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Chapter Six

Constructing union democracy: A state or union prerogative?

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The connection between trade unions and democracy is distinctive. In many countries trade unions emerged in the face of industrial conflict in the early phases of industrialisation. Their primary purpose was to bring democracy to the workplace. This has led many to adopt the value judgement that organisations with such a purpose should themselves be democratic.

An alternative view of union government, which does not see internal democracy as an imperative, may place greater weight on the army analogy, on the fact that, in order to bring democracy to the workplace or for that matter, to a national political system, unions often need to be on a war footing in their dealings with the employer, or with a hostile state. No one expects an army to be democratic, however (Howard 1980 p. 162). In some countries, unions were created, or reconstituted, for an additional purpose: to create a countervailing power to the state and capital following a period of dictatorship, for example in Japan and in the former West Germany.

In yet other countries, without Western style political democracy, unions existed or were created as an extension of the state, with their primary purpose to support the political regime. These unions lack independence. In this environment, any independent unions which struggle to emerge outside the state often begin with the goal of political democracy as a major, if not primary, purpose.

This chapter proceeds from the position that unions should be democratic and that, paradoxically, efficiency may be contingent on their democratic structure. This is not to say that a union's democratic structure may not permit a move to military

mode under certain circumstances, just as democratic nation states do from time to time. This may mean membership control over the circumstances under which the leaders may exercise their own discretion. Both traditional and emerging notions of union democracy are then briefly identified before consideration of several international positions on the question of who should be the architect of union democracy. The current Australian position is then discussed against this international background. Finally, the (re)construction of union democracy by the Australian union movement in recent decades is examined.

Models of union democracy: traditional and emergent

Unlike political democracy, union democracy does not possess a commonly accepted predominant meaning (Valdes Dal-Re 1988, p. 83). Implicitly recognising this, Leader (2001) argues that any model of union democracy will comprise elements relating to three core factors: representation (whether representatives are primarily loyal to the union as a whole or to the constituents who elected them, and thus act as delegates); participation (whether members elect and recall decision-makers or vote on decisions directly); and protection of minority rights.

The configuration of union democracy depends on the relative weight given to three 'orientations' or principles. The 'preference', or choice-based, principle is grounded in employee preferences, and *prima facie* requires smaller constituencies to ensure that individual preferences are voiced and heard. Freedom of association is advocated and the principle favours strong rights to disassociate (Leader 2001, pp. 495–6). This principle sits comfortably with a competitive marketplace for union representational services (Estreicher 2001, p. 452).

The 'functional' principle selects elements of democracy to best ensure the effective operation of the union. For the functionalist, the union's effective external role comes first. There is no preference towards any size of constituency groupings. (Leader 2001, p. 499). Freedom of association is of secondary importance under this principle; exclusive representation is acceptable in the name of stability (Leader 2001 p. 499). There is also an institutional conception of rights. For example, if leaders refused to authorise strike action, members would have no further right to strike and those who chose to take action would be

disciplined. Members could, however, choose to vote out the representatives at the next election (Leader 2001, p. 501).

Third is the 'civic' principle, which regards union democracy as a potential source of wider civic virtues and civic education. Selection of elements of democracy depends on one's wider democratic convictions, for example, support for a balance of power among interest groups. Such a principle favours smaller constituencies to facilitate individual participation to determine what members want, and uses dialogue to educate members. Along with the preference principle, the civic principle, with its focus on 'prerogative' rights for all individuals, does not require the activity of members to be authorised by the formal organisation itself, as is the case with the functional principle (Leader 2001, pp. 496–8). The civic principle favours a strong trade union, but unlike the functionalist, endorses independent power bases (Leader 2001, p. 500).

Recent decades have seen the emergence of new elements of union democracy, such as fair representation and gender democracy, as civic values are imported into the union sphere. Pressure for change has come from marginalised groups, especially women, but also groups based on race, ethnicity, age, sexuality and disability, and from union leaders responding to a membership crisis (Colgan and Ledwith 2002, p. 6). A study of two British unions distinguishes radical measures, such as affirmative action to achieve proportional representation, and liberal measures, such as removal of barriers to participation of women and minority groups by, for example, changing times and dates of meetings and training. Another radical measure, 'semi-autonomous self-organising' groups, is seen as part of a revival of participatory democracy associated with union renewal. Where these groups are formal, the union provides separate structures and resources (Colgan and Ledwith 2002 pp. 3-4). While the groups provide for social creativity, being a significant site for personal growth and activist skills, their social change potential appears limited by inadequate links to 'mainstream' union structures (Colgan and Ledwith 2002, p. 11).

Whether these new modifications to union democracy are membership or leadership driven, they are organic developments, generated by unions themselves. Determining the model of union government however, may not always be the sole prerogative of the union.

Constructing union democracy: who decides?

A fundamental question is whether the union democracy model should be designed by the Constitution, by parliaments, by the courts or by the union itself? The International Labour Organisation (ILO) position is clear. The benchmark set by the international community in 1948 advocates union self-determination. The ILO Convention on freedom of association provides, *inter alia,* that:

> Workers' and employers' organisations shall have the right to draw up their constitutions and rules, to elect their representatives in full freedom, to organise their administration and activities and to formulate their programmes. The public authorities shall refrain from any interference which would restrict this right or impede the lawful exercise thereof (Convention 87, Article 3).

There is variation in opinion among countries signatory to the Convention in terms of the balance between union and state sovereignty. The United States' position, for example, does not equate with the ILO benchmark. Here, wide-ranging legislative intervention in the late 1950s followed Senate investigations which concentrated on a handful of strategically placed unions. The Senate findings included evidence that rank-and-file members had no voice in union affairs and were frequently denied a secret ballot. There were also reports of a widespread misuse of union funds. The union movement attempted to avert their loss of autonomy through self-regulation via ethical codes, but this was unsuccessful. The resulting legislation established a bill of rights for members and dealt with elections, the relationship between national and local unions and officials' fiduciary responsibilities (Witney and Taylor 1996, pp. 346-8).

Canada's 'statutory abstinence' approach (Lynk 2001, p. 459) approximates the ILO benchmark. This is based on the belief that unions are essentially private and voluntary organisations on a par with social clubs and political parties (Lynk 2001, p. 462) and that the law can play only a modest role in furthering union democracy. Union autonomy is tempered only by minimal requirements that unions respect their constitutional procedures, accord members natural justice and have rules which are fair and non-discriminatory (Lynk 2001, p. 489). The Canadian approach

has been attributed to a democratic culture at work, lack of evidence of corruption, at least relative to American unions, and an absence of popular demand for legislative intrusion. As Lynk explains, 'The cry for "union democracy" has never acquired the hot-button persona that it achieved in Britain or the United States. Nor has the term "union bosses" resonated in the media or in popular speech' (Lynk, 2001, pp. 459-61).

Spain provides another variant. In the transition from authoritarian regime to democracy, the Spanish Constitution established union rights and required that unions' internal structure and functioning be democratic. Democracy is viewed as a supreme value, extending beyond the state to permeate society and take in social groups, such as unions, that contribute to social pluralism (Valdes Del-Re 1988, pp. 86-7). However, the Constitutional concept of trade union freedom in Spain entails self-determination in union government. Each union has the right to define its own model, the only legislative requirement being the election, rather than appointment, to positions of responsibility. As with Canada, a monitoring function resides with the judiciary. They have the potential to shine a light on the Constitutional requirement of democracy as it operates in practice (Valdes Del-Re 1988, pp. 90-92). Thus a significant distinction is made between the design and monitoring of democracy.

The Australian case

In 2002, Australia is in the company of the United States and Britain, with the state prominent as the architect of union government. In 1948, Australian government, union and employer representatives voted for the ILO Convention endorsing autonomy in union government and the Australian parliament ratified this in 1973 (ILO, 1950 p. 268; ILOLEX, 2000). Yet in the 1920s, the parliament had rejected autonomy. State intervention was defended, just as it was later in Japan, in terms of the 'great privileges' conferred on unions by the statute (Latham 1927, p. 3286). Despite the removal in recent years of privileges such as union preference and freedom from competition in representation, the rationale of 'substantial rights and privileges' justifying intervention prevails (Abbott 2001, p. 26342).

From the beginning, Australia established state machinery for managing union rules and it is these rules that reveal the nature of

formal democracy. The initial vetting function at the time of union registration was assigned to public servants and that function remains today for new unions and for those seeking to change their rules. Not surprisingly, the existence of a central agency approving rules led to considerable conformity in style and content. In the 1920s, the parliament assigned the judiciary, today the Federal Court, both a design and a monitoring function. The design function arose from the power to disallow rules considered to be tyrannical or oppressive or to impose unreasonable conditions on members or applicants for membership (Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1928 (Cth), s.58D (CAA)). The monitoring function existed in the power to order performance or observance of the rules (CAA 1928, s.58E). Both functions prevail, albeit with slightly amended wording under the current legislation (Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), ss 196, 208, 209 (WRA)). The Court has no pro-active brief but when invited to do so by a union member or members, the legislation allows it to pass judgement on any element of the model in accordance with parliament's generic benchmark (WRA, ss 3, 187A). As the interpreter of the wishes of the parliament, the judiciary becomes, by default, an architect of the ideal democratic model. Over the decades, it has established standards, for example for natural justice to prevail in disciplinary hearings and for the right to campaign for office.

The legislature has also been active. Since the 1920s there have been 33 bills with provisions relating to union government, only one third of which have been single-issue bills, the remainder being omnibus legislation. Australia's complex legislation evolved from a skeletal framework (CAA 1904, Schedule B) to a hybrid situation of extensive state prescription co-existing with limited union discretion. Activation of much of the Australian regulation depends on the existence of branches in the rules. Thus if, as is typical, there are no branches at enterprise or workplace level, the nature of the union government is a union prerogative.

The consequence of frequent parliamentary intervention, the dual function of the judiciary and the willingness of unionists to invoke judicial involvement, is that union rule books are managed by lawyers and public servants, with rank-and-file members unlikely to have a sense of ownership. Pressures for conformity are to be expected when a state apparatus has broad design and monitoring functions. Thus, for example, a cursory examination

of a universal rule – objects of the association – reveals similar and bland language between unions. An interesting question for research would be the extent of inter-union rules variation and the origins of any individuality.

Union power and union democracy: a damaging nexus

The Australian legislative regulation of union democracy has had a relatively long history. The legislature as architect began in earnest in the 1920s when the Bruce-Page conservative government legislated for member-initiated and court-initiated secret ballots of members for elections and union resolutions on any matter (CAA 1928, ss 56A-56G). Crucially, the provisions were grounded in the need for public management of strikes. Concern with union democracy was triggered by concern with union power, in particular union leadership decisions to take industrial action and enforce *de facto* closed shops (Latham 1927, pp. 3278-3279). The secret ballot would give members 'control over the officers and the affairs' of the union (Latham 1927, p. 3280) and 'The opportunity of self-government is given to them; the rest remains with themselves' (Latham 1927, p. 3291). The link between simplistic democratic measures and concerns with perceived excessive union power created a template that prevails in the twenty-first century.

The perception of an inevitable link between militancy and undemocratic government, or conversely, between rank-and-file control and non-militant behaviour, has proved highly marketable. It continues to be manifest in campaigns for political office and in parliamentary debate.

In the 1975 federal election campaign, the Liberal Party promised to take action to prevent militant union leaders dictating to their rank and file members: all officials would be elected under Electoral Office supervision by secret ballot (Fraser 1975). However, a secret ballot requirement had already existed in Australia since 1951. Another example was in 1996, when a parliamentary debate about proposed enterprise-based branches for unions, potentially significant for union democracy, was undermined by omnibus legislation which contained measures with the potential to weaken unions *vis-à-vis* the employer (Fox 1999, pp. 409-410). In 2000, the Howard Liberal-National Coalition government, in a second unsuccessful attempt to make

industrial action conditional on majority endorsement via secret ballot, argued secret ballots would 'enhance freedom of choice, *minimise unnecessary industrial action* and strengthen the accountability and responsiveness of unions to their members' (Reith 2000, p. 18244) (emphasis added).

A further instance of state intervention occurred in 2001, when measures designed to increase competition between unions received a hostile reception from the Labor opposition because of the Howard government's previous raft of anti-union measures and a belief that the objective was a proliferation of weak unions (Bevis 2001, p. 29871).

The coupling of union democracy with measures seeking to weaken union power has precedents in Britain and the United States. It was a feature of both the Conservative Party legislation in Britain in the 1980s and early 1990s (Undy et. al. 1996) and the 1959 union democracy measures in the United States (Goldberg 2001, p. 78). The nexus results in the neglect of union democracy on its own merits. A true test of the position of the political parties toward union democracy would be a parliamentary bill concerned exclusively and comprehensively with this issue, something which, regrettably, has not occurred in Australia in a hundred years.

Reconfiguring union democracy: the labour movement as architect

As state intervention in union government continues unabated, Australian unions, within the forum of the ACTU, have engaged in some reconstruction of union democracy in recent years, albeit largely as a by-product of union function. ACTU Congress decisions over the period 1987 to 2000 have related to: a) democracy models: union or state prerogative?; b) competition between unions; c) new concepts of representation and participation including gender democracy; and d) workplace union organisation and the role of workplace representatives.

As often happens when organisations face a crisis, the threat to the survival of the union movement has triggered self-examination (Healy and Kirton 2000). A central concern has been the need to arrest membership decline, improve the capacity to deliver policies, and provide a greater range and level of service to members. This has been the backdrop for all deliberations on union government and has frequently been expressly stated (see

for example ACTU 1989, p. 85; 1991, p. 126).

The restoration of democratic legitimacy was also sought by affirming the belief that unions should be democratic, describing them as 'collective organisations of workers with democratic and participatory structures to represent workers' interests and needs', by noting the consensus to maximise membership involvement at all levels of union activity, including workplaces (ACTU 1991 pp. 120, 125), and placing on record that 'Unions must be democratic, adaptive with their resources dedicated to the servicing of membership needs' (ACTU 1995, p. 3).

Democracy models: union *vs.* state prerogative?

Union democracy as a union prerogative was strongly advocated by the ACTU in 1991, but has since been neither expressly affirmed or qualified. In 1991, the ACTU supported almost total deregulation of democracy design, curbing the judiciary's monitoring function and expanding the Industrial Registrar's advisory role (ACTU 1991, p. 72). The industrial legislation policy of the unions recognised 'the right of unions to regulate their own affairs in a democratic way' and 'the right of union officials and members to perform their union duties free from outside interference' (ACTU 1991, p. 63). Autonomy was to be exercised consistent with principles of fairness and natural justice. In asserting that members should be free to determine the government structure best suited to their needs and to the needs of the organisation (ACTU 1991, p. 69), all three principles – preference, civic and functional – are evident although their relative importance is not addressed.

Legislation and judicial decisions were criticised as impeding both union efficiency and democracy, for example a) the 'excessively complex' union election provisions and the industrial dispute secret ballot provisions which, as noted, originated in the 1920s and were extended by a Liberal-National government in 1981 (CAA (Amendment) 1981); b) inconsistent judicial decisions which were generating uncertainty and expense (ACTU 1991 pp. 69-71). Incongruously, the ACTU supported proscriptive Hawke government legislation to facilitate union mergers (ACTU 1991 p. 63), meaning that decision-making processes on mergers were not to be a union prerogative. The functional principle was implicitly dominant. Ironically, aspects of the legislation were

subsequently found to be in breach of the ILO Convention on Freedom of Association.

Despite the strong union prerogative sentiments of the union movement, neither the Hawke nor Keating Labor governments moved to deregulate, a position paralleled in Britain by the Blair Labour government (Taylor 1998, pp. 293-294). The complex omnibus industrial relations legislation of 1993, not least the threat to union monopoly of representation rights, probably consumed union energy, leaving no time to pursue union government reform. In 1997, one theme of Australian conservative government legislation, interference with unions' democratic decision-making processes, was noted with disapproval (ACTU 1997, p. 28). In 2000, the ACTU endorsed the ILO Convention on freedom of association, thereby affirming support for union democracy as a union prerogative,part of the 'Globalisation and Labour Rights' policy (ACTU 2000, p. 38). The 2000 Congress was silent on the specifics of state regulation of union government in Australia. It seems other issues became more important with the re-election of the union-hostile Howard Liberal-National Coalition government.

Inter-union competition

Changes to the external structure of unions, *via* mergers and rationalisation, were central to union goals, both institutional (union survival and growth) and agency (membership benefits) (ACTU 1991 p. 119). In this context, the position adopted on inter-union competition gave precedence to the functional over the preference principle. It was consistently seen as a destructive and negative phenomenon, weakening unions *vis-à-vis* employers (ACTU 1989, p. 81; 1991, pp. 2, 123). Enterprise-based unions, in particular, had the potential to destabilise and divide workers' collective strength (ACTU 1997 p. 31). The 2000 ACTU Congress maintained this theme: 'the basic determinant of union representative rights is the rules coverage of a union and not "freedom of choice" for members to transfer membership to whatever union they choose' (ACTU 2000, p. 15).

A co-ordinated response of active opposition in legal proceedings to the registration of new competitors, especially enterprise-based unions, was advocated and a 1995 co-operation pact proscribed competition (ACTU 1989 p. 84; 1991 p. 125; 1995

p. 1). The policy response to 1996 legislation facilitating competition was that new unions, or unions seeking to expand their territory, should be required to demonstrate that they were not merely a guise for inter-union rivalry or the product of employer preference (ACTU 1997, p. 31). The legislation had expressly protected against the latter. Membership views were recognised as a legitimate factor in ACTU decisions on external structure (ACTU 1993, pp. 144, 146) but this was only included as a result of an Electrical Trades Union amendment to the Executive's report in 1991 (Davis 1992, pp 89-91). Further, the principle of what the members want has to compete with what maximises unionisation and what provides the best wages and conditions (ACTU, 1995, p. 2). This leaves unresolved Leader's central question: namely, the relative weight to be given to, in this case, the preference principle and the functional principle.

New concepts of representation and participation

Emergent elements of democracy have been evident in the Australian union movement. Unions have aimed to become more representative of and more attractive to all workers, with special attention needed for target groups (ACTU 1991, p. 127). Target groups, whose representation and participation in union government has been encouraged, are women, young people, part-time workers and workers of non-English-speaking background. The overwhelming number of policies and action initiatives have been directed towards women. These policies have emerged in the context of the institutional objectives of membership recruitment and retention. For example, a detailed policy on union structure incorporates proposals for increased participation and fair representation (ACTU 1991, pp. 120-121). Union government reforms have been consistently complemented by agency objective policy initiatives, with priority given to industrial campaigns based on the Working Women's Charter, abolition of age related wage rates and conditions for casual and part-time workers (ACTU 1991, pp. 127-128).

These changes were not new to democracy but new to union government models, importing practices from other democratic organisations in the community. The 1989 ACTU Congress, for example, endorsed both liberal and radical measures to increase women's participation and influence in union decision-making

processes. Liberal measures included removing barriers such as inappropriate meeting times and places and the absence of childcare. Radical measures took the form of affirmative action strategies based on proportional representation and formal recognition of self organising via establishment of women's committees, special publications and conferences directed to women members (ACTU 1989, pp. 62, 64-66, 85-86; 1995, p. 96). An example of affirmative action cited in 1991 was the Australian Services Union special Vice President positions elected by and filled by women.

While in the late 1990s, proposals on women's participation in union decision-making forums were limited to liberal measures, by 2000 gender democracy statements were stronger. There was a continued commitment to affirmative action in ACTU decision-making, to building the organisational strength of women in unions through developing delegate structures, and to ACTU monitoring of progress in achieving gender balance within union decision-making processes and structures (ACTU, 2000, pp. 85-86). The treatment of representation of young people in union structures is less proscriptive than for gender democracy (see for example ACTU, 1989 and 2000). This target group only became the subject of specific union government proposals in 1997 (ACTU, 1997, pp. 87-88).

The flavour of union movement policies seems to advocate participatory democracy. In 1993, participation at workplace level was endorsed as ' involving members in actions and decisions that affect them.... [such as] bargaining for a workplace agreement, recruiting new members or settling workplace grievances' (ACTU, 1993, p. 111). Enterprise bargaining also raises new issues for participation. The union movement position here is very much 'work in progress'. The crucial matter of bargaining structure has not been addressed and appears ambiguous. While reporting back to members after every bargaining meeting has been endorsed (ACTU, 1995, p. 87), bargaining unit size will be critical to the feasibility of this participation, unless reporting back means sending an email. The state has intervened, as usual in a partial way, by mandating a vote of all employees *(sic)* on collective agreement ratification (WRA, ss 170LJ, 170LR) but otherwise there is scope for union prerogative in union decision-making on enterprise bargaining.

Workplace union organisation and the role of workplace representatives

Successful organising and recruitment strategies are determined by strong workplace activism and organisation and expanding the role of workplace representatives (ACTU, 1993, p. 111; 1995 p. 3; 1997 pp. 2, 36-37; 2000, p. 73). The workplace focus emerged in a high-profile Department of Trade/ACTU study produced at the zenith of the Accord era (Department of Trade, 1987). Strong local and workplace organisation was to be an element of 'strategic unionism' which assigned a prominent role to peak union bodies as they participated in tripartite, consensus-oriented economic and social policy. Local power was contingent upon a social reform model of unionism and a corporatist approach. While lauding union strength and vitality at the workplace level, the 1987 study did not put in place any model of social reform unionism.

Issues of representation, participation and distribution of power between levels of government arise here, but the only clear position concerns the nature of representation, apparent when the 2000 ACTU Congress operationalised support for workplace delegates via a Charter of Workplace Union Delegate Rights (ACTU, 2000, pp. 11-12). This established workplace level representatives as 'delegates' rather than being institutionally bound. The delegate's key role, critical to improved pay and conditions, was to represent '.the collective and individual hopes, aspirations and needs of their work colleagues' and '..endorsed delegates speak on behalf of union members in the workplace' (ACTU, 2000, pp. 11-12).

The Charter's focus was delegates' rights, with little comment on their powers except that delegates should be involved in preparation of organising campaigns, educated in organising skills and have the right to bargain collectively on behalf of those they represented (ACTU, 2000, pp. 12, 74-75). If this is referring to bargaining for certified agreements, it is potentially very significant. One interpretation is that delegates have the exclusive right to negotiate but the practicality of this may depend on bargaining structure. For example, if the workplace delegates were in the large communications company Telstra and bargaining was at enterprise level, only a limited number of delegates could be part of the negotiating team and further, some co-ordination or even control from a higher level of the union seems likely, thereby

opening up the issue of the nature of representation. A 1995 ACTU statement leaves the impression that bargaining is at workplace level: best-practice enterprise bargaining is held to include 'strong workplace organisation, with properly trained shop stewards in place... before...negotiations...' (ACTU, 1995, p. 87) and incidentally, changes the terminology for representatives.

Clearly, workplace delegates are to be involved in bargaining but whether this is either exclusive or practicable is a moot point. As noted above, this level of government is typically entirely a matter for individual union prerogative. If a union has a clear position on this issue it may well be at a policy or custom and practice level. Anecdotal evidence suggests few powers, including bargaining authority, reside at workplace level and that the term 'workplace delegate' is not common in union rule books. On the matter of participatory democracy, Colgan and Ledwith (2002) point to the tension between Marxists and feminists on the location of participation. The former traditionally see the workplace as a vital location (Fairbrother 1986) while this can be problematic for women unionists. The Australian union movement has some distance to travel in articulating a clear position on participation, and indeed on representation, at workplace level. In pursuing this, it must also take up the challenge of the feminist perspective on participation.

Conclusion

Countries vary in the extent of compliance with the ILO Convention which treats union government as a union prerogative. The extent to which the state supports unions is not always the determining factor. In Australia, the formal aspects of union government, found in union rules, are essentially state property. They are rigorously monitored and often designed by the state, comprising a mix of parliament, the bureaucracy, and the judiciary. Gaps in state intervention mean residual union prerogative exists in relation to the workplace level of government and most industrial dispute decisions. While the labour movement challenged the state dominance in 1991, its union prerogative policy position was not pursued.

A damaging feature of the Australian legislature's role as architect has been the perception that adopting selective democracy measures is the antidote for alleged excesses of union

power. This nexus, together with frequent omnibus legislation, prevents a dispassionate consideration of the merits of democracy *per se* and of alternative models. If parliament wishes to continue as principal architect it should adopt a professionalism consistent with the role. Those constructing union democracy models may benefit from recognition of the competing, but not mutually exclusive, underlying principles - preference, civic and functional. Account must also be taken of new social concepts such as gender democracy and fair representation.

A world away from the legalism of union rule books and the exactitude of judicial decisions, Australian unions, in their peak council forum, have been reconfiguring union democracy, for the most part as a by-product of institutional goals and strategies. Challenges remain, however, to clarify the union vision in relation to member participation and to union government at workplace level, to incorporate new concepts such as gender democracy into the democracy model and to face the tensions between representative and participatory democracy which these new concepts accentuate.

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