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### **Like Farmers Whose Lands have a Common Concession Line**

Thank you for the invitation, I will begin with a disclaimer that these views are mine and mine alone. NORAD has loomed large over Canada U.S. relations for over 50 years and in some sense has become identified with Canada U.S. defence relations. The U.S. and Canadian armed forces have been working well together to deal with the terrorist threat, but further integration has not occurred. A binational planning group was created but not much has been done on its recommendations and this is largely the norm.

U.S. and Canadian governments, and common opinion, have preferred a loose defence relationship not along the NORAD model. Canadians and the U.S. have resisted integration as there is the belief that Canada would suffer a loss of sovereignty and a U.S. working relationship tied to closely with Canada would limit the U.S.'s freedom of action.

In the Louis St. Laurent school Canada approaches it's relations with the U.S. as the title implies: farmers whose lands have a common concession line, and through this we settle questions that arise without dignifying the word policy. The Real Politick approach says that the discrepancies between the two countries show the differences in their place in the world.

In the case of air defence during the Cold War this was an exception because of technology, threats, and the nature of geography. Even if there were no boundaries upstairs there were always boundaries downstairs with lines of demarcation between governments and military. Canada looks towards the security of the U.S. and looks to the U.S. to make decisions, without interference, with foreign governments and so NORAD worked, but there were differences in perception.

Our experience in military planning with the Canadians is that Canadians can't arrive at negotiated positions without approval by the Canadian government, and it might be difficult to gain the approval for the expense of a NORAD program.

During the late 50's missile threat NORAD was involved on the maritime side but this relationship was largely based in the two navies. U.S. and Canadian strategic culture is expeditionary. Atomic deterrence created security during the Cold War and this helped make NORAD work well because of the nature of the threat to the continent, and not much was demanded of Canada. Europe was the front line in the Cold War. In post 9/11 we have an era where Canada is becoming an important piece of real estate. This may create a move to an expanded NORAD because a command for North America may become essential due to increased navel, air and intelligence security.

New cooperation is happening across the board but this is non defensive. Exchange of information, and security at the border, is being taken care of in a St. Laurent way meeting from time to time to manage discreet relations as the need arises.

There is also the question of integrated border enforcement teams. On the maritime side NORAD was given a maritime warning mission and this is being worked out, but it is unclear if we're going to see a replication of the aerospace warning and assessment on the maritime side. This is not due to resistance on either side, but instead the nature of the threat. Additionally, each country has been working unilaterally. On the U.S. side when they talk about maritime awareness it is in a larger global context to meet the threat as far from U.S. shores as possible. On the Canadian side we know the U.S. has another Navy, the U.S. Coast Guard, and it's the lead agency on maritime homeland security. What has developed is a series of discreet arrangements and the ability to capture it in a broader approach is in the discussion. Big ideas and broad arrangements have not satisfied the needs of either country. Dwight pointed out the idea of BMD and the creation of Canada Command and Northern Command. In the wake of 9/11 the countries create unilateral commands for the defence of the country. The creation of the Canada First Defence Strategy suggests the future of bilateral security and defence relations.

A model more in tune with the St. Laurent approach uses his understated remarks to capture the essence of the Canada U.S. relationship. During the Cold War it was a relationship that reflected the different priorities and strategies that encompassed the wide range of programs that were put into place when the time came. NORAD was necessary and needed to handle the aerospace command but this was not the norm. There were boundaries downstairs. The St. Laurent approach has been the one that Canada and the U.S. turned to after the terrorist attack and this shows that Canada and the U.S. are working well together in traditional and novel ways to deal with the threat towards the continent.