Case 2:93-cv-07044-RSWL-GHK Document 432 Filed 01/04/19 Page 1 of 8 Page ID #:3\$00

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Unified School District ("LAUSD") alleging Defendant
LAUSD ("Defendant") did not comply with the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"). See Compl.,
ECF No. 1. Currently before the Court is Defendant's
Ex Parte Application for Leave to file a Third-Party
Complaint and Summons ("Application") against United
Teachers Los Angeles ("UTLA"). The Court, having
reviewed all papers and arguments submitted pertaining
to this Application, NOW FINDS AND RULES AS FOLLOWS:
the Court DENIES Defendant's Application.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit on behalf of students enrolled in the LAUSD alleging Defendant failed to comply with IDEA and state education laws. See Compl. The parties negotiated a settlement in 1996 via a consent decree to improve LAUSD's special education program. See ECF No. 84. On May 15, 2003, the parties agreed to a Modified Consent Decree ("MCD"). See ECF Nos. 265-266. An Independent Monitor ("IM") was appointed to ensure the MCD was implemented and achieved all of the proposed Outcomes. The IM is tasked with presenting an Annual Report to the Superintendent and Board of Education concerning the progress and effectiveness of the MCD implementation. See MCD \P 83, ECF No. 266. In 2013, two groups of Intervenors including April Munoz, Julia Flores, Cheryl Ayapana, and Mina Lee and Frances Moreno ("Intervenors"), filed Motions to Intervene [285, 300]

to protect their interests and were granted intervention as to the Individual Intervenors [387] in 2016.

On January 3, 2019, Defendant filed the instant Ex

Parte Application for Leave to file a Third-Party

Complaint and Summons [428] to bring UTLA into this

action as a Third-Party Defendant.² Plaintiffs filed an

Opposition [429] later that same day, and Intervenor

April Munoz filed a Response [430] on January 4, 2019.

II. DISCUSSION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14 provides that "[a] defending party may, as third-party plaintiff, serve a summons and complaint on a nonparty who is or may be liable to it for all or part of the claim against it." Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 14(a). If the defendant seeks to file a third-party complaint more than fourteen days after serving its original answer, it must file a motion and obtain leave of court before filing its third-party complaint. Id. "The decision whether to implead a third-party defendant is within

On October 15, 2013 and October 23, 2013, Intervenors filed a Motion to Intervene [285, 300]. On January 16, 2014, the Court denied these motions [359]. On May 20, 2016, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this Court's denial of the Motions to Intervene [366]. Smith, et al. v. Los Angeles Unified School District, et al. v. April Munoz, et al., Nos. 14-55224 and 14-55256 (9th Cir. May 20, 2016). On August 16, 2016, the Court granted Intervenors' Ex Parte Application granting intervention as to the individual Intervenors [387].

² The Court notes that Defendant, at this moment, is not seeking injunctive relief from the Court. Defendants seek only to implead UTLA and file a Third-Party Complaint.

the sound discretion of the district court." <u>Southwest</u>

<u>Administrators, Inc. v. Rozay's Transfer</u>, 791 F.2d 769,

777 (9th Cir. 1986).

Rule 14(a)'s purpose is judicial economy. Zero

Tolerance Entm't, Inc. v. Ferguson, 254 F.R.D. 123, 126

(C.D. Cal. 2008). Thus, "a third-party claim may be asserted only when the third-party's liability is in some way dependent on the outcome of the main claim and is secondary or derivative thereto." Stewart v. Am.

Int'l Oil & Gas Co., 845 F.2d 196, 200 (9th Cir. 1988).

Mere relation between the claims is insufficient; rather, a third-party claim "must be derivatively based on the original plaintiff's claim." Zero Tolerance, 254 F.R.D. at 126.

It is true that Rule 14 should be liberally construed to promote judicial economy and avoid piecemeal resolution of disputes. See, e.g., Martinez v. Transp. Mgmt. LLC, No. CV 08-00819-MMM (AJWx), 2008 WL 11338164, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2008) (citation omitted) ("Since the rule is designed to reduce the multiplicity of litigation, it is construed liberally in favor of allowing impleader."). This does not mean, however, that it is appropriate to authorize the filing of a third-party complaint if Defendant fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 14(a).

Here, Plaintiffs brought this Action against Defendant in 1993 for violations of IDEA, and the parties settled by 1996 via a consent decree.

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Plaintiffs and Defendant then entered into the MCD in 2003. Thus, it has been over fifteen years since Plaintiffs and Defendant settled their claims. Defendant now seeks to implead UTLA (as the bargaining representative for LAUSD employees) and file a Third-Party Complaint for claims regarding a strike of teachers, counselors, and psychologists that is set to commence January 10, 2019. Def.'s App. 1:12-22, ECF No. 428-1. Defendant argues that should the strike occur, Defendant will not be able to comply with the MCD.

UTLA has never been a party or relevant to this litigation in the twenty-five years since Plaintiffs brought their claims. |The only connection Defendant's proposed Third-Party Complaint against UTLA has to this case, is that the MCD was created as a result of this litigation. The extent of the Court's involvement in this case was overseeing the settlement agreement that created the MCD. The Court is not responsible for handling every possible noncompliance issue with the MCD, especially one that has not yet occurred. event LAUSD fails to comply with the MCD as a result of the strike, the procedure under the MCD requires a complaint to be filed with the IM first, and not the MCD \$14(a)-(b)|. The IM then attempts to Court. resolve the matter by mutual agreement with the parties, and if the parties cannot come to an agreement, the IM issues a binding decision. Id. §

14(b)-(g). Only in the event that a party does not comply with an order by the IM, can a party move the Court to enforce the order. Id. § 14(h). The Court thus serves as a last resort and cannot act on mere speculation that if the strike occurs, Defendant will fail to meet the MCD requirements. It is unclear whether the strike will happen, how long it would last, and what actual effects it would have on LAUSD's special education services.

While there is always a possibility that issues with compliance with the MCD or renegotiations as to its terms will arise, there is no present legal claim by Plaintiffs against Defendant. Because Plaintiffs' original claims have been settled, there is no main claim before the Court of which Defendant's claim against UTLA could be dependent on, as required by Rule 14. Irwin v. Mascott, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1056 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (quoting 6 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Section 1446 at 257 (1971 ed.)) ("For impleader to be permitted under Rule 14, the third-party plaintiff's claim must be dependent upon the outcome of the main claim.").

Even if Plaintiffs had commenced new claims against Defendant, Defendant fails to explain how UTLA would be legally liable to Defendant for Plaintiffs' claims.

Stewart, 845 F.2d at 200 (citation omitted) ("The crucial characteristic of a Rule 14 claim is that defendant is attempting to transfer to the third-party defendant the liability asserted against him by the

original plaintiff."); <u>Irwin</u>, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 1056 (same). Defendant is attempting, prematurely, to bring an unrelated party into a long-settled dispute without any explanation as to how UTLA would be legally liable to Defendant under the MCD or special education laws.

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The Court acknowledges that a strike could burden Defendant in its ability to provide services to students, however even the original Plaintiffs, representatives of a class of disabled students, oppose bringing UTLA into this "long-settled lawsuit with a consent decree." See \$1.'s Opp'n 1:1-7, ECF No. 429. The proposed Third-Party Complaint against UTLA is a new and independent claim that would inject facts and legal issues that have nothing to do with claims that were settled between Plaintiffs and Defendant over fifteen years ago. Defendant has failed to articulate its legal basis for its claims against UTLA, and the fact that Defendant's claims would arise from a potential violation of the MCD is insufficient to implead UTLA into this case. See, e.g., Irwin, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 1056 ("The mere fact that the alleged third-party claim arises from the same transaction or set of facts as the original claim is not enough."). Thus, Defendant's Application must be denied pursuant to Rule 14.3

³ Rather, Defendant's claims against UTLA are better suited to be brought in a separate, new action that is not barred by Rule 14's requirements.

III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court **DENIES** Defendant's Application. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: January 4, 2019 s/ RONALD S.W. LEW HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW Senior U.S. District Judge