



COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY REQUIRES COMPREHENSIVE STRUCTURES— HOW COMPREHENSIVE CAN WE GET?

Ann Fitz-Gerald and Don Macnamara | March 2012

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Despite the generational calls for '3-D', 'joined-up', 'Whole of Government' and, more recently, 'comprehensive' approaches to security, it is still unclear as to what Canada's concept of security is, how it is promoted, pursued and projected at home and abroad, and how it is managed by Ottawa-based government ministries and departments. This short paper confirms the fact that the 'comprehensive approach' to security remains more rhetorical than realizable. The paper then investigates three areas which continue to impede prospects for a coherent approach to future security planning, particularly with regards to Canada's overseas assistance: the impediments to strategic agility; the need for earmarked departmental and 'family' resources; and the lack of an integrated comprehensive international security analysis body that evaluates domestic security concerns in the face of international trends and allows Canada to 'push out its borders'. During a time in which Canada commands a respectable and comparatively healthy position in the world, this paper recommends that efforts be made to realize comprehensive security and not expose the lack of structures, systems and processes that currently sit behind Canada's security rhetoric.

SOMMAIRE

Malgré les appels des générations pour des approches « 3-D », « cohérentes », « pangouvernementales » et, plus récemment, « globales » en matière de sécurité, on ne voit pas encore clairement ce qu'est le concept de sécurité du Canada, comment on en fait la promotion, comment il est poursuivi et projeté au pays et à l'étranger, et comment il est géré par les ministères et les départements du gouvernement dont le siège se trouve à Ottawa. Cette courte étude confirme le fait que « l'approche globale » à la sécurité demeure plus rhétorique que réalisable. Le document explore ensuite trois domaines qui continuent à occulter les perspectives qui permettraient d'approcher avec cohérence la future planification de sécurité, particulièrement en ce qui touche l'aide que dispense le Canada à l'étranger, les entraves à l'agilité stratégique, le besoin de ressources ministérielles et « familiales » désignées, et l'absence d'un organisme intégré d'analyse de la sécurité internationale globale qui évalue les préoccupations de sécurité intérieure face aux tendances internationales et qui permet au Canada de « pousser ses frontières vers l'extérieur ». Pendant un moment où le Canada commande une position respectable et comparativement saine dans le monde, cette étude recommande qu'on fasse des efforts pour réaliser une sécurité globale sans exposer le manque de structures, de systèmes et de processus qui se cache présentement derrière la rhétorique du Canada sur la sécurité.

INTRODUCTION

It may have become trite to state that the international security environment has become complex. It now involves a range of risks and threats from terrorism, to failing states, to natural and humanitarian disasters, which may not be best addressed by military means alone; however, the notion of national security being more broadly based than military security, or even internal security, is not new. Barry Buzan, in his 1981 seminal work, *People, States and Fear*, addressed the matter of a more wide-ranging spectrum embodying five sectors: military; political; economic; societal; and environmental factors across three levels of individuals, states and international systems.¹ Recent re-definitions of national security have relied heavily on a wider approach most often based in the definition adopted by Canada's National Defence College in 1981² and, more recently, by the International Working Group on National Security (IWGNS).³

Canada's National Security Policy of 2004 included a broad list of features, factors and government departments and the 2005 Defence Policy Statement also called for the 3-D approach—Defence, Diplomacy and Development—plus C for Commerce or trade.⁴ This may be seen as a 'strategic derivative' of US Marine Corps Commandant General Krulak's assessment of future conflicts involving troops required to be in combat, delivering humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping within a 3-block radius.⁵ Although the concept is still widely discussed in US Government circles, the term '3-D' was replaced by 'Whole of Government Approach' (WGA), which reflected the research and policy advocacy efforts of the Paris-based Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), of which Canada is an active member. The adoption of 'WGA' by the Government of Canada also came at a time when its efforts to support the delivery of international assistance in countries such as Haiti relied on a 'wider-than-3-D' effort, including the corrections services, justice and health. The WGA 'genre' also became the foundation for Canada's engagement in Afghanistan, including the assumption of a 'whole of government' involvement in the new security spectrum activities.

Now the 'comprehensive approach' serves as a further 'spin-off' to the WGA literacy, and is one that, based on the level of comprehension embedded in its campaign analysis tools, the military—and Canada's military allies, especially NATO—relate to quite well. For well over a decade this environment has been referred to by the military as 'JIMP': Joint, Interagency, Multinational and Public.⁶ The philosophy calls for the bringing together of previously separate agencies into closer collaboration in achieving policy objectives. In fact, a comprehensive approach aims to operationalize "the goal that these philosophies identify. Indeed, it involves developing a capacity to interact with such players in a cooperative and constructive manner."⁷

To capture the scope of the subject, we propose the following definition of comprehensive security: *the end-state of a nation's security policy achieved through the coordinated application of the multiplicity of government and non-government components and instruments involved in developing and maintaining a stable and peaceful environment that permits the effective operation of political, economic and social institutions for the overall benefit of citizens.*

1 Reference and discussion in Marianne Stone, "Security According to Buzan," *Security Discussion Papers*, Group d'études et d'Expertise "Securite et Technologies," Series 1 (Spring 2009).

2 "National Security is the preservation of a way of life acceptable to the Canadian people and compatible with the needs and legitimate aspirations of others. It includes freedom from military attack or coercion, freedom from internal sub-version, and freedom from the erosion of the political, economic, and social values which are essential to the quality of life in Canada." In W.D. Macnamara and A.M. Fitz-Gerald, "A National Security Framework for Canada," *IRPP Policy Matters* (2002): 8.

3 "National Security is the first and most important obligation of government. It involves not just the safety and security of the country and its citizens. It is a matter of guarding national values and interests against both internal and external dangers—threats that have the potential to undermine the security of the state, society and citizens. It must include not just freedom from undue fear of attack against their person, communities or sources of their prosperity and sovereignty, but also the preservation of the political, economic and social values—respect for the rule of law, democracy, human rights, a market economy and the environment—which are central to the quality of life in a modern state." In "A National Security Planning Framework for Post-conflict Countries", *Global Policy Brief*, International Working Group on National Security, No 1 (2009).

4 "Securing an Open Society for Canada: Canada's National Security Policy," Canada Privy Council Office, April 2004.

5 The 3-D and 3-Block War concepts are well discussed in Walter Dorn and Michael Varey, "The Rise and Demise of the Three-Block War," *Canadian Military Journal* (October, 2009).

6 "Joint, Interagency, Multinational and Public is a descriptor that identifies the various categories of players (i.e. organizations, interest groups, institutions) that inhabit the broad environment in which military operations take place." In Michael Rostek et al, "Toward Army 2040," *Claxton Paper* 14 (2011): 69.

7 Ibid.

Notwithstanding Canada's engagement in the multilateral fora leading the WGA debate, its 2004 national security policy and its more recent efforts to reform the reporting structure of the Privy Council Office in a way that allows the National Security Adviser to serve as the principal advisor to the Prime Minister on foreign, defence, development, security and intelligence matters, precious little has happened in terms of the Departments coming together to pursue a more coherent approach to security policy strategy. This challenge is also seen to be compounded by the constitutional construct that hinges on ministerial responsibility. Unless a truly strategic approach is taken to support Canada's strategic goals and future security policy, the comprehensive approach will remain out of reach, as will comprehensive security.

This paper will highlight three important variables that are paramount to achieving Canada's much-desired comprehensive security approach that, at the moment, remains more rhetorical than realizable. These variables include: (1) the absence of some practical norms that characterize strategic planning and implementation; (2) the issue of individual departmental and collective resources; and (3) the need for an evidence base supporting rich and relevant analysis required for comprehensive security strategy development.

POLICY VS STRATEGY

One of the tragic lessons from Canada's Afghanistan deployment is the failure of the Canadian public to understand the "why" and the "what" of over a decade of operations there.

The "why" does indeed start with our national interests: security; prosperity; stable world order; and the promotion of our fundamental values of freedom, democracy, the rule of law and human rights. The World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks evoked the NATO Article 5 response of "an attack against one is an attack against all" and the UN Security Council resolution establishing the International Security Assistance Force, subsequently a NATO formation. We have been there in our national interests and in accordance with our long-standing obligations to UN operations and NATO Treaty commitments.

The 'why' is also very much based on the changing nature of Canada as an 'active,' rather than a 'passive,' military donor country. Canada's enhanced maneuverability to combat a broad range of strategic threats, its well-developed deployable capacity for overseas assistance, and the strategic and diverse international partnerships that Canada maintains now culminates in a heavier footprint that contributes more directly to the 'globalized' security agenda, including, most recently, in the NATO Libyan intervention. Amidst the current global economic climate, and based on the impact that an increasingly American unilateral security posture will have on the national security interests of close and like-minded allies, this enhanced international 'footprint' and 'voice' takes on a greater degree of importance.

The "what" is more difficult to explain and to understand in depth. The combat operations have indeed received almost all the media attention. Canada has been in Afghanistan from the beginning and participated in the search for Osama bin Laden in Operation Anaconda in early 2002. In 2003–2004, Canada was in command of the Kabul-based International Security Assistance Force, contributing the largest number of troops to that mission.

In addition, from the earliest days, many non-military tasks were undertaken, but even then they involved military resources because of a lack of a civilian capability and capacity.⁸ Canada assumed responsibility for security and development in Kandahar province, including the Provincial Reconstruction Team, for six years. Included in its activities were some members of a number of other government Departments (OGDs) reflecting the much-vaunted integrated "3-D approach." Unfortunately, aside from the resources of the Canadian Forces, other government departments were initially limited in their participation, exposing a lack of culture of 'deployment'.

⁸ For example, in 2005, Hillier assigned a group of 12 senior officers and two DND civilians with a wide cross-section of graduate-level academic backgrounds, from economics and strategic planning to public administration and strategic communications, to form a "Strategic Advisory Team—Afghanistan" (SAT-A). The team made critical contributions to the development of a government structure for Afghanistan, the drafting of the Afghanistan Compact and the Afghan National Development Strategy approved in Bonn in Feb 2006. Four separate groups were assigned to the SAT-A until its disbandment in 2008.

Considerable developments have occurred within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), and more recently within the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), with the aim of organizing the most appropriate assets to coordinate comprehensive security, particularly with the creation of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START). Having been led by Canada's former Representative of Canada in Kandahar, Elissa Goldberg—who herself has directly experienced challenges to headquarters and field-based comprehensive security efforts—START has made some tremendous strides in ensuring cross-Government support, liaison, training and representation within the unit. In addition, it maintains a close relationship with its counterparts elsewhere, such as stabilization teams in the UK, Australia and the United States.

Notwithstanding the laudable operational and technical efforts of START, the efforts of one unit within a ministerial portfolio on its own neither will, nor should, provide the leadership and *modus operandi* for comprehensive security. This is especially the case when significant elements of START's overseas manpower sit outside of DFAIT. At the moment, whilst the outdated 2004 National Security Policy provides the only macro-government strategic framework for comprehensive security, a lack of accompanying 'strategy' underpinning the document has rendered it lifeless and unable to be implemented. Notwithstanding the efforts to overcome ministerial barriers through the formation of the Afghanistan Task Force, as a result of this strategic policy vacuum, the three variables mentioned above collectively risk undermining the culture and ethos required to pursue a comprehensive approach.

INTERDEPARTMENTAL ISSUES UNDERMINING STRATEGIC CAPACITY AND AGILITY

Joined-up government approaches implemented during the early 2000s exposed the departmental cultural, bureaucratic, legal and generational barriers that like-minded security departments had to confront and work through in order to achieve greater collective cooperation on security issues. For example, it became eminently clear that a 'programming' culture was dominant in the international development agencies; on the other hand, defence institutions tended to think strategically, albeit constrained by short-term funding cycles. Whereas being posted as a development policy officer to a certain country may have been understood bureaucratically as a 'career detracting' posting, for a diplomat or a defence official this may have represented a 'career enhancing' opportunity. Legal differences also entered the frame, with international development agencies, particularly the more 'passive' international development donors, being restricted by 'Official Development Assistance' criteria that, at times, would preclude their participation in countries that lacked absorptive capacity, or in which the security conditions were other than benign.

Linked to the legal area was also the importance of the 'strategic mantras' of these organizations and the recognition that funding and intervention opportunities, which may serve the diplomatic or security interest, may not serve the 'poverty eradication' interest of the international development community; something that further underscores the need for strategic level security policy with clear collective goals and expected outcomes. Lastly, the generational differences that are evident between the current senior and middle management cadres of the security-related institutions can also impact on what does—and does not—win 'comprehensive support'. More specifically, whilst some senior management cadres of many international development agencies are still of the view that international development should operate according to the traditional development culture, and not one that is inter-linked to the security agenda, others demonstrate high levels of acceptance towards the relationship between security and development. One could argue that both retired Generals and young staff college captains both share a similar appreciation towards the security-development 'nexus,' not least by way of the counterinsurgency campaigns of the past and present, but also because of a common military cultural, ethical, training and professional education background.

Canada still suffers from a lack of precision, expression and cohesion supporting comprehensive security policy. This only serves to sustain the cultural, bureaucratic, legal and generational cleavages described above

which collectively undermine the comprehensiveness promoted and pursued. The absence of any strategic and capstone ‘formula’ results in a divisive duality of strategic independence and operational functionality: strategic independence as a result of no strategic security policy goals being articulated, and operational functionality based on the good working relationships and high number of inter-departmental working groups at the middle management, ‘operational’ and program level. Operating in a strategic policy vacuum results in decisions being made by a ‘lead’ department and according to the ‘lead’ department’s institutional strategic policy. If this is not of sufficient concern, the concern becomes greater when there is an absence of *overall* institutional strategic policy. It is clear that the public servants lack an appropriate professional development and education program to develop the common cultural, intellectual and strategic planning skills to develop such a policy or set of policies.

The way in which decisions are made in support of international security-related deployments serves as a good case in point. At the moment, based on the non-military nature of the security threats to which donor governments respond—and based on its operational security capacity—Public Safety (a Government Department that other countries might recognize as a ‘Ministry of Interior/Homeland Security’ combined with a domestic intelligence agency) is routinely turned to for deployable personnel and assets in a range of weak, conflict-affected and developing states.⁹ The recommendation to deploy these assets is often led by DFAIT. Whilst the ‘policy’ guiding such a decision is referred throughout the Pearson Building as the ‘fragile states policy,’ the paper that appears to support such activities is in fact a concept paper entitled “Sustaining Canada’s Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States”; a good read though it is, it is tantamount to neither a policy, nor a strategy paper. Furthermore, with at least five separate organizational cultures operating within the Public Safety portfolio, a sixth in DFAIT and then another completely different culture in National Defence, it is unlikely that an appropriate and effective ‘joint’ policy or strategy could be developed.¹⁰

Based on the apparent authority of this concept paper, what becomes questionable is the strategic impact of decisions taken at the operational/program level on matters concerning international security and other government departments when the lead department appears to operate in an institutional policy vacuum. The high-level interdepartmental Director General-level discussions and priority review processes are no doubt critical to informing spending priorities and emerging issues; however, without a manageable set of grand strategic ‘beacons’ to which all departments can relate and subscribe, assessing each opportunity based on priority reviews means that a *‘crise de la journée’* approach can very quickly become the norm. Furthermore, in the absence of the necessary planning skills among the responsible departments and individual officials, the problem is compounded.

DILEMMAS IN DEPARTMENTAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION

The strategic security policy vacuum also impacts on resources and funds that are specifically earmarked for certain purposes and in support of specific departmental remits. For example, if Public Safety personnel were drawn on for the purposes of international security assistance without a dedicated pool of human resources, budget or ‘earmarked’ funds for improving the ‘rule of law’ in other countries, these resources must be taken from their primary responsibility to promote domestic security in Canada. As highlighted in a recent report published by the Centre for International Governance and Innovation, despite the demands placed on the personnel and the technical competencies of Canada’s domestic security agencies to support overseas security engagements, resources are not forthcoming. Only a very small staff complement (2 full-time staff members) currently exist within the International Strategic Issues Unit of Public Safety’s International Affairs Division to look at this issue.¹¹ Despite the priority the Government of Canada has placed on Afghanistan, only one policy officer supported this file on a full-time basis within Public Safety. In contrast, a total Public Safety effort supporting

9 “Sustaining Canada’s Engagement in Acutely Fragile States and Conflict-Affected Situations,” Government of Canada, EDRMS 4275191, July 2009.

10 Mark Sedra and Geoff Burt, “SSR and the International-Domestic Security Nexus,” *SSR Monitor*, No. 1, Centre for International Governance and Innovation, March 2011.

11 Based on discussions with Public Safety’s International Affairs Division, June 2011.

Afghanistan over a 10-year period, amounting to approximately \$96 million, was received through DFAIT-led initiatives, all of which was allocated to the RCMP and Correctional Services Canada. The work of Public Safety's International Affairs Division under this file was funded through the internal reallocation of funds (i.e., funds that were diverted from existing domestic security-related activities).

This lack of investment contrasts markedly with the requirements for overseas support to domestic security institutions, which are characteristic of almost all present day international security (and many international development) related interventions. As these interventions increase both in depth and breadth, a lack of strategic approach will only lead to further strains on resources in the future.

EFFECTIVE STRATEGIC ANALYSIS AND STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT

Another issue that arises is the evaluation of what represents a 'priority country' for the Government of Canada. To senior policymakers, this issue is often implicit and sometimes based on short-term program reviews that gauge priorities in a changing environment; however, in scanning institutional concept and framework documents such as Public Safety's 2010 International Strategic Framework, DND's 'Canada First Defence Strategy', DFAIT's 'Sustaining Canada's Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Regions' and CIDA's Policy on Human rights, Democratization and Good Governance—as well as its Policy Statement on Strengthening Aid Effectiveness—the disparities on paper with regard to this issue become clear. Furthermore, in specific programmatic areas, discussions with cross-Government representatives expose differences in interpretations of suitable target countries for activities such as anti-crime and counter-terrorism capacity-building support. For example, some policy desks tend to prioritize support for counter-terrorism activities in favour of countries that are considered threats to Canada, which already have a certain level of counter-terrorism 'infrastructure' in place. Others regard these activities as addressing the needs of weak and fragile states and others still, admit to aligning themselves with the priorities of their close international partners, as opposed to priorities expressed by the programmatic lead within the Government of Canada.¹² These disparities run the risk of bolstering the lack of policy focus and diluting the collective impact of Canada's overseas assistance.

Lastly, without clarity on strategic policy goals and implementation imperatives, one is forced to question the evidence base that informs and supports program-related decisions. At the moment, despite the policy focus on 'pushing out the borders' and identifying security threats before they reach Canadian soil, Canada's security intelligence legislation and function remains domestic in their orientation. Despite the existence of departmental intelligence and research bureaus such as in DFAIT, CIDA and DND, the Intelligence Assessment Secretariat (IAS) in the Privy Council Office serves as the only desk capable of producing comprehensive 'global' analysis; however, it lacks a domestic intelligence responsibility still retained by the Security and Intelligence Secretariat. Further, the IAS does not make policy recommendations such as a prioritized list of international threats to Canada, which require a response from domestic security agencies aimed at building the 'rule of law and law enforcement capabilities in other countries; however, with increasing transnational and global security trends, the economic security vulnerabilities of the US and Europe and the rise of sophisticated licit and illicit non-state networks, there is a fundamental need for international security analysis that evaluates the domestic security considerations of these international trends. These trends will only warrant attention if the need for their analysis becomes aligned with a concise and dynamic national security framework, of which Canada currently has none. This particularly cries out for top-down policy direction for a system of professional development programs that allow mid-level and senior management level officials to participate in formal and graduated professional development education programs together and with their military opposite numbers. Existing programs relevant to the knowledge and skills required already exist at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto, some of which are available through both residential and distance education programs at the Royal Military College in Kingston. Only a handful of officials now attend these programs, but the real needs of the public service require many more attendees of these programs, or perhaps an additional executive course variant that caters to the needs of mid-career and senior public servants.

¹² Based on cross-Government interviews on issues related to counter-terrorist and anti-crime capacity-building programs.

A STEP-BY-STEP FRAMEWORK FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY STRATEGY FOR CANADA

Step 1—A Policy Statement Regarding Comprehensive Approach

As indicated above, a strategy should flow from an overarching statement of policy that states clearly what the Government wants to do and why. This statement can simply indicate that in the increasingly complex and interdependent international security environment—and in the light of the experience gained in deployments to Afghanistan, Haiti and Libya—Canada's responses to matters affecting Canada's broad security, prosperity, international stability or human rights interests will involve a collaborative and comprehensive multi-departmental approach to national security. This will require the development of a coordinated response capability from a range of Government departments, such as National Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Justice, Public Safety, Finance and the Canadian International Development Agency, to ensure the deployment of the appropriate resources to intervene and participate with allies in events ranging from military action and stabilization through disaster relief, recovery and reconstruction.

As indicated in earlier sections of this paper, the nature of this thinking and activity is not new at the operational level of Government. Existing mechanisms, such as inter-departmental working groups and priority review processes, would make such policy declarations easy to absorb and respond to; however, having a clear message and guidance in the form of 'macro-strategic' security policy would lead to inter-departmental responses becoming more consensual and coherent. Moreover, the policy statement document would provide executive level 'strategic policy goals'—a seemingly missing level of policy in the Government of Canada, despite its multilateral commitments to Whole of Government Approaches.

Step 2—A Comprehensive Security Strategy document including statements of the ends, ways and means: the capabilities expected to be developed and maintained; a coherent set of responsibilities for all departments involved; and the human, capital and financial resources to be allocated.

As per the more recent experience of a number of Canada's allies, the facilitation, research, direction and development should be led by a high-level cross-Government committee of policy officers with experience in writing effective strategy.

Step 3—A single high-level Cabinet Committee for National Security will be required to assess situations and to authorize the deployments of resources. This should be supported by the National Security Adviser and Cabinet Secretariat.

Step 4—The successful pursuit of any strategy will lie in its implementation based on coherence, commitment and cooperation across Government. To achieve this, the understanding and exercising of truly joint operations will require the same dedicated approach to joint professional education already pursued by the Canadian Forces. This means understanding the capabilities of each department, understanding the planning processes involved in launching an operation, common goal setting and allocation of responsibilities to achieve coherence of intent and objective, and commitment to the ends through an organization and execution concept followed by cooperation in achieving the intended outcomes through educated and trained leaders. Development of the necessary common professional education and training programs for personnel at leadership levels who may be involved in deployments can be directed to existing institutions, notably the Royal Military College of Canada—Canada's only national university capable of providing undergraduate and graduate programs to meet national needs—and the Canadian Forces College in Toronto that currently offers joint programs aimed at these comprehensive requirements.

CONCLUSION

This short paper has exposed an ongoing concern about the lack of 'strategicness' characterizing Canada's security policy, which seems oddly ironic during a time in which calls are being made to implement a 'comprehensive approach' and to realize 'comprehensive security'. As this paper indicates, the problem lies not in Canada's understanding of the utility of comprehensive mechanisms, but in the mechanisms themselves.

A significant impediment to 'strategicness' is the lack of understanding about the relationship between a policy and a strategy; without a strategy, policy cannot be realized. Without a strategy, the policies of powerful purse-string holding ministries remain dominant, which presents further cause for concern when ministerial policies being followed are not actual policies. Without a strategy, leadership is exerted at the program/operational level; something that does not bode well for program officers' understanding of strategy once they advance to more senior levels. Lastly, without a strategy, a dangerously incoherent and 'hip-shooting' approach to resource (people, assets and knowledge) allocation can risk undermining related activities and mandates.

In this context, the newly announced structural changes in the Privy Council Office to deliver integrated advice on major international events and global issues facing Canada is welcomed news. This provides a real entrée to supporting integrated approaches to 'comprehensive security,' rather than continuing to debate around the difficulties of the 'comprehensive approach;' however, in order for this mechanism to function effectively, cross-Government training should be provided that supports a more strategic cross-Government pedigree and teaches capable policy officers how to develop, implement and lead strategic processes. In short, realizing changes in this area goes beyond reforming structures; it includes professional development, and creating the human capacity to make policy implementable.

Without the development of macro-strategic security policy goals that sit above, and provide the essential direction for, the cross-Government family of Departments and Agencies, separate institutional policies will continue to lack coherence, appropriate resources and evidence bases, and the strategic credibility required to ensure that policy commands cross-Government support. The authors of this paper recommend that security-related Government departments and agencies working at the first, second and third tiers of security policy and strategy invest in cross-Government professional education and training in order to develop the very personnel that will lead Canada's future comprehensive security policy and approach. At a time when Canada commands such a respectable and stable position in the world, let us not reveal that the new, and perhaps younger, Emperor has no clothes.

STRATEGIC STUDIES WORKING GROUP

The Strategic Studies Working Group (SSWG) is a partnership between the Canadian International Council (CIC) and the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). The CIC absorbed the former Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies (CISS) upon the CIC's formation in 2008, and the CISS's original focus is now executed by the SSWG.