in my view |
|--|---------------------|-------------|-------------|----------------------|
| If an Israeli government were to announce that it will freeze all settlement construction and indicate a willingness to remove a large number of settlers from the West Bank, would that make you... | Israeli Jews | 39 | 38 | 23 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 88 | 8 | 4 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 56 | 31 | 14 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 50 | 29 | 21 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 56 | 20 | 24 |
| | Jewish Americans | 49 | 10 | 38 |
| If an Israeli government were to remove road-blocks, the blockade of Gaza, and other restrictions to travel and commerce in the occupied territories, would that make you... | Israeli Jews | 25 | 47 | 29 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 78 | 13 | 9 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 56 | 31 | 13 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 52 | 27 | 21 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 60 | 16 | 24 |
| | Jewish Americans | 38 | 18 | 42 |
| If the Palestinian leadership were to unify their ranks and recognize Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people, would that make you... | Israeli Jews | 58 | 30 | 12 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 53 | 36 | 11 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 35 | 42 | 22 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 34 | 41 | 25 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 39 | 13 | 48 |
| | Jewish Americans | 80 | 3 | 16 |
| If an Israeli government were to recognize the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and their right to an independent state, would that make you... | Israeli Jews | 38 | 38 | 23 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 89 | 7 | 4 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 54 | 29 | 17 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 71 | 17 | 13 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 60 | 16 | 24 |
| | Jewish Americans | 54 | 10 | 34 |

* "More likely" is the aggregation of "much more likely" and "somewhat more likely" responses, and "less likely" is the aggregation of "somewhat less likely" and "much less likely" responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded and responses of "not sure" were not included.

Respondents were asked a series of “what if” statements to determine what might improve the prospect for peace. Israeli Jews and all groups of Palestinians would see peace as more likely should the other side come forward with a clear statement of an intention to accept the 1967 borders and land swaps. For Israelis, 46% believe peace would be more likely if the Palestinian leadership were to unify their ranks and come forward willing to negotiate a two state solution based on the 1967 borders with agreed land swaps and an end to the conflict (37% say less likely and 17% say it would make no difference). For Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, 51% believe peace would be more likely if the Israeli leadership were to come forward willing to negotiate a two state solution based on the 1967 borders with agreed land swaps and an end to the conflict (34% say less likely and 15% say it would make no difference). Among Palestinian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon, 57% and 49%, respectively, say that such a statement from Israel would make them believe that peace is more likely.

Israeli Jews are the group least open to U.S. and E.U. involvement, while all groups of Palestinians are more receptive to this idea.

All the scenarios presented move the needle in a positive direction for Palestinians—except for the option of the Palestinian leadership recognizing Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people, which receives low scores among all Palestinians. That scenario is, however, the “what if” that most moves the Israeli side in a positive direction (58% more likely, 30% less likely). In addition, a majority of Israeli Jews believe peace would be more likely if the Palestinian leadership unified and renounced violence (53%). And note that about one-third of Israeli Jews and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza see all options as less likely to bring about a peace agreement.

Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are moved in a positive direction by the Israeli government freezing settlement construction and expressing a willingness to remove a large number of settlers (56%); by lifting the Gaza siege and other travel and trade restrictions in the territories (56%); and by Israel recognizing the right of Palestinians to self-determination and an independent state (54%).

Attitudes among Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are even more moved by the idea of Israel accepting Palestinian self-determination (71% more likely to believe in a peace agreement being reached). Among refugees in Jordan, their belief in a peace agreement is most positively impacted by Israel lifting the Gaza siege (60%) and Israeli leadership saying they are willing to negotiate a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders and land swaps (57%).

Israeli Arabs are the group that is the most moved in a positive direction by all the “what if” scenarios. Most impactful for them are the acceptance of Palestinian self-determination by Israel (89%) and a settlement freeze (88%).

Unfortunately, the scenarios most negatively received by Israeli Jews are precisely those that Palestinians find most hopeful: lifting the siege on Gaza (only 25% of Israelis are more likely to believe in peace agreement); a settlement freeze (39%); and Israeli recognition of Palestinian self-determination (38%).

In 2000, then U.S. President Bill Clinton proposed the outlines for an agreement. It contained the following items:

- A sovereign, viable Palestinian state coexisting with a secure state of Israel. Palestinians will have sovereignty over Gaza and a vast majority of West Bank. Settlement blocs in the West Bank will be incorporated into Israel with land swaps to compensate for such annexation.
- A solution to the Palestinian refugee issue that provides them with compensation and gives them the choice to return to a new Palestinian state or relocate in third countries including Israel, subject to those states' agreement.
- A security solution that includes an international presence, a non-militarized Palestinian state and guarantees for Israel that do not come at the expense of Palestinian sovereignty or territorial integrity.
- A solution to Jerusalem under which it will be the capital of both Israel and Palestine and in which Arab neighborhoods will be Palestinian and Jewish neighborhoods will be Israeli. Palestinians will have sovereignty over the Haram al Sharif and Israelis sovereignty over the Western Wall.

Using a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning you are completely opposed, 5 meaning you are in full support, and 3 meaning you are neutral, please tell me how you feel about the Clinton Plan.

| | | Support | Neutral | Opposed |
|---|---------------------|---------|---------|---------|
| What is your opinion regarding a peace agreement based on this formula? | Israeli Jews | 35 | 25 | 40 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 57 | 18 | 24 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 33 | 25 | 42 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 10 | 29 | 61 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 12 | 14 | 75 |
| | Jewish Americans | 42 | 30 | 22 |

**Respondents were asked to rate their support on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is "completely opposed," 3 is "neutral," and 5 is "in full support." "Support" here is the aggregation of "5" and "4" responses, "neutral" are the "3" responses, and "opposed" is the aggregation of "2" and "1" responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded.*

Now using the same scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning you are completely opposed, 5 meaning you are in full support, and 3 meaning you are neutral, please tell me how much you support each of the following elements of the Clinton Plan.

| | | Support | Neutral | Opposed |
|---|--|--------------|---------|---------|
| A sovereign viable Palestinian state coexisting with a secure state of Israel; Palestinians will have sovereignty over Gaza and a vast majority of West Bank; settlement blocs in the West Bank will be incorporated into Israel with land swaps to compensate for such annexation. | Israeli Jews | 51 | 20 | 30 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 69 | 16 | 15 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 39 | 21 | 41 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 21 | 11 | 68 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 14 | 16 | 69 |
| | A solution to the Palestinian refugee issue that provides them with compensation and gives them the choice to return to a new Palestinian state or relocate in third countries including Israel, subject to those states' agreement. | Israeli Jews | 26 | 23 |
| Israeli Arabs | | 71 | 8 | 21 |
| Pal. WB/Gaza | | 37 | 22 | 41 |
| Refugees in Lebanon | | 29 | 8 | 63 |
| Refugees in Jordan | | 34 | 9 | 57 |

continued...

| | | Support | Neutral | Opposed |
|---|---------------------|---------|---------|---------|
| A security solution that includes an international presence, a non-militarized Palestinian state and guarantees for Israel that do not come at the expense of Palestinian sovereignty or territorial integrity. | Israeli Jews | 57 | 23 | 20 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 27 | 18 | 55 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 18 | 18 | 65 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 8 | 17 | 75 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 2 | 4 | 94 |
| A solution to Jerusalem under which it will be the capital of both Israel and Palestine and in which Arab neighborhoods will be Palestinian and Jewish neighborhoods will be Israeli. Palestinians will have sovereignty over the Haram al Sharif and Israelis sovereignty over the Western Wall. | Israeli Jews | 30 | 19 | 51 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 71 | 13 | 16 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 18 | 14 | 68 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 17 | 13 | 70 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 10 | 10 | 80 |

**Respondents* were asked to rate their support on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is “completely opposed,” 3 is “neutral,” and 5 is “in full support.” “Support” here is the aggregation of “5” and “4” responses, “neutral” are the “3” responses, and “opposed” is the aggregation of “2” and “1” responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded.*

The Clinton Plan is not overwhelmingly supported by any side. About one-third of Israeli Jews and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza support the Clinton Plan (35% and 33%, respectively), while 25% of each group are neutral and a plurality of each group (40% of Israelis and 42% of Palestinians) are opposed to the plan. Israeli Arabs have the strongest support for the Clinton Plan of any group surveyed with 57% saying they support the plan overall. Palestinian refugees are the least supportive with just 12% of those in Jordan and 10% of those in Lebanon supporting the plan, and sizable majorities in opposition (in Lebanon: 61% oppose; in Jordan: 75% oppose).

A majority of Israeli Jews approve of two aspects of the Clinton Plan: two coexisting states, with Gaza and the “vast majority” of the West Bank under

Palestinian control, some settlement blocs being incorporated into Israel and land swaps as compensation (51% support); and security based on an international presence, a non-militarized Palestine, and security guarantees for Israel (57% support).

Israeli Arabs are the most supportive of the Clinton Plan, with about seven in ten supporting three aspects of the plan: two states with land swaps (69%); refugee compensation and a choice of returning to a new Palestinian state or relocating to third countries including Israel (71%); and a divided Jerusalem as capital of two states (71%). The security plan, which Israeli Jews support with a solid majority, is strongly opposed by Israeli Arabs (27% support, 55% oppose).

Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are divided on two provisions of the Clinton Plan: the two-state solution with land swaps is supported by 39% and opposed by 41%; and the refugee plan allowing for compensation and return to Palestine or relocation elsewhere is supported by 37% and opposed by 41%. The other two aspects of the plan, the security solution and Jerusalem, are rejected by about two-thirds of these Palestinians (65% and 68%, respectively).

Palestinian refugees are even more strongly opposed to all provisions of the Clinton Plan. Their strongest opposition is to the security plan which calls for a non-militarized state and an international presence (75% in Lebanon and 94% in Jordan oppose) and the provision about Jerusalem (70% in Lebanon and 80% in Jordan oppose). About one-third of refugees support the proposed resolution to the refugee issue (29% in Lebanon and 34% in Jordan support), but majorities of refugees in both countries are opposed to this component of the plan (63% in Lebanon and 57% in Jordan oppose).

arab league plan

In 2002, the Arab League endorsed a peace plan, which they ratified again in 2007. It contained the following elements:

- A full Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories to the pre-June 1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian state in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem
- An agreed solution for the Palestinian refugee problem
- In exchange, the Arab states will consider the Arab-Israeli conflict over and will sign a comprehensive peace agreement and establish normal relations with the state of Israel

Using a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning you are completely opposed, 5 meaning you are in full support, and 3 meaning you are neutral, please tell me how you feel about the Arab League peace plan.

| | | Support | Neutral | Opposed |
|---|---------------------|---------|---------|---------|
| What is your opinion regarding a peace agreement based on this formula? | Israeli Jews | 22 | 25 | 53 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 74 | 12 | 15 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 61 | 20 | 20 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 10 | 39 | 51 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 56 | 14 | 30 |
| | Jewish Americans | 21 | 29 | 47 |
| A full Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories to the pre-June 1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian state in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem. | Israeli Jews | 17 | 18 | 65 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 77 | 16 | 8 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 71 | 14 | 16 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 28 | 12 | 60 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 46 | 10 | 44 |

| | | Support | Neutral | Opposed |
|---|---------------------|---------|---------|---------|
| An agreed solution for the Palestinian refugee problem. | Israeli Jews | 38 | 29 | 33 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 87 | 8 | 5 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 74 | 13 | 13 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 48 | 15 | 37 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 59 | 6 | 35 |
| In exchange for an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, the establishment of a Palestinian state, and an agreed solution to the refugee problem, the Arab states will consider the Arab-Israeli conflict over and will sign a comprehensive peace agreement and establish normal relations with the state of Israel. | Israeli Jews | 49 | 24 | 27 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 86 | 9 | 4 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 41 | 25 | 35 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 19 | 19 | 62 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 44 | 18 | 38 |

**Respondents were asked to rate their support on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is "completely opposed," 3 is "neutral," and 5 is "in full support." "Support" here is the aggregation of "5" and "4" responses, "neutral" are the "3" responses, and "opposed" is the aggregation of "2" and "1" responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded.*

Overall, the Arab Peace Initiative (API) offered by the Arab League is supported by 74% of Israeli Arabs, 61% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, and 56% of refugees in Jordan. It faces strong opposition, however, from Israeli Jews (22% support, 53% oppose) and refugees in Lebanon (10% support, 51% oppose).

When looking at the specifics of the plan, the vague formula of “an agreed solution to the Palestinian refugee problem” receives the strongest support from all groups. A full withdrawal to pre-1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian state in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem is strongly supported by Palestinians in the territories (71% support) and Israeli Arabs (77% support), but rejected by Israeli Jews (65% oppose) and Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (60% oppose). Normalization of Israeli-Arab relations in exchange for peace is generally agreed to by Israelis and Palestinians, except for refugees in Lebanon.

Israeli Arabs display strong support when asked about the individual pieces of the plan, with 87% supporting “an agreed solution for the Palestinian refugee problem,” 86% supporting a comprehensive peace agreement and normalized relations between Israel and the Arab states, and 77% supporting Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories to pre-1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian state in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem.

Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza express strong support for two of the three provisions: 74% support a resolution to the refugee problem and 71% support Israeli withdrawal and the creation of Palestine using '67 borders. However, Palestinians show less support for the provision related to a comprehensive peace agreement between Israel and the Arab states (41% support, 35% oppose).

Israeli Jews stand firmly in opposition to the basis of the API, a full Israeli withdrawal and establishment of Palestine in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem (17% support, 65% oppose). Opinion is mixed with regard to the refugee solution with 38% in support and 33% opposed. But when told that should all elements of the API be implemented that the Arab states will “normalize relations” with Israel, support increases and opposition significantly declines (49% support, 27% oppose).

Palestinian refugees in Jordan are divided when asked about the specific provisions of the API. Their strongest support is for the resolution of the refugee problem (59% support, 35% oppose). Opinion is closer to even with regard to a comprehensive peace between Israel and the Arab states (44% support, 38% oppose) and a Palestinian state drawn along '67 borders in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem (46% support, 44% oppose).

Among refugees in Lebanon, there is a plurality in support of only one provision: 48% support an agreed solution for the Palestinian refugee problem (with 37% opposing). Only 28% of refugees in Lebanon support the establishment of a Palestinian state in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem (with 60% in opposition). Finally, 19% support normalizing relations and a comprehensive peace between Israel and the Arab states (with 62% in opposition).

Using a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning very important and 5 meaning not important at all, when you think of Jerusalem how important do each of the following locations factor into your thoughts?

| | | Important | Not Important | Don't know of location |
|--------------------|---------------------|-----------|---------------|------------------------|
| Al-Haram Al-Sharif | Israeli Jews | 27 | 38 | 36 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 92 | 8 | 1 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 99 | 1 | 0 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 99 | 1 | 0 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 96 | 4 | 0 |
| | Jewish Americans | 44 | 26 | 30 |
| Temple Mount | Israeli Jews | 85 | 14 | 2 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 67 | 26 | 7 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 68 | 25 | 7 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 71 | 15 | 15 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 61 | 25 | 14 |
| | Jewish Americans | 78 | 11 | 11 |
| The Western Wall | Israeli Jews | 94 | 4 | 1 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 76 | 22 | 2 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 91 | 8 | 1 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 73 | 18 | 10 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 73 | 20 | 7 |
| | Jewish Americans | 93 | 4 | 3 |
| Ramot Alon | Israeli Jews | 52 | 21 | 26 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 38 | 34 | 29 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 30 | 43 | 27 |
| Ras Al'Amud | Israeli Jews | 33 | 43 | 25 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 73 | 24 | 2 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 95 | 4 | 2 |
| | Jewish Americans | 34 | 20 | 46 |

| | | Important | Not Important | Don't know of location |
|---------------|------------------|-----------|---------------|------------------------|
| Ma'ale Adumim | Israeli Jews | 75 | 21 | 4 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 35 | 39 | 26 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 37 | 42 | 21 |
| | Jewish Americans | 34 | 19 | 48 |
| Silwan | Israeli Jews | 38 | 47 | 15 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 70 | 29 | 1 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 87 | 8 | 4 |
| | Jewish Americans | 24 | 18 | 58 |

*Respondents were asked to rate the importance with the following options: "very important," "somewhat important," "not so important," and "not important at all," or "don't know of location." "Important" here is the aggregation of "very important" and "somewhat important" responses, while "not important" is the aggregation of "not so important" and "not important at all" responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded.

When asked about specific locations in Jerusalem, Israeli Jews are deeply concerned with the importance of the Western Wall and the Temple Mount; 94% and 85%, respectively, say these sites are important. These sites are also considered important by Palestinians, particularly the Western Wall which is considered important by 91% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, and about three-quarters of Israeli Arabs (76%) and Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (73%) and Jordan (73%). The Temple Mount is rated as important by about two-thirds of Palestinians in the territories (68%) and Israeli Arabs (67%).

Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are most concerned with al-Haram al-Sharif (100%), Ras al'Amud (95%), and Silwan (87%). Israelis, however, are far less concerned with these sites (important: al-Haram al-Sharif, 27%; Ras Al'Amud, 33%; Silwan, 38%). In fact, many Israelis surveyed claim not to know the location of al-Haram al-Sharif (36%), Ras al'Amud (25%), or the settlement Ramot Alon (26%). Similarly, many Palestinians and Israeli Arabs do not appear to know about Ramot (27% and 29%, respectively) or Ma'ale Adumim (21% and 26%, respectively).

There have been several different options proposed for Jerusalem. Now using the same scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning you are completely opposed, 5 meaning you are in full support, and 3 meaning you are neutral, please tell me how much you support each of the following proposals.

| | | Support | Neutral | Opposed |
|--|---------------------|---------|---------|---------|
| Jerusalem will remain the undivided capital of Israel. | Israeli Jews | 70 | 19 | 11 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 2 | 3 | 95 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 7 | 6 | 87 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 3 | 11 | 86 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 1 | 7 | 92 |
| | Jewish Americans | 67 | 19 | 12 |
| Jerusalem should be divided on the basis of the 1967 lines, with West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine. | Israeli Jews | 15 | 20 | 66 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 70 | 12 | 17 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 22 | 17 | 61 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 10 | 18 | 72 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 18 | 14 | 68 |
| Jerusalem should be divided in accordance with the Clinton parameters, where Arab sections of the city are Palestinian, and Jewish sections of the city are Israeli. | Israeli Jews | 28 | 22 | 50 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 68 | 13 | 19 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 15 | 15 | 69 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 12 | 15 | 73 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 6 | 11 | 83 |
| | Jewish Americans | 29 | 27 | 41 |
| Jerusalem should be an international city with no Israeli or Palestinian sovereignty over it. | Israeli Jews | 10 | 13 | 77 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 2 | 14 | 58 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 9 | 13 | 78 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 10 | 19 | 71 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 3 | 5 | 92 |
| | Jewish Americans | 21 | 16 | 61 |

**Respondents were asked to rate their support on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is “completely opposed,” 3 is “neutral,” and 5 is “in full support.” “Support” here is the aggregation of “5” and “4” responses, “neutral” are the “3” responses, and “opposed” is the aggregation of “2” and “1” responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded.*

Finding a solution to the problem of Jerusalem will be difficult. Palestinians and Israelis hold deeply opposite views on Jerusalem as an “undivided capital of Israel,” with about nine in ten Palestinians overall rejecting this (87% in the territories, 86% in Lebanon, 92% in Jordan) and 70% of Israeli Jews in support. The two sides, however, equally reject three other options:

1. A Jerusalem divided between East and West is opposed by 66% of Israeli Jews, 61% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, 72% of refugees in Lebanon, and 68% of refugees in Jordan.
2. The Clinton Plan’s approach to dividing Jerusalem between Arab and Jewish sections is opposed by 50% of Israeli Jews and 69% of Palestinians in the West Bank—and even greater percentages of refugees in Lebanon (73%) and Jordan (83%).
3. Jerusalem as an international city is the least popular option overall, with opposition from 77% of Israeli Jews, 78% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, 71% of refugees in Lebanon, and 92% of refugees in Jordan.

Israeli Arabs tend to be supportive of the two possible divisions of Jerusalem: East and West (70% support) or using the Clinton parameters (68% support), but strongly oppose Jerusalem as an undivided capital of Israel (95% oppose) as well as an international city (58% oppose).

One idea that may still be explored is the option of Jerusalem as an undivided city with two capitals, since there is somewhat less hostility to this arrangement.

There have been several different options proposed to address the issue of the Palestinian refugees. Now using the same scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning you are completely opposed, 5 meaning you are in full support, and 3 meaning you are neutral, please tell me how much you support each of the following proposals.

| | | Support | Neutral | Opposed |
|---|---------------------|---------|---------|---------|
| All Palestinian refugees should be granted the full right to return to their original homes in Israel (pre-1948 Palestine). All Palestinian refugees, including those who choose not to return, are entitled to compensation. | Israeli Jews | 3 | 12 | 85 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 93 | 3 | 4 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 80 | 9 | 11 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 72 | 1 | 27 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 52 | 4 | 43 |
| | Jewish Americans | 15 | 21 | 59 |
| Israel should acknowledge its responsibility for creating the Palestinian refugee problem and allow a symbolic number to return to Israel. Palestinians have the right of return only to a newly created Palestinian state. | Israeli Jews | 19 | 19 | 62 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 43 | 21 | 36 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 51 | 21 | 28 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 41 | 8 | 51 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 37 | 10 | 53 |
| | Jewish Americans | 21 | 24 | 47 |
| Israel has no responsibility for the Palestinian refugee problem. Neighboring countries, including a future Palestinian state, should resettle them permanently. | Israeli Jews | 63 | 18 | 19 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 5 | 3 | 92 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 18 | 14 | 68 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 5 | 8 | 86 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 16 | 5 | 79 |
| | Jewish Americans | 35 | 27 | 34 |

**Respondents were asked to rate their support on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is “completely opposed,” 3 is “neutral,” and 5 is “in full support.” “Support” here is the aggregation of “5” and “4” responses, “neutral” are the “3” responses, and “opposed” is the aggregation of “2” and “1” responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded.*

As with Jerusalem, there are deeply held opposing views regarding the issue of Palestinian refugees. Israelis clearly reject a scenario in which Palestinians have a full right to return to their homes in Israel, or the right to compensation if they

choose not to return (85% oppose). Further, Israelis appear to accept only return of refugees to a future Palestinian state (63% support), rejecting even a symbolic return of some refugees to Israel (62% oppose).

Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza demonstrate strong support for the full right to return (80% support), while reaction to a symbolic return of some refugees is mixed (51% support, 28% oppose). These Palestinians reject limiting the right to return to a future Palestinian state (68% oppose).

The views of Israeli Arabs are more emphatic than those of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, with 93% supporting a full right of return or compensation and 92% opposing return of refugees only to a future Palestinian state. Their opinions are mixed with respect to an acknowledgement of responsibility by Israel for the refugee problem and a symbolic return of some refugees to Israel (43% support, 36% oppose).

Refugees in Lebanon and Jordan clearly reject the proposal of limiting return to a Palestinian state (86% in Lebanon and 79% in Jordan oppose), and also have mixed opinions on a symbolic return with majorities in both countries opposing this plan (support/oppose: 41%/51% in Lebanon, 37%/53% in Jordan). Their views on full right to return are divided between the two groups. Refugees in Lebanon support the full right to return (72%), while only a slim majority of refugees in Jordan agree (52%) with a sizable percentage of opposition (43%).

These scenarios were presented with multiple components, making some of the responses difficult to parse. When refugees in the West Bank and Gaza, Lebanon, and Jordan were asked about the importance of each specific piece of a possible resolution to the refugee issue, the picture is somewhat clearer.

Please tell me how important are each of the following:

| | | Important | Not Important |
|---|---------------------|-----------|---------------|
| The right of refugees to return to their homes or towns or villages | Pal. WB/Gaza | 96 | 2 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 94 | 3 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 97 | 2 |
| The right of refugees to receive compensation for all that they have lost | Pal. WB/Gaza | 83 | 8 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 89 | 6 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 97 | 2 |
| That Israel acknowledges wrongdoing in creating refugees in 1948 | Pal. WB/Gaza | 90 | 4 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 76 | 13 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 94 | 1 |

**Respondents were asked to rate the importance of these issues on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is “very important,” 3 is “neutral,” and 5 is “not important at all.” “Important” here is the aggregation of “1” and “2” responses, and “not important” is the aggregation of “4” and “5” responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded and the percentage responding “3” is not included.*

All three groups of refugees surveyed strongly assert the importance of the rights of refugees in general to return to their homes or towns or villages (West Bank/Gaza: 96%, Lebanon: 94%, Jordan: 97%), the rights of refugees to receive compensation for all of that they have lost (West Bank/Gaza: 83%, Lebanon: 89%, Jordan: 97%), and Israel’s acknowledgement of wrongdoing in creating refugees in 1948 (West Bank/Gaza: 90%, Lebanon: 76%, Jordan: 94%).

Please tell me how important are each of the following:

| | | Important | Not Important |
|---|---------------------|-----------|---------------|
| That you return to your home or town or village | Pal. WB/Gaza | 92 | 5 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 88 | 10 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 97 | 2 |
| That you will be able to live in a Palestinian state in the West Bank or Gaza | Pal. WB/Gaza | 83 | 7 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 68 | 18 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 96 | 2 |
| That you be given compensation for all that you have lost | Pal. WB/Gaza | 73 | 13 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 86 | 8 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 96 | 3 |

**Respondents were asked to rate the importance of these issues on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is “very important,” 3 is “neutral,” and 5 is “not important at all.” “Important” here is the aggregation of “1” and “2” responses, and “not important” is the aggregation of “4” and “5” responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded and the percentage responding “3” is not included.*

But when asked about their personal hopes and aspirations, refugees say it is important that they be able to return to their home or town or village (West Bank/Gaza: 92%, Lebanon: 88%, Jordan: 97%), that they be able to live in a Palestinian state (West Bank/Gaza: 83%, Lebanon: 68%, Jordan: 96%), and that they be given compensation for all that they have lost (West Bank/Gaza: 73%, Lebanon: 86%, Jordan: 96%).

Please tell me how important are each of the following:

| | | Important | Not Important |
|---|---------------------|-----------|---------------|
| If circumstances prevent or delay your return to your home, town, or village, that you remain where you are as a citizen of the new Palestinian state | Pal. WB/Gaza | 66 | 13 |
| If circumstances prevent or delay your return to your home, town, or village, that you be given Lebanese citizenship | Refugees in Lebanon | 41 | 44 |
| If circumstances prevent or delay your return to your home, town, or village, that you retain Jordanian citizenship | Refugees in Jordan | 77 | 7 |
| If circumstances prevent or delay your return to your home, town, or village, that you be given the opportunity to emigrate and become a citizen in another country | Pal. WB/Gaza | 43 | 35 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 42 | 46 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 81 | 5 |

**Respondents were asked to rate the importance of these issues on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is “very important,” 3 is “neutral,” and 5 is “not important at all.” “Important” here is the aggregation of “1” and “2” responses, and “not important” is the aggregation of “4” and “5” responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded and the percentage responding “3” is not included.*

It is interesting to note, however, that when asked to reflect on realities that may prevent these hopes from coming true, refugees tend to temper their expectations. Refugees were asked, for example, about possible scenarios if circumstances prevent or delay their return to their home, town or village. Among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, 66% would accept staying where they are as citizens of the new Palestinian state. In Lebanon, 41% would accept Lebanese citizenship, and in Jordan, 77% would accept retaining their Jordanian citizenship. When asked how important it would be to be given the opportunity

to emigrate and become a citizen in another country, 43% of Palestinians in the territories, 42% of refugees in Lebanon and 81% of refugees in Jordan say this would be important, if unable to return to their homes.

Please tell me how hopeful you are in the following outcomes:

| | | Hopeful | Not Hopeful |
|---|---------------------|---------|-------------|
| That you will be living in an independent Palestinian state | Refugees in Lebanon | 83 | 14 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 73 | 17 |
| That you will be able to return to your town or village | Refugees in Lebanon | 76 | 19 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 66 | 27 |

**Respondents were asked to rate how hopeful they are of these outcomes on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is “very hopeful,” 3 is “neutral,” and 5 is “not hopeful at all.” “Hopeful” here is the aggregation of “1” and “2” responses, and “not hopeful” is the aggregation of “4” and “5” responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded and the percentage responding “3” is not included.*

Despite the fact that less than a third of refugees in Lebanon and Jordan say that a peace agreement is likely or even possible in the next five years, these groups remain strikingly hopeful that they will ultimately live in an independent Palestinian state (Lebanon: 83%, Jordan: 73%) and that they will be able to return to their towns or villages (Lebanon: 76%, Jordan: 66%).

Please tell me how important are each of the following:

| | | Important | Not Important |
|---|---------------------|-----------|---------------|
| A Palestinian state in all of the West Bank and Gaza, with Jerusalem as its capital | Refugees in Lebanon | 77 | 14 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 97 | 2 |
| The right of refugees to return to a Palestinian state | Refugees in Lebanon | 96 | 2 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 96 | 2 |

*Respondents were asked to rate the importance of these issues on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is “very important,” 3 is “neutral,” and 5 is “not important at all.” “Important” here is the aggregation of “1” and “2” responses, and “not important” is the aggregation of “4” and “5” responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded and the percentage responding “3” is not included.

Refugees in Lebanon and Jordan express strong support for a Palestinian state in all of the West Bank and Gaza, with Jerusalem as its capital is important (Lebanon: 77%, Jordan: 97%). Further, they strongly insist (almost unanimously) that it is important that refugees have the right to return to a Palestinian state (Lebanon: 96%, Jordan: 96%).

Refugees in Lebanon: Attitudes Compared 2005/2012

| | 2005 | | 2012 | |
|--|-----------|---------------|-----------|---------------|
| | Important | Not Important | Important | Not Important |
| Right to return to their homes | 83 | 11 | 88 | 10 |
| If not, emigrate to another country | 38 | 51 | 42 | 46 |
| If not, return to Palestinian state in West Bank and Gaza | 35 | 50 | 68 | 18 |
| If not, receive Lebanese citizenship | 13 | 79 | 41 | 44 |
| That there be a Palestinian state in all of the West Bank/Gaza with Jerusalem as its capital | 52 | 34 | 77 | 14 |
| That you will be able to live in Palestinian state in West Bank/Gaza | 21 | 79 | 68 | 18 |

Back in 2005, we conducted a similar survey of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. There was a deeper pessimism and less willingness to entertain alternatives than we found in our 2012 survey. About the same percentage of Palestinians in Lebanon believed that it was possible for there to be a Palestinian state in five years time (2005: 29%; 2012: 30%). In 2005, about one half of refugees in Lebanon thought it was important for there to be a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza with Jerusalem as its capital, and only 21% thought it was important that one day they might live in that Palestinian state. It simply was not “home” to them. Today, 77% of refugees in Lebanon believe such a Palestinian state is important, and 68% are hopeful that they might live in that state. And they are much more open to accepting other options, as well, such as accepting citizenship in Lebanon or emigrating to another country.

With which of the following statements do you most agree:

| | Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Pal. WB/Gaza | Refugees in Lebanon | Refugees in Jordan | Jewish Americans |
|---|--------------|---------------|--------------|---------------------|--------------------|------------------|
| Statement A. Israel has a right to build wherever it pleases in the land it currently holds. | 47 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 32 |
| Statement B. Settlements in the occupied territories create a problem for any peace agreement with the Palestinians and there will need to be a negotiated agreement on which settlements Israel will annex and which it will evacuate. | 45 | 25 | 22 | 17 | 5 | 46 |
| Statement C. All settlements are illegal under international law and should be evacuated. | 8 | 74 | 75 | 79 | 95 | 12 |

Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded.

There are deep divisions on the matter of settlements, with Israeli Jews themselves divided between insisting that it is Israel's right to build wherever it pleases in the land it currently holds (47%) and the position that settlements create a problem for any peace agreement and there will need to be a negotiated agreement on which settlements Israel will annex and which it will evacuate (45%). Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, refugees in Jordan and Lebanon, and Israeli Arabs, on the other hand, all overwhelmingly say settlements are illegal under international law and should be evacuated (75%, 79%, 95%, and 74%, respectively).

Several proposals have been advanced to resolve the settlement issue. Now using the same scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning you are completely opposed, 5 meaning you are in full support, and 3 meaning you are neutral, please tell me how much you support each of the following proposals.

| | | Opposed | Neutral | Support |
|---|---------------------|---------|---------|---------|
| All settlements east of 1967 borders must be removed and settlers relocated within Israel. | Israeli Jews | 58 | 24 | 19 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 7 | 8 | 85 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 21 | 15 | 64 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 33 | 19 | 49 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 32 | 9 | 58 |
| Several settlements blocs will be annexed by Israel; those that are not will be dismantled and settlers relocated either into the annexed blocs or within Israel. | Jewish Americans | 49 | 30 | 15 |
| | Israeli Jews | 34 | 23 | 44 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 29 | 27 | 44 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 32 | 28 | 40 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 40 | 27 | 33 |
| All settlers should be allowed to remain in the West Bank under Palestinian sovereignty, if they so choose. | Refugees in Jordan | 38 | 11 | 51 |
| | Jewish Americans | 26 | 36 | 29 |
| | Israeli Jews | 48 | 26 | 26 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 64 | 16 | 20 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 66 | 19 | 15 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 46 | 22 | 32 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 43 | 13 | 44 |
| | Jewish Americans | 33 | 31 | 31 |

**Respondents were asked to rate their support on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is "completely opposed," 3 is "neutral," and 5 is "in full support." "Support" here is the aggregation of "5" and "4" responses, "neutral" are the "3" responses, and "opposed" is the aggregation of "2" and "1" responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded.*

When asked about possible solutions for the settlements problem, respondents make a few things perfectly clear. No agreement is possible on the removal of all settlements and the evacuation of settlers to Israel. Among Israeli Jews, 58% oppose the removal of all settlements east of the 1967 borders and the relocation

settlements

of settlers into Israel. It may appear as surprising that one-third of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (33%) and Jordan (32%) as well as 21% of Palestinians in the territories are also opposed to this proposal. In the case of the refugees, opposition may be based on an objection not only to the settlements, but also to the settlers themselves. The refugees who come from villages in what is now Israel may simply not want to see settlers rewarded by relocating them to areas that were the sites of their ancestral lands. There is little support for settlers being allowed to remain in the West Bank under Palestinian sovereignty, if they so choose. Half of Israeli Jews (48%) and two-thirds of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza (66%) and Israeli Arabs (64%) are opposed to this idea.

It may be possible, however, to find enough support from all sides on attaching some settlement blocs to Israel and evacuating the rest. When asked about their support for the annexation of several settlement blocs by Israel and the dismantling of all other settlements, about two-thirds of Israeli Jews and Palestinians in the territories either support or are neutral with respect to this proposal (Israelis: 44% support and 23% neutral; Palestinians: 40% support and 28% neutral). The percentages of Israeli Arabs and Palestinians refugees are similar, with between 60-70% of these groups being either supportive or neutral.

Several proposals have been advanced with regard to the location of the border between Israel and a future Palestinian state. Now using the same scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning you are completely opposed, 5 meaning you are in full support, and 3 meaning you are neutral, please tell me how much you support each of the following proposals.

| | | Support | Neutral | Opposed |
|--|---------------------|---------|---------|---------|
| The 1967 border. | Israeli Jews | 11 | 22 | 67 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 74 | 9 | 17 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 47 | 22 | 31 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 18 | 34 | 48 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 41 | 23 | 36 |
| The 1967 border with agreed upon territorial exchanges. | Israeli Jews | 34 | 25 | 42 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 57 | 15 | 28 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 35 | 23 | 42 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 24 | 25 | 51 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 38 | 25 | 37 |
| The current location of the separation barrier should become the final border. | Israeli Jews | 32 | 40 | 28 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 4 | 5 | 91 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 14 | 22 | 64 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 5 | 13 | 82 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 33 | 16 | 51 |

| | | Support | Neutral | Opposed |
|--|---------------------|---------|---------|---------|
| A fairer and more viable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would be the creation of a single state in which all citizens have equal rights. | Israeli Jews | 12 | 22 | 66 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 39 | 20 | 41 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 34 | 20 | 47 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 20 | 17 | 63 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 15 | 38 | 46 |
| A fairer and more viable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would be absorption of Palestinians into the state of Israel where they will enjoy significant autonomy but not the equal right to vote. | Israeli Jews | 6 | 18 | 76 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 5 | 10 | 84 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 16 | 19 | 65 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 4 | 25 | 71 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 30 | 12 | 57 |
| A fairer and more viable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would be the creation of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation. | Israeli Jews | 26 | 37 | 37 |
| | Israeli Arabs | 21 | 15 | 64 |
| | Pal. WB/Gaza | 15 | 18 | 67 |
| | Refugees in Lebanon | 17 | 19 | 64 |
| | Refugees in Jordan | 39 | 19 | 42 |

*Respondents were asked to rate their support on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is "completely opposed," 3 is "neutral," and 5 is "in full support." "Support" here is the aggregation of "5" and "4" responses, "neutral" are the "3" responses, and "opposed" is the aggregation of "2" and "1" responses. Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers were rounded.

Respondents were presented with a variety of proposals for the location of a border between Israel and a future Palestinian state. All the options, save one (the 1967 border with agreed upon territorial exchanges), are opposed by about two-thirds of one or more of the groups surveyed. This leaves the option of the 1967 borders with land swaps as the only proposal with any promise of winning the necessary support.

Using the 1967 lines as the borders between Israel and a Palestinian state is rejected by 67% of Israeli Jews, as well as by almost half of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (48% oppose). Using the current location of the separation barrier as the final border is opposed by 64% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and even greater numbers of Israeli Arabs (91%) and refugees in Lebanon (82%). This proposal does not garner much support from Israeli Jews either; only 32% say they support the separation barrier as a final border.

Several proposals that are not based on two states, Israel and Palestine, are also opposed by significant majorities. First, the creation of a single state in which all citizens have equal rights is opposed by two-thirds of Israel Jews (66%) as well as 47% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, 41% of Israeli Arabs, 63% of refugees in Lebanon, and 46% of refugees in Jordan. The absorption of Palestinians into the state of Israel with significant autonomy but without equal voting rights is roundly rejected by Israelis and Palestinians alike. Three-quarters of Israeli Jews (76%) oppose this proposal, as do 84% of Israeli Arabs, 65% of Palestinians in the territories, 71% of refugees in Lebanon, and 57% of refugees in Jordan. Finally, the option of a Jordanian-Palestinian federation is rejected by Palestinians (67%) as well as by Israeli Arabs (64%) and refugees in Lebanon (64%) and Jordan (42%).

DEMOGRAPHICS

| | | Israeli Jews n=1,061 | Israeli Arabs n=414 | Pal. WB/Gaza n=1,264 | Lebanon Refugees n=497 | Jordan Refugees n=489 |
|----------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|
| Age Group | Under25 | 16% | 16% | 25% | 22% | 17% |
| | 25-36 | 23% | 31% | 41% | 33% | 34% |
| | Over36 | 61% | 52% | 34% | 45% | 48% |
| Gender | Male | 49% | 53% | 50% | 60% | 61% |
| | Female | 51% | 47% | 50% | 40% | 40% |
| Education | Elementary or less | 1% | 3% | 15% | 21% | 12% |
| | Intermediate/Secondary/ Technical | 46% | 52% | 51% | 59% | 50% |
| | University or more | 53% | 46% | 34% | 21% | 38% |
| Marital Status | Married | 65% | 48% | 67% | 56% | 69% |
| | Single | 24% | 48% | 29% | 41% | 26% |
| | Divorced/widowed/ separated | 12% | 4% | 5% | 3% | 5% |
| Number of Children | One | 13% | 7% | 14% | 14% | 7% |
| | Two | 33% | 14% | 21% | 24% | 26% |
| | Three | 29% | 20% | 13% | 14% | 13% |
| | Four | 11% | 28% | 11% | 9% | 16% |
| | Five or more | 6% | 20% | 24% | 20% | 28% |
| | None | 8% | 10% | 17% | 19% | 9% |
| | Refuse | - | 1% | - | - | - |
| Children in House- hold | One | 21% | 12% | 16% | 18% | 9% |
| | Two | 28% | 23% | 27% | 33% | 34% |
| | Three | 19% | 28% | 18% | 21% | 16% |
| | Four | 7% | 16% | 13% | 10% | 17% |
| | Five or more | 4% | 6% | 20% | 14% | 20% |
| | None | 22% | 15% | 6% | 4% | 4% |
| Employment Status | Employed | 79% | 62% | 39% | 65% | 63% |
| | Not employed | 21% | 39% | 61% | 35% | 37% |
| Religion | Secular | - | 27% | - | - | - |
| | Religious | - | 26% | - | - | - |
| | Traditional | - | 33% | - | - | - |
| | Other | - | 14% | - | - | - |
| Religion | Secular | 60% | - | - | - | - |
| | Traditional | 16% | - | - | - | - |
| | National religious | 11% | - | - | - | - |
| | Orthodox | 11% | - | - | - | - |
| | Other answers | 1% | - | - | - | - |
| Religion | Secular | - | - | 2% | 12% | - |
| | Pious | - | - | 59% | 25% | 25% |
| | Traditionalist | - | - | 38% | 61% | 61% |
| | Religious activist | - | - | 2% | 3% | 14% |

| | | Jewish Americans n=500 |
|---------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------|
| Age Group | 18-29 | 15% |
| | 30-49 | 30% |
| | 50-64 | 20% |
| | 65+ | 35% |
| Gender | Male | 53% |
| | Female | 47% |
| Education | No College Degree | 22% |
| | College Degree+ | 78% |
| Party | Democratic | 55% |
| | Republican | 21% |
| | Independent | 24% |
| Ideology | Progressive/very liberal | 17% |
| | Liberal | 26% |
| | Moderate | 29% |
| | Conservative | 21% |
| | Very conservative | 4% |
| Religion | Libertarian | 3% |
| | Reform Jewish | 34% |
| | Conservative Jewish | 27% |
| | Orthodox Jewish | 20% |
| | Reconstructionist Jewish | 3% |
| | Secular Jewish | 13% |
| Attend Temple | Other | 4% |
| | More than once a week | 11% |
| | About once a week | 17% |
| | Once or twice a month | 16% |
| | Only on religious holidays | 24% |
| | Rarely | 22% |
| Never | 10% | |

