



APD Forward's Summary and Analysis of the Monitor's Outcomes Assessment Report

"In short, APD should become a Learning Organization, one which plans-implements-assesses-corrects-repeats based on hard data and careful analyses of failures and successes. We cannot emphasize enough the criticality of this model if APD is to make progress in CASA compliance over the coming months and years."

- Dr. James Ginger, Independent Monitor, Outcomes Assessment Report

Paragraph 298 of the Court Approved Settlement Agreement (CASA) between the City of Albuquerque and the U.S. Department of Justice requires the Independent Monitoring Team to assess, both qualitatively and quantitatively, whether the CASA has resulted in "high-level, quality service; officer safety and accountability; effective, constitutional policing; and increased community trust" of the Albuquerque Police Department (APD). This paragraph requires APD to collect and analyze data trends and patterns on use of force, specialized units, crisis intervention, recruitment measures, force investigations, training data, officer assistance and support, supervision measurements, and civilian complaints.

Unfortunately, the Independent Monitoring Team's first Outcomes Assessment Report, or 298 Report, provides yet another substantive indication that APD is falling short. Since the Independent Monitor, Dr. James Ginger, began tracking compliance with the settlement agreement, every single report has raised red flags over APD's seeming inability to identify and correct improper uses of force. Instead of a learning organization that is identifying, analyzing, and responding when correction is necessary, Dr. Ginger says that "APD's normal response is denial, debate and defense."

The Outcomes Report also raises serious concerns over the quality and organization of the data that APD is collecting. In one particularly egregious example, APD provided Use of Force Data from 2014 that failed to include multiple high-profile incidents: the shooting deaths of James Boyd, Alfred Redwine, Mary Hawkes, Armand Martin, or Ralph Chavez. In another example, "data" on Crisis Intervention Teams (CIT) for 2015 and 2016 was so unusable that APD is "unable to identify successes, failures, liability exposures, or any other meaningful management detail."

While the Monitor notes serious concerns over the accuracy of the data from APD, perhaps the greater concern is that APD is simply reporting raw data without doing the critical work of *analyzing* the data for "trends, issues, problems or solutions." The Monitor calls this a "critical deficiency for all aspects of 298-reporting."

For APD to become a learning organization, supervisory, command, and executive level staff need to provide meaningful oversight to the agency. Improving data collection is critical to this process, but data is only a tool for the more difficult task of thoughtful analysis. It seems unlikely that APD will be able to significantly improve outcomes if it is unwilling to consider *why* the outcomes are what they are. This latest report from the Monitoring Team provides yet more evidence that APD leadership is failing to generate the critical systemic changes necessary to fundamentally reform the department.