The Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves, 1995: Ten Years Later

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The Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves, 1995:

Ten Years Later

By

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and
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Foreword

In 1995 Defence Minister David Collenette established the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves (SCRR) to advise him on how to improve the state of the Canadian Forces reserves.

He appointed retired Chief Justice Brian DICKSON, a wounded veteran of the Second World War to head the Commission, along with Lt.Gen (ret’d) Charles Belzile, former COMMANDER OF MOBILE COMMAND, and Jack Granatstein, Canadian military historian, as the Commission’s other members. The Defence Minister’s intent was to re-establish order, morale and purpose to the reserves after decades of neglect, indecision, underfunding, and loss of direction.

The SCRR criss-crossed the nation, AND heard hundreds of hours of testimony from both the military and civilians. They had access to thousands of documents from inside government and out, and they received private briefings from senior bureaucrats and commanders. At the end of the process, they issued their Report. It was intended to serve as the blueprint not only for restructuring the reserves, but also for laying out reserves policy into the foreseeable future. Although the Commission examined the state of all Canadian reserves forces – land, maritime, and air – the bulk of the Commission’s observations and recommendations concerned the army reserves, usually referred to in Canada as “the militia”.

Minister Collenette accepted ALMOST ALL OF the Commission’s findings and the Department of National Defence was charged with implementing them. Events did not transpire quickly or easily.

Much has changed in the world of the Canadian Forces reserves since 1995, indeed much has happened to the world in general and to the Canadian military in particular. Reserves restructure turned out to be far more complicated and contentious than anyone might have imagined in 1995. Thus, to mark the tenth anniversary of the SCRR Report, the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI), in cooperation with the University of Calgary’s Centre for Military and Strategic Studies commissioned the two surviving members of the Commission, Charles Belzile and Jack Granatstein to re-visit their original report, to evaluate the fate of that report, and to report to Canadians what has transpired in reserves reform over the past decade.

This they have now done. Their report – The Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves, 1995: Ten Years Later – is an important historical document in its own right. It should be read and studied by all Canadians, civilian and military, who are concerned about the future of Canada’s defences.

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Introduction

At the beginning of 1995, Canada’s defence budget had been shrinking for several years, Canadian Forces (CF) personnel strength was dropping quickly and, paradoxically, CF commitments abroad were increasing. The Cold War was over, but United Nations and other peace support operations were proliferating. At the same time, the Somalia Inquiry was tearing the CF military leadership apart and weakening public support for the Army. The Chrétien government, led by Finance Minister Paul Martin, was struggling to get the country’s budget deficits under control, and the CF was preparing itself to take a big hit, which it duly received again and again.

In this atmosphere of crisis, the relations between the Regular Army and the Militia (the reserves) should not have mattered very much—but they did. The Militia had a long and great history as the provider of leaders and soldiers for every Canadian campaign. More directly, its stalwart figures in 1995 were major players in Canadian public and corporate life, and these men were able to command attention in Ottawa. In addition, the minister of national defence, David Collenette, was aware of and amenable to pressure from honorary colonels, ordinary voters with military connections in his constituency, as well as others across the land. The Militia may not have been important militarily, as some regular soldiers claimed, but it was politically important.

Did the Militia matter militarily? Its strength in the spring of 1995 was 18,347 (against a paid ceiling of 19,957), and its units were spread across the country.¹ Most were woefully understrength*, top-heavy with majors, and suffering very high annual turnover rates. And yet, the Regular Army, stretched beyond endurance by overseas commitments, had been forced to rely ever more on reservists to augment its ranks. Between 1996 and August 2004, 4,976 army reservists deployed overseas with regular units.² (The great majority of regulars, more than

* The largest unit in 1995 was Les Fusiliers de Sherbrooke with a strength of 264; the smallest, each with strengths of 27, were the 21st Field Engineer Squadron in Flin Flon, MB, and 16 Medical Company Detachment in Regina, Sask. (Department of National Defence, Report of the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves (Ottawa, 1995), Appendices H-K, pp. 109ff.
usual, also deployed during these years.) For example, most infantry units dispatched to serve in the Former Yugoslavia had 20 percent of their strength from the Militia. At least one infantry unit, the 2nd Battalion of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry that fought the Medak Pocket battle against Croatian troops in September 1993, had half its strength from reserve units. This good showing ought to have won plaudits from senior reservists, but it only increased complaints. Their deployed personnel left the Militia on their return to Canada; because of their field service, they could not get along with Non Commissioned Members (NCMs) and officers who did not share their military experience. Some Militia personnel even complained that, because of their service overseas, reservists had come to respect the Regular Force! More seriously, the repeated deployments abroad wore out the regulars’ equipment, and the Militia’s stocks were “robbed” to make up shortfalls. Similarly, during this time of funding difficulties, the Militia’s share of the budget was used to make up shortfalls in the Army budget. The answer to that problem, many stalwarts claimed, was a separate Militia budget, administered by and for the Militia, not the Regular Force.³

Above all, the Militia complained that it had no clearly defined role. In the Second World War, the Militia had been the basis for the mobilization of the Army; all the units, except for the few Permanent Force regiments, had been raised by and bore the historic names of the Non-Permanent Active Militia units. By 1995, however, the Canadian Forces had no mobilization plan at all and, in the eyes of reservists, this threatened the very existence of the Militia. The Regulars called this nonsense—there was one Army with two components, and the job of the Militia was to deliver the augmentees the Regulars needed to flesh out their units’ ranks. The cultural divide was large and growing, relations had reached their nadir, a well-funded and active Militia lobby (Reserves 2000) was in the field and targeting MPs and Senators, and the government feared that this internecine fight could have political consequences.

In the time-honoured Canadian tradition of delaying difficult decisions, on April 5, 1995, the defence minister appointed a commission, the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves (SCRR), and charged it with examining the “need to restructure Canada’s Reserve
Forces, notably the Militia, with the aim of enhancing their ability to respond to requirements of the new global environment." To head it, Collenette secured the services of the former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, the Right Honourable Brian Dickson. Dickson had served in the artillery in Normandy, been grievously wounded in a “friendly fire” incident, and made his brilliant career in law despite constant pain and the loss of a leg. The Minister chose Lieutenant-General (Retired) Charles Belzile, a former Army commander, and Jack Granatstein, a graduate of the Royal Military College and a political and military historian from Toronto, as Dickson’s colleagues. Dickson’s avowed aim was to report "on time and under budget," an aim that the SCRR would achieve when it delivered its report on October 30, 1995.

The SCRR received extensive briefings in Ottawa and then traveled the country holding well-attended and frequently acrimonious hearings. The commissioners were struck by several factors: the success of the Naval Reserve in finding roles for its members, the imagination of the Air Force Reserve in creating new units, and the bitterness of Militia-Army relations. There were CF-wide problems in areas such as recruiting and pay that seemed all but hopeless, and the CF leadership at National Defence Headquarters appeared to have little or no interest in mobilization planning.

The Commission’s Report laid out an extensive array of recommendations, 41 in all. It noted that the Reserves were the Canadian Forces’ link to the community, a critical factor at a time when the Regular Force’s bases increasingly tended to be located away from Canada’s main urban areas. It spoke out on the need to fix pay and recruiting, and offered recommendations on the Air and Naval Reserve.

Most of its attention, however, inevitably focused on the Militia. The SCRR proposed the creation of a paper corps structure, with regionally organized Militia brigades. It called for the testing of unit viability and effectiveness and for subsequent tactical and administrative consolidation of militia units with the hope and expectation that increased unit strength could lead to better and more advanced training. It called for mobilization planning, declaring that its absence “seems very imprudent” for any nation. The Militia’s role in Stages 3 and 4 of
mobilization planning, the stages that constituted preparation for a crisis or war, was essential. In addition, while supporting the augmentation role, the Commission also called for the Militia to be tasked to provide formed sub-units (sections, platoons, and perhaps eventually companies) for overseas deployments.\(^5\)

The government accepted most of the SCRR recommendations and eventually set up the Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) project. The CF created Militia brigades, but not a corps, and began a process of unit evaluation.\(^6\) Almost nothing was done to begin serious mobilization planning however, and the sniping between Regulars and Militia, far from disappearing as Minister Collenette had hoped, increased. Collenette’s successors, Doug Young and Art Eggleton, faced continuing pressure from Reserve 2000’s hugely effective ranks. Two successive Chiefs of Land Staff, Lieutenant-Generals Leech and Baril, made abortive efforts to fix the problem, the first by fiat, the second by a consultative process; neither succeeded despite good intentions. In the meantime, Militia strength collapsed, diving as low as 11,000 by 1999 according to some accounts. At the same time, CF and Army planners began to talk of “re-rolling” a large part of the Militia into providers of Combat Service Support; Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC); Public Affairs, Chemical, Bacteriological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN); Psychological Operations (PsyOps); or Intelligence units.

This scheme created enormous resistance from Reserves 2000 and its friends. Further, the Minister’s Monitoring Committee (MMC), headed by Hon. John Fraser and set up in 1997 to watch over the recommendations made in a series of studies of the CF, produced a succession of reports that focused on the Militia’s problems and what it sometimes perceived as the Army’s mendacity. In particular, the MMC’s 2000 report, *In Service of the Nation: Canada’s Citizen Soldiers for the 21st Century*, forced the Army leadership to move in a more conciliatory way.

Lieutenant-General Mike Jeffery, named in May 2000 as the Special Adviser to the Chief of the Defence Staff for Land Force Reserve Restructuring and the Chief of Land Staff-designate, took hold of the issue. He put more resources and push into the LFRR process and set up the Project Manager’s Office, and finally began to fix the Reserve’s problems and deal
with the mistrust. In the LFRR Strategic Plan, issued in October 2000 by the Minister, re-rolling the Reserve largely disappeared (though capacities such as CIMIC, PsyOps and CBRN became add-ons to, rather than replacements for, existing capacities) as did the SCRR’s proposed tactical and administrative consolidation of units.*

Jeffery proposed a phased plan, which the government endorsed, to stabilize the Militia and to change and grow the Land Force Reserve back toward a total paid strength of 18,500 so that it could function within Jeffery’s Future Army Development Plan and take its proper place within his ideas of “managed readiness.” Although everything depended on funding, which is never certain in Ottawa, General Jeffery and his Project Manager for LFRR, Major-General Ed Fitch (promoted from brigadier-general soon after he was named to the job in November 2001) had at last seized control of the issue. Over time, the poisonous nature of the infighting was drawn out of the system by extensive consultations that treated “stakeholders,” such as Reserves 2000 and the Honorary Colonels, as a key part of the process, and progress on reformation began to take hold.† The strength of the Army Reserve began to rebound: it was close to its target of 15,500 by the end of Phase 1 in March 2003 and within a few hundred soldiers of the Phase 2 target of 17,000 by the end of Fiscal Year 2004-05.‡ The Martin government’s February 2005 budget promised the funds needed to grow the Militia to 18,500 by March 31, 2007. At the same time, as detailed below, planning for managed readiness, with its manifold effects on the Army Reserve, was in full swing.

* Current planning for an Army Reserve of 18,500 is beginning (Spring 2005) to look at “optimization” of establishment. If units are not in the right place, e.g., or if they cannot generate a CO from within their ranks, perhaps they should—temporarily? permanently?—be absorbed by another unit. Whether the Reserves will accept this remains uncertain.
† Some Army Reserve officers are concerned that the influence of stakeholders such as Reserves 2000 and Honourary Colonels has relegated senior serving Army Reserve officers to subsidiary roles and even impotence. This should be a concern for the Army leadership. Confidential source.
‡ Contrary to this generally rosy picture, BGen S.A.S. Beare, commanding Land Forces Western Area, noted that reserve strength in his area was 3253 – “our lowest level in the past five years.” (“A Message to LFWA Leaders on Training in our Reserve Force,” 26 Jan 05). LFWA’s problem, some senior reservists say, were due to the lack of training opportunities and bad management in militia brigades. (Email from a senior reservist, 20 May 05.) The boom in Alberta and economic statis in Saskatchewan and Manitoba no doubt also contributed.
This paper, prepared by the two surviving SCRR commissioners (Chief Justice Dickson died in 1998) picks up the story at this point. We do not have the space, nor did we feel it necessary, to examine every subject or re-trace every recommendation the SCRR considered. Instead we discuss the issues that we consider important today. Not surprisingly, most of our focus remains on the Army Reserve. At the same time we have not hesitated to address new issues that have arisen since the SCRR reported a decade ago. For the sake of avoiding possible misunderstandings, we wish to point out that this paper was completed on June 30, 2005; subsequent developments are not considered.

J.L. Granatstein

Charles Belzile
I) Mobilization

The Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves (SCRR) considered the question of mobilization planning most seriously. Its recommendations were straightforward:

4. The Commission recommends that a national mobilization plan be drafted and put in place with all dispatch.

5. The Commission recommends that the definition of stages 3 and 4 in the four phase mobilization scheme set out in 1994 White Paper on Defence be amended immediately to reflect clearly defined roles for the Reserve Force, and especially the Militia, as the basis for recruitment, training, and the provision of formed units required in the event of a major conflict.

The SCRR believed that every sovereign nation in its own self-interest needed a full mobilization plan covering all foreseeable contingencies. It believed that the Army Reserve, in particular, needed mobilization planning as the very justification for its existence: namely, to be the generator for the land forces Canada would need in the event of a major war or great national crisis. This is still essential for Canada and the Army Reserve.

Today, the very word “mobilization” has largely passed from use. To Canadian politicians and military planners it is apparently too redolent of the Great War, the Second World War, and conscription. The new word employed at National Defence Headquarters is “activation.” Activation, in truth, may be a better term than mobilization to cover forces-in-being. Thus Land Forces’ planning encompasses Stages 1, 2, and 3 of activation, which are the same as Stages 1, 2, and 3 of mobilization. Stage 3 of activation still calls for selective activation of individuals and units by call-up under the terms of an order-in-council.

Activation, as a word or a concept, does not, however, apply to any contingency that may call for rapid national expansion of Canadian military capabilities in the event of a global crisis.
Thus, Stage 4 of mobilization, as called for by the SCRR—a declared national emergency with the mobilization of all the CF’s Reserves—is nowhere to be found (not just in National Defence Headquarters but anywhere in the Government of Canada’s emergency planning). The intention is to use Stage 3 activation as the pinnacle of mobilization planning and, as necessary, to stamp out as many Stage 3 activations as necessary. Another way of putting this is that no planning is being done for a major war.

This is shortsighted in the extreme. A military that thinks in terms of turning itself into a great host in a crisis is very different from one that is small, thinks small, and plans for very little.* The Canadian Forces needs a plan.

The lack of a full-scale mobilization plan is also, as suggested above, very dangerous for the survival of the Army Reserve. Without a guarantee of its role as the generator of citizen soldiers and of formed units in a great national crisis, one of the most important reasons for the continuance of the Militia is in jeopardy. This could be the catalyst for another outburst of Reserve-Regular antipathy. The Minister of National Defence must direct the CF to undertake Stage 4 “activation” planning now.†

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* BGen (retd) Kip Kirby put it neatly: “Preparation for the worst case will automatically prepare the Canadian Forces for any lesser instance.” That, to us, is the essence of mobilization planning. (Memorandum, “In Defence of Canada: Reserves,” 2 Apr 05.

† The Air Force “is developing mobilization plans…required to mobilize the Air Force to Stage 3 mobilization,” or so says the Department of National Defence, Air Reserve Development Strategy (2005), p. 37/46. We have been unable to discover the Navy’s plans other than one reference: “The naval reserve does not exist solely as a basis for mobilisation. Instead, its value is in the assignment to it of specified tasks within the Total Force.…” (VAdm G. Maddison, Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020 (Ottawa, 2001), p. 115.) We believe the Navy and Air Force, indeed the Canadian Forces and Canadian Government as a whole, must be engaged in Stage 4 mobilization planning.
II) Pay

“The most pervasive, oft-repeated complaint” that the SCRR heard in its hearings in 1995 concerned reservist pay. The Canadian Forces simply seemed unable to get pay to its Reserve Force personnel on time or with the calculations correctly made.

This problem has been fixed competently, thanks to hard work that dates back to the late 1990s. There are still occasional difficulties, but the Reserve pay system now works as it should, and reservists, as the Special Commission recommended in 1995, receive 85 percent of the regulars’ pay scale. Moreover, the complaints about paid days of service (in 1995, it was common for these to be under 30 days per year) have disappeared. The norm now is 37.5 days per year as a minimum during the September-May training cycle, plus seven days collective training (summer concentration) and, effectively, as much summer employment as individual reservists want.

There has also been much improvement in benefits paid to reservists, ranging from dental coverage to a reserve pension that comes into effect in 2005; an education gratuity that provides as much as $2,000 a year to a career maximum of $8,000 for post-secondary education; and a Reserve Force retirement gratuity. There are still wrinkles in these systems to be ironed out, but in the last decade, the pay and benefits system has been transformed.

III) Recruitment

Unfortunately, the transformation that took place in the pay system has not happened for the recruitment process. In 1995, the SCRR called for a scheme of conditional enrolment so that individuals joining the Reserve Force could begin training before their reliability checks were completed. The SCRR urged that the recruitment process be speeded up so that it could be completed in one month. Complaints from reservists in every component of the Forces, however, have not ceased; indeed they have reached a crescendo, and the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group (CFRG) remains the target of bitter comment. What is seen as the overly bureaucratic and risk averse culture of CF recruiting (and indeed of all CF Human Resources policies) now
ranks as the major reservist grievance, so much so that the CF Ombudsman has been studying the problem and reporting unfavourably on the recruiting system. “The recruiting centres are spinning out of control,” Ombudsman André Marin said in January 2005, "trying to pretend there is not an issue.”11 One senior officer believes that as many as 30 percent of recruits are lost to the Army Reserve because of months-long delays; even those re-joining the Reserves, sometimes after overseas deployments, are subject to long delays and new security clearances.12 As another officer observed, “we must orient the culture of recruiters to recognize potential recruits as a valuable resource to be treated with respect. Wasting the time of an individual is not respectful.”13

We do not want to suggest that recruiting is a simple matter. The Canadian Forces Recruiting Group has said that of 24,000 Reserve applications for the CF, 2,100 were rejected on medical grounds, 1,600 on aptitude and 7 percent for drug use. The screening generated 9,000 potential candidates of whom 4,500 were suitable applicants, and 4,200 were enrolled. One quarter of this number were put on the Reserve books in six days, another quarter in seven to 16 days, and a third quarter in 17 to 43 days. The remainder took more than two months. 14 Still, the complaints persist—and increase.

Many suggestions have been made on how best to repair matters within the existing system—the Land Force Reserve Restructure process has been agitating for remediation at least since 1998 and Reserves 2000 also produced a long paper on the subject. One effective scheme, devised by the LFRR Project Manager’s Office in 2004, tested 1,000 Army Reserve recruits. It dramatically reduced the time taken by the recruiting process. Fundamentally the scheme worked this way: potential recruits with no declared physical deficiencies and no apparent security difficulties could be locally enrolled after a period as short as three to five days. Upon enrollment they would draw uniform, began training, and start to earn pay. If questions were later raised nationally about a medical condition or a security concern the local recruiters would attempt to address them while training continued. If a medical or a security problem was deemed insoluble, the recruit could be readily released. The experiment has been deemed to be
a success, and the expedited medical screening used in that trial has been ordered implemented Forces-wide in a Canadian Forces General Order (CANFORGEN) of 20 May 2005.\textsuperscript{15}

**IV) Transferring From One Component of the CF to the Other**

If there are some signs that the recruiting system may be in the early stages of being brought under control, there are still very few signs that the Canadian Forces will readily permit a member of the Regular Force to join the Reserves or vice versa. There are even fewer indications that a permeable membrane will be put in place to allow a soldier to join the Reserves, for example, transfer to the Regular Force for five years, return to the Reserves, and then transfer to the Regulars once again. Recommendation 32 of the Report of the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves saw such permeability as the ideal way to maximize the talent at the disposal of the entire CF, while simultaneously allowing those who serve in it the maximum flexibility. The needs of the service must take precedence, of course, but ordinarily there should be room to permit an individual with an ill spouse, for example, or for a junior officer seeking a graduate degree, to temporarily move to the Reserves without sacrificing either time in rank or pensionable status.

At present there is one proposal, originating in the LFRR Project Manager’s Office, for a new “human resources vision” for the Land Forces.\textsuperscript{16} A young man or woman would join the Army and choose one of three options—full-time, short engagement full-time, or part-time service. The full-time recruit would be paid and trained on a continuous basis and be deployable as regular CF members are now. The part-time recruit would train as reservists now do and receive pay and benefits as those on full-time service do based on their time on active service. Part-time recruits would be maintained at various states of readiness; as a minimum, all would be available to be deployed on humanitarian Domestic Operations on short notice.

What is new is the third category—the short-term full time engagement basis. Under this proposal a recruit would contract for up to one year of full-time training. After one year, the individual and the army would agree on the career path: full-time service, part-time service, or
transfer to the Supplementary Reserve for up to five years. Those who elect the part-time route would transfer to a Reserve unit. Thereafter, as the proposal suggests, movement between components of the Army would be by posting message after evaluation of qualifications and training needs. “An individual will be recruited only once during this life-long relationship,” in effect creating the permeable membrane between full and part-time service that is so necessary. The proposal goes on to declare that all personnel “should intend to be deployed during their career,” though some individuals, of course, would serve in units of higher readiness than others. Individual soldiers could move from low to high readiness units (or from high to low) as their military/civilian career path changes and develops. This scheme maintains the existing common recruiting standard, but would establish a single pay system with a common base pay and increments for commitment, training, and experience, and would obviate the present requirement for separate HR systems for regulars and reservists.

This proposal merits full study not just in the Land Forces but throughout the CF. It offers the possibility to streamline HR management, pay and recruiting, and achieves both cost savings and the flexibility of career management that individuals in the 21st Century demand. It would also serve the nation’s needs better than the existing system. All that is needed is the will to challenge entrenched bureaucratic practices.

V) Supplementary Reserves

The Supplementary Reserve (SR) was established as a list of trained officers and Non-Commissioned Members (NCMs), both Regular and Reserve, to be recalled in the event of a particular CF need or a national emergency and subsequent mobilization. There is a compelling logic to such an organization: expensively trained personnel could be recalled to the colours and prepared for active service in a shorter period and at far less cost than preparing an untrained civilian for duty. The difficulty is that the Supplementary Reserve (amalgamated in 2000 to comprise both the Supplementary Ready Reserve and the Supplementary Holding Reserve that existed in 1995) simply does not function effectively.
At a time when the military faces personnel shortfalls and an acute lack of specialists, the Canadian Forces incredibly does not even maintain accurate lists of retired personnel with up-to-date addresses. Estimates are that as many as 10,000 highly qualified and all but irreplaceable officers and NCMs will retire or leave the CF in the next five years. If Canada faced an emergency, the CF would be dependent on the goodwill and public spirit of these former members to step forward. This is simply not acceptable. A resource that could and should be invaluable—both because of the need for gap-filling that the undermanned CF faces every day and in the inevitable event of a crisis—is being squandered for want of direction and will, and a few clerks to keep records up to date.

Every person who joins the CF, regular or reserve, should be advised that, if the CF wishes, she or he will be attached to the SR on leaving the military until the compulsory retirement age. Such individuals should retain their uniforms and identity cards and be obliged to pass changes of address and status on to National Defence Headquarters. A nominal cash inducement (it was $300 until it was eliminated in 1994) might also be considered to encourage SR members to report to the nearest Reserve or Regular unit of their service for an annual briefing and to send in their data willingly.

The SCRR recommendation of 1995, therefore, remains to be implemented. Indeed it is even more urgent today:

17. The Commission recommends that it be a condition of joining the Canadian Forces that all trained personnel, officers, and NCMs, regular and Reserve, will be enrolled in the Supplementary …Reserve on leaving the Canadian Forces....

VI) Reserve Entry Training Programme

Ten years ago, the Commission looked at the Reserve Entry Training Programme (RETP), a scheme that aimed to send young men and women to the Royal Military College (RMC) of Canada but without the commitment to serve for five years after graduation in the Regular Forces that all other graduates have. The following recommendation was made:
37. The Commission recommends that, for RETP graduates, the required term of Primary Reserve service ought to be five years in the first 10 years after graduation. If such service is not secured, then all the real cost of the education received should be treated as a repayable loan.

In the intervening decade, the RETP has come to allocate spaces for up to 15 cadets each year at RMC (out of a cadet body of 950 in all). Such cadets receive support from the RMC Club (the ex-cadets’ organization) of $2,500 in first year, regardless of academic standing, and $500 in each subsequent year, providing they maintain second class academic standing and a “B” military assessment. Some of the RETP cadets are varsity athletes recruited to RMC, but all RETP cadets benefit from a heavily subsidized programme paid for with tax dollars: they pay only $5,000 a year for tuition and rations and quarters; they are also paid on summer training at the same rate as Regular Officer Training Plan cadets. The upshot is that, with the RMC Club grants, RETP cadets might well receive the least costly university education in Canada.

RETP is a useful programme that should be increased because it can provide well-trained junior officers to the Reserves. The difficulty is that RETP cadets make only a “moral” commitment to serve; predictably, some take this seriously, but some do not. All (or all except those who might join the regular forces) must do so, because the fiscal support for such cadets has increased while the moral obligation to serve appears to have decreased over the intervening decade. Therefore, SCRR Recommendation 37 of 1995 remains to be implemented and should be implemented. The RMC Club supports this position.

VII) Job Protection Legislation

The vast majority of SCRR recommendations were adopted by the government in whole or in large part. One that was not, however, was the Commission’s call for job protection legislation:

41. The Commission recommends that job protection legislation be drafted and presented to Parliament as soon as possible. The Bill should address, at a minimum, providing additional time (with or without pay) for reserve training, as well as obliging an employer
to accommodate, if reasonably possible, a reservist’s request for longer-term leave (without pay) for the purpose of participating in Canadian Forces operations.

The Commission’s concern was that reservists might be called up or volunteer for service overseas or in Canada and lose their jobs. SCRR members recognized the small size of the CF Reserves and the fact that a large percentage of reservists were university or college students who, in most cases, could readily take a year off. But in 1995 the primary concern was the specialists whose skills help the CF work and fight.

In 2002 the government brought in The Public Safety Act (Bill C-17) which proposed to protect reservists’ civilian employment in the event they were called to service in certain armed emergencies.\textsuperscript{20} It did nothing more. While the Public Safety Act (its regulations on job protection not yet promulgated) seemed to be a step forward, it still left the protection of most reservists’ jobs in “non-emergency service” to the voluntary work of the Canadian Forces Liaison Council. This is insufficient, especially now when reservists’ participation in the Army’s managed readiness planning is essential for success.

In the current CF planning for deployments abroad, Task Forces of some 1,000 personnel are to be formed and trained for standing contingencies and for specific operations (See below). Planning provides for different mixes of personnel and capabilities depending on the particular mission, but all such Task Forces will train and be deployed for a minimum of 12 to 13 months in total and all will include from 10 to 15 percent reservists. So strapped are the regular forces for personnel that the CF’s deployed units will for all practical purposes be unable to function without reservists, some of whom will be specialists. Operations such as service in Afghanistan, Haiti or the Balkans are not covered by the job protection clauses of The Public Safety Act of 2002, which apply only to emergencies in Canada. In such circumstances, and without a guarantee of employment on return to Canada, why would a reservist with a good civilian job accept a posting overseas?

If the government proposes to deploy forces abroad in the future, as it will, and if the CF needs reservists for such forces, as it will, then \textbf{real} job protection legislation is essential. No one
doubts that job protection works best when it is not needed. Nonetheless, the United States military is struggling to guarantee the jobs of the reservists it deploys abroad, as it must. Can Canada do any less?

VIII) Domestic Operations

When the SCRR did its work in 1995, the idea of Homeland Defence, or Domestic Operations as it is now termed at NDHQ, was limited in concept. The CF had often played a role in dealing with floods or other natural disasters; in the early years of Confederation, the military had tried to preserve order in confrontations between labour and capital. Many senior Militia officers vividly remembered the National Survival fiasco of the Diefenbaker years that saw the Militia stripped of its military roles and turned into a post-nuclear attack rescue force. No one wanted to return to that scenario that devastated Militia morale. But after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, the concept of Domestic Operations for the CF assumed a new dimension and urgency. The 2005 Defence Policy paper declared that “the first priority of our military will be the defence of Canada;” in late June, the CF established Canada Command with this as its task. After 9/11 there was a new urgency to defending the homeland.

The CF Reserves are ideally placed for this task with their units found in more than 110 communities, large and small, and in every province. In the event of a terrorist attack in Toronto, Montreal or Vancouver, for example, the presence of one or two thousand trained reservists will certainly be invaluable to the civil authority in preserving public order and in tasks of rescue, containment and clean-up. Wisely, the Land Forces made such duties an add-on responsibility—not the sole role—for the Army Reserve.

The Army Reserve has been pro-active in the Domestic Operations role, designating unit commanding officers or Militia brigade commanders to do community-level contingency planning or, in other words, to establish links with the civil authorities and prepare security platoons; Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) platoons; and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) teams to work with them. In addition, as many as 120 community planning officers will be based
in cities and towns to work with the civilian authorities. One practice demonstration of CBRN potential in the Army Reserve, for example, was held successfully in downtown Ottawa in November, 2004.

Unfortunately, the Army Reserve has not been successful in persuading the Air and Naval Reserve organizations to cooperate with it in planning for these tasks (although all Reserve components did cooperate in Y2K preparations and some Naval Divisions have struck informal working arrangements with the Army Reserve). This is deeply disturbing, although the Defence Policy paper (2005) emphasis on Canada "as a single operational area" and the creation of joint regional headquarters under Canada Command will begin to remedy this concern.

The Minister of National Defence and the Chief of the Defence Staff must follow through with their plans and press the commander of the new Canada Command to direct all the CF’s Reserve components urgently to develop joint plans for Domestic Operations. Nothing less will serve the needs of the Canadian nation and people.*

* The unified Canada Command was established on June 28, 2005.
Service-Specific Concerns

I) The Naval Reserve

In 1995, the SCRR considered the Naval Reserve to be the most successful of the CF Reserve components. It had a defined role, manning 10 Kingston-class Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDVs) on a full time basis, and it provided Harbour Defence Units, Convoy Commodore Units, and Naval Control of Shipping Units as required. Its total effective strength then was 4,341. Its tasks today consist of manning six of the MCDVs and providing two Port Inspection Diving Teams on a full-time basis, and manning four Port Security Units and four Naval Control of Shipping Units as required. Increasingly, as the Navy’s strategy document states in referring to these capabilities, the Navy Reserve “will provide those skills not (or minimally) held by the regular force.” Current authorized strength is 5,130 in 24 Naval Reserve divisions across the country; actual strength is 3,943 with 1,240 officers and NCMs employed on Class B (full-time) or C (full-time deployed) service; of the remaining 2,703 Class A (traditional part-time) reservists, almost 800 are still unqualified in their first trade course. In other words, a trained Naval Reserve of 3,100 has 40 percent of its strength on full-time service. This situation, caused by funding shortfalls (and to some extent by difficulty “recruiting to enroll a dwindling number of applicants to meet growing production requirements”) is unsustainable.

The Navy recognizes that too many of its reservists are employed on full-time service. The result has been what some in the Reserve Divisions across the country have categorized as two Navy Reserves: one made up of Class B reservists, most of whom serve on the MCDVs, and the Naval Division Class A reservists who cannot readily reach the competencies achieved by their Class B colleagues when they are deployed to the MCDVs. This is not surprising (and it mirrors the experiences of the Army Reserve). The MCDVs now have complex operational roles that make the requirement for full-time crews on a two or three-year posting all but essential, but it is almost certainly proving to be a strain on morale because there is insufficient training time available to accommodate the very large number of Class A sailors and officers who must
be updated on various skills. As a result, significant numbers of trained but ultimately frustrated personnel have departed the Naval Reserve. A large experience gap exists between Class A personnel and Class B and C personnel even though on paper it may appear that they have the same or similar qualifications.\(^ {31}\)

Morale has also suffered—for Class B or C reservists—when decisions on the extension of their employment were delayed, fostering the widespread sense of an overly bureaucratic, inefficient administrative system. The cause of all problems is widely perceived to be the persistent budget shortfall that affects all components of the CF and greatly hampers training. And, as the long years of training required hurts retention of Maritime Surface and Sub-Surface (MARS) and Maritime Engineering System Operator (MESO) reservists, this has been and remains a serious problem. There are also difficulties with amount of time at sea, unpredictable sailing schedules, and a lack of realistic team training.\(^ {32}\)

These problems matter, not least because the responsibilities of the Naval Reserve are going to increase. The government’s National Security Policy of April 2004 announced the creation of interagency Maritime Security Operations Centres in Halifax and Victoria for which the Navy will have primary responsibility. There will be a need for more naval intelligence officers, and the Reserve has been charged with training and supplying them. Moreover, new ORCA vessels—approximately 30 metres long, capable of 18 knots, and with crews of approximately twenty—are on order. The Naval Reserve hopes and expects that its Class A reservists will be able to command and crew such vessels, which will operate in domestic waters and undoubtedly have a role in the nation’s marine security.

II) The Air Force Reserve

The Air Reserve mandate is “To provide a flexible, responsive and reliable contribution to Air Force capabilities where and when required.” In 1995, the SCRR reported that Air Reserve strength was 1,469; today it is approximately 2,390, 23 percent of whom are officers.\(^ {33}\) Significantly, 70 percent of Air reservists are former regulars,\(^ {34}\) a fact that contributes to the
Director General Air Reserve’s claim that “in contrast to their reserve force counterparts in the army reserve and naval reserve,” Air reservists “meet fundamentally the same training and qualification standards as their Regular Force colleagues.” As a result, the average age of Air reservists is just under 45.

All Canadian Air Force units are “Total Force,” integrating regulars and reservists. Nonetheless, three flying squadrons, including two helicopter squadrons that support the Army, are “reserve-heavy,” and there is one reserve-heavy Airfield Engineering Squadron (Bridgewater, NS). The Air Reserve, moreover, is integrated into the Air Force’s Contingency Capability (CCap) organization that provides support elements for expeditionary operations abroad and service at home. CCap Headquarters is commanded by a reservist.

The SCRR’s enthusiastic support in 1995 for more reservist Contingency Support Wings was derailed by downsizing and budget cuts; Airfield Engineering Flights, however, were established in four locations across the country. With its expeditionary focus, CCap aims to create a defined readiness cycle (not dissimilar to that which the Army is putting in place) and to make the Air Reserve responsible for a significant part of this.

Certainly, high demands have recently been placed on the Air Reserve, directing fighter operations over Canada after 9/11, for example, or flying Griffon helicopters in support of Army operations abroad. In November 2004, 21 Air Force reservists were on deployment abroad, a decline from the numbers of March 2004 which resulted from a reduction in operational tempo. These are small numbers when compared to deployed Land Force reservists, to be sure, but many more Air reservists were employed on domestic operations, estimated at some 45 to 50 person years on CF deployments or roughly 20 percent “of Air Force personnel supporting contingency operations and incremental tasks…. The Director General Air Reserve, Brigadier General Robert Clark, noted that the heavy use of reservists had led some to describe the Air Reserve as “a secondary full-time force.” (At any one time “over 40% of the Air Reserve can be on full-time service….”) This partial mobilization of the Air Reserve, he said, was directly attributable to downsizing and budget constraints, a situation that had forced the Air Force to
move many reservists to full-time Class B service. As we have already seen, this reliance on Class B service is not unique to the Air Reserve.

General Clark believes that “this high level of air reserve ‘surge’ generation is not sustainable within existing funding allocations in the long-term...” The implications of these budgetary problems are clear: the Air Force has been forced to define its Reserve as “a part-time organization with the capacity to surge for limited periods when required.” Whether the Air Reserve will get the funding it needs to achieve even this goal is uncertain. If the Air Force is to be able to sustain its role in future Canadian expeditionary forces and joint national operations, the Regulars and Reserves will both require more money. Moreover, like the other services, the Air Force needs to take steps to create a more permeable membrane between its Regular and Reserve components, in order to build a system that readily allows officers and NCMs to move in ways that serve both service and personal interests.

III) The Communications Reserve

The SCRR briefly examined the Communications Reserve which, in 1995, was more than a quarter century old and controlled by the Defence Information Services Organization. The Commission found it anomalous that a staff agency commanded units, and it recommended that command and control of Reserve field signals units be returned to Land Forces Command. This recommendation was not accepted.

Today, the Communications Reserve with its 2,200 personnel strength is found at National Defence Headquarters under the Assistant Deputy Minister Information Management Group, yet another staff agency commanding units. This is an anomaly that should be corrected. Members of the Communications Reserve train as soldiers and dress as soldiers; they ought to be commanded by soldiers. Senior reservists still complain that it is a struggle to get signals support for their exercises; this should not be.

The first priority for the Communications Reserve is to support the regular forces, which is certainly more than acceptable in the CF’s straitened circumstances. On a recent deployment
to Afghanistan, Colonel Chris Weicker, commander of the Communications Reserve, noted that there were 28 reservists; at the UN operation on the Golan Heights, approximately half the communications personnel are reservists. “We see ourselves as a force generator for the Regular Force,” Weicker said, “and that is our mission.”

The second priority is providing support to the Reserves and, according to the figures in the Communications Reserve Development Plan 2004-2009, the army used 4,920 of 6,506 Class A personnel days, or more than 75 percent of Communications Reserve time. The Air and Naval Reserves took the remainder. The high concentration on supporting the Army Reserve reinforces the contention that the signals units that work with the Land Forces Reserves should be under Army command. Very simply, assets that are immediately required on a continuing basis, such as communications, should be provided as an integral part of establishment. In other words, a Land Forces Reserve Brigade needs its signals unit under its command and control.

Moreover, as the Army Reserve increases toward its goal of 18,500 personnel, Communications Reserve strength similarly must rise. Eliminating redundant bureaucracy may make that growth more attainable and sustainable. This should be the goal of the CF and the Department of National Defence. Anything that increases the paper burden and puts obstacles in the way of the most efficient use of resources, especially for the Reserves, should be pared away.
IV) The Health Services Reserve

The CF’s Medical Services have been in difficulty for some years, subject to repeated reorganizations and personnel difficulties. These issues fall outside the mandate of this “paper”. However, a few years ago the CF replicated its approach to the Communications Reserve and created the CF Health Services Reserve as a separate component of the Reserve Force, incorporated medical and dental officers into its ranks, and put it under a brigadier-general, the Director General Health Services at NDHQ. This too creates an anomaly in that military personnel are under the command of a staff agency. The same reasons that require the Communications Reserve to be under army command apply with equal force to the Health Services Reserve. Field Ambulances work with Land Force Reserve brigades and should normally be under their command.

It appears, however, that because of a critical shortage of qualified personnel, the Health Services Reserve finds itself in a situation where the command and control arrangements described above might hinder its ability to support deployed elements, particularly in the provision of clinicians. This shortage of resources forces the Health Services’ hands when it comes to calling out qualified personnel from all environments to form mission elements. It is also obvious to regulars and reservists that the CF Health Services will find the Managed Readiness concept now being implemented very difficult, if not impossible, to follow. The Health Services Reserve now must call out its personnel for periods as short as six weeks to meet training and operational requirements and must do so each time the medical support assigned for a deployment is being tailored. Such difficulties can only increase in the coming months as the CF is preparing for new tasks.

* One retired Medical Services colonel complained that the CF medical system now “is a bean-counter driven hybrid system encompassing Canadian military and proprietary, contractual civilian resources and a plethora of foreign military and civilian health care providers …the Canadian service man and woman of today no longer has the nation’s assurance that should they fall sick or become wounded they will be tended to by their own nation’s doctors and nurses….” Email to Granatstein, 30 Mar 05. On the other hand, most of those CF personnel who have used foreign military hospitals overseas have been greatly impressed by the standard of care.
Whatever the ultimate fate of this component of the Reserves, the strength of the Health Services Reserve (now some 1,300 with a projected increase to 1,400 or 1,500) must increase along with the Army Reserve’s strength.

V) The Army Reserve

No one doubts that the overall condition and morale of the Land Force Reserves is better than it was in 1995. For the first time in years, the Regular Army now takes the Reserves seriously, or so most senior reservists believe. There is satisfaction with the LFRR leadership and process, and some of the problems of a decade ago have been satisfactorily resolved: pay and the once offensive (in the eyes of reservists) attitude of Regulars to Reserves, to cite just two examples. Reserve commanders are no longer upset by reservists joining the Regulars, though since units have to budget for training and courses, they would be delighted to receive recognition when that happens. Similarly, where once there had been complaints about the deployed reservists who return to their units, now the talk is of the benefits reservists who had been deployed bring to their Reserve unit. While it might mix metaphors to say there has been a sea change in the way the Army Reserve sees itself today, indeed there has.

But nothing is perfect. It remains a key point of the Army Reserve community that mobilization planning is necessary and is not being proceeded with. The priorities for the militia as laid down by Defence Minister Art Eggleton in 2000—mobilization, the role of the Army Reserve as the footprint of the Army throughout the nation, and the use of reservists for augmentation of the Regular Force—are still the right ones in the eyes of reservists. They are surely correct; the focus on managed readiness cannot be allowed to overshadow these essential tasks. Reservists also continue to have serious concerns about recruiting, and about the state of their equipment. If they are to be of the most use to the Army and to the nation, the reservists have to train with the same kit used by the regulars. This would save time and money in the training of reservists for deployment and speed up mobilization (or activation, as it is now called), whenever that might become necessary (As described below, present plans call for
reservists who are to deploy with the Army’s two standing task forces to train at the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre at Wainwright - to be opened sometime in 2006. They will train on the same equipment as the rest of those task forces, but other Army reservists won’t).

Should mobilization be necessary, the Army Reserve will need university and college-educated officers. The SCRR was concerned that the Canadian Officers Training Corps had disappeared from campuses and, while it did not make it a recommendation, it declared that a military presence on university campuses was important. Land Forces have now established a link with Mount Allison University in Sackville, N.B. The LFRR also plans to include 36 positions to “Connect with Universities” and encourage students to enlist in the Reserve.52

The SCRR Report urged that Militia units prepare sections, platoons, and eventually companies for overseas service. There has been substantial progress in this respect. For example, Land Forces Western Area had a composite Reserve company with platoon-sized representation from the Calgary Highlanders and the Loyal Edmonton Regiment for Bosnian service on Roto 11 in the fall of 2002; LFWA also mounted a composite company for Roto 12. Land Forces Central Area provided a Reserve mixed company for Roto 13, and Land Forces Quebec Area did the same for Roto 14 in Spring 2004. In Roto 13, the Essex and Kent Scottish, the 48th Highlanders, the Lorne Scots, and the Grey and Simcoe Foresters each provided a section. Other units provided half sections, weapons detachments, or fire teams. None of this could have occurred in 1995.53 Much more will be demanded of the Army Reserve in the coming months. As described below, every standing task force will have at least one platoon and as much as a company of reservists.

There is still much to be done to ensure that Land Force reservists receive proper treatment on their return home from deployment abroad. As one officer who served on Bosnia Roto 13 noted, “there is anecdotal evidence that Reserve units were not prepared to debrief or even employ” their soldiers on their return to Canada, and the two half-day “decompression period[s] at their Home Units” likely made soldiers “feel more isolated while being intentionally kept away from their families.” The same officer added that “Army Reservists continue to fall
through the cracks in the post-deployment” medical and debriefing system.\textsuperscript{54} This requires Army attention.

So too does the high number of reservists on full-time Class B service with units in Canada. In August 2004, the monthly average on Class B duty in Canada was 2,641 which, with the 309 reservists deployed abroad on Class C service, amounted to 18 percent of Army reserve strength.\textsuperscript{55} As one junior officer, reflecting a widespread view, privately observed, “I’ve been saying for the past few months that if every Class B Army reservist…put their 30 day notice in, the Army would shut down on the 31st day…”\textsuperscript{56} This may be perilously close to the truth, and not just for the Army, so stretched are the Canadian Forces. Perhaps the addition of 5,000 Regular personnel to the CF, as directed in the February 2005 budget, may deal with this problem.

The new managed readiness concept will further test the Army. At the time of the SCRR in 1995, the Army was committed to deploying a brigade group overseas in the event of emergency. This commitment in fact could have been met only with the greatest difficulty because of personnel and equipment shortages. De facto, the plan then changed to the deployment of battle groups, ordinarily a battalion of infantry with some armour and other organic sub-units attached. Such units were deployed in Former Yugoslavia and, with variations, in Afghanistan. This too has become difficult for the CF to manage.

The intent now, first enunciated by Lieutenant-General Mike Jeffery when he was Chief of the Land Staff and then developed further and readied for implementation by his successor General Rick Hillier, now the Chief of the Defence Staff, is to deploy Task Forces. This term was chosen because it can flexibly group together different capabilities, including some that hitherto might have been found only at the brigade or division levels. A Task Force ordinarily will number from 700 to 1,200 soldiers and other CF personnel,\textsuperscript{57} and will likely consist of a headquarters and three sub-units, ordinarily of light or mechanized infantry and engineer, artillery, and other specialist sub-units, the exact organization of which is dependent on the mission. The CF will—once it ramps up to deal with this new plan by mid-2006—be able to deploy a Special Operations Task Force (SOTF), based on JTF-2, the CF’s special operations unit, and a Standing
Contingency Task Force (SCTF) on short notice. In effect, these will become the CF’s rapid response units, assuming that the necessary air and naval resources to deploy quickly are acquired.\(^5^9\) Few reservists, we may assume, will be in either the SOTF or the SCTF.

In addition, the Army will also ready four task forces each year, two every six months, for deployment abroad or, as necessary, at home. In a pinch, a third could be deployed for a six month period but could not be sustained. (Whether governments will accept such limitations in the future remains to be seen—the CF’s recent history does not offer much reassurance—but the CF leadership has at least made its situation very clear to ministers.\(^5^9\)) To achieve this operational capacity, the Army will adopt a three-tier readiness scheme—at the top will be the two Task Forces on deployment (or prepared to go on deployment), while below them will be two more training for future deployment, and two more regenerating after deployment. In effect, a unit will have some certainty about its future and its role, its soldiers knowing that they will eighteen months hence be going abroad should the international situation and national commitments require. The CF also intends to maintain the capability to deploy a formation-level headquarters (essentially a brigade HQ), much as it did in Bosnia and Afghanistan.

As General Hillier describes, “What we will be going through over the next 18-24 months is putting the army…on an assembly-line process to produce the task forces, the headquarters, and all the enablers that we need to conduct operations, so that it will become a systematic, routine way of doing business.” The CDS added that “We will know that each year we will produce this number of task forces, they’ll have within them specific modules (sub-unit levels, infantry, etc.), and we will know…exactly what capabilities we are producing for foreign or domestic operations.” Why an 18 to 24 month time frame? Because soldiers need to be trained to a certain level of readiness at the sub-unit level, and then every Task Force must go through the new, state of the art Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre at Wainwright, Alberta to be brought to full readiness to fight a “three block war” that could see different types of operational requirements (high intensity, stability, or humanitarian) occurring simultaneously within a small geographic area.
As General Hillier also says, it will be rare for a complete battalion (1 PPCLI, e.g.) to be deployed: “You are going to have a piece of that organization go out, sometimes it will be the battalion headquarters, sometimes it will be one of the companies…one of the sub-units or other bits and pieces of it, and that is a significant change.” Indeed it is, and there are already critics complaining that General Hillier’s plans threaten the survival of the regimental system. Certainly, care must be taken to ensure that regiments do not lose their spirit. Another of General Hillier’s assumptions, again one yet to be tested, is that every Canadian overseas deployment will be as part of a multinational force.  

Before the impact of this plan on the Army Reserve is assessed, it needs to be said that Canada’s Army has gone, in a decade, from the nominal capacity to deploy a brigade group of 5,000 soldiers to an eventual capacity to deploy two Task Forces of roughly 2,000 in total every six months. The decline in presumptive capability is marked, the direct result of governmental budgetary and policy decisions. What also needs to be said is that General Hillier’s planning correctly aims to get the maximum possible effort from the nation’s shrunked military and to achieve sustainability. The CF, in other words, will offer the international community what it has to offer and not necessarily what the UN or NATO or some other organization wants. Whether or not the Canadian government will permit this when the public and media are in full cry and demanding a large commitment remains to be demonstrated.

To function effectively, these task forces will be heavily dependent on personnel from the Reserve. First, the ten Reserve Army brigades, like the Regular Army brigades, will be force generators, and the Reserve will provide sub-sub units amounting to a company in strength or more for each Task Force. The aim is to have Reserve units provide sections, platoons, and eventually companies; individual augmentees, however, may still be “required as a priority.” The Reserve brigades will know what is expected of them well in advance and will be able to plan to meet the requirement, a process already underway. At the same time, the specialist

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* A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Defence (Ottawa, 2005), p. 6, declares that with the expansion of the CF by 5000 regulars and 3000 reservists, directed in the 2005 Budget, the Army “will effectively double (its] capacity to undertake operations overseas.”
capacities that are now developed and developing in the Army Reserve will be needed. The Army Reserve will be “the single provider” of CBRN, PsyOps, and CIMIC capability, while such tasks as Public Affairs and Geomatics capacities will be provided primarily from the Reserve. It is anticipated that each Task Force, with up to 160 reservists each, will ordinarily be generated by one Land Force Area (although some capabilities, such as medium direct fire systems, for example, if required by a particular Task Force, might need to be provided from another LFA). With the new Canada Command expected to stand up in 2005-06, the expectation is that LFAs will disappear, their responsibilities transferred to the Joint headquarters in each region.

The success of the Army Reserve Regeneration plan hinges on reaching the 18,500 manning level (which includes the medical units under separate command). The LFRR Project Manager’s plan requires substantial numbers of new infantry, engineers, military police, intelligence, and soldiers in other specialties. His plan also has 750 unallocated positions that will be determined by operational requirements. What is clear, however, is that it will be difficult to recruit the numbers required in a competitive job market and even more difficult to retain them in the Reserve. Moreover, the bad old days where small units endlessly repeated individual training cycles will no longer suffice. Units need to grow with Reserve infantry battalions, for example, reaching a critical mass of some 250 that will permit collective training to be carried out.

The new system will place very heavy demands on individual reservists and their units. First, Reserve units will need to raise the standard of their training. Then, the soldier who wishes to sign up for a Task Force will be required to commit to up to 13 months of service: part would be Class A training at his Reserve unit; part would be Class B training as he or she is brought up to readiness for deployment; and at least six months Class C service on deployment. The expectation is that more than 600 reservists will be required each year, and the further expectation is that this can be sustained from within an Army Reserve of 18,500. The strain of providing relatively large numbers of reservists for repeated deployments may eventually fall on this small pool, but the Land Forces are committed to ensuring that this effort will not break the
Reserves. What is abundantly clear is that a willingness to be deployed will gradually become the cultural *sine qua non* for Reserve service, much as it already is for Regular Force service.

The Army Reserve staffs in the Land Force Areas believe they can meet these new requirements. Atlantic Area, for example, says it will generate the required numbers for its first Task Force in 2007; Quebec Area says it will produce 15 percent of the Task Force that will deploy in February 2006 and again for the Task Force being readied for August 2006 deployment. Central and Western Area similarly state that they can meet the Army’s needs. The confidence of Army Reserve staff is impressive. Nonetheless, this will be a severe test for the Reserve—and it may force the government to pass job protection legislation if it expects reservists to rise to the challenge.

There are other problems facing the Reserve as the Army transforms itself. A new system called Whole Fleet Management will direct vehicles and major equipment of all types to units, Regular and Reserve, where and when they need them. Equipment for two Task Forces will be concentrated near Montreal for deployment abroad; Regular units will own only enough vehicles for, at most, two companies and a headquarters, and the CMTC Wainwright will have its own complement. Those aside, all Regular Army equipment, like all Reserve vehicles, will go into the Army pool. Units, Regular and Reserve, on operations or training for operations will have Standard Military Pattern vehicles; others, Regular and Reserve, will have Commercial Off-the-Shelf vehicles. Everything will be assigned from higher levels. Once again, the army is being forced to plan as best it can to make do with what it has. Unless this is handled with sensitivity to Reserve needs, this is a recipe for dissention.
Conclusion

In a message posted on the Army’s website, Lieutenant-General Marc Caron, the Chief of the Land Staff, talked about the Army Reserve’s place in the transformation process now underway:

Army Transformation is the complete army transforming - regular and reserve components, supported by the civilian team. LFRR Phases I and II will give us more capacity in the Reserve Component and more capability. Make no mistake, we will ask more and more from our reservists, from operational commitment to training support to close recce to numerous specialties which they, and they alone, will have. While we have used reservists in large numbers this past several years, there is much more to be done from training funds to personnel support to equipment availability for our Reserve Component of the army. We will mature our Managed Readiness program … to include all the brigades, regular and reserve, seek more personnel for support to their units and give reservists more opportunity to develop their unique skills by teaching courses, participating in training or deploying on more operations. They will utilize the vehicle and major equipment fleets for training in a similar manner to the regular component.67

General Caron’s message puts heavy responsibilities on the Land Force Reserve, responsibilities that can only be carried out if adequate funding, personnel, training, and exemplary leadership are provided now, and for the foreseeable future. The leadership is there; the funding—without which the above changes cannot be implemented—is less certain.

The Air and Naval Reserve, and the Communications and Health Services Reserves face similar challenges. In their constrained state, all components of the Canadian Forces and Reserve must cooperate to get the most from their equipment and people.

Ultimately, however, it is the duty of the Canadian government to provide the resources required by the military. It is also the responsibility of the Canadian people to demand that their sons and daughters have everything they need to meet the challenges they must face. Neither government nor people have yet accepted their responsibilities, however, and not even new threats to North America have truly stirred them to action.
Recommendations

1. The CF should develop Stage 4 Mobilization plans, something particularly important for the Army Reserve.

2. The CF recruiting system is broken and urgently needs to be fixed.

3. The CF needs to facilitate the process of transferring between Regular and Reserve components.

4. The Supplementary Reserve urgently needs revivification.

5. RETP graduates from RMC should be obliged to serve five years in the Reserve.

6. Job Protection legislation should be implemented to ensure sufficient Army Reserve soldiers can be secured for Task Force deployments.

7. Domestic Operations (homeland security) require the Army, Navy, and Air Force Reserves to do joint planning, most particularly to deal with WMD events.

8. Reservists returning from deployment must receive adequate care and follow-up.

9. The Regular Forces need to reduce their dependence on Class B reservists’ service.

10. Communications and Health Services Reserve units working primarily with Land Force Reserve brigades should normally be under Army command.

11. The Army Reserve priorities as enunciated by Minister Eggleton in 2000—mobilization, community footprint, and augmentation—need constant reaffirmation.

12. Army Reserve sub-sub-units, if they are to be effective on deployments, should train on the same equipment as Regular Force soldiers.

13. Whole Fleet Management must not deprive Army Reserve units of major equipment to favour Regular units.


The recommendations are collected in ibid., pp. 74ff. The SCRR Report was examined—and attacked—in Tamara Sherwin, “From Total War to Total Force: Civil-Military Relations and the Canadian Army Reserve (Militia), 1945-1995,” MA thesis, Univ. of New Brunswick, 1997. Sherwin considered that the SCRR produced “politically-oriented recommendations” by, e.g., adhering to the mobilization plan as laid out in the 1994 Defence White Paper. As if the SCRR had any choice in the matter! Contrary to journalist Scott Taylor, “Some pluses for the reserves,” Halifax Chronicle-Herald, 11 Apr 05, the SCRR most emphatically did not call for an Army Reserve strength of 30,000 or for a separate Army Reserve budget.

The post-SCRR period was examined in J.L. Granatstein, “The Search for an Efficient, Effective Land Force Reserve,” Canadian Military Journal, III (Summer 2002), pp. 7ff.

See LGen Jeffery’s Address to the Conference of Defence Associations, Ottawa, 1 February 2001.

Government of Canada “Policy Statement: Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR),” 6 October 2000. Gen Jeffery’s ideas on managed readiness were expressed in his address on 22 Feb 02 to the CDA.

As is the norm in Ottawa, announcements are always made several times. Defence minister John McCallum announced in April 2003 that the Army Reserve would grow to 18,500, but he was silent on both authorization and funding. The budget of February 2005 promised the approximately $70 million in funding for 1500 new reservists to bring the Army Reserve strength to 18,500 end FY 2006-07. Data provided by PMO LFRR.


Conversations with a reserve general officer and a former Militia battalion CO.

Conversations with a senior officer.

The deputy commander of the CFRG, LCol Guertin, provided this data on 28 Jan 05. The army reserve has more difficulty recruiting than the other services because of the regimental culture—“a hundred different armies”. To us, this seemed an argument for decentralizing recruiting to units, not an argument against doing so. See also the CFRG’s “Mythbuster: Dispelling Mythtery and Mythconception,” a powerpoint presentation (n.d. (2004)); BGen (ret) Ken Quinn, “The Recruiting System (Attraction to Retention),” a paper prepared for the Minister’s Monitoring Committee, 27 Jan 03; and Reserves 2000 Task Force “Proposals on Improving the Recruiting Process,” 28 Aug 01. There is also a popular piece by Adam Day, “Going through the Hoops to be in the Forces,” Legion Magazine (March/April, 2005), pp. 62-3.

CANFORGEN 097/05, “Change to Enrolment Medical Procedure.”

“A Concept for Human Resources in the Army of Tomorrow,” draft Mar 05

This suggestion is very similar to the system in place in the United Kingdom where, say, an officer leaving the army at age 45 would have obligations until normal retirement age. Conversation with a senior British Army officer.

Emails to Granatstein from LCol (ret) Peter Dawe, 14 Feb 05; Steve France, 14 Feb 05; Dr John Cowan. 11 Feb 05.

William Lye, President, RMC Club, to Granatstein, 18 Feb 05. The Club position is nuanced, calling on DND to offer RETP graduates access to various programmes open to regulars.


As MGen Ed Fitch, the Project Manager for LFRR, told the media, the present plan “is distinct from that (1950s-60s) period in that we are training for war-fighting first. Reserves are not just for homeland defence. Reserves are an integral part of your army,” David Pugliese in The Ottawa Citizen, 4 Oct 04, p. A1.


Pride and Influence: Defence. p. 17.
28 LCDr F.L. Zebruk, “Briefing Note to CAT—Reserve Mandate Command and Control,” 15 March 2005. (Secured from NavRes HQ.) Other sources of similar provenance and date give Naval Reserve strength as 3729.
29 Zebruk “Briefing Note”.
31 Based on a Naval Reserve Division document and conversations with Naval Reserve officers.
33 “Air Reserve Statistics,” 24 Jan 05. (A collection of data provided by Air Reserve Directorate.)
34 Col P.J. Davies, “Briefing Note for CDS Action Team 1,” 15 Mar 05.
36 “Air Reserve Statistics,” 24 Jan 05.
37 “Air Reserve Structure,” on www.airforce.forces.ca/air_reserve/organization/organization_e.asp
38 Email, Col P.J. Davies to Pamela Stewart, 29 Mar 05.
40 Col Davies, “Briefing Note”.
41 Clark, “Transforming Canada’s Air Reserve”; Col Davies, “Briefing Note.”
42 Gloria Kelly, “Vital role in wide range of CF operations,” The Maple Leaf, 10 Nov 04, p. 2. The Comm Res strength in this article is higher than some other estimates.
43 Conversations with senior reservists.
44 Kelly, p. 2.
45 Communications Reserve Development Plan 2004-2009, VI, 4-6. This report is found on
46 See E.P. Green and J.C. Berezowski, “Canadian Forces Medical Services Suffering ‘Change Fatigue’, DANN National Network News, VII, Spring 2000. Health Services Reserve personnel who were part of the Army Reserve when the 18,500 figure was established (October 2000), while now separate, are counted in the Land Force Reserve projection of a strength of 18,500. The present strength of the Health Services Reserve is approximately 1300; it will increase by some 100 as its share of the Army Reserve increase.
47 Interview with Cmdre M.F. Kavanaugh, DG Health Services, 2 Jun 05.
48 One senior retired reservist suggested that the improvement in the educational standard of Regular officers over the last decade might have something to do with the better relations. University-educated officers can now deal better with Militia officers with successful civilian careers than their predecessors could. Conversation with a retired reservist colonel. The authors remain somewhat dubious but present the thought as an interesting one.
49 Nonetheless, the Army rule of thumb is that for every five reservists only one will be available for full-time service every two or three years. Powerpoint, “The Army Reserve of Today,” briefing delivered by A/CLS and PM LFRR, 18 Aug 04.
50 Based on conversations with senior reservists.
51 This was re-stated in a published note, “Army Reserve Role,” by the CDS, General Henault on 11 June 2002.
53 “Op Palladium Roto 13, Composite Infantry Company,” Information provided by PMO LFRR, 31 Jan 05.
54 “ROTO 13 CRIC Redeployment Briefing Note,” 31 Jan 05, prepared by a reservist officer employed at NDHQ.
56 Email, 20 Jan 05.
57 The 7-1200 figure is from Pride and Influence: Defence, p. 31. The Army Reserve Regeneration Working Groups used a Task Force strength of just under one thousand. Presentation made to ARRWG, Cornwall, ON, 28-30 Jan 05.

Chris MacLean, “Experience is Shaping Army Transformation,” Frontline, Jan-Feb, 2005, pp.8, 11.

Lagasse, op. cit.


62 Ibid., p. F-1/5.

Powerpoint, “The Army Reserve of Today,” briefing delivered by A/CLS and PM LFRR, 18 Aug 04; email, MGen Ed Fitch to distribution, 1 Feb 05.

64 Based on presentations made to the Army Reserve Regeneration Working Group meeting, Cornwall, ON, 28-30 Jan 05.

66 Based on an email, 31 Jan 05, from an officer at NDHQ.