



**CANADA'S INTERNATIONAL
POLICY STATEMENT FIVE YEARS LATER**

Canada's International Policy Statement Five Years Later

By

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A member of the Canadian Army primary reserve since 1990, Andrew trained first as a sapper before being commissioned from the ranks in 1993. He held both troop and squadron commands, finally serving as adjutant of his regiment. Andrew spent his summers as a senior instructor at the Canadian Forces School of Military Engineering, and subsequently served a year on the staff of the 1st Canadian Division Headquarters. In 1998, he joined the Directorate of Space Development at National Defence Headquarters as a Canada-U.S. strategic analyst. In 2000, Andrew was deployed to the Canadian Forces Joint Operations Group, where he commanded the Joint Space Support Team until 2004. He then transferred to the Canadian Army's Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, where he eventually became head of academic research, outreach, and publications. In addition to oversight of unmanned ground systems conceptual development, Andrew is the editor-in-chief of the Canadian Army Journal, the series editor of the JADEx occasional papers, and the military oversight for the 100,000 volume Fort Frontenac Army Library. He is a graduate of the Canadian Forces School of Military Engineering, the Canadian Forces School of Aerospace Studies, the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College, as well as the Joint Operations Staff Course in the United Kingdom.

Andrew is a regular author and lecturer on defence, foreign, and technology affairs, with several appearances on radio, television, and in print. The author of over 40 scholarly publications including books, chapters, and articles, his major works are, *For Freedom and Honour? The Story of Twenty-Five Canadian Volunteers Executed in the Great War* (1998); *Allies in Orbit: The Future of Canadian-American Defence Cooperation Through Space* (2000); *Space Power Vulnerability and its Implications for Canada's National Security* (2000); *Problems and Promises: An Analysis of Civil-Military Integration of Canadian Space Assets* (2000); *Europe and the Non-Weaponization of Space: Future Options for Canada* (2004); (ed.) *The Army of Tomorrow: Assessing Concepts and Capabilities for Land Operations Evolution* (2006); (ed.) *Land Operations 2021: Adaptive Dispersed Operations - A Force Employment Concept for the Army of Tomorrow* (2007); *Maple Leaf in Orbit: An Official History of Canada's Space Program* (2007); *Lessons Learned About Lessons Learned: An Analysis of Policies, Organizations, and Processes in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces* (2009); (ed.) *Projecting Power: Trends Shaping Canada's Air Force in the Year 2019* (2009); (with Peter Gizewski eds.) *Towards Land Operations 2021: Studies in Support of the Force Employment Concept for the Army of Tomorrow* (2009); (ed.) *Bush Warfare: The Early Writings of General Sir William Heneker KCB, KCMG, DSO* (2009); (ed.) *Projecting Power: Canada's Air Force 2035* (2009); and (ed.) *Great War Commands: Historical Perspectives on Canadian Army Leadership, 1914-1918* (forthcoming 2010).

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Canada's publication of an International Policy Statement (IPS) in 2005 was designed to mark the beginning of a new and proactive whole of government engagement in international security and foreign relations. With a broad focus on development cooperation as the first line of defence for collective security, it recognized that Canadians could not sustain their own standards of living through isolation. Rather, only through global engagement could Canada expect to remain safe and prosperous. Looking at each of the four pillars in turn – diplomacy, defence, development and commerce, this paper critically examines the success of this policy half a decade after its creation. It argues broadly that, although the machinations of the IPS may have changed with the new government, its spirit has lived on. Five years after the publication of the IPS, Canada has returned to a more central role in international affairs, but whether it has been entirely successful, a total failure, or something in between is more open to debate. In the end there can be little doubt that international policy over the next five years must be informed by the lessons of the past and guided by the institutionalization of best practices in helping shape future policy decision making.

SOMMAIRE

La publication d'un Énoncé de politique internationale, en 2005, voulait marquer du début d'un nouvel engagement pangouvernemental proactif en matière de sécurité et de relations étrangères internationales. En mettant largement l'accent sur la coopération en matière de développement comme première ligne de défense pour ce qui est de la sécurité collective, on reconnaissait que les Canadiens ne pourraient pas maintenir leur propre standard de vie en restant dans l'isolement. Ce n'est que par un engagement au plan mondial que le Canada pourrait s'attendre à continuer à jouir de sa sécurité et de sa prospérité. En examinant à tour de rôle chacun des quatre piliers, la diplomatie, la défense, le développement et le commerce, la présente étude regarde d'un oeil critique le succès de cette politique une demi-décennie après sa création. Elle allègue que, de façon générale, même si les machinations de l'Énoncé ont pu changer avec le nouveau gouvernement, l'esprit du document est toujours vivant. Cinq ans après la publication de l'Énoncé, le Canada est revenu à un rôle plus central dans les affaires internationales, mais le débat reste ouvert quant à savoir si la politique a été couronnée de succès, si elle est un échec total ou si elle a abouti quelque part entre ces deux pôles. En fin de compte, il y a peu de doute que la politique internationale des cinq prochaines années doive être nourrie des leçons du passé et guidée par l'institutionnalisation des meilleures pratiques pouvant contribuer à donner forme à la prise de décision en matière de politique future.

“Making a difference”.¹

This simple title at the head of the Prime Minister’s introduction to the 2005 official publication, *Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*, (IPS) belied the complexity of the new “doctrine of activism” that his government was looking to take. Released to the public on 19 April, in five parts, the new IPS constituted one of the most detailed and comprehensive compendiums of government policy on international relations to be announced in decades. Still, no one could have foreseen how quickly events both at home and abroad would change in the months immediately after its release. Assessing the status of the IPS five years later, many would argue that although the spirit of the policy lives on, its literal interpretation has been greatly altered.

Yet, even before one can begin to assess whether the IPS was a success, failure, or something in between, it is first necessary to briefly explain the historical context in which Canada’s new international policy was born. For the western world the 21st century did not begin as many would have hoped. On 11 September 2001, suicidal terrorists belonging to the radical Islamist organization known as Al-Qaeda attacked several iconic installations in the United States of America. Turning civilian passenger jet liners into flying bombs, two hijacked planes succeeded in completely destroying the Twin Towers in New York City, while a third aircraft seriously damaged a section of the Pentagon. A fourth plane, undoubtedly enroute to destroy Capitol Hill, or perhaps even the White House, only failed to reach its intended target when the doomed passengers aboard courageously rose up and foiled their last objective.

Such a blatant attack on the west, resulting in the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians, came as a profound shock. As the United States’ leading partner in continental defence, the sting to Canada was especially intense. There was little doubt that the American response to such attacks would be swift, direct and decisive. The United States invaded Afghanistan less than a month later on 7 October, followed by the United Kingdom in early 2002, Canada also entered the fray not long after that with its own troop deployments into theatre alongside its allies. When the first reports of Canadian soldiers having been in combat appeared at home later that year, the country had effectively crossed something of a foreign policy Rubicon.

The “unexpected war” against international terrorism that Canada became involved in from 2002 onwards did not automatically bind the country to all other Allied expeditions overseas.² Canada did not follow suit when the United States and its main ally, Great Britain, called for a near simultaneous war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in early 2003; however, by the third year of the 21st century it had already become clear that Canada could no longer ensure its own peace, stability and prosperity with a philistine international policy that ignored global insecurity.

With global security in a precarious state and another federal election looming, the Liberal government, in early 2005, announced a new comprehensive international policy clearly aimed at reinserting Canada into international affairs. Its primary target was the ‘arc of instability’, a region of failing and failed states stretching more or less along the equatorial regions from Central America across the globe to Southeast Asia. War, civil strife, famine, epidemics, and social and commercial destitution plagued this entire region. It was here that Canada sought to

¹ Government of Canada. *Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*. (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, April 2005), in five parts – Overview, Diplomacy, Defence, Development, and Commerce. Hereafter referred to as IPS and IPS-specific section, eg. IPS - Defence.

² This term gained temporary popularity following the publication of Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang. *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar*. (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007).

engage in new diplomacy, defence, development and commerce on a broad, but realistic, scale in the hopes of promoting stability, and if possible, economic trade.

Looking back from today, for Canada, the last five years have proven eventful both domestically and internationally. At home, the political party that launched the IPS subsequently fell, and despite two new leaders, a federal election, an attempt to form a coalition, and constant threats to topple the current government, it has since been incapable of regaining power. Thus, it is instead the old opposition that wields some version of the IPS as its own instrument of national power. With it, the ascendant party exerted its own agenda abroad and cherry picked from the IPS recommendations to extend Canada's commitment to the security, stability, reconstruction and development of a number of vulnerable countries, including places like Afghanistan and Haiti. Canada's role in securing and stabilizing Afghanistan has drawn particular attention, both at home and abroad, having played out over the last half decade in a way that few policy pundits thought would ever be possible.

Still, the basic question remains: was the IPS a success or a failure? Or, did it become something else entirely due to changes in government at home and the international system abroad? And, how might one even define policy 'success' or 'failure' in the dynamic and ever fluid realm of international affairs? Thus, the remainder of this report will analyze broadly, yet concisely, how the invocation of the four pillars of the 2005 IPS – diplomacy, defence, development and commerce – has fared, both at home and abroad, over the last five years with a view to highlighting what was successfully undertaken by the government and what was not. As will be discussed, in most cases, the core ideas remained the same, whereas the process by which they were pursued changed considerably under new masters. Finally, some consideration will be made of the document itself, as well as what its potential fate might be in the next five years to come given Canada's current international policy trends.

Diplomacy

Despite an impressive diplomatic history stretching over six decades, there were clear signs by 2005 that Canada's influence in shaping international affairs had diminished greatly. No longer a central architect of international order as it had once been at the outbreak of the Cold War, the country had long since fallen vulnerable to the realities of the post-Cold War era, globalization and the myriad of new and more deadly international security threats. The IPS acknowledged that Canada, "must recognize and adapt to these realities, and contribute to building a new framework of governance that can serve both our interests and solve contemporary global problems."³ Simply put, its very relevance and future legitimacy in international affairs was at stake.

Building on previous achievements in 2004 and early 2005, renewed diplomatic efforts sought to increase Canadian security and prosperity partnerships in North America, specifically with the United States.⁴ Starting with the revitalization of the country's core international relationships, the IPS made a priority of increasing Canada's influence in the western hemisphere while strengthening ties with other select states and organizations around the world. Specific initiatives included developing new key regional bilateral relationships, as well as strengthening Canada's position in regional international organizations such as the Organization of American

³ IPS – Overview, p.26.

⁴ Key 2004 diplomatic agreements included the *Canada-U.S. Joint Statement on Common Security, Common Prosperity, and a New Partnership in North America*, and the *Canada-Mexico Partnership*. Key 2005 diplomatic agreements included the tripartite *Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America*.

States (OAS).⁵ Similarly, renewed commitments were made by the government towards asserting its sovereignty and national interests over Canada's Arctic Region, with a view to reaching common international agreements regarding its sovereignty claims over various arctic lands and seaways. Finally, the IPS suggested sustained diplomatic cooperation in areas of common international concern, such as the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, all while continuing to improve its diplomatic influence in a broad range of international economic and financial policies.⁶

With a growing stake in new international developments, the IPS committed Canada to "changing how we work".⁷ Yet, it was expected that much of this would be accomplished by simply reallocating Canada's existing diplomatic resources through the development of new strategies and instruments.⁸ For the most part the gamble proved unsuccessful. The ongoing internal restructuring of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) into two new separate agencies, Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC) and International Trade Canada (ITCan), met stiff opposition in Parliament. Legislation introduced into the House of Commons in February 2005 to formally abolish DFAIT in favour of FAC and ITCan failed to pass even a first vote.⁹ When the Conservative government came to power in 2006, one of their first acts was to rejoin the two organizations into a single department.

Still, there were exceptions. One of the more notable reorganization achievements after launching the IPS was the creation of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START), to ensure longer term planning for early coordinated multi-agency responses to international crises. This new organization was essentially a vehicle for the true manifestation of the government's 3D+C (diplomacy, defence, development, commerce) policy and was at once a clear indication of the beginning of a cultural shift in how Canada's government departments functioned abroad. Specifically, START managed high level foreign policy efforts, such as the Canadian government's Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF), an initiative designed to encourage conflict prevention, peacekeeping and security sector reform in fragile and failing states. The IPS initially called for a fund of \$100 million, but five years on the GPSF remains vibrantly active with a current annual budget of \$146 million.¹⁰ The Global Peace Operation Program (GPOP) and the Glynn Berry Program (GBP), a project that funds research into rule of law, human rights policy, democracy and conflict prevention, further supports the initial GPSF program.¹¹

Overall, the 3D+C framework initiated by the Liberal government through the IPS did not disappear entirely from the new government policy in 2006, but the newly elected Conservatives sought to quickly rename the philosophy to make it appear their own. Thus, 3D briefly became 1C (one Canada) before eventually becoming WoG, which stood for 'Whole of Government'.¹²

⁵ For OAS goals, purpose, organization and structure see 'Organization of American States' access online at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organization_of_American_States

⁶ IPS - Overview, p.27.

⁷ Ibid. Section subheading, p.26.

⁸ IPS – Diplomacy, p.2.

⁹ The government initiated the separation process in December 2003. Regardless of its failure in the House of Commons vote on 15 February 2005, the government maintained its administrative separation of the two departments despite neither having been established through an Act of Parliament.

¹⁰ Details of program may be found at <http://www.international.gc.ca/START-GTSR/gpsf-fpsm.aspx>

¹¹ Named in honour of Glyn R. Berry, a senior Canadian diplomat murdered by insurgents in Afghanistan in January 2006.

¹² The term 'whole of government' is routinely found in most government documents and statements today. For example, see DND. The Defence Team. The Defence Priorities for 2010-2011. 'Priorities –

Essentially the same process, but under a new label, this somewhat awkward acronym has since begun to be replaced in several government publications with yet another new term: 'the comprehensive approach'.¹³ Though still considered unofficial at home, abroad the comprehensive approach framework is a mature concept already applied by several international organizations, including the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).¹⁴

Taking a comprehensive approach to Canadian international policy objectives through organizations like START has since allowed the government to demonstrate more clearly to Canadians how the country's foreign policy objectives are focused. As well, organizations like START serve as a test bed for learning institutional lessons and promoting best practices. This is not to suggest that the START is a single solution to a very complex problem, only that a policy of coordinated inter-agency response has proven far more effective, and at times even more efficient, than the continuation of stove-piped responses to crises and opportunities.

Beyond organization and process, Canadian diplomacy has enjoyed some improvement over the past five years. The IPS emphasis on developing a strategy for improved North American partnerships, as well as towards building a more secure world, was validated by later developments in the international security environment. Though Canada's efforts to improve basic human security remain a noble cause, the global community appears less interested in this part of the country's IPS agenda. Likewise, there has been only very limited support for Canada's new forms of multilateralism based upon its five stated 'responsibilities': to protect, to deny, to respect, to build and to the future.¹⁵ Perceived by some to be intrusive, others still have proclaimed these as impossible goals. For example, despite considerable global respect for the Canadian inspired International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS),¹⁶ it remains near impossible to secure concrete action in troubled areas beyond the immediate foreign policy interests of the major powers. The protracted conflict in Sudan, for example, is often highlighted as but one example of R2P's (responsibility to protect) overall failure.¹⁷

Some have suggested that the glacial pace of progress on global human security may be perceived as an illustration of the failure of the IPS, but this would be attributing a false level of influence to both the document, as well as Canada's influence, in the international system. Though touted as major components of Canadian foreign and security agendas they remain, and rightly so, a political pursuit and not a moral crusade. That the IPS promoted optimism in improving human security is not justification to damn it for the world's failure. The IPS is simply a tool to address human security, not a guaranteed solution to its problems.

In the final analysis, the IPS served as good guidance for the amelioration of Canadian diplomacy over the past five years and, as with any policy, only parts of it proved successful in

Contribute to Whole-Of-Government Priorities'. Accessed online at <http://defenceteam-equipedeladefense.mil.ca/df-pd-eng.asp>

¹³ For one overview and analysis see LGen Andrew Leslie, Mr. Peter Gizewski, and LCol Mike Rostek, "Developing a Comprehensive Approach for Canadian Forces Operations", *Canadian Military Journal*, (Vol.9 No.1), pp.11-20.

¹⁴ For details on UN perspectives see <http://www.diis.dk/sw69227.asp> For NATO see, 'A Comprehensive Approach'. Accessed on the World Wide Web on 1 August 2010 at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51633.htm

¹⁵ IPS – Diplomacy, p.20.

¹⁶ Information on ICISS may be accessed at <http://www.iciss.ca/menu-en.asp>

¹⁷ Examples of the ongoing debate surrounding Darfur may be found on the Canadian Consortium on Human Security at <http://www.humansecurity.info/#/protecting-darfur/4527372922>

implementation. Whether the IPS continues to serve as substantive policy guidance over the next five years remains to be seen. Already, the current government has effectively replaced another chapter of the IPS (defence) with its own new strategy. New policy guidance and direction on diplomacy and foreign affairs as well is likely to follow.

Defence

Five years on, the diplomacy portion of the IPS remains very relevant under the current government, as a much different approach was employed to achieve many of its original objectives. Rather than depending entirely on development or commerce policies, the Conservatives, instead, often chose to enhance its international diplomacy through the application of defence and security. To that end, the defence portion of the IPS was significantly enhanced, and to some degree altered, by a new security framework document released by the current government in June 2008. Titled, *The Canada First Defence Strategy*, it provided broad new guidance and direction on Canada's defence and security priorities without making any major changes to long standing national security interests. Still focused on the defence of Canada, North America and contributions to international security and stability abroad, the strategy also identified six core missions that ranged from domestic security to leading major international operations for an extended period overseas.

Accepting that Canada would continue to face numerous security challenges in the 21st century, particularly from failed and failing states, regional conflicts, the threat of terrorism and the potential dangers associated with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the Liberal government supported ongoing DND initiatives to reorganize large elements of both the department, and the forces, into a series of new operational commands under the leadership of a strategic joint staff.¹⁸ At the same time senior defence planners successfully advocated for an adjustment to its current operational tempo to ensure that the future capacity of the armed forces was never again as badly overstretched as it had been in the past.¹⁹ The government accepted both recommendations after further consultation and debate, setting the stage for the IPS's announcement of new defence and security initiatives.

The defence portion of the IPS publicly recognized two key facts. First, it conceded that despite any hopes for a new world order the international security environment would remain somewhere between unpredictable and volatile. Second, it acknowledged that without a legitimate security and defence apparatus to wield as one of its instruments of national power, Canadian interests, both at home and abroad, would become increasingly vulnerable over time. To that end, the IPS announced a new vision for the Canadian Forces: one that proposed to fundamentally and permanently transform the military from its lingering Cold War paradigms into a very new, strategically relevant, operationally responsive and tactically decisive joint force.²⁰

Building on DND's internally driven reorganization already underway, the IPS announced a new vision for the CF, focused on protecting Canada and Canadians, honouring the unique bilateral Canada-US defence relationship and contributing to international security and stability abroad. Although, far from being revolutionary, it was an ambitious agenda given the resources and

¹⁸ This reorganization came to fruition in 2006. For the brief announcement see DND News Release: "New Canadian Forces Operations Commands Take Charge of Domestic, Special, an International Operations". NR-06.002 dated 31 January 2006.

¹⁹ G.E. Sharp and A. English. *Observations on the Association Between Operational Readiness and Personnel Readiness in the Canadian Forces*. (Toronto: DRDC Report CR2006-072), dated 31 March 2006.

²⁰ IPS – Defence, pp.10-11.

capabilities of the CF in 2005, causing defence analysts David Bercuson and Denis Stairs to observe:

Once [Canada] gets into the kind of enterprise that is represented by “stabilizing failed and fragile states”, however, or attempt to pull our weight in coalition operations, a great deal more is required. In particular, the commitment of resources needs to be both substantial and very long-term, all in a context of which the chances for success (as Canadians would measure it) range from the very limited to the downright hopeless....Nor it is entirely clear that the public at large would accept the steady diet of sacrifices that would ensue at home were it to do so.²¹

Such a criticism, if not skepticism, was warranted. Past governments had often failed to deliver on sweeping defence promises, especially during periods of rapid and unpredictable political change. Yet, still there was potential this time given that the promises made in the IPS were building on precedent. Beyond expanding diplomatic contributions to international affairs, the Canadian government made it a key priority in 2004-2005 to increase the Canadian Forces' capacity to participate with its allies in global counter terror operations. Additionally, the government sought to act directly in the stabilization of failed and fragile states, through initiatives such as the creation of the START, to plan and coordinate rapid and integrated responses to international crises. To further make good on its projected policy, the February 2005 federal budget announced \$13 Billion in new defence spending over the next five years, the largest increase witnessed within DND in two decades. Finally, authorization was given to increase the overall size of the CF by 5000 regular force personnel and 3000 reserve personnel.

Despite the fall of the Liberal government as a result of the Conservative party victory in the 2006 federal election, many of the defence recommendations in the IPS remained in place. In some places the policy was even accelerated. The transformation of the CF was allowed to proceed without serious interruption under the leadership of the existing Chief of Defence Staff, General Rick Hillier. Command and control of operations were further integrated with the establishment of new commands, specifically the Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM), Canada Command (CANADACOM) and the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM). Another command, focused on operational support, would be created soon after.

The creation of these new strategic level commands, as well as a series of joint task force headquarters across the country, predictably reintroduced criticism concerning creating a top-heavy department and armed forces. Despite new authority to grow, and best efforts made towards new recruitment, the CF continued to experience challenges in building its total strength and another shift of much needed personnel from the 'tip' to the 'tail' was not universally welcomed. Also, there were concerns regarding command and control. Under the new system, though the three elemental chiefs of staff continued to oversee force generation issues, they were set to lose much of their traditional control over force employment to the new commands. Not surprisingly this caused some internal debate and discontent, while other issues still remain unresolved at present.

Other IPS transformation initiatives outlined in the original document received similar attention. Special operations capabilities received a considerable injection. Beyond creating a new

²¹ David J. Bercuson ed. *In the Canadian Interest? Assessing Canada's International Policy Statement*. Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute. (Calgary, CDFAI, October 2005), pp.4-5.

command, Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2) was enlarged; a new Joint Nuclear Biological Chemical Defence (JNBCD) Company was formed, as well as a new Canadian Special Operations Regiment (CSOR). Likewise, Canadian aerospace power was increased with the acquisition of much needed strategic and medium-weight lift, new unmanned aerial systems and a commitment to modernize other fixed and rotary wing platforms.²² In mid-2010, a major government announcement revealed plans to upgrade Canada's air force with the acquisition of a number of next-generation Lockheed F-35 fighter interceptors.²³

The IPS also promised a number of new, and much-needed, maritime capabilities, however, over the past five years these commitments have proven much harder than others to fulfill. Beyond the typical complexities associated with its force development, the Canadian Navy has been routinely plagued by serious shortcomings in its overall maritime and naval strategies. The IPS arrived in the wake of the 2004 HMCS Chicoutimi incident²⁴ and naval planners in Ottawa subsequently balked at its guidance to develop a new Standing Contingency Task Force (SCTF), preferring instead to focus on rebuilding its 'blue water' credibility.²⁵ Yet here the IPS guidance was much less specific, stating only that the navy should "proceed with the acquisition of ships" capable of carrying out typical tasks, while at the same time starting the definition of "requirements for a new class of surface ship to replace the current destroyers and frigates over the longer term".²⁶ Five years on, there has been very limited advancement towards these goals. At the top of the navy's list in 2005 was a \$2.9 Billion attempt to build three new Joint Support Ships (JSS) to replace the ageing HMCS Protecteur and HMCS Preserver. This effort finally "sank" in 2008, after none of the four pre-qualified industry teams selected for the project were able to meet its capability requirements. In July 2010, another attempt to build JSS was announced by the government, this time with a \$2.6 Billion project to build only two vessels with an option for the procurement of a third.²⁷

Many of the IPS initiatives proved directly beneficial to the army, which itself was promised continued support as it transformed towards a modern, combat-effective, medium-weight force.²⁸ Though land force capability development remained focused on the objectives set out in the IPS, the operational realities of the last five years have had its own tremendous influence. For example, the proposed replacement of the Canadian Leopard Main Battle Tank (MBT) with

²² Media references to theatre and tactical lift are often coining Americanisms that focus on range of aircraft rather than their actual capability requirements.

²³ For an overview see Ray Canon, "The F-35 and Canada's Aviation Future: We Have a Potential Boon for the Canadian Aerospace Industry", *Wings*, accessed on the www on 1 August 2010 at <http://www.wingsmagazine.com/content/view/462/>

²⁴ For overview see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/3717906.stm accessed on 1 August 2010.

²⁵ Personal observation and analysis. In 2005 a combined design team from the army's Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts (DLSC) and the navy's Directorate of Maritime Strategy (DMarStrat) were assigned to develop the SCTF's operational concept. The author served as one of the army's lead designers on this project.

²⁶ IPS – Defence, p.14.

²⁷ For a brief announcement of the revised project see DND News Release. "Government of Canada to Acquire New Joint Support Ships" NR-10.074 dated 14 July 2010.

²⁸ Though analysts often mistake the existence of main battle tanks, like the Leopard, as an indication of a heavy force, it is in fact force structures, not equipment, which defines a force as heavy, medium, or light. The Canadian Army is, therefore, typically characterized as a medium weight force due to its infantry centric force structures and limited amounts of heavy armour formations. This label may also be found in official Canadian Army vision statements. For example see <http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/land-terre/life-vie/vision-eng.asp>

the Mobile Gun System (MGS) was reversed, the Leopard eventually returning to combat duties in Afghanistan. Similarly, operations in Kandahar province and elsewhere necessitated a large number of unforeseen operational requirements (UOR) that subsequently led to dramatic evolutions in Canadian theatre specific capabilities and equipment. For example, Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) capabilities were greatly enhanced, as were a number of combat vehicle and individual soldier systems. By the time Canada ends its ground combat commitment in Afghanistan next year, the army will have progressed far beyond anything the IPS ever imagined five years before.

The revitalization of CF capabilities over the past five years has had a tremendous impact on other defence aspects of the IPS as well. Specifically, it has allowed the government to actively pursue its Canadian arctic sovereignty and security agenda, while at the same time responding effectively to a number of domestic missions ranging from natural disaster relief to economic summit security. The CF has enjoyed high domestic visibility during events, such as the 2010 Winter Olympics, and overall the general relationship between the military and its society has improved dramatically. For example, the government introduced a new veteran's charter in 2006 that has since become a living document as it continues to strive to meet the needs of soldiers. Additionally, in 2009 the Chief of Military Personnel announced a new housing vision for serving members aimed at improving the quality of life for professionals expected to relocate regularly as part of their terms of service. Yet, nowhere is this new friendship more poignantly evident, perhaps, than along the aptly renamed 'Highway of Heroes': the stretch of Highway 401 between Trenton and the Don Valley Parkway. As part of the route employed to bring fallen soldiers home to their final resting place, it is now common to witness hundreds of Canadian citizens lined all along the route in a physical demonstration of solidarity and support.²⁹

The IPS defence portion made its greatest policy commitment, perhaps, in the sections devoted to the Canada-US defence relationship and to contributing to a safer and more secure world. Despite an initially bumpy policy road, specifically Canada's decisions to not participate in either the Iraq War, or the new American Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) program, Ottawa quickly mended its foreign policy fences with the US by making a tangible security and defence commitment in southwest Asia at a time when considerable US and UK effort was focused elsewhere. Similarly, Canada committed troops to a number of other international missions, including foreign training and assistance programs in Sierra Leone, UN observer missions in the Sudan and the Congo, counter-piracy missions off the Horn of Africa, a number of security sector reform operations in and around the Middle East and, most recently, disaster relief in Haiti following a destructive earthquake in early 2010. Canada's proactive policies towards international security and stability over the last five years have achieved noticeable results and have earned the respect of many allies. For example, it was no great surprise in 2009 when the U.S. largely supported NATO's consideration of the Canadian Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Peter MacKay, for the post of Secretary General. Conversely, however, it has also been suggested that the government's focus in certain areas of security and defence ultimately cost it a seat at the UN security council in the fall of 2010.

Still, all of Canada's defence commitments, and the results they have obtained over the past half-decade, have sought to fulfill the spirit of the IPS, and one could easily argue that this portion, perhaps more than all others, achieved tangible success beyond the hopes of many. That said, it seems the days of Liberal inspired IPS-defence initiatives are numbered, if not

²⁹ This section of the 401 was designated on 24 August 2007 in recognition of it being the route taken by fallen Canadian servicewomen and servicemen from the Canadian Forces Base to the Coroner's Office in Toronto.

already dead. The introduction of the CFDS in 2008 definitely marked the beginning of a political transition towards a new Conservative agenda, set in motion by the current government. Though, far from being a comprehensive new 'White Paper', it is likely that the CFDS will continue to guide future defence policy, strategy and procurement so long as the current government retains power.

Development

The IPS Development chapter likewise recognized that Canada faced an unpredictable "world in transition" at the start of the 21st century, which was directly affecting an internationally agreed to set of time-bound targets and objectives known as the Millennium Development Goals (MDG).³⁰ Evolving from a previously promising record of recent global progress in tackling poverty, inequality and injustice since the year 2000, several developed and developing countries further committed themselves to achieving tangible results in eight basic elements of human development by the year 2015. Briefly, the eight areas of effort were 1) halving extreme poverty and hunger; 2) achieving universal primary education; 3) promoting gender equality; 4) reducing under-five years of age mortality by two-thirds; 5) reducing maternal mortality by three-quarters; 6) reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB; 7) ensuring environmental sustainability; and 8) developing a global partnership for development, with targets for aid. As a traditional leader in international assistance, Canada sought through its IPS to reassert its own commitment specifically to these as well as a number of other development objectives.

The real strength of the IPS Development policy guidance was its commitment to a strategically focused whole of government approach targeting specific partners. Appreciating that a number of challenges were ever present, uneven global development, societies suffering from weak governance, health and famine issues, low education, gender inequalities and other related demographic pressures, the IPS nevertheless strived to make the international assistance it did provide actually count. Moving away from traditional strategies of giving too little to too many, the IPS instead recommended a focused policy that promoted good governance, improved health, strengthened basic education, supported private sector development, advanced environmental sustainability and ensured as much as possible gender equality. The IPS also noted that in order to realistically achieve some measure of success, a more select list of partners would be helped based upon their level of poverty, their ability to use aid effectively and where there was sufficient Canadian presence to add value.

Underwriting the IPS-Development chapter was the promotion of democratic values, though the actual term 'democratization' itself never appears once in the IPS. Instead, the IPS aimed for a 'democratic development' policy and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) was tasked to make this new direction its priority.³¹ Not surprisingly, perhaps, these orders were somewhat ill-received. Five years on, CIDA's website still advises visitors that it never officially adopted the IPS-Development chapter, suggesting that the agency never felt itself intellectually bound to following new government policy or direction.³² Yet, looking back at the last five years, one is hard pressed to see where CIDA did not follow its orders.

The IPS certainly highlighted disagreements between government and the agency over specific priorities, in particular, how much foreign aid Canada would promise as well as how it was to be

³⁰ IPS – Development, p.3.

³¹ Geoffrey Cameron. *Between Policy and Practice: Navigating CIDA's Democracy Agenda*. University of Regina, The Saskatchewan Institute of Public Policy. Paper No.47, (December 2006), p.1.

³² This caveat is at the very top of CIDA's website reference page containing the IPS-Development chapter. See link at <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/acdi-cida.nsf/eng/JUD-2107401-GV3>

spent. Prior to 2005, CIDA supported projects in no less than 150 of the world's 191 sovereign states. The IPS planned to seriously curb that appetite by forcing the agency to focus its aid efforts on many less partners. Additionally, CIDA would be expected to do so with more or less the same investment it had always been given. Canada's official development assistance expenditures had experienced gradual, but steady, decline since the end of the Cold War. In the early 1990s, the country spent nearly 0.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on foreign aid. By 2003, this figure had dropped to 0.3 percent of GDP. This level of official development aid contrasted sharply with CIDA's previously published white paper goal of reaching the UN mandated 0.7 percent of GDP by the year 2000.³³ Though Canada had never come near reaching the 0.7 percent mark in all of its fifty years of foreign aid donations, it had made some headway to improving existing funding leading up to the publication of the IPS; however, to the disappointment of some, the IPS made no promises to reach the goal of 0.7 percent, only that Canada would commit to further aid spending as the country's own fiscal position continued to improve.

Yet, world events over the past five years ensured that not even this option could be pursued. Instead, both the government and CIDA found themselves almost entirely committed to the security and stabilization of Afghanistan, universally recognized as one of the world poorest countries. CIDA's Afghanistan Program rapidly became, and currently remains, the agency's most important program in terms of its magnitude, complexity, visibility and challenges. CIDA members are fully committed to improving security, evolving governance systems, rooting out corruption and building institutional capacity so that one day the country can assume greater administrative and financial risk management. At the same time, CIDA managed no less than thirteen specific initiatives in theatre ranging from strengthening the rule of law to developing a free media. In many ways, the Afghanistan Program ranks among the agency's greatest achievements.

Still, Afghanistan was not the only focus of official development assistance. In the past five years the spirit of the IPS was followed as both the government and CIDA worked through the rough spots to ameliorate their relationship with each other, as well as their relationships with other multilateral institutions. CIDA remains involved in several other UN sponsored programs, such as the UN International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and the UN Development Program (UNDP). Likewise, it continues to play roles in other crises, conflicts and natural disasters where Canada can rapidly make a difference.

As for the remainder of the IPS-Development objectives, only time will tell if they can be reached by the year 2015. It is already highly unlikely, despite weathering the wide-reaching economic recession suffered in the west during 2008-2009 rather well, that the government would pursue any immediate plan to increase its overall official development assistance to equal 0.7 percent of GDP;³⁴ however, in 2009, the government did announce a new Aid Effectiveness Agenda, where it would focus eighty percent of its bilateral resources in a group of twenty select countries chosen by their real needs, their capacity to benefit from aid and their alignment with

³³ CIDA. *Sharing Our Future: Canadian Assistance to International Development*. (Ottawa: Canadian International Development Agency, 1987). See also UN Financing for Development – overview, documents, and reports – accessed online at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/documents/ga_ffd.htm

³⁴ In 2009 the government announced that by 2010-2011, Canada's international assistance funding would reach \$5 Billion annually.

Canadian foreign policy priorities.³⁵ The aim of this exercise was simply, as the Minister of International Cooperation, the Honourable Beverly J. Oda, stated, “to make Canada’s aid work better.”³⁶

Looking back over the past five years, the spirit of the IPS-Development chapter has definitely prevailed, even though several specific policy goals are still unachieved. Democratic development remains fraught with risk and both Afghanistan and Haiti have clearly demonstrated the strengths and limitations of any international development program, regardless of its organization, resources, or application.

Commerce

Canada’s economic and financial prosperity has long been anchored by its international success. A country born out of strong export markets in raw materials and trade goods, by 2005, Canada was a fully financially secure and sovereign nation with full memberships in the world’s most exclusive G8 and G20 economic clubs. Still, Canada’s success continued to depend on its ability to position itself advantageously at all times. At the time of the publication of IPS, Canada remained one of the most open of the globe’s major economies, as well as its fifth largest exporter and importer. International trade composed more than seventy percent of the country’s GDP. Likewise, exports accounted for nearly forty percent of the economy and were linked to one-quarter of all Canadian jobs. Foreign direct investments in Canada were very extensive, as were Canada’s investments abroad.³⁷

Still, the country’s continued prosperity in the 21st global marketplace depended on managing change, making good choices and setting clear economic priorities for the coming decade; therefore, the IPS-Commerce chapter focused on policies primarily aimed at further strengthening the Canada-US trading partnership, as well as the North American Free Trade Agreement. Similarly, it advocated for a continued domestic economic policy aimed at encouraging productivity and competitiveness, while at the same time exploiting new markets and opportunities abroad.

Despite the obvious importance of sustaining Canadian economic security and prosperity in an increasingly globalized international market, at just 23 pages the IPS Commerce chapter was the smallest of the five documents and it offered the least amount of new guidance for international policy development. Though recognizing that globalization would likely mean fewer and fewer barriers to future international business and trade abroad, the IPS document was largely focused on Canada’s special relationship with its closest and largest trading partner, the United States. Already exchanging approximately \$1.8 Billion in goods and services *daily* (or \$1.25 Million every minute), the US was in 2005, and remains today, Canada’s largest source of direct investment, both foreign and domestic.³⁸

Thus, the IPS-Commerce advocated for the further cultivation of this relationship through a number of initiatives. For example, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, border security had been significantly tightened, requiring the development of new ‘smart borders’ that provided adequate

³⁵ Details on the Aid Effectiveness Agenda may be found at <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/FRA-825105226-KFT>. For the list of the 20 countries of focus, see <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/JUD-51895926-JEP>

³⁶ Speaking Notes for a speech presented by the Honourable Beverley J. Oda, Minister of International Cooperation, at the Munk Centre for International Studies, Toronto, dated 20 May 2009.

³⁷ IPS-Commerce, p.1

³⁸ Ibid, p.2

security without jeopardizing international commerce and trade for either the US or Canada. Such a requirement was no small task. For example, in 2005 a truck carrying goods crossed the border in both directions every two seconds. Delaying, or disrupting, the flow of commerce and trade could have more serious consequences. The IPS further addressed similar issues with a section devoted to resolving disputes, despite the fact that at the time over 95 percent of Canada-US trade was dispute-free.

Turning to other trading partners, the IPS-Commerce chapter directed the country towards a two-pronged approach. Domestically, the government's international commerce strategy and policy focused on making Canada an attractive location for business through smart regulation, investment in people, encouraging innovation and enabling new Canadians to become employed.³⁹ All of this was designed to provide the right services to business. Abroad, the IPS focused on the development of improved government-to-government relationships that would subsequently foster the development of business-to-business and other non-governmental ties. Through participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO), International Government Organizations (IGO), and other trade, investment and related commercial agreements, the IPS sought to engage international commerce on a broad scale at all levels from government to worker.

As with other sectors covered in this study, the past five years proved particularly challenging for Canada's economy and presented numerous direct challenges to the objectives identified in the IPS-Commerce chapter. As Canadians went to the polls in 2006 to vote for a new government, the world was about to fall into its worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Beginning with the collapse of the global housing bubble in 2006, US markets were particularly hard hit and this subsequently caused the values of securities tied to the real estate market to plummet, seriously damaging a number of global financial institutions. Within a year there were increased concerns over western bank solvency, credit availability and investor confidence in a rapidly falling global stock market. By 2008, the large losses suffered in securities on the international stock exchanges resulted in a decline in international trade, which in turn led to the global economy slowing down as credit tightened.⁴⁰ By the end of the year, several economies were openly reporting wide scale recession and even a possible depression. It was a financial crisis on a global scale and arrived when the world's only superpower, and many of its allies, was fully embroiled in two major regional conflicts abroad.

Around the world, both governments and their central banks responded to the crisis with "unprecedented" financial stimulus, monetary policy expansion and institutional bailout.⁴¹ Although touched by the economic storm, Canada's stable banking system and traditional regulatory approaches to commerce sheltered it from the worst effects; however, the contraction of the U.S. economy heavily affected Canadian business and investment. As of mid 2010 much of the systemic crisis has passed, although, like other countries, Canada still suffers from the longer-term global effects of the recession.

³⁹ Ibid, p.9.

⁴⁰ For further background to the crisis see Margaret Atwood. *Payback: Debt and the Shadow Side of Wealth*. (Toronto: House of Anansi. 2008); William D. Cohan. *House of Cards: A Tale of Hubris and Wretched Excess on Wall Street*. (New York: Doubleday, 2008); and Niall Ferguson. *The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World*. (London: Allen Lane. 2008).

⁴¹ Financial crisis of 2007-2010. Accessed on 1 August 2010 at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Financial_crisis_of_2007-2010

Those preparing the IPS in 2004 could never have predicted that the entire world would face a recession of such magnitude within 24 months of its release. The entire international economic environment changed after 2006, and at the time of this writing the recession has yet to play itself out entirely. Given these circumstances, along with the change of government, there is little doubt regarding the current insignificance of the IPS-Commerce chapter on broader international issues. The Conservative government was forced to take different action than that envisioned and gave priority to those issues necessary to maintain calm at home. In such an austere environment further analysis of the IPS-Commerce chapter seems moot.

Conclusion

Should one wish to access the *International Policy Statement* on the Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada website today, it will be located among the department's archived documents.⁴² Initiated under a Liberal government, just prior to its fall from power, their successor chose to adhere to the spirit of the policy, but not its letter. Looking back over the last five years, Canada's international policy objectives abroad have changed less than the mechanisms and procedures employed to attain them. But then, such changes are to be expected when one political party replaces another in government.

Was the IPS a success or a failure? Given that its ownership changed hands in the 2006 election it becomes difficult to fully quantify a response to this, for the policy undoubtedly suffered from the larger changes in the strategy, policy and machinery of government. Taking a more pragmatic approach one could offer a qualified 'yes'. Canada's international policy has definitely matured over the past five years, but it will take many more before its greatest test, Afghanistan, can be assessed with accuracy. Looking back today, the IPS put in motion the policy needed to take on such ambitious ventures. It would have been very difficult to fully engage in a mission like Afghanistan without the IPS in place beforehand. Still, it is very likely that any conclusion drawn about the diplomacy and defence portions of the IPS will depend entirely on how the mission itself is assessed in the years to come.

As for the policy's other elements, the development section was very likely doomed from the start. History has shown that no amount of policy can automatically lead to the action required to ameliorate human security on a broad scale. The IPS held true to Canadian traditions of promoting human security, but it will likely always require a 'coalition of the willing' to make such ideas a reality. Finally, the commerce portion of the policy simply reinforced long standing Canadian strategy towards international finance and trade. In this respect, one could qualify the IPS a success. As the global recession took hold in the west over the past five years, Canada's international commerce policy shielded it against the very worst of the bank, industry and credit crises. This is not to suggest that no effects were felt, but when other members of the G20 came seeking counsel on best practices the government was able to reflect well on its disciplined approach.

What, then, does the future hold? There is little question that as an 'opposition' document, the IPS itself will continue to languish in obscurity until the current government has replaced it entirely with strategies and policies of its own. From a policy perspective, it may in fact be an opportune moment to evaluate the lessons learned over the last five years with a view to institutionalizing those best practices under the aegis of an entirely new comprehensive document. This would allow the IPS to pass gracefully into history without the loss of its overarching ideas.

⁴² Accessed on 1 August 2010 at <http://www.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/documents/IPS-EPI/>

Yet, it seems somehow doubtful that Canadians should expect to see an entirely new IPS within the next five years, even with an impending federal election coming in 2011-2012. The appetite for sweeping foreign policies, or investments, seems to have run its course for the moment, and with an election looming it is very likely that government policy priorities will shift from an international focus to domestic issues. Essentially, defence may not become an election issue, but there is a good chance defence spending will.

Returning to Prime Minister Paul Martin's pledge to "making a difference", there is little question that Canada has achieved this over the past five years. Sitting on the backburners of international affairs in 2005, Canada has since become a central actor in the massive international stabilization effort in Afghanistan, in bringing relief to disaster-stricken countries all along the arc of instability, in focusing military assistance and training, security sector reform, civilian development and aid towards those countries that need it most, and in promoting corporate social responsibility in international commerce; whether this may all be attributed to the publication of the IPS in 2005 remains debatable. Regardless, Canada's overall international policy has strengthened over the last five years through many new vehicles and initiatives and shows few signs, if any, at present of weakening in the next five years to come.

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