ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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He was Chair of the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs from 2001 to 2003. Mr. Pratt was appointed as Canada’s 36th Minister of National Defence in December, 2003 in the Government of the Rt. Hon. Paul Martin, P.C.

From late 2004-2008, he served as Special Advisor to the Secretary General of the Canadian Red Cross (CRC) where his focus was on issues related to international humanitarian law, the control of small arms and light weapons and government relations. He also led the CRC’s “Auxiliary to Government” project which promoted a new relationship between the CRC and governments at all levels. In 2009 and 2010, Mr. Pratt worked as a consultant on a democracy promotion project in Baghdad as part of a USAID effort to support the Iraqi Parliament.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is very important to underscore the fact that although one person’s name is attached to this paper, many people made significant contributions to it in one form or another. This study would not have been possible without the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). Professor David Bercuson of the Institute approached me to do this paper late in the spring of last year based upon a request that came from a person who wishes to remain anonymous, but whose long interest, knowledge and support for Canada’s Reserve Forces are well known nationally. This study was financially supported by CDFAI and the Canadian International Council through the Strategic Studies Working Group. I offer sincere thanks to them for allowing me to research and write on this interesting and important subject.

I would also like to express my gratitude to a group of people who made very noteworthy contributions to the content of this report. A number of former and serving senior officers of the Canadian Forces (CF) agreed to be interviewed and gave generously of their time to share their knowledge and insights on the subject of Canada’s Reserve Forces. This group includes MGen (Ret’d) Clive Addy, LGen (Ret’d) Charles Belzile, MGen (Ret’d) Ed Fitch, LGen (Ret’d) Michael Jeffrey, LGen Andrew Leslie, Chief of Transformation, LGen (Ret’d) George Macdonald, Col (Ret’d) George Petrolekas, MGen (Ret’d) Jerry Pitzul, LCol (Ret’d) and former Honourary Colonel, John Selkirk and MGen Dennis Tabbernor, Chief – Reserves and Cadets. On the civilian side, Professor J. L. Granatstein and Ms. Louise Mercier, VP Maritime Affairs, Navy League of Canada were also most helpful.

MGen (Ret’d) Ed Fitch, MGen (Ret’d) Jerry Pitzul and MGen Dennis Tabbernor, Chief – Reserves and Cadets were kind enough to go above and beyond the call of duty to offer valuable and very detailed comments and suggestions on the final working draft. An individual who wishes to remain anonymous also made an important contribution to this paper for which I am very grateful. While every effort was made to ensure that the facts contained in this paper are correct, any mistakes, inaccuracies or faulty analysis are, of course, my sole responsibility.

David Pratt, March 2011
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In recent years, strategic thinking and military restructuring have been confounded, not only by the uncertainties of the threat environment, but also by significant budget restraints. The latter has had important implications for the size of military forces, equipment purchases, training and potential commitments. One of the areas to which many have looked to help mitigate the lack of resources and for ensuring the long term viability of an effective military is the Reserve Forces. How best to make use of the Reserve component has become an important matter of concern not only for Canada, but for many of our allies as well.

This report is an initial attempt to highlight some of the more important issues facing the Canadian Army Reserve. The report does not pretend to have all the answers, but is an important first step in promoting what is hoped will be a wider ranging examination of the Reserve and its role as part of an effective and modern Canadian military. The report recognizes the important contribution made by the Reserve to deployments in the post-Cold War era and argues that the experience gained must be built upon in order to ensure an effective Reserve Force for the future.

The first section deals briefly with the implications of recent expenditure reductions for Canadian and other allied militaries. As well, it provides a brief discussion of the importance allied defence establishments are placing on their Reserves. It then goes on to provide a brief historical background on the evolution of the Canadian Army Reserve and what successive governments have done with regard to its development.

Next, the report provides a discussion of the changing strategic environment and its implications for the Canadian Forces. This section places particular emphasis on the importance of 9/11 and the subsequent need to re-evaluate our strategic assumptions and force structures. The discussion is pursued in light of various reports and studies done by governments and parliamentary fora in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks.

The subsequent section provides a review of the Regular and Reserve force structures as well as a discussion of the CF transformation launched by the then Chief of the Defence Staff General Rick Hillier. There is also an analysis of the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) announced by the Harper Government in 2008. Also addressed are the Command and Control (C2) challenges related to the effective management of operations that combine military and civilian capabilities in foreign and domestic settings. It is argued that if we are to achieve a unified vision and more integration within the CF then the Regular and Reserve forces will have to work together very closely. The efficient use of the Army Reserve is critical to the sustainability of Canada’s land forces into the future.

The report supports a recent view expressed by LGen Leslie concerning the need to reduce headquarters staff in order to better support the field force and examines the idea of a divisional model where Canada’s three Regular Force Brigades would comprise the 1st Division and an unspecified number of Reserve Brigades the 2nd division. The primary role of the former would be expeditionary deployments with support to domestic operations while that of the latter would be domestic deployments with support to expeditionary operations. Each division would contain a certain percentage of Reservists and Regulars, thereby providing for a degree of “cross-fertilization”. The pros and cons of the idea are also laid out. A variety of other important issues facing the Reserve are also discussed including budgets, recruitment and training, retention rates and medical care. Also examined is the question of whether or not the Reserve should have their own chain of command. In the end, the report supports the “integrationist” position while noting that the “separationists” and those calling for reforms have some valid points as well. The report supports the conclusion that Canada needs one army with the Army Reserve being an integral component thereof under one chain of command.

In discussing the question of mobilization, the report brings the debate over the Reserve into the 21st century. It contains a critique of the long standing argument on behalf of stage four or mass mobilization as a core role for the Reserve. This role, the report concludes, should simply be abandoned. In the present and foreseeable future strategic environment, a focus on mass mobilization simply makes no sense. The future roles laid out for the Reserve “must be realistic insofar as the strategic environment is concerned and affordable from the
standpoint of force size, training and equipment”. Today, the Reserves are an integral part of the CF family, but they need roles that are relevant in a modern context to the people they serve.

Having dispensed with mass mobilization as a key role for the Reserve, there remain those of augmentation and the Reserve “footprint” in the community. The former is self-explanatory, but the latter is one we may do well to further develop. The Reserve is more representative of the ethnic diversity of Canadian communities than the Regular Force. It also brings recruits with skills not always readily found amongst those who decide to make the military their first career choice. Therefore, it is important that we provide the Reserve with meaningful tasks or roles where young recruits feel they are making a significant and intelligent contribution to their community and nation. The report offers some do-able examples in this regard; one of the more intriguing being that of cyber-defence.

The report also provides insights into the “culture” of the Reserve Force and its relationship to the Regulars. While the relationship has not always been an easy one, it has improved significantly. Much of this is due to the respect generated by Reservists in deployments to the Balkans and Afghanistan. Also recognized is the important role tradition has played with respect to the Militia and the “veneration” of historic regiments. However, while paying tradition its due, the report provides an argument for the need to stay abreast of today's realities and the necessity for change.

The paper surveys a variety of programs in place among allied countries and suggests that we take a serious look at adopting the recommendations recently made by the C.D. Howe Institute concerning employer support.

The basic message conveyed is that, if we expect the Reserve to honour its commitment to serve when called upon, then it is our responsibility as a society to ensure that they are able to do so. The responsibility is mutual. The report argues that if we consider the Reserve to be an important national institution, then its long term well-being cannot be left to a few individuals in the Reserve community, the senior command of the CF, a few pundits and a select group of senior bureaucrats. It should rather be decided by open and public debate that involves outreach to the public and important stakeholders through either a Special Commission or some form of parliamentary study.
SOMMAIRE

Ces dernières années, on a confondu pensée stratégique et restructuration militaire. Incertitude quant aux menaces, certes, mais aussi sérieuses restrictions budgétaires qui ont joué sur la taille des forces armées, sur l’acquisition de matériel, sur l’entraînement et sur les engagements à prendre.

Aussi, pour pallier au manque de ressources et assurer la viabilité à long terme d’une armée efficace, s’est-on tourné vers la force de réserve. Reste à savoir comment faire le meilleur usage de cette composante? La même question se pose à nos alliés.

Nous tentons, dans ce rapport, de signaler quelques-uns des gros défis auxquels fait face la réserve de l’Armée canadienne. Nous ne prétendons pas avoir toutes les réponses, mais c’est une première étape importante. Il faudrait en effet poursuivre un examen plus approfondi de la réserve et de son rôle dans une force militaire canadienne efficace et moderne.

Nous faisons état de la contribution importante de la réserve aux interventions qui ont suivi la guerre froide et jugeons que l’expérience acquise devrait permettre d’étayer une force de réserve efficace.

La première partie du rapport traite brièvement des implications des récentes compressions budgétaires pour la force militaire canadienne et pour celle d’autres pays alliés. Nous rappelons brièvement l’importance que les alliés accordent à leur réserve. Suit un bref historique de l’évolution de la réserve de l’armée canadienne et de ce que les gouvernements successifs ont fait quant à son développement.

Nous évoquons ensuite l’évolution du contexte stratégique et ses implications pour les forces canadiennes. Cette section met un accent particulier sur l’importance du Onze Septembre qui a obligé à réévaluer nos hypothèses stratégiques et les structures de nos forces militaires.

La discussion se poursuit à la lumière de divers rapports et études émanant du gouvernement et de forums parlementaires dans le sillage des attaques terroristes. Nous passons ensuite à un examen de la structure des forces régulières et des forces de réserve et de la transformation des FC entreprise par le Général Rick Hillier, ancien chef de l’état-major de la Défense. Nous analysons aussi la Stratégie de défense Le Canada d’abord, annoncée par le gouvernement Harper en 2008, les défis du Commandement et Contrôle (C2) quant à la gestion efficace d’opérations combinant capacités militaires et civiles dans des cadres d’opération à l’étranger et au Canada. Nous soutenons que si nous voulons parvenir à une vision unifiée et à une plus grande intégration des FC, les forces régulières et les forces de réserve devront œuvrer en très étroite collaboration. Une utilisation efficace de la réserve de l’armée de terre est critique pour la durabilité des forces terrestres.

Le rapport défend un point de vue récent exprimé par le L.Gén Leslie concernant la nécessité de réduire le personnel du quartier général afin de mieux soutenir la force sur le terrain, et avance l’idée d’un modèle divisionnaire, où les trois brigades des forces régulières seraient la 1ère Division et un nombre non spécifié de brigades de réserve, la 2ème Division. Le rôle fondamental de la première serait les déploiements expéditionnaires avec soutien aux opérations intérieures alors que celui de la seconde serait les déploiements intérieurs avec appui aux opérations expéditionnaires. Chaque division compterait un pourcentage de réservistes et de réguliers, favorisant une certaine intégration. Nous présentons le pour et le contre. Le rapport aborde tout un éventail d’autres questions concernant la réserve, notamment les budgets, le recrutement et l’entraînement, les taux de rétention et les soins médicaux. Nous examinons en outre si, oui ou non, la réserve devrait avoir sa propre chaîne de commandement. Enfin, le rapport soutient la position « intégrationniste » tout en reconnaissant que les « séparationnistes » et ceux qui réclament des réformes ont eux aussi des arguments valides. Le rapport conclut que le Canada a besoin d’une armée dont la réserve est une composante intégrale sous une seule chaîne de commandement. En discutant de la mobilisation, le rapport situe dans le 21e siècle le débat sur la Réserve.
Il comporte une critique du vieil argument selon lequel la quatrième étape, la mobilisation de masse est le premier rôle de la réserve. Ce rôle devrait simplement être abandonné. Dans le contexte stratégique actuel et futur, centrer le débat sur une mobilisation de masse n’a simplement aucun sens. Les rôles futurs de la réserve « doivent être réalistes dans le contexte stratégique et possibles si l’on considère son effectif, son entraînement et son équipement ». Aujourd’hui, la réserve fait partie intégrante de la famille des FC, mais elle doit avoir un rôle qui, dans un contexte moderne, a quelque pertinence pour la population qu’elle sert.

La mobilisation de masse n’étant plus considérée comme un rôle clé pour la Réserve, reste l’augmentation et de « l’empreinte » de la réserve dans la communauté. Le premier rôle est clair, mais le second mérite peut-être d’être accentué. La réserve est plus représentative de la diversité ethnique de la population canadienne que la force régulière. Elle apporte aussi des recrues possédant des compétences qui ne se trouvent pas toujours facilement chez ceux qui décident de faire carrière dans l’armée. Il est donc important de confier à la réserve des tâches et des rôles qui permettent aux jeunes recrues de sentir qu’elles apportent une contribution significative et intelligente à leur communauté et à leur pays. Le rapport offre quelques exemples pratiques à cet égard, notamment dans le domaine de la cyberdéfense.

Le rapport donne aussi une meilleure idée de la « culture » de la Force de réserve et de sa relation avec les forces régulières. Même si cette relation n’a pas toujours été facile, elle s’est sensiblement améliorée. Ceci, en partie, grâce au respect qu’ont inspiré les réservistes déployés aux Balkans et en Afghanistan. Le rapport s’arrête aussi sur le rôle majeur de la tradition quant à la milice et à la « vénération » des régiments historiques. Toutefois, il expose aussi combien il est nécessaire de considérer les réalités actuelles et les changements qu’elles imposent.

Enfin, le rapport traite de la vieille question du soutien accordé par les employeurs aux réservistes. La question fondamentale est la suivante : « quelle est la responsabilité du pays envers les réservistes et leurs familles quand on fait appel à leurs services ? » Le rapport suggère que si nous voulons pouvoir compter sur notre réserve, nous devons repenser la façon dont nous la soutenons. Au Canada, les programmes de protection des emplois varient selon les provinces et selon qu’ils relèvent ou non du gouvernement fédéral. Il faudrait une certaine constance. En même temps, il est important que les employeurs, qui supportent les coûts de remplacement des employés qui servent ainsi la nation, puissent bénéficier de quelque soutien. Nous passons en revue un certain nombre de programmes existant dans les pays alliés et suggérons d’envisager sérieusement d’adopter les recommandations récentes du C.D. Howe Institute au chapitre du soutien de l’employeur.

Le message fondamental de ce rapport est que, si nous nous attendons à ce que la réserve honore son engagement à servir quand on fait appel à elle, nous devons, en tant que société, veiller à ce qu’elle soit en mesure de le faire. C’est une responsabilité mutuelle. Si nous considérons que la réserve est une institution nationale importante, son avenir à long terme ne peut être décidé par quelques uns de ses représentants, le haut commandement des FC, quelques pontes et hauts fonctionnaires. L’avenir de la réserve doit faire l’objet d’un débat ouvert et public. Une commission spéciale ou une forme quelconque d’étude parlementaire s’impose.
ABBREVIATIONS

AG Auditor General
BGen Brigadier General
C2 Command and Control
C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance
CANCOM Canada Command
CANOSCOM Operational Support Command
CANSOFCOM Special Operations Force Command
CDFAI Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute
CEF Canadian Expeditionary Force
CEFCOM Expeditionary Force Command
CF Canadian Forces
CFDS Canada First Defence Strategy
CFLC Canadian Forces Liaison Council
CFNOC Canadian Forces Network Operations Centre
CFSCF Canadian Forces School of Communications and Electronics
CFRC Canadian Forces Recruiting Centre
CFRG Canadian Forces Recruiting Group
CIC Canadian International Council
CIMIC Civil Military Cooperation
CLS Chief of the Land Staff
COTC Canadian Officer Training Corps
CRF Consolidated Revenue Fund
CRS Chief of Review Services
DMPAP Director Military Pay and Accounts Processing
DND Department of National Defence
DoD Department of Defense (US)
DPS Defence Policy Statement
IPS International Policy Statement
LCol Lieutenant Colonel
LFC Land Force Command
LFRR Land Force Reserve Restructure
LGen Lieutenant General
MAD Mutually Assured Destruction
MAD 2.0 Mutually Assured Disruption
MAP Management Action Plan
MGen Major General
MMCCDND Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change in DND
MND Minister of National Defence
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCM Non-Commissioned Member
NDA National Defence Act
NDHQ National Defence Headquarters
PPCLI Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry
PSYOPS Psychological Operations
PTSD Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
QDR Quadrennial Defence Review (US)
ROTP Regular Officer Training Plan
RPSR Revised Pay System for Reservists
SCONDVA Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>SCRR</td>
<td>Special Commission on Re-structuring the Reserves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDSR</td>
<td>Strategic Defence and Security Review (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBG</td>
<td>Territorial Battalion Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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PREFACE

This paper on Canada’s “citizen soldiers” – our Army Reserve – was written in response to a series of questions the author was given when the project was initiated. The questions touch on a variety of issues relating to Canada’s Reserve Force ranging from the number of Reservists who have been deployed offshore to whether or not the Reserves should have a separate chain of command. Both the questions and brief answers are provided below. The background to these answers, which forms the basis of this paper, was necessary to justify the conclusions reached. It is also intended to form a status report on Canada’s Army Reserve.

In a report of this nature, it is very important to define terms. The National Defence Act states that: “There shall be a component of the Canadian Forces, called the reserve force, that consists of officers and non-commissioned members who are enrolled for other than continuing, full-time military service when not on active service.”1 For the sake of simplicity, this report speaks of the “Army Reserve”. While the term “Army” is used extensively, it should be noted that the proper name for the Canadian Army is “Land Force Command” since it is the land component of Canada’s integrated defence forces. Also, the term “Reserve” is employed instead of “the Militia” except where “the Militia” is used in its historical context. The terms “Land Force Reserve”, “Army Reserve” and “Reserve” are often used interchangeably.

To better situate the Army Reserve within the Reserves organization, it is important to understand the overall structure. Canada’s Reserve Force has four sub-components: the Primary Reserve, the Supplementary Reserve, the Cadet Instructors Cadre and the Canadian Rangers. The “Army Reserve” forms one portion (albeit the largest) of the Primary Reserve, which also includes the Naval Reserve, the Air Reserve, Canadian Special Operations Forces Command Reserve, the Health Services Reserve and the Judge Advocate General Reserve.

When this report uses the terms “Canada's Reserve Force” and the “Reserves”, it is generally referring to all the elements of the Primary Reserve. Depending on the context, the other three sub-components of the Reserve Force collectively might also be considered to be included. The size and importance of the Army Reserve is such that, in the author’s view, it is possible to make general recommendations concerning the Army Reserve that apply to the other elements of the Primary Reserve. The chart below provides information on the size of each of the respective components of the Reserves. It is important to point out that Class A Reservists are those employed part time in Canada, Class B are employed full time in Canada and Class C Reservists are those deployed on operations.

| Reserve Paid Strength² |
|------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                        | Class A | Class B | Class C | Total         |
| Navy Res               | 3,790   | 1,312   | 373    | 3,798         |
| Army Res               | 17,936  | 4,412   | 1,385  | 19,521        |
| Air Reserve            | 1,871   | 1,271   | 90     | 1,961         |
| Others                 | 460     | 796     | 38     | 1,328         |
| Sub-Total              | 24,057  | 7,791   | 1,886  | 35,733        |
| COATS*                 | 7,282   | 627     | 0      | 7,909         |
| Rangers                | 4,323   | 0       | 0      | 4,323         |
| Supp Res               | 0       | 0       | 0      | 15,383        |
| Total                  | 35,662  | 8,418   | 1,886  | 53,313        |

¹Section 15(3) National Defence Act, Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985, Chapter N-5.
²Figures as of November 30, 2010 - provided by MGen Dennis Tabbernor, Chief – Reserves and Cadets.
As noted above, this report was based on a series of questions provided to the author. To properly answer some of these questions, the provision of significant background information including history and an explanation of the current situation was required. Other questions required less detail. What follows are the questions and some succinct answers based upon the conclusions reached in the paper:

- **Question One**: Please provide an accurate count of numbers of Class “A” Reservists and Class “B” Reservists in the Land Force in 2009 and a chart showing the percentage of each in proportion to the total number of personnel in the Land Force as far back as possible (25 years?)

**Answer One**: This question was put to the Library of Parliament, which approached the CF for a comprehensive response. Because of the volume of information provided, their complete reply is included in Appendix ‘A’. The core of their response is as follows: “The number of Class A and Class B Reservists in the Chief of the Land Staff formations and units on 31 March 2009 was: Class A – 17,903 and Class B – 3,609. Class A and B Reservists combined have represented 46%, 44%, and 44% of the total Chief of the Land Staff Regular and Reserve personnel for 2008, 2009, and 2010 respectively (as of 31 Mar on each of those years).” The response also notes that “Due to differing databases, and improved but different information management systems, information prior to 2008 is unreliable and difficult to readily obtain, requiring archival searches in addition to substantial cross-checking across systems. Therefore, reliable information from the past three years only is provided.” There is also an explanation of the complexities of providing statistical information on force strengths and deployments within the three operational environments.

- **Question Two**: Please provide the numbers of Reservists who have served “off shore” since 2000 both in absolute numbers and as a percentage of offshore deployments.

**Answer Two**: The response can also be found on page 35 as well as in Appendix ‘A’.

- **Question Three**: How feasible would it be for the CF to adopt a separate chain of command for Reservists? E.g.: Chief – Reserves and Cadets is made a “three star” and all Reservists fall under his/her direct command or in the alternative all Army Reserve personnel report up through a Reserve chain of command to a MGen Reserve in LFC.

**Answer Three**: The short answer is “no”, but it requires an explanation. We will have to wait for the results of the CF Transformation exercise to see what, if any, changes are made to the command structure. However, it is unlikely that any new arrangement would involve a “three star” commanding the Reserves since it would effectively bifurcate the CF and, in the case of Land Force Command (LFC), create two armies. Nevertheless, it would appear as though the CF Transformation process is giving consideration to a command structure that could potentially provide for more autonomy for the Army Reserves and which might have them reporting up the chain of command to a MGen in LFC.

- **Question Four**: On p. 68 of his memoir, Rick Hillier writes of first confronting Reservists under his command: “The Regular Army and the Reserves were different worlds... the Reservists could be touchy and often had an inferiority complex.” What do you think can be done to solve this problem? Would you be able to seek input on this from Michael Jeffery and Rick Hillier?

**Answer Four**: Input for the answer to this question was sought from serving and retired members of the CF at senior and junior levels. While views on this subject vary widely amongst Reservists and Regular Force members, it is reasonable to conclude that Regular Force – Reservist relations have improved in recent years largely as a result of the positive role Reservists have played in the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan. However, it is likely and natural that a “we-them” mentality will continue to exist given the different cultures involved. The challenge for the CF leadership is to ensure that the Regular Force and the Reserves better understand and appreciate the unique contribution the other makes.
• Question Five: Is it possible, feasible and desirable to establish separate recruitment, pay, training, and equipment budgets for the Reserves?

Answer Five: It is possible and feasible to establish separate systems for the Reserves. The more important question is whether it is desirable. In the case of the pay system, the Reserves already have a separate system that is not working well and needs significant improvement. Most junior level Reservists would prefer to be on the Regular Force pay system which they see as infinitely more reliable. As a general principle, it makes little sense to duplicate administrative systems such as recruitment or pay. It terms of a separate training budget, those who speak on behalf of the Reserves would like to see more transparency in how training dollars are spent. Indeed, a separate training budget for the Army Reserves may result from the Transformation exercise. This is reasonable and appropriate. However, given budget constraints, it is unlikely in the extreme that there would be a separate equipment budget for the Reserves.

• Question Six: What is your view about the implementation by the MND of a new Minister's Monitoring Committee with specific responsibility to monitor the state of the Reserves? How might such a committee be established? Who should be on it?

Answer Six: This paper suggests as its primary recommendation that the Government of Canada undertake a comprehensive study of the Army Reserve either through a Special Commission or through the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence to review: a) the roles of the Reserve, b) budget allocations to the Reserve, c) administrative and other problems relating to recruitment, pay, training and equipment d) the results of the CF Transformation exercise as they affect the Reserve, e) “cultural” issues between the Reserve and the Regular Force and e) any other matter the Commission/Committee deems appropriate for the effective and efficient functioning of the Reserve.

It is important that this study consult extensively with a range of stakeholders and look at other Armed Forces for evidence of best practices relating to the Reserves. Once a study by the Special Commission or House of Commons Defence Committee has been concluded, then it would be appropriate for the purposes of follow-up to consider a Minister’s Monitoring Committee. Such a Monitoring Committee should include individuals with Regular Force and Reserve Force experience, as well as civilians with some knowledge of the Reserves and the CF.

• Question Seven: In your view, does the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) adequately address Reserves issues and if not, how might it be improved?

Answer Seven: The CFDS does not adequately address Reserves issues largely because that was not the intent of the document. It is not a comprehensive Defence White Paper and, consequently, there is not enough detail in the CFDS to provide any real indication of what the Government’s approach is on Reserve issues. However, the fact that Reserve personnel figures are generally flat-lined indicates a largely status quo posture.

• Question Eight: Given the operational tempo, should the Army Reserve strength be increased and why or why not? Is it feasible to disband the 3rd battalions of the Regular Force infantry regiments so as to use the troops in those regiments to expand Reserve ranks after the 1st and 2nd battalions have been brought up to strength?

Answer Eight: This report takes the position that, notwithstanding the drawdown from Afghanistan and the transition from a combat to a training mission, that Canada’s Army is too small and that both the Army and the Army Reserve should be expanded. Before that is done, however, some of the current issues and problems plaguing the Army (i.e. too many headquarters personnel) and the Army Reserve (i.e. too little administrative support) should be addressed. The suggestion that the 3rd battalions of the Regular Force be disbanded to expand Reserve units after the 1st and 2nd battalions have been brought up to strength is, in the view of the author, both unworkable and undesirable since Canada needs more not less Regular Force battalions.
• Question Nine: Given the current situation in Afghanistan and Haiti is there an opportunity for Reserve Units to be first responders in specific roles beyond Psyops and CIMIC e.g. local defence, construction, and other civil-military activities for which NGOs cannot perform initially due to the security situation or time required to mobilize.

Answer Nine: One of the general themes of this paper is that the Reserves should have updated and more clearly identified roles with the training needed to support those roles. This paper also espouses the view that the Reserves can move into other areas of activity, such as cyber warfare. However, it is important to keep in mind that the primary focus of the Reserves must always be on war-fighting. They have and will continue to play a role in Psychological Operations (Psyops), Civil Military Relations (CIMIC) and what have been described as “war-winning enablers.” While a “can do” attitude seems to permeate the ethos of the CF – both Regular and Reserve Force – based upon what is necessary under the circumstances, we must be careful about assigning roles to the Reserves that stray significantly from their war-fighting capabilities and this includes moving in to areas traditionally occupied by NGO’s. The Reserves should never be viewed or treated as a cheap source of labour either for domestic or foreign operations.

• Question Ten: Given potential threat scenarios and Canada’s national security requirements, is it time to re-address the question of writing a mobilization plan for the Land Force and for the CF as a whole?

Answer Ten: The issue of mobilization is a central concern of this paper. The 1994 White Paper outlined a graduated four stage national mobilization framework, which stated that “while a major global war is highly unlikely at this time, it remains prudent to have ready “no cost” plans for total national mobilization”. Importantly, it added that “this fourth step could touch upon all aspects of Canadian society and would only come into effect with the proclamation by the Governor-in-Council of a “war emergency” under the Emergencies Act.”3 This paper supports the view that if such a “no cost” plan were to be drafted, it should be done by the Government of Canada rather than the CF. It also takes the position that, given the strategic environment and the nature of modern warfare, planning for a large Reserve Army as part of a program of national mobilization is a quixotic exercise that creates unrealistic expectations around what the Reserves are and ought to be.

• Question Eleven: Could the Army Reserve become more effective by introducing more computer based training in local armouries, instead of going to distant schools, and how might this be implemented? Conversely, can courses at locations such as Camp Borden be better tailored to visiting Reservists who can only take limited time for employment?

Answer Eleven: There appears to be a consensus that more computer training could, and should, be done. A junior rank Reservist interviewed for this report suggested that computer training and simulations would be particularly valuable for Reserve officers who normally don’t train above the platoon level. There is a widespread view that training needs to be better organized in terms of scheduling to respect the time constraints of Reservists and that it should be “modified and modularized”. Junior ranks in the Army Reserve seemed to believe firmly that nothing can replace experience in the field and that too much emphasis on class room training is no substitute for “hands on” experience with real wrenches, real radios and real weapons.

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3 Bland, Canada’s National Defence, Volume One, Defence Policy, p. 353.
• Question Twelve: What is your view of replacing the CF/DND Ombudsman with an Inspector General for the Reserves?

Answer Twelve: The DND Ombudsman has played an important and constructive role in investigating complaints and concerns, providing information and conducting in-depth studies of issues important to both the DND and the CF. Currently, the DND/CF Ombudsman reports to the Minister and has significant authority for receiving and investigating complaints from current and former civilian employees of DND, members of the CF (Regulars and Reserves) and, importantly, their families, cadets, and those applying to become members of the CF. The Ombudsman has the authority to investigate a wide range of problems and issues, both individual and systemic, related to the Regular and the Reserve Force. The role of an Inspector General, if the American model provides any guidance, is focussed on enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of the organization and operates more like an internal auditor. The mission of the US DoD Inspector General, for instance, is to “promote integrity, accountability, and improvement of Department of Defense personnel, programs and operations to support the Department’s mission and serve the public interest.” Whether the CF should consider the creation of an Inspector General for DND and the CF as a whole is an idea that deserves some consideration. If an Inspector General’s office were to be established, it should have authority to investigate the administrative practices of both the Regular and Reserve forces.

INTRODUCTION

This year, two thirds of Canada’s forces in Afghanistan will be withdrawn. They will be replaced by a training component of approximately 950 soldiers spread across the country. This will ease the burden of the Afghanistan operation which has placed substantial pressures on the Canadian Forces (CF) in recent years. This draw down will also provide decision makers with an opportunity to take stock of the kind of military force we want and will need for the future. To this end, it was announced earlier this year that LGen Andrew Leslie will be the new Chief of Transformation. According to the announcement, “the Chief of Transformation will act as the driving force behind organization changes and re-positioning the CF for the future. Specifically the Chief of Transformation will be responsible for increasing organizational efficiency and effectiveness.”

This transformation exercise will be implemented in tandem with expenditure reduction and austerity measures. Few would argue that the CF and the Department of National Defence (DND) are models of frugality. But at the same time, it is reasonable to argue that for too long our military has been asked to do too much with too little. While austerity may be the order of the day, the hope is that transformation will produce a more efficient and effective CF. The Regulars and the Army Reserve have borne the brunt of the work in Operation Athena and they are currently the ones feeling the most stresses and strains. Measures are undoubtedly necessary to permit the CF to recover, recuperate and reconstitute to ensure they are ready for whatever missions might be in store for them in the future.

The DND budget clearly outlines the financial squeeze. This fiscal year (2010-11), DND’s planned spending will be cut by $2.5 billion (14.2%) over the next three fiscal years, as highlighted below. Defence spending of about $20 billion will slow in two fiscal years, providing the Department with about $2.5 billion less than previously planned between 2012 and 2015 under the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS). According to Budget 2010, after 2017-2018, forecasted increases will continue to be less than previously expected. The Department will have a base budget of $22 billion in 2017-2018, three years later than anticipated. Reductions over 2012-2015 are the following:

- 2012-2013 down by $525 million
- 2013-2014 down by $1 billion
- 2014-2015 down by $1 billion

In the harsh world of defence cut backs, the “re-profiling” of resources and structural change, Canada is not alone. Our allies are undergoing similar exercises. The February 2010 US Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) announced, among other things, that the US Department of Defence (DoD) was ending production of the F-22 fighter, reducing the number of DDG-1000 destroyers to be acquired, deferring production of new maritime pre-positioning ships, delaying the procurement of a new class of aircraft carrier and reducing its fleet of fourth-generation fighters. On August 9, 2010, US Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates also announced the closure of Joint Forces Command in Norfolk Virginia, restrictions on the use of outside contractors and a significant reduction in the number of generals and admirals across the US Armed Forces.

Commentators noted that while large headquarters had been combined and realigned in the past, none could recall a time when a major command was completely shut down. With the announcements of dozens of cancelled or trimmed down weapons programs, Secretary Gates was expecting to save $330 billion USD. He “ordered the armed services and the Pentagons’ agencies to find $100 billion in spending cuts and efficiencies over the next five years: $7 billion for 2012, growing to $37 billion annually by 2016.” In early January 2011, Gates...
announced another round of cuts totaling $78 billion over five years. In spite of the wide-ranging reductions, US Assistant Secretary of Defense, Dennis McCarthy, recently emphasized to Congress the importance of adequately funding the Reserve Force and providing predictability about deployments.8

On October 19, 2010 the British Government completed its Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), which will see spending on the UK’s Armed Forces reduced by eight percent over the next four years. In all some 42,000 jobs will be cut. This includes 25,000 civilians and 7,000 soldiers and The Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force will each lose 5,000 personnel. The equipment inventory was also cut: the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal is to be decommissioned four years early; the fleet of Harrier jets retired and the Nimrod reconnaissance plane cancelled; the number of tanks will be cut by 40 percent and heavy artillery by 35 percent; and the total number of frigates and destroyers will also drop from 23 to 19 by 2020. These changes will restrict the UK’s ability to mount overseas operations similar to those conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan. Britain will, however, still meet NATO’s target of spending two percent of GDP on defence.

The SDSR also touched upon the issue of the Reserve Force and the Territorial Army, which it noted, had performed “outstandingly well” in Afghanistan. However, it also stated that they “were originally geared for a Cold War role” and that “we need to make sure that they are organized to deal with the threats of today”. As the document says:

There is a strong case for reviewing whether our Reserve Forces are properly structured for the type of conflict we envisage undertaking in future so that we make best use of the skills, experience and capabilities of our Reservists whilst at the same time moving towards a more efficient structure. We will therefore undertake a six month study into the future role and structure of the Reserves which will be undertaken by the leadership of the Regular and Reserve Forces.9

The Australian Government has also taken a recent look at its defence structure and expenditures. In 2009, it produced a Defence White Paper entitled Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: 2030, as well as another document entitled The Strategic Reform Program: Delivering Force 2030. As with other reviews, the main driver of the Strategic Reform Program was economic reality. The proposed reforms are expected to generate savings of approximately $20 billion AUS over the next ten years.10 A recent report by Australia’s Auditor General also raised serious questions about the readiness of the Army Reserve. According to the Auditor’s report, Reserve Forces in Australia are down 25% compared to ten years ago, thereby casting doubt over the White Paper’s plans to better integrate the Reserve Force into the Regular Force. The report also noted that individual readiness requirements were being met by only 51 percent of Army Reserve personnel. It also questioned the Army’s preparedness to accommodate a broader mandate for its Reservists.11

Canadians are far from being alone in their efforts to provide a sound defence structure while dealing with the exigencies of economic restraint and, as with others, there is great concern over how this will affect our Regular and Reserve forces. All governments and their defence establishments generally try (some more successfully than others) to place a significant emphasis on the importance of their Reserve Force and more particularly their Army Reserve in helping them meet future security challenges. Some common objectives for the Army Reserve are that: they achieve better integration with Regular Force units; they utilize their “particular” skills better; they replace the Regulars in some roles; they receive proper training and equipment; and, they continue to be an important force generator. However, many observers are not particularly sanguine about what the future holds for the Reserve Force in these times of restraint and budget cuts. While they may grant that efforts have been taken to make some of the foregoing a reality, for them, the Reserve Force still remains a poor cousin to the Regulars.

11 Reserve Forces Intelligence, Australia: Army reserves are the weak link in defence plans, May, 16, 2009, p. 2-3.
That Canada’s Reserve Force has generally been poorly equipped, under-appreciated and under-funded is nothing new in the annals of the CF. Despite commission studies, reports by monitoring committees and recommendations by parliamentary committees, administrative neglect and an unwillingness to confront basic issues head-on still prevails at DND. While progress has been made in some areas, many observers still feel the need to continually ask first order questions. Perhaps this is because we still do not have the required answers. The most basic of these is: “Why do we need a Reserve Force and what do we want it to do?” Senator Hugh Segal, in a recent speech to the University of Calgary’s Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, noted that “the absence of a coherent, forward-focused Reserves strategy is a total denial of the lessons of history; lessons that have seen Canada woefully unprepared in some circumstances and tolerating larger than necessary casualties and deaths in theatre as a result.” According to Senator Segal, we ignore these lessons at our peril. To act on the basis of political expediency or the pretense that the political takes precedence over matters of true strategic importance will only lead to a repetition of previous mistakes and losses. This paper shares the view expressed by Senator Segal that it is time to provide a coherent plan with accompanying action.

In this examination of the Reserve Force, it is important to pose some of the following questions:

- What should be the principal roles of the Reserve Force?
- Is mobilization really the raison d’être of the Reserve Force?
- Does the augmentation role undermine other Reserve Force roles?
- How important is the Reserve Force as the CF’s footprint in the community and how do we improve their presence?
- Should the Reserve Force have a separate command structure and budget?
- What improvements need to be made to Army Reserve training?
- Is there a need for a more expansive role for the Reserves in support of disaster response and emergency management?
- Are traditional regimental ties still relevant?
- Has the culture gap between Regulars and the Reserve Force finally been closed?

While the resolution of some questions may require policy changes, some may also entail additional funding. Senator Segal is right to draw attention to the absence of a coherent, forward looking Reserve Force strategy, but it is just one component of a larger picture. It is particularly disconcerting that important decisions regarding restructuring, resource allocation and tasking continue to be made in the absence of any discernable defence policy. Because it lacks depth and strategic analysis, the CFDS simply does not qualify as a defence White Paper. Although the Martin Government completed a significant review of foreign, defence and aid policy in 2005, Canada has not produced a comprehensive foreign and defence policy review since the Chrétien Government’s White Paper of 1994. Much has changed since then. Today’s strategic context is markedly different from that of the mid-1990s. In terms of policy hierarchy, foreign policy is meant to guide defence policy. Without clear foreign policy goals, it becomes difficult to properly determine defence needs. When both foreign and defence policy are allowed to drift or to remain obscure, then decision making becomes little more than a series of ad hoc responses to immediate pressures without an overarching strategy. The Harper Government’s quick decision to opt for a training mission in Afghanistan just before the NATO Summit in November, 2010 is a case in point.

The Defence White Paper of 1994 prompted some serious reflection on virtually every aspect of Canada’s defence capabilities. Beginning in 1995, the Reserve Force was the object of considerable scrutiny. The Special Commission on Restructuring the Reserves (SCRR) and the Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence (MCCDND) delved into issues such as the roles and responsibilities of the

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12 Hon. Hugh Segal, Towards a Coherent Reserve Strategy for the Canadian Forces, (speaking notes), Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, April 23, 2010.
13 Ibid.
Reserves, the Total Force concept, mobilization issues, command structures, pay and benefits, budget control, training, equipment, medical treatment and the need for more resources. Within DND, the Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) initiative helped to move the institution forward. It probably speaks to the importance of the Reserves as a national institution that if they were incidental to Canada’s defence needs, they would not have attracted so much attention. However, in recent years and probably because of the focus on Afghanistan, the Reserve Force has attracted less attention.

This paper is intended to stimulate discussion by providing a status report or snapshot of the Army Reserve as it exists today. It seeks to explain how we got to where we are today with a brief history of the Army Reserve focusing on the last 20 years. It surveys the strategic environment, explains the CF structure and reviews the current policy environment touching on transformation issues. This is followed by a discussion of mobilization and the roles of the Reserves with particular reference to the Army Reserve and the current organizational culture. While this paper questions some of the foundational precepts or articles of faith of the Army Reserve, there is no pretence about the depth or breadth of analysis. It is merely a brief overview of some issues confronting the Army Reserve and the CF that are important if we are to ensure the continued health and vitality of a very important Canadian institution. This paper also includes a series of recommendations that could lead to improvements.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ARMY RESERVE

As any student of history will know, traditions can be both a blessing and a curse. If properly nurtured, traditions can help provide for stability and a sense of security and belonging. If they are overly revered and impervious to change, stagnation and eventual decline may be the result. A healthy institution is one that balances the importance of traditions with the prospect and need for change. Edmund Burke wrote that an appreciation of tradition and what has gone before keeps us from losing sight of the important lessons of history. For Burke, slow and “imperceptible” change was best. It allowed for a degree of progress without unnecessary disruption. When the situation demanded more rapid reform in order to forestall upheaval or widespread discontent, then it was the responsibility of authorities to ensure that needed change be implemented. The consequence of not permitting or initiating reform, in such circumstances, could well prove worse than the changes demanded.

Canada’s Army Reserve is an institution steeped in tradition with deep roots pre-dating Confederation. It has gone through much change. It has seen its importance rise and fall and has alternately felt cherished and neglected. The origins of today’s Army Reserve can be traced back to the early principle of levée en masse, which meant that Militia service was compulsory for all able bodied males aged 16 to 60. This was the case from the early 1600s under the French regime until almost a century after the Conquest. In 1855, a large part of the British Army withdrew from Canada prompting the passage of the Militia Act in the then Province of Canada. The 1855 Act “established the concept of a volunteer Militia force of 5,000, as well as a small Regular Force.”

In 1868, partly in response to the Fenian Raids, a new Militia Act provided for 40,000 volunteers. The 1883 Militia Act added additional units to the active Militia - the small permanent force whose primary task was to train organized voluntary regiments known as the sedentary Militia.

The 1885 Northwest Rebellion was put down by a force of 5,000 thereby enhancing the Militia’s reputation. Militia volunteers also served in the Boer War. A total of 8,372 men deployed, effectively making the conflict Canada’s first major expeditionary force (after the much smaller Nile Expedition). The Boer War contingent consisted of both Militiamen and Regulars (active Militia). While the Militia served Canada well in both world wars, its role is often misunderstood. In 1913-14, the trained strength of the Militia was 57,527 while a total of 628,462 served in the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF). Even though the Governor in Council could send the

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16 McDonald, p. 1.
17 Ibid.
18 Archambault, p. 15.
Militia abroad in an emergency, the Borden Government through its Minister of Militia, Sam Hughes, decided that the CEF would be organized as a purely voluntary force in numbered battalions distinct from the Militia. Still, Militia members responded en masse to the call. After the First World War, the government again reverted to the pattern of a large, relatively untrained, Militia and a small Permanent Force whose principal task was Militia training in the event of conflict.

The Second World War followed a similar pattern. By mid-1939, the Permanent Force had 4,261 personnel. The trained Militia at the time was 46,251. By 1945, 730,625 Canadians had served in the Army – the vast majority of whom had no previous military experience. The cultural divide between the Regulars and the Reserve is evident in how they tell their stories of World War II. The Reservists note with pride that only two percent of the Canadian troops who hit the beaches of Normandy on June 6, 1944 were part of the Regular Force before the war. The rest were citizen soldiers. The Regulars certainly agree that citizen recruits formed the basis of Canada’s Army in World War II. However, they also insist that, after three years of training in England, Canada’s Army was as professional as any in the world. In other words, the citizen recruits and the Militia were then, by definition, the Regular Force.

Whether by 1945 Canada’s Army was a citizen soldier based Regular Force or a Regular Force based upon citizen soldiers depends on one’s perspective. While the Army collectively had precious little military or combat experience in 1939, it was a very different matter in 1945. According to some accounts, these citizens turned soldiers brought a breadth of experience from other walks of life to the profession of arms and war fighting that emphasized flexibility and innovation. When German officers were interviewed at the end of the war, they were asked about the various enemy troops they faced. The Germans seemed to agree that the Russians, the Americans and British were conventional in terms of doctrine and thus generally predictable. The Canadians, they said, often did not follow their own (largely British) doctrine. More so than other larger armies, they were inclined to innovate and change things “on the fly.” When fighting the Canadians, the Germans often found it more difficult to gauge what the next move might be.19

Some have attributed this phenomenon to the fact that the Canadian Army had a high proportion of citizen soldiers and Militia officers who had less respect and patience for standard operating procedures and Army doctrine. As a consequence, they were generally more inclined to pursue less conventional and more innovative strategies. Some have suggested that this kind of battlefield flexibility is often characteristic of small armies – a type of experimentation and chauvinism that only they can indulge in. Large armies have different internal dynamics when it comes to standard operating procedures and military doctrine. Whether the above anecdote is apocryphal or accurate, by the end of the war Canada had a large and experienced Army that could look back with pride on its battlefield accomplishments and its contribution to the Allied victory.

During the Korean conflict, the Army Reserve made up the majority of Canadian troops in the theatre of operations. The Regulars were assigned to duty in Europe in the event of a possible conflict with the Soviet bloc. Canada’s commitment to NATO and the realities of the Cold War required the establishment of forces-in-being – full time professional soldiers. These personnel would be at high readiness levels and, given that any nuclear war was expected to be short, it was felt that the Reserve would be less likely to play a meaningful role. Under the NATO/Eisenhower doctrine of “massive retaliation,” it was believed there would be no time available for mustering and training a Reserve Force. For the first time in a period of relative peace, the focus permanently shifted from the Militia to the Regular Forces. As a direct consequence, in 1956, the Reserve Force was assigned the primary task of national survival or civil defence in the event of a nuclear conflagration. Predictably, within a few years, the Army Reserve, in particular, was demoralized, had few resources and was left with no real sense of purpose.20

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19 This story was recounted by MGen Ed Fitch (Ret’d) in an interview with the author. September, 20-21, 2010.
20 Archambault, p. 18.
But doctrines change and evolve and so too does force structure. In the early 1960s, the Kennedy Administration’s adoption of a policy of flexible response called for mutual deterrence at the strategic, operational and tactical levels using both nuclear and conventional forces. This gave the US and NATO the capability to respond to aggression not just with nuclear weapons, but across the entire spectrum of warfare. Slowly, allied governments including Canada’s began to appreciate the need to improve the readiness and capabilities of their conventional forces – both Regulars and Reserves. While forces in being were still essential, the need to prepare for the possibility of a protracted conflict increased the importance of the Reserve Force. Defence Minister Donald Macdonald’s 1971 Defence White Paper stated that the Reserve was to support the Regular Force in augmentation and reinforcement and provide an expansion base in an emergency. Unfortunately, budgets remained constrained and, by the end of the 1970’s, the Army Reserve, which took the brunt of the cuts, had little to contribute to Canada’s overall defence capability.

The Mulroney Government’s 1987 Defence White Paper, Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada, was the first defence policy paper in almost 20 years. Under Defence Minister Perrin Beatty, it called for the “revitalization” of the Reserve Force and noted that Canada was conspicuous among NATO countries for having more Regulars than Reservists. The CF had one quarter as many Reservists as Regulars. The Forces, it said, could not meet all their commitments with the Regulars; the costs had simply become too high. It also focused on making the transition to the Total Force concept. As described in the White Paper, under Total Force, any mix of Regulars or Reservists could respond to an emergency. The appropriate ratio would be based upon the type of unit, the skills required and the reaction time.

The rationale behind the Total Force concept is significant. Announced by US Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird in August of 1970, it was widely viewed as having been the brainchild of Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams. Earlier in the Vietnam War, President Lyndon Johnson decided not to mobilize the Army Reserve. Many at the time and since have argued that the decision had serious consequences militarily since the Army was deprived of added strength, experience and capabilities. Politically, it effectively severed the link between the citizenry and the citizen-military in a time of war. Abrams’ intent was to integrate the Army Reserve and Army National Guard with the active Army so closely that it would, in his view, virtually guarantee the support of the American people and their political leadership at the outset of any conflict. Abrams summed up his approach when he said: “If we go to war again, we’re taking the Reserves with us.”

By the early 1990’s, the CF, the Reserves, and more particularly the Army Reserve, found itself in a difficult predicament. Although the Cold War had ended, peacekeeping was stretching the Army to the limit and requiring the use of more Reserve personnel. Concurrently, a declining economy and a debt crisis were leading to calls for decreased defence expenditures. The Army Reserve was the natural place to go for both augmenting the Regular Force and for extracting savings from the defence budget. Something had to give and by 1992, the Auditor General (AG) painted a grim picture of the Army Reserve in terms of readiness, equipment, training and a lack of departmental planning on its behalf. The Defence department largely agreed with the AG’s assessment and argued that reforms were already underway. However, in the AG’s 1994 follow up report, the department was admonished for having done little on issues other than training. Ignored were inadequate promotion policies and levels of readiness.

Amidst all of this, both components of the CF, the Regular Forces and the Reserves were heavily committed in places like Somalia and the former Yugoslavia where the challenges were significant and where the results of operations would have profound consequences for the CF. A great deal of attention has been devoted to the Somalia Affair, which shook the CF to its foundations. However, a battle fought by Canadian troops – Regulars and Reservists – in the former Yugoslavia was a defining moment for the post-Cold War CF and represented a

21 Archambault, p. 19.
23 Bland, Canada’s National Defence, Volume One, Defence Policy pp. 256-257.
24 Colonel Randy Pullen, Keep the Reserves in the Fight, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.
25 McDonald, p. 3.
significant break with the more benign peacekeeping that had been conducted in previous decades. It was also a harbinger of things to come. The fighting in the Medak Pocket from September 9 – 17, 1993 involved a Croatian Army attack against Serbian forces in the vicinity of Gospic in south central Croatia. At the time, both Serbs and Croats were quickly developing a reputation for brutality and inhumanity. In the first few days, dozens of civilians were killed. The offensive quickly attracted international criticism forcing both sides to agree to a ceasefire.

The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) tasked 875 Canadian troops under the command of LCol Jim Calvin from the Second Battalion of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (2nd PPCLI) and two French mechanized units with monitoring the withdrawal of Croatian and Serb forces as part of the ceasefire agreement. Under the pretext of not receiving authorization from Zagreb, a numerically superior Croat force attacked the Canadians as they moved between Serb and Croat forces. Exchanges of heavy fire over two days involved artillery, anti-aircraft guns, rocket propelled grenades, 20 mm cannons and small arms. Unlike some other UN troops who were easily intimidated by the use of force, the Canadians held their position. The Croatian Commander, Rahim Ademi, soon realized he faced a stalemate. He met with Calvin and agreed to a ceasefire and troop withdrawal for noon on September 17. Although the Croats attempted to renege on the agreement, they were forced to withdraw when Calvin organized a media conference with international journalists between Croat and Canadian lines as the two sides confronted each other with weapons cocked.

In the course of the fighting, four Canadians were wounded, while Croatian casualty estimates ranged from 27 to 100 killed or wounded. In the aftermath of the fighting, charges were laid by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia against several Croatian commanders for crimes against humanity and for atrocities committed against the local Serb population. Approximately 100 Serb civilians were murdered. Because of its limited size and strength, UNPROFOR was unable to stop the ethnic cleansing. Still, its Commander, French LGen Jean Cot, had strong praise for the troops under his command. He observed that: “it was the most important force operation the UN conducted in the former Yugoslavia... They [Canadian and French] did everything I expected from them and showed what real soldiers can do.”

For Canada, the Medak Pocket was important for many reasons. First, it was widely regarded as the most intense battle fought by Canadian soldiers since the Korean War. As such, it began the process of restoring the reputation of the CF as combat troops rather than simply peacekeepers. Second, it was the first example of the concept of Total Force in a modern combat setting involving Regulars and Reservists. (The 2nd PPCLI was comprised of approximately 30 percent Reservists.) Third, it began to draw public attention to the serious matter of post-traumatic stress disorder since many of the soldiers in 2nd PPCLI had personally witnessed the results of the Croatian Army's ethnic cleansing efforts. Fourth, it was the first experience Canadian soldiers had with what later became known as the three block war. Finally, the belated recognition given the 2nd PPCLI helped restore the public image of the CF in the aftermath of Somalia.

The Medak Pocket did nothing if not exemplify the evolution from “peacekeeping” to “peace-enforcement” and the three block war. In the late 1990s, US Marine General Charles Krulak wrote on the complexities of modern warfare and argued that soldiers, within three city blocks, may be required to engage in full scale combat, peacekeeping operations and humanitarian aid. Underlying the concept was the view that modern militaries must be trained to operate in all three conditions in a seamless manner. To do so successfully, training and more specifically leadership training at the lowest levels needed to be high – hence the concept of “strategic corporals.”

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27 In an unpublished article entitled: The Canadians at Medak Pocket: Fighting for Peace, Sean Maloney argues that the operation at Medak Pocket was the first time since 1974 that soldiers in a formed unit were involved in a sustained firefight. The previous instance occurred when Turkish forces invaded Cyprus. UN troops were squeezed between the Greek and Turkish forces. The Canadian Airborne Regiment, in an unacknowledged action, was inserted into Nicosia Airport. Soldiers from Canada’s Airborne Regiment fought against Turkish paratroopers to protect the UN’s fragile position: many were wounded and at least three were killed.
On lessons learned for the CF, the Medak Pocket operation confirmed that intensive training, especially when deploying with a combined formation of Regulars and Reservists, was absolutely essential. When testifying before the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA) in 1998, Calvin, then a full Colonel, explained that even before arriving in theatre he understood that peacekeeping wasn’t what it used to be and that peace operations could possibly entail combat. He noted the importance of pre-deployment training as a means of molding cohesion and esprit de corps in a battalion. He observed that it was fortunate his unit did not encounter its greatest challenge until the end of the tour when his troops had considerable on-the-ground experience.28

The story of the Medak Pocket only became publicly known three years after it took place with an October, 1996 story in the Ottawa Citizen. Two years later, SCONDVA also described the situation in its 1998 report: Moving Forward: A Strategic Plan for Quality of Life Improvements in the Canadian Forces. Had the Medak Pocket action received attention at the time it occurred, it is unlikely that anyone would remember it now. In the months following the summer of 1993, the public’s attention was turning toward the terrible and tragic events in Somalia and the subsequent inquiry that ran for three years. Somalia and the brutal actions of several soldiers in the Airborne Regiment dominated the headlines and did serious damage to the reputation of the CF.

On December 1, 2002, the 2nd PPCLI received belated recognition in the form of a Commander-in-Chief Commendation for the Battle of the Medak Pocket. It is interesting to note that the Department of National Defence had considered a unit CF commendation for the Medak Pocket Operation, but Col Calvin and Regimental Sergeant-Major McCarthy argued that individual soldiers should receive medals for bravery, especially since so many of them had been drawn from Reserve units. Nevertheless, one could argue that, just as Canada was ramping up its involvement in Afghanistan, the belated and much deserved recognition given to Regular and Reserve forces that saw action at the Medak Pocket helped begin the process of restoring the image of the CF in foreign operations post Somalia.

While plenty was happening in foreign fields through the 1990s, the policy machinery in Ottawa ground inexorably on. The Chrétien Government’s White Paper of 1994, introduced by Defence Minister David Collenette, was undertaken during a time of economic downturn and fiscal restraint. The document set ambitious goals, but provided little in the way of resources. It called for an effective, realistic and affordable policy to produce multi-purpose, combat-capable armed forces able to meet the challenges to Canada’s security both at home and abroad. The Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons played a major role in shaping this policy since virtually all its recommendations were reflected in the White Paper. Noteworthy also is the fact that the parliamentary committee report called for a significant rationalization, reorganization and re-tasking of the Reserve Force.29

The White Paper announced a reduction in both Regular and Primary Reserve forces. It also suggested that all elements of the Primary and Supplementary Reserves be examined with a view to streamlining both organizations.30 Many close to Army Reserve issues were angered and alarmed by what they perceived as the slow and steady demise of the Militia. There were serious problems with training, equipment and pay. Also, those speaking on behalf of Reservists viewed the continuous augmentation of the Regular Forces as undermining the mobilization role and depriving the Militia of its raison d’être. Amongst a group of Honorary Colonels and activists in the Militia community, a decision was made to take the case of the Army Reserve to the halls of Parliament. The result was the formation of Reserves 2000.

The magnitude and controversial nature of the changes being considered made it essential for Defence Minister David Collenette to reach out and consult with an array of stakeholders. In the spring of 1995, he announced the establishment of the SCRR. The Commission included the Right Honorable Brian Dickson, a

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30 McDonald, p. 4.
former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and World War II veteran, as Chair. Serving with him were LGen (Ret’d) Charles Belzile and Professor J.L. Granatstein. The Committee held hearings throughout the country and presented its report along with 41 recommendations to the Minister on October 3, 1995. The SCRR took up the issue of mobilization and the role of the Reserves and reported on problems in processing recruits, the pay system, insufficient training and equipment.

In late 1995, the SCRR report was reviewed by the House and Senate committees. Both parliamentary committee reports were supportive and only suggested a few minor alterations. The SCRR had recommended that the Militia Districts be replaced by seven Militia Brigade Groups. The House Committee recommended nine, but in the end there were ten Militia Brigade Groups. All but two of the Commission’s recommendations were accepted. The exceptions were one pertaining to job protection and another concerning the enrolment of all military personnel in the Supplementary Reserve upon leaving the Regular Force.

Notwithstanding the solid work of the SCRR, Reserves 2000 continued its campaign of opposition to many of the Committee’s recommendations even going so far as to question the independence and credibility of its Members. According to Granatstein, the tactics of Reserves 2000 during this period were clear – “delay, delay, and more delay.”

In late 1997, Defence Minister Art Eggleton announced the establishment of the MMCCDND to follow up on the recommendations of the SCRR. In April 1998, former House Speaker and Fisheries Minister John Fraser, an Honorary Colonel with the Seaforth Highlanders, took over as Chair of the Committee. Fraser’s team included Bev Dewar, a retired public servant, and military historian Professor David Bercuson of the University of Calgary. They had their work cut out for them. Regular-Reserve relations were at a low point. The issue of mobilization was still very much a concern as was the speed at which DND headquarters and the senior command were acting on various SCRR recommendations. The Fraser Committee interim reports in 1998 and 1999 also noted that, despite protestations to the contrary, the Defence department was dragging its feet on many of the problems facing the Reserves. By the spring of 1999, Army Reserve strength stood at approximately 11,000 and Reserves 2000 was stepping up the pressure on a variety of grievances and concerns – many of which were fully justified.

The millennium year was ushered in with Reservists taking a significant role in emergency preparedness in anticipation of Y2K computer problems and the chaos that some predicted would ensue. A reform agenda for the Reserves seemed to be gaining momentum. In February 2000, the Fraser Committee issued their final report only to be brought back by Defence Minister Art Eggleton to provide further advice on LFRR and to monitor the implementation of departmental reforms in the areas of leadership and the Army Reserve. Further progress was made in May when LGen Michael Jeffery was named as Special Assistant to the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) for LFRR. Jeffery made his way across the country meeting with Reservists and seeking to carefully balance the needs of augmentation and mobilization. In June, the Fraser committee issued another report entitled In Service of the Nation: Canada’s Citizen Soldiers for the 21st Century. The report, seen by many as a turning point in Regular-Reserve relations, was credited by Granatstein for “breaking the log jam that stalled meaningful Reserve restructuring.” Over the summer, Jeffery became Chief of the Land Staff (CLS) and released the LFRR Strategic Plan.

A significant development occurred on October 6, 2000 when Minister Eggleton, responding to the Fraser Committee through a Policy Statement, announced the first moves to implement LFRR. The Government, Eggleton said, was committed to increasing the size of the Army Reserve in two phases to 15,500 in FY 02-03 and to 18,500 in FY 05-06. The Minister also accepted the SCRR position on the roles of the Reserves: mobilization, augmentation and the footprint in the community. Among the other important aspects in the Policy Statement was the appointment of a senior official to manage LFRR and a commitment to clarify the authority and role of the Chief – Reserves and Cadets. Eggleton also added MGen (Ret’d) Reg Lewis to the Monitoring

Committee and was effusive in his praise for the members of the SCRR and the MMCCDND as well as LGen Jeffery. “These individuals… have wrestled this very complex problem of Reserve restructure to the ground” said Minister Eggleton.33

The Minister’s declaration of victory may have been slightly premature since there were still many major and, in some cases, longstanding problems confronting the Reserves. Nevertheless, progress continued to be made on a number of fronts. The appointment of then BGen Ed Fitch to lead the LFRR team enhanced the level of transparency and consultation that Jeffery had promoted. A Command Consultative Advisory Group was created, chaired by the CLS. It had representation from Reserves 2000, the Honorary Colonels, the Army Reserve Advisory Group, the four Area Deputy Commanders (Reservists) and the Director General of the Land Reserves. This replaced a more arbitrary method by which National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) would simply assign roles to Reserve units. Fitch also deftly avoided upsetting Reserve sensitivities by adding capabilities to existing units in areas such as civil military cooperation (CIMIC), Public Affairs, Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), Movement Control, Computer Incident Response, Geomatics and Heavy Urban Search and Rescue. The fact that the Army Reserve was able to send composite Reserve companies to Bosnia in 2002 can largely be attributed to the work of Jeffery and Fitch.

In April 2003, Defence Minister McCallum and Army Commander Jeffery announced the start of Phase 2 of LFRR. Noting that the phase one recruitment objectives of 15,500 Army Reservists were achieved, the Minister also stated that it was not just about numbers. “This (revitalization) includes the development of new capabilities and the adjustment of current output levels and structures.”34 In June of 2003, Progress Report II of the MMCCDND reflected the many positive developments that had occurred and noted that “steady progress has been observed in many areas”. One of the LFRR accomplishments the Committee highlighted was “producing a first draft Army mobilization plan capable of generating forces up to the Stage 3 level of the four stages of mobilization outlined in the 1994 Defence White Paper.” Also noted was the fact that Bill C-17 – The Public Safety Act, 2002 contained provisions to protect Reservist jobs while deployed during an emergency.

But some problems seemed to defy solution. As the MMCCDND report stated, “There are... still pockets of activity where greater attention is necessary.” The challenges identified included the need to streamline the recruitment process, improve training delivery, reduce the paper load on Reserve units, provide more and better equipment and create “surge capacity” (fourth stage of mobilization). Also needing dire attention were accountability issues. In particular, the report stated that “the CF is unable to ascertain the exact number of Militia personnel on strength at any one time or precisely trace the disbursement of funds allocated to the Militia.”35

By 2005, much had been accomplished, but much remained to be done. The two surviving members of the SCRR (Chief Justice Brian Dickson passed away in 1998), LGen (Ret’d) Charles Belzile and Professor J.L. Granatstein produced a report entitled, The Special Commission On The Restructuring of the Reserves, 1995: Ten Years Later. It reflected on the progress that had been made and commented on matters that remained unresolved. The authors re-iterated their concerns about the absence of a national mobilization plan and a number of other unresolved issues including pay, training, recruitment, transfers between the Regular and the Reserve forces, job protection legislation and domestic operations. In spite of the problems, Belzile and Granatstein were able to observe that “while it might mix metaphors to say there has been a sea change in the way the Army Reserve sees itself today, indeed there has.”36

Some progress has been made since Belzile and Granatstein issued their ten year review report, but many of these issues today still remain unresolved. In the meantime, the Reserve Force, and the Army Reserve in particular, has continually proven itself as an indispensable component of Canada’s defence capability. The following table provides data on the growing importance of Reservists to Canada’s overseas deployments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th># of Reservist Deployments</th>
<th>Total # Deployments</th>
<th>Reservist Deployments as % of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>5,465</td>
<td>11 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>7,183</td>
<td>9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>7,013</td>
<td>11 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>942</td>
<td>8,550</td>
<td>11 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>7,649</td>
<td>11 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>6,232</td>
<td>10 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>6,617</td>
<td>10 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>9,442</td>
<td>14 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,569</td>
<td>9,910</td>
<td>16 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1,651</td>
<td>11,156</td>
<td>15 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010*</td>
<td>3,631</td>
<td>17,636</td>
<td>21 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*To date.

With the current transformation exercise, budget restraint and the winding down of combat operations in Afghanistan, the Canadian Government is on the threshold of having to make some important decisions regarding the future of the CF – including the Army Reserve. It is perhaps worthwhile to examine the current strategic environment through Canadian eyes and from the perspective of some of our friends and allies. This will help us better understand the types of missions and roles the CF and the Army Reserve will likely be required to undertake and the type of force structure Canada will need in the future.

THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Despite the international community’s best efforts at crafting institutions and legal regimes for containing conflict, “the most striking and significant characteristic of our current international political system… is its fundamental anarchic nature.”37 As Granatstein, Smith and Stairs observed in their 2007 study A Threatened Future: Canada’s Future Strategic Environment and Its Security Implications, the practical consequences of this for the CF has been that, in the past twenty years, they have become involved in more overseas deployments than at any time during the preceding four decades.38

The end of the Cold War proved a defining moment in the history of the 20th century soon to be followed by another with the onset of the new millennium. Old assumptions fell by the wayside as the international community sought new means of managing conflict. The doctrine, concepts and even the lexicon of the Cold War and immediate post-Cold War era were quickly becoming irrelevant. The crises that flared up were not the ones that many had assumed we would be confronting. Instead, the world faced internecine ethnic conflict and failed states compounded by the development of transnational crime, trafficking in human beings, narco-terrorism, kleptocratic regimes and terrorist movements in support of various causes. In our effort to cope, we fashioned

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new theories and approaches. We began to speak of human security, the responsibility to protect, peace-making and peace-enforcement, anti-corruption and improved governance. Perhaps one of the most significant geo-strategic understandings to emerge was the widely held view that major state to state confrontations were no longer probable. And, should the improbable actually occur, many security and defence observers were of the view that there would be significant lead time to prepare for a major war between dominant powers.

While the new conflicts were worrisome, they were taking place, in most cases, on the other side of the planet. They did not directly threaten our home territory or security. Whether it was on the basis of humanitarian considerations or just plain self-interest, Canada and others generally accepted the fact that we had a role to play in helping to ameliorate them. Motivations aside, what is important is that we committed troops and resources to help mitigate conflict, safeguard international peace and security and assist the victims of conflict.

September 11, 2001 was the second pivotal moment. Everything changed. Probably for the first time since the Cuban Missile Crisis, many of our citizens were feeling vulnerable and threatened. It was not as though we had not seen the face of terrorism and mass murder before. The Air India bombing in June of 1985 brought that brutal reality home. However, we also understood instinctively that if the world’s dominant power could be subject to terrorist attack on its home soil, then so could we. Fear was further heightened by the targeted bombings in Madrid and London. Very quickly, the well-intentioned principles of human security and the responsibility to protect seemed barely relevant to the new strategic paradigm. After all, those principles had been crafted for the conflicts of the 1990’s to protect victims of ethnic conflict and failed states. The dominant themes governing our strategic thinking in the immediate post 9/11 period became those of counter-terrorism, homeland security and emergency preparedness. Although public policy was consumed with the new threats, the old threats had certainly not disappeared. In fact, linkages began to appear between the old and new dangers.

This fact was highlighted by SCONDVA in its 2002 report, “Facing Our Responsibilities: The State of Readiness of the Canadian Forces.” The report argued that our national security dictated that Canada’s military have the capability to respond, along with our allies, to the following:

- the asymmetric capabilities of certain states, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles;
- transnational threats including terrorism, genocide, international criminal and drug organizations, warlords, environmental security issues, health and disease problems, and illegal migrations;
- the problems of failed states that require peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief or national reconstruction;
- domestic emergencies that cannot be handled by other federal or provincial agencies; and
- threats to our information and other critical infrastructure.\(^{39}\)

The Committee went on to conclude that, while it is important to address the structural elements of terrorism including its root causes, our first priority “must always be the sovereignty of our own nation and the security and well being of Canadians.”\(^{40}\)

Similar assessments and conclusions were drawn in A Threatened Future: Canada’s Future Strategic Environment and Its Security Implications. As the authors note, “tackling conflict by emphasizing root cause strategies is usually a very long-term enterprise and is likely to be highly unreliable as a peace-inducer in the short-term, even if the resources required for the job are mounted both effectively and in sufficient quantity, which they rarely are.” Furthermore, these kinds of strategies cannot even be attempted unless a reasonable

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\(^{40}\) Ibid. p. 6.
degree of stability has been established and maintained. “They cannot guarantee by themselves the de-fanging of the security threats at issue.”

While domestic security has in recent years assumed great prominence, it certainly has not been our sole preoccupation in terms of defence and security policy. Although the Harper Government seems very reluctant to employ the term human security, it continues subtly to guide our foreign policy insofar as deployments to disaster zones such as Haiti is concerned and our support of peace keeping/enforcement missions. But the post 9/11 environment has meant that we have important domestic security concerns and that these cannot take a backseat to dealing with problems beyond our borders.

The post-9/11 period has also been a time when both governments and their citizenry became more aware of the need to plan for non-traditional threats. Among these are possible pandemics, the use by terrorists of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, cyber attacks and attacks on critical infrastructure. Planning for such threats led to the creation of new bodies such as Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada now known as Public Safety Canada (PSC). These new threats demanded more inter and intra-government cooperation and better collaboration between intelligence agencies, first responders and even the voluntary sector.

As a response to the new security paradigm, the Martin Government presented its policy paper Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy in 2004. This was the first comprehensive statement of national security policy ever issued by a Canadian Government. The document discussed the security threats that confronted Canada, described the legal and administrative changes made since 9/11, and outlined plans for the future. A Progress Report on the Implementation of Canada’s National Security Policy was issued in April 2005. The core security interest now became “protecting Canada and the safety and security of Canadians at home and abroad.” This was the first time since World War II that a Canadian Government had to “look to the physical security of their citizens, their institutions and their critical infrastructure.” A second core interest of the new security policy was “ensuring that Canada is not a base for threats to our allies.”

Similar messages were contained in the Martin Government’s International Policy Statement (IPS) of 2005. Surveying the strategic landscape in mid-decade, the statement observed:

Today, war between major powers seems more remote than ever. The threats we face now are different – from non-state actors such as terrorists to new infectious diseases. Increasingly, they are beyond the control of any one country... In addition, many countries today threaten us – and their own citizens – not because of their strength, but because of their fragility. Their collapse creates humanitarian tragedy and poses wider security threats, including to Canadians. These challenges, which increasingly transcend national boundaries, demand more than ever that governments work multilaterally to find durable solutions.

In view of these complexities, the Government’s international security policy concentrated on dealing with failed and fragile states such as Afghanistan and Haiti, countering terrorism and organized crime, combating the proliferation of WMD and promoting human security. While the Harper Government has made various changes in the focus of our international policy such as less aid to Africa, more hemispheric involvement and more political support for Israel, it has not released any capstone policy documents relating to foreign affairs or defence. Most observers agree that the CFDS released in 2008 falls well short of the detail required for White Paper status. Nevertheless, the CFDS does contain a page on the strategic environment that is consistent with the Martin Government’s conclusions. In effect, it appears that the Harper Government largely shares the previous government’s strategic view.

The academic community has also been actively engaged in trying to understand our increasingly complex world and identify the implications for global peace and security. Current conflicts are certainly not what could be described as traditional and it is likely future conflicts will most probably defy existing stereotypes. When the world is rife with volatility, when events quickly cause other events and when information flows too rapidly, predicting what might be around the next corner, let alone understanding the lessons of history, becomes an almost fruitless exercise. As Nassim Nicholas Taleb recently noted, “What is surprising is not the magnitude of our forecast errors, but our absence of awareness of it. This is all the more worrisome when we engage in deadly conflicts: wars are fundamentally unpredictable (and we do not know it).” Taleb contends that we can easily trigger conflict thanks to aggressive ignorance – “like a child playing with a chemistry kit.” He adds, “We do not spontaneously learn that we don’t learn that we don’t learn.”

Umberto Eco argues that we are now engaged in “neo-wars”. Here the identity of the enemy is uncertain and the war itself has no front. Are all Afghans the enemy? Why do some help us today and betray us tomorrow? How does one calculate hearts and minds won? For the soldier on the ground it creates an almost impossible scenario in which to operate. There is no apparent ground gained and no apparent resolution in sight. Neo-war can, and often does, border on the surreal. For example, during the first Gulf War it was thought that Western aircraft had destroyed a cache of Iraqi tanks and aircraft, only to find out that they were decoys produced and legally sold to Saddam by an Italian factory. This war also witnessed for the first time the “western media voicing the reservations and the protests not only of the representatives of Western pacifism… but also of the ambassadors and journalists of those Arab countries that supported Saddam.” Some might point to the protests and public discussions held by radicals during the Vietnam War as having been similar; however, the difference is that during that debacle “we did not see the ambassadors of Ho Chi Minh or General Giap making speeches on the BBC. Nor did we see American journalists transmitting news from a hotel in Hanoi the way Peter Arnett did from a hotel in Baghdad.”

The tragedy of 9/11 has taken on many of the characteristics of a neo-war: the front completely vanished. The war against terrorism is no longer territorial and even if Afghanistan is stabilized, terrorism will continue to be of concern: “The infamous rogue states may be hotbeds of terrorism, but terrorism has no borders. It is also present in Western countries. This time the enemy really is behind the lines.” Today, there are no journalists reporting from the camp of Osama Bin Laden or various Al Qaeda cells. The terrorists only become known when they are arrested by police or security forces. Today, terrorists are not only foreign nationals that have infiltrated our territory, but our own native born countrymen. As noted by Eco, “the envelopes containing anthrax were most likely put into circulation not by Muslim kamikazes but by Yankee sectarian groups, neo-Nazis, or other fanatics.” More recently, we have witnessed the arrests of Canadian born Muslims on suspicion of terrorist activities. The world and its conflicts, it seems, can no longer be categorized in simple terms.

There are no truly secure borders and one could argue there probably never were. And often, there are no clearly identifiable bad guys, since among other things, we have domestic and international groups promoting radical and violent agendas. Security in its broadest sense requires a robust mix of capabilities involving the military, first responders and emergency management, foreign and domestic intelligence, development assistance, diplomacy and NGOs. Foreign policy must be able to engage the international community and help address some of the more long term structural problems that allow for the incubation of different kinds of parochial extremism and terrorism. As noted by SCONDVA, “if the conditions giving rise to a particular brand of fanaticism are rooted in poverty or some other form of unjustifiable deprivation – the loss of historically held territory or the yearning for democratic self-rule – then we can have an idea of how to address the ‘structural’ problem of root cause. If the determinants are those of religious or ideological zealotry, then matters become more complex.”

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48 Ibid, p. 18.
49 SCONDVA, p. 8.
Whether through the reports of the Defence Committee earlier this decade, the various policy reviews, or indeed the comments of academics, there appears to be a general consensus around the types of future security threats we will encounter. They include terrorism and organized crime, failed and fragile states and the proliferation of WMD. Just how these threats may present themselves remains highly unpredictable since the current strategic environment continues to be fluid, dynamic and very complex. A reasonable conclusion to draw is that we will, for the foreseeable future, require a military capable of defending against an array of traditional and non-traditional threats. Canadians certainly seem to view the world in this way, but it is reasonable to ask whether our allies see our future security challenges in a similar light. Three relatively recent documents are pertinent to this discussion. The first is the US Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) of February 2010, the second is the UK Government’s Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) of October, 2010 and the third is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Strategic Concept released in November, 2010.

On the strategic environment, the QDR speaks of “a complex and uncertain security landscape in which the pace of change continues to accelerate.” It notes that the distribution of global power is becoming more diffuse and that China and India “will continue to shape an international system that is no longer easily defined.” On threats and challenges, there is significant consonance between the QDR and those views expressed in Canadian policy documents. The QDR speaks of “a multifaceted political, military and moral struggle – against Al Qaeda and its allies around the world” and “preventing the emergence and reemergence of transnational terrorist threats.” It also references “non-state actors” and the proliferation of WMD, cyber-threats, whole of government efforts, and observes that:

Other powerful trends are likely to add complexity to the security environment. Rising demand for resources, rapid urbanization of littoral regions, the effects of climate change, the emergence of new strains of disease, and profound cultural and demographic tensions in several regions are just some of the trends whose complex interplay may spark or exacerbate future conflicts.50

The QDR’s four priority objectives for the US Department of Defense (DoD) are to: prevail in today’s wars, prevent and deter aggression, prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, and preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force. In a section of the QDR entitled “Keeping faith with the Reserve Component”, the document states that:

Achieving the defence strategy’s objectives requires vibrant National Guard and Reserves that are seamlessly integrated into the broader All-Volunteer Force. Prevailing in today’s wars requires a Reserve Component that can serve in an operational capacity – available, trained, and equipped for predictable routine deployment. Prevening and deterring conflict will likely necessitate the continued use of some elements of the Reserve Component – especially those that possess high demand skill sets – in an operational capacity well into the future.51

Two points from the QDR are particularly noteworthy for the purposes of this discussion. First, that the US wishes to “preserve and enhance the All Volunteer Force” is indicative of a view that does not foresee anything on the strategic horizon forcing a return to a mass conscript Army. Second, it is quite reasonable to assume that the reference to the continued use of the “Reserve Component” is in an augmentation role through formed units in support of the Regular Force. Although the QDR notes that “our nation must have a force generation model that provides sufficient strategic depth,” it clearly does not contemplate a mass mobilization in anticipation of a much larger conflict.

51 Ibid. p. 53.
How do the British see the strategic environment? Their recent SDSR is consistent with the conclusions reached by both the Canadian and US strategic analysis. Noting that, globalization “increases the likelihood of conflict involving non-state and failed-state actors,” it also observes that “state-on-state conflict” will not disappear. “Asymmetric tactics,” it says, “such as economic, cyber and proxy actions instead of direct military confrontation will play an increasing part, as both state and non-state adversaries seek an edge over those who overmatch them in conventional military capability.” Perhaps taking a cue from Umberto Eco and Nassim Nicholas Taleb, it also states:

It will be more difficult to distinguish our enemies from the civilians, media, non-governmental organisations and allies also present on the battlefield. We must expect intense scrutiny of our operations by a more transparent society, informed by the speed and range of modern global communications.52

Interestingly, it also remarks that “the growth of communications technology will increase our enemies’ ability to influence, not only all those on the battlefield, but also our own society directly. We must therefore win the battle for information, as well as the battle on the ground.” The military capabilities required to counter the threats, it says, include intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR).” Most importantly from the standpoint of personnel, it concludes that:

We will need highly capable and motivated personnel with specialist skills, including cultural understanding; strategic communications to influence and persuade; and the agility, training and education to operate effectively in an increasingly complex environment.53

What conclusions has NATO arrived at concerning the security environment? The recently announced Strategic Concept starts from the proposition that “the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low.” It adds, however, that “the conventional threat cannot be ignored.” The document expresses concern that many parts of the world are acquiring substantial military capabilities with consequences for NATO countries and international peace and security that are difficult to predict. It also draws attention to the proliferation of ballistic missile technology and nuclear weapons and other types of WMD and forecasts that “proliferation will be most acute in some of the world’s most volatile regions.”54

Terrorism, it says, “poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity.” It warns that extremist groups continue to operate in areas of strategic importance to NATO. Not surprisingly, it raises concerns about the possibility of terrorists acquiring “nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological capabilities.” It adds that “instability or conflict beyond NATO borders can directly threaten Alliance security, including by fostering extremism, terrorism, and trans-national illegal activities such as trafficking in arms, narcotics and people.”

Future economic security is also highlighted within the document. It speaks to the issue of protecting lines of communication and the entire infrastructure that supports international trade and more specifically the transportation of energy supplies. From a technological standpoint, it states that “laser weapons, electronic warfare and technologies that impede access to space – appear poised to have major global effects that will impact on NATO military planning and operations.” From an environmental perspective, it notes that “resource constraints including health risks, climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs will further shape the future security environment.” On the issue of “transformation”, it points to the need to “ensure the maximum coherence in defence planning, to reduce unnecessary duplication, and to focus our capability development on modern requirements.”55

52 UK Strategic Defence and Security Review, p. 16.
53 Ibid. p. 16.
55 Ibid. p. 11.
Importantly, the new Strategic Concept also addressed relations with our former Cold War adversary Russia which is also facing some of the same budget challenges and transformation issues as NATO militaries. The Russian economy was hit hard by a 7.5 percent GDP contraction in 2009 that forced significant cutbacks. According to Oksana Antonenko, a Senior Fellow of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Russia started a process of reform last year that will see it abandon its “mass mobilization army.” It is also moving toward greater inter-operability with other militaries as it seeks a closer relationship with the West.56 As the Strategic Concept states:

NATO-Russia co-operation is of strategic importance as it contributes to creating a common space of peace, stability and security. NATO poses no threat to Russia. On the contrary: we want to see a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia, and we will act accordingly, with the expectation of reciprocity from Russia.57

So how does the strategic environment current and projected affect the CF’s planning for both the Regular Army and the Reserve Force? We know today’s threat environment is complex and unpredictable. That is unlikely to change. We know that conventional and non-conventional threats are likely to continue and that we need a range of appropriate capabilities to counter foreign and domestic threats. Our goal then must be to have forces that are agile, flexible, deployable, sustainable, networked and affordable. Canada has done much in recent years in terms of transformation, but there is still much to be done with both the Regular Force and the Army Reserve.

The most important conclusion we can draw from an analysis of the strategic environment is that a mass mobilization of forces either within NATO, or from a potential adversary, is unlikely in the years ahead. That fact does not in any way detract from the importance of the Army Reserve. They have and will continue to be a critical component of our defence capability to ensure the safety and security of Canadians. However, we must ask ourselves whether the current role of the Army Reserve in mass mobilization has any relevance today. We must also ensure the other Reserve Force roles are consistent with our overall defence needs and the security environment. Before launching into a discussion of mobilization and the roles of the Reserves, this paper will first describe the structure of our Regular and Reserve Forces, review the current policy environment and “transformation”, and touch upon some of the issues that are a source of concern to Reservists and those in the broader Reserves community.

REGULAR/RESERVE STRUCTURE AND THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT

The National Defence Act (NDA) is the foundational statute for Canada’s military. Originally passed in 1922, it created the Department of National Defence on January 1, 1923 by merging the Department of Militia and Defence with the Department of the Naval Service and the newly created Department of Aviation. Amendments to the Act in 1967 created a unified structure that brought together the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force on February 1, 1968. As Section 14 of the Act states, “The Canadian Forces are the armed forces of Her Majesty raised by Canada and consist of one Service called the Canadian Armed Forces.” Section 15 describes the composition of the Regular and Reserve Forces.58

The command and control of Canada’s Regular and Reserve land forces resides within Land Force Command (LFC) headquarters in Ottawa under the leadership of the Chief of the Land Staff. The present structure has evolved considerably since unification in 1968. At that time, “Mobile Command” was established, which included ground forces and tactical ground attack aircraft (fixed wing and rotary) similar to the integrated warfare

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57 NATO, Strategic Concept, p. 10.
model of the US Marine Corps. A 1975 re-organization created Air Command and took the air assets out of Mobile Command. This new structure, Force Mobile Command, became exclusively ground based and in 1997 was re-designated Land Force Command.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regular Forces59</th>
<th>Establishment</th>
<th>Trained Strength</th>
<th>Total Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Maritime Force</td>
<td>8,526</td>
<td>7,855</td>
<td>9,650</td>
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<tr>
<td>Land Forces</td>
<td>22,849</td>
<td>21,995</td>
<td>25,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Forces</td>
<td>12,858</td>
<td>12,045</td>
<td>13,822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>13,815</td>
<td>13,169</td>
<td>20,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>58,048</td>
<td>55,064</td>
<td>69,216</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The current size of LFC is approximately 22,849 Regular Force service members. The Primary Reserve component of Land Force Command (Army Reserve) consists of 17,936 Class A Reservists, 4, 412 Class B Reservists and 1,385 Class C Reservists members. There are also approximately 4,323 Rangers that form another sub-component of the Reserve Force. There are four regional area commands within LFC: Land Force Atlantic, Land Force Québec, Land Force Central and Land Force Western Area each of which is responsible for all Regular and Reserve Forces within its territory. With the exception of Land Force Atlantic, each Area has a Regular Force Army Mechanized Brigade Group.60

Today’s Army Reserve is organized into ten Canadian Brigade Groups that are populated by 130 units located in 110 cities and towns across Canada. The Atlantic and Québec land force areas each have two brigade groups while the Central and Western areas have three. At the Army Reserve unit (battalion) level, the Commanding Officer is a LCol or, in some cases, a Major. These officers are normally Reserve Force service members. A Regular Force officer may occupy the position should a suitable Reserve officer not be available. As a general principle, the command, control and administrative structures are similar in each area. At the Area Headquarters, each commander is assisted by a deputy commander who is a Reservist. From a command and control (C2) perspective, all Army Reserve units are accountable to the Area Headquarters and from there up the chain of command to LFC.

Whether it is Land Forces Command, Maritime Command or Air Command, all of the elements of the CF and DND – both civilian and military – are in place to support Canada’s defence policy. The basic tenets of this policy are the defence of Canada, the defence of North America in cooperation with US forces and contributions to international peace and security. These three aspects of Canadian defence have been part of the policy landscape since Brooke Claxton issued the first post war defence policy in 1947. These core elements were re-iterated in the Martin Government’s Defence Policy Statement (DPS), which was part of its international policy review – the last such review by a Canadian government. The policy statement also called for an effective, responsive and relevant 21st century Canadian military – a force able to defend Canada and Canadian interests and values while contributing to international peace and security.61

In conjunction with the DPS, in March of 2005, the CDS, General Rick Hillier, launched the first overall transformation of the CF since the mid-1960s. Under transformation, the Forces were, among other things, to:

- adopt a fully integrated and unified approach to operations;
- evaluate their force structure on an ongoing basis;

59 Figures as of November 30, 2010 - provided by MGen Dennis Tabbernor, Chief – Reserves and Cadets.
60 See Appendix B for a complete list of LFC Regular and Army Reserve units.
61 Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – Defence, Canada, Department of National Defence, (Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2005) pp. 2, 11-12, 17, and 32.
• improve coordination with other government departments and interoperability with allied forces; and
• update their command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities (C4ISR).

The DPS also stated that “the operational transformation of the CF will focus on the establishment of new joint organizations and combat structures that can meet the Government’s expectations for effectiveness, relevance and responsiveness.”62 Two other points are noteworthy for the purposes of this discussion. First, the promise in the DPS to increase the Forces by 5,000 personnel was done with a view to “increasing the ‘tooth to tail ratio’ – the number of personnel capable of being deployed on operations compared to those in administrative overhead.”63 Second, there was a commitment to increase the Reserve Force by 3,000 personnel and complete Phase II of the LFRR Program.

Wishing to put its own imprint on defence policy, the Harper Government introduced the CFDS in 2008. As noted above, because of its lack of detail, the CFDS could not be described as a White Paper. It re-iterated the three traditional themes of defence policy, drew attention to what it described as four pillars upon which military capability is built – personnel, equipment, readiness and infrastructure – and tasked the CF with six core missions:

• conduct daily domestic and continental operations, including in the Arctic through NORAD;
• support a major international event in Canada, such as the 2010 Olympics;
• respond to a major terrorist attack;
• support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada such as a natural disaster;
• lead and/or conduct a major international operation for an extended period; and
• deploy forces in response to crises elsewhere in the world for shorter periods.

The CFDS contained an overall target of 70,000 Regulars and 30,000 Reservists (Army, Navy and Air Force) to be achieved by 2028.64 While any proposed increase in personnel for the CF – either Regular Force or the Reserve – is positive given the operational tempo, many considered the CFDS personnel growth targets exceedingly modest to the point of underwhelming. Indeed, it would appear that the target of 30,000 Reservists has been around for some time. John Fraser’s 2000 Report, In Service of the Nation, provides a detailed chronology of LFRR and states that:

10 June 1996: Initial VCDS Action Directive D4/96 of 10 June 1996 provided the following: MND [Minister of National Defence] Direction: (a) Increase the strength of the Primary Reserve from planned reduction figure of 23,000 to around 30,000. The Militia would be the beneficiary of this 7,000 increase.65

The CFDS document notes that “at current manning levels of about 64,000 Regulars and 26,000 Reserves personnel, our military is still hard pressed to carry out core operations at home and abroad.” In the next sentence, however, it states: “The Government will remedy this situation by funding significant personnel growth. Budget 2006 provided funding to increase the effective strength of the Regular Force to 68,000 personnel and the Reserves to 26,000.” In other words, despite “being hard pressed to carry out core operations,” the Reserve Force was to get no additional personnel in the short term. The Government’s own graphs describing CF personnel growth from 2000-2028 show the department essentially flat-lining in personnel increases between 2014 and 2028.

62 Ibid. p. 12.
65 In Service of the Nation, Minister’s Monitoring Committee, Department of National Defence, June, 2000, p. 16.
Budget pressures seem to have thrown a further wrench into the CFDS projections. As Granatstein wrote recently, “the CF in 2009 – 2010 has had to reallocate funding to meet pressing needs, and it did so by hacking at the Land Force Reserve budget, a fine reward for the Army Reserve’s extraordinary efforts in Afghanistan and at the Olympics.” Granatstein went on to lament that “many Class B Reservists were sacked… a number of Class Cs had their training for Afghanistan interrupted until the Chief of the Land Staff intervened, and much Class A training was cut short, only to be belatedly restored.” He also pointed to rumours about possible cuts in Reserve strength that, if administered, would “set the Army-Reserve relations back to the fratricidal mess of the early 1990s.” Furthermore, the last budget (March 4, 2010) did little to provide encouragement. According to Granatstein, it simply affirmed that the CFDS’s 2008 pledges of stable funding have vanished. Moreover, “the pledge of 70,000 Regulars and 30,000 Reservists… keeps slipping backwards.”

Similarly, a Globe and Mail editorial in early 2010 worried that cuts were falling disproportionately on those deploying to Afghanistan – both Regular and Reserve Forces. It noted that, although the CFDS promised to increase the CF by 1,000 new recruits, the Army had to reduce Regular Force intake by 1,000 because there was no money to train new recruits. The Reserves were deemed to have been especially hard hit with 80,000 man-days of training taken from their budget. This meant that many units would not train and when Reservists do not train they do not get paid. This was a very serious issue for many Reservists who count on this income to make ends meet. But, for student Reservists who are helping to fund their education through their work as part time soldiers, it constituted a major disappointment. It also sent a poor message to those who have agreed to dedicate themselves to national service only to be told that their country has other priorities. All of this occurred as their comrades were being sent to war within a system increasingly overstretched.

The Globe editorial also made some general observations on the importance of the Reserve noting that they are a “critical strategic asset, both operationally and culturally.” The Reserves, it said, comprise 20 percent of the Canadian contingent in Kandahar and are able to back up the Regulars allowing for rapid deployments elsewhere such as Haiti. Out of a total of approximately 2,500 soldiers, every rotation to Afghanistan has at least 300 Reservists and some as many as 500. Reservists, when deployed, do the same jobs and take the same risks as their full time counterparts. The editorial also mentioned that one of their most important roles is to connect the general citizenry to the military “both as the military’s presence in the community and in making sure that the military is reflective of society.” It added that “the Reserves are ethnically diverse and have a higher percentage of women than the Regular Force. What hurts the Reserves hurts the Army.”

Even before the current economic troubles and ensuing budget cuts, questions were being raised about the viability of the CFDS personnel commitments. As LGen (Ret’d) George Macdonald has noted, the projections presented in the CFDS did not address the “qualitative aspects of personnel growth: the proportion of people undergoing training and the loss of experience of those leaving the military.” There is continuing pressure to fill some military occupations with qualified individuals, which can only lead one to conclude that experience levels in many areas are low.

As we have seen, future growth in both the Regular and the Reserve Force will be constrained and the CF may not have the qualified people it needs to fill vacant positions. Global numbers can often be deceiving. Even if growth were occurring at originally anticipated rates, a simple numerical depiction of CF strength would prove misleading. As Macdonald has pointed out, an understanding is needed of the “areas in which experience is lacking… and the year over year increases to the trained effective strength, that is, the cadre of personnel

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67 Ibid. p. 6.
69 Ibid.
70 LGen (Ret’d) George Macdonald, The Canada First Defence Strategy – One Year Later, CDFAI, October 2009, p. 3. For the fiscal year 2009-2010, the Regular Force strength was projected to be almost 67,000 and the paid Primary Reserve strength at about 26,000 for a total of 93,000. Projections for 2011-2012 were for an increase of 1,000 each for a total of 95,000.
available to fulfill an operational role.” Expanding this cadre presents a major challenge to the operational readiness of the CF. All three environments – land, sea and air – need to sustain the resources required for force generation in order to meet operational demands, while at the same time having to deal with an almost unsustainable level of deployments for key personnel. Compounding problems, according to Macdonald, is the fact that the ‘readiness reserve’ will remain shallow for some years to come. The CFDS, he says, “does not appear to be the result of a balanced approach to capability development when it comes to personnel.”

The modest increases in the personnel complement originally proposed in the CFDS and the recent budget restraint initiatives have produced a disappointing result in terms of the future prospects of the CF. In effect, the CFDS offers little to improve the situation for either Regular or Reserve forces in the short and longer term. The most recent federal budget illustrated quite clearly how fragile the Harper Government’s projections were. The economic slowdown reduced revenues and the government’s own tax cuts have dramatically constrained the government’s fiscal flexibility. In a department like DND, it has forced them to take a hard look at personnel costs, which account for over half of the defence budget. It is also regrettable that the CFDS is silent on what the government sees as the future roles and responsibilities of Reserve Forces.

So how should one assess the CFDS overall? Certainly, the Government deserves some credit for moving on some of its equipment acquisition projects, especially those related to the mission in Afghanistan as well as the increases to the defence budget. It is important to note, however, that some of the Harper Government’s “new” procurement projects were initiated by the Martin Government and were re-packaged for the purposes of the CFDS. Regrettably, some of these projects such as the Joint Support Ship and Fixed Wing Search and Rescue have not been well managed. The public’s perception is certainly that the Government is spending a lot more on defence. By adding up operational and capital budgets over a 20-year span, the Government could claim it was spending “close to $490 billion” on defence. However, according to a Globe and Mail story, based upon recent cuts, there is now a $44 billion gap between what was promised in the CFDS and what the government will now spend.2 On the whole, the CFDS is generally very light on substantive policy. Given the drawdown of troops in Afghanistan, the time would seem to be right for a clear statement of foreign and defence policy to provide needed strategic direction.

While budgets and defence policy are critically important, how DND organizes itself to conduct its missions has a direct impact on the success of our deployments at home and abroad. The major changes to the command structures announced in 2005 by the Martin Government as part of transformation were implemented in 2006 under Harper with four new operational commands: Canada Command (CANCOM), Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM), Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) and Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM). While the nature of these new commands is largely self-explanatory, it is important to note that CANCOM, CEFCOM and CANSOFCOM are all in a position to command maritime, land, air and Special Forces assets, while CANOSCOM is a joint and interoperable command intended to support the other three operational commands.

In all four commands, the primary objective is to increase the capability of the CF to act in a more integrated and interoperable manner in both combined and joint operations. All of these commands report to the CDS and are overseen by the Armed Forces Council which includes the chiefs of the three environmental commands – Maritime, Land Force and Air Command. According to Jeffery, these changes were instituted because General Hillier believed that the command and control (C2) function within the CF had deteriorated and was not up to the challenge of confronting today’s security threats. In effect, too little attention was being devoted to the operational needs of deployed forces that were not getting the support they needed from NDHQ.73

71 Ibid. p. 4.
72 Military cuts to target reservists, paper pushers, general says, Globe and Mail, October 27, 2010.
C2 issues are not exclusive to the Canadian Forces. They exist in all militaries. Indeed, both NATO, through its Research and Technology Organization, and the US military, through its Command and Control Research Program, have devoted considerable time and effort to studying C2 problems. The prevailing view is that today's missions differ substantially from those of the past. They are more dynamic, more complex and require the collective efforts of many organizations to succeed. Pulling together organizations with diverse capabilities within a limited time frame and shaping them into a coherent and effective coalition is no mean feat. In an era where organizational agility is critical, the old way of doing things simply will not succeed in the 21st century. As David Alberts and Richard Hayes have observed:

“After years of trying in vain to make what historically has become known as Command and Control work in an era of complex coalition civil-military operations, there is an increasing willingness to rethink the subject. At the same time, Information Age concepts and technologies offer opportunities to do things we could never do before. The ‘stars are aligning,’ matching our need to change with the means to change.”

The challenges associated with implementing the most appropriate C2 structure in the Canadian context are significant and have implications for the Regular and Reserve forces. Indeed, these challenges have been with us for many years. The perennial “tooth to tail” debate was alive and well during the Second World War. As MGen E.L.M. Burns noted in a post-war study of resource utilization, “The Canadian Army overseas in World War II was over-organized; it had too many high formations and administrative headquarters for the numbers of fighting troops.” The recent proliferation of operational commands seems to have re-ignited a similar debate around too many headquarters and too much bureaucracy. As Jeffery has observed, it was likely that the old C2 structure would not have been able to cope with the operational demands of domestic and foreign operations post 9/11. Unfortunately, however, these new headquarters took some of the best staff officers out of the system and resulted in stresses and strains in other parts of the structure. Summing it up, Jeffery said: “The new C2 structure may be more effective, but it is not more efficient.”

For Canada, the C2 challenges are very much related to the effective management (political, bureaucratic and military) of operations that combine military and civilian capability in foreign and domestic settings. Effective and efficient force generation that is service specific, or joint, is also vital as is the need to construct a workable interface with other government departments and our coalition partners. From 1968, when unification occurred, to the more recent changes to the CF command structure, the evolution of C2 has generally been toward more integration and “jointness” within the forces. It has not been an easy process. There is much evidence to suggest that, within the maritime, land and air force elements, there continues to be subtle resistance to more integration. Similar resistance has existed between Regular and Reserve Forces. As Jeffery notes:

“What is needed is a unified vision that would allow the shaping of the CF, and in particular its C2 structure, in a manner that would optimize both effectiveness and efficiency.... Such an approach should focus on the development and implementation of a true “Joint” force generation process and managed readiness programme for the CF. Recognizing the bona fide service requirements, an integrated force generation process, would move the services closer together in doctrinal and philosophical terms. In time, this should see a greater integration or sharing of capabilities, leading to a reduced demand for service headquarters and an improvement in overall efficiency.”

75 MGen E.L.M. Burns, Manpower in the Canadian Army 1939-1945, (Toronto, Clark Irwin, 1956) p. 42.
77 Ibid.
Why is all of this important for the Army Reserve? If we are to achieve a unified vision, and more integration within the CF, it means that the Regular and Reserve forces will have to work together even more closely. As Jeffery has noted above, this is very much dependent upon a successful process of force generation and managed readiness. He has also argued that the efficient use of the Army Reserve is critical to the sustainability of our land forces into the future.

The concept of managed readiness was introduced by Jeffery as CLS around 2002. It was intended to balance the quality of life for the individual soldier – and more specifically predictability – while ensuring the Army could meet its tasks.

Managed readiness means that at any time, one third of the Army would be at a high state of readiness or deployed on operations, one third would be conducting training and one third would be undergoing reconstitution. In February 2002, Jeffery addressed this issue in a presentation to the Conference of Defence Associations. Managed readiness and better use of the Reserve, he said, were two ways to improve Army sustainability. “But I do not see these two approaches as quick fixes,” he added. “Rather, I see them as a fundamental change in the way we run the Army. One Army – two components, working together to generate and sustain the most effective Army we can.”

TRANSFORMATION ISSUES – THE “INTEGRATIONISTS” VERSUS THE “SEGREGATIONISTS”

While an exhaustive examination of transformation and new models of C2 for the CF are not the purpose of this paper, it is important to take note of the current status of the transformation process and what it may hold in terms of major structural change for C2 and the Reserve Force. There appears to be a growing current of dissatisfaction both inside and outside DND with the amount of administrative overhead surrounding the various HQs functions. The optimistic increase in the “tooth to tail” ratio promised by the DPS has not materialized over the last five years. As Chief of Transformation Leslie has stated, “it is critically important to reduce the HQ staff and support the field force. It is all about effectiveness and efficiency.” According to Leslie, there are approximately 18,000 personnel (civilian and military) working in various HQ functions within the department and roughly the same number of soldiers in the Regular Army. There are 46 Level 2 and Level 3 HQ’s or HQs equivalents. The four Area HQs employ 1,000 people, Regular and Reserve Force, and civilians. The ten Reserve Force brigade HQs employ a combined total of 600-700 people and the HQ for First Canadian Division (1st Cdn Div) has another 100 people.

One of the ideas being considered as part of the transformation process is a divisional model that would see the establishment of a 1st Cdn Div consisting of the three Regular Force brigades. These would be primarily responsible for expeditionary deployments with support to domestic operations. A Second Canadian Division (2nd Cdn Div.) would consist of an unspecified number of Reserve Force brigades (possibly between three and five) whose primary purpose would be domestic operations with support to expeditionary operations. Presumably, this new structure would not add to HQ’s bureaucracy, but would benefit from a reduction and rationalization of existing HQs. Each division would be commanded by a Major General. There would also be cross fertilization between the Reserve and the Regular Force with potentially 80 percent Regulars and 20 percent Reservists in 1st Cdn Div with the proportions reversed in the 2nd Cdn Div. Both of these formations would be responsible for force generation and for force employment.

79 LGen Andrew Leslie, Interview with the author, September 27, 2010.
80 Ibid.
The proposal is not without its detractors. According to Jeffery, “The idea of a Reserve division is an anachronism. Modern militaries simply don’t use divisions much anymore. Some people want to go back to a simpler time in terms of structure.” He added that the era in which we live and the resources we have dictate the structures of today (i.e. battle groups and brigade groups). “We need a modular approach,” he said. “We have been doing this for years and will continue to.” There is much evidence to support Jeffery’s opinion. The US Army, for instance, has changed the key unit of action from the division to the brigade. Some observers note that the US Army’s brigade combat teams approach the lethality of an old style division. Not all defenders of the two division model disagree with Jeffery’s view of the importance of the brigade or indeed a modular approach. They concede that it would be extremely unlikely that Canada would deploy a full division either for domestic or international operations and they insist that major operations would still be based around the deployment of a combat brigade group.

An important question from the standpoint of this discussion is whether or not this two division structure would solve some of the problems, real or imagine, that have been dogging the Army Reserve in recent years. It presents some intriguing possibilities. Among some in the Reserves community, there has been an underlying view that if only Reservists had more control within the Army organization and command structure and more control over budgets, equipment, training and recruitment, many of the problems they face would disappear. MGen (Ret’d) Ed Fitch who, as Project Manager LFRR, was closely connected to Regular-Reserve relations has characterized the divide between these two solitudes as pitting the “integrationists” against the “separationists”. In a Canadian context, this description may appear to be politically loaded. However, it is a fact that many in the Reserves community support a maitre chez nous approach to managing the Army Reserve separately from the Regular Army. As Jeffery has observed:

There is a belief that as long as the professionals [Regulars] have control, the Militia will never be what it should be; that if they have control then all the problems (lack of money, poor recruiting, lack of equipment, etc) will all go away. This is a naïve perspective that belies the realities of cost and the nation's willingness to pay for more defence. At the end of the day, it's up to the government to allocate resources. The Militia too often lays its problems at the feet of the Regular Force.

Nonetheless, a separate administration for the Army Reserve is seen as a good starting point for many who speak on behalf of Reservists – and budgets are at the top of their priority list. Although some progress has been made toward increasing the transparency and fairness of Reserve Force budgets (especially under Jeffery and Fitch), the view persists that any budget cuts fall disproportionately on the Reserve Force. Sometimes a particular decision will re-ignite old tensions. A recent flash point came in late 2009 when the area commanders caused acute distress in the Army Reserve community by dramatically reducing Reserve Force pay. In an effort to cut costs, it was announced that Reserve Force service members would parade one day per month for three months. The normal practice is to parade one night per week and one weekend per month. Individual Reservists who had counted on a specific pay amount over this period suffered an immediate and unexpected income reduction. Globe and Mail columnist Christie Blatchford was quick to take up the cause:

When budget push comes to shove, the Reserves take a harder hit than the Regular Force – chiefly because, where in the Regular Force wages come from a separate envelope of funds, in the Militia it’s all of a single piece, so when you cut Reserve dollars you’re cutting training, bullets, travel, pay and people. Thus, what purports to be suffering dispersed equally in fact isn’t.

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81 LGen (Ret’d) Michael Jeffery. Interview with the author, September 13, 2010.
82 A combat brigade group is distinct from a brigade in that it contains divisional elements.
83 Jeffery. Interview, September 13, 2010.
The Reserves also found a keen political ally in Senator Hugh Segal, who recommended that “We need a clear policy statement from the Minister of National Defence based on a Cabinet minute that indicates that no budget cuts will be allowed from the Reserves to fund other aspects of the Canadian Forces.” Long time Reserve supporter MGen (Ret’d) Clive Addy also noted:

> There is a recurring unfairness with the budget in terms of reliability of Reserve pay. Canadian volunteers should understand very clearly how much pay they will receive. The government then should commit to meet this promise and ensure these circumstances do not change unless there is an immediate and critical reason announced at the highest level.

The Government appears to have received the message – up to a point. In a letter dated August 18, 2010 to Reserves 2000 Chairman BGen (Ret’d) Peter A.G. Cameron, Defence Minister Peter MacKay states:

> The real issue, of course, is the ability of the Reserves to attract, train, and retain the nation’s best, and stable funding is a core enabling element in our personnel strategies... I have directed the (VCDS)... to determine the model that is relevant and specific to each service... Our aim is to develop funding models to ensure fairness and predictability. Equitable and equal are not the same, and there should be no expectation that in our efforts to protect part-time Reservists, they could be afforded the same guarantees as the Regular Force; the terms of service are very different. There must also be flexibility that allows the Department of National Defence to re-allocate funds to higher priorities as needed.

So while the aim is “fairness and predictability,” clearly the Minister does not rule out the possibility of future funding re-allocations.

But it is not just budgets; recruiting is also identified as a serious irritant that raises “separationist” impulses. According to Reserves 2000, “the inefficiency of the system... contributes also to drain Militia units of their sources of new leaders required to command them in the future.” While they concede that “sincere efforts have been made by the CF recruiting centres, the fact remains that this centralized system of recruiting is poorly suited to a Militia clientele.” They complain that CF recruiting centres put “Militia tasks on the back burner” and that “the systemic deficiencies and paperwork that strangle effective Militia recruiting have still not been cured.” Consequently, they recommend that “it would be much [more] preferable to return the responsibility for recruiting and enrolment to the Militia units.”

This issue has some history with the Reserve Force since it was identified as needing attention fifteen years ago when the SCRR reported. Indeed, in their 2005 follow-up report Granatstein and Belzile reported that serious delays in processing recruits had become “the major Reservist grievance.” The complaints were that health and security checks were taking far too long and that the system was “overly bureaucratic and risk averse.” Another criticism levelled at Canadian Forces Recruiting Centres (CFRCs) is that they have not been as sensitive as they could be to the needs of Reservists in terms of hours of operation. They are open from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. Monday to Friday with no evening or weekend hours.

One of those who had concerns about the recruitment system around the time of the 2005 SCRR follow-up report was MGen Ed Fitch. At the time, he was involved in a pilot project aimed at streamlining the system.

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86 Conference of Defence Associations Council Meeting Resolution, April 19, 2010.
88 Letter dated August 18, 2010 from Minister of Defence, the Honourable Peter MacKay, PC., M.P. to BGen. Peter A.G. Cameron, Chairman, Reserves 2000.
According to Fitch, of all the Reserve recruits who signed up, fully 30 percent were lost because the process took so long. The recruiting process, he said, took place in two phases. The initial contact and testing was done by the local CFRC – typically within a week of the applicant signing up. The applicant’s file then went up the chain to the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group (CFRG) for processing and could take many weeks before an offer of employment was authorized. As Fitch observed, “the review process did not introduce anything new, it was simply verifying the findings of the CFRC. We also learned that of files that were found to be suitable at the local CFRC, only 1-3% would later be found unsuitable by the CFRG review.”

The result of this research, said Fitch, led to the concept of making an employment offer immediately after the CFRC found the applicant suitable. The new recruit would then be enrolled, start training and begin getting paid. If the recruit was later found unacceptable because of a previously undetected medical condition or if they had provided false information, then they could be immediately discharged under existing Queen’s Regulations and Orders. This process significantly reduced the numbers lost because of processing time. As Fitch noted, “this was trialed with great success. It served to conserve our considerable investment in attracting applicants. I cannot remember one instance of there being a serious problem because someone was enrolled but later found unsuitable.”

The graph below, from an LFRR briefing in the spring of 2006, illustrates the extent of the losses in the recruiting system prior to improvements.

It would appear that the results of this pilot project, and perhaps other initiatives emanating from the CFRG in recent years, have resulted in improvements to the system. A recent (and unscientific) survey of one CFRC and the officer in charge seems to indicate that some rather significant improvements have been implemented. The officer indicated that in a best case scenario a Reserve Force applicant can be processed through the CFRC in approximately two weeks. A more typical scenario puts the time line at between four and five weeks – still not an unreasonable period given the paperwork involved.

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91 MGen (Ret'd) Ed Fitch, email to the author dated October 20, 2010.
92 Ibid.
93 This graph provided courtesy of MGen (Ret'd) Ed Fitch.
Today’s process is relatively straightforward. An applicant for the Reserve Forces who applies at a CFRC is directed to the Reserve unit of interest where a determination is made as to whether a position is available. If there is no opening, the applicant may be directed to another unit that needs a new recruit. Once a place has been identified, the applicant returns to the CFRC for processing. The applicant is then required to pass an aptitude test before proceeding. Following the test, a medical examination and interview are scheduled. A criminal records check and background check are conducted concurrently followed by a reference check. The successful completion of these various phases finalizes the CFRC processing. The applicant then undergoes a fitness test which is done by an outside service provider such as the YMCA. The applicant’s file is then forwarded to the Reserve unit.

The speed with which an applicant is processed is dependent upon a number of factors not the least of which is the applicant showing up for his or her various appointments. Reserve units themselves can become choke points at the beginning and at the end of the process. For instance, delays can result if they are slow to respond to applicants in terms of available spaces and if they sit on completed files and do not take new recruits on strength because of budget issues or other administrative impediments. The number of recruits taken on in any given year is based upon the Strategic Intake Plan. A CFRC officer indicated that he has seen some completed files sit with a Reserve unit for three to four months in the worst cases. However, a Reservist advised that some of these waits can be longer. He said, “Our unit currently has a list of over 20 people who have completed applications that have been waiting for quite a while, in some cases over a year, to get sworn into the military, and loaded onto a basic training course.”94 As a general practice, however, it would appear that this final phase of the process can occur within a month.

While the system is far from perfect, it would seem that notable advances have been made in recent years. Many, however, would like to see further improvements. According to Leslie, “recruiting has improved, but it is still not what it should be since it takes too long.” Evidently, if and when there are delays in the process, they cannot all be blamed on the CFRCs – individual Reservists and Reserve units bear some responsibility. And, if budget constraints force Reserve units to delay taking on new recruits, then it is not the fault of units either, but rather the system as a whole.

But real efforts have been made to improve applicant processing. It would appear, for instance, that the CFRCs heard and responded to criticisms about their hours of operation. Apparently, CFRC commanding officers have been given the flexibility to adjust hours of operation by staying open in the evenings and on Saturdays. And indeed, some CFRCs have also experimented with longer hours. However, the results were disappointing since the number of additional recruits attracted was minimal and did not justify the extended hours. More recently the CF also announced a streamlined recruiting website to better convey information to remote communities and make recruiters available to answer questions through the website.

Should the Reserves have a separate recruiting system? It is important to bear in mind that it was not that long ago that Reserve units did their own recruiting before the system changed and the CFRCs became the principal point of contact. According to some familiar with the old system, there was very little in the way of common standards and there were no centralized lists of personnel or human resources management systems. In a modern military, that is hardly an ideal situation. So while Leslie believes the idea of a separate recruiting system is “worth studying”, he also adds the important caveat that “whatever changes are made, it is important not to increase the Army’s overhead costs.”95

It is hard to believe that a separate system would not add to the administration costs of the CF. The dynamics of transformation and the trend toward greater integration leads to the conclusion that the only plausible course of action would be to maintain the existing CFRC system. Also necessary, however, is the need to take whatever

94 This was part one of a series of detailed, anonymous responses provided by email to the author by serving Army Reservists. See Appendix E for their comments on a variety of subjects.
95 Leslie interview.
administrative actions are required to reduce choke points in the system while making it as user-friendly for Reservists as possible. As one recruiting officer noted, right now the time from “flash” (first contact with the applicant) to “bang” (enrolment in the Reserves) is variable. The objective must be to make it as predictable, short and efficient as possible.

If improvements have been made to recruiting, the Reserves pay system is a source of major complaints among the rank and file. Those consulted for this study were virtually unanimous in their view that the pay system is badly broken and desperately needs immediate attention. From the standpoint of the "integrationist/separationist" debate, this is a case where a separate system does exist and is functioning very poorly. The Revised Pay System for Reservists (RPSR) is administered by the Director Military Pay and Accounts Processing (DMPAP) and is a web-based centralized system for recording and calculating pay for Reservists employed or deployed in Class A, B and C service. The RPSR calculates amounts due based upon information inputted by Reserve Force units where the pay files are maintained.

In 2007, an audit of CF Reserve Force Pay was done and a Management Action Plan (MAP) was to be implemented. In March 2010, a follow-up report on the MAP was done by the Chief Review Services (CRS). It notes that, while some issues identified by the MAP such as contingency payments, rank changes and management of user identification had been addressed, others, such as those requiring significant programming changes to the RPSR, had not. The report states:

The primary issue with regards to the payment of Reservists was the inability to ensure the accuracy, completeness and validity of attendance information. There is an initiative underway to replace RPSR but it is currently in the options analysis phase with current estimates being January 2013 as the earliest implementation time. We have been advised that functional and technological requirements to address the attendance-related issues have been incorporated into the project requirement. As an interim control measure DMPAP was to have scheduled random verifications to better monitor compliance, but as of February 2010 there had been no visits to any of the Reserve units. In the meantime, the originally identified attendance-related risks still exist.96

Many Reserve Force members have horror stories when it comes to pay. One summed it up as follows: “Endemic pay problems are widespread… understaffed orderly rooms and high turnover create a perfect storm of lost paperwork.”97 Another Reservist stated that his pay problems began the moment he joined: “It took almost four months for my pay to accurately reflect the number of days I had worked.” He went on to say that after his deployment to Afghanistan, his Class C contract was never properly ended and he was told he had been overpaid by $2,600. He stated that before this deployment he had gone to the Finance staff to ensure all the pay details were in order. Yet another Reservist stated that:

The CF Reserves would recruit more and retain more troops if these financial issues were resolved. I can think of a few troops that have left due to having their pay being constantly screwed around with. I would personally like to see how many MPs and top government officials would keep their positions if they did not see a pay cheque for six months or their pay was consistently butchered! When I came back from Afghanistan the second time they paid me improperly which has resulted in me owing them $2,000.98

Another unfortunate pay experience concerns a Reservist on a one month contract with a Regular Force regiment in Petawawa in 2009. To avoid having to deal with the Reserve pay system, he was given $1,400 in cash twice to cover the two pay periods. After a two week hiatus, he started another eight week contract in Petawawa on a

96 Follow-Up on CF Reserve Pay Audit, Chief of Review Services, Department of National Defence, March 2010, p. 5.
97 Anonymous information provided by serving Army Reservist. See Appendix E.
98 Ibid.
different project and returned to the Reserve pay system. For the first three pay periods (six weeks), he received no pay at all. That error was eventually corrected at the end of July, 2009. However, in March 2010, again after not being paid for six weeks, he went to a pay clerk to have the issue addressed. The clerk advised him that he had been incorrectly paid for two weeks the previous May and that he owed the CF $1,400. The Reservist offered up the following commentary:

One of the biggest challenges the Reserves face is terrible retention rates. I couldn’t give you statistics, but the bureaucratic system doesn’t respect the needs of soldiers. Inadequate administrative support is a major reason people release from the Reserves. In fact I know of several soldiers who left the Army in large part due to pay problems. We were stood down for several weeks more than normal at the start of this year, forcing many junior members to get new jobs. When my unit started up again, many privates and corporals said to themselves, why should I go out of my way for an Army that doesn’t care about me, when I can work at a big box store and know I’ll be paid properly?

For instance, one specific Cpl I know well left the Army and said Subway was a much better employer than DND. Another soldier, who is in Afghanistan right now, was attached to a different unit in Québec while he went to university. In an entire academic year, he wasn’t paid once. It is a wonder he kept showing up at all. In my experience it is foolhardy, if not outright negligent, to put yourself in a position where your financial support is dependent on the Reserves. This sentiment is shared almost universally by most soldiers working part time with the Army.99

Whether a separate pay system for the Army Reserve should be maintained is debatable. That will have to be the subject of further examination and analysis to determine whether the existing system should, or could, be fixed or whether it should be amalgamated with the Regular Force pay system. Discontent with the Reserve pay system is palpable and it is no exaggeration to say that improvements to the system cannot wait until 2013. If the matter were left up to Reservists, by most accounts, they would be more than pleased to see one pay system for both the Regular and Reserve Forces. Directly tied to the issue of the pay problems is the amount of administrative support that exists in Reserve units. Apart from the serious pay problems, there also appear to be other management issues related to human resources, training, hours of work and financial accountability. Consequently, there appears to be a very good argument for increasing the amount of administrative support and accountability at the Reserve unit level.100

Reserves 2000 also express deep concerns about training. Their principal complaint is that the system of individual training is so complicated it is incapable of generating the replacements needed for Regular Force augmentation let alone a significant Army expansion should one be required. The crux of the problem, they say, is a system that requires the Reserve Force soldier to have the same skill levels as a Regular Force member. “This concept fails to take into consideration the logic of the Militia soldier’s status of citizen soldier,” they note. They also argue that the Regular Force training standards often reflect significant over-qualification which is not essential for the Militia and that in the long term may negatively impact recruiting. While they recognize that for a foreign deployment “it makes sense to undertake further training to upgrade one’s skills to essential levels”, they remain concerned that augmentation on expeditionary operations has required that Reservists “reach high levels of training that conflict with the status and availability of the typical citizen-soldier.”101

There seems to be a major divide between Reserves 2000 and serving Reservists on the issue of training. The general view expressed by those Reservists interviewed for this paper was that more training was better. One Reservist who has served two tours in Afghanistan notes: “I don’t think anyone can have too much training.”

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99 Ibid.
100 See Appendix D for an anonymous letter received by the author. A caution is in order. Since the letter writer did not identify himself/herself, there is no way of verifying this information. It would appear that the CF is poised to take action on some of the major issues referenced (i.e. to reduce the number of Class B contracts).
101 The Militia and its Citizen-Soldiers, p. 4.
He adds that “a favourite expression of mine that I heard from an instructor years ago states that ‘when the shit hits the fan, you will not rise to the occasion; you will sink to the level of your training.’” Few would disagree with the notion that the modern battle space, especially in counter insurgency warfare, is complex. To the extent the CF does everything it reasonably can to prepare soldiers – both Regulars and Reserve – for what they might face, it would seem that the CF deserves credit, not criticism.

The manner in which training is organized for the Reserve could be vastly improved. Class A Reservists have time constraints on them that full time soldiers do not. As Leslie observes, “We must respect Reserve availability and accessibility for training. The structure of the training needs to be modified and further modularized. There currently is a lot of computer assisted training, but more could be done.” One Reservist suggested additional computer training for Reserve officers since “most Reserve units don’t have enough soldiers to allow officers to train above the platoon level.” He added that, “computer generated training would allow these officers to train from a theoretical level with formations much higher than would be possible with real troops.” He also observed that:

"NCMs, however, I feel would be better served by continuing with an on the ground, in the field, training model. No amount of computer simulation can prepare a soldier for carrying a real rucksack, turning a real wrench, firing a real weapon, using a real radio etc. The basic soldier skills which everyone in the Army must master are physical tasks, NCMs especially. Given the propensity for computerized training to be quite expensive, I see little value for the money."

Another major complaint of Reservists is that courses are scheduled and often cancelled at the last minute. For Reservists who have booked time off work this is a significant source of aggravation. It is appropriate to ask whether more computerized training could be done at the unit level. The short answer is probably, but it depends upon the nature of the subject material and whether it lends itself to computer training. Clearly, as the Reservist infanteer notes above, there are some things that cannot be conveyed on a computer screen and need to be learned in the field.

The issue of the availability of equipment for training is a recurrent one and there appear to be many examples of the Regular Force running roughshod over the Army Reserve. A case in point was the procurement of the G-wagon. Originally intended for the Army Reserve (based upon the procurement rationale), as soon as these new vehicles arrived LFC diverted a large proportion to the Regular Force. Standard operating procedure is that the Regulars and the Army Reserve should be using the same equipment, especially for pre-deployment training. However, sometimes it does not work out that way. As one Reservist noted, “All task forces communicate on radios which are encrypted, yet Reserve units are not allowed to hold the equipment required to train with this capability, and it is very difficult to even get the courses required to operate the equipment.” Between deployments, the Army Reserve often has to make do. As LCol John Selkirk notes, “the Regular Force gets 90% of the resources and the Militia gets whatever is left over.” In fairness to the Regular Force, the issue of training equipment is one that faces virtually all militaries. As MGen Dennis Tabbernor, Chief – Reserves and Cadets, observes: “No country has all the equipment it needs to train its soldiers.” Still, it would seem that more could be done to ensure that Reservists get trained up on all the equipment necessary for them to function effectively in a theatre of operations.

There have also been criticisms of Reservists medical care. In April 2008, the Interim Ombudsman, Mary McFadyen, released a special report, entitled Reserved Care: An Investigation into the Treatment of Injured Reservists. This report followed a series of complaints from Reservists about different and unequal standards

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102 Anonymous information provided by serving Army Reservist. See Appendix E.
103 Leslie interview.
104 Anonymous information provided by serving Army Reservist. See Appendix E.
105 LCol (Ret’d) John Selkirk. Interview with the author. September 11, 2010.
106 MGen Dennis Tabbernor, Chief – Reserves and Cadets. Interview with the author. September 13, 2010.
of health care for those injured or wounded in the line of duty. The investigation identified major areas of concern. These included significant inequities in the provision of health care to injured Reservists, consistency of standards, benefits and the processing of medical releases.

Overall, the quality and quantity of medical care provided to Reservists was found to be largely unpredictable with some receiving no medical care at all from the CF. Unfortunately, there has been no follow-up report on health care for injured Reservists although one is expected in the near future. Another looming issue for Reservists who have been in combat in Afghanistan is Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Regular Force soldiers will be provided appropriate health care if they are diagnosed with PTSD in the future whether still serving or retired. The situation for Reservists who leave the CF and are diagnosed with PTSD at some future point, however, presents a potential problem. Will they be covered by specialized CF medical care or will they simply have to rely on their provincial medical coverage? The answer is unclear and that is unsettling.

Another proposal that has come forward concerns the possibility of creating a new position of Ombudsman or Inspector General for the Reserves. Currently, the DND/CF Ombudsman reports to the Minister and has significant authority for receiving and investigating complaints from current and former civilian employees of DND, members of the CF (Regulars and Reserves) and, importantly, their families, cadets and those applying to become members of the CF. In the study mentioned above, the existing Ombudsman has the authority to investigate a wide range of problems and issues, both individual and systemic, related to both the Regular and the Reserve Force. The role of an Inspector General, if the American model provides any guidance, is focused on enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of the organization and operates more like an internal auditor. The mission of the US DoD Inspector General, for instance, is to “promote integrity, accountability, and improvement of Department of Defense personnel, programs and operations to support the Department’s mission and serve the public interest.”

If we agree with the “one Army” proposition, setting up an Ombudsman or Inspector General strictly for the Reserves means moving away from integration toward a separate system. It is difficult to come to any other conclusion but that this represents an unnecessary and wasteful duplication of effort. This idea of a separate Ombudsman/Inspector General was raised with current Chief – Reserves and Cadets Tabbernor. He has some serious reservations about the idea. As he states, this position “pre-supposes that the chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force are not doing their jobs and that they are not sensitive to Reserve Force issues. I believe they are, but they have to balance their operational requirements with their personnel requirements.” Importantly, he adds that: “Some of my Reserve colleagues see discrimination against the Reserves for any decision that negatively affects the Reserves. They don't see these decisions as meeting the operational requirements of the Canadian Forces at a particular time.” This is not to say that the idea of an Inspector General for DND and the CF should not be considered. Indeed, there are many civilian and uniformed personnel who believe it would be a good idea and deserves further study and consideration from the standpoint of the effectiveness and efficiency of the CF and DND.

One of the suggestions that has been made concerns the Reserves having its own chain of command and that the position of Chief – Reserves and Cadets should be re-structured and made a “three star” (Lieutenant General) with all Reservists (land, sea and air) falling under his or her direct command. Here, it is important to understand the existing mandate of the Chief – Reserves and Cadets. The position is held by a “two star” or Major General and does not involve command responsibilities. The Chief, who is a member of Armed Forces Council and Command Council, is responsible for the Directorate of Reserves. This directorate gathers and analyses information on Primary Reserve matters to enable the Chief to serve as an effective advisor to the CDS. The directorate gives advice on the development and implementation of Reserve policy and provides assistance to commands and NDHQ’s divisions and directorates on matters affecting the Reserves.

108 Tabbernor interview.
The suggestion to re-structure the Chief’s position and to create a separate “three star” commanding the Reserves is problematic for a variety of reasons. It is important to re-iterate that the CF consists of two components, (as stated in the NDA) Regular and Reserve Forces. The various elements of the Primary Reserve (Army, Navy and Air Force), either as individual augmentees or as part of formed sub-units, report up through the chain of command to the chiefs of the three environments. These include the Chief of the Land Staff, (Lieutenant General) Chief of the Maritime Staff (Vice Admiral) and Chief of the Air Staff (Lieutenant General). This triumvirate of the senior command reports directly to the CDS. If a “three star” position were inserted into this structure, with direct command responsibilities, it would bifurcate the existing command structure and be the first step toward establishing a separate Reserve Force Army, Navy and Air Force within the CF. Not only would such a command structure be inimical to the aims of the NDA, it would also be very much out of step with the Total Force concept. It would move the CF away from further integration and unity, which are the hallmarks of today's modern militaries. So in many respects, the idea is a non-starter.

To briefly return to Leslie’s “two division” model which is being considered as part of transformation, one of the reasons it is very attractive lies in its potential to offer the Army Reserve more autonomy while maintaining the existing command structure. For the “separationists”, it provides a separate chain of command up to the position of Major General (within the existing LFC structure) with a separate budget and more control over administrative issues as well as training and equipment. With the appropriate administrative support, it could also furnish more transparency and financial accountability on how the Army Reserve budget is spent. If there is a drawback for the Army Reserve community under the two division model, it may be that it requires a further rationalization of the ten existing Reserve brigades to better fit the divisional model. While the total number of Reservists will hopefully not be subject to cuts, individuals and units may be re-organized and rebadged in order to address new requirements. If the number of Reserve Brigades were reduced, this could potentially decrease headquarters costs at both the brigade and area command levels.

For the “integrationists,” the two division model upholds the Total Force concept. It allows for more interaction and integration between the Regulars working with the Reservists in the 2nd Div and Reservists working with the Regulars in the 1st Div. In fact, under the two division structure, it may very well be that individual augmentees and formed sub-units could flow back and forth between the two divisions with regularity based upon levels of training and operational needs. But this would largely be dependent, for the Reserve, on increasing the authorized strength of their units to realistic levels so they can provide appropriate training and meet actual operational requirements.

An important question is whether the two division model makes sense from the standpoint of effectiveness and efficiency. That is yet to be determined. Leslie’s transformation team is now considering this model along with others and a decision on this and other transformation issues is expected sometime in the first half of 2011. The two division proposal could certainly offer some advantages that would put the CF on a track to resolving many traditional Reserve grievances. The two division model also raises some important mobilisation issues and potentially affects the roles of the Reserves that are the subject of subsequent sections.

MOBILIZATION

NATO defines mobilization as “The process by which the armed forces or parts of them are brought to a state of readiness for conflict to meet a military threat. This includes assembling and organizing personnel, formations, materiel and supplies for active military services, as well as training.”\(^{109}\) Writing on this subject just prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, Peter Dawson describes a traditional view of mobilization in which the matter of balancing resources and needs – a central problem for all militaries – is examined in the context of a significant scale up leading to mass mobilization. He says:

Few states possess the resources to maintain standing armed forces in peacetime on a scale sufficient to support protracted or large military action. It would make neither military nor economic sense to use wartime standards to determine peacetime needs. Peacetime levels are based on certain commitments and on the need to maintain a ‘training base’ (for later expansion), to deploy forces rapidly in an emergency, and to uphold the deterrent value of the forces. Wartime levels are determined by most of the above, plus the need to increase existing commitments, to replace losses, and to expand to meet new commitments.\textsuperscript{110}

Aspects of Dawson’s observations on mobilization still apply, but as we have seen from the survey of the strategic environment, the prospect of mass mobilization remains highly unlikely. Nevertheless, having sufficient well trained Reserve Forces available for augmentation and some potential expansion of the Regular Force makes perfect military and economic sense.

The question this section seeks to answer is whether in today’s security environment there is any rationale for having mass mobilization as one of the three key roles of the Reserves. The roles Reserve Forces play within a nation’s military must be carefully chosen and then supported with the appropriate resources if that force is to have a meaningful and ongoing impact on that country’s defence and security needs. Those roles must be realistic insofar as the strategic environment is concerned and affordable from the standpoints of force size, training and equipment. If one of those roles is not carefully thought out, is outdated or does not make any sense from a military, strategic, political or economic standpoint, it raises fundamental questions about the entire institution.

In the first half of the last century, mass mobilization was a key role for Canada’s Militia. The malignant strategic environment justified a larger Regular and Reserve Force. However, Canadian politicians, in keeping with their historical reluctance to spend money on the military, went into both world wars with a very small Regular Army. With such a small force, mobilization took on added importance. Inasmuch as mass mobilization of the Militia was part of the plans in both the first and second world wars, there were serious problems with implementation in both instances.\textsuperscript{111} The rise of Canada’s Regular Force in the 1950s and the concept of “forces in being” meant that the role of the Militia as an expansion base for the Regular Force has steadily diminished.

A brief survey of Canadian defence policy in recent decades reveals that there has been an inexorable movement away from a focus on mass mobilization and toward augmentation. Defence Minister Paul Hellyer’s 1964 \textit{White Paper on Defence}, for instance, makes no reference to the Reserve as a base for expansion or mass mobilization. It says that “the primary role of the Militia is to support the Regular Army.” It goes on to note that the Emergency Defence Plan called for the withdrawal of the Regular Army from “static installations” involved in territorial defence “to bring the field force up to establishment.” The Reserve would be required to fill this role. They were also to form the basis for logistics and other special units and, as a “secondary” role, were to provide a “training force” to support the field forces.\textsuperscript{112}

Donald Macdonald’s August 1971 White Paper entitled \textit{Defence in the 1970’s}, offers a similar view. “Generally speaking,” it says, “the role of the Reserves is to support the Regular Force. In particular, the Reserve provides trained officers and men for augmentation and reinforcement, and they have a particularly important role in internal security contingency plans.” Almost as an afterthought, it states that “The Reserves also provide a base which could be expanded in an emergency.”\textsuperscript{113} But again, there is no specific mention of mass mobilization.

Perrin Beatty’s 1987 White Paper, \textit{Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada}, took a somewhat different approach on the role of the Reserves. It states that it is both “impractical and undesirable” to rely solely on the Regular Force for all our military commitments. Many tasks, it argues, could be carried

\textsuperscript{110} Dawson, Mobilization, p. 38.
\textsuperscript{111} For more information on mobilization/training issues, see J.L. Granatstein’s \textit{Canada’s Army, Waging War and Keeping the Peace} (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2002) (Chapters Three and Six).
\textsuperscript{112} Bland, \textit{Canada’s National Defence, Volume One, Defence Policy}, p. 100.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid. p.175.
out by the Reserves. The policy statement adds that “If we are to rely to a greater degree on the Reserves to augment the Regular Force, the size of the Reserves will have to be significantly increased and their training and equipment improved.” It promised to increase Reserves strength to about 90,000. Emphasizing the Total Force concept, it saw a continuing role for the Reserves in augmentation but there is no mention of mass mobilization. It also notes that “if the Reserve Force is to be used fully and effectively, the distinction between the Regular and Reserve personnel must be greatly reduced.” In terms of additional Reserve roles, the policy states that:

The Militia will contribute to defence operations in Canada and elsewhere in North America, and will train replacements for land forces deployed overseas. The Militia will also establish a relatively large force of lightly armed guards to protect military vital points, and make a major contribution to the logistics and medical organizations required to support our consolidated European commitments.114

The 1994 White Paper was a departure from previous policy documents. It established a framework for mobilization that still guides Canadian defence policy. A four-stage framework was established for mobilization planning in response to various emergencies and crises. Consistent with the view expressed by Dawson, this four-tiered process reflects a more traditional view of mobilization as part of an immediate post-Cold War strategic environment. According to the White Paper, the four stages of mobilization are:

**Stage One** – Force Generation: This entails all measures needed to prepare elements of the CF to undertake new operational tasks and to sustain and support them. These functions will be undertaken within the existing resource framework of the Canadian Forces. They will include the training and preparation of Reservists to augment the Regular Force.

**Stage Two** – Force Enhancement: This provides for the improvement of the operational capabilities of the existing forces through the allocation of more resources. It would be undertaken without permanent change in the posture or roles of the Canadian Forces, although the formation of temporary units or specialist elements could prove necessary. This level of mobilization is similar to actions taken in response to the 1990 war in the Persian Gulf and all current peacekeeping commitments.

**Stage Three** – Force Expansion: This involves the enlargement of the CF – and perhaps selected elements of the Department of National Defence – to meet a major crisis or emergency. It will involve permanent changes in the roles, structures and taskings of the CF – and could call for the formation of new units, the enhancement of existing facilities, and the procurement of additional equipment. This stage is similar to the structural and role changes undergone by all elements of the CF and the Department of National Defence in 1950-1952, when Canada provided armed forces to the United Nations’ multinational force in Korea, and to the newly formed NATO in Europe.

**Stage Four** – National Mobilization: Noting that a major global war is highly unlikely at this time, it remains prudent to have ready “no-cost” plans for total “national mobilization”. This fourth step could touch upon all aspects of Canadian society and would only come into effect with the proclamation by the Governor-in-Council of a “war emergency” under the Emergencies Act.

It is worth noting that even though the 1994 White Paper laid out an elaborate four stage mobilization process, it largely ignored any mass mobilization role for the Reserve. In fact, it states that the primary role of the Reserve is “augmentation, sustainment and support of deployed forces.” In this, the 1994 White Paper was consistent with defence policy statements going back to the Hellyer and Pearson era. And, while it noted that a major global war was “highly unlikely”, it still managed to create expectations within the Reserve community of a large role in force expansion (stage four) mirroring the experiences in the two world wars.

114 Ibid. p. 257.
The issue of mobilization was a major preoccupation of the Army Reserve community, but it was not the only source of concern. By the early 1990s, the economy was in a tail spin and a serious deficit crisis threatened Canada’s economic security. Virtually all government departments sustained cuts of almost 25 percent. The 1994 White Paper reflected this reality. DND, which had one of the largest budgets in the Federal Government, took its proportion of the cuts in the 1995 budget at a time when defence commitments were expanding rather than contracting. Both the Regular Force and the Reserve Force were cut significantly – the Regulars to 60,000, the Reserves to 23,000.

There was much in the 1994 White Paper to raise alarm in the Army Reserve community. The cuts in personnel and the White Paper’s emphasis on augmentation were not well-received, but there were also other issues. Similar to Perrin Beatty’s 1987 defence policy, the 1994 White Paper focused on the Total Force concept and noted that the “Militia structure requires attention and rejuvenation.” On specific roles, it stated that “Consideration will also be given to assigning more service support roles – such as medical, logistics, communications and transport functions – to the Reserves.”

The assignment of non-combat roles was not greeted with enthusiasm by the Reserves and was seen to encroach on the traditional war-fighting capability of the citizen soldiers. It was also announced that the Supplementary Reserve would no longer be funded. As if all of this were not enough to digest, the White Paper also stated that individual armouries and units could be on the chopping block:

Many Reserve units, despite long and honourable service, have diminished in size and effectiveness in recent years and their armouries are under-used. The new strategic and fiscal environment will require a streamlining of Reserve organizations and rank structures. Every effort will be made to maintain the traditions and effectiveness of Reserve regiments. However, local communities must take more responsibility to help sustain Reserve traditions and activities.

While there were a range of concerns, mobilization was still at the heart of the differences between the military leadership and the Reserves community. According to Army Reserve activists, NDHQ saw one Army with two parts – the Regulars and the Reserve – with the primary role of the Reserve being augmentation of the Regulars. The Reserve activists, on the other hand, saw two armies: the “Army in being” – the Regular Force – and the Militia, upon which a large Army through mobilization could be recruited and built. As J.L. Granatstein noted, “This was the nub of the argument that consumed the last decade of the 20th century, an on-going struggle that resulted in the worst Regular-Reserve relations in Canadian military history.”

Although there were many issues facing the Reserve, such as the Total Force concept, personnel levels, equipment, training, budgets, armouries and the preservation of historic Reserve regiments, mobilization became the focal point for their lobby efforts. Defence Minister David Collenette’s SCRR provided an excellent forum for Reserves 2000 to drive home the message on mobilization and to expose problems in the system. They took full advantage of this opportunity to vent their grievances, which fell on sympathetic ears. The SCRR report released in November 1995 stated:

While the mobilization concept offered in the 1994 White Paper on defence is appropriate, the priorities given to its four phases fail to recognize that the fundamental role of the Reserve Force is to provide the mobilization base for war. Such a role should be paramount in planning, and a mobilization plan should be completed with dispatch.

115 Ibid. p. 354.
116 Ibid. p. 354.
117 Granatstein, The Search for an Efficient, Effective Land Force Reserve, pp. 5-12, p. 7.
118 Special Commission on Restructuring the Reserves, October, 1995, Executive Summary, p. 1.
The SCRR was also emphatic about roles it felt the Reserves should play. The report stated:

First, it is to serve as the basis for augmenting the Regular Force in the first and second phases of mobilization; secondly, it is to serve as the basis for full-scale mobilization; and, thirdly, it is to serve as the link between the military and the community at large.119

The focus on mobilization planning continued with the Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Land Force Reserve Restructure. The first report by John Fraser and his team in November of 1998 contained a forceful message directed to the Minister and the senior brass:

[The] implementation of recommendations relating to the Reserves has been slow. A considerable amount of work remains to be done, for example, in connection with the implementation of the Total Force concept and regarding the definition of the role of the Reserves in the new four-stage national mobilization plan.120

However, it was five years before the Government endorsed the three primary roles for the Reserve as described in the SCRR report. Defence Minister Eggleton’s Policy Statement of October 2000 declared that the roles of the Reserve were to: “provide the framework for expansion should we require mobilization… for individual and unit augmentation on peace support operations; and, to represent the military footprint in communities across the nation.” Eggleton’s statement did not lock the government into a full national mobilization plan. It only promised “further consideration of national mobilization planning.”121 It would take another two years before these Reserve roles were to be recognized officially by the CF through a CLS Planning Directive dated August 15, 2002 that was approved by the CDS. These three roles – mobilization, augmentation and “the footprint” – reflect current Canadian Government policy.

For the Army Reserve community, and some outside observers, the lack of a concrete plan for mobilization was an egregious oversight. For Reserve advocates it amounted to an un-kept promise, the fulfillment of which was central to the future of the institution. As an issue, the need for a mobilization plan refused to go away. When LGen (Ret’d) Charles Belzile and J.L. Granatstein did a follow-up report entitled, The Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves, 1995: Ten Years Later, they once again focused on mobilization. They described as “most serious” the absence of a national mobilization plan, which they criticized as “short sighted in the extreme.”122 They added that “without a guarantee of its role as the generator of citizen soldiers and of formed units in a great national crisis, one of the most important reasons for the continuance of the Militia is in jeopardy.”123

Some of those that speak on behalf of Army Reservists (particularly Reserves 2000) continue to see inaction on the issue of mobilization planning and overuse of augmentation as undermining the very foundations of the citizen soldier concept and the Army Reserve system. Today, Reserve advocates maintain that the fundamental roles of the Army Reserve are seen from very different perspectives by Land Forces headquarters staff and the Reserve community. At times, their rhetoric around these issues is excessive. In a policy paper released in November 2009, Reserves 2000 Québec and Reserves 2000 state that “a chronic lack of awareness of the culture, history and foundations of the Militia by military authorities has led them to adopt policies which threaten the survival of Québec’s Militia units as well as those of the rest of the country.”124 Reserves 2000 Québec and Reserves 2000 also seem to have a slightly different understanding of the established roles of the.
Reserve. According to their 2009 policy paper, the Land Force Reserve has been assigned not three, but four roles, which are to:

• provide a framework for force generation at the national level (mobilization);
• reinforce and support the Regular Force (augmentation);
• act as a link between military and civilian communities; and
• conduct domestic operations in aid of the civil power.

Interestingly, the fourth role Reserves 2000 Québec and Reserves 2000 identifies involving domestic operations is not strictly aligned with official policy, but is one with which most observers would have little difficulty. It is non-controversial and consistent with the traditional role of the Reserves in assistance to civilian authorities during emergencies, natural disasters and territorial defence. Still, Reserves 2000 believe strongly that the Army Reserve’s ability to execute these roles has been steadily eroded. The Reserve, it said, is:

> Reduced to being nothing but a source of immediately available manpower for plugging holes in staffing deficiencies for the Regular Force. The latter is so short of personnel available for operations and deployments, that the Reserve Force augmentation role has quickly become the only one that is taken seriously by the chain of command.\(^{125}\)

While acknowledging that augmentation is a rewarding experience for individual Army Reservists, “the way it is carried out has a very insidious impact, slowly and surely driving the Militia soldier away from his primary role of serving as a citizen soldier in the territorial defence of his country”. They lament the fact that augmentation often results in experienced Reservists opting for full time service – the result of which is that “units are stripped of their leaders and struggle to recruit and train replacements.”\(^{126}\)

Reserves 2000 Québec and Reserves 2000 also suggest that augmentation be used only for “special situations.” As their policy paper argues, “the idea that they [Reservists] can, to a large extent, be used to bring the Regular Force up to strength, providing full-time soldiers at bargain rates, should never have seen the light of day.”\(^{127}\) They note that “even if force generation (mobilization) at the national level is the first mission of the Militia, it is not really taken seriously.” From the standpoint of resources, Reserves 2000 states that “the authorized strength of the Militia is too low and the system of allocating recruiting quotas to Militia units is unrealistic.”\(^{128}\) There is a good argument to be made for the fact that overuse of augmentation probably does have a negative impact on Reserve units. However, Reserves 2000 Québec and Reserves 2000 have perhaps lost some perspective on the overriding priority, which is the operational needs of the CF.

As we have seen, the pre-occupation of Reserve advocates with mobilization issues can be traced back to the 1994 White Paper’s framework for mobilization, which represented perhaps one of the last vestiges of Cold War thinking in an otherwise post-Cold War document. The SCRR’s position on the roles of the Reserves, which linked them directly to the mobilization framework, was hardly surprising. This position had a historical basis drawn principally from Canada’s experience before and during the Second World War. But yet over five decades, defence policy statements provide little support for the idea that mass mobilization should be one of the Reserve’s key roles. Few would argue that Canada should not have the capacity to expand the CF to train new recruits and have them fill operational needs in response to a prolonged national emergency or international crisis. Since mobilization in the early stages of the Second World War, the country has gone to Stage Three only once – during the Korean War. Seventy years after the last full scale mobilization, and twenty years after the end of the Cold War, it is most certainly time to re-consider the importance of mass mobilization as one of the three key roles of the Reserves.

\(^{125}\) Ibid. p. 1.
\(^{126}\) Ibid. p. 4.
\(^{127}\) Ibid. p. 5.
\(^{128}\) Ibid. p. 6.
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The views of senior officers – both serving and retired – and others who have been directly involved with Reserves issues including mobilization are important. In the case of officers still serving, they could potentially be tasked with expanding the Army in a major crisis. A widely held, but not unanimous, view among a group of senior officers surveyed for this paper on the issue of mobilization indicated general agreement on four points: 1) the likelihood of having to implement a Stage Four mobilization plan is slim to nil; 2) the 1994 White Paper’s reference to a “no cost” Stage Four mobilization plan is reasonable; 3) in terms of the scope of the plan, all that is required is “a sketch;” and 4) if such a plan were done, it should be done by the Federal Government as part of an “all of Canada approach” (i.e. private industry, NGO’s, other federal departments and other levels of government) since a CF plan for mobilization without the involvement of other key players would be of marginal value.

Individual comments from serving officers are insightful and instructive. For instance, MGen Dennis Tabbernor, Chief – Reserves and Cadets, expresses the view that there is no connection between Stage Four mobilization and the raison d’être of the Reserves. “The Reserves are no longer a force in waiting,” he says. “An excessive focus on mobilization would disconnect us from our Regular Force counterparts.” He adds, “Sometimes having a plan gets in the way of the situation on the ground and reacting to it appropriately.”129 Similar views were expressed by LGen Leslie:

One of the problems is that there is great uncertainty around the mobilization role. The Reserves should not be viewed as an Army corps in waiting. The Reserves are what they are today and should embrace the new roles and missions they have been assigned. They should not waste their time dreaming about mass mobilization. It is distracting and frankly the Reserves are too important to be given false expectations about some grand mobilization role.130

Former Vice-Chief of Defence Staff Macdonald was blunt in his assessment of mobilization. He said: “Total mobilization is a total waste of time.” He added that the principal role of the Reserves should be augmentation and that efforts would be better directed to equipping and training Reservists for a “realistic role” in that regard. “Employing units of Reservists can be effective, but is dependent on the situation…Infantry sub-units composed of Reservists exclusively can be an acceptable arrangement if they have the required training.”131 Former CLS Jeffery said he generally agreed with Macdonald on the issue of total mobilization adding that “we are not going to realistically go to Stage Four.” He added that “mobilization is a very different thing in today’s context.”132

Fitch’s comments carry the weight of experience and a detailed knowledge of Reserve issues because of his involvement in Land Force Reserve Restructure. According to him, even if Stage Four mobilization were needed at some point, “the requirement will be so different from the plan as to render any fixed plan useless.” The CF and the Government, he said, should not “waste time or money” on Stage Four mobilization except as an academic exercise. He suggested an annual academic competition that would generate ideas around the concept. On the politics of the issue, he said:

The mobilization plan in LFRR was a sop to the Honorary Colonels and Reserves 2000. The plan was produced, but it was only for the Army, not the Navy and the Air Force. And the government didn’t do one. So what was the value of that?133

The two surviving members of the SCRR, Belzile and Granatstein continue to hold the view that a mobilization plan is necessary. However, both feel it is the responsibility of the Government, and not the CF, to undertake such a plan. As Belzile stated, “We need a stage four plan. But we need to do it in the context of an overall government

129 Tabbernor interview.
130 Leslie interview.
131 LGen (Ret’d) George Macdonald. Interview with the author. September 8, 2010
132 Jeffery interview.
effort involving the federal, provincial, municipal governments and the private sector.”\textsuperscript{134} For Granatstein, having a mobilization plan is a “basic document of nationhood.”\textsuperscript{135}

Mass mobilization raises other important issues that must be considered. A discussion of mobilization, for instance, must take into account the nature of modern warfare. If we consider conflict as a continuum, the low end of the scale would involve fighting by irregulars – guerrilla groups, terrorists and freedom fighters primarily, but not always, using light weapons. Since the end of the Second World War, three quarters of the armed hostilities have entailed low intensity conflict. The causes of these disturbances vary. Some were civil wars involving ethnic, sectional, religious or racial differences, some involved border disputes and others were anti-colonial wars of national liberation. Other conflicts, such as Sierra Leone, simply involved crime on a massive scale for control of resources.

During the Cold War, the existence of a balance of nuclear terror meant that much of the competition between the US and the USSR was played out in surrogate or proxy wars involving low, medium and sometimes high intensity conflict. The Vietnam War and the Korean War directly involved the US and some of its allies. Both North Korea and North Vietnam received support from the Soviets. The various Arab-Israeli wars had the superpowers actively supporting the belligerents. Similarly, the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan had the US providing weapons and supplies to the Mujahedeen and, of course, there were smaller scale conflicts, such as those in Angola and Nicaragua, which saw behind the scenes involvement by both the Soviets and the Americans. Although some saw the Iran-Iraq war as a proxy affair, it is a less clear cut example than those cited above.

The post Second World War period has seen a broad range of wars fought for various reasons ranging from low to high intensity conflict from small guerilla wars involving light weapons to large conventional wars fought on the land, on the sea and in the air. Fortunately, the world has not seen the highest of high intensity conflict – nuclear war. The doctrine of “mutually assured destruction”, which was the basis of Cold War strategic thinking, preserved an uneasy peace for 45 years. It also meant that the only utility that nuclear weapons had was in their deterrent value. Should a nuclear conflagration occur at some point in the future, it is very doubtful that conventional military forces would have much operational value except, perhaps, for helping to maintain public order in whatever was left of the countries involved.

A cursory survey of the nature of modern warfare and the conflicts fought in the years since the Second World War reveals that, largely because of its very fortunate geo-strategic position, the Canadian Government has never really had to consider mass mobilization, either for its own defence or as part of its contributions to international peace and security. In all of the conventional wars that have been fought since the Second World War, the only one that required Canada to conduct a significant mobilization of national resources was the Korean War. But even it fell well short of the mass mobilization the Canadian Government implemented at the beginning of the Korean War. The implementation of mobilization in the years following 1939, it should also be noted, was also a very risky political proposition. It was far from smooth and relied more on good luck than good management.

As noted in the previous section on the strategic environment, predictions regarding a future security environment are always fraught with risk. In the post Second World War era, low intensity conflicts have been the norm. And, unfortunately, there has been no lack of larger conventional wars. Looking ahead, it is not difficult to conjure up a set of circumstances that would see a single state, or group of states, pose a threat to NATO or one of its members or a general threat to international peace and security. In this regard, it is probably worthwhile to review some possible threat scenarios.

\textsuperscript{134}LGen (Ret’d) Charles Belzile, Interview with the author. September 16, 2010.
\textsuperscript{135}J.L. Granatstein, Interview with the author. September 9, 2010.
At the forefront of international peace and security is the issue of nuclear non-proliferation. While there are currently three states that are a cause for major concern, the possibility of others being added to the list certainly exists. The potential involvement of non-state actors is also particularly troubling. An Iran capable of launching a ballistic missile aimed at Europe or Israel with a nuclear payload provides a significant basis for alarm. As a nuclear power, North Korea’s bellicose and unpredictable behaviour threatens the entire Korean peninsula and parts of East Asia. The possibility of a nuclear equipped Pakistan coming under the control of radical Islamist elements and threatening India is also a source of severe apprehension.

The prospect of a terrorist group obtaining access to a nuclear device is perhaps a worst case scenario – the results of which are almost too horrendous to contemplate. A nuclear incident or accident would certainly ratchet up international tensions in an unprecedented fashion. The CF and militaries around the world would likely move to a high alert status. However, viewed from the perspective of mobilization, it is extremely doubtful that any action would be taken in this regard that could not be accommodated within stages one to three of the mobilization framework. Probably the only scenario one could construct where mass mobilization might be contemplated would involve a belligerent state or group of states with no nuclear capability, but with enough economic power to finance, recruit, train, deploy and sustain modern military forces in sufficient numbers to engage in very large scale conventional warfare. The magnitude of this threat would have to be such that NATO could not rely on its current force levels. A scan of the strategic environment reveals that this remains a most unlikely possibility. Once again, even if such an event were to come to pass, it is reasonable to believe that it could also be accommodated within stages one to three of the mobilization framework.

Issues of technology and politics also have a direct bearing upon the likelihood of mass mobilization ever being implemented. Over the last fifteen years, technology has profoundly changed how armed conflict is conducted – not just in terms of hardware and software, but also organization. The Revolution in Military Affairs, Network Centric Warfare, C4ISR and Battle Command generally refer to a systems integrated approach to warfare (a system of systems). These information systems, combined with advanced weapons technology (drones, precision guided munitions and stealth capabilities), are intended to increase the lethality of forces, improve force protection and situational awareness, reduce collateral damage and friendly fire incidents, and generally control the tempo of warfare.

Today’s modern militaries have formidable capabilities when it comes to the application of force. Hence the change from the division to the brigade as the unit of action based upon firepower. While the contemporary brand of conventional warfare is less labour intensive, it is also more expensive and requires more highly trained combatants than at any other time in history. There will undoubtedly always be a need for infantry to occupy captured territory, the so-called “boots on the ground.” But the cost of technology, training and equipment – and the long lead times for procurement – generally militate against mass mobilization scenarios. If the past is any indication, the conflicts of the future will largely be “come as you are” wars that rely almost completely upon the forces in being – Regular and Reserve.

Unsurprisingly, given our history, there are also political issues with mass mobilization. Although the experience with conscription in Québec in the two world wars serve as a guide to the extent to which Canadians are prepared to mobilize in the face of an existential threat, there are other factors present today that make the likelihood of mass mobilization a politically risky move. The rise of the Internet, the connectedness of the individual citizen, the ubiquity of information and the inability of states to control public opinion, create a political climate in which the authority of public officials and so-called experts is constantly questioned. There are also legal issues. Given the equality provisions of the Charter, should women be conscripted as part of a mass mobilization scenario? While the presence of a serious existential threat, although unlikely, might prompt a government to consider mass mobilization, it is an open question whether it is something that would, given a range of political considerations, actually be implemented.
Canada's involvement in Afghanistan is a case in point. Despite the popular view a few years ago that the war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda was justified, increasing numbers of Canadian casualties and a frustration with the lack of apparent progress, have turned a large section of public opinion against continued participation. While it is very difficult to speculate on how Canadians might respond to future conflicts, it is reasonable to believe that the tolerance for long casualty lists is not high. The sentiment expressed by the famous line from Horace's Odes: “Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori”\(^{136}\) does not have the same resonance it did when the wars of the first half of the 20th century were fought. Mass mobilization almost invariably entails the possibility of mass casualties – a prospect that is anathema today to the public and politicians alike.

The only other scenario one could contemplate that might involve a higher level of mobilization would be a massive and cataclysmic natural disaster or series of natural or man-made calamities. The federal Department of Public Safety does domestic emergency planning for a range of catastrophic scenarios that involve responses from all levels of government, the private sector and non-governmental organizations. Certainly, more could be done to improve our national level of emergency preparedness. However, even if one were to speculate about mass casualty earthquakes on the West Coast, a pandemic, or a Hurricane Katrina type disaster, it remains difficult to envision a situation that would overwhelm all authorities – federal, provincial and municipal – and require a World War II level of mobilization.

Emergency planning to cover a range of possible threats is critical for any country and Canada does have plans in place. Still, every circumstance is different and requires unique and situation-specific responses that cannot be accounted for in grand plans regardless of how elaborate or detailed. Some thought and consideration must be given to even the most unlikely possibilities. This is why the 1994 White Paper states that it would be “prudent to have ready no-cost plans for total national mobilization.” In effect, the Chrétien Government was saying indirectly that so unlikely was the prospect of national mobilization that little if anything in the way of resources was going to be dedicated to that possibility. It is unlikely that the Harper Government would disagree with this position. Canada may indeed be faced with conflict and natural disasters in the future that may require some significant mobilization of national resources. Mass mobilization, however, is not a likely possibility.

While a larger scale of mobilization is something the Canadian Government should at least devote some thought to, the time has passed where mobilization should be considered one of the three fundamental roles of Canada’s Reserve Forces. The idea of mobilization feeds the dream of some in the Reserves community that maybe someday this country will re-live the glory days of the end of the Second World War when Canada could boast that it had two Army corps in the field and what John English described as “the best little Army in the world.”\(^{137}\) No one would wish to see the historic circumstances that produced that Army repeated. Thankfully, nothing on the strategic horizon indicates that we will re-live those dangerous and tumultuous days. Still, our security must be based upon planning for threats that may be as politically toxic as Nazism and, from a security perspective, equally, or even more lethal. But when all is said and done, we do not need industrial age defence planning for information age security challenges.

THE ROLES OF THE RESERVES – SOME SUGGESTIONS
FOR AN UPDATE

If full scale stage four mobilization is removed as one of the three principal roles of the Reserves, it is reasonable to ask whether the two other existing roles – augmentation and the footprint in the community – are also still valid. As well, if mobilization is taken away, is there a specific role that should replace it? If we follow the narrative within defence policy statements over the last fifty years and if we project ahead, augmentation was, is and will continue to be critical to the CF. The Total Force concept is very much a part of the underlying philosophy of the CF and has been in evidence during peacekeeping, peace-making and combat operations in

\(^{136}\) “It is sweet and fitting to die for one’s country.”

recent years. And, since “activation” has replaced “mobilization” in the terminology of force expansion, perhaps augmentation could be considered a catch all phrase to cover all likely force expansion scenarios ranging from stage one to stage three of the White Paper mobilization framework.

As we have seen, augmentation has been an essential element of the Afghanistan deployment and has resulted in significant numbers of Reserve Force service members attached to the Regular Force both at home and abroad.138 This has been the case for both Class B service in Canada and Class C service on foreign deployments. With the winding down of the Afghanistan operation in 2011, there will likely be a significant reduction in Class C contracts as the number of Reservists deployed is dramatically reduced. As Regular Force troops return home, the numbers of Class B Reservists who were performing duties on behalf of Regular Force members deployed will also be reduced.139 While it is hoped that the numbers of Class A Reservists will increase, this post-Afghanistan scenario could pose some problems. As Addy notes, “The change in the focus is going to affect [Reservists] profoundly. Many Reservists will go from deployment back to training. In my view, they will lose a lot of people. And there will be instability in the personnel complement because of this.”140

If we accept augmentation as a continued role, then we must ask: what sort of objectives do we wish to work toward in the longer term? Individual Army Reserve augmentees dropped into Regular Force units will no doubt continue. There will also likely be movement back and forth with Reservists transferring to the Regular Force and Regular Force members retiring and joining the Army Reserve. The larger question for the future will be to what extent augmentation for foreign deployments will be possible in terms of formed Reserve sub-units – sections, platoons and companies. Ideally, it would certainly be good for the Reserve at some point to have the capability to deploy and command front line sub-units with some degree of regularity. In the short run though, there may be problems with resources that will affect training and equipment.

Army Reserve sections or platoons currently deployed in Afghanistan seem to find themselves doing jobs that are non-front line roles, which are considered menial “defence and security tasks”. These include manning guard towers and front gates and filling clerk or technician roles such as issuing equipment. One Reservist cautions that:

Institutionalizing this process [of assigning menial security jobs to Reservists] by creating Reserve sub-units will amount to the wholesale sell off of these undesirable tasks. Of all of my friends who deployed in the last few years, about 40 or so, the ones who rate highest on job satisfaction were those working in Regular Force led units with front line tasks. Those with the lowest job satisfaction were those in Reserve led units doing routine security tasks. Not only are these jobs mundane and bad for morale, but it further reinforces the image of Reservists as second class soldiers.141

This particular Reservist suggests that, at least in the short term, more integration of Reservists into front line units is the way to address the problem. When he was part of TF (Task Force) 3-06, there were nine infantry platoons with a mix of Regulars and Reservists (85% and 15% respectively). There were also two Reserve platoons that tended to get stuck with “defence and security tasks” – one of which was gate security. As he explains: “Had the TF organized eleven infantry platoons based on a mixed Reg/Reserve structure, all eleven of the platoons could have rotated through all of these tasks. Spending three weeks in KAF on the gate, after two months at the front, would have been a very welcome change of pace.”142 This appears to be a view shared by many Reservists and one which (subject to levels of training) certainly seems to make sense.

139 See Appendix C, Army Reserve Programme, Directive from the Chief of Land Staff dated 19 October, 2010.
140 MGen (Ret'd) Clive Addy Interview by the author September 8, 2010.
141 Anonymous information provided by serving Army Reservist. See Appendix E.
142 Ibid.
Ultimately, the extent to which Reservists will be able to deploy in formed sub-units in the future will be contingent on the quality of training that can be provided to non-commissioned members (NCMs) and officers. As Jeffery explains, this is extremely important:

The principle is that Canada should never send troops into operations without meeting an essential level of training and capability and without ensuring that they have good quality leadership. Whether a Reservist can effectively command a unit or sub-unit depends upon their level of knowledge and experience. It also includes an assessment of whether the risks to the troops are acceptable.\footnote{Jeffery interview.}

Based upon the CF experience in Afghanistan, the ability to cultivate the leadership cadre among Reserve Force NCMs and officers is vital. Our military – both Regulars and the Reserve – now have more combat experience than at any time since the Korean War. It is important that all the lessons learned be transmitted to the next generation of soldiers.

The other existing role of the Reserve is to be the CF’s footprint in communities across Canada. There are just over a dozen major CF bases across Canada for the Army, Navy and Air Force. In contrast, there are approximately 130 Army Reserve units located in 110 cities and towns across Canada. This transnational presence in large and medium sized cities and small towns is very significant. In essence, it ensures that the Army Reserve in particular is part of the Canadian landscape, but there are other more specific reasons as well. These include societal ownership of the CF, demographic representation, recruitment and the institutionalization of local knowledge and local military support for civilian authorities in an emergency.

The first point – societal ownership of the military – is particularly salient. In a democracy, it is imperative that the military’s connection to its citizens remains strong. David Bercuson argues, “If an army [here one can extrapolate and say military] does not reflect the values and composition of the larger society that nurtures it, it invariably loses the support and allegiance of that society.”\footnote{David Bercuson, Significant Incident (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1996,) in Franklin C. Pinch and others, Challenge and Change in the Military: Gender and Diversity Issues (Winnipeg: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, Canadian Defence Academy, 2004) p. 198.} A military that is garrisoned in a few communities takes on a mercenary character and loses the broad contact it needs to develop solid links with the people it is intended to protect. Because of their ties to their local communities, Reservists are de facto ambassadors of the CF to the public. As Corinne Macdonald has observed:

They are a force for national unity and a reminder to local communities of the work of the Department of National Defence and the services it provides. It is through the Reserve Force that the CF can best participate in, and garner the support of, local communities. This link then makes it possible for the CF to maintain a presence throughout the country.\footnote{McDonald, p. 3.}

The manner in which Canada mourns its war dead also provides a link to communities. From the ramp ceremony at Kandahar Airfield to the “Highway of Heroes”, Canadians have come to know the faces and names and towns of those – Reserve and Regular – who have died in the service of their country. Regulars and Reservists often come from small towns or cities outside the main bases and large urban centres. When the body of a CF member is brought home, the community as a whole can identify with the loss of one of its own in the service of Canada.

From a representational standpoint, the Army Reserve also serves an important function. If all Canadians are going to feel a higher degree of ownership of their military, then that military must seek to reflect the constantly changing face of Canada. Historically, the Regular Army has not been a perfect mirror of the population. In a 2006 article entitled “Can the Canadian Forces Reflect Canadian Society?” Captain (N) Hans Jung notes that:
The recruitment pool for the CF traditionally has been fit young men between the ages of 17 and 24, coming from rural areas or from urban areas with a population of less than 100,000. Recruits generally have been white males with previous familial CF ties, possessing a high school education or less. Since the majority of MAs (Metropolitan Areas), which constitute the bulk of the Canadian population, are not the traditional recruitment bases for the CF, it is questionable whether the CF has ever been truly reflective of Canada, even if one were to leave the visible minority issue on the sidelines.146

The Canadian Forces Diversity Plan, formally called the Employment Equity Plan, was launched in 2006 with a view to making the CF more representative of the general population. As of 2009, visible minorities represented 3.5 percent of the CF, women accounted for 15 percent and 1.7 percent were Aboriginals. The Human Rights Commission established goals for the CF to increase those numbers (Visible Minorities – 9.1 per cent, Women – 19.5 per cent and Aboriginals – 2.8 per cent).147 Notably, in 2006 the Primary Reserve had almost double the number of visible minorities compared to the Regular Force. The former had 1,347, or 4.2%, of the total compared to 1,307, or 2.1%, of the Regular Force. In the same year, Statistics Canada reported that visible minorities constituted 12.6 % for the total Canadian work force. The Primary Reserve also had more women – 6,037, or 18.8%, of the total compared to 8,168, or 13%, of the Regular Force. Women accounted for 47.3% of the Canadian workforce. Only Aboriginal representation was higher in the Regular Force – 1,070, or 1.7%, of the total compared to 370, or 1.2%, of the Reserve.148

While there is much to be done to make the CF more representative of the people it protects, one can conclude that the Reserves are somewhat better than the Regular Force in reflecting Canada’s ethnic, racial and gender makeup. Jung’s research provides some interesting observations. For instance, it appears that visible minorities, especially from the South Asian and Chinese populations, would potentially be more attracted to the Reserves than the Regular Force. This has much to do with “human capital” issues related to education and the job market – and the fact that the Reserve is a part-time commitment. So, if we wish to expand the representation of visible minorities and women, the best platform to accomplish that objective is the Reserves.

There are some other considerations that affect both the Regulars and the Reserves that touch on recruitment and operational issues. As Jung points out:

Beyond the legal aspect of diversity, there is a practical reason to achieve diversity, and the incumbent Chief of the Defence Staff, General Rick Hillier, has highlighted this point on numerous occasions. Given the shrinking demographics of the traditional recruit base, it is imperative that the CF ‘tap into’ the increasing demographics of the various DGMs [Designated Group Members], not only to meet the expanding needs of the CF, but also to provide the diverse knowledge base for various cultures and languages as the CF continues to engage in its international commitments.149

General Hillier’s point about the need to have a wide base of linguistic and cultural knowledge within the CF is very important. Ideally, such a base should exist in both the Regulars and the Reserve Force. In the short term, however, the Reserves are probably the best place to foster this capability. The cadet movement also presents a great opportunity to build a more diverse CF since many observers feel that it is even more multicultural and multilingual than the Reserve – especially in the major metropolitan areas. So, diversity has more benefits than just simple demographic representation. The sooner the CF can accelerate the process of attracting more visible minorities, women and aboriginals into uniform, the better.

148 Jung. p. 3.
149 Jung. p. 2.
Another footprint issue relates to recruitment and renewal of the leadership cadre of the CF by having a
greater presence in Canadian universities. Until the late 1960s, the Army had the Canadian Officers Training
Corps (COTC) and the Navy and Air Force officer training programs that focused on the recruitment and summer
training of officer candidates. These ended in the 1960s and have not been replaced. The only other program is
the Regular Officer Training Plan (ROTP), which combines military and academic training to officer cadets who,
upon completion of their degree, are granted a commission and obliged to serve five years in the Regular Force.
Support appears to exist for more CF engagement with post-secondary institutions generally. According to Leslie,
the “COTC provided a good model and we need to look at that again – how much it would cost and how much
overhead would be involved. But we do need to re-introduce the military presence on campuses.”150 Granatstein
offers a similar opinion: “We need to bring back the COTC. Summer jobs would be one way of making this
happen.”151

The last two components of the “footprint” – the institutionalization of local knowledge and local Army
support for civilian authorities in an emergency – are closely related. Having detailed local knowledge at the
disposal of the CF is crucial when it comes to dealing with an emergency where the Forces are called in to
provide assistance. A Reserve unit in a particular area with personnel who combine corporate memory with
a web of connections and relationships and on the ground knowledge are essential ingredients in emergency
management, planning and organization. As Fitch explains:

The key to CF performance in domestic operations is the establishment and maintenance of trust
relationships with emergency partners. The Army Reserve is well-placed to do this. You can get around
and over just about every regulatory, technical or cultural issue with good trust relationships. You
need people who know each other over a longer term. Good connections between the local emergency
manager and the local Reserve commander are invaluable. The Reserve is there to build those trust
relationships.152

Fitch added that good solid liaison relationships exist at the operational level between the CF Land Force Areas
and the Joint Task Forces and provincial emergency planners. “This is rarely the case,” he notes, “at the tactical/
municipal level.”153 If anything, this situation speaks to the need for even greater emphasis on the Army Reserve
footprint role at the local level. In fact, if we follow Fitch’s line of thinking, the Reserve could serve as the
custodians of those trust relationships between the CF and local communities across Canada.

There are many examples of local knowledge being applied by local Reserve Force units or service members
to aid local authorities in civilian emergencies when the CF’s assistance has been requested. The most recent
case was support to the residents of Newfoundland and Labrador during Hurricane Igor, which struck the coast on
September 20, 2010. In early October, Defence Minister MacKay commended local Reservists and their civilian
employers for their contributions to Operation Lama. In all, 219 Reservists from Newfoundland and Labrador
were involved in the operation including personnel from 56 Engineer Squadron, the Royal Newfoundland
Regiment, 37 Service Battalion, 728 Communication Squadron, HMCS Cabot, 9 Wing Air Reserve Flight Torbay
and 9 Wing Air Reserve Flight Gander. As a DND press release noted:

The Reservists filled staff positions and performed route and site reconnaissance and assessment,
logistic and administrative support, communications, bridge construction and monitoring, assistance in
aid relief, access control, military transport, and site security.154

150 Leslie interview.
151 Granatstein interview.
152 Fitch interview.
153 MGen (Ret’d) Ed Fitch, Email to the author. December 6, 2010.
They were joined by 800 Regulars from Atlantic Canada as part of Joint Task Force Newfoundland and Labrador (JTF(NL)). The Minister also lauded the efforts of the Canadian Forces Liaison Council (CFLC). Local Reservists helping local residents when assistance is requested in a civilian emergency makes perfect organizational sense.

If augmentation and the community footprint remain as key roles for Canada’s Reserves, is/are there other roles that would be appropriate. It would also seem reasonable to base a new official role around tasks that the Reserves have been doing for years. A natural fit would perhaps involve various aspects of domestic operations under Canada Command. The mandate of this command is to provide a single point of contact for Canadian civil authorities seeking CF support, a single military command for domestic and continental operations and a focus on Canada as a single theatre of operations. Indeed, tasking the Reserves with domestic operational responsibilities under Canada Command has natural ties to the community linkage/footprint roles and the augmentation role.

The Army Reserve is certainly familiar with a domestic operations role. Disaster response is a case in point. For over a decade, they have responded to provincial requests for assistance and in doing so have solidified their connections to local communities. Virtually every major natural disaster that has affected Canadians in recent years – floods, forest fires, hurricanes, ice storms and tornadoes – have involved some component of the Reserve providing assistance. Indeed, the Reserve has also been significantly involved in other types of domestic operations ranging from Op Abacus (the Y2K operation noted above) to the Vancouver Olympics and the G-8 Summit.

Domestic operations can cover many areas. For instance, they can involve territorial defence, sovereignty protection, “Aid of the Civil Power” and all the responsibilities that flow from the National Defence Act, the Emergencies Act and other federal legislation. Recognizing this general heading of activities in a more formal way as one of the three established roles of the Reserves would highlight an important and practical public service that the Reserve Force provides. This would not in any way limit the role of the Regular Force in domestic operations. Depending upon the situation, the Regular Force could be tasked exclusively for a particular mission, in combination with the Reserve, or in support of the Reserve. Geography, availability, skill sets and timing would likely be determinants concerning the best available asset to utilize under the circumstances. Also, over the course of a mission the lead role may shift between the Reserves and the Regular Force.155

In the last dozen years, the Reserve Force has gained a solid reputation for disaster response and assisting provincial and municipal authorities, but this was not always the case. When the SCRR issued its first report in November 1995, they noted that:

We have heard repeatedly of instances where the Militia could have been used to assist civilian authorities, but unfortunately were not, as, for example, in fighting floods in Alberta in the spring of 1995. In British Columbia, where the possibility of national disasters such as earthquakes is present, the need was stressed to simplify procedures so as to have ready access to the Reserves in case such a disaster occurred.156

Some of the obstacles to better use of the Reserves were addressed following the SCRR report. The report also cautioned that “it is important not to repeat the errors of the past and to turn the Reserves into a mere instrument of relief for civilian authorities, who may look upon them as a source of cheap labour.”157 This is an important point and harks back to the “national survival” role of the Reserves in the late 1950s. The Reserve Force is, first and foremost, part of our defence forces, but they do bring a value added element to disaster response. As the CF recruiting ads proclaim, they can bring order to chaos. Fitch summed it up well: “The Reserve is disciplined. They can follow orders… They can be helpful by virtue of their training for war. But their primary role is still war fighting”.158

156 SCRR, DND, p. 21.
157 Ibid. p. 22.
158 Fitch interview.
The SCRR was certainly correct. The Reserve should never simply be seen as a backup for provincial or municipal authorities or as a source of cheap labour. The City of Toronto’s "snow emergency" in the winter of 1999 where almost 2000 Regular and Reserve Force service members were brought in to assist with snow removal is a case in point. In this instance, the issue of cost recovery when the CF is requested to provide assistance to provincial or municipal emergencies is not inconsequential and touches different aspects of the CF mandate. In a recent op-ed piece for the Ottawa Citizen entitled "Sending in the Army," Granatstein raises some important questions around the use of the Aid of the Civil Power provisions in the NDA. He asks "Should the provinces pay the costs? And where is Parliament in this equation?" Granatstein suggests that some of the NDA’s provisions need a careful review. Indeed, if the Reserve Force was called upon to perform a more expansive role in domestic operations, a careful review of the NDA, and some of the cost recovery issues, would definitely be advisable.

Granatstein’s view is supported by Fitch who notes that where cost recovery arrangements exist for the federal government to be reimbursed by provincial governments for the assistance provided by the CF, these funds are not returned to the DND budget, but are directed to the Consolidated Revenue Fund (CRF). As Fitch says, "A cost recovery structure is needed because CF assistance provided “free” will be over-used and abused. On the other hand, if CF assistance is perceived to be too expensive (to a province) then they will not call for help until it is too late." At the very least, it would seem reasonable that DND should at least be able to recover additional personnel and operating costs over and above what was provided for in its base budget.

The highest level of armed assistance provided to the provinces by the CF in support of domestic security is "Aid of the Civil Power." The NDA states that the CF “are liable to be called out for service in aid of the civil power in any case in which a riot or disturbance of the peace, beyond the powers of the civil authorities to suppress, prevent or deal with... occurs.” This provision is often confused with other types of assistance provided to other governments or public agencies. There are, for instance, sections in the NDA that provide for the authorization of the CF to perform any duty involving public service. As well, the NDA provides that, subject to any directions issued by the Governor in Council (normally the PM and Cabinet), the MND may issue directions authorizing the CF to provide assistance in respect of any law enforcement matter. This can be done if the MND considers the assistance is in the national interest and the matter cannot effectively be dealt with except with the assistance of the CF:

It is important not to confuse an “emergency” under the NDA with other definitions of “emergency” under other pieces of legislation. Under the NDA, “emergency” is strictly defined to mean an insurrection, riot, invasion, armed conflict or war, whether real or apprehended and Reserve Force service members are only liable to be called out on active service by reason of an emergency, for the defence of Canada; or in consequence of any action undertaken by Canada under the UN Charter, the NATO treaty, the NORAD agreement or similar instrument to which Canada is a party (see section 31 of the NDA). In all other call outs (i.e. not active service call outs) Reserve Force service members are not liable to serve unless they consent to do so (see Sections 33. (3) and 276 of the NDA). Obtaining that consent is not always practical nor is it reliable from a planning perspective on how to deal with time sensitive crises which Aid of the Civil Power normally present.

Relations between the CF, and more particularly the Army Reserve, and provincial governments were strengthened over the last decade. Jeffery recalls that during his tenure there were significant Army Reserve exercises involving disaster management. Solid relationships, he said, existed with provinces such as Québec and British Columbia. Across Canada, there appear to be strong ties between the area commanders and provincial officials involved in emergency management. And, of course, this involves both the Regulars and the

159 J.L. Granatstein, Sending in the Army, Ottawa Citizen, November 10, 2010.
161 Section 275, National Defence Act, RSC, 1985.
162 MGen (Ret’d) Jerry Pitzul, Email to the author, November 10, 2010.
Reserve. Tabbernor describes the relationship this way: “We are linked into the provincial emergency measures organizations pretty well... The who talks to who is all laid out. The links are there and the links are strong.” He notes that exercises are done “on a fairly regular basis.” Leslie supports that view: “The current arrangements are working well since the military sends planners to the provinces. But there could be improvements made and, as a matter of fact, we have a team working on that right now.” While current cooperation on emergency management between the CF and the provinces appears good, as noted above, improvements, particularly at the municipal level, could be made.

A good example of this cooperation was an exercise conducted in April 2010 by soldiers from the Territorial Battalion Group (TBG) Montreal. They deployed to Varennes in the Monterégie region of Québec to work with the Sureté de Québec, local police and fire departments, municipal and provincial public safety officials. The exercise involved various disaster scenarios where local officials had to call upon senior levels of government for assistance. In this particular instance, the TBG consisted of approximately 130 members from 71 Communications Group and some logistics elements. Specific activities included search and rescue, establishing a refugee camp, escorting convoys, controlling demonstrations and going door to door to reassure the local population. The Army Reserve also provided a back-up satellite communications system to assist local authorities. More of these types of exercises are required to ensure that, from one end of the country to the other, standard operating procedures exist for CF-provincial collaboration.

In recent years, the Army Reserve has also developed proficiency in areas such as CIMIC, Public Affairs, PSYOPs, Movement Control, Computer Incident Response and Geomatics. These skills have been utilized extensively on foreign deployments and much of this expertise can also be used to great effect in domestic operations. While they do not involve traditional war fighting skills, these modern capabilities are, according to Leslie, “war-winning enablers.” In addition to responses to natural disasters, the post 9/11 environment has made governments and citizens more aware of the need to plan for non-traditional threats. For the Army Reserve, this could mean providing assistance on “consequence management” for an assortment of public emergencies including possible pandemics (e.g. SARS), the use by terrorists of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and attacks on critical infrastructure. We know that these types of threats will demand higher levels of training among first and second responders and a higher degree of inter and intra-governmental cooperation. Certainly, the Army Reserve could make a positive contribution here.

Within domestic operations, there is another area where the Army Reserve could undertake an important task – cyber defence. Because this activity is relatively new, it does require some background to lay the foundation for discussion of how the Reserve might be involved. In recent years, defence against cyber attacks and cyber warfare have taken on new prominence as governments seek to grapple with the policy and technological implications of a real and serious threat. Our American and British allies and NATO have identified cyber defence as a priority and are taking significant measures to bolster their efforts in this regard. According to Hamadoun Touré, Secretary General of the United Nations International Telecommunications Union, “The next world war will likely happen in cyberspace.” In a networked world, the Cold War doctrine of “Mutually Assured Destruction” (MAD) may be overtaken by its cyber equivalent – “Mutually Assured Disruption” (MAD 2.0).

Recent incidents of the release of sensitive military and diplomatic communications by WikiLeaks indicate how vulnerable US government information systems are. To date, hundreds of thousands of documents that appear to have come from the US Secret Internet Protocol Router Network have been released. Is this a form of cyber warfare? To the extent that it damages US diplomatic, political and economic relations with other countries and to the extent it could possibly put the lives of US military, intelligence or diplomatic staff at risk, the answer is “yes”. While the recent WikiLeaks incidents are disturbing, most observers believe that this phenomenon is
really in its infancy and that anarchistic types of cyber attacks by “hacktivists” are on the rise. “Hacktivism,” says Wikipedia, “could be defined as ‘the nonviolent use of illegal or legally ambiguous digital tools in pursuit of political ends’. These tools include web site defacements, redirects, denial-of-service attacks, information theft, web site parodies, virtual sit-ins, virtual sabotage, and software development.”\(^\text{168}\)

Control of cyberspace was also played out in an incident recounted in a November 17, 2010 story in The Washington Post. According to a US-China Economic and Security Review Commission report, for about 20 minutes in April 2010, a state-owned Chinese telecommunications firm rerouted massive amounts of Internet traffic through Chinese servers before sending it on its way. Traffic to about fifteen percent of the world’s 300,000 Internet network routes was affected. Among the sites re-routed were those owned by the US Senate, the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Commerce and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, as well as commercial Web sites such as Dell, Yahoo!, Microsoft and IBM. The commission report warns, “Evidence related to the incident does not indicate whether it was deliberate, but computer security researchers have noted the capability could enable ‘severe malicious activities.’”\(^\text{169}\)

The cyber defence issue is being taken very seriously by our southern neighbour. Within US military doctrine cyber warfare has been formally recognized as a new domain of warfare. On May 21, 2010 United States Cyber Command was activated under the aegis of United States Strategic Command. As of October 31, 2010, it was fully operational. In the September/October 2010 issue of Foreign Affairs magazine, William J. Lynn III, US Deputy Secretary of Defense provided some context and perspective on the issue. He said information technology enables virtually everything US Forces do from logistics to global command and control, intelligence and remote operations. This information infrastructure is supported by 15,000 networks, seven million computers in hundreds of facilities in dozens of countries. He also noted that “cyber warfare is asymmetric” and added that:

A dozen determined computer programmers can, if they find a vulnerability to exploit, threaten the United States’ global logistics network, steal its operational plans, blind its intelligence capabilities, or hinder its ability to deliver weapons on target. Knowing this, many militaries are developing offensive capabilities in cyberspace, and more than 100 foreign intelligence organizations are trying to break into U.S. networks. Some governments already have the capacity to disrupt elements of the U.S. information infrastructure.\(^\text{170}\)

Lynn also drew attention to the risk of industrial espionage and the theft of commercial information. The amount of intellectual property “exfiltrated”, or stolen, on an annual basis from networks maintained by US businesses, educational institutions and government agencies is, according to Lynn, “many times larger than all the intellectual property contained in the Library of Congress.” From a strategic standpoint, he argues, the issue is critical because “As military strength ultimately depends upon economic vitality, sustained intellectual property losses could erode both the United States’ military effectiveness and its competitiveness in the global economy.”\(^\text{171}\)

The US is committed to working with its allies on cyber defence and believes that the Cold War doctrine of “shared warning” also applies to cyberspace. For their part, the British are taking substantial measures to counter the cyber threat. Their SDSR identifies cyber security as “one of the four Tier One risks to national security.”\(^\text{172}\) Like the Americans, the British also link national security to prosperity and warn that the threats over the last decade have increased exponentially. It also states that: “Over the decades ahead this trend is likely to continue to increase in scale and sophistication, with enormous implications for the nature of modern


\(^{169}\) Washington Post, Chinese Internet diversion was worrisome, report says; Ellen Nakashima, November 17, 2010.


\(^{171}\) Ibid. p. 100.

\(^{172}\) UK Strategic Defence and Security Review p.41.
conflict. As part of their strategy, the British are also creating a new organization, the UK Defence Cyber Operations Group and will be investing £650 million over the next four years on a National Cyber Security Program. The British also believe that, where there are threats, there are opportunities. They are interested in being able to leverage the knowledge and resources of the private sector and see British businesses benefitting from effective cyber security measures.

NATO’s Strategic Concept also devotes considerable attention to the issue of cyber attacks, which it says “are becoming more frequent, more organized and more costly in the damage they inflict on government administrations, businesses, economies and potentially also transportation and supply networks and other critical infrastructure.” Such attacks “can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability.” The culprits, it says, are foreign militaries, intelligence services, organized crime, terrorists and extremists. It pledges to:

develop further our ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyber-attacks, including by using the NATO planning process to enhance and coordinate national cyber-defence capabilities, bringing all NATO bodies under centralized cyber protection, and better integrating NATO cyber awareness, warning and response with member nations.

While the US is at the forefront of the cyber defence issue, as we can see from recent developments, NATO and other countries such as the UK and Australia are moving quickly to put cyber defence strategies in place.

Canada’s approach to the cyber threat was recently released by Public Safety Minister Vic Toews in October 2010. Entitled Canada’s Cyber Security Strategy: For a Stronger and More Prosperous Canada, it is based upon three pillars: securing government systems; partnering to secure vital cyber systems outside the federal government; and, helping Canadians to be secure online. Public Safety Canada has responsibility for implementation within a “whole of government” approach that involves a number of departments including the Communications Security Establishment, the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, the Treasury Board Secretariat, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada and, of course, the Department of National Defence. As the strategy document notes, DND and the CF will “strengthen their capacity to defend their own networks, will work with other Government departments to identify threats and possible responses, and will continue to exchange information about cyber best practices with allied militaries.” It adds that the department will also “work with allies to develop the policy and legal framework for military aspects of cyber security.”

Within the CF, the unit responsible for cyber defence is the Canadian Forces Network Operations Centre (CFNOC) whose intriguing mission motto is to “fight the networks”. Their mission is to support on-going CF Operations under CEFCOM and CANCOM and to “provide network situational awareness across all classification domains through the operation, management and defence of CF information systems and networks.” The mission of CFNOC can be divided into six separate mission components which are the unit level operational functions of which contain several operations. They include: National System Operations, Incident Management, Computer Network Defence, Security Operations, ITI Situational Awareness and Problem Management. The CFNOC works closely with the Canadian Forces School of Communications and Electronics (CFSCE) in Kingston. In fact, the CFSCE has developed a Computer Network Operations Training Development Program as an ongoing educational tool for personnel involved in cyber defence.

What could the Reserves do in cyber defence and is this a realistic task in support of Canada’s domestic cyber security? Part of the answer to that question lies in what the CF has already done. For instance, in November, 2009, the CF created the “21st Electronic Warfare Regiment”, which combined a Reserve unit, the 772nd Electronic Warfare Regiment, with a Regular Force unit, the 2nd Electronic Warfare Regiment. This was

173 Ibid, p. 5.
174 NATO, Strategic Concept, p. 5.
apparently only the second instance since the Second World War that a new regiment had been created. In effect, it would appear that the Reserves already have a modest role in the area. In October 2010, the CFSCE sponsored a cyber challenge based upon a similar exercise in the US. The intent was to bring people with a knowledge, aptitude or interest in cyber defence from outside the CF into the organization. Dubbed the 21st century version of the “Manhattan Project”, the US cyber defence exercise sought to attract 30,000 “ethical hackers” with the objective of recruiting 10,000 into Government. The CFSCE’s challenge was considerably smaller, but with similar objectives.

The benefits of having the Reserves involved in aspects of cyber defence are considerable. If the Reserve Force was able to attract a cadre of people with the knowledge, aptitude and interest in computers and cyber defence, those human resources and that capability would be a definite benefit to the CF, the Canadian Government and all Canadians. Cyber security involves not just governments, but individuals and the private sector. The Reserves could furnish part of the link between community and the government on cyber security. Reservists employed in the private sector could, for instance, bring knowledge gained through cyber security training back to their companies and also bring their problems, issues and challenges with private sector cyber security back to their Reserve units.

Reservists with the appropriate clearances and training could also provide instruction in the field on cyber security for soldiers on deployed operations or be involved as “ethical hackers” testing government or private sector cyber defences. There are many facets to the area of cyber defence and cyber warfare and much work remains to be done on many of the legal and policy implications. It is not too early to start thinking about how we are going to address this challenge. The Reserve Force presents one possible option among many in terms of Canada’s future cyber security needs.

As this section describes, there are numerous dimensions to domestic operations. The Reserve Force is already involved in many of these areas and has done solid work on behalf of Canadians. They are able to draw upon civilian skills that, when combined with military training, make them an invaluable, if under-utilized, asset. Given the complexities of domestic operations, some of which have been outlined here, the Reserves could, working with the Regular Force, be substantially and profitably more involved in other areas such as cyber defence. If we wish to ensure that the Reserve Force remains firmly rooted in communities across Canada and relevant as an institution, then we must ensure they have roles that Canadians can identify with and support. Many of our citizens have been affected by natural and man-made disasters. They understand the need to take steps to ensure that, when civilian authorities are incapable of addressing a problem, a well trained and equipped Reserve Force is there to provide assistance. Formal recognition of an array of tasks associated with domestic operations as a bona fide role would help ensure that our citizens understand that the Reserve Force is there to protect Canada and Canadians and to assist civilian authorities when required.

ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

It is ironic that in the development of the Militia and its relationship to its Regular Force counterpart, Militia supporters argued against the establishment of a permanent professional Army. In the post-Confederation period, “professional soldiers were considered layabouts, drunkards and wastrels… the unemployable who squandered the government’s money that might better be used to build post offices and wharves.” According to prevailing views at the time, Canada’s real defence rested with its citizenry – the Militia.176 Once a permanent professional force was created, the Militia bemoaned the fact that their resources were now being diverted to fund the Regulars and that the professionals were now doing all they could to limit the effectiveness and viability of the Militia. To this day, there remains an undercurrent of tension between the Regular and Reserve forces based upon institutional interests that often coincide, but sometimes diverge.

176 Granatstein, The Search for an Efficient, Effective Land Force Reserve, pp. 5-12, 5-6.
This historically antagonistic relationship may have been furthered by a particular element of the Canadian psyche; that is, its indifference to national defence except when confronted by an emergency. As LGen G.G. Simonds, one of Canada’s best war time generals, once observed:

Of all the traditions Canada has inherited in the military field, none is more persistent than public neglect of and indifference to national defence, until face to face with an emergency... when an emergency does come, the general public believes that the citizen recruited off the street can be turned into an effective fighting man at the wave of a wand. The public mind seems incapable of grasping the fact that the military business is a highly skilled profession.177

Transforming average citizens into combat ready soldiers is not an easy task. As noted above, it took three years of training during the Second World War before Canadian troops were ready to take on a battle hardened and well equipped German Army. If the challenge was significant then, it is exponentially even greater now in the context of modern warfare. To some, the very existence of the Army Reserve, and the concept of the “citizen-soldier”, is a challenge to the professionalism of the Regular Force because it implies that, subject to a physical examination, a security check and a few basic courses, just about anyone can be a soldier. Any infantry veteran of the Second World War or Korea or any soldier today – Regular or Reserve Force – who has served in the former Yugoslavia or Afghanistan will bear witness to the fact that soldiering is a lot more difficult than it appears. It is only natural then that a “we-them” mentality should arise between the Regular and the Reserve Force based on the presumed status of the former as professionals and the latter as amateurs. The divide exists for many reasons, but seems to widen when there is competition for the same scarce budget resources. As Granatstein noted almost a decade ago, “There are two mutually antithetical cultures at work here and there always have been, and the declining defence budgets of the last four decades have only exacerbated matters.”178

To better grasp these cultural issues within the CF, and more particularly the Army, it is important to understand the regimental system since it has a role to play in how Regulars and Reservists relate to their comrades and the larger whole. According to one writer, the idea of “the Regiment” in the Canadian context is not well understood. Writing a decade ago, Captain Michael O’Leary observed that the first exposure young recruits – officers and NCMs – get to the Army is through regimental training. This instruction provides a cultural basis for the new recruit and leads them to believe in the “sanctity and strength of the Regiment.” But there is little emphasis on its position within a greater whole. Often, he says, this training neglects the regiment’s position within the Army and the Army’s position within the CF. The new recruit loses sight of the fact that the regiment “is merely one of the many small building blocks that make up the Army.”179 Institutionally, the system militates against recruits having a broader understanding of where they fit in the larger picture.

As a vital part of military culture and organization, regiments are important tools for the purposes of socializing new recruits into the “warrior class” and for maintaining unit cohesion in times of war and peace. The depth of this indoctrination or socialization process is significant. As William C. Cockerham has observed, “Military organizations have their own norms, values, symbols, styles of dress, social structures, vocabularies, rituals and forms of socialization. They serve to induct and maintain individuals in a specific social world, a unique world oriented toward warfare.”180 Historian John Keegan has added an interesting perspective on the role of regiments, arguing that they exhibit “tribal” characteristics:

Regiments, I discovered, defined themselves above all by their individuality and it was their individuality which made them into the fighting organizations whose effectiveness in combat was proclaimed by the medals and crosses I saw all about me. My regimental friends – the ready friendship extended by

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177 This quote from LGen Simonds provided courtesy of LGen (Ret’d) Michael Jeffery. It was referenced as part of a CF presentation, but unfortunately no documented source is available.
178 Granatstein, p. 5.
warriors is one of their most endearing qualities – were brothers-in-arms; but they were brothers only up to a point. Regimental loyalty was the touchstone of their lives. A personal difference might be forgiven the next day. A slur on the regiment would never be forgotten, indeed would never be uttered, so deeply would such a thing touch the values of the tribe. Tribalism – that was what I had encountered.181

The extent to which Keegan’s observations on regiments apply to the militaries of the 21st century would make for interesting further research. As important as regiments are to both Regulars and Reservists, they are a means to an end and not an end in themselves. Over the course of our military history some soldiers and politicians have understood this better than others. Indeed, before, during and after the various wars Canada has fought, significant changes were made to the structure of the CF and the makeup of individual regiments in the name of mobilizing, prosecuting the war effort and demobilizing. A good example of this was the numbered battalions created at the outset of the First World War by the mercurial Defence Minister Sam Hughes. This decision, made for practical reasons related to the expeditionary nature of the CEF, distressed many Militia leaders. Making wholesale changes to regiments, and more particularly Militia regiments, has never been terribly popular – since change is almost invariably seen as negative, disrespectful and subversive of tradition. In some cases, it has also been seen as an attack on the regimental system itself.

In every era, there have been those who at times defend tradition at the expense of efficiency and vice-versa. Field Marshall Garnet Wolseley, who commanded the Red River Expedition in 1870, deployed in response to the Riel Rebellion, probably spoke for many a soldier – Regular and Militia – when he said: “Keep your hands off the regiment, ye iconoclastic civilian officials who meddle and muddle in Army matters.”182 At the end of the Victorian era, however, there were also those who, while understanding the value of regimental traditions, understood the place of the regiment in the larger scheme of things. As Col. Clifford Walton wrote in 1894, “Every trifle, every tag or ribbon that tradition may have associated with the former glories of a regiment should be retained, so long as its retention does not interfere with efficiency.”183 The regimental system, and to be more precise, individual regiments, cannot be treated as sacrosanct in an age of rapid change. When adjustments are required, institutions must adapt and regimental affiliation, while important, must sometimes give way to the dictates of economy and practicality.

How do individual soldiers adjust to changing regimental affiliations? According to Belzile, soldiers adapt. Citing his own experience around the time of the Korean War, he says that as a young officer he wore four different badges: the COTC (Canadian Officer Training Corps – no regimental designation), the Regina Rifles, the Queen’s Own Rifles and the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry. He had no qualms about being associated with various regiments. The regimental system needs to be preserved, he argues, but it also needs to be “flexible” and “practical.”184

We live in an age of transition. With the financial pressures currently faced by the government, and the possible re-structuring of the CF through “transformation”, it is likely there will be demands to alter the current structure of the Army Reserve at the brigade and unit/regimental level. Some units may be disbanded or re-roled, some new units created and some existing units bolstered with additional resources. While criticism can undoubtedly be expected, it is important to maintain perspective on the change process. As Doug Bland once stated, “Defence policy is not about nor should it be concerned with, preserving units, perpetuating units, services, traditions, and so on. National defence policy is about defending Canada.”185 Still, whenever change comes, as it inevitably will, it must be sensitive to tradition. But, it must also provide value for the taxpayer. Change, however, should not be automatically regarded as an attack on the regimental system. Again, a constructive perspective on this was advanced by Captain O’Leary:

182 As quoted in O’Leary, p. 13.
183 Ibid. p. 21.
184 Belzile interview.
185 As quoted in Granatstein, Search for an Efficient, Effective..., p. 9.
It’s time to define and establish a common understanding of the concept and role of the Regimental System in the Canadian Army of 2000 and beyond. We must be prepared to completely and honestly divest ourselves of any historically perceived aspects of the Regimental System which do not support current Army missions. Some things will remain, some may go, to many observers, the outward signs of our Regiments may never change. But it is time—it was once unthinkable not to carry Colours in combat, for they were the embodiment of the Regiment’s history and honour. The Regimental System got over that too.  

While structures may change, it is harder to change culture—especially when the institution involved has such a long and storied history. The “we-them” mentality of the Regulars and the Reserve Force is seen by some as a problem and by others as a perfectly natural and healthy dynamic. Former CDS General (Ret’d) Rick Hillier touched on the cultural divide in his recent memoirs. In 1979, Hillier was assigned the job of working closely with the Army Reserve as part of LFC Central Area in Petawawa. His impressions from this period are illuminating:

The Regular Army and the Reserves were different worlds… There was certainly a huge disparity and a large gap in the understanding between the Regulars and the Reserves. Although we all wore the same uniforms, neither side really trusted the other. At times we barely spoke to each other. The Regulars could be quite arrogant, looking down our noses at part-time soldiers, and the Reservists could be touchy and often had an inferiority complex.  

Like others, Hillier has come to the conclusion that the relationship has improved in the last fifteen years. While the Regular and Reserve Forces have competed for scarce resources, tight budgets have also meant that they have had to work together more closely in a relationship marked by compulsory interdependence. As he notes, “With the cuts to personnel and funding, the Regular Force needed the Reserve Force to accomplish all those missions and the Reservists needed the Regulars to really hone their skills so that they could be successful.” Hillier credits Jeffery with the improvements in Regular-Reserve relations: “Mike’s work was instrumental in bringing us together, and now the Army works together as one unit.” While the Army has made progress on this issue in recent years, and while the rapport between the Regulars and the Army Reserve has improved, the cultural gulf that separates the two components still needs attention if the relationship is to improve.

There is a consensus among senior officers that the Afghanistan experience in particular has contributed to a better working relationship between the Army Reserve and the Regular Force. There has not been this much sustained interaction between the two components of the Army since the Second World War. According to Jeffery, the Army Reserve is more capable and is acquitting itself well in combat. This has had a very beneficial effect on morale. As a consequence, he believes that the unity of the Army has improved, but it requires constant vigilance and sensitivity. “It’s like a marriage,” he notes, “The moment one partner takes the other for granted is the moment that problems start. It has to be worked at all the time.” However, he cautions, given the dominating impact of Afghanistan, it is important not to neglect the “care and nurturing of the relationship.” Jeffery raises an important point. Afghanistan has dominated the agenda of the CF in a way that can lead to the neglect of important issues such as Regular – Reserve relations.

186 O’Leary, p. 21.
188 Ibid. p. 69.
189 Ibid. p. 70.
190 Jeffery interview.
Praise for the performance of the Army Reserve in Afghanistan has come from many quarters including the senior command where it has been particularly effusive. As Leslie says:

To anyone who has soldiered with them in war, yes they are equal. They have undergone the same training and when they come off that ramp and set foot in Afghanistan, you can’t tell the Reservists from the Regulars. The Army could not have done what it did in Afghanistan without the Reserve. We would have crashed and burned. The country owes them a huge debt of gratitude.\(^{191}\)

Tabbernor expresses similar sentiments, but in a more solemn vein. “At the end of the day, when the ramp ceremony takes place, nobody asks if the person was a Regular or Reserve,” he says. Tabbernor goes on to note that there is today a better understanding of both sides in terms of what they do. Today’s Regular Army and the Reserve, he said, are better educated and more experienced in combat and other roles. He also points out that when the Army recently needed to find money, they went just about everywhere before they went to the Reserves looking for it.\(^{192}\) If anything, he believes this is evidence of the Regular Force’s sensitivity to the Reserves and a confirmation of the closing of the divide. Overall, he is optimistic about the direction of the relationship.\(^{193}\)

Notwithstanding the views of senior officers, there is another perspective that ought not to be ignored – that of the average Reservist who has served in Afghanistan and who has experienced the Regular-Reserve relationship first hand. While one might conclude that the relationship is better than it used to be, it remains far from perfect. It has been said that it is a soldier’s right to complain. Several Reservists interviewed for the purposes of this paper (and who did not wish to be identified) exercised that right and had much to say about the cultural divide. One Reservist said the condescending attitude of the Regulars to the Reserves “is deeply entrenched in military culture.” Another Reservist had a harsher assessment:

If a high ranking officer tells you that Reservists are treated as equals with Regular Force members, they are either lying, completely out of touch, or delusional. The stigma associated with Reservists working with the Reg Force is huge. Not only are the differences institutional, but cultural as well. Wearing a distinctive headdress such as a highlander balmoral or unit strange insignia immediately marks you as a second rate soldier. When I walk across the base in Petawawa, I’m keenly aware that my weird hat makes me a target for higher ranking members looking to ensure proper dress and deportment.\(^{194}\)

He added that when members of his unit arrived in Petawawa for work up training to deploy overseas they were “torqued” for weeks to “earn their place” as soldiers within their organizations. He also recalled that one Regular Force member laughed at him and said: “Ha ha, a 19 year old corporal? That’s ridiculous.”\(^{195}\) It would seem that Reservists attached to Regular Force units can expect a variety of comments from Regular Force members ranging from good natured ribbing to ridicule and disdain.

According to another, the cultural divide between Regular and Reserve Force members takes root at basic training. He explains that training for the Army Reserve is conducted over a protracted period of time (sometimes months long) often on alternating weekends. This fosters what he refers to as an “on the clock” attitude toward training where the approach taken is “it doesn’t matter how bad this gets; I’m going home on Sunday.” For the Regular Force, he says, it is a different matter. They undergo the rigours of a six to nine week long battle school training course that is physically and psychologically demanding. “This,” says the Reservist, “leads the Regular Force members to adopt an elitist attitude towards anyone else who did not endure the same hardships they did to reach the same goals.”\(^{196}\)

\(^{191}\) Leslie interview.  
\(^{192}\) Tabbernor interview.  
\(^{193}\) Ibid.  
\(^{194}\) Anonymous information provided by a serving Army Reservist. See Appendix E.  
\(^{195}\) Ibid.  
\(^{196}\) Ibid.
This same Reservist noted that inasmuch as there were cultural differences, they appeared to be manageable. As he reflected on one of his deployments, he said:

My particular experience with the Regular Force was actually quite positive. I never had a problem with the leadership of my Company about my being a Reservist, but there was always an underlying sense that several of the junior ranks felt a sense of superiority over Reservists serving in the same position. The only thing that ever kept our differences from becoming serious problems was that over time, most members of both Reserve and Regular Force realized that it didn’t matter where a soldier came from, as long as they could do the job in the end.197

Another Reservist framed the issue of the cultural divide somewhat differently:

Most Reservists who deploy with the Regular Force end up feeling like a rented piece of equipment which was sought out in time of need. You are never quite treated like something that is owned. Sometimes you overhear the user complain about the state of repair that you were issued in. While you are rented, you will likely be repaired or maintained to get you up to a workable standard. Then, when the job is done, you are returned to the rental depot without much care or concern for what happens afterward.198

This Reservist also explained that after returning from two deployments to Afghanistan, the welcome home left a lot to be desired. On both occasions, he and the other Reservists were dismissed from their units at the airport. As he said, there was:

No formal thank you, no job well done, thanks for coming out, no recognition of the fact that we weren’t going back to Petawawa with the rest of our unit. It was as if we were going home at the end of a work day, not saying goodbye to the team we had worked with for over a year. After filling a vital role we were let go without a second thought.199

But it was not all negative. He also said that “For everything from pay, admin, equipment, support services, medical/dental, my experiences, while tasked to the Regular Force, have been outstanding. My experience with the military outside of those deployments has been one of struggling for recognition.”

Insofar as there is a cultural divide between the Regulars and the Army Reserve, there also appears to be a generational divide between what could be described as the old school Reservists and the new. As Jeffery has noted, the old school tends to include many older veterans and the Honorary Colonels who make up the backbone of Reserves 2000. In his view, many do not trust the Regular Force as a result of re-organizations that have seen Reserve regiments disbanded and budgets slashed. They see the traditions of the Army Reserve and the concept of the citizen-soldier being undermined. On the other hand, says Jeffery, the new school consists of those currently serving in the Reserve, or recently retired. This group is proud of their accomplishments. They have considerable operational experience and have served in a variety of command and staff positions. They have also taken their share of casualties and very much feel they are a core part of the Army.

From a political standpoint, the old school and the new school approach Reserve issues from very different perspectives. The new school tends to concentrate on basic issues that are of immediate concern to serving Reservists. These issues include pay and benefits, medical care, post-deployment assistance, pensions, training, equipment, recruitment and retention. When asked about the current roles of the Reserves, there seems to be a consensus that augmentation ranks first and mobilization last. And this translates into a desire to have the

197 Ibid.
198 Ibid.
199 Ibid.
Reserve Force move closer to the Regular Force. As one Reservist noted, “I could see the Reserves being more integrated with the Regular Force in the future.” So more integration may be inevitable, but it is also arguably the best way forward. The old school does not disregard or neglect the basic issues facing the Army Reserve such as recruitment, training and health care. They do, however, tend to see these issues through a lens that focuses on the history and traditions of the Militia, mobilization and the concept of the citizen-soldier. As noted above, many in the old school feel that the senior command of the Regular Force lack an appreciation of the culture and history of the Militia which leads them to pursue policies which threaten the very foundations of the institution. Clearly, there appears to be a significant difference between how the old school and the new school articulate their grievances.

Some serving officers express frustration about fielding questions or attempting to address the concerns of the old school. For example, Tabbernor says:

Some of our friends outside the system are not doing us any favours. They don’t like the answers we are giving to the questions they are asking. They are well meaning, but they are a pain in the butt for those of us serving…Their hearts are in the right place (but) their heads just haven’t caught up.200

Acceptance of the proposition that there is an old school (quite vocal) and new school (serving and thus less vocal) within the Army Reserve community begs the question: “Who speaks for the Reserve?” While it is not the province of this paper to address that question, one thing is evident: the interests of the Reserves generally, and the Army Reserve in particular, would be better served if there was one voice concentrating on issues that were important to individual Reservists, their conditions of service and the overall health and future of the institution.

That there is a cultural divide between the Regular and Reserve forces is apparent and it is reasonable to ask if this is a problem that needs to be solved. Examined from a broader perspective within the CF, and indeed within all militaries, there are cultures and subcultures. All of the environmental commands – Army, Navy and Air Force – have different organizational cultures and within each of these commands subcultures can be said to exist. If the reader is prepared to excuse a terrible pun, submariners have their own distinct subculture within the Navy as do fighter pilots in the Air Force. Some of this is perfectly natural and speaks to the need to foster a team spirit that is normal and natural. However, in the absence of leadership, the subcultures can take on a destructive character that places misguided loyalty to the particular unit above loyalty to the CF as a whole. The disastrous behaviour of some members of the former Airborne Regiment in Somalia comes to mind. The CF has given every indication that it has learned that lesson – albeit the hard way.

It is the role of military leadership to ensure that the cultural issues and “tribal differences” do not affect the well-being of the institution of the CF or, in the case of Regular-Reserve Force relations, the Army. In recent years, both the Regulars and the Army Reserve have been highly dependent each upon the other to get the mission done. Regular-Reserve relations have certainly improved. One of the goals of our military leadership must be to ensure that there are no setbacks and that the relationship continues to get stronger. Will the “we-them” mentality ever completely disappear? The answer is probably not. Indeed, it would run counter to human nature if it did. Assigning clear roles to the Reserve (with the appropriate training) should be one of the priorities of the CF and the Government of Canada. From the most junior ranks to the most senior, both the Regular and Reserve Force must understand that each of its members brings something to the profession of arms that the other cannot do without and which is indispensable to accomplishing the overall mission of the CF.

200 Tabbernor interview.
SUPPORT

I would appeal particularly to employers to put up with what, after all, is more or less the minor inconvenience, of supporting those representatives of firms who are prepared to give their time to Reserve Force training. Without the support of employers, if an officer or man, because he serves in the Reserve Forces is handicapped in his day-to-day job and the means by which he wins his bread, then we cannot expect to build up the Reserve Forces in the form in which they have to be, and it depends on the willing co-operation of employers in playing their part in making certain that no man who works for them suffers by virtue of the fact that he is giving service to the Reserve Army.201

The issue of employer support for Reservists has been around for some time and needs to be addressed. Reserve Force members not on active service have obligations to their families, themselves, their employers and to the nation at large. If we accept this and look to Reservists in times of need, what should the nation's obligations be in return? A Reservist trains so that he or she can one day be deployed in the service of their community or country. This is their fundamental raison d'être as part time soldiers. They can perform their duties if they have adequate support while they are away and job protection when they return home. This raises two questions: 1) how do we as a nation provide for that security? and 2) how should the costs be shared? An employer confronted with losing a valued employee for an extended period and having to hire someone else for the interim may well decline a request for leave or simply refuse to hire Reservists. This does not serve the national interest. If the employer grants leave, why should he or she personally bear the total costs of the decision?

If we want our Reserve Force to function, then we must rethink how we support it as a society. Job protection legislation may well need to be complemented by employer protection. While we have various degrees of job protection in place at the national and provincial levels, there is an overall lack of consistency. Job protection programs vary among the provinces and between the provinces and the federal government. And in terms of measures to protect employers, there simply are none.

The basic principle that needs to inform our approach to Reserve Force civilian job protection is that Reservists should never be put in a position of having to make a choice between service to their country and their livelihood. Once they volunteer for deployment, they should be fully confident that, upon return, their job or its equivalent will be there for them. If, as Leslie argues, we could not do without them, then we need to ensure that they remain with us.

The UK and Australia have employer support programs along with job protection legislation. The United States has only job protection legislation relying on the patriotic spirit of the employer to help in the support of Reservists. In the UK, a system of financial assistance to employers has been in place since 1997. “Companies can, without financial limits, claim one-off costs, such as recruiting agency fees for replacement and advertising costs.” Recurring expenses “such as the overtime costs of other employees and temporary replacement fees can be claimed up to £125 per day per lost employee.” Companies may also be reimbursed for “additional training costs, above and beyond what is normally required in relation to the activation period” when a Reservist returns. These claims have no set limits. The UK has three compensation packages: “one to assist employers with the hiring costs of finding a new employee; a second to cover overtime costs as a consequence of the employee’s absence; and a third to compensate employers for any retraining necessary upon the Reservist’s return.”202

One of the advantages of the UK program is that it tries to link benefits to actual costs. However, the disadvantage is that trying “to tailor the size of benefits to costs, isolating the total costs in terms of lost output, productivity and additional expenses from the loss of an individual employee is a nearly impossible task.” A further problem with the package is that trying to determine such costs places a significant burden on both the administrative body and the employer, and may encourage fraudulent claims.203

201 Gen Guy G. Simonds, Speech to the Empire Club, February 14, 1952.
203 Ibid. p.7
The Australians have had a system of employer support in place since 2001 where the application and approval process is relatively easy because it does not place significant information demands on employers. However, the level of compensation is the same for all employers, irrespective of the actual costs incurred. “Employer assistance is awarded at the average weekly full-time adult, ordinary-time earnings as determined by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. Employers who claim that the weekly levels of payments are insufficient may apply for more.” This “tends to make the compensation unrelated to firm-specific factors,” thereby leaving it less equitable overall than the British model.204

A study by the C.D. Howe Institute offers a compromise between the British and Australian models. Author Colin Busby suggests that any Canadian compensation program should be “administered by the Department of National Defence so it can reflect informed military personnel choices.” Compensation should be available to both public and private sector employees and they should be able to use the money as they see fit. The amount of compensation itself would be based on compensation levels obtained from employer payroll data. It is assumed “that a Reservist’s wage is a reasonable estimate of disruption costs; i.e. a high salary implies high productivity and thus high disruption costs.” If an employee has not worked a full year prior to the end of the tax year, then earnings could be prorated, thereby covering full and part-time employees.

Under the Institute’s scheme, more support would be extended to smaller firms that are less able to easily absorb employee losses. Compensation would be based on an employee’s tax return and the size of the firm. Thus, a firm with more than 100 employees would be entitled to 40% of the employee’s annual salary. Those between 20 to 99 employees could claim 50% and those with 10 to 19 could claim 60%. Small companies with 5 to 9 employees would be entitled to 70% and even smaller businesses of 1 to 5 employees would be entitled to 80% with an annual ceiling set at the yearly maximum pensionable earnings of $47,200. A special hardship exemption could also be claimed.205

To qualify, an employee would have to be either on Class B or C service for more than 30 days and claims would have to be submitted within a fixed period. A reasonable time frame would be within six months of the employee’s new military service. It would be incumbent upon the employee to inform the employer of the program and to provide reasonable notice of a potential deployment to enable the employer to make relevant adjustments. Four weeks’ notice would seem to be reasonable. Benefits would be paid for a maximum of 16 months, including both pre deployment training obligations and post deployment transition back to Canada. A further benefit would be available to allow for claims in the case of injury or illness as a result of service.206

In establishing this type of support program, the challenge is to set qualification rules that will be compatible with the “myriad of standards under federal and provincial job protection laws.” One solution, suggested by Busby, is to “set national qualification criteria that roughly correspond to the minimum requirements of the least stringent provincial or federal legislation.” An additional advantage of this system is that it would allow an employer to receive compensation even in a case where the employee is not covered by job protection legislation – as long as the employer grants the necessary leave of absence and agrees to reinstate the employee on completion of his or her tour.207 Cost estimates for 2009 put the price of the program at $19 million. Projections suggest that annual costs would be approximately $26 million for 2010 and about $8 million for 2011.208

If the C.D. Howe estimates are correct or even reasonably close, such a program would be easily affordable within the DND budget. Indeed, the adoption of such a program would do much to support both Reservists and their employers. As a general principle, companies like to hire Reservists because of their work ethic, discipline and the particular skills they bring with them. Currently, however, the employer bears a significant portion of personnel costs when it comes to a Reservist’s deployment. While DND benefits from this arrangement, it is

204 Ibid.
205 Ibid. p. 8-9.
206 Ibid. p. 9.
207 Ibid.
208 Ibid. p. 10.
inequitable and does not help in ensuring good relations between the Reserve Force member and their employer. A program of support, as outlined in the C.D. Howe study, is long overdue. The responsibility is a broad societal one and the costs should not be borne by any one sector or element.

**CONCLUSION**

Many western governments, Canada’s included, are facing a period of restraint as they struggle to recover from the recession against a backdrop of large deficits and debt. Defence spending is squeezed and military transformation exercises seem to be as much about restructuring as they are about dealing with austerity measures. Our closest allies, the Americans, the British and the Australians are all facing similar challenges. The 2010-11 Federal Budget has undercut the defence spending projections outlined in the CFDS. And Canada, regrettably, continues to lag far behind our NATO allies in defence expenditures as a percentage of GDP. At 1.3 percent of GDP, significant new investments would be required to get us to the recommended NATO target of two percent.

The CF has been through much in the last decade. Not since the Korean War have Canadian troops seen so much combat. By all accounts, our men and women in uniform – Regular and Reserve Force – have acquitted themselves extremely well. There have been many lessons learned and it is likely there will be significant adjustments in everything from doctrine and battlefield tactics to equipment and personnel support programs. As the Canadian Government brings our combat troops home from Afghanistan and replaces them with trainers, the time is right to reflect upon what we as a country want our military to be able to do in the years ahead. If we are serious about the Reserve Force and if we are truly thankful for the contributions they have made, we will ensure that in a period of fiscal restraint their needs and issues are not shoved aside.

One of the principal areas of focus of this paper has been the issue of mobilization and the established roles of the Reserve Force. A review of the history of the Army Reserve (Militia) helps to illustrate both the organizational culture of the Reserve and the role mobilization played in the past. A survey of the strategic environment suggests the types of threats Canada might be facing in the future. Taking into account where we have been and what we are likely to encounter in the years ahead, it seems evident that a re-appraisal of the roles of the Reserve Force is required. This paper suggests that a range of tasks associated with domestic operations be adopted as a designated role replacing mobilization. Attention should also be devoted to involving the Reserves in relatively new areas such as cyber defence as one portion of the Government’s overall cyber security strategy.

Like the Regular Forces, the Reserves have seen some improvements over the last ten years, but there are still problems. Immediate action must be taken to fix the pay system. Although recruiting seems to have improved, many still find it slow and inefficient. More attention must also be paid to medical care for the Reservists and the training and equipment issues are still a source of irritation. Better administrative support for Reserve units would address many problems that cause continuing frustration. Working to ensure the Reserve Force reflects the changing face of Canada and that the CF establish a stronger presence on university and community college campuses should also be among DND’s priorities. Finally, the government would be strongly advised to take action on the issue of civilian job protection for Reservists and support for employers of Reservists. Those who serve their country as part-time soldiers, and those who employ them, should not be financially penalized for service that benefits all Canadians.

The objective of this paper was to provide the reader with a status report on the Army Reserve and to stimulate discussion around some of the larger issues facing the institution. It is by no means an exhaustive study and makes no such claim. Further examination and analysis of Canada’s Reserve Force is required. But ideally, such an examination should be part of a larger Defence White Paper, possibly in conjunction with an overall review of diplomacy, defence and development assistance. With the Afghanistan mission slowly winding down, there is a need to recalibrate our foreign and defence policy to reflect the changes that have occurred in
the strategic environment almost a decade after 9/11. Our principal allies recognize the value of such reviews and undertake them on a regular basis. The Americans conduct a defence review every four years, the British every five. In Canada, Conservative and Liberal governments alike tend to take a more lackadaisical approach to defence and foreign policy. But such reviews are important from a public policy standpoint. They stimulate public debate, help explain and define our foreign policy objectives and help determine the type of military we will need in the future.

In the absence of a major review of foreign and defence policy, the next best option would be a stand-alone study of the Reserve Force. This could be accomplished either through a Special Commission similar to the SCRR, the Defence Committee of the House of Commons or a Special Joint Committee of the House and Senate. In the latter two cases, parliamentarians would bring a special legitimacy to the process that cannot be replicated by a policy paper such as this. The House of Commons Defence Committee’s October 1998 study, Moving Forward: A Strategic Plan for Quality of Life Improvements in the Canadian Forces, could serve as a template for a study of the Reserves. The committee hearings, which were held at CF bases across Canada, allowed serving members of the Forces to voice their grievances outside of the chain of command. It resulted in 89 recommendations dealing with issues of pay, family support, housing and the care of the injured. Virtually all of the recommendations were implemented by DND and the CF. Either a special commission or a parliamentary committee would be a good starting point from which to launch a process of reform.

The Army Reserve has developed over a long period and will continue to evolve. As an institution, it has matured to the point where it has proven itself to be an essential part of Land Force Command. It sounds trite to say that the Regular Force needs the Reserve Force and vice versa – but that is the truth. Both components of the CF are indispensable to the pursuit of Canada’s national and strategic interests. The Reserve Force also needs to be understood as a core component of the CF – one essential to the safety and security of Canadians. Under sometimes adverse and austere conditions, they have steadily built their reputation and have garnered the respect of many in the Regular Force and the public at large.

In his book, Canada’s Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace, Granatstein makes what he calls “an extended argument for military professionalism.”209 This paper supports that view completely. The challenge for the Reserve Force is threefold. First, it needs relevant and updated roles. The pipe dream of mass mobilization must be put aside. Second, it needs more training and professionalism to allow it to better integrate with the Regular Army. Third, it requires the resources to execute the missions we assign it. Finally, it is time to put to rest the idea that Canada has two armies consisting of “forces in being” and “forces in waiting.” Our military leadership must also work to ease the tensions that flow from two very different organizational cultures. Fifty years ago, Jean Larteguy reflected on similar tensions that existed between conservative and progressive elements in the French Army during the Algerian War of Independence. He wrote:

I’d like France to have two armies; one for display, with lovely guns, tanks, little soldiers, fanfares, staffs, distinguished and doddering generals, and dear little regimental officers who would be deeply concerned over their general’s bowel movements or their colonel’s piles; an army that would be shown for a modest fee on every fairground in the country.

The other would be the real one, composed entirely of young enthusiasts in camouflage battledress, who would not be put on display, but from whom all sorts of impossible efforts would be demanded and to whom all sorts of tricks would be taught. That’s the army in which I should like to fight.210

Canada must have one Army consisting of a Regular and a Reserve Force. These soldiers must know their roles, be well trained, well equipped and respectful of the other’s contributions to the profession of arms. That is the Army we need to defend Canada’s interests now and in the future.

209 J.L. Granatstein, Canada’s Army, p. xi.
RECOMMENDATIONS

(In the absence of a positive response to Recommendation One, other actions should be taken independently by the DND/CF and the Government of Canada.)

1. That the Government of Canada undertake a comprehensive study of the Army Reserve either through a Special Commission or through the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence to review: a) the roles of the Reserve, b) budget allocations to the Reserve, c) administrative and other problems relating to recruitment, pay, training and equipment, d) the results of the CF “transformation” exercise as they affect the Reserve, e) “cultural” issues between the Reserve and the Regular Force, and e) any other matter the Commission/Committee deems appropriate for the effective and efficient functioning of the Reserve;

2. That the DND/CF undertake an internal study of the roles of the Reserve;

3. That the DND/CF take action to address problems in the recruiting and pay systems;

4. That the DND/CF take action to improve the recruitment of women, visible minorities and aboriginals;

5. That the follow-up report from the Ombudsman’s office entitled “Reserved Care: An Investigation into the Treatment of Injured Reservists” be completed as soon as possible and that a plan be developed to assist Reservists who experience Post Traumatic Stress Disorder after they leave the CF;

6. That DND/CF study and consider the establishment of the Office of the Inspector General to investigate complaints and conduct investigations related to effectiveness and efficiency with the department and the CF;

7. That the Government of Canada re-examine the four stage mobilization/activation framework contained in the 1994 White Paper to ensure that it reflects current needs and is consistent with the Government’s overall plan for emergency planning and preparedness and take whatever follow on action is required;

8. That the DND/CF take action to expand its presence on university campuses and consider new recruiting programming similar to the Canadian Officer Training Program;

9. That the DND/CF examine the National Defence Act with a view to identifying possible amendments to the Act that would be required for the Reserve to play a more substantive role in domestic operations;

10. That the DND/CF continue to strengthen its relationship with provincial emergency management officials to ensure that all the necessary protocols and arrangements are in place to expedite CF assistance during emergencies;

11. That the DND/CF investigate a possible role for the Reserve in the area of cyber defence and security in support of the CF Network Operations Centre and the Government’s overall Cyber Security Strategy;

12. That the Government of Canada and the DND/CF take action to implement a program of job protection and employer support for Canada’s Reservists based upon recent proposals by the C.D. Howe Institute.
APPENDIX ‘A’

CANADIAN FORCES RESPONSE TO LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT REQUEST FOR INFORMATION – CF PERSONNEL

1. The aim of this document is to provide a response to questions posed by the Library of Parliament. Each of the four questions posed are addressed separately below.

Q1. Would it be possible to get the number of reservists year by year who have deployed on operations since 2000?

Q2. Would we be able to get this as a percentage of total deployments broken down by year since 2000?

2. The information presented in Table 1 (below) provides the answer to Q1 and Q2, outlining both the number of Reserve deployments and the percentage of total deployments by year. The unit of measure counted was ‘deployments’. So, for example, if one Reservist deployed twice during a calendar year, the table would reflect two deployments. Further, a deployment that began in one year and continued in the next, would be reflected in both calendar years. Note also that deployments vary in duration from a few days to many months.

Table 1. Reservist Deployments on Operations – As a Percentage % of Total Deployments

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Year</th>
<th># of Reservist Deployments</th>
<th>Total # Deployments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>5,465</td>
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<td>2001</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010*</td>
<td>3,631</td>
<td>17,636</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*To date.

3. The information reflects numerous operations of varying sizes, many of which saw multiple rotations of personnel, and a number of which the CF is no longer engaged in. It must also be noted that a few years ago an improved system for managing operational taskings was introduced. Information from the last few years is considered reliable. Prior to that time, however, there is likely some data on operational deployments that has not been captured. Accordingly, and for the reasons outlined above, caution should be exercised in interpreting this data, both over time and with respect to total numbers of deployments.

Q3. Would we be able to get the number of Class A and Class B reservists in the land force in 2009?

4. For the purposes of this response, the ‘land force’ is defined as the Chief of the Land Staff and its subordinate formations and organizations. Please see the enclosed handout entitled Canadian Forces (CF) Personnel Requests for Information (RFIs) – Context and Complexity for information on the variety of ways that one can categorize personnel as ‘land force’ or ‘Army’.

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5. Personnel strength statistics are dynamic and are generally provided as of a specific date. People enter the organization (enrol) and leave (release and retirement) throughout the year. There may, therefore, be differing numbers of Class A and Class B Reservists over the course of a year. Providing the number of all who served at some point during the year, even if they had already left, would inflate that statistic; therefore, and in order to avoid this inflation, the information provided here is a ‘snapshot’ of the personnel strength as of 31 March 2009:

*The number of Class A and Class B Reservists in the Chief of the Land Staff formations and units on 31 March 2009 was: Class A – 17,903 and Class B – 3,609.*

Q4. And the percentage that class A and B reservists have made up of land force personnel since 1990?

6. Due to differing databases and improved, but different, information management systems, information prior to 2008 is unreliable and difficult to readily obtain, requiring archival searches in addition to substantial cross-checking across systems; therefore, reliable information from the past three years only is provided.

*Class A and B Reservists combined have represented 46%, 44% and 44% of the total Chief of the Land Staff Regular and Reserve personnel for 2008, 2009 and 2010 respectively (as of 31 Mar on each of those years). Further details are provided in Table 2, below.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class A and B Reservists as a Percentage of Total CLS Personnel</th>
<th>Total Regular and Reserve Personnel in CLS 1</th>
<th>Reservists on Class A Service</th>
<th>Reservists on Class B Service</th>
<th>Reservists on Class A and Class B Service 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage of CLS Total</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage of CLS Total</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>45,490</td>
<td>17,095</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>3,630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>48,919</td>
<td>17,903</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>3,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>50,739</td>
<td>17,852</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>4,514</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. As a final point regarding this response, it must be noted that the Reservists employed on Operations (who are on Class C service and come from many force generators other than CLS (Q1 and Q2) and the Reservists employed on Class A and B within CLS (Q3 and Q4)) are two distinct groups. No attempt should be made to relate this information across these two separate data sets.

Enclosure: CF Personnel Requests for Information (RFIs) – Context and Complexity
CANADIAN FORCES (CF) PERSONNEL REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION (RFIs) - CONTEXT AND COMPLEXITY

1. The aim of this document is to provide contextual information on the organizational structure and complexity of the Canadian Forces, in order to inform the understanding of personnel statistics and allay possible confusion due to that complexity and/or to terminology. The CF often receives Requests for Information (RFIs) posing questions in the form of ‘How many Army personnel…?’ or ‘How many Navy personnel…?’ In order to provide the correct answer, it is necessary to understand what the requestor means by ‘Navy’, ‘Air Force’, or ‘Army’; in effect, to ascertain the true intent of the requestor’s research question.

2. There are just over 100 occupations, or trades, in the Canadian Forces. Of these, there are 22 occupations that are Navy (e.g., Boatswain), 25 that are Air Force (e.g., Aeronautical Engineer), 20 that are Army (e.g., Infantryman), and 35 support occupations (e.g., Cook, Legal Officer). Personnel in most support occupations are assigned a Navy, Air Force, or Army uniform in numbers roughly proportional to the size of the three environments. One way, therefore, of conceptualizing ‘Navy’, ‘Air Force’, ‘Army’, ‘land force’ or similar adjectives for personnel is based on their occupation and/or the ‘colour’ of their Distinctive Environmental Uniform (DEU); the latter is known as the ‘element’ to which they are assigned. So, one can designate personnel as Navy, Air Force, or Navy by either their occupation or their element.

3. Prior to 1968, there were three distinct services; the Royal Canadian Navy, the Royal Canadian Air Force and the Canadian Army. Unification of the three services and the establishment of National Defence Headquarters blurred the previously distinct lines between the three services. There is now a Canadian Forces, and Army, Navy and Air Force do not exist as entities within the CF. In 2010, post-service unification and post-transformation, there are 23 ‘Level 1’, or ADM-level, organizations, many of which also have concurrent command responsibilities over subordinate formations, units and schools throughout the country. Personnel who are Navy, Air Force or Army by virtue of their occupation and/or their element serve throughout most of the Level 1 organizations. There are, for example, Army or land force personnel (by occupation and/or element) serving in the Navy (Chief of the Maritime Staff formations and units) and vice versa.

4. Three of the Level 1s are called the Environmental Commands (ECs) or the Environmental Chiefs of Staff (ECSs). They are the Chief of the Maritime Staff (CMS), the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) and the Chief of the Land Staff (CLS) and are sometimes referred to as the Navy, the Air Force and the Army respectively. Each of these is a force generator of capabilities and personnel for operations. So, for example, CLS generates personnel to deploy to Afghanistan. Some of those personnel may be in Navy or Air Force occupations, or in support occupations and wearing a Navy or Air Force uniform, even though they are generated for deployment by the Army (CLS). Another way of designating personnel is thus based on which Environmental Command they are currently posted to.

5. There are four operational commands: Canadian Expeditionary Force Command, Canada Command, Canadian Operational Support Command and Canadian Special Operations Forces Command. Each of these can be a force employer for operations and can sometimes also be force generators. The organizational structure for a given mission will be based on the capabilities required and could, therefore, include units or sub-units that are essentially Navy, Air Force or Army: e.g., a frigate, a helicopter squadron or a battle group. So yet another way of describing personnel could be based on the deployed unit that they currently belong to.

6. So what, then, is meant by ‘Navy’ or ‘Army’? With the organizational and occupational structure, as well as the deployed unit issues outlined above, the answer is ‘It depends.’ An example serves to illustrate this point. Someone may ask, “How many Air Force personnel are in Afghanistan?” Does the requestor actually want to know ‘How many personnel were force generated by (provided by) the Chief of the Air Staff, regardless of what colour uniform they wear?” Does the question ask “How many people in Air Force uniforms are in Afghanistan, regardless of which L1 organization force generated them?” Perhaps it means, “How many personnel are serving as part of the Air Wing in Afghanistan?”
7. As outlined above, there are a variety of ways to categorize personnel as Navy, Air Force or Army. The answer to 'how many' will differ depending on which definition is meant. Providing responses to requests for information about Navy, Air Force or Army personnel, therefore, invariably requires specification of what is meant by the term; indeed, specifying what is meant by the term effectively outlines what has, and has not, been included in the data or tally provided. It should be noted that requests for information about Canadian Forces personnel, vice 'Navy' or 'Army' will result in a more comprehensive response.

8. In order to provide the most accurate data possible, if a requestor does not specify what he or she intends by a term such as 'Navy' when querying numbers of personnel, the response provided will stipulate which definition was used in obtaining the reported data. The definition chosen will be the one deemed most likely to conform to the requestor's intent based on the wording of the question.
APPENDIX ‘B’

LIST OF LFC REGULAR AND RESERVE UNITS

Infantry
Regular Force infantry regiments and battalions of the Canadian Army are:

1. The Royal Canadian Regiment
   • 1st Battalion (CFB Petawawa) – Mechanized Infantry
   • 2nd Battalion (CFB Gagetown) – Mechanized Infantry
   • 3rd Battalion (CFB Petawawa) – Light Infantry + Parachute Company

2. Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry
   • 1st Battalion (CFB Edmonton) – Mechanized Infantry
   • 2nd Battalion (CFB Shilo) – Mechanized Infantry
   • 3rd Battalion (CFB Edmonton) – Light Infantry + Parachute Company

3. Royal 22e Régiment
   • 1er Bataillon (CFB Valcartier) – Mechanized Infantry
   • 2e Bataillon (Québec City) – Mechanized Infantry
   • 3e Bataillon (CFB Valcartier) – Light Infantry + Parachute Company

Artillery
Canada’s Regular field artillery has traditionally been called the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery. Canada currently has four Regular Force regiments:

   • 1st Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery
   • 2nd Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery
   • 5e Régiment d’artillerie légère du Canada
   • 4th Air Defence Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery

Armour
Regular Force units include:

   • The Royal Canadian Dragoons – CFB Petawawa
   • Lord Strathcona’s Horse (Royal Canadians) – CFB Edmonton
   • 12e Régiment blindé du Canada – CFB Valcartier and Trois-Rivières

Combat engineers
   • 1 Combat Engineer Regiment – CFB Edmonton
   • 2 Combat Engineer Regiment – CFB Petawawa
   • 4 Engineer Support Regiment – CFB Gagetown
   • 5e Régiment du genie de combat – CFB Valcartier
Electronic Warfare

- 21 Electronic Warfare Regiment - CFB Kingston

Reserve Force

1. Land Force Atlantic Area

- 36 Canadian Brigade Group
- 36 Canadian Brigade Group Headquarters
- 36 Canadian Brigade Group (NS) Band (Music)
- The Halifax Rifles (RCAC) (Armored) (Halifax)
- The Prince Edward Island Regiment (RCAC) (Armored) (Charlottetown)
- 1st (Halifax-Dartmouth) Field Artillery Regiment, RCA (Artillery) (Halifax)
- 84th Independent Field Battery, RCA (Artillery) (Yarmouth)
- 45 Engineer Squadron (Combat Engineer) (Sydney)
- 1st Battalion, The Nova Scotia Highlanders (North) (Light Infantry) (Truro)
- 2nd Battalion, The Nova Scotia Highlanders (Light Infantry) (Sydney)
- The Princess Louise Fusiliers (Light Infantry) (Halifax)
- The West Nova Scotia Regiment (Light Infantry) (Aldershot)
- 33 (Halifax) Service Battalion (Service and Support) (Halifax)
- 35 (Sydney) Service Battalion (Service and Support) (Sydney)
- 37 Canadian Brigade Group
- 37 Canadian Brigade Group Headquarters
- 8th Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise’s) (Armored) (Moncton)
- 3rd Field Artillery Regiment, RCA (Artillery) (Saint John)
- 56 Engineer Squadron (Combat Engineer) (St. John’s)
- 1st Battalion, The New Brunswick Regiment (Carleton and York) (Light Infantry) (Fredericton)
- 2nd Battalion, The Royal New Brunswick Regiment (North Shore) (Light Infantry) (Bathurst)
- 1st Battalion, Royal Newfoundland Regiment (Light Infantry) (Corner Brook)
- 31 (Saint John) Service Battalion (Service and Support) (St John)
- 36 (NFLD) Service Battalion (Service and Support) (St. John’s)
- 72 Communications Group – (Halifax)
- 721 Communication Regiment (Charlottetown)
- 722 Communication Squadron (Saint John)
- 723 Communication Squadron (Halifax)
- 724 Communication Squadron - Active Unit (Oromocto)
- 725 Communication Squadron (Glace Bay)
- 728 Communication Squadron (St. John’s)
- 5 Canadian Ranger Patrol Group (Gander)
- 3 Intelligence Company (Halifax)
2. Land Force Québec Area

- 34 Canadian Brigade Group
- 34 Canadian Brigade Group Headquarters (Montreal)
- The Royal Canadian Hussars (Montreal) (Armored) (Montreal)
- Le Régiment de Hull (RCAC) (Armored) (Hull)
- 4e Bataillon, Royal 22e Régiment (Light Infantry) (Laval)
- 6e Bataillon, Royal 22e Régiment (Light Infantry) (Saint-Hyacinthe)
- Le Régiment de Maisonneuve (Light Infantry) (Montreal)
- Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal (Light Infantry) (Montreal)
- The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada (Light Infantry) (Montreal)
- The Canadian Grenadier Guards (Light Infantry) (Westmount)
- The Canadian Grenadier Guards (Light Infantry) (Montreal)
- The Royal Montreal Regiment (Light Infantry) (Westmount)
- 2nd Field Artillery Regiment, RCA (Artillery) (Montreal)
- 34 Combat Engineer Regiment (Combat Engineer) (Westmount)
- 51 (Montréal) Service Battalion (Service and Support) (Saint-Hubert)
- 35 Canadian Brigade Group
- 35 Canadian Brigade Group Headquarters
- Sherbrooke Hussars (Armored) (Sherbrooke)
- 12e Régiment blindé du Canada (Milice) (Armored) (Trois-Rivières)
- Le Régiment de la Chaudière (Light Infantry) (Lévis)
- Le Régiment du Saguenay (Light Infantry) (Chicoutimi)
- Les Fusiliers de Sherbrooke (Light Infantry) (Sherbrooke)
- Les Fusiliers du Saint-Laurent (Light Infantry) (Rimouski)
- Les Voltigeurs de Québec (Light Infantry) (Québec City)
- 6e Régiment d’artillerie de Campagne, ARC (Artillery) (Lévis)
- 62e Régiment d’artillerie de campagne, ARC (Artillery) (Shawinigan)
- 35 Combat Engineer Regiment (Combat Engineer) (Québec City)
- 55 (Québec) Service Battalion (Service and Support) (Québec City)
- 71E Communications Group (Montreal)
- 712 Communication Squadron – (Montreal)
- 713 Communication Regiment – (Beauport)
- 714 Communication Squadron – (Sherbrooke)
- 2 Canadian Ranger Patrol Group – (St. Jean)
- 4 Intelligence Company – (Montreal)

3. Land Force Central Area

- 31 Canadian Brigade Group
- 31 Canadian Brigade Group Headquarters (London)
- 1e Hussars (Armored) (London)
• The Windsor Regiment (Armored) (Windsor)
• The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (Wentworth Regiment) (Light Infantry) (Hamilton)
• The Lincoln and Welland Regiment (Light Infantry) (St. Catharines and Welland)
• 4th Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment (Light Infantry) (London and Stratford)
• The Royal Highland Fusiliers of Canada (Light Infantry) (Cambridge and Kitchener)
• The Essex and Kent Scottish (Light Infantry) (Windsor and Chatham)
• The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada (Princess Louise’s) (Light Infantry) (Hamilton)
• 11th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA (Artillery) (Guelph and Hamilton)
• 56th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA (Artillery) (Brantford)
• 31 Combat Engineer Regiment (The Elgins) (Combat Engineer) (St. Thomas)
• 21 (Windsor) Service Battalion (Service and Support) (Windsor)
• 22 (London) Service Battalion (Service and Support) (London)
• 23 (Hamilton) Service Battalion (Service and Support) (Hamilton)
• 23 Field Ambulance, CFMS (Medical) (Hamilton)
• 32 Canadian Brigade Group
• 32 Canadian Brigade Group Headquarters (Toronto)
• The Governor General’s Horse Guards (Armored) (Toronto)
• The Queen’s York Rangers (1st American Regiment) RCAC (Armored) (Toronto and Aurora)
• The Queen’s Own Rifles of Canada (Light Infantry) (Toronto - Downtown and Scarborough)
• The Royal Regiment of Canada (Light Infantry) (Toronto)
• The Grey and Simcoe Foresters (Light Infantry (Owen Sound and Barrie)
• The Lorne Scots (Peel, Dufferin and Halton Regiment) (Light Infantry) (Brampton, Oakville and Georgetown)
• 48th Highlanders of Canada (Light Infantry) (Toronto)
• The Toronto Scottish Regiment (Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother’s Own) (Light Infantry) (Toronto)
• 7th Toronto Regiment, RCA (Artillery) (Toronto)
• 32 Combat Engineer Regiment (Combat Engineer) (Toronto)
• 25 (Toronto) Service Battalion (Service and Support) (Toronto)
• 25 Field Ambulance, CFMS (Medical) (Toronto)
• 33 Canadian Brigade Group
• 33 Canadian Brigade Group Headquarters (Ottawa)
• The Ontario Regiment (RCAC) (Armored) (Oshawa)
• Governor General’s Foot Guards (Light Infantry) (Ottawa)
• The Princess of Wales’ Own Regiment (Light Infantry) (Kingston)
• The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment (Light Infantry) (Belleville, Peterborough and Cobourg)
• The Brockville Rifles (Light Infantry) (Brockville)
• Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders (Light Infantry) (Cornwall)
• The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (Light Infantry) (Ottawa)
• The Algonquin Regiment (Light Infantry) (North Bay and Timmins)
• 2nd Battalion, Irish Regiment of Canada (Light Infantry) (Sudbury)
• 30th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA (Artillery) (Ottawa)
49th (Sault Ste. Marie) Field Artillery Regiment, RCA (Artillery) (Sault Ste Marie)
1st Air Defence Regiment (Lanark & Renfrew Scottish), RCA (Air Defence Artillery) (Pembroke)
33 Combat Engineer Regiment (Combat Engineer) (Ottawa)
26 (North Bay) Service Battalion (Service and Support) (North Bay)
28 (Ottawa) Service Battalion (Service and Support) (Ottawa)
28 Field Ambulance, CFMS (Medical) (Ottawa)
2 Operational Support Group (Toronto)
700 Communication Squadron (Borden)
705 Communication Squadron (Hamilton)
709 Communication Regiment (Toronto)
763 Communication Regiment (Ottawa)
772 Electronic Warfare Squadron (Kingston)
3 Canadian Ranger Patrol Group (Borden)
2 Intelligence Company (Toronto)
2 Intelligence Platoon (Ottawa)

4. Land Force Western Area

38 Canadian Brigade Group
38 Canadian Brigade Group Headquarters (Winnipeg)
The Saskatchewan Dragoons (Armored) (Moose Jaw)
The Fort Garry Horse (Armored) (Winnipeg)
The Royal Regina Rifles (Light Infantry) (Regina)
The North Saskatchewan Regiment (Light Infantry) (Saskatoon)
The Royal Winnipeg Rifles (Light Infantry) (Winnipeg)
The Lake Superior Scottish Regiment (Light Infantry) (Thunder Bay)
The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada (Light Infantry) (Winnipeg)
10th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA (Artillery) (Regina)
26th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA (Artillery) (Brandon)
116th Independent Field Battery (Artillery) (Kenora)
16 (Saskatchewan) Service Battalion (Service and Support) (Regina)
17 (Winnipeg) Service Battalion (Service and Support) (Winnipeg)
19 (Thunder Bay) Service Battalion (Service and Support) (Thunder Bay)
39 Canadian Brigade Group
39 Canadian Brigade Group Headquarters (Vancouver)
The British Columbia Regiment (Duke of Connaught's Own) (RCAC) (Armored) (Vancouver)
The British Columbia Dragoons (Armored) (Kelowna)
The Rocky Mountain Rangers (Light Infantry) (Kamloops)
The Royal Westminster Regiment (Light Infantry) (New Westminster)
The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada (Light Infantry) (Vancouver)
The Canadian Scottish Regiment (Princess Mary's) (Light Infantry) (Victoria)
5th (British Columbia) Field Regiment, RCA (Artillery) (Victoria)
• 15th Field Regiment, RCA (Artillery) (Vancouver)
• 39 Combat Engineer Regiment (Combat Engineer) (Vancouver)
• 11 (Victoria) Service Battalion (Service and Support) (Victoria)
• 12 (Vancouver) Service Battalion (Service and Support) (Richmond)
• 41 Canadian Brigade Group
• 41 Canadian Brigade Group Headquarters (Calgary)
• The South Alberta Light Horse (Armored) (Edmonton and Medicine Hat)
• The King's Own Calgary Regiment (RCAC) (Armored) (Calgary)
• The Loyal Edmonton Regiment (4th Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry) (Light Infantry) (Edmonton)
• The Calgary Highlanders (Light Infantry) (Calgary)
• 20th Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery (Artillery) (Edmonton and Red Deer)
• 18th Air Defence Regiment, RCA (Air Defence Artillery) (Lethbridge)
• 41 Combat Engineer Regiment (Combat Engineer) (Edmonton and Calgary)
• 14 (Calgary) Service Battalion (Service and Support) (Calgary)
• 15 (Edmonton) Service Battalion (Service and Support) (Edmonton)
• 73 Communications Group
• 731 Communication Squadron – Active Unit (CFB Shilo)
• 734 Communication Squadron (Regina)
• 735 Communication Regiment (Winnipeg)
• 736 Communication Squadron (Thunder Bay)
• 737 Communication Squadron (Saskatoon)
• 742 Communication Squadron - Active Unit (CFB Edmonton)
• 745 Communication Squadron (Edmonton)
• 746 Communication Squadron (Calgary)
• 749 Communication Squadron (Red Deer)
• 74 Communications Group
• 741 Communication Squadron (Victoria)
• 744 Communication Regiment (Vancouver)
• 748 Communication Squadron (Nanaimo)
• 4 Canadian Ranger Patrol Group (Victoria)
• 6 Intelligence Company (Edmonton, Vancouver and Winnipeg)
APPENDIX ‘C’

THE ARMY RESERVE PROGRAMME

References:
A. LFC Op Plan 10/11 v3
B. NDHQ 1948-3-2 (DPDF 2) Fiscal Year 2011/2012 Strategic Planning Guidance dated 21 Sep 10

1. Background. Over the past several years the Army Reserve has demonstrated extraordinary success in its achievement of Force Expansion targets and in rising to meet the surge in full-time employment imposed by the Afghan mission. With the mission now drawing to a close, we must take steps to reconstitute the Class “A” Army in order to ensure this critical force generation base remains ready to respond to Canada’s future requirements. This correspondence provides initial direction to Army formations on the application of the limited funds received to conduct the Army Reserve Programme to achieve defined outputs and ensure a sustainable part-time Army in FY 11/12 and beyond.

2. Output. The Army Reserve not only generates soldiers for individual augmentation, it generates capabilities. The foundation upon which these capabilities are built is the 37.5 days of Class “A” training and the 7 days of Collective Training (CT) for the 1/10

LE PROGRAMME DE LA RÉSERVE DE L’ARMÉE DE TERRE

Référence :
A. Plan op CFT 2010-2011 v3
B. QGDN 1948-3-2 (DPDF 2), Année financière 2011-2012 – Guide de planification stratégique, 21 septembre 2010

1. Contexte. Depuis plusieurs années, la Réserve de l’Armée de terre a su démontrer son succès extraordinaire en atteignant ses objectifs d’expansion de la Force et en réussissant à combler l’augmentation subite d’emplois à temps plein exigée par la mission afghane. Maintenant que la mission tire à sa fin, nous devons entreprendre la reconstitution de l’Armée de classe « A » afin de nous assurer que la base de composition de cette force essentielle demeure prête à répondre aux exigences futures du Canada. La présente correspondance contient des directives initiales aux formations de l’Armée de terre sur l’application des fonds limités reçus afin de diriger le Programme de la Réserve de l’Armée de terre pour atteindre les résultats déterminés et assurer une Armée à temps partiel viable pour l’AF 2011-2012 et pour les suivantes.

2. Résultat. La Réserve de l’Armée de terre ne se contente pas de mettre sur pied une force de renforts individuels, elle met sur pied des capacités. Ces capacités sont établies comme suit : 37,5 jours d’instruction pour les réservistes de classe « A » et 7 jours
part-time Army to meet the requirement to train. This foundation supports generation of the incremental capabilities assigned to the Army Reserve; in particular Territorial Battalion Groups (TBG), Arctic Response Company Groups (ARCG), Influence Activities Task Force (IATF), and components of the Affiliated Battle Group (ABG).

Resources assigned to these activities support the applicable Master Implementation Plans (MIP) published at Reference A and demonstrate an institutional commitment to these capabilities. The TBGs are the principal force employment structure for Reserve capability. Assisted by COS Land Reserves, Comd LPDTS has been tasked to develop an improved Collective Training (CT) framework to leverage the TBGs as the primary CT organizing structure in support of the Army Reserve’s domestic force generation mandate.

Resources have also been directed toward institutional sustainment of the Army Reserve through Permanent Class “B” personnel. In the interest of transparency and the sustainable provision of a part-time Army, resources assigned to particular activities such as those described above will not be diverted to other uses.

3. The Army Reserve Funding Model (ARFM). Resources directed toward the Army Reserve programme have traditionally been provided through the ARFM. Developed over a period of years and adjusted through a number of initiatives, including the two phases of Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR), the existing ARFM has ceased to be a relevant and efficient mechanism through which to fund the Army Reserve. Subsequent paragraphs will explain the revisions to the ARFM that

3. Modèle de financement de la Réserve de l’Armée de terre (MFRAT). Les ressources allouées au Programme de la Réserve de l’Armée de terre ont été traditionnellement fournies par le MFRAT. Le MFRAT actuel, dont l’élaboration a duré un certain nombre d’années et que l’on a modifié à l’aide d’initiatives, notamment les deux phases de restructuration de la Réserve de la Force terrestre (RFT), n’est plus le mécanisme pertinent et efficace de financement de la
will ensure we meet the intent to reconstitute the part-time Army. I will also identify further steps that will reduce the current reliance of the Regular Army on the full-time employment of Reservists. An initial draft of the proposed ARFM for FY 11/12 has been circulated to your staffs. I look forward to receiving your continued feedback on both the revised funding model and the proposed steps to reduce the Army’s reliance on Casual Class “B” employment as we develop the Land Force Funding Model (LFFM) Version 2 for FY 11/12.

4. The paid ceiling of the Army Reserve consists of 19,997 Class “A” and 1,467 Permanent Class “B” positions based upon funded expansion realized to date. These numbers do not include the Canadian Rangers. The foundation upon which we build Army Reserve capability is the 37.5 days of Class “A” training and the 7 days of CT. If we are to reconstitute the part-time Class “A” Army, we must protect the resources necessary for this foundation. It is well understood that the actual Class “A” establishments considerably exceed the paid ceiling, are not manned to 100%, and that each Reservist does not parade to the full mandate. The proposed allocation funds Class “A” training and CT to 100% and 50% of the Class “A” paid ceiling respectively. This is a change from the current ARFM, which funds LFAs to differing percentages based on historical data. Funding to a common percentage across the Army is intended to allow you to achieve and sustain your respective Class “A” authorized establishments. However, it is also understood that historically underfunded LFAs will not be able to achieve the desired manning of their

3/10


4. Le plafond de la rémunération autorisé pour la Réserve de l’Armée de terre correspond à un peu moins de 19 997 postes en service de classe « A » et à 1 467 postes permanents en service de classe « B »; il est basé sur le financement de la croissance atteinte à ce jour. Ces chiffres excluent les Rangers canadiens. La base sur laquelle nous constituons la capacité de la Réserve de l’Armée de terre est de 37,5 jours d’instruction en service de classe « A » et de 7 jours d’IC. Si nous voulons reconstituer le service de réserve de classe « A » à temps partiel de l’Armée de terre, nous devons protéger les ressources nécessaires à cette base. Il est bien entendu que les effectifs en service de classe « A » dépassent largement le plafond de la rémunération, qu’ils ne sont pas dotés à 100% et que ce ne sont pas tous les réservistes qui remplissent la totalité du mandat. L’allocation proposée vise à financer l’instruction en service de classe « A » et l’IC à 100% et le plafond de la rémunération en service de classe « A » à 50% respectivement. Il s’agit d’un changement par rapport à l’actuel MFRAT qui prévoit le financement des SFT selon différents pourcentages en se basant sur
Class "A" establishments immediately. Accordingly, as an in-year measure for FY 11/12 and pending the outcome of the ARB Review, $3.7M in Class "A" funding for LFWA and $1.6M for LEFA provided in the proposed model will be retained in a Protocole reserve at the LFC HQ for allocation through the Quarterly Review process to LEAs demonstrating success in reinvigorating their Class "A" establishments. ARFM funds designated for the part-time Class "A" Army will not be converted for other uses without CLS approval.

Table 1. Comparison of Class "A" Personnel

5. Analysis by LS Comptroller, COS Land Reserves, and DLS has revealed by name and service number the increasing number of personnel parading in excess of 120 Class "A" days. This trend is unaffordable within finite Class "A" resources and comes at the expense of training on the Ammunition Floor. In a similar vein, analysis of manning versus establishment discrepancies indicates that certain Army Reserve rank groups exceed the current establishment by significant margins. This applies in particular to the ranks of CWO, Li, Capt, and LCol. Excess rank growth beyond the authorized establishment also places pressure on the funding envelope for Class "A" training. The persistently large percentage of Army Reserve personnel (approx 20%) who are classified as Non-effective Strength (NES) (both those formally placed on NES by letter and those failing to parade in a six-month period) impedes the Army's ability to man the Class "A". Des données historiques. L’adoption d’un pourcentage de financement commun à toute l’Armée de terre a pour but d’atteindre et de maintenir nos effectifs réglementaires respectifs en service de classe « A ». Toutefois, nous prenons aussi que les SFT qui ont toujours été sous-financés ne réalisent pas immédiatement à atteindre les objectifs de dotation pour le service de classe « A ». Par conséquent, comme mesure prise en cours de l’année, l’Armée de terre a placé 3,7 millions de dollars du financement de classe « A » pour le SOFF et 1,6 millions pour le SAFF fournis dans le modèle proposé seront conservés dans une réserve protégée au QG CFT et seront utilisés à travers le processus de revue trimestrielle pour les secteurs démontrant du succès dans la relance de leurs établissements de classe « A ». Le financement du MFRAT alloué à l’Armée de terre pour le service de classe « A » à temps partiel ne servira pas à d’autres usages sans l’approbation du CEMAT.

5. En se basant sur les noms et les numéros matricules, les analyses du Contrôleur de l’BMAT, du CEM Réserve terrestre et du DEMAT ont révélé qu’un nombre accru du personnel en service de classe « A » se présente à leur unité pour plus de 120 jours. Les ressources limitées de classe « A » ne permettent pas de poursuivre cette tendance sans être retirée de l’entraînement dans les manœuvres militaires. Dans le même ordre d’idées, l’analyse de la dotation en comparaison à l’écart des effectifs indique que certains groupes de grades de la Réserve de l’Armée de terre sont largement supérieurs à la norme actuelle. Ceci s’applique en particulier aux grades d’adjudant, de lieut, de capitaine et de lieutenant-colonel. La croissance excessive de ces grades au-delà de l’effectif autorisé surcharge également l’enveloppe budgétaire d’instruction de classe « A ». Le pourcentage élevé persistant de réservistes de l’Armée de terre (environ 20%) qui est classé en tant qu’effectifs en non-
establishment: You are to conduct an aggressive campaign to reduce the NES cohort by placing those who fail to parade during a six-month period on NES status and by completing the NES release process. Finally, it is evident that an excessive number of Army Reserve personnel fail to parade with sufficient regularity to contribute to the sustained generation of capability (approx. 5,000 personnel parade fewer than 15 Class “A” days per year). With your assistance we can reduce the unnecessary pressures against the Reserve programme caused by excessive Class “A” parading by some, rank inflation beyond establishment, NES, and poor attendance. Finally, the proposed model identifies resources for specific requirements within the Reserve Programme, such as Casual Land Duty Allowance, and key incremental capabilities, including ARCG, TBG, and 1A TP. Identified funding for these activities has been based upon current expenditures or approved MIP requirements. Effective immediately, the following indicators will be tracked to determine success in reconstituting the Class “A”

- Increase to 50% the members of the Army Reserve who parade between 20 and 40 Class “A” days annually.

- Activity (ENA) (à la fois ceux qui sont officiellement inscrits sur la liste des ENA à la suite d’une lettre et ceux qui omettent de se présenter aux rassemblements durant six mois) entrave la capacité de l’Armée de terre à doter l’effectif en service de classe « A ». Vous devez prendre tous les moyens afin de réduire le groupe des ENA en ajoutant aux ENA les personnes qui ne se présentant pas aux rassemblements durant une période de six mois en effectuant la procédure de libération des ENA. Finalement, il est évident qu’un nombre excessif de réservistes de l’Armée de terre ne participent pas assez régulièrement aux rassemblements pour contribuer à une mise-sur pied soutenue de la force (environ 5 000 réservistes accomplissent moins de 15 jours par année en service de classe « A »). Avec votre aide, nous pouvons réduire les pressions inutiles imposées au Programme de la Réserve qui sont causées par des rassemblements excessifs de classe « A », par l’inflation des grades au-delà des normes établies, par les ENA et la faible participation. En conclusion, le modèle proposé prévoit l’affectation des ressources à des besoins spécifiques à l’intérieur du Programme de la Réserve, notamment l’indemnité de mission terrestre occasionnelle et les principales capacités d’accroissement, y compris le GCA, le GBT et la FOAL. Le financement accordé pour ces activités a été établi selon les dépenses courantes ou les exigences du PDMO approuvé. Dés maintenant, nous assurons le suivi des indicateurs ci-dessous afin d’évaluer si la reconstitution de l’effectif en service de classe « A » est réussie.

- Hausse de 50 % du nombre de membres de la Réserve de l’Armée de terre qui se présentent aux rassemblements en service de classe « A » de 20 à 40 jours par année.
6. Reserve Individual Training (IT). The proposed ARFM provides a reduction of funding for Reserve IT. Moreover, there remains widespread dissatisfaction across the Army concerning the management, funding, and programming of IT in support of the sustained delivery of an effective, reliable, and dependable Army Reserve. Commd LFDTs has been directed to examine options including the complete return of Reserve IT funding and tasks to the LFAs and a hybrid wherein some officer and NCM DPs are devolved to the LFAs and others are retained by LFDTs. The results of this analysis will be presented to the ASPT at the earliest opportunity. I seek your input as we move to increase transparency of demand against what will remain finite resources for IT. Clarity in terms of training needs will improve our ability to preserve sufficient funding for this key activity.

7. Casual Class “B.” At the moment, we have very limited visibility on the significant resources from across the entire Army.
programme dedicated to the full-time employment of Reservists on Casual Class “B”. It must be understood that with the Regular Army approaching 100% of its establishment and with funding provided within the ARFM for growth in 1,500 Permanent Class “B” personnel in direct support of the Army Reserve, continued full-time employment of large numbers of Reservists against requirements exceeding our full-time establishments is not sustainable. This is an Army issue not an Army Reserve issue. However, the effect on the broader Army programme is analogous to challenges already identified herein for the ARFM such as rank groups exceeding establishment. Within a constrained Army programme, resources devoted to full-time requirements in excess of establishment are unavailable for key activities such as training the Army.

8. LS Comptrollers and DLS are conducting an analysis of over $200M in Casual Class “B” wage within the overall Army programme. Some of these funds are programmed within the proposed ARFM for IT, Ceremonial Guard, IA TF, etc. Other funds come from incremental resources provided by the CF for the duration of the Afghan mission, recurring programmes such as Regular Force Expansion, or the ad hoc conversion of funds from within the Army programme. Once the analysis determines the various sources of funds for Casual Class “B” wages, we will be in a better position to determine, in conjunction with the Army’s Force 2013 comprehensive review, an affordable level of full-time Reservist support to the Army. You will be better able to participate in this staff analysis by identifying all Casual Class “B” personnel in your formations and the incremental or recurring

8. Le Contrôleur de l’EMAT et le DBMAT analysent plus de 200 millions de dollars en rémunération de classe « B » occasionnelle à l’intérieur du programme global de l’Armée de terre. Une partie de ces fonds est prévue à l’intérieur du MFRAT proposé pour l’instruction individuelle, pour la Garde de cérémonie, pour la FOAI, etc. D’autres fonds proviennent de ressources supplémentaires allouées par les FC pour la durée de la mission africaine, de programmes répétitifs tels que l’expansion de la Force régulière ou de la conversion ad hoc de fonds à l’intérieur du programme de l’Armée de terre. Une fois que l’analyse aura déterminé les diverses sources de rémunération pour les classe « B » occasionnelle, nous serons plus aptes à déterminer, avec l’aide de l’examen global de l’Armée de terre de la Force 2013, un niveau abordable de réservistes à temps plein afin de soutenir les activités de l’Armée de terre.
With the Regular Army at close to 100% of its establishment, the Army O1 is working to ensure that Regular Force personnel are in the correct places, including the critical Regular Force Cadre positions required by the Army Reserve. Consideration is also being given to ending the flexibility of subordinate formations and commands to convert 5% of their Class "A" funding for the employment of Casual Class "B" personnel.

9. From the outset, it must be understood that incremental resources provided by the CF for the Afghanistan mission will be withdrawn during FY 11/12. These funds were provided to free up Regular Force personnel for deployment. There is no internal Army capacity to replace these funds once they are withdrawn and the Class "A" funds provided in the ARFMA will not be used for this purpose. You must plan now to cease the activities that were funded by these incremental mission specific funds. This will include transitioning the associated Casual Class "B" personnel back to Class "A" status with their parent units.

10. ARE Review. CDS Land Reserves is currently leading a comprehensive review of the Army Reserve Establishment (ARE). This review is examining not only the ARE for Reserve units and formations but also the Reserve component of headquarters, support establishments, training establishments, and Army Reserve establishments and paid personnel.

Vous serez plus en mesure de participer à cette analyse en identifiant tout le personnel occasionnel en service de classe « B » de vos formations et les sources de fonds supplémentaires ou répétitives qui leur sont attribuées.

La Force régulière étant près d’atteindre 100 % de son effectif, le G1 de l’Armée de terre a l’obligation de s’assurer qu’un personnel de la Force régulière est au bon endroit, ce qui inclut la mise en place de personnels de classes « A » et « B ».

9. Il faut d’abord comprendre que les ressources supplémentaires fournies par les forces pour la mission en Afghanistan seront retirées au cours de l’année 2011-2012. Ces fonds sont accordés afin de libérer le personnel de la Force régulière pour le déploiement. L’Armée de terre ne sera pas en mesure de remplacer ces fonds une fois qu’ils auront été retirés, et les fonds prévus pour le service de classe « A » dans le MIRAT ne serviront pas à cet effet.

Vous devez planifier maintenant de cesser les activités qui étaient financées par ces fonds Alloués spécifiquement à la mission. Ceci va comprendre la transition du personnel au service de classe « B » à nouveau au service de classe « A » avec leurs unités d’apparition.
ceilings by LFA. The final product of this review will have an impact on the ARFM and necessitate a further revision of the funding model for FY 12/13. In accordance with Reference B, no further growth is programmed for the Army Reserve. The funds allocated to the Army for the Reserve Programme will not increase and are subject to future reductions based on the application of Strategic Review and other divestments across the CFDS pillars. Efforts to institutionalize or main establishments exceeding the current authorized by seeking to increase the paid ceiling will not succeed.

11. Conclusion. We have two tasks before us. First, we must reconstitute the part-time Class “A” Army in order to ensure this critical force generation base remains ready to respond to Canada’s future requirements. Second, we must determine a sustainable level of full-time Reservist support to the Army through Casual Class “B” employment. The draft ARFM is intended to provide a transparent funding mechanism to assist in addressing the first task. The Force 2013 comprehensive review work that will be conducted over the coming months will be informed by detailed analysis of our current expenditures. Success in these tasks will require acceptance across the Army of the reality that the incremental funds associated with the Afghan mission are about to cease with no possibility of replacement from within the Army programme. I trust you recognize that the transition of Casual Class “B” personnel back to Class “A” status upon termination of the incremental Afghan mission requirement is not inconsistent with

étallements d’instruction ainsi que les effectifs de la Réserve de l’Armée de terre et les plafonds de rémunération par SFT. Le produit final de cette étude aura une incidence au niveau du MFRAT et nécessitera une révision subséquente du modèle de financement pour l’AP 2012-2013. Conformément à la référence B, aucune nouvelle croissance n’est prévue pour la Réserve de l’Armée de terre. Les fonds alloués à l’Armée de terre pour le Programme de la Réserve n’augmenteront pas et feront l’objet de réductions fondées sur l’application de l’examen stratégique et d’autres désinvestissements parmi les piliers de la Stratégie de défense Le Canada d’abord (SDCD). Les initiatives visant à institutionnaliser ou à doter des effectifs dépassant ceux actuellement autorisés en tentant de hausser le plafond de la rémunération sont vouées à l’échec.

the main effort to reconstitute the part-time
Class "A" Army. I will continue to seek your
feedback and advice as we move forward.
Questions regarding the proposed ARPBM
should be directed to LGen Controller or D!.
Questions regarding the Force 2013 review
should be directed to DLPD.

Canada's Citizen Soldiers: A Discussion Paper

Lieutenant-General P J Devlin
Lieutenant-General

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Report de classe "B" occasionnel au sein
de classe "A", à l'expiration du budget
supplémentaire de la mission afghane n'est pas
incompatible avec l'effort principal de
reconstitution de l'Armée de terre de classe
"A", à temps partiel. Je vais continuer de
recueillir vos commentaires et vous consulter à
mesure que nous progressons. Les questions
concernant le MPRAT proposé doivent être
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APPENDIX ‘D’

Mr. David Pratt & Dr. Jack Granatstein
C/o Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute
8 York Street 2nd Floor
Ottawa, ON KIN 5S6

27 October 2010

Dear Mr. Pratt,

While it is admired your love of the Reserves and wanting towards expanded funding for the Militia or Army Reserves, it is important that you also know the facts. Some of them are the deep, dark facts you may not have seen while Defence Minister, but are certainly prevalent today. My office reports directly to a One Star for funding approvals and audits of expenditures, and as we joke about in my office: "If the public knew the waste that goes on in the military, especially in the Army Reserves, they would come after us with pitchforks". The more money we push to the Army Reserves, the more gets siphoned off to the Brigade Headquarters so they can run inflated empires with retired Regular Force personnel collecting pensions and double dipping a 2nd income off of Reserve Class B contracts.

Reserve Annual Training Plans – The Canadian Forces, both Regular and Reserve, which includes Class A and B, have a checklist of items that “all members of the CF” must achieve annually. It is called the Annual Readiness Verification or ARV. It is broken down into a few sections, requiring current Medical, Dental and Canadian Vaccination Currency, to administrative items like reviewing address, Will on Unit Personnel File, Emergency Contact Info (NOK), current military ID Card, valid drivers licence, passport, etc. There is a spectrum of training specific items which we will elaborate on. Some of these items are an annual training requirement, but a “no brainer to accomplish”. My HQ staff does the training usually within a few days on a given week. Staff unavailable does a follow up training week later on in the month. It is comprised of Land Force Command Physical Fitness Standard (13 Km Rucksack March or BFT), Personal Weapons Training (PWT), NBCD (now CRBN). Combat First Aid and Personal Fire Equipment Training (PFET). All of these items are coordinated by the Regular Support Staff (RSS) Adjutant/Ops Officer or RSS Training WO/Sgt in conjunction with the RSS RQ Sgt/MCpl. A grade 6 student with a crayon can actually do it, but we leave this to the "Professionals".

LFCPFS or BFT - Soldier, 20 kg rucksack, Rifle, Helmet, Tactical Vest, March 13 km in 2 hours & 26 minutes or less over flat terrain - go - Pass. Personnel who do not pass within the allotted time are given Remedial Measures, recommendations for a PT Program to assist them by local PSP staff, and a retest in 8-10 weeks, another failure may result in increased Career Action to include Counseling and Probation to Release from the Canadian Forces.

PWT – Book ranges for two training weekends in October and April, outside of bad weather, with all personnel directed to complete the C7A2 Annual Range qualification with a pass. Those that did not attend or did not pass October shoot must attend April range weekend. 68 bullets, hit target 45 times - Pass.

NBCD Refresher – Senior NCO, Pamphlet on NBCD, Classroom, 12 Gas Suits, soldiers with Tactical Vest and Gas Mask with carrier attached to Vest (standard fighting order in the CF). One hour class on NBCD drills including donning of suit and gas mask drill - Pass.

Combat First Aid Refresher – Local Field Ambulance gets tasked or asked to provide 2 x instructors for a Saturday or Sunday Reserve Training Day. Reserves who attend - Pass.

PFET Refresher – Have a real Fireman come to the armoury with a few fire extinguishers, or go to the local fire department, and soldiers get a 2 hour refresher on Classifications of fire and extinguishers. Those in attendance - Pass.
Mr. Pratt, we have systems access to dozens of DND Software programs that we run across Canada. PeopleSoft Human Resource Management System and Monitor Mass are the main engines tracking training at the unit level. A nominal roll of personnel attending any of the training sessions above can be given to a Private or Corporal in the Orderly Room and those personnel can be checklisted into the HRMS as Pass. We have encountered reports that show half the unit has not done most if not any of the basic annual refresher training items above. Why? When you figure that out, let us all know you in your next Globe and Mail article.

We have approached CO’s back channel to ask them if there is a problem getting access to training facilities or staff and they say no. Then we see that they have not completed required annual training requirements with the money we have sent thru their Brigade Headquarters. My staff and I have gone to Field Ambulances in the same armoury as some units and asked if they were approached to teach Combat First Aid and they confirm no. We have gone to Fire Departments next door to armouries and asked the Fire Chief if they were approached to run a PFET and they claim they have never been asked, but would love to. We have noted deficiencies in Reserve Brigades & units not achieving annual training standards for years on end, but in our face will lie to us and say the money is being well spent. On what?

We have walked into these Reserve Brigade Armouries at 0800 hours to do Technical Visits, only to have to wait around for 1-2 hours while everybody comes walking in at 0900-0930 hours after “PT Own Time” with Tim Horton’s Coffee in one hand, sleep still in their eyes and pillow marks on their face. By 1500 hours the whole Reserve Headquarters was empty, including the person we were auditing, who said she had to leave to “beat the traffic”. My staff and I have walked into Reserve Armouries and units where 2-5 Reserve Personnel are collecting full time Class B salaries but nobody is around, save maybe the Clerk or a Civilian CR-03. When we ask where the Reserve Unit Adjutant or Reserve Ops/Training Warrant Officer is, they either don’t know, or not sure who is doing the job right now. We even found out one of the Reserve CQ Sergeants on a full time Class B was at his real full time job at the local Home Depot. One of the Corporals hanging around his CQ stores was covering for him on Class B contract???

Class B Junkies - Many of the Reservists have become what they themselves self title Class B Junkies. They go from Class B Contract to Unemployment Insurance for several months staying home playing XBOX, watching Porn, getting drunk or high. When the EI runs out, they go back on another Class B contract. The former Chief of Land Staff put the hammer down to cut off funding to Class B contracts. It was in an attempt to have one full time Army - The Regular Force. In one of his briefs to my HQ staff, he said words to the effect: “If they want to do this full time, join the Regular Force. If they want to do this part time, join the Reserves. We are going to cut off this Class B funding to stop this merry-go-round”.

Once the Army cut off the Class B funds, all the Reserve Brigade HQ’s simply reallocated the funds, taking from the units to feed the Class B contracts to their over-inflated HQ staff of Annuitant Double dippers and golf buddies. They have even resorted back to the old trick of hiding Non Effective Strength Personnel (NES) so that funds allocated for soldiers who do not parade are simply whitewashed into other spending. We are all just waiting for somebody like Retired Colonel Michel Drapeau or Scott Taylor to expose this scam again in the National Post or Ottawa Citizen.

Mr. Pratt, I admire your National attempt to rescue the Reserves from funding cuts and attempts to increase their role, it is a noble gesture. I would also ask that you use your back door channels and CO contacts to let them know we are not all stupid up here in Ottawa and Area Support Groups. We see the Claims X Reports of their Brigade staff going on Golfing Trips, and the failure of their training staff to properly coordinate training unit personnel to Canadian Forces annual standards. When they start to train properly, trim the fat Reserve HQ’s and spend properly, they will become a better part of the Canadian Defence Strategy.
APPENDIX ‘E’

ANONYMOUS RESPONSES BY RESERVISTS

Reservist A

On the principal issue facing the Reserve at this point...

I think that the biggest issue facing the Reserve is identifying exactly what role the Reserve should play in Canada and how that affects the way we do business. I think the traditional role of a stand by force in case of a worst case military scenario is no longer appropriate. The likelihood of a large scale military action against Canada, or one of her allies, is not likely. The military mission to Afghanistan is set to end and the current pattern of substantial and sustained augmentation to the Regular Force will likely also end. Given the unprecedented level of operational experience now enjoyed by the large number of Reservists who have deployed, in addition to the new capabilities that have been developed, a return to the old way of thinking is not desirable and not very possible. Reservists have shown that they can be relied on in a time of need and most enjoy the reinvigorated sense of purpose that Afghanistan has afforded us. Gone are the days of training fruitlessly to defend Canada from the Great Russian bear. What to do with that experience, those lessons learned and that renewed vigour post Afghanistan should be a question on everyone’s mind, lest that experience be wasted.

On the roles of the Army Reserve (mobilization, augmentation, footprint in the community)...

I would prioritize these in the opposite order as you have listed them. That is, augmentation to the Reg Force being the most important and providing a framework for mobilization being least. This judgement is based on the fact that mobilization of the Reserve Force on mass hasn’t happened since WWII and likely won’t happen again unless Canada is invaded by a large scale military force. In the event that Reserves are needed for something like this a considerable amount of time and resources would be devoted to it in advance, as demonstrated by both world wars where Reserve units took quite a bit of time to scale up operations, train and equip soldiers before deploying.

Being a foot print in the community is an important priority for any Reserve unit because, at a minimum, this is where their members come from. Through unit led recruiting activities at schools and universities, parades and word of mouth, Reserve units have always been de facto responsible for their own recruiting.

Recruiting centres do little to generate interest in joining the Reserves. Regimental Associations are also vitally involved in their communities in order to fundraise for important regimental issues, like our Distinct Environment Uniforms (DEU). Kilts, balmorals, insignia, etc, is expected to be worn by CF members on duty; however, the burden of payment and supply relies largely on private donations.

Augmentation to the Regular Force is what keeps the Reserves busy and motivated. Whether staffing various strategic headquarters, helping support courses, filling maternity leaves, or deploying on operations, many young soldiers, NCMs and Officers alike, eagerly strive for these positions in order to gain better experience in their Reserve job. Most of my friends in the Reserves were raised from day one to want to deploy on operations as an essential part of doing our job. This last item, augmentation, is also the hardest task to prepare a soldier for. It requires a serious training commitment on the part of the Reserve unit to produce soldiers who can easily transition into a Regular Force unit without a steep learning curve. For this reason, I think it merits a top priority. As recent history shows, this is the task which the Reserves have been called to do the most lately and something that we must be prepared to do seamlessly.
On a strengthened Reserve role as “second responders”…

There certainly is a role as second responders; however, I don’t think there needs to be much attention, or effort, paid to this role. As natural disasters are hard to predict, it would be even harder to predict what gaps the Reserves would need to fill in a response, for example, BC forest fires saw soldiers digging fire breaks. This requires no practice. Op Cadence G20 Summit saw soldiers manning gates, roadblocks and observation posts with no actual mandate to intervene. This requires no practice. An eastern Ontario ice storm saw soldiers shovelling snow, delivering humanitarian aid and driving people to the hospital. The Reserves are always prepared to respond to these events. I think that the only thing the military needs to do to ensure that preparedness is to give the units the equipment/transportation/access to facilities they need to be self-sufficient in their community to overcome a critical emergency period, i.e. 72 hours, until reinforcements from the nearest base can show up.

On roles for Reservists on foreign deployments…

Reservists tend to do well at Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and PSYOPS jobs for several reasons. First there is a high emphasis placed on soft social skills that urban Reservists will tend to show stronger than rural Regular Forces soldiers of similar education levels. Second, your average Reservist has a noticeably higher average education level, which supports some of the more cognitive problem solving needs of CIMIC and PSYOPS. These jobs are relatively easy to train for to a minimum level (CIMIC operator and PSYOPS disseminator are two week courses), but require a rather high aptitude at the outset.

Something more applied, like reconstruction, would require much more technical skills and would be best left to someone who can dedicate themselves to mastering a skill at a professional level. On my last tour there was a team called the Construction Management Office, which had Regular Force technicians and engineers, with a contingent of Reserve infantry doing security for the team. While the team functioned well, the Reservists were not supported by the other Infantry units very well, certainly not the same as a Regular infantry platoon would have been supplied, in terms of vehicles, equipment, etc. Also, the commander of the Reserve contingent was a little over the top in terms of how he conducted himself, but this was because he was trying to impress his Regular Force colleagues, a very common occurrence.

The problem with Reservists being deployed in these specialty roles is that post-deployment the capability will not be maintained effectively. Since my tour with PSYOPS two years ago I have had no contact with the PSYOPS community. Only the Reservists who live in Toronto, where the work up training was conducted, were invited to help train the next rotation of soldiers. In spite of the fact that my Reserve unit has enough qualified soldiers to field an entire PSYOPS Detachment, there is no mandate to maintain this capability below the area level. The Skill fade on these capabilities makes it so that we are effectively training new soldiers for the first time, every time.

On the possibility of establishing separate recruitment, training, pay and equipment budgets for the Reserve…

In general, I’m not a fan of creating separate anything for the Reserves, because when times get tough, as we are seeing now, a separate Reserve budget means a potential budget cut that will disproportionately affect the Reserves. An integrated Canadian Forces is one where budgets, and budget cuts, will not affect the overall balance of the whole. The feeling on the ground when this happens is never conveyed as a decision in response to a valid policy shift, but instead as a knee-jerk reaction taken against a particular area of the military considered as secondary, or less important, which hugely affects moral.
On the main human resources issues facing the Reserve...

The more I learn about the Reserve pension plan, the more impressed I am with a job well done. While slow to enact, its provisions for buying back previous service makes it more than worth the wait.

Notwithstanding the upcoming changes within the Army, and the intent to reconstitute the “Class A Reserves”, I would suggest that the biggest HR issue facing Reservists is administration. There are long lists of entitlements that soldiers are granted: field pay, relocation expenses and meal claims. Soldiers are owed things from time to time, but, often, members are either not aware or units are reluctant to pay them for some financial reason. Endemic pay problems are widespread, but are usually a local unit issue. Under staffed orderly rooms and high turnover create a perfect storm of lost paperwork.

In the short term, the large number of Reservists who have come to rely on long term Class B contracts as a career are facing a lot of uncertainty and I am sceptical that much consideration will be given to effecting the “transition to Class A employment” with much sensitivity. It is going to be, in effect, large scale terminations and a loss of benefits without any real attempt at providing severance pay or job relocation services, which would be standard if conducted by the Regular Force or public service. The military has always benefited from the convenience of creating and cancelling these contracts as a hassle free way to fill vacancies in times of need without creating any obligations to the employees. This uncertainty has always been a bone of contention for Reservists, but is a risk that many accept as a necessary alternative to the equivalent Regular Force fear of being posted.

On a separate command system for the Reserve...

I don’t think I can really comment on this issue from my perspective as an NCM. Ultimately, I would like to work under the same chain of command that I would be following in the event of any kind of deployment. Since Reserve units rarely train at the formation level, it is pretty much a non-issue.

In my mind the question is, do the issues facing the Army Reserve differ substantially from that of Navy Reserves and Air Reserves? If so, then maybe staying integrated with the respective element commander makes sense, like LFC. If the issues facing all Reserves are much more in line, than perhaps an integrated Reserve command structure reporting to the CDS would make more sense. Seeing as how in my career I’ve spent much more time working with Regular Force Land units then I have with Navy Reserve units, I would instinctively suggest that Reserves stay integrated at the command level with the elements of the CF that they are most likely to have to work with on operation.

On the desirability of having (wherever possible) Reservist sub-units commanded by Reservists...

It is certainly practical; however, I do not think it is desirable from a military/Reserve culture point of view. On foreign deployments there will always be easy tasks, like issuing equipment and manning guard towers, and difficult tasks, like fighting an insurgency in their own back yard. Whenever Reservists have been deployed en masse in Reserve sub-units, they are almost always assigned the easiest, but subsequently least desirable, tasks, for instance, manning the front gate at KAF. While an unprecedented number of Reservists have been deployed on operations lately, the vast majority of them have been in non-front line roles: technicians, general duties and what is always considered to be menial defence and security tasks. Very few have deployed as augmentees working side by side with Regular Force soldiers in their primary role as infanteers. Reservists will continue to fight and compete individually for the left over positions that the Regular Force couldn’t fill; however, institutionalizing this process by creating Reserve sub-units will amount to the whole-sale sell off of these undesirable tasks. Of all of my friends who deployed in the last few years, about 40 or so, the ones who rate highest on job satisfaction were those working in Regular Force led units with front line tasks. Those with the lowest job satisfaction were those in Reserve led units doing routine security tasks. Not only are these jobs mundane and bad for morale, but it further reinforces the image of Reservists as 2nd class soldiers.
The cultural struggle of young Reserve officers trying to make a good impression within the Regular Force Task Force has often caused a lot of animosity amongst their own troops. Reserve soldiers often end up working longer and harder hours than their Regular Force counterparts, merely because the commanders don’t want their “all Reserve” units to be perceived as being less than fully capable.

When I deployed with TF 3-06, there were nine infantry platoons that were a mix of Regular and Reserve Force soldiers, approximately 85% Regular. They were the mainstay of the battle group and we spent the bulk of our tour at the front under the most austere of conditions, fighting the enemy. Our only break was our HLTA leave for 3 weeks.

There were two more platoons, both all Reserve. One was tasked with front gate security, the other with convoy escorts. Both of these are considered routine defence and security tasks (DnS). Convoy escorts is normally a mundane task, but in a high IED threat environment this task proved to be incredibly dangerous. The 30 man escort platoon was involved in over 50 significant incidents, either IED strikes or ambushes, which amounted to about 25% of all of their patrols. These numbers are easily double any other unit in the task force. This platoon was also under staffed and under equipped for the task, but because they were low priority, no help was coming.

The soldiers of the gate platoon spent 12 hours a day, 6 days a week, searching thousands of Afghans as they entered and exited the airfield. They were never in any harm and experienced no significant incidences. Often these soldiers lived and worked in isolation and ignorance of what the rest of the task force was doing. Anecdotally, I believe upwards of 30% of the soldiers in this platoon released immediately upon returning to Canada.

Had the TF organized 11 Infantry platoons based on a mixed Reg/Reserve structure, all 11 of the platoons could have rotated through all of these tasks. Spending 3 weeks in KAF on the gate, after 2 months at the front, would have been a very welcome change of pace. Similarly, a 40 man platoon with LAVs is a much more effective way to do convoy escorts than 30 people in RG-31s.

That said, very few Reserve units would have the ability to deploy an entire sub-unit, even if only a platoon. So the regimental consideration would be moot. Trying to keep Reservist forces generated from the same home unit together in their deployed unit does have advantages in terms of team cohesion and working with people you know. The longer the work up training, the less this matters.

For short deployments with short work up training, like Op Cadence and the G20 summit, keeping the Reserve units together with their own people was an integral factor to success, as most of the soldiers and commanders would have already had good working relationships that they imported from their home units. This success was emphasized in my own rifle company because people were not only kept together with their home units, but they were kept in the same jobs. Our CQMS from our regiment was our CQMS on OP Cadence. Our Ops NCO from our regiment was our Ops NCO while deployed, etc.

As a side note…

I’m not convinced that deploying Reservists in leadership positions is a good idea unless they already have operation experience while in lower rank levels. From basic training right on up to the ranks of commanding officer, there is a huge disparity in both the quantity and quality of training between Regular and Reserve personnel. Over time, there will also be a huge experience disparity as well. In a few short months of work up training, a Reserve corporal can be brought up to the same level as a Regular Force corporal. It would, however, take years to get a Reserve Warrant Officer up to the training and experience level of a Regular Force Warrant Officer. Either the training programs of the two components should be brought closer in line to mitigate this disparity, or only Reservists with previous operational experience should be allowed to deploy in command positions.
**On the need to have a larger CF (Reservist) presence on university campuses...**

Ultimately, the issue here lies in the fact that while in school soldiers need a job. Once they graduate they find something more permanent that may preclude the possibility of continuing a Class A career. The education reimbursement program is a crucial financial assistance tool that helps many soldiers finish their university program. It is, however, without any real strings attached and is only contingent upon passing your classes, and maintaining your Class A service.

Perhaps signing a contract of minimum service for a period of time after graduation, say 3 years of active "Class A service", could help Reservists transition into the civilian job market while forcing them to consider staying in the Reserves. Once the initial transition has been made, I expect the vast majority of Reservists would probably continue their service long after the mandatory three year period had lapsed.

I feel that making Reservists sign a three year contract when they initially join would be beneficial as well, as there are a lot of individuals who take advantage of the revolving door terms of service of the Reserves. They join, get issued equipment, begin doing their basic qualification courses, but disappear within their first two years of service, usually without clearing out or accounting for themselves. I think part-time contracts could be used in a couple of ways to address attrition, whether at the beginning of their service in the military, or as a condition of university funding to keep people active after graduation.

**On whether the Reserves have a special role in ensuring that the Canadian Forces are more reflective of the diversity of our society...**

As the vast majority of Reservists are drawn from the cities in which they operate, they are by default more representative of Canadian diversity. This will continue to be so as Canada becomes an increasingly urban nation. Increasing the size of the Reserves will easily emphasize this trend.

As most people, in general, want to live near their friends and families, I think the best way for the Army to attract urban Canadians into service is to garrison more Army units near cities. For someone who wants to join the infantry their options are Petawawa, On, Oromocto, NB, Shilo, MN, Wainwright, AB, Valcartier, QC, or Edmonton, AB. Only the last location on that list is a city that would come close to being considered urban, but hardly rates high on the list of happening cities.

If Canada considered stationing more soldiers closer to the big cities, where soldiers could actually live on the economy, like Toronto, Vancouver, Montreal, Calgary, Fredericton and Halifax, then I think there would be a lot more Reservists, and civilians alike, considering the Regular Force as a viable career option that is consistent with their values of raising their own family in a diverse urban community.

The cost of travelling a bit further to training areas outside of the city limits would be a small price to pay to bring the Regular Force more in line with the diverse nature of Canadian society. It would also help break the spell of what I personally feel is the root of all evil: base housing.

**On the need for more specialized and computer based training...**

I think the Reserve officer corps could benefit from computer based training to combat the reality that most Reserve units do not have enough soldiers to allow their officers to train above the platoon level. The commanding officer of a Reserve unit will never lead three full companies of soldiers in the field on a Reserve exercise. Most units struggle to deploy a full company. Computer generated training would allow these officers to train from a theoretical level with formations much higher than would be possible with real troops.

NCMs, however, I feel would be better served by continuing with an on the ground, in the field, training model. No amount of computer simulation can prepare a soldier for carrying a real rucksack, turning a real
wrench, firing a real weapon, using a real radio etc. The basic soldier, and especially NCM, skills that everyone in
the Army must master are physical tasks. Given the propensity for computerized training to be quite expensive,
I see little value for the money.

If our Firearms Training Simulator can be any comparison, it is often underutilized on account of the
specialty training required to operate the system and does little to actually improve one’s shooting ability.

**On the need for another Minister’s Monitoring Committee…**

I think a mixed Regular Force/Reserve Force integration office conducted within the military would help to
solve a lot of issues, while avoiding the issue of bureaucratization of the Reserve. The vast majority of the
issues that I have witnessed over my nine years come from the Reserves being viewed and treated as a separate
organization from the Regular Force. With Reserve augmentation of the Regular Force being our current raison
d’être, bringing people together from both sides of an issue would be far more effective at solving problems than
ministerial involvement.

**On the weekend warrior issue and the attitudes of the Regulars to the Reserves…**

I think the weekend warrior attitude is steeply entrenched in military culture and it isn’t going to change any
time soon. If the recent Afghanistan experience has done anything to change military culture, it has been to shift
the notion of weekend warrior to that of “rental“. I have, in fact, heard this term used by more than one senior
military officer and I think it is quite appropriate.

Most Reservists who deploy with the Regular Force end up feeling like a rented piece of equipment that
was sought out in a time of need. You are never quite treated like something that is owned and sometimes you
overhear the User complain about the state of repair that you were issued in. While you are rented, you will
likely be repaired or maintained to get you up to a workable standard. Then, when the job is done, you are
returned to the rental depot without much care or concern for what happens afterwards.

When I returned home from overseas on both occasions, we were immediately dismissed from our units
at the airport, either in Trenton, or Ottawa. No formal thank you, no job well done, thanks for coming out, no
recognition of the fact that we weren’t going back to Petawawa with the rest of our unit. It was as if we were
going home at the end of a work day, not saying goodbye to the team we had worked with for over a year. After
filling a vital role we were let go without a second thought.

In 2006, on my medals parade, the general who presided over the affair told us how important it was that
soldiers be honoured for their service in their home communities in front of their friends and families. But the
Reservists? We’ll do it here in a rainy vehicle parking lot in Kandahar Airfield because you won’t be coming back
to Petawawa for our medals parade.

For everything from pay, administration, equipment, support services and medical/dental, my experiences
with the Regular Force has been outstanding while I was tasked to the Regular Force. My experience with
the military outside of those deployments has been one of struggling for recognition. Trying to complete
pre-deployment screening check lists, like medical appointments, is usually frustrating. A medical doctor has
to do a check up to make sure you are fit for service before you can be given your Class C offer of employment;
however, you need to have a current Class B or C contract in order to get an appointment with a medical doctor.
For a Reservist who is already ‘rented’, getting the appointment is easy. A class A Reservist is not entitled to
military services. There are lots of examples of these little conundrums.

There is a myriad of training courses that are now considered to be part of the basic needs of a soldier that
are still off limits to Reservists. Similarly, there are many skill sets that are required within an infantry company
that are considered too advanced for Reservists. For example, every member of the 1st Bn Royal Canadian
Regiment is supposed to be LAV driver qualified, as for a mechanized infantry unit this is a basic requirement. Not all of the 1000 or so soldiers are qualified, but they come pretty close. On the other hand, every Reserve infantry unit is classified as a dismounted infantry and, therefore, doesn’t need these skills. Canada hasn’t deployed a light infantry battalion overseas in over 40 years. Every Reservist that has deployed in Afghanistan has done so as a member of a mechanized task force. All task forces communicate on radios that are encrypted, yet Reserve units are not allowed to hold the equipment required to train with this capability and it is very difficult to even get the courses required to operate the equipment. Close Quarter Combat Instructor and Urban Operations Instructor courses are almost inherently exclusive to the Regular Force, yet Reserve soldiers are expected to operate in the close, urban environment of Afghanistan without the benefit of having had this training prior to joining the task force.

Progress is being made in dribs and drabs and I think it is mostly being driven by individuals who are willing to ignore rules from time to time and do what makes sense. On my most recent deployment to the G20, someone at the Montfort hospital made a call and my whole unit was able to block book a doctor and get all of our medicals done on time. We were the only unit in LFCA to have every member complete the checklist before we showed up to work up training.

The progress does not seem to be coming in uniformly across the service, nor does it seem to be driven by policy or leadership from the top. It comes mostly from personal connections that have been made at the ground level by both Regs and Reserves working together to solve problems.

Any leeway that has been made in reversing negative cultural stereotypes of the Reserves will be lost if we cannot figure out a way to continue the ongoing working relationship between the two components. If the current direction of the CLS is followed in earnest, then I think you will see a quick resurgence of the weekend warrior.

On delays in the recruiting process...

The situation now is much different than nine years ago when I got in. Our unit currently has a list of over 20 people who have completed applications that have been waiting for quite a while, in some cases over a year, to be sworn into the military and loaded onto a basic training course.

I’m not sure if you can call this a retention problem, as they aren’t yet sworn members of the CF. The fact remains the same – that we are still going to be losing a lot of qualified applicants as many find other jobs while they are waiting. In terms of generating interest and attracting applicants, my impression is that there is still an abundance of people applying. It’s just a question of moving fast enough to process them and get them into uniform to ensure that we hire the most appropriate personnel, rather than reaching too deep into the barrel of those who couldn’t, or wouldn’t, be able to find a job elsewhere.

On the recent CLS directive dated October 19 concerning the Army Reserves

My primary concern is that the Reserves are often used as disposable labour. Every clued in Reservist always tries to manage their affairs while keeping in mind that when we are on full time employment, we have no job security. The proposed “Transition to Class A employment” is a euphemism for wide scale terminations. This many jobs lost would be a major news story if it happened in any other branch of the government. Especially because the military can technically get away with serving people their 30 days’ notice letter with no requirement for severance pay, benefits, pension pay outs or, anything really.

I also wonder how the CLS wishes to address the fact that many of the CLASS B Reservists who may be losing their jobs actually belong to the PRL (Primary Reserve List), a separate component of the military that is not associated with any of the traditional CLASS A units. These Reservists will be going to employment insurance if they lose their jobs. There may be a big rush of these individuals joining an actual Reserve unit, but I doubt it as many of these people are actually retired Regular Force soldiers who are now “double dipping”: 
collecting a pension because they are retired Reg force, but still working full time for the same organization that gave them their pension in the first place.

Secondly, and more importantly, the CLS states that the point of reconstituting the CLASS A Army is to provide a force of soldiers who are available for tasks, deployments, and Reg force augmentation as required. If the CLS succeeds in curtailing CLASS B employment, as well as limiting soldiers ability to make a living from CLASS A by parading in excess of 100 days a year, these people are going to be forced to get other jobs. Class A soldiers who have full time civilian careers rarely deploy and are almost never available for special tasks, like humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, summit security etc.

One of my friends on my last tour worked at a distribution centre for General Motors. He managed to get his union involved to get him the year and a half off needed to go on a tour. His deployment dates changed so frequently that his employer threatened to cancel his leave unless he could commit to a specific timeline for his absence. Rest assured, the experience was so frustrating that neither the member, nor his employer, was interested in trying to facilitate that again.

It is the “free-lance” Reservists, who hop around from CLASS B to CLASS B, contract to contract, who have no other civilian careers, which fulfill the vast majority of tour positions, short term staffing requirements and other operational needs that the CF has come to rely on Reservists for. I understand the CLS is forecasting a reduced need for this type of work in the post Afghanistan, but this current policy seems to be setting the system up to not have access to this capability in the future. I wonder if that is part of the plan.

**On training issues and the Regular Force…**

The vast majority of the time, when Reservists are brought into Regular Force battle groups for a deployment the mechanized learning curve is a big one. For a soldier to learn how to drive a new vehicle, or operate a new radio, is a manageable affair; however, it takes years of experience for a commander to learn how to effectively command a vehicle, which is based on a working knowledge of both the vehicle and its capabilities, and coordinate between vehicles, troops on the ground, and mechanized doctrine in general. For infantry officers, the course that introduces them to this doctrine is their PHASE IV, which few Reserve officers have been allowed to take.

I don’t think anyone can have too much training. A favourite expression of mine that I heard from an instructor years ago reads “when shit hits the fan, you will not rise to the occasion; you will sink to the level of your training.” That said, an argument can always be made over how much money we can afford to spend on training and how much is enough. That’s a different story. Inevitably, I think that regardless of how much money there is the quality and relevance of training should be measured against what tasks we will be expected to perform.

**On the issue of Regimental history…**

I think that the recent history of the unit is far more important than the ancient history from World War Two, etc. I am far more proud of what my unit has done in Afghanistan in terms of the number of soldiers deployed, the positions held and battles participated in, than I am with what certain people did on D Day. I think that the younger generation of soldiers would more or less agree with that identity. All of the older NCOs, however, I think would feel more strongly about the broader regimental history, as, before Afghanistan, trading on the credibility of past generations of soldiers was all they had.

Remembrance Day is always an important day for regimental history. I think it is equally important for retired veterans to see their regiments live on and continue to live up to the hard earned reputations that some units have fostered in combat. Battle honours are a very significant way for the Canadian Forces to honour regiments, Reg force and Reserves alike. I’m interested to see if any Reserve units will be honoured for their contributions to Afghanistan.
Reservist B

On the principal issues facing the Reserves...

There are many issues facing the Reserves. The most important issues that I think top the list are: Reserve pay and budget for training and courses (i.e. not having proper training or having training cut due to budget restraints). In my opinion, these two issues are intertwined. The CF Reserves would recruit more and retain more troops if these financial issues were resolved. I can think of a few troops that have left due to their pay being constantly screwed around with. I would personally like to see how many MP’s and top government officials would keep their positions if they did not see a pay cheque for 6 months, or their pay was consistently butchered!

Currently, the Reserve pay system needs to be improved in how it is administered. As well, the Reserve pay system needs to have more clerical staff dedicated to supervising pay to ensure troops pay is accurate. Lastly, the Regular and Reserve Force pay systems need to be amalgamated. Case and point: when I came back from Afghanistan the second time they paid me improperly which has resulted in me owing a balance of $2,000.00 to them. I know of too many issues like these occurring when Reservists deploy and are then required to move to the Regular Force pay system.

On the roles of the Reserves (mobilization, augmentation and footprint in the community)...

These roles are still valid. I would rank them in the priority of: C, B and A. I could see the Reserves being more integrated with the Regular Force in the future. I know that the Reserves having a specific role would be interesting and provide more relevance to some of the training. At the same time, I know that we are very effective in our current format of supporting the Regular Force in domestic and international operations, in a similar capacity to Afghanistan and the G20/G8 summits (as well as conducting normal Army training).

I think it is very important to establish a presence in communities across Canada. Providing the framework for mobilization is also important; however, the overall goal of the Reserves should always be to be in ‘Reserve’ to support military operations when required. We’re the happy medium: qualified troops ready to fight or assist without having to pay everyone a full salary.

On the desirability of establishing separate recruitment, training, pay and equipment budgets for the Reserves?

I think it would be very important to have a secondary budget; therefore, we would not become an easy target for when the higher ups are required to cut something (case in point the cuts to Reserve training, approximately Dec 09-Mar 10). A separate budget would make sense in a way.

On the main human resources issues facing the Reserves...

Pay administration should be at the top. The dedicated pension that came into existence is excellent for the Reserves (however a pain to buy back and calculate past service, but well worth it). The 85% issue is still a sticky subject. I also think that keeping people happy by ensuring they are paid on time and all administration issues are taken care of is integral to retaining Reserves. I can see how millions of dollars is lost due to troops discharging because they are fed up with the Reserve pay ‘BS’ that consistently sees them not being paid. On a good note, I like the $2000.00 education reimbursement that the Reserves offer. Definitely a perk!
On the issue of having more formed Reservist sub-units on foreign deployments...

Perhaps, perhaps not. As far as I have seen, integrating the Reserves into Regular Force units has worked so far. I am not sure how effective or practical an all Reserve sub-unit in an Afghanistan ‘like’ conflict would be; however, there is only one way to find out!

On the importance of the Reserves connection to local communities...

Having ties with the local community is very important for the CF’s ongoing PR campaign. A lot of Canadians are unaware of where the CF does their business. Continuing to have ties to the community is important.

On connecting the Reserve more strongly with provincial emergency measures organizations...

Not sure if there is a way to streamline the Chain of Command to ensure that when we are needed, we can be activated to assist. Has this been an issue in the past? Regardless of Reserve or Regular Force, I say that whatever is the most effective method of providing troops to whatever conflict/disaster arises should be kept.

On a stronger Reserves presence on university campuses...

Not sure what could be done! Keep the students happy by offering them the education reimbursement and maintaining relevant training would be one way to retain students. Would a university ROTP program like in the States be an option? Offering credits to students for service – perhaps an option.

On the role of the Reserves in reflecting the diversity of Canadian society...

Yes, they do. Reserves help reflect an interesting cross-section of Canadian society that is, sometimes, not present in the Regular Force. From different races, creeds, background, socio-economic and educational backgrounds, the Reserves assist in representing Canadian society more diversely than the Regular Force.

On the need for more computer-based and specialized training...

I am not sure if this would be the best option; however, more computers to assist in an administration capacity (to do paperwork and write reports) would greatly benefit training overall. I am not sure how many computers other armouries have, but if there was a computer to leaders’ ratio at the armouries where I work it would greatly benefit the efficiency and effectiveness of our unit.

On the need to establish a new Minister’s Monitoring Committee on the Reserves to report regularly on issues facing the Reserves...

Absolutely! I think this would help provide the Reserves a sounding board to address some of the concerns that we are/have been facing.

On the weekend warrior issue and the cultural divide between the Reserves and the Regular Force...

I think the Reserves have made a lot of headway in attaining parity with the Regular Force. It is something very difficult to measure, but it is certainly better than what it was years ago. Afghanistan has contributed to this improvement. The rough average being 1 in 6 of the troops deployed over the last several years to Afghanistan and abroad has been a Reservist; however, there is still a stigma facing Reservists that are injected into Regular Force units. How can this attitude be improved? Another war? That is the million dollar question.
On regimental history...

I do appreciate my unit’s history and a lot of others appreciate, respect and know about their unit. I think knowing about unit history, past battles and operations is important to inspiring unit cohesion, teamwork, pride and esprit de corps. I believe there is a lot of unit loyalty from the troops, it varies a little from person to person, but overall it is good and is instrumental in accomplishing reserve training.

To save money there was talk of disbanding the regiments and moving to a more American system; however, if they do this in the near future (say 2012), how much unit loyalty and esprit des corps will there be when you are part of 33 Brigade Light Infantry Battalion, which has a rich history of involvement with Canada and around the world dating all the way back to 201?

On the recruiting system...

The recruitment process when I went through took me 6 months with a lot of hoops and administration to jump through. I like the fact that you can fill stuff out online (that was back in 2002 as well!). I think some of the problems fall on the candidate him/herself to follow up on the administration and attend the appointments.

Reservist C

On pay issues...

At the beginning of May, 2009 I went on a one month contract with a unit in Petawawa. Over the month long period I was paid twice, in cash, to avoid the common pay problems that arise from Reservists working in Regular Force units. Both of the pay checks totalled around $1,400 each. At the end of the month, I went back home. In mid-June, I started a new contract for eight weeks, again in Petawawa, as support staff for leadership courses running that summer. For three pay periods I was not paid at all. This was rectified after numerous calls and emails to my orderly room. Solving the problem ultimately required unofficial support from a helpful Sgt.

Normal methods of redress proved ineffective. Usually all of the administrative problems required a memo sent up through the chain of command, which was a slow and arduous process. Often, paperwork was either lost, or ignored entirely; however, during the summer the unit was stood down and there was literally no support for junior non-commissioned members to receive proper representation because part time members have no chain of command at all. At the end of July 31, myself and another member of my unit were finally paid the accumulated sum of six weeks work and claims totalling approximately $4,600.

In March 2010 I investigated why I hadn’t been paid for 6 weeks. During this time I was desperately short on money after an extended holiday stand down and was living on credit. I was told that I was incorrectly paid twice for two weeks’ worth of work in May of the previous year, as shown by a large deposit at the end of July. This meant that I owed the unit around $1,400, or two weeks full time pay. The pay clerk assumed this off hand, and although I explained the situation thoroughly, she wouldn’t need to heed my complaints unless I filed an official grievance. The other soldier I worked with in May was able to prove definitively that he was not paid twice, thus fixing the situation, although this required three more weeks of him badgering the clerks for a solution.

On some of the challenges facing the Reserves...

One of the biggest challenges the Reserves faces is terrible retention rates. I couldn’t give you statistics, but the bureaucratic system doesn’t respect the needs of soldiers. Inadequate administrative support is a major reason people release from the Reserves. In fact, I know of several soldiers who left the Army, in large part, due to pay problems. We were stood down for several weeks more than normal at the start of this year, forcing many junior
members to get new jobs. When my unit started up again many privates and corporals said to themselves, why should I go out of my way for an Army that doesn’t care about me, when I can work at a big box store and know I’ll be paid properly?

For instance, one specific Cpl I know well left the Army and said Subway was a much better employer than DND. Another soldier, who is in Afghanistan right now, was attached to a different unit in Québec while he went to university, in an entire academic year he wasn’t paid once. It is a wonder he kept showing up at all. In my experience it is foolhardy, if not outright negligent, to put yourself in a position where your financial support is dependent on the Reserves. This sentiment is shared almost universally by most soldiers working part time with the Army.

If a high ranking officer tells you that reservists are treated as equals with Regular Force members, they are either lying, completely out of touch, or delusional. The stigma associated with reservists working with the Reg force is huge. Not only are the differences institutional, but cultural as well. Wearing a distinctive headdress, such as a highlander balmoral or unit strange insignia immediately marks you as a second rate soldier. When I walk across the base in Petawawa, I’m keenly aware that my weird hat makes me a target for higher ranking members looking to insure proper dress and deportment. When members of my unit arrived in Petawawa for work up training to deploy overseas they were torqued for weeks to “earn their place” as soldiers within their organizations. “Ha, ha a 19 year old corporal? That’s ridiculous”

On the recruiting system and subsequent retention...

Generally, most members don’t view it as a problem, because they don’t know what to expect and how long the process should take. It took about 6 to 8 weeks for me from start to finish and that was just fine. What I feel hurts the military much more is members who join and take their basic qualification courses and release shortly after for various reasons. Courses in general are very expensive and after only a couple months of training, tens of thousands of dollars are invested in soldiers; to have them release only a couple months to years later is a very costly loss, both financially and in terms of effort. Time and money spent on someone who doesn’t use their training are resources that could have been spent on someone else and are forever wasted. Of my “generation” of soldiers who joined the same fiscal year as I did, perhaps 60% of them made it to 2 years of service.

Reservist D

On the cultural divide between Reservists and Regular Force members...

I believe that the differences between the two stem right from the beginning of the training that members of each component go through. In the Reserves our military career courses are taught over the course of a long period of time, sometimes over alternating weekends for months at a time, and are taught by instructors from several different units depending on whoever was available at that time. Reservists will then sometimes adopt an “on the clock” attitude regarding military training, where “it doesn’t matter how bad this gets, I’m going home on Sunday” sort of mentality. The Regular Force members go through a 6-9 week straight training regimen (I forget the actual duration of Reg Force Battle School), taught by the instructors who are working at the Battle School, and they know that once they finish their training they will be living that lifestyle for the duration of their contracts. Meaning, they know that they aren’t going anywhere else. This leads the Regular Force members to adopt an elitist attitude towards anyone else who did not endure the same hardships they did to reach the same goals.

My particular experience with the Regular Force was actually quite positive. I never had a problem with the leadership of my Company about my being a Reservist, but there was always an underlying sense that several of the Jr. Ranks felt a sense of superiority over Reservists serving in the same position. The only thing that ever kept our differences from becoming serious problems was that over time most members, both Reserve and Regular Force, realized that it didn’t matter where a soldier came from, as long as they could do the job in the end.
On the positive side of being a Reservist...

I’m sure that you must have heard enough negative stories from myself and the others that you met earlier. But there are several positive aspects of being a Reservist that I would like to mention. Although we strive to be professional in what we do, many Reservists are students going to school, or fathers who work full time at a civilian career and still make time to come out to train once a week. I love being able to fit my military work into my lifestyle as simply as I do. There is (or was until recently) always work for me when I needed it and I always have the option of refusing work if I find myself pressed with other personal matters. That is probably my favorite aspect of being a Reservist – that I can tailor my work and personal needs depending on what I have going on at the time.

Reservist E

On pay issues...

In my five years in the Reserves there have been two major issues I have had with the Reserve Pay System. The first problem occurred when I first joined the Reserves. It took almost four months for my pay to accurately reflect the amount of days I had worked. This meant I had to be vigilant in keeping track of my days worked and reporting any discrepancies to the FIN staff. During this period, the amount I would get paid would always fall short of what I was actually owed by the CF. Eventually, however, this problem was corrected, but not after numerous visits to my FIN staff.

The second significant issue happened after my deployment. I was told that my Class C contract never ended correctly and I was over paid to the sum of approximately $2,600. I was told I needed to pay back this money to the CF and because of this my Land Duty Allowance claim was taken from me and I still had to pay the difference I owed around $170. This was very frustrating as this is a large sum of money to be over paid and because I remember going to the FIN staff to finalize all my tour administration prior to being over paid.

I know many stories of Reservists having problems with the pay system; however, I can only comment on my personal experience.
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