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Institute

From the Operational to the Strategic: A Post-2011 Opportunity

A Policy Update Paper

By

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December, 2010

Prepared for the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV assumed command of the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan and Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan in November 2009 after serving as the Commander for the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth for 28 months, during which time he led the transformation of U.S. Army doctrine through the development of the Operations, Stability Operations, and Security Force Assistance Manuals. These publications have driven innovation within the Army to address current complex operations. Prior to that assignment Lieutenant General Caldwell was the face of Multi-National Force–Iraq during OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM as the spokesman and Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Effects. Before this, he led the 82nd Airborne Division for 25 months, spearheading civil support operations and humanitarian relief following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Commanding the 82nd Airborne Division followed service as the Deputy Director for Operations for the United States Pacific Command; and the Assistant Division Commander, 25th Infantry Division.

Lieutenant General Caldwell was commissioned in the Infantry upon graduation from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1976. He has held leadership positions in airborne and mechanized infantry units in the United States, the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Caribbean, including command of a battalion in the 25th Infantry Division and a brigade in the 10th Mountain Division. In addition, he has held a number of staff assignments: the Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Executive Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; a White House Fellow, The White House; Politico-Military Officer in Haiti during OPERATION RESTORE/UPHOLD DEMOCRACY; Brigade Operations Officer, 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division during OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM; and Chief of Plans for the 82nd Airborne Division during OPERATION JUST CAUSE in Panama.

Lieutenant General Caldwell has earned Masters Degrees from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in systems technology and from the School for Advanced Military Studies at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He has also attended the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University as a Senior Service College Fellow.

Awards and decorations earned by Lieutenant General Caldwell include two awards of the Distinguished Service Medal, three awards of the Defense Superior Service Medal, three awards of the Legion of Merit, two awards of the Bronze Star, four awards of the Humanitarian Service Medal, the Military Outstanding Volunteer Service Medal, and the Louisiana Cross of Merit. He has also earned the Presidential Service Identification Badge, the Office of the Secretary of Defense Identification Badge, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge. He is a Master Parachutist and Ranger qualified. He has also earned the Combat and Expert Infantryman Badges, and German, Canadian, British, and Irish Jump Wings. Lieutenant General Caldwell has been recognized as an Honorary Member of the Sergeant Audie Murphy Club and was made the Honorary ROCK of the year in 2008 by The ROCKS, Inc..



Afghan National Army soldiers conduct move and communicate techniques during a basic training course at the Kabul Military Training Center May 4, 2010

INTRODUCTION¹

While most of the recent news coverage of Afghanistan involves operations in Kandahar and its environs, there is a more important element of the war in Afghanistan that is rarely covered: the development of the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF). This force is one of the cornerstones of the counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan and must have the capacity and capability to serve its people and protect the nation from threats inside its borders. Without a self-sustaining security force, tactical gains on the battlefield will not be enduring.

To develop this force, we must professionalize the police, army, and air force, create viable logistics and medical systems, and improve the infrastructure and the institutions that train and educate them. To do this we must have the institutional trainers to develop both the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Police (ANP), specialized trainers that countries like Canada have and can increasingly employ with the redeployment of forces from combat areas in southern Afghanistan next year.²

¹ This article draws from a report published by NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan titled the “One Year Review and Way Ahead,” November 2010.

² Canadian governmental figures seem to be moving in this direction in recent months, including the Canadian Defence Minister, Peter MacKay, who stated that “We will work within the parameters of the parliamentary motion, which states very clearly that the military mission will come to an end in 2011...We will then transition into some of the other important work that we’re doing. That includes a focus on police training. The prime minister has been clear in saying our commitment to Afghanistan is for the long-term.” (Baron, Ethan, “MacKay says Canada will continue training Afghan police after 2011,” *National Post*, 10 April, 2010, <http://www.nationalpost.com/story.html?id=2788298>).

On 21 November of last year the international community activated the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A) to address the lack of resources and coordination in the development of the Afghan army and police. With support of NTM-A and collaborating stakeholders, the ANSF has made significant progress in the last twelve months. This progress is demonstrated in five main ways: the acquisition of necessary inputs, the delivery of improved professionalization, the increase in availability and quality of training, the development of sustainment systems, and the expansion of total strength.

NTM-A was created to synchronize NATO and bilateral efforts to develop the ANSF. Failing to attain a NATO mandate for ministerial development, the United States Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) was retained as a part of the new command to build the capability and capacity of ministerial development efforts. In the first year of NTM-A our support to our Afghan partners enabled the reversal of previously negative trends in quantity and quality and field an infantry-centric force capable of participating in counterinsurgency operations.

What still remain are building an enduring and self-sustaining force and the attainment of the growth objectives for the next year. Currently growth objectives appear to be on track, but combat operations and the resultant high operational deployment will remain real challenges for efforts to build quantity and quality. In the next year the focus for ANSF development is shifting to the creation of a more balanced force – a force that contains the organizational elements necessary for enduring, self-sustaining capacity. To create a balanced force, the need for specialist trainers becomes more urgent. For the long term, the probability of successful growth and professional development of the ANSF are directly correlated with specialized instructor capabilities.

INPUTS³

With the assistance provided by trainers from countries like Canada, there was significant progress in the development of the ANSF this year. While in previous years a lack of resources led to a force generation focus on quantity – getting as many soldiers and police into the field as quickly as possible – for the last year our focus was on improving the quality of the force while maintaining an increase in quantity. NTM-A quickly recognized that while quantity is important, quality is imperative in a professional force. To support this reinvigorated focus on quality, NTM-A worked to get the inputs right with respect to resources, strategy, organization, and people.



Superintendent John Brewer of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police visits an Afghan Border Police training center, June 12, 2010.

Since late 2009 resources has increased to develop the ANSF. Manning for NTM-A, including trainers and advisors, have increased from 25% of authorized strength to over 77%. Trainers at the regional and consolidated training centers across Afghanistan are critical to the increase of quality. They provide higher levels of training and serve as an example of the professional ethos we are trying to instill in every Afghan soldier and policeman. At the same time, they are working with their counterparts to build up the training and sustainment institutions and systems that will

³ These inputs come from a recent paper in the Association of the United States Army's *Army Magazine* in November 2010, titled "Economy of Force to Strategic Cornerstone: The Past, Present, and Future of the Afghan National Security Force."

eventually be transitioned to the Afghans in order to generate and sustain the ANA and ANP themselves. Additionally, advisors in the Ministries have been crucial to improving quality. NTM-A has placed advisors at all levels of the ANSF, from the Ministers of Interior and Defense to commanders of regional training centers. Advisors are dedicated to developing key Afghan leaders, supporting their efforts to build, improve, and reform their departments and commands; they are key enablers for both the Ministries and NTM-A to improve the institutions and systems of the ANSF.

A changed strategy has also been a crucial input. A greater focus on civil-military cooperation across all organizations training the ANSF has led to a greater unity of effort toward shared goals. Where training the Army and Police was once an economy of force effort, it has now become one of the cornerstones of the overall strategy – only when Afghans can secure their country will they truly be able to govern it.

Creating more integrated and efficient organizations is another input. The activation of NTM-A itself is evidence of this. By placing the responsibility of all training and education of the ANSF under one command, it has allowed a greater synchronization of efforts already underway and facilitated greater international participation. NTM-A itself has also supported the creation of other organizations to further develop unity of effort in developing the ANSF.

Finally, the selection of talented and experienced people has been an important input to ANSF development. While our leadership over Army and Police matters has been among the best, the greatest impact has been by personnel with special skills to train and advise the Afghans. Personnel from Canada that are training police in Kandahar and pilots for the Afghan Air Force in Kabul are examples of the impact a few specialized trainers can provide.

Despite these inputs, significant challenges remain to developing a self-sufficient and enduring ANSF. The greatest challenge is creating professionalism within the force. Professionalism is the key ingredient to an enduring force that can serve and protect its people. The three elements that are required to build this professional force are leader development, increasing literacy, and decreasing losses from attrition.

PROFESSIONALIZATION

Developing capable leaders has been NTM-A's top priority for the past year and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Strong, capable leaders who exemplify a servant-leader ethos are a catalyst for positive change within the ANSF and crucial to everything from recruiting to retention, training to planning, operations to sustainment. Creating this ethos amongst leaders throughout the ANSF will move leaders from personal and local ties to national loyalties, focusing on serving the people of Afghanistan. To build this ethos we are focusing on improving education, expanding opportunities for experience, and creating a systematic approach to training.

For education, our Afghan partners have developed, reorganized, and improved their leader development courses – overhauling basic soldier, noncommissioned officer, and officer training, providing literacy training throughout professional education courses, and creating branch school training. Today nine schools have been opened, with three more projected in the next year. Opened schools include the enablers necessary for a self-sustaining force, including the Infantry, Logistics, Human Resources, Engineering, Legal, and Intelligence. Additionally, on 4 October the Afghan National Army Artillery School was opened. This school is critical to the eventual self-sustainment of the Army, providing the capability to support their troops in the field with indirect fire. The Artillery School will teach every level of the force, from private to field-grade officer, the professional skills of an artilleryman, including how to calculate gunnery data to accurately conduct fire missions, provide fire support as an artilleryman on the ground with infantry troops, and operate and maintain artillery guns.

The Afghan Ministries of Interior (MoI) and Defense (MoD) are making great strides in using a transparent approach to providing experiential positions and systematic training to ANSF personnel. They have undertaken steps to ensure that positions, promotions, schools, and



BGen Dave Neasmith opens an Afghan National Army synchronization meeting, Kabul, Afghanistan, July 7, 2010.

rewards are based on performance and need, not patronage networks and favoritism. Moreover, key developmental positions, training, and education are vital to build the experience of Afghan leaders. An example of this is the Inherent Law for Officers and NCOs (ILON) decree passed by both MoI and MoD, a vital step for the long-term efficacy of the ANSF that outlines the legal procedures for retirement, pension, and other personnel actions. ILO supports leader development by allowing good leaders to advance to positions of greater responsibility, while allowing leaders past their prime to retire with support from the government.

The importance of literacy and numeracy for the quality of ANSF cannot be understated—it is fundamental for professional military and law enforcement personnel.⁴ Over the last year mandatory literacy programs have enjoyed success and widespread popularity, supporting both recruiting and retention efforts. To support these mandatory programs, we increased the literacy training capacity by 120%. As a result, NTM-A is educating 27,000 recruits, army and police, at any given time in literacy programs. These programs have led to a rise in first grade literacy completions by 18,000 and third grade completions to 6,000 ANSF personnel. Literacy undergirds accountability, supports branch competency, and helps prevent corruption. More specifically, literacy allows accountability of equipment—especially weapons—as one cannot to properly fill out paperwork or even read a weapon's serial number without the ability to read and understand numbers. Literacy also supports the various branch schools, thereby contributing to branch competency and improvement in the quality of the ANSF. Literate members of the ANSF increase transparency and therefore make it more difficult for others to engage in corrupt practices. For example, literate ANSF members can track their pay and are less likely to be preyed upon by corrupt superiors. The goal for the capacity for students in literacy programs is to grow to 50,000 by December 2010 and 100,000 by June 2011.

Finally, losses from attrition, which include desertions, deaths, or low retention, pose the greatest threat to quantity and quality of the ANSF. For example, based on the current attrition rates, to grow the Afghan National Security Force the additional 56,000 needed to meet the 2011 goal of 305,000, we will need to recruit and train 133,000 soldiers and police. To put this into context, in order to meet the 2011 goal, we will need to recruit and train in less than twelve months approximately the same number as is the total strength of the Afghan Army today. Rates of attrition are declining in most components of the ANSF, but if total strength objectives are increased in the future attrition must be reduced even further. High attrition coupled with growth will reach a point of diminishing returns—producing thousands of new ANSF personnel in order to replace attrition.

⁴ For more information on the importance of literacy training, see the article "Security, Capacity, and Literacy" in the January/February 2010 edition of the U.S. Army's *Military Review*.

One of the greatest stories of professionalization is the improvement in Afghan air power. Both the Afghan Air Force (AAF) and the Air Interdiction Unit (AIU), which supports Mol counter-narcotic efforts, made steady progress over the last year towards becoming a professional, fully independent, operationally capable, and sustainable force by 2016. Over the past year, six C-27 aircraft were acquired and made operational, bringing the total number of AAF aircraft from forty-two aircraft in November 2009 to forty-eight aircraft today. This includes one C-27 equipped for VIP airlift for the President of Afghanistan and his cabinet. AAF manning increased from just over 2,700 Airmen to nearly 4,000. To improve quality, the AAF opened the “Thunder Lab” to train young AAF officers in aviation, English language, ethics, fitness, and leadership. Similarly, the Pohantoon-e-Hawayee (PeH or “Big Air School”) was established to support a comprehensive force development strategy based on education, leadership development, and technical training. The PeH grew from seventeen courses to 54 with Afghans beginning to train Afghans. Operational capacity also increased from four mission sets to thirteen.



Lt. Jen Martin mentors female Afghan Border Police officers, Kabul, Afghanistan, August 18, 2010.

The AAF also developed capabilities for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as four Mi-17s deployed to support flood relief in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Finally, the AAF also rescued survivors of the Salang Pass avalanche, supported search and recovery following an airliner crash, and delivered generators and supplies to schools, all of which built trust and confidence of the population in their government and build goodwill with Afghanistan’s neighbors.

TRAINING

The ANSF made great strides over the past year with respect to training programs. A year ago most Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), the largest element within the ANP, were recruited and assigned without formal training. This caused significant opportunity for friction and abuse with respect to the Afghan population. Once this deficiency was identified, the old model of ‘Recruit-Assign’ was replaced with by one that made training mandatory for all police recruits. This new model of ‘Recruit-Train-Assign’ improved and continues to improve the quality of the AUP. Additionally, NTM-A assisted the Mol and MoD to dramatically increase training throughput and quality. ANP training capacity grew from less than 8,000 seats to almost 11,000. ANA NCO training annual throughput increased from less than 2,000 to over 9,000. An increase in quality can be seen in efforts to improve ANA individual soldier rifle marksmanship qualification, from 35% last year to 97% today. Much of the improvement in quality training is directly attributable to the increase in institutional trainers over the last year. For example, the instructor-to-student ratio for Basic Warrior Training improved from 1:79 last year to a 1:29 today. This not only increased the overall instruction, but allowed for the development of Afghan trainers that can take over some training, a key step for an enduring and self-sustaining ANSF. Courses like the Military Skills Instructor Course—a six-week class to train officers and NCOs that combines drill sergeant training and advanced instructor training—will drastically increase the quantity and quality of Afghan trainers, paying training dividends in the future.

To set the foundation to balance the force over the next year, NTM-A has supported the ANSF to build branch and specialty schools and courses to develop the requisite skill sets. The Mol has opened the Afghan Border Police (ABP) School, the National Police Staff College, the National Police Training Center in Wardak, and the ANCOP Center in Jalalabad. Additionally, the ANP Academy in Mazar-e Sharif will open by November 2011. As discussed earlier, the ANA as opened the Artillery, Infantry, Legal, Military Police,

Logistics, Religious and Cultural Affairs (to create Afghan chaplains), Intelligence, and Finance Schools.

Continuing education consists of four educational levels. These educational levels are pre-commissioning, primary, intermediate, and senior. Pre-commissioning education consists of military education received at the National Military Academy of Afghanistan and National Police Academy, primary education consists of education received at the Military Branch Schools and Police Specialty Schools, intermediate education consists of education received at Staff Officer Courses or the Junior Staff Officer College, and senior education consists of education received at Senior Staff Officer Courses or Afghan National Command and Staff College or the Sergeant Major's Academy for senior NCOs. It should also be noted that small, but growing numbers of Afghans are being trained outside of Afghanistan, such as in the United States and the United Kingdom. All of these schools will facilitate continued professionalization. All of these courses are partnered with coalition forces and require sustained support by institutional trainers.

SUSTAINMENT

Although progress has been made logistically, sustainment remains a significant challenge. The ANA improved from having no logistic center capability at the beginning of 2009 to operating four regional centers and a national logistic center expected to be established by the end 2010. Similarly, the ANP developed and stood up four regional logistics centers and planned for authorized stockage lists (ASLs) at the brigade and provincial levels. The ANA also developed and fielded ASLs for forward support depots and has prepared to field Combat Logistics Battalions to support corps. The equipment levels for the ANA are similarly showing steady improvement. Units graduating from the Combined Fielding Center (CFC) routinely have 98% of their weapons and vehicles, 80% of their communications gear, and 99% of their organizational and individual equipment. There is much improvement yet to be done, but progress has been made. The greatest challenge for the sustainment of Afghan forces at the current time is the shortage of trained Afghan personnel. The creation of logistics courses will lessen the shortage in the near future, but specialized institutional trainers are still needed to develop this lagging capability.

Another element required to sustain the ANSF is medical support. NTM-A has assisted the ANSF to improve the quality of their medical community, but the maturation of the Afghan medical system will require years of effort. The ANSF medical community has had five key accomplishments in the past year. First, the ANSF established a Physician Assistants Course, which began as an ANA course but is planned to also be provided to the ANP. Second, five medical training programs have transitioned to an Afghan lead: Combat Medic Instructor Training, Kabul Combat Medic Course, Medical Officer Basic Course, Medical Sergeants Course, and Medical Logistics Course. Third, the Combat medic training completion increased from 600 to 1,500 personnel per year, a 135% increase over a very short period. Fourth, the ANSF has increased Afghanistan's only sustainable intensive care unit to thirty-three beds within the ANSF system. Finally, the ANSF established educational and clinical standards for doctors. These efforts are vital for the future of the ANSF, as disease and non-battle injuries cause significant losses for the ANSF.

GROWTH

While quality has been the primary focus of NTM-A over the last year, increasing the end-strength of the ANSF was also a priority, resulting in extraordinary growth. The changes in Afghan senior leadership and their determined efforts to increase recruitment, decrease attrition, and improve retention resulted in achieving all growth goals for October 2010 three months ahead of schedule. More specifically, the ANA total strength grew from approximately 97,000 to over 136,000, an increase of over 40%, and the ANP total strength



Cpl. Karen Holowaychuk of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police congratulates a female Afghan National Police officer, Kandahar, Afghanistan, 2010.

grew from 95,000 to 116,000, an increase of 22%. In this growth the ANSF made small but significant steps towards gender integration, a significant achievement given the state of women's rights during the rule of the Taliban. There are now over 1,000 females serving in the ANSF, mostly in the ANP, including those that graduated from the first female Officer Candidate School course in September. Overall, high attrition in units committed to the fight in the south and east remains a long-term concern, as are significant officer and noncommissioned officer shortages in the ANA.

One of the primary reasons for the significant increase in ANSF end-strength is changes made toward recruiting. NTM-A worked with Afghan leadership in the MoI and MoD to improve recruiting through pay raises, tripling the number of recruiters, and standing up a Recruiting Command. NTM-A also contracted for a major Afghan media recruiting campaign to support the recruiting drive. The ANSF and NTM-A also established sixteen mobile sub-recruiting stations; these recruiting efforts were highly successful and were the driving force behind the ANSF meeting its total strength goals. However, recruiting sufficient southern

Pashtuns to maintain the ethnic balance within the ANSF remains a significant challenge. While most recruits from the south are Pashtun, the southern provinces only produced 3% of this year's recruits. The ANSF and NTM-A have set a 4% standard for the coming year. Three major efforts have been adopted to help meet this standard: sending ministerial delegations of Pashtun leaders to the south to recruit their brethren, development of a "Return to Protect Your Home" program that allows recruits to serve in the southern two ANA corps, and closely coordinating recruiting efforts with successful security operations.

Finally, the mitigation of attrition has been crucial to growth. Aggregate attrition for the ANA and ANP has decreased over the last twelve months; however, specific components are still at risk, such as the ANCOP. High operational tempo and an unpredictable schedule are significant reasons for high attrition in ANCOP and ANA units in heavily-contested areas. ANCOP is of particular concern due to its vital role in counterinsurgency and its high level of effectiveness, both of which result in more demand for ANCOP participation in operations by tactical commanders. While down from the highs of November 2009, the ANCOP level of attrition remains unacceptable and unsustainable. To mitigate the effects of high ANCOP attrition, recruiting has been ramped up, but more initiatives to reduce attrition are required to meet ANCOP total strength objectives for 2010.

SUSTAINING THE MOMENTUM

While significant progress has been made over the last year, an increase in the amount of institutional trainers is needed to sustain the momentum. There will be a steep increase in trainer requirements over the next eight months to develop the schools to balance the force, as well as to continue its growth. More than mere numbers are needed – distinct trainer capabilities with the skills and experience to grow and professionalize the ANSF.

A persistent lack of trainers in the near term will negatively impact the quality of police and soldiers and their ability to generate and sustain their forces. Without more specialty trainers the expansion of Afghan training bases will be hindered, specialty school development will be delayed, the creation of support units to balance the force will be slowed, professionalization efforts will be hampered, and the eventual transfer of security responsibility to Afghans will be delayed.

The Canadian military and civilian police forces have done much to support NTM-A and the development of the ANSF. The recent addition of 44 police trainers and 10 air mentor trainers to the NTM-A mission has been invaluable, as these specialties are particularly hard to fill. However, to move from building the basic Afghan military and police forces to developing the key capabilities required for those forces to be self-sustaining requires, more of your trainers with specialized skills and experience are required. Police, air, and medical trainers are especially needed, and your nation has the capabilities to provide more air mentor teams in Kandahar, police trainers in Kandahar, trainers at the ANA medical facility in Kandahar, and logistics facilities across the country. Your forces are more broadly experienced than most other nations serving in the International Security Assistance Force, and such mature soldiers, with multiple tours serving in Afghanistan, would be extremely effective trainers for the ANSF.



Canadian Troops at Kandahar Airfield,
Afghanistan, February 21, 2010.

As Elinor Sloan, a former defense analyst in the Canadian Department of National Defence wrote recently (emphasis added):

*The new circumstances in Afghanistan create an opportunity for Canada as to what contribution it can make to building stability in Afghanistan. As a participant at the recent Kabul conference, Canada fully supported the Afghan government's objective for the ANSF by 2014. After October 2011 the ANSF will stop growing in size, but it will continue to need training and development for the better part of a decade in order to achieve the level of quality required to truly be a self-sustaining army and air force. **The deployment of 300-400 specialist trainers and advisors – engineers, signalers and communicators, logisticians, mechanics, air frame technicians, etc. – would have an impact well out of proportion to the actual numbers deployed.** When Canada's current commitment comes to an end, a new mission should be established that encompasses several hundred specialist trainers and advisors located in or near Kabul, charged with training Afghan military and police units over a period of at least three years. Such a mission would be eminently feasible and would constitute a tangible, visible, enduring contribution to Canadian and Afghan security.⁵*

⁵ Sloan, Elinor, "Canada's Post-2011 Commitment to Afghanistan," *Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute Dispatch*, Fall 2010 (Volume VIII, Issue III).

While NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan makes up only 2% of the coalition force strength in Afghanistan, its impact is enormous – their trainers have generated an ANSF that today



MGen Stuart Beare, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan Deputy Commander for Police, talks to local students during his visit to their school to watch a play about anti-extremism, November 2, 2010.

makes up 63% of all security forces in the country. By improving the Afghan capacity to generate, equip, field and sustain their security force, they have begun to create a force that will be able to take the lead for security in the future. This would not have been possible without the professional trainers from Canada, and will not be possible with continued support. As Canada begins to shift their forces from operations in the south, invest the specialized trainers required to develop the ANSF. Ultimately, the ANSF is the only force that can secure Afghanistan and provide stability into the future. Let us provide all the support and mentorship we can to ensure they have the capacity and capability to accomplish this mission.



Shohna ba Shohna - Shoulder to Shoulder

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CDFAI was created to address the ongoing discrepancy between what Canadians need to know about Canadian international activities and what they do know. Historically, Canadians tend to think of foreign policy – if they think of it at all – as a matter of trade and markets. They are unaware of the importance of Canada engaging diplomatically, militarily, and with international aid in the ongoing struggle to maintain a world that is friendly to the free flow of goods, services, people and ideas across borders and the spread of human rights. They are largely unaware of the connection between a prosperous and free Canada and a world of globalization and liberal internationalism.

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