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Jean-Yves completed his military career as Vice-Admiral and first Commander of Canada Command in Ottawa, after 34 years of service. His senior appointments included Commanding Officer HMCS ALGONQUIN, Commander Maritime Operations Group Four, Deputy Commander Naval Reserve, Chief of Staff Joint Operations National Defence Headquarters, Commander Maritime Forces Pacific and Commander Canada Command.

Since leaving the military he has shared his time between consulting in matters of defence and emergency management, and mentoring officers at the Naval Officer Training Centre and Canadian Forces College.

Jean-Yves also has extensive experience in Organizational Review and Restructure having led the efforts in restructuring the Naval Reserve personnel and training the Pacific Fleet support organization. In 2005, he lead the Chief of Defence Staff Study on the Command and Control of the Canadian Forces (CF), which lead to the transformation that same year of the Operational Command structure of the CF. He is also well-known for his cooperation with other government departments and agencies who work as part of the National Security team.

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The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Canadian International Council, its Senate or its Board of Directors, or the views of the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Canada's announcement of a National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy to provide new ships raised the question: why two separate federal fleets? While the Canadian Navy has the mandate for the defence of Canada and its interests offshore, the Canadian Coast Guard has the civilian mandate of Marine Safety. Except for the RCMP, no one has a clear security mandate.

In some countries, the Coast Guard has the full spectrum of responsibilities which include Marine Safety and Homeland Security; others use mainly multi-tasking of their marine services through cooperation and coordination, but with strong government strategic direction and priorities. Fleet consolidation and rationalization studies in Canada supported the cooperative model with separate fleets.

While both services cooperate in Marine Search and Rescue, there is little else in matters of cooperation and, so far, only limited and mainly regional coordination.

While the RCMP relies on both the Canadian Navy and the CCG for transportation and support, politicians, academics and security pundits would like to see a more robust Coast Guard mandate with a Homeland Security mandate, especially in the North. The CCG must strategize about its future role if it wants to truly become a member of the National Security Team.

In the end, the right balance and mandate of the sea services can only be made following the publication of an overall Maritime Policy for Canada and supportive Government Directions.
SOMMAIRE

L’annonce, par le Canada, d’une Stratégie nationale d’approvisionnement en matière de construction navale pour encadrer l’acquisition de nouveaux navires a soulevé la question : pourquoi deux flottes fédérales séparées ? Alors que la Marine canadienne a pour mandat de défendre le Canada et ses intérêts au large des côtes, la Garde côtière canadienne a le mandat civil d’assurer la sécurité maritime. Sauf pour la GRC, personne n’a un mandat clair d’assurer la sécurité.

Dans certains pays, la Garde côtière est chargée de la gamme complète des responsabilités, et notamment la sécurité maritime et la sécurité du territoire ; d’autres utilisent surtout un fonctionnement multitâche de leurs services de marine au moyen de la coopération et de la coordination, mais avec une solide direction stratégique et des priorités dictées par le gouvernement. Les études de consolidation et de rationalisation de la flotte effectuées au Canada ont soutenu le modèle coopératif avec des flottes séparées.

Même si les deux services coopèrent en matière de recherche et de sauvetage en mer, cette coopération porte sur peu d’autres domaines et, jusqu’à maintenant, il s’agit seulement d’une coordination limitée et régionale.

Alors que la GRC s’en remet à la fois à la Marine canadienne et à la GCC pour le transport et l’appui, les politiciens, les universitaires et les pontifes de la sécurité aimerait voir un mandat plus robuste pour la Garde côtière, qui comprendrait un mandat de sécurité du territoire, particulièrement dans le Nord. La GCC doit réfléchir stratégiquement sur son rôle futur si elle veut vraiment devenir un des membres de l’Équipe de sécurité nationale.

Au bout du compte, il sera possible de réaliser un juste équilibre dans le mandat des services maritimes seulement à la suite de la publication d’une Politique maritime d’ensemble pour le Canada et de directives d’application émanant du gouvernement.
INTRODUCTION

In the midst of the Canadian Navy Centennial celebrations, “the Government of Canada… announced the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy, a long-term plan that will create good jobs in high-tech industries across Canada and provide much needed ships for the Canadian Navy and the Canadian Coast Guard.”

Although the main focus in the aftermath of the announcement has been discussion on the economic dimension of the Government’s Procurement Strategy, another issue has arisen in many Canadians’ minds: Why a Navy and a Coast Guard?

To the casual observer, having two main sea services may seem a replication of capability and a waste of public resources. Let us therefore examine their respective mandate, evaluate the international trends for Coast Guards, consider previous decisions on fleet consolidations, examine the current paradigm for cooperation and coordination, and discuss the future needs of the nation.

THE CANADIAN NAVY

Especially in 2010, during the year of its Centennial Celebration, the Canadian Navy has enjoyed a relatively good level of public recognition for its role in the defence of Canada. Describing its mission and role, the National Defence official website highlights that:

The Canadian Navy fleet roughly balanced between the Atlantic (Halifax, N.S.) and Pacific (Esquimalt, B.C.) coasts, has 33 destroyers, frigates, replenishment ships submarines and maritime coastal defence vessels, plus many more auxiliary and support vessels… The navy has both domestic and international roles. At home, maritime defence and security is the navy’s first priority in ensuring that Canada’s maritime approaches are effectively monitored and protected. Canada also needs naval forces with the ability to act internationally – whenever and wherever issues arise that threaten our national interests.

The Canadian Navy, as part of the Canadian Forces, draws its mandate from the Canadian Constitution and the National Defence Act, and is therefore an instrument of defence for Canada and of Canadian interests through the oceans of the world.

Guiding the future of the Navy is a recurring and evolving strategic assessment. The Canadian Navy has been an innovator within the Canadian Forces (CF) by conducting its own strategic assessments and articulating its resultant visioning since the early 1980s. More recently, since 2001, it has relied on its published and widely circulated publication Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020:

Leadmark examines the principles of naval strategy essential for a medium power such as Canada. As a strategic plan, it provides the rationale (the why) for capabilities (the what) required to fulfil [sic] the roles and functions projected for the navy of 2020 and beyond.

In 2005, an update was published in the form of a complementary publication, Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers: Charting the Course from Leadmark, which extended the outlook to 2025.
THE CANADIAN COAST GUARD

The Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) today is not quite what its name represents. Through the amalgamation of several federally owned fleets, the CCG is the government civilian fleet operator of 35 medium to large vessels. From an accountability perspective, the CCG is a Special Operating Agency of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO); a 2003 Order-in-Council formally redefined “the Coast Guard as a marine service delivery Agency of the Government of Canada.”

As a result, the CCG is responsive to several federal departments. It takes its direction from Transport Canada on matters of Marine Safety, including: “pleasure craft safety, marine navigation services, pollution prevention and response, and navigable waters protection”. Its other responsibilities are derived from the Oceans Act and the Canada Shipping Act.

Specifically, under the Oceans Act, the CCG has “responsibility for providing:

• aids to navigation;
• marine communications and traffic management services;
• icebreaking and ice-management services;
• channel maintenance;
• marine search and rescue;
• marine pollution response; and
• support of other government departments, boards and agencies by providing ships, aircraft and other services.”

It also derives from the Canada Shipping Act “...powers, responsibilities and obligations concerning:

• aids to navigation;
• Sable Island;
• search and rescue;
• pollution response; and
• vessel traffic services.”

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5 In the Oct 15, 1990 Osbaldeston Report to the President of the Treasury Board, All the Ships That Sail: A Study of Canada’s Fleets, it was reported that as part of the 1962 Royal Commission, there were, then, 13 separate fleets (p.1). When the 1990 Study was undertaken, there were four fleets located in National Defence, CCG (then with Transport Canada), DFO and the RCMP. Albeit small, today the RCMP still operates vessels.
6 The DFO website lists a fleet of 116 vessels; however, when comparatively examining vessel size and ocean going capability with the Canadian Navy, the author assesses that only 35 are significantly large ships (mid-shore patrol vessels to Icebreakers: http://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/eng/Ccg/fleet.
7 The decision resulted from the hearings of the Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans Report, Safe, Secure, Sovereign: Reinventing the Coast Guard, which addressed machinery of government changes.
9 The CCG or the CF provide vessels for transportation, or support for Law Enforcement when duly requested by the responsible Minister.
11 The Minister of National Defence is the Minister responsible for SAR. Under Canada Command, the CF operates Joint Rescue Coordination Centres in Halifax and Victoria. While Marine Controllers from the CCG and Air Controllers from the CF man those two centres, the two Navy Rear-Admirals in command of Joint Task Forces Pacific and Atlantic have the overall command of Marine and Air SAR operations in their regions.
12 Fisheries and Oceans Canada (2010), Canadian Coast Guard: Mission, Vision and Mandate.
The Canadian Navy and the Canadian Coast Guard: Cooperating Sea Services or Co-existing Federal Fleets

What is Guarding the Coast?

When looking at practices around the world, there are two main models for Coast Guards: one that focuses on a multi-role of Marine Safety, Search and Rescue, and Marine Environmental Stewardship; and one which, in addition, incorporates Homeland Security functions\(^{13}\) to its mandate and capabilities, often with a marine constabulary dimension. Today, the CCG is built on the former, but it is not alone. While the quintessential model and most recognized example of an all encompassing Coast Guard is the United States Coast Guard (USCG) with its own personnel, vessels and aircrafts, a quick look at both Pacific and European nations shows that both models co-exist in those continents.

Looking at the large Coast Guards in the Pacific, Japan, as an example, has grown to emulate the USCG with its sizeable fleet that is mandated and capable of fulfilling the full spectrum of missions,\(^{14}\) and Singapore has, separate from its Navy, a Police Coast Guard that is sizeable and mandated to enforce the law and maintain order in Singapore Territorial Waters and to prevent and detect crime [and]... also conduct Search and Rescue and assist other maritime agencies such as MPA [Maritime and Port Authority], RSN [Republic of Singapore navy], ICA [Immigration and Check Point Authority] and Customs.\(^{15}\)

Many other nations, however, adhere to a regime of cooperation and coordination between their maritime agencies to fulfill the range of missions to protect their nations, citizens, and interests on the water. Some models of those, as well as Canada’s evolving model, will be discussed later on.

Fleets Consolidation

Fleet consolidation and rationalization have been considered on more than one occasion. Back in 1962, the Canadian Government established the Royal Commission on Government Organizations (GLASSCO); as part of its study, the GLASSCO Commission found that 13 separate departments and agencies operated vessels. Although it examined the option of consolidation under one agency, it rejected it, but “...did recommend progressive consolidation under the Coast Guard of all civil marine patrol and law enforcement activities to the extent that this could be done without detriment to efficiency”\(^{16}\).

The subject was formally raised again in 1990, and once again a study was commissioned, this time by the President of the Treasury Board. By then, in part from the recommendations of the GLASSCO Commission, the number of agencies operating significant size vessels\(^{17}\) had been reduced to four: DND; Transport Canada;\(^{18}\) the Department of Fisheries and Oceans;\(^{19}\) and the RCMP\(^{20}\). Under the chair of the Honorable Gordon F. Osbaldeston, P.C., O.C., these four departments/agencies, which operated fleets, actively participated in a comprehensive study in which the objectives were:

- to examine the current management of the federal government’s fleet management policies, practices and operations, including the resources involved;

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\(^{13}\) Typical Homeland missions may include: ports, waterways and coastal security; drug interdiction; migrant interdiction; marine law enforcement.

\(^{14}\) Japan Coast Guard Pamphlet: http://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/e/pamphlet.pdf.


\(^{16}\) Osbaldeston, G.F. (1990, October 15), All ships that sail: A study of Canada’s fleets, Ottawa, Canada: Treasury Board, P.1.

\(^{17}\) Author considers significant size vessels those classed as ocean or coastal going ships, not small boats of which there must be hundreds as on the water utility vehicles.

\(^{18}\) At that time the CCG was under Transport Canada (TC).

\(^{19}\) The TC and DFO fleet have since merged.

\(^{20}\) The RCMP Marine Section, which was formed In 1932 from the Department of National Revenue Preventive Services’ duties and vessels, had at one time 35 ships, including 11 seagoing craft with a primary duty to curtail smuggling in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and on the east and west coasts. Today, the RCMP operates five patrol vessels (PVs) over 9.2 m in length, one on the east coast and four on the west coast: http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/mar/index-eng.htm.
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• to assess alternatives to the current management and delivery of these functions; and
• where the findings of the Study team warrant the consideration of some form of fleet consolidation, to identify preferred options for its achievement in term of desirability and feasibility.21

The Osbaldeston Report is considered to this day to be one of the most thorough reviews undertaken by the Government on the subject of Fleet consolidation. Its conclusions, in part, were that:

The full consolidation or “single fleet” option, while theoretically possible [was] not a viable option and should not be pursued further...The [then] present arrangement of three fleets and three operating departments [was], generally speaking, a suitable organization structure for efficient and effective utilization of marine assets. However, the status quo [could not] be endorsed as there [was] significant opportunity for more effective utilization and consequently increased economy and effectiveness.22

COORDINATION VS. CONSOLIDATION

When a nation does not possess the resources to create a large full spectrum Coast Guard independent of its Navy, it resorts to multi-tasking, cooperation and coordination; however, in order to be effective, it must provide Policy, Strategic Guidance and Priorities. Let us examine two very well working models: France and Australia.

France

The General Secretariat for the Sea, established in 1995, leads France’s maritime policies. Under the direct authority of the Prime Minister, its role is to ensure coherence with government decisions concerning coast guard functions among 15 ministerial departments and agencies. Its mission is to control, evaluate and forecast maritime policies.23

Although France’s Coast Guard functions have seemingly been only formally recognized since December 2009 when an inter-ministerial Committee adopted the Blue Book – a National Strategy for the Sea and Oceans, France has had a functioning Coast Guard through the organization of the Préfet Maritime, first defined in 1978.24 The Préfet Maritime has under his command the regional Préfectures Maritimes and the Gendarmes Maritimes, and the responsibility for national coordination of all stakeholders in marine safety and security.25

With its unique paradigm rooted within its turbulent history, France has made its national security apparatus part of the military. The Gendarmerie is both a public security/safety organization that acts as a civilian constabulary and as a military police force. As a result, the Gendarmes Maritimes are military personnel carrying out police operations; their missions include immigration control, monitoring of fishing operations, police at sea, and search and rescue operations.

22 Osbaldeston, p.58.
23 Fisheries and Oceans Canada (2010), North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum – France: http://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/e0011264.
24 The roles and subordinate organizations are listed in Préfecture Maritime de l’Atlantique, Le préfet maritime: http://premar-atlantique.gouv.fr/prefecture/organisation.
**Australia**

Based on the numerous challenges of its sovereignty, the vastness of its territorial seas and the reality that scarce resources need to be closely managed, Australia has chosen to forge a network of government and non-government stakeholders to deal with a range of threats to its offshore maritime domain. Its structure is based on the four pillars of Disaster and Emergency Management: prevention, preparedness, response and recovery. Their approach is very much whole-of-government, especially during the response and recovery phases when strategic direction is expected and given.

The uniqueness of the Australian system is that it also:

a. created one government strategic document, the *Guide to Australian Maritime Security Arrangements (GAMSA)*, that provides a synopsis of all Government legislation, roles and responsibilities in one single, easy-to-refer-to document; and

b. stood up under one roof a permanent inter-agency command for the planning and conduct of Maritime Security operations – Border Protection Command.

Combining the resources and expertise of the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service and the Department of Defence, and working with officers from the Australian Fisheries Management Authority, the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service, and other Commonwealth, State and Territory agencies, Border Protection Command delivers a coordinated national approach to Australia’s offshore maritime security.

Since in Australia many of the traditional coast guard roles are conducted by the Customs and Border Protection Service, they were designated as the lead and host department for the Border Protection Command; however, to maximize the experience gained through complex maritime operations, the Royal Australian Navy seconds a Rear-Admiral to be head of the Border Protection Command.

Of note, although Border Protection Command contributes to Search and Rescue through the sharing of its Command Operating Picture (COP), the SAR on water capabilities are often performed by regional volunteer organizations such as the Marine Rescue New South Wales.

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**Coordination and Cooperation in Canada**

As previously described, Canada operates a distinct Navy and Coast Guard with so far only two things in common: both contribute to the maritime SAR and both are occasionally tasked to support the RCMP, especially for transportation of their members who are required to enforce the laws of Canada.

Although cooperation occurs at sea when SAR or marine safety responses are required, there are no day-to-day coordination mechanisms ashore for resource allocation for all other national tasks. There is no whole-of-government strategic direction body that provides coherent direction and guidance in matters of maritime issues.

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27 Ibid., p.18.


29 Coordination of maritime surveillance began in the late 1970s. Government Reviews in the 1980s and 1990s saw many changes that lead to the 2004 Taskforce report on Offshore Maritime Security; this resulted in the formation of Joint Offshore Protection Command (JOPC), with a significant focus the counter-terrorism effort. In October 2006, it was renamed Border Protection Command to better reflect the organization’s wider maritime surveillance and response role: [http://www.bpc.gov.au](http://www.bpc.gov.au).


32 Although the CCG’s primary role is for SAR Zone coverage, occasionally the Navy will backfill when needed. An annual numbers of ship days is allocated by the Navy for this task and is normally negotiated.
That is not to say, however, that stakeholders do not talk. At the National level, both the Canadian Navy and the CCG, along with key federal partners, contribute to the discourse on the Marine Security Initiatives by being members of the Transport Canada lead Inter-departmental Maritime Security Working Group (IMSWG). More importantly, however, is that regionally there is now a true opportunity for cooperation and an opportunity for day-to-day potential coordination with the creation of the Marine Security Operations Centres (MSOC):

The National Security Policy provided government direction for specific federal agencies with a vested interest in Marine Security to establish Marine Security Operations Centres. The Centres will provide Canadians with enhanced marine security and help detect, assess and support a response to any threat to marine security that could affect the safety, security, environment or economy of Canada. Threats could include emerging terrorist activity, trans-national crime, environmental and health threats, and over-fishing in Canadian waters by other countries...Partners include Transport Canada, the Department of National Defence, the Canada Border Services Agency, the Canadian Coast Guard and the RCMP. The project itself is led by the Department of National Defence.

Although the MSOC project has only officially achieved an Initial Operating Capability and may not be finished for two years, the DND facilities in Victoria and Halifax are now able to permanently host representatives of all stakeholders.

WHITHER THE CANADIAN COAST GUARD

When it comes to the role and the future of the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG), there is no lack of opinions among politicians, academics and national security pundits. The prevalent theme is that the CCG needs to be more robust and more capable of “guarding” Canada’s three Oceans, especially given the renewed emphasis on the North. The Canadian International Council, in its 2010 report, Open Canada: A Global Positioning Strategy for a Networked Age, is quite critical in its recommendation:

We recommend that the Canadian Coast Guard, currently an arm of the Department of Fisheries, be moved to Public Safety Canada, alongside the Canadian Border Services, and that it be appropriately armed. The Canadian Coast Guard must be given the capability to literally guard our coasts; on this we agree with the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. This is especially true in the Arctic...

Despite these sorts of pronouncements, there is clearly reluctance in some quarters towards having the CCG become an armed agency, and it does not only emanate from the outside. While opinions may be split on the subject, the CCG itself remains overtly passive – one could say unengaged on the subject – and simply happy to be the generic civilian fleet of the Government of Canada with a very limited role in National Security. A recent query, as background to this article, to the CCG Headquarters regarding the CCG desire, or lack thereof, to add Homeland Security types of missions to its traditional roles resulted in a response that officially supported the status quo:

36 Observations by the author as part of his functions while in the Canadian Navy and later consulting for DND.
37 The CIC is a non-partisan, nationwide research council established to strengthen Canada’s foreign policy.
[The] CCG is already a core member of Canada’s maritime security community and is relied upon by partner agencies to provide on-water platforms, maritime expertise and vessels traffic system information in support of Canada’s national security priorities.39

The “elephant in the room”, expressed quietly in maritime circles, is the lack of confidence about the capability of the CCG to become an armed service. A deeply civilian culture and a unionized environment are often heard of as perceived obstacles. There is no denying that the current CCG crews are skilled sailors, but they have seldom, if ever, been put in the position of Peace Officers,40 nor have they controlled the use of deadly force; but it does not mean that they could not. Over the years, the same concerns were vehemently expressed about civilian unionized Fisheries and Oceans Officers and Canada Border Services Agents. Given national will and government direction, obstacles, real or perceived, were overcome and today no one questions the decisions of the past which resulted in the training and arming of those government representatives.

Towards the Future

If we are going to move forward and create a better paradigm of Maritime Security, a few key decisions are recommended:

• The future balance of responsibilities between the Canadian Navy and the Canadian Coast Guard, especially as members of the National Security team, must not be decided based on today’s numbers of vessels in service, the immediate desire to increase our Northern presence, and historical roles of the government fleets. Like in Australia, the Government needs to articulate an overall Maritime Policy, provide Strategic Guidance, and state its Priorities. From there, the true domestic and territorial sea capability requirements of the CCG and the Navy can be examined and formulated.

• The CCG needs to step up and conduct its own strategic review, offer recommendations for its future, and overtly enter the public debate arena. The CCG will surely include a continued key role in the enforcement of the Oceans Act and the Canada Shipping Act, and a prominent partnership role in Marine SAR; however, the future could include a vital role in National Security. In today’s security climate, to be only a supporter and not a major contributor to National Security may not be good enough to ensure a future.

• Cooperation between the two Sea Services must be widened, regardless what the future paradigm of national fleets might be. Working side-by-side in the MSOCs is a start, but there could be many opportunities from working more cooperatively in developing mutually supportive sea schedules, to conducting exchange of personnel at the tactical and operational level. As examples, the Canadian Navy knows Use of Force and has learned much about armed support to the RCMP and maritime boarding in general over the last 20 years, while the CCG has much expertise to share in operations in ice and SAR equipment. In addition, exchange at the executive level would be a huge breakthrough, and this is possibly what the CCG needs to start thinking strategically.

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39 E-mail correspondence from the Office of the CCG Commissioner to Author, Feb 10, 2011.
40 The Criminal Code of Canada defines the obligations, powers and protection of Peace Officers under the Law. Section 2 of the Criminal Code specifically defines who may have the status of Peace Officer.
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STRATEGIC STUDIES WORKING GROUP

The Strategic Studies Working Group (SSWG) is a partnership between the Canadian International Council (CIC) and the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). The CIC absorbed the former Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies (CISS) upon the CIC’s formation in 2008, and the CISS’s original focus is now executed by the SSWG.