The Role of the Militia in Today’s Canadian Forces

Jack English | September 2011
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Lt. Col.-Dr. John A. English retired from the Canadian army in 1993 with 37 years service in the King's Own Calgary Regiment, the Queen's Own Rifles, and Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry. Educated at Royal Roads and the Royal Military College, he went on leave without pay to attain an MA in history from Duke University in 1964. He graduated from Canadian Forces Staff College in 1972, attained an MA in war studies from RMC in 1980, and a Ph.D. from Queen's University in 1989. During his career he served as a NATO war plans officer, Chief of Tactics of the Combat Training Centre, instructor at the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College, and curriculum director of the National Defence College. He is the author of A Perspective on Infantry republished in paperback as On Infantry (Praeger, 1984), The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command (Praeger, 1991), Marching through Chaos: The Descent of Armies in Theory and Practice (Praeger, 1996), Lament for an Army: The Decline of Canadian Military Professionalism (Irwin, 1998), Patton’s Peers: The Forgotten Allied Field Army Commanders of the Western Front 1944-45 (Stackpole, 2009), and Surrender Invites Death: Fighting the Waffen SS in Normandy (Stackpole, 2011). He is also co-author of On Infantry: Revised Edition (Praeger, 1994) (translated into Chinese) and principal editor of The Mechanized Battlefield: A Tactical Analysis (Pergamon, 1984). In 1992 he received a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council fellowship and between 1997 and 2002 served as a Professor of Strategy with the US Naval War College. On return to Canada he was employed as director of the Defence Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change. In 2004 the Minister appointed him Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel of The Brockville Rifles and in 2010 Honorary Colonel.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In June 2002, the Chief of the Defence Staff officially approved the role of the Militia as: “Within the Army, the Reserves (Militia) provide the framework for mobilization, the Army's connection with Canadians, and augmentation within the Canadian Forces ['augmentation' referring to the provision of supplementary (depth) and complementary (breadth) capabilities].” This role statement flowed naturally from Minister of National Defence Art Eggleton's 6 October 2000 policy announcement that the raison d'être of the Militia would be mobilization, closely followed by the augmentation of regular army operations, all based on an adequate national military footprint to provide a framework for army expansion should the need arise. This announcement also set in motion Land Force Reserve Restructure aimed at rejuvenating and revitalizing the Militia.

The foregoing Militia role was gradually swept under the carpet, however, by a regular force military establishment that failed to implement the growth aspect of Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) in the intended spirit of original and subsequent ministerial direction. While substantial progress was made in the area of Militia conditions of service, owing largely to the indispensable contribution made by reservists to regular force operations, little progress was made in increasing Militia strength. Originally, LFRR Phase I aimed at attaining a Militia part-time strength of 15,500 by the end of March 2003, while Phase II aimed at reaching 18,500 by March 2006. The Militia made the first target in May 2003 when it paraded 15,648, but never the second. In March 2010, Militia armoury floor strength totaled only 15,613 part-time soldiers and 949 full-time reservists in direct training support. And this was after a net influx of some thousand personnel of the Communications Reserve, which was not part of the Militia in 2000.

This paper argues that the forces-in-being approach of National Defence Headquarters thwarted the growth of the Militia at every important turn. Such an approach placed little value on what was considered the anachronistic concept of the Militia as a framework for mobilization. As a consequence NDHQ concluded that the Militia was quite large enough as it was and because of this, no longer an army in waiting ready to be expanded in an emergency. The ideal task for the Militia was to augment the regular force, preferably as individuals, closely followed by that of providing a military connection to the civil community. The trouble with this approach was that the more reservists were called out for regular force augmentation, the fewer leaders and instructors were left to train Militia personnel in their units. Without a strong leadership cadre to train an infusion of recruits, the Militia base risked shrinking to the point of not being able to sustain the augmentation of the regular force. For this reason alone the Militia needs to be expanded.

The NDHQ forces-in-being approach also ignored the reality of a dangerous world in which flash points such as Korea, Iran, and the Taiwan Strait could conceivably blow up into major conflicts. Unforeseen wars in the Falklands, the Gulf, and Afghanistan, have already shown that future conflicts cannot be foretold with any certainty. Current trends further suggest that whether they be conventional or asymmetric in nature, large forces with substantial logistical trains will continue to be required. This points to a potential need for force expansion, especially for a regular army as small as Canada’s. That such a need exists was also made abundantly clear by the 2004 testimony of the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, Vice Admiral R. D. Buck, that it would take about five years to induct 5000 regulars and 3000 reserves owing to a shortage of training personnel and inadequate infrastructure. At this pace Canada would have missed World War II.

Having plans for mobilizing on a reserve framework would, therefore, be prudent and provide a strategic hedge against the unpredictable nature of future conflict.

Clearly, the regular army has been stretched to the breaking point and is currently too small to carry out all assigned tasks. Indeed, by many measures, it is tiny. U.S. regular armed forces numbering roughly 332,000 sailors, 323,000 airmen, and 548,000 soldiers would translate into regular establishments of 33,200 for the Canadian navy, 32,300 for the air force, and 54,800 for the Canadian army. Here again, however, the reality is a total Canadian armed force of 65,000 regulars and a regular army of under 20,000 with insufficient critical mass to field more than battle groups. And this is not even taking into account a U.S. Marine Corps of about
200,000 personnel. Even by the British yardstick of around 224,500 regulars in all armed forces for a nation not quite twice as populous as Canada, the Canadian Forces should parade over 120,000. British army regular strength of 114,000 would convert into almost 60,000 for the Canadian army.

In addition to being too small, the regular army is on the verge of pricing itself out of business. The Canadian defence budget, while comparatively modest in global terms, constitutes one of the largest national expenditure envelopes, which, because it is discretionary, leaves it vulnerable to cuts. Between 51 and 57 percent of the defence budget also goes toward personnel related costs, mainly to sustain the regular force establishment. Such costs include the provision of housing and other facilities, particularly infrastructure, to accommodate and improve the quality of life of regular troops and their families. Plainly put, the cost of maintaining standing armies in peacetime has always proven problematic, which is why General Guy Simonds once said: “No nation, not even the richest, can afford to maintain continuously ‘forces in being’ capable of meeting major unforeseen emergencies. There must be reserves of partially trained personnel which can be called upon in emergency.”

The Canadian predicament of having too small an army because of fiscal inability to afford regulars in larger number can be resolved by reserves. Like any business aiming to save money by hiring part-time employees, the army cannot help but benefit from an expanded Militia capable of fielding full-time citizen-soldiers as required. Until called out on full time duty, however, Militia soldiers are far less expensive than regulars whose wages, housing, pensions and other standing army overheads cost 80 percent more. The cost of wages for a hypothetical 18,500 Militia soldiers would be around $200 million as compared to about $880 million for roughly 17,500 civilians employed by the defence department and $800 million for the regular army. Such figures underscore the worth of the Militia as an economical avenue for expanding the army and getting a better military return on taxpayer dollars.

A traditional and natural task for an expanded Militia to undertake would be home defence, the one area in which Canada imposed conscription during World War II. This would entail assisting other federal agencies in protecting the nation from terrorist attacks on pipelines, hydro stations, roads and railways that could be delivered by foreigners or home grown dissidents within Canada. First-hand experience in dealing with floods, ice storms and forest fires has also left the Militia ideally suited to take on tasks associated with other natural disasters such as earthquakes, nuclear meltdowns and major chemical spills. Any disruption of the flow of critical oil and energy supplies to the U.S. by terrorist groups could, of course, present a more knotty problem. If Canadians prove incapable of dealing with such disruption, the Americans might well feel compelled to act unilaterally in their own interests even if it involves jeopardizing Canadian sovereignty. This means that Canada may have to defend against American “help.” Having a capability for doing this constitutes one of the most compelling reasons for Canada to retain a Militia large enough to carry out territorial defence tasks for sovereignty purposes alone.

Besides providing a natural skeletonized framework around which to expand the army of Canada, the Militia additionally offers an honourable and desirable vocation in and of itself. What is surprising, however, is the failure of the regular army to comprehend the worth of a stronger Militia in advancing land force interests. Though civilians holding down responsible jobs in communities cannot afford to give more than part-time service to regiment and country, the skills they bring could make them better candidates for certain specialized tasks than regulars. To have doctors, lawyers, business entrepreneurs, teachers, professors, students and members of other professions learn about military matters in various degrees of depth benefits national defence in another important way as well. With most Canadians having never served in the military, Militia troop time, if more actively encouraged, would go a long way toward redressing a pronounced lack of public knowledge about Canada’s armed forces. To cut the Militia, which at present is shockingly no larger than NDHQ, would therefore be a tragic mistake. Cutting headquarters to save a citizen-soldier force that has demonstrated its worth in action overseas, on the other hand, would surely be prudent.
SOMMAIRE

En juin 2002, le chef d’état-major de la Défense approuva officiellement le rôle de la milice comme suit :
« Au sein de l’Armée, la Formation des réservistes (milice) offre un cadre pouvant accueillir une mobilisation, une connexion de l’Armée avec les Canadiens et une augmentation des Forces canadiennes [« augmentation » fait ici référence à la fourniture de capacités supplémentaires (en profondeur) et complémentaires (en largeur) »].

Cet énoncé de rôle découlait naturellement de l’annonce de politique faite le 6 octobre 2000 par Art Eggleton, le ministre de la Défense nationale, à l’effet que la raison d’être de la milice serait la mobilisation, suivie de près par l’augmentation des opérations de l’armée régulière, le tout fondé sur une empreinte militaire nationale adéquate pour servir de cadre à une expansion de l’armée au cas où le besoin s’en ferait sentir. Cette annonce a également mis en branle la Restructuration de la Réserve de la Force terrestre, qui visait la réjuvenation et la revitalisation de la milice.

Le rôle antérieur de la milice a toutefois été graduellement balayé sous le tapis par un établissement militaire de la force régulière qui n’a pas réussi à faire la mise en œuvre de l’aspect croissance de la Restructuration de la Réserve de la Force terrestre (RRFT) dans l’esprit qu’avaient voulu lui imprimer la directive ministérielle originelle et les directives subséquentes. Même si on a fait un progrès substantiel dans le domaine des conditions de service de la milice, en majeure partie grâce à la contribution indispensable faite par les réservistes aux opérations de la force régulière, peu de progrès fut accompli dans l’augmentation de la force de la milice. À l’origine, la Phase I de la RRFT visait à atteindre une force de milice à temps partiel de 15 500 membres à la fin de mars 2003, et la Phase II visait à atteindre 18 500 en mars 2006. La milice atteignit son premier objectif en mai 2003, alors qu’elle atteignit les 15 648 membres, mais jamais le deuxième. En mars 2010, la force au plancher du manège militaire n’arrivait qu’à 15 613 soldats à temps partiel et 949 réservistes à plein temps en soutien direct à l’entraînement. Et c’était après l’arrivée nette d’un millier de personnes de la Réserve des communications, qui ne faisait pas partie de la milice en 2000.

Le propos de la présente étude est que l’approche de forces constituées du Quartier général de la Défense nationale a contrarié la croissance de la milice à tous les virages importants. Une telle approche accordait peu de valeur à ce qu’on considérait être le concept anachronique de la milice comme cadre d’une mobilisation. En conséquence, le QGDN a conclu que la milice était bien assez nombreuse comme elle était et, à cause de cela, qu’elle n’était plus une armée en attente d’expansion dans une situation d’urgence. La tâche idéale réservée à la milice était d’augmenter la force régulière, préféremment comme individus, suivie de près par celle d’offrir une connexion militaire avec la société civile. La difficulté de cette approche, c’était que plus on appelait des réservistes pour augmenter la force régulière, moins de chefs et d’instructeurs restaient pour entraîner le personnel de la milice dans leurs unités. Sans un cadre de leadership solide pour entraîner une infusion de recrues, la base de la milice risquait de se ramasser au point de ne pas pouvoir soutenir l’augmentation de la force régulière. Pour cette raison seule la milice a besoin d’expansion.

L’approche des forces constituées du QGDN ignorait aussi la réalité d’un monde dangereux dans lequel il était concevable que des points chauds comme la Corée, l’Iran et le détroit de Taiwan puissent éclater en conflits majeurs. Des guerres imprévues dans les Falklands, le Golfe et en Afghanistan ont déjà montré qu’il n’est pas possible de prédire les conflits futurs avec la moindre certitude. Les tendances présentes suggèrent de plus que, qu’elles soient de nature conventionnelle ou asymétrique, de grandes forces dotées de trains logistiques substantiels vont continuer à être nécessaires. Cette observation pointe vers un besoin potentiel d’expansion de la force, particulièrement pour une armée régulière aussi petite que celle du Canada. Le fait qu’un tel besoin existe a aussi été rendu abondamment clair par le témoignage de 2004 du vice-chef de l’état-major de la Défense, le Vice-Amiral R.D. Buck, à l’effet qu’il faudrait environ cinq ans pour admettre 5 000 réguliers et 3 000 réservistes à cause d’une pénurie de personnel d’entraînement et d’une infrastructure inadéquate. À ce rythme, le Canada aurait manqué la Seconde Guerre mondiale.

Il serait donc prudent d’avoir des plans de mobilisation sur un cadre de réserve et d’avoir ainsi une avance stratégique devant la nature imprévisible d’un conflit futur.
Il est clair que l’armée régulière a été poussée jusqu’au point de rupture et qu’elle est présentement trop petite pour s’acquitter de toutes les tâches qui lui sont assignées. En fait, quelle que soit la mesure, elle est minuscule. Les forces armées régulières des États-Unis comptent en gros 332 000 marins, 323 000 aviateurs et 548 000 soldats, ce qui se traduirait en des établissements réguliers de 33 200 pour la Marine canadienne, 32 300 pour l’aviation et 54 800 pour l’Armée canadienne. Mais là encore, la réalité est que la force armée totale du Canada est de 65 000 membres réguliers et une armée régulière de moins de 20 000, avec une masse critique insuffisante pour mettre en service plus que des groupements tactiques. Et on ne tient même pas compte d’un U.S. Marine Corps d’environ 200 000. Même suivant le critère britannique d’environ 224 500 réguliers dans toutes les forces armées pour un pays qui n’a pas tout à fait le double de la population canadienne, les Forces canadiennes pourraient aliginer plus de 120 000 personnes. La force régulière de l’armée britannique, de 114 000, devrait se convertir en presque 60 000 pour l’armée canadienne.

En plus d’être trop petite, l’armée régulière est sur le point de devenir assez chère pour ne plus trouver preneur. Le budget de la Défense du Canada, bien qu’il soit comparativement modeste en termes globaux, constitue l’une des enveloppes de dépenses nationales les plus importantes, ce qui, parce qu’il est discrétionnaire, le rend vulnérable aux coupures. Entre 51 et 57 pour cent du budget de la défense va aussi à des coûts reliés au personnel, en majeure partie pour soutenir l’établissement de la force régulière. De tels coûts incluent le logement et autres installations, particulièrement d’infrastructure, pour assurer et améliorer la qualité de vie des troupes régulières et de leurs familles. En termes simples, le coût du maintien d’armées permanentes en temps de paix s’est toujours trouvé problématique, et c’est pourquoi le Général Guy Simonds a déjà dit : « Aucun pays, même le plus riche, ne peut se payer le luxe de maintenir continuellement des ‘forces constituées’ capables de répondre à des situations d’urgence imprévues. Il doit y avoir des réserves de personnel partiellement entraîné qu’on peut appeler dans ces cas-là. »

La situation malencontreuse du Canada, d’avoir une armée trop petite à cause de l’incapacité financière d’avoir les moyens de se payer des réguliers en plus grand nombre, peut être résolue par les réservistes. Comme toute entreprise qui vise à économiser en embauchant des employés à temps partiel, l’armée ne peut pas ne pas bénéficier d’une milice élargie capable de mettre en service des citoyens-soldats au besoin. Mais en attendant d’être appelés à servir à plein temps, les soldats de la milice sont beaucoup moins chers que des réguliers, dont les salaires, le logement, les pensions et autres coûts de frais généraux des armées constituées coûtent 80 pour cent de plus. Le coût des salaires pour les soldats d’une milice hypothétique de 18 500 personnes serait d’environ 200 millions de dollars, comparativement à environ 880 millions pour, en gros, 17 500 civils employés par le ministère de la Défense et 800 millions pour l’armée régulière. Ces chiffres soulignent la valeur d’une milice comme avenue économique d’expansion de l’armée et comme façon de tirer un meilleur rendement des fonds du contribuable.

Une tâche traditionnelle et naturelle pour une milice serait de se charger de la défense intérieure, un des domaines où le Canada a imposé la conscription pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Il s’agirait d’aider d’autres organismes fédéraux à protéger le pays contre des attaques terroristes, sur les pipelines, les centrales hydroélectriques, les routes et les chemins de fer, qui pourraient être portées par des étrangers ou par des dissidents bien à nous, du Canada. L’expérience de première main, qui consiste à s’occuper des inondations, des tempêtes de verglas et des feux de forêts, a aussi laissé la milice comme étant idéalement adaptée pour assumer les tâches associées à d’autres catastrophes naturelles comme les tremblements de terre, des fusions de cœurs de réacteurs nucléaires et des déversements chimiques majeurs. Tout interruption du flux des approvisionnements critiques de pétrole et d’énnergie vers les États-Unis par des groupes terroristes pourrait bien sûr présenter un problème plus épineux. Si les Canadiens s’avèrent incapables de prendre en charge de telles perturbations, les Américains pourraient bien se sentir forcés d’agir unilatéralement dans leurs propres intérêts même si la chose risquait de compromettre la souveraineté canadienne. Cela veut dire que le Canada peut avoir à se défendre contre « l’aide » américaine. Avoir la capacité de faire ça constitue une des raisons les plus impérieuses pour le Canada de retenir une milice assez importante pour s’occuper de tâches de défense territoriale à des seules fins de souveraineté.
The Role of the Militia in Today’s Canadian Forces

En plus de fournir un cadre naturel réduit à un squelette autour duquel étendre l’armée du Canada, la milice offre en plus une vocation honorable et désirable en elle-même et par elle-même. Ce qui est surprenant, cependant, c’est que l’armée régulière de parvienne pas à comprendre la valeur d’une milice plus forte dans l’avancement des intérêts de la force terrestre. Bien que les civils qui détiennent des emplois responsables dans les communautés ne puissent pas se payer le luxe de donner plus qu’un service à temps partiel au régiment et au pays, les habiletés qu’ils y apportent peuvent faire d’eux de meilleurs candidats que les réguliers pour certaines tâches spécialisées. De faire en sorte que des médecins, des avocats, des entrepreneurs commerciaux, des enseignants, des professeurs, des étudiants et des membres d’autres professions s’instruisent de questions militaires à des degrés divers bénéfice à la défense nationale d’une autre façon importante également. Avec la plupart des Canadiens qui n’ont jamais servi dans l’armée, le temps de troupe de la milice, s’il est plus activement encouragé, ferait beaucoup pour redresser un manque prononcé de connaissance du public à l’endroit des forces armées du Canada. Ce serait une erreur tragique de couper la milice, qui n’est présentement pas plus nombreuse que le QGDN, au point où c’en est choquant. Il serait par ailleurs sûrement prudent de couper le quartier général pour épargner une force de citoyens-soldats qui a démontré sa valeur dans son action outremer.
INTRODUCTION

Canada’s reserve army of part-time citizen-soldiers is still commonly, if not legally, termed the Militia, which as an established military force in country predated the Dominion Militia Act of 1868 by almost sixty years. Sadly, not much visible evidence remains to show that the new Dominion fully appreciated the efforts of Militia soldiers in quashing rebellions, fending off Fenians, and establishing sovereignty in British Columbia and the Yukon. Most militiamen who served went to their graves unheralded and unremembered. When the entire nation girded for war in 1914, however, things changed. The Non-Permanent Active Militia of part-time soldiers and the Permanent Active Militia (or Permanent Force) of full-time soldiers formed the kernel of the Canadian Corps, and the patient work of marking every fallen soldier’s grave commenced in earnest.1 The sacrifice and battlefield performance of the Canadian Corps was such that after the Great War the Chief of the General Staff, Major General A. G. L. McNaughton, expressed the view that a citizen Militia, trained by a permanent regular cadre, was the proper type of land force for Canada. As he expected armies of the future to be smaller, more mobile, harder hitting and better trained than those of the past, he did not envision any large expansion of fighting forces on mobilization. Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King shared this view and asserted as late as 30 March 1939 that the days of great expeditionary forces acrossing the oceans were over.2

When the Second World War broke out in September 1939, about half the volunteers joining the Canadian Active Service Force to fight overseas were former or serving members of the Non-Permanent Active Militia and the Permanent Active Militia. Militia as a wartime title disappeared during the preparation of the Canadian Army Programme of 1941, as General H. D. G. Crerar considered both names unattractive and an “awful mouthful.”3 An order in council of 19 November 1940 consequently re-designated the Canadian Active Service Force the Canadian Army (Active) and the Non-Permanent Active Militia the Canadian Army (Reserve). The Militia name nonetheless received a renewed lease on life following the dispatch of another Canadian Army Special Force to Korea and a mixed regular-reserve brigade to Germany during the Cold War. In 1954, a major study recommended basing mobilization on the reserve army and re-designating the full-time active component as the Canadian Army (Regular) and the part-time reserve component as the Canadian Army (Militia).4 The Militia name continued to stick, even through the unification years, although the National Defence Act no longer mentioned the term.

Since Militia remains an historically, well-understood, name that is still, even fondly, used to describe the army or land force citizen-soldier reserve, it will be employed as a preferred term throughout this paper. Given the place of today’s Militia within the rather complex and delusively inflated structure of Canadian Forces reserves, the term additionally lends clarity to an otherwise prosaic nomenclature. As currently constituted, Canadian Forces reserves comprise four separate elements, officially termed the Primary Reserve, the Supplementary Reserve, the Cadet Organizations Administration and Training Service, and the largely aboriginal Canadian Rangers who patrol the North. The Cadet Organizations Administration and Training Service can hardly be considered a true reserve, however, as it trains 12 to 18 year-old youth in non-military pursuits. The Supplementary Reserve, which could be a valuable asset, still remains highly suspect from an organizational perspective.5 The Primary Reserve includes the 4000-strong Naval Reserve, the Air Reserve of some 2300 personnel, a Health Services Reserve, the Judge Advocate General Reserve, the new Canadian Special Operations Command Reserve, and the Army Reserve or Militia. In April 2008 the Communications Reserve with

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1 In March 1915 the British formed a Graves Registration Commission and in May 1917, on the suggestion of Canadian Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden, established a permanent Imperial War Graves Commission to commemorate the missing and care for the graves of the dead. In March 1960 it became The Commonwealth War Graves Commission as it continues to be known today. Herbert Fairlie Wood and John Swettenham, Silent Witnesses (Toronto: Hakkert, 1974), 5-6, 18, 203-204, 215-216; J. L. Granatstein, Canada’s Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace (Toronto: University Press, 2002), 24; and John A. English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign (New York: Praeger, 1991), 14, 44.
2 English, Canadian Army, 69.
3 Colonel C.P. Stacey, Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Volume I, Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1955), 89; English, 68-69, 82; and Granatstein, 350.
about 2200 personnel reverted to the Militia, which with an armoury floor strength around 16,700 forms the largest reserve element within the Canadian Forces.

The role of the Militia officially approved by the Chief of the Defence Staff on 11 June 2002 under the heading Army Reserve Role, stated that: “Within the Army, the Reserves (Militia) provide the framework for mobilization, the Army’s connection with Canadians, and augmentation within the Canadian Forces.” This clear and comprehensive role statement flowed naturally from the Minister of National Defence Art Eggleton’s 6 October 2000 policy announcement that the raison d’etre of the Militia would be mobilization, closely followed by individual and unit augmentation in support of regular army operations, all based on an adequate military footprint across the country to provide a framework for army expansion should the need arise. This policy announcement also served to accelerate what was termed Land Force Reserve Restructure aimed at rejuvenating and revitalizing the citizen-soldier Militia. For reasons that are difficult to accept from a professional military perspective, the Militia role finally agreed upon after countless hours of substantial debate and discussion – and formally blessed by the Chief of the Defence Staff in 2002 – was gradually and surreptitiously swept under the carpet by the regular force military establishment.

How and why this happened will be examined in the course of this paper as it bears on the larger question of why promised Militia growth has been thwarted at every important turn. While substantial gains have been made in the area of Militia conditions of service, mainly owing to the indispensable contribution made by reservists in overseas operations, little progress has been made in increasing Militia strength. As this remains indisputably the most critical factor affecting Militia survival and effectiveness, this paper will give due consideration to numbers paraded. It will also argue that the huge labour costs associated with maintaining regular forces underscore the worth of the Militia as an economical avenue for expanding the army while getting a better military return on taxpayer dollars. The regular army, currently too small to carry out assigned tasks and relatively tiny for a nation of 34 million, may simply be too expensive to be enlarged because of the cost of maintaining a standing force of full-time soldiers. Like any organization or business aiming to save money by hiring part-time employees, the army cannot, therefore, help but benefit from an expanded Militia. The Militia would be capable of fielding full-time citizen-soldiers, already proven in operations overseas, but only as required and not on permanent hire. Since the future is impossible to predict, a strengthened Militia, backed up by an appropriate induction and training system, would also provide a natural framework for army mobilization should a major crisis arise.

Regular force truculence regarding the merits of large-scale mobilization and the contention that it is a government rather than military responsibility appears to have helped sideline the Militia role approved in 2002. Some evidence of this dates from the summer of 2006 when the Project Management Office for Land Force Reserve Restructure closed down in accordance with the view that the time had come to integrate Militia restructure into the overall Canadian Forces and army transformation process. Set up in January 2001 to ensure the progressive growth and improved effectiveness of the Militia, the Project Management Office had overseen the production of a first draft army mobilization plan aimed at generating forces up to the third highest level of four mobilization stages called for by the 1994 Defence White Paper. In assigning primary and secondary missions to every Militia unit in Canada, the plan detailed specific tasks for the mobilization of some 40,000 citizen-soldiers in an emergency. These tasks included critical infrastructure protection involving security operations, urban search and rescue, protective construction, and chemical, biological and radiation

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5 Slide showing Army Reserve strengths as of 31 March 201, provided by Chief of Staff, Land Reserve to the Executive Council of Honorary Colonels 27 June 2011.
6 CDS 11 Jun 02 – Army Reserve Role. With the inclusion of the bracketed caveat: “(‘augmentation’ referring to the provision of supplementary (depth) and complementary (breadth) capabilities)”.
8 The buzz word “transformation” was used by NATO in the 1990s and the U.S. where President George W. Bush campaigned on a pledge to transform the U.S. armed forces by skipping a generation of technology. In early 2001 he called for lighter, more mobile and more lethal ground forces as well as manned and unmanned air forces capable of striking with precision globally. His Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, saw his critical challenge as bringing the American military successfully into the 21st Century. Thomas G. Mahnken, “Transforming the U.S. Armed Forces: Rhetoric or Reality,” Naval War College Review, 3 (Summer 2001): 85-99.
defence. Given the threat of catastrophic terrorism continuing after 11 September 2001, possessing a capacity to induct large numbers of reservists to undertake such tasks seemed prudent. Described as a foundation upon which to build, the plan represented concrete progress toward fulfilling a recommendation of the 1995 Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves to define Primary Reserve roles in higher mobilization stages – especially for the Militia – as a basis for the recruitment, training and the provision of formed units. The demise of the Project Management Office, however, presaged the end of mobilization planning and even mention of the Militia role in which mobilization figured prominently.9

The latest rendition of the transformation of the Canadian Forces set in motion by General Rick Hillier, who became Chief of the Defence Staff on 4 February 2005, coupled with the expansion of the Canadian expeditionary effort in Afghanistan, effectively focused almost all attention on reinforcing the overstretched regular army with Militia augmentation. Mobilization simply disappeared from the military lexicon, which arguably suited air and sea environments that considered themselves forces-in-being. Expensive ships and aircraft take years to produce, compelling naval and air forces manning relatively more sophisticated weapons platforms than armies to plan on fighting with the equipment and crews immediately available to them. Today, both the navy and air force claim to have reserves, but they are not reserves in the sense of a skeletonized army of part-time soldiers that could be mobilized in emergency and completely manned through the addition of citizen volunteers.

Owing to their more pronounced equipment orientation, the navy and air force have inclined to keep their reserves small while using them for immediate operational and tactical augmentation. Unlike the Militia, the tiny naval reserve has sailors paid as regulars on full-time duty permanently operating an ancillary force of small Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels alongside the heavier warships of the regular fleet. The air force reserve, with a large complement of former regular pilots, likewise participates in on-going operational training as part of the team. The army approach to having a reserve, on the other hand, is much more personnel intensive and aims at the strategic deployment of main contingent manpower to sustain smaller regular forces committed to action. As navies and air forces have never viewed their reserves in the same light as armies have theirs, lumping them together in a common mould has always been a mistake. This marked difference in approach has, unfortunately, bedeviled discussion about the future of reserves within the unified Canadian services.

Hillier, who made a name for himself commanding NATO’s International Stabilization Force in Afghanistan from February to September 2004, nonetheless expressed the view that the navy and air force had led the way in integrating their regular and reserve forces in order to accomplish their mission. He also felt that any mistrust that had existed between army reserves and regulars had dissipated by the time he became Chief of the Defence Staff and that they now both operated as one army with a shared common vision. As Chief, Hillier sought to transform the Canadian forces from a Cold War-oriented, bureaucratic, process-focused organization into a modern, combat-capable force, where the three elements – navy, army and air force, enabled by special forces – all worked together as one team to protect Canada by conducting operations effectively at home and abroad.10

Like countless military visionaries before him, he advocated an agile and flexible military that could field the right kind of force for assigned missions, whether to deal with natural disasters such as a tsunami or ice storm, or counter an insurgency in southern Afghanistan. The charismatic and personally likeable Hillier promoted his brand of transformation with the evangelical fervour of a latter day Elmer Gantry, effecting the closest thing ever to a personality cult within the Canadian Forces. In fact, Hillier was able to do what was institutionally impossible in America and Britain for three reasons: the military inexperience of Canadian politicians, the relatively tiny size of the Canadian Forces, and the overly powerful position of the Chief of the Defence Staff. Unlike his U.S. counterpart, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who is not in the chain of command, but only advises the

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9 After retirement Major General E. S. Fitch, who headed the Project Management Office, said that his efforts had no value inasmuch as the mobilization plan was only a sop to Honorary Colonels and a reserve lobby group. David Pratt, The Army Reserve: A Status Report for the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, January 27, 2011, 82-83.

10 General Rick Hillier, A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War (Toronto: HarperCollins, 2009), 68-69, 270, 323. Owing to their relatively small size, Canadian land, sea, and air elements are unlikely to fight together overseas as a joint force. To employ Canadian air forces just to support a Canadian army, for example, would be a less efficient use of assets that could be more effectively employed centralized in alliance with other air forces. A similar argument applies to the use of the navy, which also prefers to work with other navies.
The Role of the Militia in Today's Canadian Forces

Secretary of Defense who gives orders directly to unified global commanders, the Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff retains sole responsibility for the control, administration and de facto command of the Canadian Forces.11

Hillier's vision, endorsed by Prime Minister Paul Martin and Minister of National Defence Bill Graham, resulted in the 2005 Defence Policy Statement that announced a $13 billion defence budget and three broad roles: protect Canadians, defend North America in conjunction with the United States, and contribute to international peace and stability. The Canadian Forces, while not replicating every function of premier militaries, had to be effective, relevant and responsive, capable of carrying out a range of operations, including combat. Aiming to strike a balance between domestic and international operations, the policy statement placed greater emphasis on the defence of Canada and North America than in the past by according home defence first priority. Stability operations with allies abroad were also to be undertaken using diplomatic, defence and development assets. Land forces were additionally saddled with a highly questionable “three block war” doctrine that integrated combat, stability functions and humanitarian relief operations.12 In short order it became the foundation of all combat training for operations as the army turned to embrace a mainly counter-insurgency role. Significantly, all of this was accomplished without any counter-argument, the assumption being that there was nothing of value to be learned from the Cold War. Hillier's successor as Chief of the Land Force Staff, Lieutenant General Marc Caron, parroted the flawed “three block” mantra and even declared that he wanted no Cold War warriors around. As for reserves, the statement only acknowledged their nationwide presence and specific skills, noting that they would remain an essential part of overall national military posture. In recognition of Hillier's concern that he did not have enough troops for prospective tasks, the statement announced that the Canadian Forces would be increased by 5000 regulars and 3000 reservists so that 5000 troops could be continuously sustained on international operations or natural disaster involvements.13

The 2005 Defence Policy Statement also called for the restructuring of the Canadian Forces command system in accordance with Hillier's wishes. This resulted in standing up four new commands: Canadian Expeditionary Force Command with responsibility for all overseas operations; Canada Command with responsibility for all domestic operations; Canadian Special Operations Forces Command; and Canadian Operational Support Command. The Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff organization, previously in charge of all operations both overseas and in Canada, was at the same time dismantled, but this was all that Hillier succeeded in excising from National Defence Headquarters. Having railed against the endless process of an already bloated headquarters, he apparently wanted to cut its size, but ended up leaving it larger and possibly more inefficient than ever. In 2003 an estimated 5600 uniformed personnel worked in National Defence Headquarters, along with roughly as many civilians and a further untold number of consultants. By any organizational measure this was a ridiculous overhead for a small force of 55,000 regular personnel, 20,000 civilians and 20,000 part-time reservists. The situation was even worse than this, however, as a 1999 effort to reduce National Defence Headquarters by a third had only been achieved through the sleight of hand posting of 1000 headquarters staff from Ottawa to Kingston. Hillier, for his part, ended up increasing what was left in Ottawa to well over 6000 uniformed personnel in an outrageous total establishment of 17,500 military and civilian billets that included 400 in public relations.14

The point in mentioning this is that National Defence Headquarters is today roughly as large as the entire Militia.

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11 Douglas L. Bland, Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces (Toronto: Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995), 1, 26-29, 175-177. Under the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the chain of command runs from the President of the United States, through the Secretary of Defense, to the combatant commanders who command all military forces within their area of responsibility. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the service chiefs of staff are responsible for readiness of the U.S. military and serve as the President's military advisers, but are not in the chain of command.

12 Incredibly, the “three block war” concept penned in two magazine articles by U.S. Marine General Charles C Krulak in 1997 and 1999 became a key pillar of Hillier’s transformation policy. Krulak’s reflective articles were more illustrative than prescriptive and, understandably, never gained official sanction in either U.S. Marine Corps or U.S. Army doctrine. To carry out peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance functions, while at the same time fighting a determined enemy capable of disrupting both efforts, seemed nigh on impossible. Clearly, the concept lacked intellectual depth and needed fleshing out. Hillier nonetheless seized upon the catchy phrase while Deputy Commander of the US III Corps at Fort Hood 1998-2000 and brought it back to Canada. Thus, in 2005, the Canadian Forces embraced a concept that had been floated in the U.S. military, but never adopted with the same fervour. Doctor A. Walter Dorn and Michael Varey, “The Rise and Demise of the “Three Block War,” Canadian Military Journal, 1 (2009): 38-45.

13 2005 Defence Policy Statement; and Hillier, 272, 322-323.

14 Globe and Mail, 29 October 2010. As also reported, all Canadian Forces’ headquarters employed 12,000 uniformed and 28,000 civilian personnel.
MILITIA MARGINALIZATION AND THE CONCEPT OF FORCES-IN-BEING

This ballooning of National Defence Headquarters contrasted sharply with the contraction of the Militia over the years. Indeed, the decline of the Canadian Militia constitutes a sad chapter in the national and military history of Canada that needs to be recounted for purposes of context. Briefly, in July 1947, the Militia paraded some 33,704 citizen-soldiers within an authorized ceiling of 43,000, while the regular army fielded roughly 13,985 soldiers. By 1950, Militia strength increased to around 38,500, with a 60 paid days training ceiling, and regular numbers rose to just under 20,000. In 1952, a total of 3,908 officers and 9,865 Militia soldiers attended field camp, up from a total of 12,000 in 1951. Figures for 1953 and 1954 were 14,000 and 15,000 respectively. The growing Soviet threat and outbreak of hostilities in Korea had meanwhile led the government to triple the size of the defence budget from $403 million in fiscal year 1950-51 to almost $1.45 billion in fiscal year 1951-52. To meet Canada’s ground force commitment to Korea the government further opted to retain the regular army for defence of Canada operations, while recruiting militiamen and civilians – many demobilized World War II veterans – to form a completely new Canadian Army Special Force to cross the Pacific. Organized as the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade, this 5000-strong force, backed up by a reinforcement pool of 2105, was commanded by a former militiaman, Brigadier J. M. Rockingham who had distinguished himself in combat operations in Northwest Europe.15

In recruiting a second brigade for service in Europe with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Canadian army again turned to the Militia. The Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, believed in the power of the Militia to find men if they could continue to be affiliated with their units. At the time the regular force paraded some 49,000 troops and the Militia about 47,000. He accordingly established six regionally diverse composite infantry battalions from fifteen existing militia regiments, each providing two companies. In the event of major war, he reasoned, each of these companies could be expanded into a battalion, thereby providing the basis for a field force of two divisions. This arrangement provided enough troops for two brigades, one forward deployed in Germany as the 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade, and one in Canada ready to reinforce it as necessary. The line units of the 27th Brigade in Germany consisted of three composite Militia infantry battalions, a composite Militia artillery regiment, a composite Militia engineer field squadron and a composite Militia field ambulance. The regular Army provided a tank squadron which was actually a composite Militia-regular force sub-unit. Owing to administrative difficulties arising from different terms of service among Korean, NATO, and home brigade soldiers, however, all active duty units were made regular. The result was that by 1952 regulars outnumbered reservists for the first time in Canadian history.16

The rapid peacetime expansion of the forces from 1951, in which year 6.6 percent of GNP went to defence, also saw the strength of the Royal Canadian Air Force surpass that of the regular army in 1955. This rather uniquely Canadian evolution unquestionably reflected the great emphasis placed on the aerial deterrence of war in the era of “massive retaliation” proclaimed by U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in January 1954. In a period where growing fear of sudden nuclear attack appeared to increase the need for forces-in-being, the value of a reserve army Militia was questioned. The Minister of National Defence, Brooke Claxton, consequently commissioned a board of senior officers in June 1954 to examine and report upon the organization, training and administration of the Canadian army reserve force. Headed by Major-General Howard Kennedy, the board recommended that the reserve force, re-designated the Canadian Army (Militia), assume the role of providing a partially trained and equipped force as a nucleus to be mobilized and brought up to strength in case of emergency. By the end of 1954, however, Major-General F. F. Worthington, Civil Defence Coordinator under the Department of National Health and Welfare, called for the Militia to be used in national survival search and rescue operations in the event of nuclear attack. Simonds, who worried that such a specialized role would turn the Militia into a safe haven for those who wished to avoid active service, responded that armed forces maintained and trained

15 Granatstein, Army , 316, 320-21; and John Marteinson et al, We Stand on Guard: An Illustrated History of the Canadian Army (Montreal: Ovale, 1992), 342-344, 392.
16 Granatstein, Army, 337-342; Marteinson et al, 372-379. Simonds also selected a reserve major-general to sit on Army Council alongside his Vice-Chief of the General Staff, Adjutant-General, and Quartermaster-General.
primarily for combat could always offer assistance to the civil defence authority. The Militia, between 1955 and 1957, thus experienced a marked revival with reinvigorated summer camp concentrations, but all such training ceased thereafter, ostensibly to free up money for the purchase of equipment for the regular force. Paid training days for the Militia fell from 60 to 45 per year.\(^{17}\)

In 1958, at the height of the so-called golden age of deterrent thought that accentuated the worth of forces-in-being, newly appointed defence minister George Pearkes announced that the primary role of the Militia would henceforth be to restore order and conduct search and rescue re-entry operations into “target areas” in the event of a nuclear attack on Canada. The following year responsibility for most civil defence functions, apart from humanitarian tasks, reverted to the Department of National Defence from National Health and Welfare, which had taken over this responsibility from National Defence in 1951. The result was that the army at large inherited the civil defence role. By the spring of 1960, the regular army fielded 22 mobile support columns, backed up by 44 mixed columns of regular and Militia troops, for what were now officially termed national survival operations. But whereas the regular force continued to conduct conventional field training, national survival training became the first priority of the Militia. The emphasis accorded national survival only began to subside at the end of 1963, but at this juncture the government slashed authorized Militia strength from around 51,000 to 32,000. The Militia never fully recovered and in the following year another ministerial committee, headed by Brigadier E. R. Suttie, led to the reduction of the army presence across Canada, especially in rural areas and small towns where Militia units and armouries were shut down. From 1965 onward the Militia role changed to one of augmentation, that is, providing not formed units, but officers, specialists and soldiers on an individual basis to fill personnel vacancies in the regular force. Top priority was to bring the regular field force up to war establishment in time of need, then provide trained reinforcements for overseas formations, maintain internal security and assist the regular force in national survival operations.\(^{18}\)

Yet, as the advent of NATO’s 1967 doctrine of “flexible response” clearly showed, the requirement for large-scale conventional forces had not diminished in the nuclear era. As early as the 1950s, studies had indicated that while fewer troops might be required at any given time to man defences, more would be needed in actual fighting to replace the greater number of casualties expected in a nuclear war. Avoiding the rush to nuclear war by extending an initial conventional phase as called for by “flexible response,” of course, made greater strategic sense notwithstanding the fact that this also required substantial increases in the number of ground troops. By any reasonable logic, clashes between large mobilized armies, as unpalatable as the thought might be, were much preferable to the alternative of general nuclear war waged on entire societies across oceans and continents. This important lesson largely escaped the notice of the Canadian regular military establishment caught up in other frenetic activities. The 1964 defence White Paper placed top priority on peacekeeping and the integration of Canadian Forces Headquarters followed in the fall. The ambitious new Minister of National Defence, Paul Hellyer, also envisioned creating a mobile, global strike force to fight brush fire wars, but unlike Hillier did not find one. Hellyer departed the defence portfolio in 1967 after having set in train the unification of Canada’s armed services in February 1968. His successor, Leo Cadieux, then promoted bilingualism and the establishment of French language units in Quebec. In 1969, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau reversed the priorities assigned by the 1964 White Paper, elevating the protection of sovereignty to first priority instead of last and peacekeeping last rather than first. The 1971 White Paper also called for a management review aimed at streamlining defence department coordination between military and civilian staffs, which resulted in a newly designed National Defence Headquarters in 1972. Meanwhile, the authorized ceiling of the Canadian army in Europe dropped from over 6000 soldiers in a first-class heavy brigade group serving in the British Army of the Rhine to some 2800 soldiers in a barely viable combat group straddling two Canadian air bases.\(^{19}\)

\(^{17}\) Marteinson et al, 393; Granatstein, Army, 350-351; and John A. English, Lament for an Army: The Decline of Canadian Military Professionalism (Toronto: Irwin, 1998), 51-52.

\(^{18}\) English, Lament, 52; Marteinson et al, 396, 410-412.

The Militia, reduced to strength of 19,343 by 31 March 1970, was all but forgotten. Also cancelled, in an earlier burst of short-sightedness, was the Canadian Officer Training Corps in universities.20 The strength of the regular component of the Canadian Forces continued to erode from a peak of roughly 126,474 in 1962. Regular army strength of 49,760 in the next year fell to 46,264 in 1965 and 40,192 in 1968. In 1969 the Minister of National Defence Leo Cadieux announced that unified regular military forces were to be reduced by 20 percent to around 80,000 and all reserves to 19,000. Significantly, the Conservative government’s 1987 White Paper, the first since 1971, recommended increasing reserve strength to 90,00021 as part of a general NATO build-up. As it turned out, however, this White Paper was shortly overtaken by events unleashed by Soviet glasnost and perestroika. The signing of the Charter of Europe at Paris on 21 November 1990, was as close as anything to a peace treaty signaling the end of the Cold War. It also triggered a search for peace dividends22 that saw the new government of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien announce in 1993 that the regular strength of the Canadian Forces would be reduced from 79,799 to 60,513 by 1998. Between 1993 and 1998 the government also slashed defence spending by 23 percent. By 1995 the Militia had been reduced to 133 units in 125 Canadian cities and towns. With an authorized strength of 19,597, it barely mustered 18,347 effectives at one point. By April 1998 the Militia paraded roughly 15,243 soldiers.23

EFFECTS TO REJUVENATE THE MILITIA

As the 1994 defence White Paper called for the rejuvenation of Canadian Forces primary reserves within a personnel ceiling of 23,000, the Minister of National Defence, David Collenette, appointed a three-man Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves in April 1995. Under the leadership of The Right Honourable Brian Dickson, former Chief Justice of Canada and a distinguished veteran of World War II, the Commission accepted the need for the Militia to continue to provide formed sub-units for overseas deployments, but warned that preparations had to be made for all eventualities and, accordingly, accepted the mobilization concept set forth in the 1994 White Paper as appropriate. The concept called for four stages: Stage 1, “force generation” to augment the regular force and take on new tasks within the existing resource framework; Stage 2, “force enhancement” to allocate more resources to accommodate involvements such as the 1990 Gulf War and peace operations; Stage 3, “force expansion” to provide forces for Korean-style conflicts and NATO commitments; and Stage 4, “national mobilization” for a major war. As the fourth step could touch upon all aspects of Canadian society, it would only come into effect with the proclamation by the Governor-in-Council of a “war emergency” under the Emergencies Act.24 On finding no detailed planning for Stages 3 or 4, however, the Commissioners observed that not having a mobilization plan for a major war seemed imprudent. They consequently recommended that a “no cost” national mobilization plan be drafted and put in place with all dispatch.

In proposing a plan for a “national” mobilization stage, the Commissioners would have been well aware that the National Resources Mobilization Act of June 1940, passed by Parliament during the dark days of Dunkirk, set in motion Canadian mobilization for the Second World War. They would also have known that the Committee on Defence Coordination had compiled a Government War Book in March 1938 and that the government, over a three day period from 19 August 1940, carried out the “national registration” of all males and females above the age of 16 living in Canada. It was within this governmental context of organizing society and ramping up industry that the army mobilization plan, entitled Defence Scheme Number 3 (Major War), fitted so nicely. This plan, which manifested great institutional initiative as well as strategic vision, effectively marshalled and concentrated a larger army that swelled to nearly 500,000 for home defence and overseas operations. The Commissioners merely called for a similarly prudent measure to be taken for Stage 4 mobilization, with the Militia again

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20 For a small cash saving, Granatstein observed, killing the Canadian Officer Training Corps ensured that new members of the civilian leadership elites in Canada would have no military experience. Granatstein, Army, 351.
22 Between 1985 and 1997 US defence expenditure fell from 6.5% of GDP to 3.4%; Britain’s from 5.2% to 2.8%; France’s from 4% to 3%; and Germany’s from 3.2% to 1.6% (the equivalent figures for Canada were 2.2% in 1985 and 1.3% in 1997). Royal United Services Institute Newsbrief, 8 (August, 1999) 59.
becoming the basis for the recruitment and training of an expanded army.25 Up until mobilization, however, unit war establishments and equipment tables would be restricted in quantitative terms within a skeletonized reserve army order of battle.

Historically, reliance on reserves underpinned the rationale for mobilization, which recognized that large standing armies could not be economically sustained in peacetime. The solution was to retain a reduced standing army and effect a rapid expansion in a crisis through a mobilization plan drawing on reserves and recruiting. The key was meticulous planning that consumed few resources, but provided the extra benefit of producing planners as valuable as the plan. In the Franco-Prussian War the German originators of the efficient mobilization concept expanded their peacetime army of some 300,000 to a one million-strong deployed force in three weeks.26 As a result of this precedent, most armies today have plans for mobilization by which troops and resources are assembled under selected commanders and brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. Categories such as partial mobilization and selective mobilization27 have additionally come to characterize the concept ever since inflexible mobilization timetables contributed to the start of the 1914 Great War. Whatever the case, mobilization involves force expansion through the marshaling of troops in concentrations appropriate to unfolding situations – with weapons, equipment, deployments and even tasks related to home defence often having to follow in due course.

The government endorsed the concept of graduated mobilization and the vast majority of the Commission’s recommendations, but came to realize that the paid ceiling of 23,000 for the Primary Reserve was too low and raised it to 30,000 in 1996. The Special Commission had also been constrained by a guideline not to consider a Militia of more than 14,500, but Minister Collenette did not consider this a realistic ceiling and later rendered a policy decision calling for an army reserve of between 18,500 and 20,500. This was, in turn, confirmed by his successors, Doug Young and Art Eggleton, the latter in his announcement on 6 October 2000, of a commitment to increase the number of part-time army reservists to at least 18,500 by the end of March 2006.28 In reality, however, Militia strength continued to drop, undercutting the basic framework of mobilization. Maintaining that “national mobilization” was solely a governmental responsibility meanwhile enabled the regular force establishment to drag its feet on making any Stage 4 plans at all. Augmentation consequently trumped mobilization.

In October 1997 an arbitrary decision by the Chief of the Land Staff lopped $16,900,000 from the Militia budget while promising that the paid ceiling would remain at 18,500 with 65 training days allocated annually for part time (Class A) soldiers. As the regular army establishment failed to do any serious mobilization planning, but began instead to assess the viability of Militia units, many of which were prevented by imposed manpower ceilings from recruiting viable numbers,29 relations between reserves and regulars once more deteriorated. In this acrimonious atmosphere the regular military establishment continued to argue that there was one army of regular and reserve components in which the Militia’s primary role was augmentation to fill the gaps in regular units. Reservists, on the other hand, contended that the main Militia role was to provide a framework for mobilization, a base upon which a larger army could be formed, as recommended by the 1995 Special Commission and confirmed by successive defence ministers. To make matters worse, as Militia strength hovered around 11,000 by the spring of 1999, the army commander decided to assign Militia units combat service

27 Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves Report, 30 October 1995 (the two other members were Dr. Jack L. Granatstein and Lieutenant General Charles H. Belzile); Minister of National Defence’s Monitoring Committee, Final Report - 2003, 59-60; and Granatstein, Army, 390.
28 See In the Service of the Nation: Canada’s Citizen Soldier’s for the 21st Century – A Report to the Minister of National Defence The Honourable Art Eggleton, dated 19 May 2000 (also called the Fraser Report), specifically Recommendation Number 1 covering recruiting, enrolment, training, administration and pay.
support roles in slavish emulation of the US Army Total Force concept adopted earlier. In November the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff concurred, issuing guidance for the Militia to become a primarily logistical support organization of supply, maintenance, transportation and personnel administration units to fill service support shortages within the regular force. This left only thirty percent of the Militia with traditional roles such as infantry, armour and artillery.  

As with most American concepts adopted without understanding their full rationale, however, this one did not quite fit the Canadian case. Plugging holes in the regular force was not the underlying reason for the original introduction of Total Force within the U.S. Army. The post-Vietnam brainchild of General Creighton Abrams, the concept was intended to make it impossible for future American administrations to commit US army field forces to war without the mobilization of reserves, which, politically, required public support. To ensure that this would happen, Abrams rather cleverly placed the non-combat service support organizations on which field force deployments depended in the U.S. Army Reserve. Any wartime deployment of the field army thus required calling up reserves, which meant, in turn, having to have public support. In short, Abrams insisted that the army would not go to war again without the involvement and tacit approval of the American people. The application of such subtle political, as opposed to military, reasoning was only possible, of course, because the U.S. Army had another available reserve in the National Guard. This reserve provided the army with 44% of its combat divisions, 56% of its armoured battalions, 70% of its field artillery, 49% of its air defence artillery and 41% of its combat engineers.  

For reasons readily apparent, the Canadian situation hardly equated to the American as Canada possessed only one reserve army.

Not surprisingly, the move to marginalize the Militia, strongly opposed by many, triggered an intensely rancorous controversy in which trust between reserves and regulars completely evaporated. By April 1999 consultation between the army and the broader reserve community ceased. In November the new Minister of National Defence, Art Eggleton, requested The Honourable John Fraser, Chairman of the Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, to provide advice on how to resolve this impasse as his committee had already reported on the restructuring of the reserves as part of its mandate. Eggleton had originally established the eight-member Monitoring Committee on 14 October 1997 to oversee a comprehensive program of reforms and change initiatives largely resulting from the Somalia Crisis of 1992-1993, which had spawned several commissions, inquiries and panels to examine certain concerns about the functioning and the operations of the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence. Accordingly, a reconstituted five-member Monitoring Committee under the chairmanship of Fraser was charged to continue to monitor the implementation of reforms in the areas of leadership and the reserves. The chairman was also specifically asked to have the Committee review the Land Force Reserve Restructure process and provide the Minister with advice on this matter.

Following numerous consultations, the Committee in May 2000 published a report entitled In the Service of the Nation: Canada’s Citizen Soldier’s for the 21st Century – A Report to the Minister of National Defence The Honourable Art Eggleton. The Fraser Report, as it came to be called, offered recommendations on how to resolve

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30 Vice Admiral G. L. Garnett, “VCDS Force Structure Guidance,” 26 November 1999, which contained the howler that: “the US reserve forces are already well on the way to adopting the kind of force structure that Canada envisions for its own reserve forces”.

31 Michael D. Pearlman, Warmaking and American Democracy: The Struggle over Military Strategy, 1700 to the Present (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 29; and Brig. Gen. Robert H. Scales, Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf (Washington: Brassey’s, 1997), 18. The U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) consisted of roughly 54% combat service support, 18% combat support, 27% mobilization base expansion and only 1% combat units. The USAR provided 97% of army civil affairs units, 89% of psychological operations (PSYOPS) units, 72% of public affairs units and 70% of hospitals.


33 The eight committee members were the Chairman, The Honourable Willard Z. Estey, and seven members including The Honourable John A. Fraser, Dr. David J. Bercuson, Brigadier-General (retired) Sheila Hellstrom, Mr. Laurier L. LaPierre, Mr. D. Bevis Dewar, Ms. Carole Lafrance, and Mr. John Rankin. Fraser assumed the chairmanship in April 1998 on the departure of Estey.

34 Among these were Major General T. F. de Faye’s Board of Inquiry into the Somalia affair, the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, Defence Minister Doug Young’s ‘Blue Ribbon’ Panel on Leadership and Management in the Canadian Forces that culminated in his Report to the Prime Minister in March 1997, and former Chief Justice Brian Dickson’s review of various military justice issues and Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves.

35 Letter Arthur C. Eggleton to Mr. John A. Fraser dated 17 November 1999. The other Committee members were Mr. Bev Dewar, Dr. David Bercuson, Brigadier-General (retired) Sheila Hellstrom, and Major General (retired) Reginald Lewis.
the lack of progress in addressing the chronic problems of the Militia. All were accepted by the Minister who then appointed Lieutenant-General M. K. Jeffery, Chief of the Land Staff designate, to find common ground with reserve advocates to move the Land Force Reserve Restructure process forward.36  Jeffery, in turn, produced a strategic plan in September 2000 to provide direction for actions in support of Fraser’s recommendations. While reaffirming government policy to implement Land Force Reserve Restructure, the Minister in his announcement of 6 October 2000 stipulated that the Fraser Report and Jeffrey’s strategic plan were key to the success of the process. Specifically, the strategic plan was to rectify some of the recruiting, training and retention problems plaguing the Militia identified in the Fraser Report. It was also to lay the groundwork for developing future service policies for Canada’s part-time citizen soldiers, including new capabilities.37  The implementation of Land Force Reserve Restructure under the army strategic plan called for two phases: Phase I, to be funded from existing resources, aimed at attaining stabilization and a Militia strength of 15,500 by the end of March 2003, while Phase II, to be funded from additional resources, aimed at reaching 18,500 by March 2006.38

EQUIVOCATION IN HEADQUARTERS

In 2002 the new Minister of National Defence, The Honourable John McCallum, reaffirmed the Chief of the Land Staff as “leader of change” to implement Land Force Reserve Restructure. The problem was that the Chief of the Land Staff, though commonly called the army commander, hardly controlled, let alone commanded, the personnel induction streams of the army. Without an action directive from the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff to ensure personnel compliance, Jeffrey at a lower staff level could only request, never deliver. In fact, the army failed to attain 15,500 part-time citizen soldiers by March 2003 and managed to field only 14,869, not many more than 14,669 in November 2001. In May 2003, the Militia finally paraded 15,648, but this was the only month between April 1998 and September 2003 in which the figure of 15,500 was exceeded. In only seven of the 64 months between April 1998 and September 2003 did Militia strength ever exceed 15,000. The low months, in contrast, were staggeringly low: 9,962 in 1998, 10,912 in 1999, 10,663 in 2000, 11,290 in 2001, 11,863 in 2002 and 12,023 in 2003. Faced with a reality it did not relish,39  the army deviously started to count not just part-time Class A reservists parading weeknights and weekends on unit armoury floors, but also the roughly 2000 full-time Class B reservists hired to fill regular slots at 85 percent pay. This suggested an even more dismal reality. Reservists on full time Class B service in direct support of Militia training on armoury floors rightly belonged in the count, but not Class B reservists supporting the regular force. These, though disingenuously poached from the Militia budget,40  should have been subtracted from monthly tallies as the original intent of all ministerial pronouncements was to increase the number of part-time reservists. Clearly, ministerial calls for increasing the army reserve to 18,500 did not refer to full-time reserve service in the employ of the regular force. What the Ministers were talking about was the revitalization of the army reserve as a vital component of

36  Jeffery was appointed on 4 May 2000. Land Forces Reserve Restructure Strategic Plan, September 2000.
37  Among which intelligence, civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), psychological operations (PSYOPS), chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defence (CBRN), movement control, geomatic mapping support, public affairs, urban search and rescue, and protective construction.
39  In typical Byzantine, prevaricating gobbledygook, the Canadian Forces in 2009 reported that “due to differing databases, and improved but different information management systems, information prior to 2008 is unreliable and difficult to readily obtain, requiring archival searches in addition to substantial crosschecking across systems.” Pratt, 8, 129. The figures cited above taken from the Minister of National Defence’s Monitoring Committee Final Report - 2003 (not apparently used by Pratt) were provided by the Director Managerial Accounting and Comptrollership from Revised Pay System for the Reserves and Director Reserves. Besides counting cheques, which could be issued to the same soldier more than once, travel expense claims were also taken into account. All numbers obtained were further cross checked against figures provided by several officers of captain rank working directly in the field of tabulating Militia parade strengths. Unlike senior officers not so involved, but seeking to indicate growing Militia strength by any means possible, the front line captains did not fudge numbers. The figures cited above therefore remain reasonably reliable and, at the time, far more accurate than any bandied about by Lieutenant General Marc Caron, Chief of the Land Staff.
40  In round numbers at $40,000 per Class B soldier per annum, the regular force poached an estimated $80,000,000 of the Militia budget, a sum that would have funded 10,000 Class A citizen-soldiers.
Canada’s military capability. This meant strengthening the part-time citizen soldier “footprint” in communities throughout Canada, reinforcing thereby the framework for mobilization and augmentation.41

That this did not happen in the intended spirit bears closer scrutiny. In April 1998, the strength of the army reserve totaled roughly 15,243, but five years later in April 2003 it was about the same at 15,150, falling to 14,200 in September 2003. This general lack of progress prompted the Minister’s Monitoring Committee to observe in its 2003 Final Report that the connection between announced government policy and its strategic implementation has not always been well recognized within the Department of National Defence, the Canadian Forces, or even at times the land forces. It was thus one thing for Defence Minister John McCallum to announce on 3 April 2003 the start of Land Force Reserve Restructure Phase II, another to see his wishes and intentions carried through. Within the overall goal of ultimately increasing the Militia to 18,500, Phase II was to provide funding for an immediate increase of 750 by March 2004 and another 750 by March 2005. On 9 April 2003, before the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran Affairs, McCullum stated that he was serious about the reserves and expected Phase II to be funded from the additional monies he obtained. He noted that while there had been much talk for quite a long time about Phase II, it had not been funded, despite expressions of wishes by the government that it would be. The Minister then went on to say that the government was committed to increasing the role of reserves in home defence and safeguarding the country against terrorist threats. He added that this appeared to be a natural role for the reserves because they were spread out in many communities across the country.43 On 13 May 2003, the Minister reaffirmed the critical nature of Land Force Reserve Restructure, expressing his determination that Phase II would preserve the army reserve as a national institution and transform its operational potential to meet Canada’s needs in the 21st Century.44

Despite these clear statements of policy, the Minister was also acutely aware that the regular military establishment within his department almost banked upon the fact that ministers come and go, but the military collectivity stays on. With the federal election of November 2005 looming, the regular military establishment dragged its feet on the issue, fighting Militia increases at every turn. Documents crafted gave the appearance of compliance with ministerial policy, while actually minimizing support for the Militia. Repeated statements of reservists being “a vital component” of army capability failed to speed up delayed financial commitments that stifled Militia recruiting. In July 2003 the Chief of the Defence Staff and Deputy Minister also promulgated a jointly signed letter that stated Militia strength was henceforth to be expressed as the number of reservists serving on a full or part-time basis in Class A, B and C categories.45 By including full-time service in the count, they, by a stroke of the pen, lowered the bar for the attainment of the Militia personnel growth target of 18,500 part time soldiers.46 In a further sleight of hand, regular staff reduced the original target of 18,500 to a lower 17,300 by reallocating some 1200 positions to the Communications and Medical reserves, although the former had not been part of the Militia in 2000 and remained a separate organization.47 Even then, this adjusted Phase II figure proved elusive as only a peak of 16,106 was reached by March 2006.

The regular military establishment simply did not accept Militia expansion as a strategic necessity. As the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff asserted in 1999, the army reserve force structure was “antiquated and designed

41  Minister of National Defence’s Monitoring Committee Final Report - 2003, 28-31. Class A pertains to weeknight and weekend service, Class B (annotated A) to full-time duty in support of reserves, Class B (temporary) for reserve course attendance (14 days plus) and full-time duty in support of regulars, and Class C to essentially full-time regular service. More precise categories of Class B service, remunerated at 85% regular pay, are: Class B/TRE (CRT) – training greater than 12 days; Class B/TRE (RES) – employment in support of reserves (annotated “A” position); and Class B/TRE (REG) or SRR (BP) – employment in support of the regular Force. Such complexity, which boggles an outsider’s mind, appears to serve the interest of the regular military establishment.
42  Hansard, Number 084, 2003-04-03.
43  Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA), Evidence Number 21, Wednesday April 9, 2003; and News Release CLS NR-03/03 of 3 April 2003.
44  Letter from The Honourable John McCallum to The Honourable John A. Fraser, 13 May 2003.
45  CDS/DM letter, 10 July 2003, subject headed Implementation of Land Force Reserve Restructure Phase II.
46  Minister of National Defence’s Monitoring Committee Final Report - 2003, 26-29. The inclusion of Class C in the Militia strength count was later said to have been an “oversight;” Class C service for Bosnia and the navy reserve was never included.
47  The Health Services Reserve about 1500 strong retains control of 16 field ambulances formerly medical companies part of the Militia. An estimated 900 are on full-time duty.
to respond to contingencies which … are at best remote.” Of eleven futuristic scenarios postulated in November 2000, only two identified a possible need for mobilization. Though these could still conceivably lie within the realm of possibility, the conclusion was that there was “no scope within defence policy for national mobilization.” In 2001 another Vice Chief, this time an airman, confirmed that he never had any intention of involving himself in Land Force Reserve Restructure mobilization planning as he considered the matter to be the sole responsibility of the Chief of the Land Staff. What little guidance he felt compelled to offer on mobilization listed few specifics, but espoused many principles and generalities. His somewhat more detailed guidance on the Supplementary Reserve, basically a paper list of personnel with previous military experience who could be recalled for military service in emergency, also seemed designed to merely give the appearance of doing something on mobilization.

As the Vice Chief never produced any action directive on Land Force Reserve Restructure, the Militia thus continued to be largely viewed as a labour pool for the regular force. The term was even used in setting the operational target for reserve participation at between 10-20 percent of deployed forces. Clearly, the 1994 White Paper that called for a “no cost” national mobilization plan as a measure of prudence was simply a scrap of paper to be ignored by a military establishment that thought it knew better.

The foregoing remarks of successive naval and air Vice Chiefs of the Defence Staff point to the strait jacket of unification being a major impediment to army reserve rejuvenation. Owing to the prevalence of force-in-being perceptions, National Defence Headquarters cannot apparently conceive of Canada’s forces ever really being much larger than what they are today. The Militia, deemed quite big enough, “is what it is,” too small to be an army in waiting, for which no requirement exists anyway. Such lack of vision suggests that collective memory of World War II mobilization and Canada’s commitment of a strong brigade group to a NATO central front of some 28 divisions has almost faded completely away. Among those born in a time of a much reduced military, there seems to be no facility for thinking big, which is surely borne out by the incessant haggling that went on over increasing the army reserve by a picayune 750 soldiers. The impression gained is that National Defence Headquarters expects current conditions characterized by an expedient, short-term operational approach to continue indefinitely into the future. Yet, as renowned strategist Colin Gray recently observed, the U.S. conflict embarked upon after 11 September 2001, bears more resemblance to a protracted hunt than it does to what most people understandably call a war. Against a first or even second-class enemy able to hit back harder than the Taliban, larger forces may indeed be required.

There is a need for longer range strategic thinking. The 2003 Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative Efficiency alleged that National Defence Headquarters suffered from a “loss of strategic focus,” while its size of over 13,000 personnel supported a “bureaucratic, process driven culture.” This resulted in “a significant degree of self-generating work, much of it aimed at supporting the operation of NDHQ” and “an overwhelming focus on the current fiscal year.” Resource allocation and procurement priorities, rather than true strategic planning, still remain the chief preoccupations of the headquarters and the special province of the

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48 VCDS Force Structure Guidance, 26 November 1999, p. 17/20. Such type of thinking reflects a highly questionable short-term view that risks throwing the baby out with the bathwater. If efforts to transform the U.S. military after the first Gulf War had been fully implemented, certain capabilities used so successfully in Afghanistan might not have been readily available. Two Cold War legacy systems, the aircraft carrier and the strategic bomber, proved particularly valuable. Indeed, naval aviation supported by in-flight refuelling provided the first application of air power. The refuelling tankers dated from the 1960s, the Airborne Warning and Control System from the late 1970s, and the Joint Surveillance and Attack Radar System from the late 1980s on an airframe first flown in the 1950s. The Iraq war also demonstrated the requirement for old-fashioned heavy armour and other legacy weapons systems.


50 “Sustaining the Total Force: Realigning the Supplementary Reserve for the 21st Century,” under VCDS Force Structure Guidance: Future of the Supplementary Reserve, December 2000. The Vice Chief on 19 January 2001 also promulgated an action plan on the Supplementary Reserve intended to initiate a number of research and reorganization activities, with a view to making it more flexible, accessible and relevant to current and future operational requirements. As usual it was described as “an essential part of the order of battle” Minister of National Defence’s Monitoring Committee Final Report - 2003, 16, 22.

51 Attributed to Lieutenant General Andrew Leslie. Pratt, 52, 82.


53 Achieving Administrative Efficiency, Report to the Minister of National Defence by Advisory Committee on Administrative Efficiency, August 21, 2003, pp. 11,19. The Committee recommended cutting 1000 full time positions for annual wage savings of between $60 and $70 million – an average of $65,000 per position.
Vice Chief of the Defence Staff as resource and money manager. Only demands considered essential, however determined by a highly subjective process of judging and assessing so-called “capabilities,” tend to be taken seriously. Indeed, as had been said before, National Defence Headquarters has almost been fashioned into a fourth service primarily concerned with equipment procurement. Tellingly, Colin Gray identified this years ago when he perceptively concluded that the defence policy of Canada rested heavily upon equipment, which is presumably why he left the country to pursue his studies and earn greater acclaim in greener, more developed, strategic pastures.54

Ultimately, what Hillier correctly termed the endless process of National Defence Headquarters coupled with fast-tracked big ticket equipment purchases overshadowed efforts to rejuvenate and strengthen the Militia. His switch of the army’s main effort from Kabul to Kandahar, although not as spectacular a feat as Major General “Bobs” Roberts’ famous march of 1880, further ensured an almost total focus upon Militia augmentation of regular army operations in Afghanistan. During the period 2005-2008, major attention focused on the double quick time purchase of replacement equipment for the air, land and sea environments. Debate also ensued over the procurement of long-range strategic airlift favoured by the new 2006 Conservative Defence Minister, Gordon O’Connor, and shorter-range tactical airlift favoured by Hillier. The eventual acquisition of the “Big Five” – four C-17 Globemasters, 16 C-130J Hercules, heavy to medium lift helicopters, army heavy trucks and yet to be seen ships for the Arctic and fleet replenishment at sea – further consumed considerable command and staff effort in project implementation. The loan and purchase of Leopard 2 tanks from the Germans and Dutch, respectively, for use in Afghanistan also assumed additional priority.56 The Liberal government 2005 Defence Policy Statement that promised to increase the Canadian Forces’ Primary Reserve by 3000 personnel had, meanwhile, begun to ring somewhat hollow within a Militia that, having originally been promised 15,500 by March 2003 and 18,500 three years later, was just on its way to parading 16,106 in March 2006.57 Hope continued to spring eternal, however, as the new Conservative government during the 2006 election had promised to increase the Canadian Forces primary reserve by 10,000 personnel, with an estimated 8,000 going to the Militia.

DASHING NEW HOPES

The Conservatives who took power 6 February 2006, as the Afghan war heated up,58 also promised to stand up 14 composite Territorial Defence Battle Groups each consisting of a headquarters manned by some 100 full time Class B Militia soldiers controlling between 400-1000 part-time Class A personnel in some two or more companies of infantry, an armoured reconnaissance squadron, an artillery battery, an engineer squadron and a logistics company. All troops for these composite battle groups were to be drawn from existing Militia units. This triggered a flurry of staff activities as the first six were to be fielded by April 2007 in Victoria, Vancouver, Edmonton, Ottawa, Montreal, and Halifax. The new Chief of the Land Staff, Lieutenant General Andrew Leslie, also directed the start of Land Force Reserve Restructure Phase III with the Director General Land Reserve assuming the role of project director “for the definition of capabilities, structures and requirements,” while the Director General Land Staff assumed the role of project director for “delivering the capability through the Land Staff in accordance with assigned assets.” Leslie ordered Phase III to unfold in two stages: the implementation

55 In August 1880, Roberts marched 9986 all ranks and 18 guns from Kabul to Kandahar where he destroyed Ayub Khan's Afghan army, effectively ending the Second Afghan War on 1 September 1880. Field Marshal Lord Roberts of Kandahar, VC, Forty-One Years In India: From Subaltern to Commander-in-Chief, 2 vols. (New York: Longmans, Green, 1897), II, 336-375; and Correlli Barnett, Britain and Her Army 1509-1970 (London: Allen Lane, 1970), 316-318.
56 Hillier, 320, 347-350, 398-410. The Germans loaned 20 Leopard 2s for use in Afghanistan while 80 plus 20 support variants were purchased from the Dutch.
57 A publication prefaced by Lieutenant-General Marc Caron, Hillier's successor as the Chief of the Land Staff from early 2004, gave Militia part-time strength as 16,000 and regular army strength as 19,500. Canada's Army, DMCS CS05-0639-B; another strength of 16,200 was given by BGen Dennis C. Tabbernor in his 19 March 2006 e-mail to PM, LFRR.
58 David Pugliese, Ottawa Citizen, 8 November 2009. In April 2006 the 1 PPCLI battle group fought major actions in Kandahar and Helmand provinces and during September-October the 1 RCR battle group launched Operation Medusa in the Panjiwai and Zhari areas. During this period Canadian troops also transferred from the operational control of U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom to NATO command under International Security Assistance Force.
of the Militia Territorial Defence Battle Groups across Canada in Stage One; and the implementation of the remainder of recommendations called for by Land Force Reserve Restructure Phase II in Stage Two.\(^{59}\)

Given the resource constrained and high operational tempo environment he faced, Leslie sensibly envisioned the regular army, supported by the Militia, focusing on force generation for overseas operations and the Militia, supported by regulars, focusing on force generation for domestic operations. Leslie further called for a limited circle within his own staff and command to “validate” the Militia role that, after considerably greater consultation, examination and discussion, had been sanctioned by a defence minister and approved by the Chief of the Defence Staff on 11 June 2002.\(^{60}\) This appears to have resulted in the Chief of the Defence Staff rearticulating the role of all reserves as: “To augment the Regular Force on CF operations, to expand the CF in response to natural and man-made emergencies and crises, and to form the permanent connection between the CF and Canadian societies in communities not served by major bases.”\(^{61}\) Listing augmentation first instead of third presumably reversed the priorities set forth in the 2002 approved Militia role. The cunning replacement of the comprehensive military term mobilization with a more euphemistic reference to expansion – though it ironically constitutes the central core of mobilization generally and Stage 3 “force expansion” specifically – also seems aimed at quietly expunging the planning requirement so intrinsic to mobilization. Yet the pressing need for an expansion capability through a mobilization process was clearly shown by the 2004 admission of the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, Vice Admiral R. D. Buck, that it would take about five years to fully recruit and train 5000 regulars and 3000 reserves, owing to a shortage of instructors and an inadequate infrastructure.\(^{62}\) At this pace World War II would have been missed.

All expansion came to naught as it became obvious by May 2007 that the Conservatives had reneged on their promise to increase Militia strength by 10,000. Government financial estimates at that time signalled an increase of only 650 personnel by end March 2008 and only 750 each in subsequent years. The Canada First Defence Strategy announced in May 2008 made no mention of Territorial Defence Battle Groups and confirmed the end of the 10,000 increase by raising the Primary Reserve ceiling to only 30,000 vice the 35,000 originally promised. The Militia share of the reduced increase, possibly 3,500 soldiers, was now also to be effected over 20 years.\(^{63}\) Ironically, this came at a time when the Militia was being called upon to do more. The situation looked less bleak, however, as a net influx of over a thousand personnel of the Communications Reserve had come under operational control in April 2007. This resulted in Militia strength looking better than it ever had been,\(^{64}\) though in reality well below the 18,500 target that should have been met in March 2006. In March 2007 the Militia paraded 17,290 personnel – dropping to 16,650 in May – with a total of 13,067 trained. Of the last, 2,580 served on full-time duty outside units, leaving only 10,493 trained soldiers, including 1,379 on full-time support duty, on the armoury floors. Each 2500-strong task force deployment to Afghanistan required up to 500 reservists on full-time Class C service, which meant that with an additional task force standing by on ready status and another training in Canada, a possible annual requirement of some 1500 Militia soldiers existed. That the above figures for 2007 average out to but 87 trained soldiers per unit, the contribution of around 20 or more by many Militia regiments appears astounding.\(^{65}\)

The strain of providing such numbers of soldiers away from units on full-time duty resulted in a serious loss of leadership that adversely affected training on armoury floors. In 2007 forty percent of trained officers and 27 percent of trained non-commissioned members were on permanent call-out, with company leadership levels

\(^{59}\) Chief of Land Staff 1901-6-1 (OgLRRes), LFRR Phase III, 19 January 2007. The baseline of pay for the soldier at the time remained 37.5 days at the unit level plus seven days for concentrations.

\(^{60}\) Ibid.

\(^{61}\) Briefing by the Director General, Land Reserve 2008.

\(^{62}\) LCol Martin Galvin, “Canada’s Capability Renewal Opportunities for Innovation and Cooperation,” Canadian Forces College, AMSC 8 (31 October 2005), 23-24; and John Robson and Brigitte Pellerin, “Send in the Militia,” Western Standard, 2 January 2005. The estimated cost of inducting 5000 regulars was at least $505 million for salaries, benefits, equipment and infrastructure.

\(^{63}\) This was a 20-year roadmap ending 2028 to increase Canadian Forces regulars to 70,000 at a cost of $150 million per 1000 regulars each year.

\(^{64}\) The Communications Reserve came under command in April 2008.

hardest hit. Forty-nine percent of all majors and 48 percent of all captains were on full-time duty elsewhere, as were 49 percent of warrant officers. At platoon levels 26 percent of lieutenants, 44 percent of sergeants, and 41 percent of master corporals were away on full-time duty. The trend did not abate as Class B figures of 3,430 in November 2008 jumped to 4,750 in November 2009. The exceedingly unhealthy leadership situation that resulted struck at the viability of the part-time Class A base, the fertile ground that cultivated Militia soldiers willing and able to undertake full-time duty. Without a strong leadership cadre to train a continuous infusion of recruits, however, Militia Class A numbers ran the risk of shrinking drastically so they could not sustain augmentation for regular overseas service. The larger the number of part-time soldiers, on the other hand, the greater the likelihood of producing more full-time citizen-soldiers. As a rule of thumb, fielding one full-time reservist to provide augmentation to the regular force has historically required a ratio of five Militia soldiers to ensure one would be available when the need arose. By this measure, defence planners should be able to determine the approximate overall strength of the Militia. To call out 4,000 soldiers for full time duty, a pool of 20,000 part-timers is required. Taking into account the need to maintain an army presence in Canadian communities as well as for the Militia to respond to domestic crises, the requirement for Class A soldiers increases.

In noting that 64,000 regular and 26,000 primary reservists were hard pressed to carry out core operations at home and abroad the Canada First Defence Strategy recognized current manpower levels as inadequate. Yet, it insisted that besides being capable of limited overseas deployments, the Canadian Forces had to have the capacity to perform a number of large and challenging tasks at home, including responding to terrorist attacks and supporting civil authorities in a crisis. Failure to mention Territorial Defence Battalions, which Hillier opposed, scuttled Leslie’s proposed Land Force Reserve Restructure Phase III, though he promised a list of new missions and tasks. In May 2007 he also declared the army reserve establishment review called for by Phase II to be dead, adding that he had no intention of implementing wholesale tactical groupings or amalgamations of Militia units with the exception of service battalions restricted to one per brigade from April 2010. Militia unease increased, however, with the March 2009 declaration of Chief of Staff Land Reserve, Brigadier General Gary O’Brien, that “We are going to mess with the basic structure of the army reserve.” His expressed aim was to improve “efficiency” by combining units thought to be too small to train for large operations. By implication, units were also considered to be better off in communities with larger populations, which was sheer nonsense as just about every unit was not constrained by local demographics, but by personnel ceilings imposed from the top. O’Brien failed to grasp the rationale behind a skeletonized army based on peacetime restricted war establishments and equipment tables. Every historical attempt to make reserve units more “efficient” in peacetime, moreover, only succeeded in producing the exact opposite effect: the diminishment of the Militia. That O’Brien was a reserve officer holding a senior position on sufferance of a regular boss may have influenced his approach.

Nothing came of the counter-productive threat to mess, but worse followed in December 2009 when reserve pay budgets were slashed and reallocated to so-called higher priorities. This caused a serious drop in Militia morale, a rise in attrition and the cancellation of plans for longer range training and exercises. That reserve pay was categorized as operations and maintenance had always left it vulnerable to raiding at the end of each fiscal year to offset shortages elsewhere in the defence budget. The cut this time was particularly drastic, however, as many Militia soldiers were told without warning that they would have no more part-time employment until March of 2010. It also struck at the life blood of the Militia – recruiting. Direct ministerial intervention partially restored the paltry saving of slightly over $5 million for Class A pay – which amounted to .003 per cent of the army’s $1.6 billion budget and a miniscule percent of the total $20 billion defence budget – but cancelled

67 In March 2011, some 3000 soldiers were on full-time Class B and Class C duty away from units, which paraded a total of 15,576 Class A part-time reservists. Slide showing Army Reserve strengths as of 31 March 2011 provided by Chief of Staff, Land Reserve to the Executive Council of Honorary Colonels 27 June 2011.
69 It is nonetheless amazing how many Militia officers on full-time callout basically in the pay of regulars have been willing, even eager, to participate in the dismemberment of the Militia.
70 These were preparing soldiers for Afghanistan and international and domestic missions, plus, not surprisingly, “ensuring equipment projects remain on track.” 1000-1 (Comd) 10 December 2009.
future training could not be resurrected. The Minister also ordered the defence department to develop policies to prevent similar turmoil from happening in the future. This resulted in promises being made to prevent use of Militia pay funds for any other purpose, but as late as 23 February 2011, the Vice Chief reported that he was still “working” on the problem, possibly in anticipation of the May 2011 federal election producing another Minister. The matter of compliance still remains open.

Reports of cuts to the Militia in late 201071 caused further consternation until it was revealed that only Class B strength would be reduced because this level of full-time primary reserve employment was not judged sustainable in the long term. An expressed hope was that reservists serving on Class B would join the regulars. Class A employment was at the same time to be increased along with Class B service in direct support of Militia units and their summer training.72 Incredibly, however, the working group charged with planning the sustainable allocation of primary reserve part and full-time service received direction to adopt a four-year phased approach ending in March 2014. Phases 1 and 2 slated for 2010 will determine and validate post-Afghanistan reserve operational support, augmentation and force generation requirements. Phase 3 from January to March 2011 will see post-Afghanistan requirements prioritized against resources for supporting contingency operations, sustained force generation and current tasks presently assigned, such as coastal defence and civil-military cooperation. In Phase 4, slated to take place between April and March 2014, primary reserve revised allocations will then be implemented with the aim of ensuring that future primary reserve capacity is within planned funding and balanced between reserve force generation and augmentation requirements.73 Such a distant end date with its strong hint of more of the same as occurred since 2000 leads one to suspect that the Militia may just have come full circle. In parade strength it appears to be back almost to where it started, with only 15,613 Class A and 949 Class B soldiers on armoury floors in March 201074 – even with the addition of communications reservists, well below the 18,500 targeted for March 2006. Nothing of substance has really been done over the past decade to grow Militia numbers as promised.

THINKING BIGGER

As has been implied throughout this wretched saga of sandbagging, obstruction, futile wheel-spinning, and endlessly wasted staff effort, more for lack of will than discretionary dollars, there is a strategic argument to be made for having a much larger Militia than Canada fields today. In the first instance, as evident from more than Canada First Defence Strategy admission, the regular army has been stretched to the breaking point as it is simply too small. Indeed, by any reasonable measure, it is tiny. One suspects that the Canadian people may think they have a larger army than they do partly because most of them have never served in the military in any capacity,75 one of the adverse, if unintended, consequences of having reduced the Militia over the years. Granted, the task force that served in Afghanistan is the best equipped, trained, supported and remunerated field force ever to leave Canadian shores. From most reports it may also be the best fighting unit in NATO’s International Security Assistance Force, and Canadians have every right to be proud of the performance of their top quality and highly motivated troops. All that said, the Canadian contingent is only a 2500-strong field force that takes almost the entire home army to support. For the comparatively forgotten war in Korea, almost as far away as Afghanistan, Canada committed a 5000-strong brigade as well as a lead heavy brigade for a division in Germany. That the largely unmilitary Canadian people may not be fully aware of the implications of the limited size of

72 Chief of the Land Staff 7000-1 (DSL) The Army Reserve Programme 19 October 2010. The Class A ceiling was set at 19,997 and Class B at 1,467. Class A training was limited to 37.5 days annually plus seven for collective training.
73 CANFORGEN 229/10 CDS 026/10 161556Z Nov 10 Primary Reserve Management.
74 Figures taken from slides shown by Brigadier General Gary O’Brien, Chief of Staff, Land Reserve, in briefing the Executive Council of Honorary Colonels, Ottawa, 5-6 June 2010. O’Brien’s figures are considered more credible than the 17,852 number for March 2010 provided by the Canadian Forces’ response to the Library of Parliament’s request for information. Pratt, 129-130. In March 2011, Class A numbers fell to 15,576, but Class B armoury support numbers rose to 1138 (from slide showing Army Reserve strengths as of 31 March 2011 provided by Chief of Staff, Land Reserve to the Executive Council of Honorary Colonels 27 June 2011).
75 According to Hillier, Canadians by and large know nothing about the armed forces. Hillier, 358.
their Afghanistan contingent can be detected to some extent in the manifestation of their support. Arguably, they root for it as if it were another Team Canada in an international competition rather than an army at war.

Some examination of the strength of Canada’s forces compared with those other nations can be revealing and instructive as quantity has a quality all of its own. While only a middle power with but one tenth the population of the United States, Canada is still a member of the G-8 with a GDP of around $1.6 trillion. This equates to an economy roughly eleven percent of the size of that of the U.S. with a GDP of around $14.6 trillion. In relative terms U.S. defence appropriations of $692 billion approved for 2010 would approximate a defence budget of $76 billion for Canada. The reality, however, is a Canadian defence budget of around $20 billion, less than three, rather than eleven percent of the U.S. defence budget. In relative troop strengths paraded, Canada seriously lags behind America. US regular armed forces numbering roughly 332,000 sailors, 323,000 airmen, and 548,000 soldiers would translate into regular establishments of 33,200 for the Canadian navy, 32,300 for the air force and 54,800 for the Canadian army. Here again, however, the reality is a total Canadian armed force of 65,000 regulars and a regular army of under 20,000 with insufficient critical mass to field more than battle groups. And this is not even taking into account a U.S. Marine Corps of about 200,000 personnel. Finally, if we were to equate Canadian to American reserves of 400,000 in the National Guard and 205,000 in the U.S. reserve army, Canada should have 60,500 rather than 16,000 in the Militia.76

Even by the British yardstick of around 224,500 regulars in all armed forces for a nation nearly twice as populous as Canada,77 the Canadian Forces should parade over 120,000. British army regular strength of 114,000 would convert into almost 60,000 for the Canadian army. Comparison with the French who have some 250,582 in their armed forces would yield similar results.78 For a nation of 34 million in 2011 the current strength of the Canadian army equates in relative terms to a regular army establishment not much larger than that which existed during the 1920s and 1930s. In 1921, Canada fielded 4,127 regulars out of a population of 8,788,000, which would be the rough equivalent of almost 16,000 today. In 1939, the Permanent Force paraded 4,261 out of a population of ten million, the equivalent of fielding 14,487 today. Yet, current regular army strength of under 20,000 is not much in excess of this as the equivalent in 1921 would have been 5,866; in fact, the 1931 ceiling of the Permanent Force army was established at 6,925.79 In other words, Canada’s regular standing army of today is already relatively close to the numerical equivalent of the tiny Permanent Force that Canada fielded prior to the Second World War. Fortunately, the Militia during the inter-war years paraded around 51,000 citizen-soldiers and the Permanent Force possessed a mobilization plan based on the Militia’s structure. Today, in comparison, the Militia numbers but 16,000 with no mobilization plan that would enable the nation to enlarge the army in an emergency.

In addition to having too small a field army, Canada possesses a regular force on the cusp of pricing itself out of business. The Canadian defence budget, while comparatively small in global terms, constitutes one of the largest national expenditure envelopes, which, because it is discretionary, leaves it vulnerable to cuts. In rough base line terms, the defence budget for fiscal year 2006-7 amounted to $15.91 billion, for 2007-8 about $17.84 billion, for 2008-9 some $18.86 billion, and for 2009-10 a higher 19.05 billion. Canadian military expenditure as a percentage of GDP thus rose from 1.1% in 2004 to 1.3 percent on par with Germany. As most of this money was consumed by pay and allowances, however, Canada could not field as large an armed force as other nations for about the same military expenditure. There is nothing new here as out of $12.1 billion allocated to defence in 1991-92 – which represented 8% of total government expenditure – a weighty 57 percent went toward personnel related costs,80 mainly to sustain the regular force establishment.

76 SIPRI Yearbook 2010.
77 Britain’s current population of 62,348,447 is projected to grow to 77 million by 2060, making it larger than France at 72 million and Germany at 71 million. Ian Traynor, “Europe of the Future: Germany shrinks; France grows, but UK population booms,” The Guardian, 27 August 2008.
79 Stacey, Six Years of War, 4-5, 34; and Granatstein, Army, 416.
Given current emphasis on improving the quality of life of regulars today, it is unlikely that personnel costs have gone down. More recent figures provided by the Canadian Forces indicate personnel costs eating between 40 and 51 percent of the defence budget, but it is doubtful that these estimates include personnel related costs above pay and allowances. Providing housing and other facilities, particularly infrastructure, to accommodate troops and their families most likely raises the percentage to around 60 per cent.81 Simply put, the cost of maintaining standing armies in peacetime has always proven problematic. This is what General Dwight Eisenhower knew and what General Guy Simonds said: “No nation, not even the richest, can afford to maintain continuously ‘forces in being’ capable of meeting major unforeseen emergencies. There must be reserves of partially trained personnel which can be called upon in emergency.” And Canadians, Simonds went on to say, “have to get along as best we may with an entirely voluntary system, whatever the difficulties.”82 As the Americans have also discovered, the wage costs associated with maintaining an all-volunteer regular force continue to rise – in a land with no draft, voluntary reserves are the next best option.

The Canadian dilemma of having too small an army because of fiscal inability to afford regulars in large numbers can be resolved by reserves that constitute a hedge against the unpredictable nature of future conflict. For strategic reasons, Canada needs an enhanced skeletonized army capable of being mobilized in crises. Notwithstanding confident assessments issuing from National Defence Headquarters ruling out the future mobilization of large forces, nobody really knows how the future will unfold any more than how to accurately predict the weather or the stock market. Track records in foreseeing events have not been good. Despite the existence of reasonably sophisticated intelligence gathering tools, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the collapse of Warsaw Pact satellites in 1989, and the implosion of the Soviet Union itself in 1990 took everyone by surprise. Who would have foreseen war being waged in the Falklands, in the Gulf, in Afghanistan, and in the Gulf again? As Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates told a West Point audience in February 2011, the U.S. prediction record has been perfect: “We have never once gotten it right.”83 Just as recently a British parliamentarian charged that successive ministries of defence always got Britain’s strategic threats wrong, which led him to conclude that the most dangerous route would be to try and guess what comes next.84 As the world seems able to radically change direction in short order, this appears to be sage advice that lends itself to developing flexible contingency plans for major unexpected crises. Just as one might have a fire or flood insurance policy to cover what one hopes will never happen to one’s home, common sense and logic dictate that an army should have a plan for mobilization in case unforeseen developments call for more troops than it parades.

Projecting Afghanistan-style military engagements indefinitely into the future surely reflects short-range thinking. As Thucydides the ancient Greek military historian pointed out, states fight for honour and for interests, but they also fight out of fear.85 This last aspect, the fear factor, has been too often overlooked in the Canadian small war operational mindset spawned by Afghanistan. At least during the Cold War when Nikita Krushchev banged his shoe on a United Nations’ podium there was widespread foreboding that the barbarians were at the gate, though many since then have been lulled into thinking that as the barbarians never came they were never actually there. Canadians with their troops fighting in Afghanistan for honour and interests are not as fearful as they were when their troops were fighting in Korea. Today, in fact, the Canadian army may be at war in Afghanistan, but most other government agencies and the public are clearly not. There is no fear gripping Canada’s citizenry as it did when the Japanese captured the Aleutian islands of Kiska and Attu in early June 1942. After a Japanese submarine shelled Estevan Point on Vancouver Island on 20 June of that year, the
government even deployed over 34,000 troops – mostly conscripts – to the Pacific coast to appease frightened voters. Public fear during the Second World War also produced the forced relocation of Japanese-Canadians and a civil security force in Saskatchewan to root out fifth columnists and subversives. Alberta’s Veterans Volunteer Reserve and similar organizations in other provinces fulfilled the same paramilitary role. A Veterans Home Guard, later re-designated the Veterans Guard of Canada, also took the field at the federal level.86 In light of such experience, would it not be prudent for Canadian strategic planners to at least consider how to deal with scenarios that could engender real public fear and threaten to inflict extreme harm upon the nation?

This, of course, brings up the question of whether one can really be sure that Clausewitzian87 interstate war has forever been superseded by what Martin van Creveld seminally termed “non-trinitarian” low-intensity conflict akin to prevalent in Europe before the rise of the nation-state from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648? Ironically, van Creveld had no sooner made this argument in his book, The Transformation of War, than the largest inter-state conflict since Korea broke out in the Persian Gulf in 1991. At the time distinguished military commentator Sir Michael Howard observed that, “Historians are as liable as anyone else to seize upon an ephemeral trend and project it into the future, and Dr. van Creveld seems to have fallen into that trap.”88 Van Creveld and General Sir Rupert Smith89 could still be right that future wars will mainly involve fighting non-state guerrillas and terrorists among peoples, but neither they, nor anyone else, can be certain. The nation state remains surprisingly strong, with good reason. To assume, as the British did in every year between 1919 and 1932, that there will be no “great” war for ten years would surely be unwise. Arguably, such wars still represent a potentially greater threat than asymmetric small wars, insurgencies, or terrorism short of the nuclear kind. Also, the more one examines variants of revolutionary guerrilla war, the more one can see the significance of Mao Tse-tung’s third conventional stage. The civil war in China was won in 1949 by the Communists fielding huge conventional forces numbering some 50 divisions.90 Likewise, 20-odd divisions of North Vietnamese soldiers and tanks striking on Saigon proved decisive in the Vietnamese War. Had greater numbers of US troops been used initially in the second Gulf War, as originally recommended by General Eric K. Shinseki, subsequent guerrilla war in Iraq could likely have been avoided.91

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86 C. P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada 1939-1945 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974), 48 and Six Years of War, 79, 149-151, 160-175, 184; Queen’s University Archives, Chubby Powers Papers, Minutes of the Cabinet War Committee, 4 and 24 June 1942; and Ken Tingley, “The Veterans Volunteer Reserve: Alberta Nativism in Two World Wars,” in For King and Country: Alberta in the Second World War, ed. Ken Tingley (Edmonton: Provincial Museum of Alberta with Reidmore Books, 1995), 345-358. Under the terms of the ABC-22 defence agreement with the United States, Canada dispatched four RCAF squadrons to Alaska to meet the Japanese threat. King did not take the advice of his military chiefs who considered the troop deployment excessive in numbers of men and equipment. He instead personally emphasized the danger of under-estimating the strength of Japanese operations and the possibility of more serious ones. The Japanese thrust toward the Aleutians was, in fact, a diversionary effort in support of the Midway operation fought on 4 June.

87 Carl von Clausewitz advanced a universal theory of what war ought to be: “a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.” This, to his mind, was the only way to make sense of the wanton destruction wrought by war. From his writings on the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648), which visited more devastation upon Germany than any other conflict up to World War II, he well-understood that war had a natural tendency to run to extremes and went on to conclude that only “[state] policy converts the overwhelmingly destructive element of war into a mere instrument.” In short, without an element of rationality war can become an act of senseless violence and indiscriminate destruction. To Clausewitz, the political object, or war aim, constituted the key restraint preventing war from running to the absolute extreme. It not only determines the military objective to be reached, but the amount and kind of force to be used. The more intense the motives for war, the more closely will the military and political aims coincide and the more military and less political will they appear; on the other hand, the less intense the motives, the less will the military’s natural tendency to violence coincide with political directives and the more political will the conflict seem. Clausewitz further noted that in the latter “limited war” case, where “policy is directed only towards minor objectives, the emotions of the masses will be little stirred and they will have to be stimulated rather than held back” as in the former more “total war” case.

88 Michael Howard, "Famous Last Screams,” London Review of Books (15 December 1991), a review of van Creveld’s On Future War (published as The Transformation of War in North America). In an eleventh hour change to the British edition of his book, van Creveld described the Gulf War as “the last scream of the American eagle.”

89 Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991) and General Sir Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Allen Lane, 2005). As pointed out by Allan Mallinson in a review of Smith’s book, Saddam Hussein, oblivious to non-trinitarian theory, invaded Kuwait in the old way and so long as others like him, some with access to weapons of mass destruction, fail to recognise the theory, military planners will still be obliged to maintain the capability to win in the old fashioned way. The Sunday Times; 24 September 2005.


91 Shinseki said something in the order of several hundred thousand soldiers would be required to stabilize Iraq after invasion, adding “We’re talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of geography that’s fairly significant, with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems … and so it takes a significant ground force presence to maintain a safe and secure environment, to ensure that people are fed, that water is distributed, all the normal responsibilities that go along with administering a situation like this.” Tom Shanker, New Strategy Vindicates Ex-Army Chief Shinseki,” New York Times, 12 January 2007.
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In conventional or guerrilla war, therefore, there is little reason to assume that large forces will not be required in the future. With respect to the former the age old military question still pertains: what happens when a small, highly agile, hard hitting mobile force hits a large, highly agile, hard hitting mobile force? Guerrilla wars and insurgencies, because of their interminable nature also tend to be highly troop intensive. Canada’s commitment of 2900 rather than 10,000 troops to Afghanistan stands somewhat in contrast to the U.S. deployment of some 100,000 soldiers. The need for extensive supporting base infrastructure to accommodate intervention forces – which Saudi-Arabia possessed in abundance for the 1991 Gulf War, but Kosovo in 1999 markedly did not – is likely to ensure that mass will remain an essential ingredient of future military deployments abroad. Logistical considerations alone are likely to call for massive force deployments in military interventions. Future interventions may also face greater challenges as weapons of mass destruction and ballistic and cruise missiles become ever more universal as a result of the exponential spread of computer and sophisticated technologies worldwide. The West’s monopoly on advanced military technology has frankly eroded with cutting edge technologies now easily within reach of many nations from Israel to North Korea.

The risk of flashpoints such as Korea, Iran and the Taiwan strait blowing up into major conflicts remains and should not be ruled out by strategic planners. China’s growing global assertion of her economic, political and military might is also changing the strategic picture. While adhering to a policy of non-interference and the exercise of soft power, she is moving assertively into Africa and the Pacific. In 2007, South Africa’s president warned that the continent was in danger of becoming a Chinese colony. Australia’s 2009 White Paper named China as a prime strategic concern, not least because of her increased espionage activities and cyber-attacks against the Australian government. With a GDP expected to surpass that of the United States in 2027, China will nonetheless be dependent on sea borne oil supply that constitutes 80 percent of her total oil imports. To some Chinese, U.S. sea power poses a grave and hidden threat to China’s energy security. China has accordingly sought a capability since the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis to find U.S. aircraft carriers roughly a thousand miles from the mainland and attack them with homing anti-ship ballistic missiles. The overwhelming emphasis China has placed on developing her Second Artillery strategic missile technologies and other sophisticated weapons systems, including anti-ship cruise missiles, will provide capabilities that could easily accommodate any change in intentions. Thus, while war with China is currently assessed as unlikely, caution should be exercised.

STANDING ON GUARD

Canada has been blessed with a unique strategic position bordering only one foreign state. Although the country had always been – and remains – indefensible by Canadian arms alone, the physical integrity and security of...
Canada's great land mass has always been guaranteed by a greater power. During the many years when her principal enemy was the United States, the guarantor was Britain. Without British protection, Canada would not have survived. After President Franklin Roosevelt first extended the Monroe Doctrine to Canada in August 1936, however, the physical security of the Dominion was guaranteed by the United States. This remains the case today, which in a manner of speaking has left Canada on top of the world, benefiting from U.S. protection, but not needing to bear the full cost of defence. With physical threats from other states having been looked after, Canada's most vital interests boil down to the safety of her citizenry, the continued exercise of sovereignty and the uninterrupted flow of our 1.5 billion dollar a day trade with the United States to ensure a good standard of living for Canadians.98 The last means that American fears about terrorists entering their country from Canada have to be taken seriously,99 but any disruption of the flow of critical oil and energy supplies to the U.S. by Canadian or foreign terrorist groups could conceivably present an even more knotty problem. If Canadians prove incapable of dealing with such disruption, the Americans might well feel compelled to act unilaterally in their own interests, even if it involves jeopardizing Canadian sovereignty.

The anomaly of the Canadian strategic position is that the sheer size of America has often forced Canada, as some have put it, to “defend against help.” Before 1939 Defence Scheme Number 2 called for moving forces to British Columbia to ensure Canadian neutrality and territorial integrity in the event of a U.S. war with Japan.100 The lesson that if Canadians cannot defend themselves, Americans will, was, however, driven home during World War II. As early as 1941, the U.S. planned to incorporate Newfoundland, the Maritime Provinces, the Gaspe Peninsula, and British Columbia within their northeast and western defence commands. Canada had to struggle to gain “mutual cooperation” status and predominant influence in the colony of Newfoundland, but by 1943 there were 33,000 U.S. troops working on projects in Canada. The Americans bulldozed their way into Canada making deep inroads through such major, and often dubious, undertakings as the Alaska Highway, the Northeast Air Ferry Routes (“Crimson Project”) to Britain, the North West Air Staging Route to Alaska and the Soviet Union, associated northern weather stations, and the CANOL oil distribution system designed to provide oil from Norman Wells for U.S. forces in Alaska and western Canada. Partly to counter growing American influence in her northwest, Canada in 1943 agreed to participate in an operation to recapture the Aleutian island of Kiska. The sheer scale of the American effort posed a substantial threat to Canadian sovereignty as airbases were constructed and contracts let without reference to the Dominion government.101 “Defence against help,” thus remains one of the most compelling reasons for Canada to retain an army large enough to be capable of carrying out territorial defence tasks. Canada cannot defend herself, but she can defend her sovereignty.

Keeping in the good books of the Americans, however, remains the most compelling national interest for participating in the war in Afghanistan, especially after the decision not to assist them in Iraq as the British and Australians did.102 Whether the Canadian public will continue to accept getting involved in prolonged counter-insurgency wars, such as Afghanistan, is nonetheless debatable. Wars of this type, characterized by guerrilla tactics and terrorism, intentionally aim at the deliberate protraction of operations and historically have been quite difficult to terminate.103 An ancient barbarous and indiscriminate form of peoples’ struggle, guerrilla

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98 U.S. trade accounts for 73% of Canada's exports and 63% of imports. Canada is the largest foreign supplier of oil to the United States.
100 DND, 323.009 (D 161), Defence Scheme No. 2, 16 Apr 38, Copy No. 6 copy.
102 Americans in general were very upset by the Canadian stance, though failure to stand shoulder to shoulder with the United States, Britain, and Australia in Iraq replicated Canada's refusal to participate in the 1947 Berlin Airlift when they all did. James Eatry, In Defence of Canada: Growing Up Allied (Toronto: University Press, 1985), 47-51.
103 Terrorism is, of course, a tactic. Large-scale, conventional military forces have rarely been the primary reason for the end of terrorist groups (only 7%) and few groups achieve victory (only 10%). In examining 648 terrorist groups, Seth Jones found that most groups end in one of two ways. Either they join the political process (43%), or else small intelligence and security forces arrest or kill the leadership (40%). Dr. Seth G. Jones, RAND Corporation, “The Al Qa’ida Threat in Pakistan,” Testimony before the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Committee on Homeland Security, May 3, 2011.
war can be won by draconian measures, but is notoriously difficult for democracies to fight, especially when they stress respect for human rights and dignity. Winning hearts and minds is almost too great a challenge; in Northern Ireland, for example, it is doubtful that many Irish Catholics were ever convinced to vote against joining Eire. Public support during limited wars that drag on can also be expected to erode in democracies, which is why indications of success and the decisive nature of combat operations are so critical. In the Vietnam War American public support of involvement remained reasonably firm up until the 1968 Tet Offensive.\(^{104}\) The unflagging support of the Canadian public for troops fighting in Afghanistan, though perhaps fading for the war itself, may also be largely related to the fact that Canada’s combat dead have been visibly brought home with full military honours. This was not the case in the world wars or Korea where Canada adhered to the policy in interring servicemen close to where they died, which reflected the Commonwealth War Graves Commission deliberate policy of honouring war dead in imitation of the Athenians slain at Marathon “who for their singular and extraordinary valour were interred on the spot where they fell.”\(^{105}\)

With the war in Afghanistan winding down to a non-combat training mission for Canadian troops after July 2011, there is a risk that reserves and the Militia in particular will be hardest hit in the proposed defence cuts announced by Minister of Finance Jim Flaherty in March 2011.\(^{106}\) In light of the unpredictable nature of a dangerous world filled with flash points, this would be a tragic mistake. With the regular army as small as it is, can any strategist worthy of the name seriously defend not having any plan or reserve capability to induct a surge of patriotic citizens into the Canadian army in an emergency? Lack of a plan during Korean mobilization only succeeded in producing chaos and a public outcry for action, which spurred a too hasty ministerial intervention that lowered critical entry standards. As amply demonstrated before Korea, however, the Militia provides a natural skeletonized framework around which to expand the army of Canada. Until called out on full time duty, moreover, Militia soldiers are far less expensive than regulars whose wages, housing, pensions and other standing army overheads cost 80 percent more.\(^{107}\)

Of approximately ten billion dollars devoted to defence in 1997, nine went to field about 65,000 regulars and one to field around 30,000 primary reservists. This worked out to $138,461 per regular and $33,333 per reservist. As calculated on a hypothetical 18,500 militia soldiers in 1999, the total reserve army personnel budget came to under $200 million, compared to over $880 million for the roughly 17,500 civilians employed by National Defence and slightly above $800 million for the regular army.\(^{108}\) In this respect little has really changed. In 2007, a total of 7,700 soldiers from all components of the Canadian Forces Primary Reserve served on full time duty. This equated to 12 percent of a regular force strength of around 62,000 at that time, but the total Primary Reserve budget, including expenditures on part-time service, was less than five percent of total defence spending. This was not a bad return on a taxpayer dollar. By reducing personnel costs in this manner, but not necessarily personnel, more funds could be released for conducting productive individual and collective army training.

There are still those, of course, who continue to hold the view that militiamen will not be able to handle modern military complexities, including new equipment and armoured fighting vehicles fitted with advanced computer systems. A prevailing attitude expressed by the commander of Mobile Command in 1969 was that reserve soldiers were incapable of meeting performance requirements for classic peacekeeping operations. This appeared to be confirmed the following year when a trigger happy Ohio National Guardsman shot and killed students at Kent State University. Such judgments fly in face of reason and history, however, as good discipline


\(^{105}\) Crerar in World War II promised that Canadian soldiers would not be buried on enemy soil. Though the United Nations, rather than the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, administered burial arrangements in Korea, Canadian war dead were interred in the United Nations Memorial Cemetery in Pusan. Over 500 Canadians died in the Korean Conflict of whom 378 rest in Pusan. This contrasted with American practice which saw all remains shipped to a central mortuary in Japan and then reshipped to the United States.

\(^{106}\) Canadian Press, 23 March 2011. Flaherty indicated that defence would absorb up to 26 percent of the $2 billion in government cuts proposed for 2012 and 35 percent of total cuts anticipated for both 2013 and 2014.

\(^{107}\) Davis, “Right Way to Cut Defense Spending.”

\(^{108}\) *Globe and Mail*, 10 September 1999.
and technical expertise are determined not by reserve or regular status, but by training. The classic historical case occurred in the 1870 Franco-Prussian War when a relatively untried short-service reservist German army attacked and inflicted a humiliating defeat on a long-service regular French army, many of whose soldiers had fought continuously on numerous battlefields. The French view then was that reservists lacked the requisite training and esprit de corps to take on anything more demanding than static tasks – only regulars possessed the necessary cohesion and elan to carry out offensive operations. More recently in the 1991 Gulf War, an Iraqi army, battle-hardened by eight-years of war with Iran, was put to flight by a U.S. army that had trained well, but not recently fought. In that same war a U.S. Marine reserve company set a record for number of enemy tanks destroyed. A British squadron of the reserve 21st Special Air Service Regiment also distinguished itself in Afghanistan.

In the Canadian case, at a time when reservists suffered from declining numbers owing to neglect and more accessible jobs offering better pay, they increasingly came to be called upon to fill individual vacancies within the regular army. By the mid-1990s, Militia personnel constituted roughly 20 percent, on average, of contingents deployed to the former Yugoslavia. In the 1993 Medak pocket confrontation Militia personnel made up 44 percent of the 2nd Battalion Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI). The deployment of formed reserve sub-units to Bosnia also commenced with Rotation (ROTO) 9 of “Operation Palladium” when a number of reserve rifle sections were integrated into the 3rd Battalion, Royal 22e Regiment (R22eR) Battle Group for operations October 2001–March 2002. ROTO 10 saw formed composite reserve platoons deploy as part of the 2nd Battalion R22eR Battle Group for the period March - October 2002 and between October 2002-February 2003 a composite reserve company (CRC) deployed with the 1st Battalion, PPCLI Battle Group on ROTO 11. A second CRC, serving with 2 PPCLI Battle Group on ROTO 12, deployed in March 2003 and a third deployed with the Royal Canadian Dragoons Battle Group on ROTO 13 in September of the same year. The next step, according to the then Chief of the Land Staff, was to build upon this success by sending an entire composite reserve battalion overseas, which begs the question of why a larger Militia could not have provided 50 percent or more of deployed contingents overseas?

From all indications Militia soldiers performed well as augmentees in both the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan. On 4 November 2002, the Commander of Task Force Bosnia and Herzegovina reported favourably on the performance of the first CRC to be deployed as part of a regular army battle group. In assessing this CRC, designated D Company of the 1st Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, he remarked that “D Company is delivering the goods. They are no weak sister within the BG.” On the basis of three separate visits to the CRC he further observed that, “Were it not for unit titles on their slip-ons I would not be able to distinguish them from the remainder of the BG.” He added that his division commander had also commented very favourably on their work. It is worth noting, however, that the ROTO 13 CRC conducted six months training prior to joining its regular unit for 90 days of pre-deployment training.

Similar accolades emanated from Afghanistan, where, from 2006, the Militia continued to account for up to 20 percent of battle groups serving there. The Militia contribution to the Afghan task force steadily increased from 258 on ROTO 1 to 450 on ROTO 5 and to 525 on ROTO 9. Just recently Lieutenant General Leslie admitted that the army could not have done what it did in Afghanistan without reservists. “We would have

109 I have used the word training fully aware that much ink has been spilled on the alleged difference between training and education. In my experience this is a false dichotomy, further complicated by buzz word concepts such as professional development, since the central issue is learning.
111 Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, The General’s War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995), pp. 357-358; and Davis, “Right Way to Cut Defense Spending.” Bravo Company of the 4th Tank Battalion knocked out a record 34 Iraqi tanks. Reserve US aviation units comprised of civil airline pilots have also routinely outperformed regular units in aerial combat competitions (to the point that they are often no longer invited to participate). Once more, however, the results have usually been proportional to numbers of flying hours of pilots rather than any reserve-regular distinction. Civil airline pilots flying combat aircraft on weekends for fun simply rack up more hours.
115 Chief of Staff, Land Reserve briefing to the Executive Council of Honorary Colonels, Ottawa, 5-6 June 2010.
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Significantly, reservists volunteered for operations in unprecedented numbers despite often having to shelve careers or give up jobs, school and other commitments in order to take pre-deployment training. Regular personnel never had to make such sacrifices and, if they had to be removed from training because of health or injury, they never forfeited their pay, housing, or another chance for deployment as did Militia volunteers. When it came to serving in an operational theatre, however, there was no difference between the regular and reserve soldier. Training proved the great leveler and combat most certainly revealed them as equal. Reservists in Afghanistan also paid a price in blood.

In plugging gaps within the regular field force at a critical time the Militia fulfilled a traditional strategic role. Whereas regular armies constitute first reaction forces or vanguards, reserves provide the augmentation and sustaining reinforcement emanating from the people. Yet, while Militia soldiers creditably proved themselves in worthwhile roles that reflected the revitalization of the army reserve, their deployment abroad and out of unit – as previously mentioned – siphoned off money, equipment and leadership from the unit armoury floors that provided the personnel pools from which Militia augmentation sprang. The ongoing decline in numbers of Militia soldiers serving in home units portended that the augmentation stream for overseas service would eventually dry up, adversely affecting not just the Militia, but also the capacity of the regular army to meet deployment demands abroad. Military bureaucrats unable to see this nonetheless viewed shrinking units as candidates for closure or amalgamation. The obvious solution, finally recognized in the November 2010 directive on Primary Reserve management, proposed increasing the part-time Class A strength of the Militia. The larger the number of part-time soldiers, the greater the probability of obtaining volunteers for full-time service as required. Part-time service leading to volunteer full-time service for short-term engagements would also produce more bang for the buck than long-term regular service, which still leaves 10 to 15 percent of personnel non-deployable. Equally important, an expanded part-time Militia would provide a firmer base for large-scale mobilization.

THEY ALSO SERVE WHO ONLY STAND AND WAIT

The Militia has demonstrated its worth in Bosnia and Afghanistan and given an extremely good return on tax money invested. What needs to be better appreciated, however, is the value of part-time Class A voluntary service on the armoury floor within the civil community. This class of reservist is a citizen-soldier who has a civilian job as well as a military function. Historically, they have in mass given up their jobs and answered the call for full time military duty on mobilization in dire emergency. Among the many were Brigadier Stanley Todd who rose to command 2 Canadian Corps artillery in World War II and Major-General Bert Hoffmeister, commander of the 5th Armoured Division. Both officers were dedicated militiamen before the war, with Todd in particular spending a lot of his time on a primitive “puff table” trainer and simulator that tested bringing effective artillery fire to bear. His aim was to be the best gunner possible and the result was predictable: in war somebody had to know something about bringing indirect fire to bear, and this militiaman had learned the business better than regulars. When looking at the value of part-time Class A voluntary service these two examples among the many should be kept in mind.

For the most part, however, Militia commanders are not likely to take their units to war. Their value is

116 Pratt, 112. The artillery required 30 percent reserve augmentation to maintain operational tempo, while armour required 20 percent. That it takes 18 months to train a soldier for combat seems excessive by historical standards however. “Canadian army needs reservists to fill gaps: commander,” CBC News 21 November 2006.


118 According to one Militia brigade report, the system of placing the funding burden on the home unit of the deploying soldier and justifying this action by stating that units are funded to conduct this training is false. Units are not funded to conduct departure and arrival assistance groups, driver training and other courses to meet individual battle task standards, nor to concentrate composite platoons. Minister of National Defence’s Monitoring Committee Final Report - 2003 21.

119 From John Milton’s poem familiarly entitled “On His Blindness,” seemingly appropriate as there are those who cannot see value in Class A part-time Militia service. John Milton, Paradise Lost (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975), 393.
in keeping a skeletonized army in existence for a rainy day emergency requiring mobilization, all the while providing a source of volunteers for augmentation. Part-time soldiers also keep the army more widely in the public eye by virtue of the coast to coast Militia footprint and act as a magnet to draw in more interested citizen-soldiers. As many over the years have also opted for full-time duty in less than dire circumstances, but perceived military necessity, there is good reason to promote part-time Militia service as an honourable and desirable vocation in and of itself. Civilians holding down responsible jobs in communities cannot, of course, afford to give more than part-time service to regiment and country, but the skills they bring could make them better candidates for certain specialized tasks than regulars. To have doctors, lawyers, business entrepreneurs, teachers, professors, students and members of other trades and professions learn about military matters in various degrees of depth cannot help but benefit national defense in other ways as well. With most Canadians having never served in the military, Militia troop time, if more actively encouraged, would go a long way toward redressing lack of citizenry knowledge about armed forces. The very nature of Class A part-time service, however, calls for training and course attendance of a different order than full-time service. Many reservists cannot take time off from their jobs to attend long courses, which is an aspect not empathetically understood by regulars. A one size fits all approach to training, especially in a volunteer organization where enthusiastic, willing citizen-soldiers cannot always aim to please by adjusting their vocational commitments to fit the military circumstances, simply makes no sense.

Why part-time Militia service has not been recognized as a desirable military capability remains a mystery as a nation’s fighting strength is not limited to standing forces, but rests on mobilizing the population, most especially in the case to the army. A part-time force of citizen-soldiers not only keeps the military flame alive within civilian communities, even if only in embers, but as well provides a highly valuable coast to coast constituency for the promotion of army interests. Why the regular army fails to grasp this is dumbfounding. Neither the navy nor air force have such a strongly organized cross-country constituency, though the classic model of all time remains that of the German Navy League that for better or worse through an advocacy network of units in cities and towns across the Second Reich spawned the High Seas Fleet challenge to Britain. The vital importance of the military connection to the people of a nation cannot be stressed enough and involving the middle class in military service has been judged to be particularly important. Arguably, the part-time nature of Militia service offers a preferred avenue for such involvement. Since the withdrawal of regular army units from population centres to isolated bases, moreover, the task of maintaining a healthy close contact with the Canadian people has largely fallen to reservists. As previously alluded, this can be expected to remain an ongoing challenge as public support for the military can never be taken for granted.

A great strength of part-time Class A reservists is that while they may train after work and on weekends, they are sharp-end orientated, that is to say, the majority join up not to push paper in offices, but to practice the profession of arms by firing weapons on ranges, participating in field exercises and taking part in operations where possible. A lot of regular service time by way of comparison is taken up with matters entirely unrelated to field work and the employment of arms in operational and tactical scenarios. Militia units have benefited, as well, from a more pronounced cross-generational pollination emanating from a closer association with regimental veterans than normally the case with regular units. As time in service is not so critical as time in field work and the employment of arms in operational and tactical scenarios. Militia units have benefited, as well, from a more pronounced cross-generational pollination emanating from a closer association with regimental veterans than normally the case with regular units. As time in service is not so critical as time in training for operations and war, there is no reason that the Militia desire for hard core army training on parade nights and weekends could not be properly cultivated to produce an operationally focused source of volunteers.
The Role of the Militia in Today’s Canadian Forces

capable of fielding substantial home defence formations and expeditionary contingents. Indeed, vastly improved communications, simulation technologies and computer-enhanced methods for training individuals, units and formations should make it even easier for Militia elements to practice warfighting doctrine and operational decision-making in digitized battle command systems.

As had been intimated, the Militia part-time Class A base clearly needs to be increased in size to accommodate augmentation and provide a stronger framework for mobilization. Enlarging the current footprint of the Militia across Canada, as has already been done productively in the case of the Halifax Rifles and the Yellowknife Company, would also bring selected communities many benefits, including enhanced safety and protection as well as part-time job offerings and youth leadership and educational opportunities. Arguably a renewed military presence in Whitehorse, Yukon, is long overdue and places like Abbotsford and Prince George in British Columbia are large enough to support Militia units. Increasing Militia strength overall does not need to be prohibitively expensive and could be funded with no increase to the defence budget through a multi-year programme of reductions to current administrative overheads in the Department of National Defence. To expand the number of Militia part-time soldiers will demand more dollars for wages and one-time costs for uniform holdings, personal weapons, and other items of individual kit, but not as much as an estimated $150 million to induct 1000 regulars in a year. Militia training consumable costs for rations, fuel and ammunition will also rise, but the infrastructure for a much larger Militia has existed for decades. The increase could also be phased with a very modest growth rate of 3,000 per annum over ten years. At an average of $20,000 per year per soldier (one fifth that of a regular), the incremental cost would only be $60 million per year or .003% of a $20 billion annual defence budget.

Comparatively, this sum would cover the cost of 600 full-time civilian defence employees whose average salary, benefits, and pension provisions total around $100,000 per year. As the Department of National Defence is currently 3,500 civilian employees over Treasury Board approved establishment, increasing the part-time strength of the Militia remains well within the realm of financial feasibility if there is a will. Indeed, reducing the size of an inflated National Defence Headquarters and using the personnel savings to expand the Militia would enhance operational effectiveness and overall preparedness for possible major conflict in the future. Citizen knowledge of military affairs would also be increased along with army size. Excising headquarters’ fat would additionally be in line with Lieutenant General Leslie’s commendable intent not to cut the sharp end of the forces, but to reduce overheads. This would certainly foster force effectiveness from another perspective as an important lesson learned in World War II was that small headquarters worked more efficiently than large ones. One army group headquarters even found that the bulk of the problems encountered were created by staff officers not the enemy. Fewer staff officers meant fewer problems.

A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY

Given the increasingly unaffordable personnel costs of maintaining a regular army that is still too small to carry out assigned tasks abroad, let alone at home, and the likelihood of defence cuts announced in the range of 25

123 Whitehorse has a population of 22,898 and Yellowknife with a population of 18,700 already has a Militia element. Abbotsford has a population around 160,000 and Prince George about 83,000. Other prospective places for Militia community expansion include Chilliwack (pop. 80,892) in British Columbia, Grand Prairie (71,668) and Fort McMurray (52,643) in Alberta, Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu (87,492) and Granby (68,352) in Quebec, and several large communities within the Toronto area such as Newmarket, Vaughan, Richmond Hill, and Etobicoke. A downtown Toronto Militia unit has already been relocated in Mississauga and other elements to Scarborough.

124 An increase of 5,000 per year would cost approximately $100,000,000 in wages for the first year, with training consumable costs of $3,000 per soldier adding $15,000,000. Over five and one half years total costs would amount to $632,500,000, not including additional one-time costs of about $137,500,000 for new personal equipment at approximately $5,000 per soldier. In the fifth year of phasing, an increase to 45,000 would only be 3.5 % of the defence budget. The estimated total cost of the Militia at that time would be around $1.5 billion, or 6.8% of the defence budget. If new units are raised in new locations there will be some capital or rental costs. The longer range bill for vehicles, radios and other collective equipment is difficult to predict as scales of issue will depend upon roles assigned.


percent, the Militia offers an economical avenue for producing more soldiers for full-time duty as required. The unpredictability of the future in a dangerous and rapidly changing world coupled with the small size and cost of regular soldiers underpins the logic of building up rather than tearing down the framework of one of Canada’s oldest and proven institutions. Canada has won wars with citizen-soldiers, but with barely enough today to meet the demands of regular army augmentation, the Militia must be expanded in order to sustain land force operations over and above Canada’s commitments abroad. To assist with domestic tasks set forth in the Canada First Defence Strategy and likely to be perpetuated in one form or another in future policy announcements, the Militia will have to be increased to 45,000 part time soldiers. As will be shown, this is the estimated minimum number of soldiers needed to assist other federal agencies in protecting the nation from terrorism, insurrection and mitigating domestic disasters. Major terrorist attacks on pipelines, hydro stations, roads and railways could be delivered by foreigners, sleeper cells, or home grown dissidents within Canada, while domestic disasters could result from such things as an earthquake in Vancouver, nuclear plant melt down, floods, oil spills and forest fires. For home defence in general the army will require capabilities for operating in mountains, in the northern boreal forest, in urban areas, along coasts in cooperation with the navy and in the Arctic with the air force and navy.

The army should also be capable of mobilizing additional force through the Militia framework to whatever level is required by the circumstances and have “no cost” plans to do so. To not be able to mobilize troops for an extended disaster even remotely approaching the scale of that which recently struck Japan would be a national disgrace. More specific home defence tasks will have to include protecting vital infrastructure such as ports and airfields, mounting urban disaster recovery operations and even removing lodgements from coasts. Special units for cyber operations and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence could also be formed. By optimal staff assessment of Militia troops to tasks, this will call for two brigades in the Arctic, five in Ontario, and four each in British Columbia, the Prairies, Quebec, and the Atlantic region. With only ten brigades of Militia available cross country at present, however, an additional three will be needed to enable each of them to take on twice the load of the projected 23 brigade requirement. To sustain 13 Militia brigade deployments with rear party cadres will require an estimated 3500 troops in each. The total strength of the Militia would, therefore, be approximately 45,000, which would leave Canada in a better position to provide troops for expeditionary operations as well as home defence tasks.

As demonstrated in World War II, the Militia provides a natural framework for mobilizing home defence, significantly the one area in which Canada imposed conscription in 1940. The outstanding assistance of reserves during recent natural disasters has also conditioned many grateful Canadians to look to the Militia as a first line supporter. Most communities additionally want local reserve units to be more closely involved in emergency planning and execution, which partly explains why Prime Minister Paul Martin in announcing the creation of the new Department of Public Safety specifically mentioned increasing National Defence reserves available for civil preparedness, including a capacity to deal with natural disasters and local emergencies. As lead federal department, Public Safety Canada coordinates actions related to emergency preparedness, crisis management, policing, crime prevention and border issues as well as national security. The Cabinet Committee on Security, Public Health and Emergencies chaired by the Minister of Public Safety also manages national security and intelligence issues and activities and coordinates government-wide responses to all emergencies, including public health, natural disasters and security. The Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency

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127 “The most obvious reason for bolstering the reserves today is that it is the only realistic way to begin strengthening the regular forces.” Robson and Pellerin, “Send in the militia.”

128 Canada has already experienced terrorism in the 1985 Air India bombing. Islamic terrorism could conceivably arise, home grown, from the 750,000 Muslim community in Canada. Although no acts of domestic terrorism have yet been perpetrated by Islamic extremists, at least one plot to cause mass death and destruction within Canada has been uncovered. Disputed land claims could also result in aboriginal Canadians taking disruptive and potentially violent action as they did at Oka, Gustafson Lake, Ipperwash, Caledonia and Deseronto. The Oka crisis resulted in the deployment of the Canadian Forces to support the police. As 1.1 million aboriginals are scattered in communities across the nation, their concerted effort could result in very serious disruption. For a possible scenario see Douglas L. Bland, Uprising: A Novel (Toronto: Blue Butterfly, 2009).

129 The Canadian Rangers with 4200 personnel are to grow to 5000. Jane Kokan, “Guardians of the North: Canadian Rangers,” Frontline (September/October 2010), 29-32.

130 This occurred after the Dunkirk-prompted passage of the National Resources Mobilization Act in June 1940, which effectively created two classes of soldiers as conscripts for home defence had to volunteer to be sent overseas. English, Canadian Army, 69.
Preparedness further focuses on potential disasters such as earthquakes, floods, ice storms and major chemical spills. That the Canadian military remains in support as a “force of last resort”\(^{131}\) is fortunate, of course, as the Militia surely needs to avoid repeating the experience of the narrowly restrictive and debilitating national survival role. While the Militia has always provided valuable assistance to civil authority, it remains primarily a military not a civil resource. Providing the framework for mobilization, connecting with Canadians, and augmenting regulars must remain the role of the army reserve.

If one accepts that good training can easily bridge the difference between a reservist and regular soldier, then introducing an army training regime that could draw on a part-time Militia of 45,000 and efficiently accommodate the “surge” induction of citizen-soldiers on short-term engagements for full-time duty could better meet the needs of domestic and expeditionary operations. Reorienting the Canadian army to accommodate part-time and short-term service would also save personnel costs while increasing manning. There is no reason why an expanded Militia could not provide more than 20 percent of overseas deployments and be cost-effective in doing so. Full-time duty for short term engagements would additionally tend to foster the idea of service to country over careerist pattern progression. The intent here would be to open the army to the nation, which would require changing the culture of a military establishment that tends to run a closed shop difficult to enter. Instead of aiming to retain regular personnel in a long-term career, which seems remarkably out of step in a work world where people can be expected to change jobs several times per decade, the army would be able to offer engagements as short-term as 18 months.\(^{132}\) Such an engagement would allow five or six months for training and a year of service before returning to part-time duty in a Militia reserve unit. This would be enough time for a citizen so inclined and able to serve his country overseas and earn a medal. That it allegedly takes 18 months to train a soldier for combat\(^{133}\) seems excessive by historical standards and a luxury. A “though put” training regime with streamlined induction and instruction centres could reduce training time without compromising standards and leave the army better positioned to carry out mobilization in event of emergencies.

Such a training regime, perfectly suited to an army preparing to take on a similar task in Afghanistan, would require a full-time long service general staff to coordinate the detailed planning and execution that would necessarily be associated with more frequent personnel intakes, training programs and operational assignments. There would, additionally, be a need for a long service non-commissioned officer corps. With most regular army units and formations now stationed on bases relatively isolated from the civilian populace, the effect of catering to an expanded Militia with its coast-to-coast community connections would serve to bring the nation into the army on a broad base. Indeed, it would create a true peoples’ army in which citizens who are inclined and able to serve their country in uniform would not be precluded from doing so. To not strengthen and reinforce the existing Militia framework would be unwise as there is nothing more important for the army of a democracy than its link with its people. The community-based Militia with a more diverse ethnic and gender makeup than the regular army can be much more than what it is now. Creative thinking will obviously be required to field a land force as described, but surely there can be no more powerful and compelling vision than one of a broadly based army springing from the people – and when the people see that army, they see themselves.

\(^{132}\) One U.S. researcher found that roughly two-thirds of high school graduates went directly on to higher education and the biggest disincentive against their joining the forces during or after university was the three or more year engagement. His recommendation was to target universities with short-term recruiting offers. Charles Moskos, “Short-Term Soldiers,” The Washington Post, 8 March 1999.
\(^{133}\) “Canadian army needs reservists to fill gaps: commander,” CBC News 21 November 2006. A lot of the training for Militia going to the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan had been inefficiently delivered.
RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Immediately bring part-time Class A Militia strength up to the 18,500 target that was supposed to have been met in March 2006.

2. Reaffirm the Militia role sanctioned by the Minister and promulgated by the CDS in 2002.

3. Aim to increase total Class A strength to 45,000 with clearly defined home defence roles within a skeletonized Militia structure that would serve as a framework for further army expansion.

4. Produce a “no cost” mobilization plan with a war establishment order of battle structure for expanding a skeletonized Militia in emergency. Unit manning and equipment in this planned structure would be restricted by position and item in peacetime.

5. Restrict Class B service for Militia support only, with all reservists filling regular positions being paid at Class C rates out of the regular budget.

6. Establish a separate Militia pay envelope and ensure it is used for Militia pay only.

7. Give priority to deploying formed Militia sub-units – and eventually units – for overseas operations and establish a time-efficient through-put training system to accomplish this objective.
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