

## **PANEL ONE: North American Defence Issues**

1<sup>st</sup> Panelist: Phillip Lagasse: Canada's Back: Does it matter in Washington?

In the 2007 throne speech from the Harper government it was announced that there would be a continuation of the policies and principles introduced by the Martin government. This included an increase in defence spending and a rebuilding of the Canadian Forces, as well as the commitment to Kandahar in Afghanistan.

Why is Canada back? Part of the declinist school of thought that emerged in the 90's said that Canada's lack of military presence led to a decline in Canada's presence in the world. You can correlate Canada's respect and influence in Washington with our solidarity in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), as well as abandoning security free riding, taking on difficult missions overseas, and solidarity with major policy decisions. Signaling reliability and trustworthiness through onerous actions, solidarity and burden sharing will increase respect and gain a receptive ear. This follows the tit for tat relationship philosophy where you should receive some reciprocity from the states for doing something.

The Canada's back policies should have increased respect for Canada in. This would result in more movement of goods across the border. Respect for Canada does seem to have increased: as seen in Senator McCain's visit to Canada, in addition there has also been more positive coverage of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan.

Canada's actual influence in Washington has not increased though. This can be seen in the tightening of the border since 2005: it has continued to be securitized. The travel initiative also did not meet Canada's hopes, and there is no guarantee of an open border in the event of another terrorist attack. We cannot count the deployment of more troops to Kandahar as influence. In order to have influence the person you are influencing must actually take on some kind of risk in order to do something.

The Canada is Back school as well as the declinist school overlooked a few things. The first were structural limits: Canada is a secondary power and the returns on Canada's investments in terms of influence are inevitably poor. Second, Canada is one of many and often finds itself at the bottom of a list of many actors seeking to gain greater influence in Washington. Lastly American political culture dictates that there are few concessions to be made regarding security and it is difficult to convince people to take a risk on behalf of Canada. We may have gained a certain amount of respect in Washington but Canada will always been seen as an approach to the American homeland and not as an extension to it. At best what Washington can claim is that America is more considerate of what Canada wants, but this does not equal influence.

If Canadians are satisfied with gaining more respect in the United States then policies such as Canada is Back will continue; meanwhile, if Ottawa grows dissatisfied with returns on investments then we will have a change in policy. In this case we may see Canada revert back to a more traditional defence policy. The declinist school will also

lament the state of bilateral relations. It must be recognized that the United States will have participated in bringing about this outcome due to lack of reciprocity in the tit for tat relationship between Canada and the United States and finally because of the realities of the American Political Culture and Political system put limits on what Canada can do.

2<sup>nd</sup> Panelist: Patrick Lennox: Chopping In: Sea Power and the Canadian Contribution to the Long War

The HMCS Protector and Calgary met with the Iroquois on the Panama to form a composite task group that is self sustaining and chopped into a US mission that is involved in the war on drugs. We did this because it was the neighbourly thing to do.

The ships were linked into communication and intelligence feeds and this demonstrated that Canada is interested in the Caribbean beyond commerce.

Combined Task Force (CTF) 150 is a coalition of warships working towards stability in the Arabian sea. This was the first time Canada would command the mission and it was the first time that a group was actively deployed. This was a big leadership opportunity for Canada and one of the most significant deployments of forces since 9/11. If Canada wants to be a good neighbour it must, in the future, be capable of making these commitments on a continuous basis. If we continue to let the Navy drop the ball it will take another decade to mount a task force to send back into distant seas. This would be a strategic blunder that would have major consequences.

CTF 150 is part of Operation Enduring Freedom and it has become customary for commanders of this mission to rotate. The commander in chief then delegates responsibilities to involved nations. A cooperative strategy, such as this, shifts the tone if not the practice of Canadian Foreign Policy towards a more enlightened approach of global leadership. Canada needs to grow and foster traditional and non traditional relations. The establishment of this mission shows the sovereignty issues that are viewed regarding troops offered by nations to US led missions. The important thing though is that countries can chop out to go on national tasking from under the US command. This injects important elements of autonomy that are essential for subordinate allies to the US.

CTF 150's area of responsibility is one of the most important parts of marine real estate. 50% of the oil trade is here, as well the global economy depends on this area for reliable paths of commerce. At its most fundamental level this is about sea power. This can be compiled in 4 D's. The first is defence with regards to maritime security operations and combating piracy. The second is development that requires theatre security cooperation in order to conduct exercises with countries in the area to develop policing strategies. The third is diplomacy which involves Canada using its maritime influence to make itself look good in different parts of the world and the last is disaster relief. This is seen in the World food program escort of which Canada is the third largest contributor and we contribute to helping with major security issues. These four D's help us offer stability to an area and shows our commitment to the war on terror, but still marks the end of an era.

Canada has upheld its neighbourly duties but Canada will not be able to perform this again for about a decade due to a decline in the navy and so this decreases our ability to be good neighbours.

3<sup>rd</sup> Panelist: Pierre Leblanc: Mutual Security Interests in the Arctic

With regards to Canada's Arctic Sovereignty we use the straight baseline method, where you draw a straight line that creates a circle around the Arctic archipelago that shows the Northwest Passage Route as under Canadian Sovereignty; meanwhile, other countries use the 12 nautical mile rule that makes the Northwest Passage international waters. In addition the United States considers the Northwest Passage an international strait. Most people, including Canadians, don't realize how large the arctic is and that the monitoring and protection of the arctic is difficult. In addition internal waters are not recognized by the United States, if the US were to recognize this there would be no one to challenge, but the United States navy wants to preserve its ability to navigate freely anywhere in the world. Some experts in the law of the sea claim that the US uses a weak argument to claim that Canadian waters are international.

Global warming is affecting the arctic archipelago and for Canada the immediate danger is through the environment. It will cost a fortune to clean up the environment and it is an extremely fragile one, and so the question is who would pay for a clean up should an accident occur with a ship carrying a flag of convenience? The Canadian arctic can also be seen as a backdoor and this raises additional security concerns. Canada and the United States have two mutual interests in the arctic, one being security in the post 9 / 11 world and second, oil reserves.

The future is unpredictable but there are advantages to cooperation. If we work together we will have intelligence and advance warning. The arctic is a vast area and it is difficult to monitor with limited resources so we could share limited resources to help each other in surveillance, interception, and ice breaking. Working together would also lower our costs such as with the mapping of the continental shelf where coast guard vessels and scientists are working together in a difficult environment because it is in our mutual interests.

It is in the national interest of Canada and the US to have well managed arctic waters. This is seen in Canada announcing that it will make NORDREG, the arctic maritime regulatory regime, compulsory. It is likely that the US will reaffirm its objection to this. A possible solution would be to bring the control of the arctic under NORAD, this would bring enhanced security to both Canada and the United States.

There is some degree of urgency in coming to terms with this disagreement because global warming is proceeding faster than predicted and the world is a less secure place with rogue states, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and the resurgence of Russian activity. The security situation in the arctic is not improving and it is in the national

interests of both countries to reach a compromise. Both countries need to work to secure the arctic as this is what good neighbours do.