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Message from the President

While summer is usually a restful and relaxing time for most of us, conflicts around the world continued to rage and new challenges to Canadian foreign affairs and national security continued to develop. In this edition of the Dispatch, our Fellows and Senior Research Fellows have outlined some of these challenges as well as opportunities for Canada to play a greater role in the international community.

We actually have three feature articles in this edition that examine Russian military developments, the Obama Administration's policies on Guantanamo and water-boarding, and the opportunities for Canada that the 2010 G8 meeting in Huntsville present. The other articles cover topics from Canada's detainee policies to a new form of peacekeeping. I hope you find them interesting and educational.

Robert S. Millar



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About Our Organization

Institute Profile

CDFAI is a research institute pursuing authoritative research and new ideas aimed at ensuring Canada has a respected and influential voice in the international arena.

Background

CDFAI is a charitable organization, founded in 2001, and based in Calgary. CDFAI develops and disseminates materials and carries out activities to promote understanding by the Canadian public of national defence and foreign affairs issues. CDFAI is developing a body of knowledge, that can be used for Canadian policy development, media analysis and educational support. The Fellows, a group of highly experienced and talented individuals, support CDFAI by authoring research papers and essays, responding to media queries, running conferences, initiating polling, and developing outreach and education projects.

Mission Statement

To be a catalyst for innovative Canadian global engagement.

Goal/Aim

CDFAI was created to address the ongoing discrepancy between what Canadians need to know about Canadian foreign and defence policy and what they do know. Historically, Canadians tend to think of foreign policy – if they think of it at all – as a matter of trade and markets. They are unaware of the importance of Canada engaging diplomatically, militarily, and with international aid in the ongoing struggle to maintain a world that is friendly to the legitimate free flow of goods, services, people and ideas across borders and the promotion of human rights. They are largely unaware of the connection between a prosperous and free Canada and a world of globalization and liberal internationalism. CDFAI is dedicated to educating Canadians, and particularly those who play leadership roles in shaping Canadian international policy, to the importance of Canada playing an active and ongoing role in world affairs, with tangible diplomatic, military and aid assets.

Article Summaries from the Assistant Editor

Russia's Military Outlook

In this article **Elinor Sloan** notes that while the Western world has paid great attention to terrorism and counter-insurgency, it is still important to examine other defence developments as the security landscape could change in the not too distant future. She looks at Russian military developments and their potential impact on the international scene.

Obama's "Principled" Positions on Guantanamo, Habeas Corpus and Water-boarding

Frank Harvey argues that President Obama and his Administration have taken several important foreign policy initiatives that are supposed to demonstrate change, but in reality, seem very similar to those of the Bush Administration. He illustrates this point by examining the policy reversal Obama took on Guantanamo and *habeas corpus*.

Huntsville as Catalyst for Canadians in the Changing World Order

Colin Robertson states that for a brief time, the world's focus will be on Canada when our country takes the G8 presidency and during the 2010 Olympics. Canadians need to use this opportunity to revamp our foreign policy to ensure our status as a valued middle power on the international scene.

The Ongoing Canadian Problem with Detainees

Eric Lerhe argues that Canada's current approach to detainees is untenable and since mission success relies on an effective and just detainee policy, Canada must develop one. He outlines how this can be done.

Forging New Shields: Developing Capabilities for the Canadian Forces After Afghanistan

Andrew Godefroy argues that force restructuring is a complicated but important process that will occur in Canada after the Afghan mission and what will determine the future of the CF's organisation and activities.

The Decade of Darkness Revisited: A Personal View

Ray Crabbe gives his personal insight into the military's decade of darkness during the 1990s and notes that above all, it survived and now enjoys the trust and confidence of Canadian citizens.

2011: Peacekeeping Reloaded?

Cam Ross explains why it is highly unlikely that Canada will stay in Afghanistan past 2011 and will instead return to a peacekeeping role. He argues, however, that Canadians need to stop deluding themselves and understand that peacekeeping today requires getting dirty and carrying a big stick.

The Permanent Joint Board of the North

Stéphane Roussel contends that sovereignty disputes in the Arctic between Canada and the U.S. should be dealt with through a regional organisation in the form of a joint commission, not through NORAD or through the creation of a North West Passage Authority.

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Message from the Editor-in-Chief

David Bercuson is the Director of Programs at CDFAI, the Director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, and the Honorary Lieutenant Colonel of the 41 Combat Engineer Regiment.

The growing Russia-Canada confrontation in the Arctic may be confusing to some Canadians, but it is as scripted as any Hollywood melodrama. In the last six weeks alone we have seen an entreaty from Russia to Canada essentially declaring that both nations have vital national interests in the Polar Regions and urging Canadians to seek the path of cooperation in defending the Arctic's environment and resources against nations which have no real interests there.

A few weeks later the Russians announced that next summer they would drop paratroopers onto the ice at the North Pole to mark a similar feat first performed in the summer of 1949. That announcement almost coincided with the Canadian government's unveiling of a supposedly new Arctic Sovereignty policy revealed with much fanfare in the last week of July, but contained essentially nothing new at all.

Russian actions always speak louder than Russian words. So what are these actions telling us?

They are conveying a rather unambiguous message: Canada can claim every square centimeter of the northern polar regions if it wants to, but the entire history of Canada's presence in those regions leads to the conclusion that although Canadians have a strong romantic attachment to "the true north strong and free," they have never – repeat – never devoted more than crumbs to seriously claiming the north. So the road for Russia is open.

Take the current round of arctic pronouncements from the Canadian government. From its election in January 2006 to the late summer of 2009 – more than three years – the government has promised to acquire a heavy icebreaker capability, an armed summer ice capability, the training and basing of troops in the Arctic, the construction of a new port in the Arctic and a more visible military presence there. It has delivered only the last of these promises by holding an annual late-summer exercise called Operation Nanook. As of the beginning of August, 2009, there isn't even a project office in Ottawa devoted to the icebreaker – now to be dubbed the *John G. Diefenbaker* but not to have a winter ice capability – or the armed polar patrol vessels.

Russia has nothing to lose and everything to gain by appealing to Canadians' over-developed sense of multilateral cooperation. Some Canadians will even listen, or urge that Canada too join the Russians to celebrate the 1949 event! But behind the Russian words are concrete actions which belie the words – the rebuilding of a once very strong Soviet polar military capability in the Arctic region. When Russia achieves that, probably in less than a decade's time, that country will, for all intents and purposes, own the north – Canada's north and everyone else's. In the meantime, Canadian governments, sensing that Canadian taxpayers have no real interest in actually spending money on the north, will continue to shuffle the old nostrums pedaled by both national parties that Canada is a northern nation and will do whatever it takes to claim its rightful heritage.



ANNOUNCEMENTS

Fall Publications

Two ground-breaking major research papers will be available this Fall. In late September Dr. Barry Cooper's paper, "Democracies and Small Wars" will be released. Dr. Cooper is a CDFAI Fellow and Professor of Political Science at the University of Calgary. His paper analyses the characteristics of small wars and the reasons why democracies are relatively inept at fighting them. In light of the small war Canada is fighting in Afghanistan and the small wars Canada will fight in the future, this paper is both very timely and relevant.

The second paper, "What Became of Peacekeeping? The Future of a Tradition" by Mr. Jocelyn Coulon, CDFAI Fellow and Director of the Francophone Research Network on Peace Operations at the University of Montreal, and by Dr. Michel Liegeois, Professor of International Relations Theories and Diplomatic and Strategic Issues at the Université catholique de Louvain, will be published in late October. In this paper they say that peacekeeping has evolved considerably since the days of classic "blue beret" missions; Canada may be well served by participating in some types of today's variety of peacekeeping missions. This paper will be published in French and English.

2009 Annual Ottawa Conference

This year's annual conference, "Canada's National Strategic Relations: NATO & NORAD," is being jointly hosted by CDFAI and CIC on 2 November at the Crowne Plaza Hotel in Ottawa. This year's keynotes are:

- Bill Graham, Former Minister of National Defence
- Dwight Mason, former US Deputy Ambassador to Canada
- Josef Joffe, publisher of German newspaper *Die Zeit*

Registration and further information is now available on our conference website at www.cdfai.org/conf2009

We hope to see you there!

"The Canada First Defence Strategy – One Year Later"

This Fall CDFAI will be releasing a quarterly research paper by LGen (Ret'd) George Macdonald, CDFAI Fellow and former Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, "The Canada First Defence Strategy – One Year Later." In this paper LGen Macdonald states that "the major concern with the CFDS is whether the demands which are evolving can be satisfied with the projected funding level for Defence." He examines the CFDS' progress and evaluates if it is really meeting the needs of Canada and the Canadian Forces.

Russia's Military Outlook

Written By: *Elinor Sloan*



“Everyone is looking at counterinsurgency and failed states” one Department of National Defence Analyst charged

with making projections on future threats recently stated, “so one of the things we are looking at is traditional state to state threats.”¹ This is a smart approach. Even as the Western world pays increasing and important attention to terrorism and counterinsurgency, potentially significant developments are underway elsewhere. It is not impossible that the security landscape of the not too distant future could look very different from that of today. In the summer 2008 issue of *The Dispatch*, I discussed China's military capabilities; this article considers those of Russia.

The Strategic Context

Vladimir Putin famously described the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. His successor as president, Dmitri Medvedev, has argued Russia has a “zone of privileged interests” covering the old Soviet space.² Broadly speaking, Russia's strategic perspective and accompanying focus on increased military capabilities is driven by its desire to return to the ranks of the great powers. Specific issues have also been behind Russia's relatively more vocal approach to world affairs in recent years. These include the proliferation

of US military bases around Russia's periphery in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks; the US decision to establish missile interceptors and an associated radar in Poland and the Czech Republic, respectively; and, above all, the onward march of NATO expansion. A draft Russian military doctrine from 2007 indicated that while terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction posed threats to Russia, the greatest threats were seen to emanate from the United States and its desire to establish bases around the Russian periphery, and



Photo Source : Foreign Policy Passport (blog)
<http://www.foreignpolicy.com>

from NATO as it enlarges further eastward.

Rightly or wrongly, these issues have focused Russia's attention. But some, such as NATO expansion, have been around for over a decade. Two additional factors combined in the latter 2000s to bring about Russia's rhetorical – and to certain degree concrete – military resurgence. First, the dramatic increase in the price of oil and gas enabled Russia to emerge as an energy superpower and gave it the resources to start reequipping its military forces. Second, its brief war

against Georgia in the summer of 2008 so starkly revealed Russia's military shortcomings that, for the first time since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has begun to seriously address the need to transform Russia's military forces.

Organizational changes

One of the challenges facing Russia's conventional military is that it has an organizational structure ill suited to the post-Cold War security environment. Since the 1991 Gulf War it has been apparent that professional forces organized into smaller, more mobile units have been more relevant to modern warfare than the large conscript forces of the Cold War. And yet Russia has been slow to act in this area. The Russian military stands at about 1.1 million members, down from about 4 million in Soviet times but still relatively large.³ Experts have suggested that Russia would be better served with a better-equipped force of between 500,000 and 750,000.⁴ The Russian military is also extremely top heavy; almost a third of the force is made up of officers. Numerous “phantom” divisions made up of officers with no troops persist, a holdover from the Cold War when standing headquarters were to have been assigned reserve forces in the event of war with the West.

In the wake of the war in Georgia, Russia's defence minister set in train a military modernization program that promises to bring about greater results than previous efforts. The officer corps is to be cut by one-third, phantom divisions are being eliminated, and the



Photo Source : From Macedonian International News Agency
<http://www.macedoniaonline.eu>

overall size of force is being reduced, albeit only marginally to 1 million members. The relatively revolutionary changes in the officer corps have already prompted a number of general officer resignations.

Professionalization has proven more difficult to tackle. Various political efforts in the 1990s and early 2000s to eliminate conscription met strong opposition from the generals who would lose their positions in a pared down military. Former President Putin was finally able to push a military reform plan through parliament in 2003, setting a goal of professionalizing about 20% of the Russian military by 2007. But a lack of volunteers due to low wages, poor and often dangerous living conditions in the Russian army, and also the overall population decline in Russia, precluded achieving this goal. Present modernization plans include renewed attempts at professionalizing a large proportion of the force, but there is as yet no intention to eliminate conscription altogether.

Conventional weapons technology

Russia's conventional forces also

struggle with technologically outdated military equipment. Indeed, some analysts have characterized the Russian military as being "stuck in the pre-digital age."⁵ Severe financial constraints faced by Russia in the years following the end of the Cold War meant that not until the price of oil began to rise in the mid-2000s

did Russia have the resources to start recapitalizing its force. Most navy, army and air force platforms continue to date from Soviet times, or are improved variants of Soviet-era systems.

In 2006 the Russian government announced a comprehensive plan for reequipping the Russian armed forces. The air force focus is on long-range standoff precision strike capabilities. New fighter aircraft are being procured that are comparable to America's ground attack F-15, and Russia hopes to field a new "fifth-generation" fighter in the coming decade, similar to America's Joint Strike Fighter. Russia is also equipping its long-range bombers with precision-guided cruise missiles. Meanwhile, the Russian army is to get a new tank support combat vehicle, its Iskander theater missile system has been armed with a new long-range high-precision missile, and for battlefield mobility a new night attack helicopter comparable to America's Apache has been earmarked as Russia's next-generation attack

helicopter. Plans for Russia's navy include a next-generation destroyer, about twenty new frigates armed with anti-ship cruise missiles, one or more new aircraft carriers, and corvettes designed for littoral warfare. Despite the economic downturn, President Medvedev has insisted funding for these programs is safe and that large-scale rearmament will begin in 2011.⁶

In the area of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities (C4ISR), the Russian military lags far behind. Its development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), for example, has been "fragmented and limited."⁷

"Even as the Western world pays increasing and important attention to terrorism and counterinsurgency, potentially significant developments are underway elsewhere."

The conflict in Chechnya should have prompted an increased focus on UAVs, but this was not the case. Most Russian UAVs continue to be upgraded versions of those used during Soviet times. During the war in Georgia, Russia's severe shortages in technologically advanced surveillance drones and communications equipment made coordination between troops and air forces extremely difficult. Overall, experts assess that "much work remains before Russia's [conventional] forces are mobile, sophisticated and integrated enough for modern military operations."⁸

Nuclear weapons

Unable to field a high-tech conventional force, Russia's leaders have consistently chosen to direct most



Photo Source :
<http://www.macedoniaonline.eu>

of the country's military resources toward its nuclear forces as the guarantor of Russian security. Navy, army and air force procurement has consistently taken second place to the nuclear forces, with conventional programs often delayed to accommodate ballistic missile programs. In the late 1990s the war in Chechnya, and Russia's inability to afford both a robust nuclear force and a modern conventional force relevant to that conflict, sparked a debate within the Russian defense community as to the proper balance between nuclear and conventional forces. When Putin came to power, he initially placed his emphasis on the latter. He signed an arms control treaty with the United States, cut nuclear forces, and began to shift resources to conventional forces. But this newfound emphasis was short lived. The majority of spending in the 2006 re-equipment plan was geared toward maintaining Russia's nuclear deterrent, with the first concern being "to provide the

country with a compact and modern nuclear deterrent force."⁹ "Let me mention the top [Russian military] priorities," Medvedev stated more recently, "The main one is a qualitative increase in troop readiness, primarily of strategic nuclear forces."¹⁰

To this end, Russia's ground-based Nuclear Strategic Missile Troops are being reequipped with about 70 new-generation intercontinental ballistic missiles, half of which will be mobile. Many of these are already in place and overall deployment plans are ahead of schedule. Russia's focus on mobile systems is significant because it is meant to ensure higher survivability from a first strike. Moreover, the missiles are to have multiple warheads; the deployment of such missiles is considered the best way to maintain rough military parity with the United States.¹¹ Finally, a naval version of the missile is being developed for a new fleet of strategic nuclear submarines. The first submarine has already been launched while the missile, with up to ten warheads, is to be in service by the end of 2009.

Conclusion

Bigger defense budgets in Putin's second term enabled Russia to dedicate increased resources to conventional forces, but the world wide economic crisis, and lower oil prices, could impact recapitalization. Meanwhile, significant organizational changes are underway, however professionalization is proving more difficult. In part through circumstance, and in part by design, the Russian military's emergence as an advanced conventional force is still many years away. Focused on "detering the main

adversary, the United States and NATO," rather than Islamic extremism,¹² Moscow appears to have chosen to devote scarce resources to the Russian nuclear deterrent. The resulting military outlook is such that Russia will likely have little to contribute to regional crisis management anytime soon, and it is inevitably reminiscent of the Cold War nuclear standoff.

1. Member of the Directorate of Future Security Analysis, Department of National Defence, at a Security and Defence Forum Meeting, Ottawa, 12 May 2009.
2. Steven Erlanger, "NATO Struggles With Conflicting Views on Russia," *New York Times*, 10 April 2009.
3. With more than double the people, for example, the United States has a regular force of about 1.5 million.
4. Matthew Bouldin, "The Ivanov Doctrine and Military Reform: Reasserting Stability in Russia," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 17(4) (2004), 626.
5. Mark Kramer, "The Perils of Counterinsurgency: Russia's War in Chechnya," *International Security* 29(3) (Winter 2004/05), 23.
6. Tony Halpin, "Parade Masks Red Army's Slow Decay," *Ottawa Citizen*, 9 May 2009.
7. Alon Ben David, et al., "Special Report: UAVs—Frontline Flyers," *Jane's Defence Weekly* (May 10, 2006).
8. "Right Reforms for Moscow," *Defense News* (September 6, 2004).
9. Henry Ivanov, "Country Briefing: Russia—Austere Deterrence," *Jane's Defence Weekly* (May 3, 2006), 25.
10. Valdimir Isachenko, "Russia Says US, NATO Mean New Arms Needed," *Washington Times*, 17 March 2009.
11. Nabi Abdullaev, "Attacking the Shield: Russia Vows New Missiles if U.S. Builds in Eastern Europe," *Defense News*, 12 November 2007.
12. Heritage Foundation specialist Ariel Cohen as quoted in Bill Gertz, "Russian Military Seen in Decline," *Washington Times* (May 12, 2006).

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Obama's "Principled" Positions on Guantanamo, Habeas Corpus and Water-boarding

Written By: Frank Harvey



On January 22, 2009 President Barack Obama issued his first executive order to close the Guantanamo Bay detention facility:

The detention facilities at Guantánamo for individuals covered by this order shall be closed as soon as practicable, and no later than 1 year from the date of this order. If any individuals covered by this order remain in detention at Guantánamo at the time of closure of those detention facilities, they shall be returned to their home country, released, transferred to a third country, or transferred to another United States detention facility in a manner consistent with law and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.

The order went on to state, without any apparent ambiguity or equivocation:

Individuals currently detained at Guantánamo have the constitutional privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The writ is a mandate to bring accused prisoners to trial quickly, both to establish a justification for their imprisonment and to give them an opportunity to hear and challenge the charges against them. These protections were suspended for

Guantanamo detainees in 2001 by President Bush's executive order establishing the military commissions, and then officially suspended in 2006 when Congress passed the Military Commissions Act. The suspension of *habeas corpus* was overturned by the Supreme Court in 2008, and Obama's

"This is the official story, but how credible is the Whitehouse spin?"

executive order clearly commits the administration to the Court's ruling. As Obama declared at the time, these changes will go a long way toward re-establishing America's moral standing in the world.

This is the official story, but how credible is the Whitehouse spin?

The committee tasked to review the full range of issues surrounding Guantanamo detentions was scheduled to submit its recommendations in July, long before the January, 2010 deadline for closure, but instead, it requested a six month extension. As many observers expected, the very brief interim report provided no details on how the administration plans to resolve the outstanding legal hurdles that confounded the Bush administration.

There are currently

about 230 detainees at the facility, most are scheduled for release. So far, the president's committee has worked through about half of the cases, but only a handful of prisoners have been returned to Saudi Arabia and Iraq. A few European allies (France, Spain and Italy) have agreed to accept some of the detainees, and the release of almost 100 Yemenis is being delayed due to lingering concerns about torture if they are returned.

About 65 prisoners are scheduled for prosecution by military commission or federal courts.

In May, Congressional Democrats and Republicans joined forces in a rare bipartisan rejection of the President's budget request to cover the costs of closure. The 90-6 vote in the Senate meant that all but six Democrats opposed the President, demanded a clearer plan for the disposition of



Photo Source : "2 Guantanamo detainees released to home countries"
<http://www.ctv.ca>

remaining detainees after the facility is shut down, and barred the transfer of Guantanamo detainees to US soil unless for prosecution. In other words, none of the detainees currently scheduled for release will be relocated to the US, which is likely to hamper the President's efforts to convince European allies to help out.



Photo Source : "U.S. considering laws to hold dangerous Gitmo prisoners"
<http://www.ctv.ca>

Of course, the most difficult challenge for the President is the disposition of the 14 high value detainees, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Zubaydah, Ramzi Binalshibh, Abu Faraj al Libi and about ten others. They will continue to be imprisoned indefinitely without the benefit of a federal or military commission trial. Obama's new and improved policy was outlined in a major speech in May:

"There remains the question of detainees at Guantanamo who cannot be prosecuted yet who pose a clear danger to the American people. And I have to be honest here – this is the toughest single issue that we will face. We're going to exhaust every avenue that we have to prosecute those at Guantanamo who pose a danger to our country. But even when this process is complete, there may be a number of people who cannot be prosecuted for past crimes, in some cases because evidence may be tainted, but who nonetheless pose a threat to the security of the United States. Examples of that threat include people who've received

extensive explosives training at al Qaeda training camps, or commanded Taliban troops in battle, or expressed their allegiance to Osama bin Laden, or otherwise made it clear that they want to kill Americans. These are people who, in effect, remain at war with the United States...Let me repeat: I am not

"The Guantanamo case is only one of several important foreign policy initiatives that appear strikingly similar to the 'neocon' policies defended by the previous administration."

going to release individuals who endanger the American people. Al Qaeda terrorists and their affiliates are at war with the United States, and those that we capture – like other prisoners of war – must be prevented from attacking us again."

The revised policy directly challenges both the 2008 Supreme Court ruling and the President's own executive order. Apparently, only some

"individuals currently detained at Guantánamo have the constitutional privilege of the writ of habeas corpus", and only if the evidence is not "tainted". In essence, Obama has endorsed the Bush-Cheney policy of preventive detention. This clear reversal is supported by senior Democrats, including the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton:

The president, and certainly I and our entire administration, are 100 percent committed to the closure of Guantanamo and to proceeding with the transfer of those who can be transferred, the trial of those who can be tried, and the continuing detention of those who pose a grave threat.

Obama's policy shift is even more perplexing, if not paradoxical, in light of the reasons the President was compelled to adjust his views. Every one of the high value detainees was water-boarded dozens of times (some reportedly over 100). Because the evidence obtained from these confessions is "tainted" it would not be admissible in a federal court or military commission trial.

However, the Obama team has obviously accepted as credible the confessions obtained from these sessions, and is relying on this tainted evidence to justify indefinite detention and denial of *habeas corpus*. Now, if the information obtained from torture is accepted as reliable enough to detain prisoners without trial, isn't this a crystal clear admission by Obama that torture and water boarding work?

The Supreme Court's ruling made no



Photo Source : AP Photo/Brennan Linsley
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com>

Gitmo Vindication,” and, as predicted, human rights groups are getting a little worried. “Any effort to revamp the failed Guantanamo military commissions or enact a law to give any president the power to hold individuals indefinitely and without charge or trial,” warned Anthony Romero (ACLU’s executive director), “is

exceptions for high value detainees – in fact, moral standards are typically revealed when legal rulings are applied to the hardest of cases. Aside from a few superficial adjustments to the military commission process, however, the legal standards the Obama administration will apply to the hardest cases will look very similar to those Bush adopted.

In an effort to pressure the administration to try all remaining cases in federal courts, Human Rights First has published a major report highlighting the 90% successful conviction rate of federal courts when processing terrorist cases. But government officials are concerned that the high value detainees will fall into the 10% failure rate if prosecuted, given the tainted evidence collected from torture, and they are not prepared to take that risk, despite the legal consequences. Obama will use his exceptionally refined communication skills to finesse the politics surrounding this issue, but the fact that these policies are now being defended by a popular President should make very little difference.

Obama’s reversal was aptly described by the Wall Street Journal as “Bush’s

sure to be challenged in court and it will take years before justice is served.”

“Change you can believe in”?

The Guantanamo case is only one of several important foreign policy initiatives – on Iran, North Korea, nuclear proliferation, Iraq, Afghanistan, counter-terrorism legislation, intelligence transparency, the Middle East and ballistic missile defence – that appear strikingly similar to the “neocon” policies defended by the previous administration.

“Plus ça change...”

Frank P. Harvey was recently appointed University Research Professor of International Relations, Dalhousie University. He held the 2007 J. William Fulbright Visiting Research Chair in Canadian Studies (SUNY, Plattsburgh) and was former Director of the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie.

Huntsville as Catalyst for Canadians in the Changing World Order



Written By: Colin Robertson

As we assume the presidency of the G-8, the road to Huntsville is an opportunity to re-examine our international posture, especially as we campaign to win a seat on the UN

Security Council in the fall 2010 elections, and look towards substantive withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan in 2011.

It has been nearly sixty-five years since the end of the Second World War and we continue to benefit from the understanding that for Canada to prosper and thrive, we needed to 'be there' and 'belong.' Canadian foreign policy is therefore rooted in three realities.

First and foremost, preserving national unity in an increasingly pluralistic society requires a federal and constitutional interpretation sufficiently flexible to adjust to situations in which the domestic overlaps with the international. Sensibly applied, this gives the provinces a seat in discussions on Canadian policy, active involvement in issues of trade, commerce and investment and in addressing the new threats of climate change, pandemics and cyberspace. It also requires ongoing and active consultation with business, labour and the broader community.

Second, consistent support and active involvement in the major institutions and alliances. Canadian efforts to engineer multilateralism through the UN and its alphabet soup of agencies and to create collective security, regionally through NATO and bilaterally through NORAD, are the core examples of our commitment to institution-making. Adaptability in the face of change, initiatives from peacekeeping to the abolition of land mines, and a willingness to stand up in places like Afghanistan, are practical examples of constructive internationalism.

Third, a solidarity in global affairs with the United States, our most important relationship, with due regard for a sometimes temperamental and insecure nationalism in bilateral affairs.

"The Vancouver/Whistler Olympics and Huntsville guarantees that the global spotlight will focus, briefly, on Canada."

While this continues to be a sound code for the conduct of Canadian foreign policy, now is the time to think anew about what we want to achieve in the coming decade. Canadian foreign policy is best when it is muscular, nimble and imaginative. As a 'middleweight,' we recognize that competing in the global arena with the 'heavyweights' requires not just international institutions with rules to even the odds, but good ideas and initiatives.

Good ideas still matter as the Australians have demonstrated through the creation of the Cairns Group on agriculture and, most recently, with Kevin Rudd's initiative to establish an institute devoted to perfecting technology aimed at capturing and storing carbon.

Transformation of the G-8 to G-20 at Huntsville would be a substantive Canadian achievement in constructive internationalism.

At the July G-8 meeting in Aquila, the head count of invited leaders reached 40, another recognition that meaningful decisions require wider geographic representation, even while respecting the notion that the ticket for entry was still a substantial quotient of economic power.

We should use our presidency to transform the G-8 into



Photo Source : G8 2009
<http://www.g8italia2009.it>

"What can we do on the world stage that will bear a 'Made in Canada' stamp?"

a grouping that is more inclusive, pragmatic in design and, practical in operation.

One of the first purposes of a more energetic involvement is the stark diplomatic fact that we need to ensure we have any influence at all. France will host in 2011 and Nicolas Sarkozy has said that there will be institutional change that would include Africa, Latin America and China. CDFAI Fellow Gordon Smith and others warn there is no guarantee that Canada will make the next cut. Smith has pointed out, for example, that in any objective ranking of the twenty countries having at least 2 per cent of global GDP or population, Canada "just scrapes in." By 2020, we won't make either list. The British Foreign Office already put Canada in the second tier of the current G-20.

For Canada the months before Huntsville are an opportunity to regain some of that influence while helping to build on the emerging consensus that the G-20 can help to provide a global agenda for progress.

The case for expansion and reform of the G-8 is compelling, starting with the management of an unmanageable global economy. Recession has obliged the creation of a new, second session of leaders in the G-20. The group met first, at the behest of George W. Bush, in Washington last November, and then, at the invitation of Gordon Brown, in London in April. Barack Obama will host the next meeting, in Pittsburgh in late September. Huntsville in June will be the logical continuum in this chain and a signal that international institutions can reform and adapt to new realities.

Peking, New Delhi, Brasilia, Mexico City, et al will appreciate the Canadian initiative. The rest of the world will take note and admire our ability to bridge within the family of nations. Washington will see it fit into the Obama plan for a 'multi-partner world.' Of equal importance, it will also serve to reconfirm and reinforce Canadians' faith in our own capacity to do good and to be seen doing good on the international stage.

The Vancouver/Whistler Olympics and Huntsville

guarantees that the global spotlight will focus, briefly, on Canada.

We should use these events – when the world will be looking at Canada and Canadians will be thinking about our place in the world – to our advantage. We

should begin a consultation with Canadians, reaching out to the provinces, businesses and the wider community, to stimulate new thinking and generate new ideas about how we make and conduct our foreign policy. Start the conversation with the question: 'What can we do on the world stage that will bear a 'Made in Canada' stamp?'

The dialogue and discussion will question conventional wisdom and oblige us to confront new truths about power and place. Letting in light is healthy and restorative. The forthcoming ideas and initiatives will serve to stimulate creative thinking about Canada's international role and how we resource and direct our foreign policy.

Colin Robertson is a foreign service officer currently loaned to Carleton University to direct a Canada-US project. He served in New York, Hong Kong, in Los Angeles as Consul General, and in Washington as first head of the Advocacy Secretariat. He was a member of the team that negotiated the FTA and NAFTA.



The Ongoing Canadian Problem with Detainees



Written By: Eric Lerhe

Over the last several weeks Canada's challenges with detainees were highlighted in a series of media reports. First, Canada was accused of following a "catch and release" policy for Somali pirates. The government's plea that it lacked jurisdiction was then quickly rubbished by a series of legal experts who argued the government's position was "ludicrous." To them it was clear we had a positive legal duty to catch pirates and bring them to justice.¹ Elsewhere, a National Defence internal inquiry absolved our soldiers of detainee mistreatment as they passed Taliban suspects over to the Afghanistan authorities;² however, the government was quick to challenge the more independent Military Police Complaint Commission's authority to further investigate such transfers.³ Finally, Canada, amongst many, refused to take any of the seventeen or more recently released Uyghur Guantánamo detainees.⁴ Only China, who has every interest in further tormenting them, was ready to receive them. Ultimately, tiny Palua and Bermuda, states whose small populations make them least able to integrate them, acceded to taking the detainees. Throughout each of these separate detainee problems, it was impossible to determine any clear Canadian government policy for detainees other than to avoid bringing them here.

In one sense, this lack of policy is strange given significant detainee problems have marked every Canadian deployment as far back as our intervention in Somalia in 1993. There, our soldiers, faced with incessant thefts and incursions in an environment where no local police or legal system functioned, first detained and then administered a frightful and illegal rough justice of their own. In Bosnia, Canada and our remaining NATO allies had the greatest difficulty arresting the numerous war criminals despite their often open conduct and deportment.⁵ Throughout Canada's engagement in Afghanistan, detainee management has been problematic. In 2002, Defence Minister Eggleton famously denied we were turning the Taliban and Al Qaida over to the American forces when the media and later the military itself made it quite clear we were. Soon, however, this practice ceased perhaps as a result of the scandals over U.S. detainee activities at Gauntanamo and Abu Graib.⁶ This left the Afghanistan



Photo Source : Somalis charged with hijacking
<http://www.news.bbc.co.uk>

government that, after providing assurances of fair treatment, then received our detainees. However, from November 2007 to 29 February 2008, six years into the conflict, those assurances became suspect and we stopped turning them over to anyone, including the Afghans, to the considerable surprise of our allies.⁷ Whether this was an earlier case of 'catch and release' is not clear. Today, Canada is turning detainees over to the Afghan state after providing Corrections Canada officials to both train and oversee the Afghan wardens.⁸

In many ways these problems are to be expected. Canada's detainee problems have all involved failed states where a functioning local police, justice and penal system was one of the first casualties. Second, the international courts have been slow to respond to this challenge. The International Criminal Court's jurisdiction remains fixed on major war crimes, and there appears to be little stomach for setting up new international courts to try pirates, insurgents, or terrorists.⁹ Finally, in civil wars or insurrections the legal line between terrorist criminal and legitimate prisoner of war is often confused. Indeed, Western governments have been slow to recognize the terrorist-criminal nexus, a phenomenon well described by Paul Collier and Stephen Metz. Here they argue our current 'wars' all involve a criminal component (be they smugglers, drug producers, protection racket providers)

"Moreover, our own and our allies' current approach to detainees is untenable."



**Photo Source : Department of National Defence,
Combat Camera**
<http://www.combatcamera.forces.gc.ca>

equal in size and influence to allegedly ‘political’ forces theoretically leading the insurgency.¹⁰

While Canada and other Western states can be forgiven their initial difficulties in responding to this complex milieu, the fact is we have now some sixteen years of sustained experience with it today. Moreover, our own and our allies’ current approach to detainees is untenable. American data has shown that even their more rigorous

"It is no exaggeration to state that mission success depends on an effective and just detainee policy, and Canada should start developing one."

approach to ‘catch and release’ has resulted in fourteen percent of the 530 Guantanamo releases returning to combat against them.¹¹ In addition, prisoner abuse by own and local forces erodes public support at home and overseas. It is no exaggeration to state that mission success depends on an effective and just detainee policy, and Canada should start developing one.¹²

For Canada, the first step involves recognizing that any failed state intervention will present serious detainee issues and that this is by no means a purely military problem. There will inevitably be a large criminal component

involved. That in turn, should suggest that any future intervention have pre-trained, already designated civilian police, justice and prison officials to accompany the military’s first wave. Then, Canada must make any future contribution to United Nations or NATO-led intervention contingent on those organizations immediately establishing a coalition detention center.¹³ This recognizes there will be an interval before the local authorities can establish facilities one would trust. Canadian legal and prison officials would contribute to both the coalition and local facilities. The option of tasking each coalition member to provide its own national detainee holding area is inefficient, is likely to discourage force contributors, and risks national intelligence services treating them as private interrogation centers. Finally, Canada must recognize that some wars never finish cleanly and those involving terrorists will be particularly long. One cannot allow the combatants one has detained back into the fight and returning them to their ‘home’ nation’s justice system may still be problematic. Today we have the luxury of insisting that the Guantanamo prisoners are a United States responsibility. We would be wise, however, to establish the procedures and facilities for bringing to Canada the terrorists and criminals our future U.N. and NATO interventions are likely to produce.

Commodore (Ret’d) Eric Lerhe has held a long and distinguished career in the Canadian Forces. He was appointed Commander Canadian Fleet Pacific in 2001 and participated in the War on Terror as Task Group Commander in the Persian Gulf. In 2003 he retired and commenced his doctoral studies at Dalhousie University.

1. Paul Koring, “Ottawa’s piracy policy flouts law, experts say,” *Globe and Mail*, 1 May 2009, p. A 12. The actual story is likely more nuanced. Engaging pirates directly with gunfire risks the merchant crews and is probably illegal. Turning them over to Africa courts is equally fraught given that Kenya’s are overstretched and the Somalian of doubtful standard. In all cases, Canada would be held to a high standard of evidence and scrupulous initial and post-transfer standards of treatment. Finally, it has been argued by some in the Navy that our interceptions are too frequently intercepting the pirates after a failed attack and not in flagrante delicto thus returning to the problems of mustering strong evidence.
2. Josh Wingrove, “Military Board of Inquiry: Canadians cleared in detainee probe,” *Globe and Mail*, (14 Apr 2009), p. A 6.
3. _____, “Military police panel accuses government of stonewalling,” *Globe and Mail*, (10 Jun 2009), p. A 12.
4. Omar El Arrad, “Guantanamo Bay: Tiny island to take 17 Gitmo prisoners,” *Globe and Mail*, (11 Jun 2009), p. A 13. This reported that the Palua deal was “lubricated” by the transfer of \$200 Million in aid or roughly \$11.8 Million per detainee.
5. Of the two most prominent, Radovan Karadzic remained free for over thirteen years after Srebrenica while General Ratko Mladić remains free today.
6. _____, “The controversy over detainees: are prisoners of war Canada’s responsibility,” *CBC News*, (27 Nov 2007), at <http://www.cbc.ca/>

news/background/afghanistan/detainees.html accessed 17 Jun 2009.

7. Tonda Maccharles, Bruce Champion-Smith, "Afghan detainee decision surprises allies - Canada's move to end transfers to jails in Afghanistan catches NATO off guard, The Star.com, (25 Jan 2008), at <http://www.thestar.com/News/Canada/article/297384> accessed 17 Jun 2009.

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8. Even with that oversight, there are ongoing concerns as to almost every aspect of the Afghani prison operations. These involve reports of torture in un-monitored areas of the prison, corrupt officials releasing detainees despite their likely Taliban association, a prison breakout suspicious in the ease at which the inmates fled, and rape. See, for example, Canada, Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan, (Mar 2009) (Report to Parliament), p. 6 and 7 where some of these problems are outlined although it claims progress is being made in Kandahar prison. At http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/assets/pdfs/docs/r03_09_eng.pdf accessed 20 Jun 2009).

9. The Dutch and German government have called for an international piracy court but the cost of past international tribunals seems to have discouraged this initiative. See "Another voice supporting a 'pirate court,'" (Deminiq Zimmermann post 17 Jun, 2009), and "Is there a case for an International Piracy Court?" (franzebert post 23 Nov 2008), at International Law Observer, at <http://internationallawobserver.eu/2009/06/17/another-voice-supporting-a-pirate-court/> accessed 29 Jun., 2009.

10. Stephen Metz provides "Contemporary insurgencies are less like traditional war where the combatants seek strategic victory, they are more like a violent, fluid, and competitive market." See his "New Challenges and Old Concepts: Understanding 21st Century Insurgency, Parameters," (Winter 2007-8), p. 22 and Paul Collier, "Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective," In Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, (Eds.) Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2000), p. 91, 103-104.

11. _____, "The Gauntánamo row: Cross-purposes," The Economist, (30 May 2009,) p. 30.

12. See, Ashley Deeks, "Detention in Afghanistan: The Need for an Integrated Plan," CSIS International Security Programme, see [CSIS_Afghanistan_detentiontheneedforintegratedplan.pdf](http://www.humansecuritygateway.info/documents/CSIS_Afghanistan_detentiontheneedforintegratedplan.pdf) accessed 17 Jun 2007. He cites "a top Canadian general" who "has argued publicly that if Canada's courts permanently prevent the government from transferring detainees to the Afghans, Canadian troops would have to quit fighting the Taliban and hunker down in secure bases."

13. Canada in conjunction with some other states are reported to have urged NATO to do just that in Afghanistan but we appear to have been overruled. See _____, "Nato chided over detainees," BBC News, (13 Nov. 2007), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7091928.stm accessed 17 Jun 2009. See also David Bosco, "A Duty NATO Is Dodging In Afghanistan," The Washington Post, November 5, 2006 at <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18842&prog=zgp&proj=zme> accessed 17 Jun 2009. One would also have to consider the views and capabilities of the local government receiving the facility. Under failed state conditions or in a situation like that found in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia after the Dayton Accords, the facility would be a condition of the coalition intervening or it could be the result of a UN order. In a situation such as the UN would face in post-conflict Sudan, a coalition facility may be the only workable solution given the likely unreadiness of the protagonists to trust each other to run any form of detention facility.

Forging New Shields: Developing Capabilities for the Canadian Forces After Afghanistan



Written By:
Andrew Godefroy

The year 2009 has witnessed several major developments within Canadian defence, not the least of which was the recent announcement by the Chief of Defence Staff, General W.N. Natynczyk, concerning the upcoming departmental strategic review and defence force structure review. Perhaps above all else this year, these two activities are sure to have the greatest impact on both the near future organization as well as the future capabilities of the Canadian Forces (CF), and should be carefully monitored by analysts and academics alike.

With much talk on all sides both political and professional that Canada's combat commitment in Afghanistan may soon enter the early stages of reduction, it is little surprise that greater attention is turning to

considering what the Canadian Forces after the Afghanistan mission should look like as well as what it should be capable of. DND strategic think tanks both at the joint as well as the service level are already examining potential threats and responses beyond the year 2019 timeframe, delivering some very mature and well reasoned analyses of both the future security environment as well as the future capabilities required to defend Canada within that environment.

"Historically, it is not uncommon for militaries to undergo some form of force restructure following a major conflict or some other definable change in the international strategic environment."

Historically, it is not uncommon for militaries to undergo some form of force restructure following a major conflict or some other definable change in the international strategic environment. For example, the 1919 Otter Commission restructured the Canadian militia at the end of the First World War, followed by another militia reorganization in 1936. The air force witnessed its organizational restructure (seen by some as its demise) following the CF unification era, only to be reshaped again many times during

the 1980s and 1990s. The navy too has had its share of odysseys through institutional modernization and force rationalization, all of which have left their permanent marks.

The question then becomes, which direction will the CF take over the next decade? Recently published analyses suggest that the CF is bracing itself for several more years of stability-type operations while remaining cognizant of the need to consider threats across the entire

spectrum of conflict. The Chief of Force Development (CFD) is committed to creating a combat effective force, however, this does not mean that capabilities needed for peacekeeping or other peacetime military

engagement will be ignored. In the end it is about balance, while at the same time anticipating demands and mitigating risks. To assist with maintaining this balance, the CFD employs a systems based approach known as capability based planning and management. Very simply, once various alternate futures have been mapped out, a portfolio of capabilities required to operate in those environments is established. At this point, strategic concepts are tested and experimented with, a process that may be repeated several times, as the basic concepts are refined. These concepts will eventually lead to some form of employment model, which in turn provides the guidance for doctrinal design and force structuring.

Since the 1960s, military forces have attempted to execute force



Photo Source : Department of National Defence, Combat Camera
<http://www.combatcamera.forces.gc.ca>



Photo Source : Department of National Defence, Combat Camera
<http://www.combatcamera.forces.gc.ca>

employment modeling over three horizons situated roughly ten, twenty, and thirty years in the future. In the static strategic environment of the Cold War, longer range forecasting out to the thirty-year mark was made simpler by the more predictable nature of the main adversary. However, in the current era, military forces find themselves seriously doubting their ability to anticipate accurately what the international strategic environment may present even ten years from now, which obviously has a tremendous impact when most major defence programmes take almost that long to come to fruition. It becomes the age-old dilemma, 'how does the CF avoid simply preparing itself to fight the last war?'

As the CF contemplates its own changes to the year 2019 and beyond, many other Western forces are also reconsidering what types of forces they will need to face the challenges of the future. It is vital that the debates of our allies are closely monitored and assessed within our own Canadian context, for as a member of both global and regional alliances, their outcome will affect our own force development

future.

For example, General James Mattis, Commander U.S. Joint Forces Command, has openly questioned the value, utility, and application of the widely used model known as effects based operations; General Richard Dannatt, British Army, has criticized the dominance of maneuver-based thinking in shaping the future

security environment; meanwhile Major General P.R. Newton, Director General Development, Concepts, and Doctrine, British Army, recently issued an open plea for assistance in shaping future UK army doctrine. Finally, Lieutenant General Ken Gillespie, Chief of the Australian Army, has recently shifted the main focus of his land forces away from heavy networked armour towards 'adaptive

campaigning;' and David Kilcullen, Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor to U.S. General David Petraeus, has recently critically assessed the contemporary ideas of indirect and comprehensive approach in counterinsurgencies.

Within such a paradigm for force development, the real trick always remains how to prepare for what some academics have identified as 'future shocks,' essentially those possible future events that defy all strategic

anticipation and forecasting. Future shocks could range anywhere from a sudden global pandemic to a surprise nuclear attack. All things being equal, Western forces have to design themselves to be able to react in some capacity no matter what actually happens. This includes the CF, whose future force structures will need to remain interoperable with its allies.

There are those who flippantly suggest that force structuring is simply a matter of picking this capability or buying that piece of equipment. No worries if your objective is to simply assemble an armed mob. For those charged with developing professional militaries to defend national sovereignty and interests, however, a much more mature process informed by reasoned research and debate is required. Determining the shape of the CF after Afghanistan is no small task. Yet the fact that it is being considered today is reflective of a professional force concerned about its tomorrow and the days to come.

"There are those who flippantly suggest that force restructuring is simply a matter of picking this capability or buying that piece of equipment."

Andrew Godefroy is a strategic analyst and historian specializing in Canadian foreign, defence, and technology affairs. He has been a member of the Canadian Army primary reserve since 1993 and currently holds the Canadian visiting research fellowship in the Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War at Oxford University.

The Decade of Darkness Revisited: A Personal View



Written By: Ray Crabbe

Canada's former Chief of Defence Staff, General Rick Hillier, has been castigated by Federal Liberals for referring to the 1990s as the decade of darkness for the Canadian Forces. The darkness was created by the shadows of benign neglect cast over Canada's military by the Mulroney and Chretien governments, and some serious internal issues that the military was wrestling with during this period of time.

The darkness was exacerbated by three critical issues. Firstly, Prime Minister Mulroney was seeking a peace dividend at the end of the Cold War and the contribution made by Canada – largely through its forty year contributions to NATO – in winning that war. This dividend equated to a very significant cut in military funding and regrettably, government support. Secondly, there was a perceived lack of threat to Canada's sovereignty and values because the big Soviet bear had been defeated, even though failed states and regional conflicts that threatened Canada were on the rise. And lastly, Canada was suffering from a huge and unacceptable deficit and debt that had to be brought under control.

As the result of the above, the government ordered a series of uncoordinated and ill-defined cuts to the military budget. A series of personnel reduction programs followed that were based largely on projected future personnel requirements without the benefit of clear direction regarding Canada's future military role. These programs would eventually see the military reduced from 87,000 to about 60,000 troops. In many cases, very well trained and experienced members were released with varying incentives under the Force Reduction Program. Given the budget and manpower goals to be achieved and the well-meaning aim of meeting the government directed cuts, many members were released only to be required a few years later as the operational pace of the Canadian Forces ramped up – as a result of the operational commitments made by the very governments that had ordered the reductions.

"...the military survived and now enjoys the trust and confidence of the people it serves - the citizens of Canada."

At the same time that the ordered reductions were being implemented the operational pace of the Canadian Forces – especially the Army – was increasing significantly both in the number and nature of operations. Canada's entry into the Bosnian war was viewed by the Conservative government as a peacekeeping venture; it was anything but, as Canadian soldiers found themselves engulfed in a near-combat quagmire. The government did not want Canadians to see or understand the real nature of the conflict and this was exemplified by the Medak Pocket operation in which Canadian troops were directly engaged in combat with Croatian forces. This particular engagement would not be made known to Canadians for several years, even though the action has been very well documented.

This and many other aspects of that nasty war were not known to the Canadian population, and the government did nothing to portray it for what it really was - a very demanding peace enforcement near-combat operation. There were no ramp ceremonies for soldiers killed. Pitifully, those killed in the Balkans were not afforded the nation's gratitude, largely because of the government's attempt to portray this operation as peacekeeping and hide the reality of what the soldiers were facing. Internal to the military, many soldiers were suffering from the trauma of multiple operational tours and exposure to death and destruction but they were dismissed as complainers. This was a particularly black cloud for the military that contributed to the darkness of the 1990s.

The Somalia fiasco in the early 1990s was the low point of Canada's recent military history. The torturing and killing of an innocent Somali by Canadian soldiers placed a heavy burden on the military. The Canadian Forces came under intense media scrutiny, digging up anything that would sell newspapers and boost ratings. Some of the reporting was accurate and deserved. However, all too often it was wrong and hurtful for the men and women who were over-tasked,

under-paid and certainly not appreciated by the leadership of the country. Even more painful was the fact that neither the government nor the Department of National Defence did anything to respond or correct the undeserved and distasteful reporting.

The Minister of National Defence issued a gag order to all military personnel based on a perceived inability of the senior military to respond properly to the media. The net result was military bashing by the media – mostly misleading – with no one countering the very questionable journalism on behalf of the men and women in uniform. Outrageous and false accusations were being heaped upon the military and no one was standing up for the troops.

There were many other issues that contributed to the dark days of the 1990s. The military was being used as a test bed for social reform with no consideration being given for operational requirements. Pay was frozen for five years, having a



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**Photo Source : Department of National
Defence, Combat Camera
<http://www.combatcamera.forces.gc.ca>**

evastating impact on standards of living and future pension benefits. By the middle of the 1990s, literally thousands of soldiers were suffering from post traumatic stress and incapacitating operational injuries, and the military was very slow to respond to these changing personnel needs. Military housing and bases were poorly maintained because funds were not available. Equipment was wearing and rusting out. Training and challenging exercises were cancelled.

It was somewhat ironic that it took two devastating domestic events to turn around and end the decade of darkness. The first was the outstanding response to the flood of the century in southern Manitoba in 1997 during which troops worked alongside civilians to keep the rages of the Red River from taking their homes and businesses. The second was the ice storms that hit Montreal and southeast Ontario in 1998. Over 15,000 troops from across the nation were deployed in response to a potentially devastating humanitarian disaster. In both cases, Canadian lives and property were saved through the efforts of the military and solidified their immeasurable value to the nation. This appreciation by Canadians has manifested itself in the tremendous support for the ongoing efforts in Afghanistan – in sharp contrast to the decade of darkness.

The 1990s were a low point for Canada's military forces. The support and appreciation by both the Mulroney and Chretien governments were virtually non-existent, despite the results of the military efforts being the only real foreign policy success story at the time. Internally, adjusting to the post Cold War era within the context of significant funding and personnel cuts and an unprecedented operational pace took its toll on the troops. What is significant, however, is that as an institution of this nation, the military survived and now enjoys the trust and confidence of the people it serves – the citizens of Canada.

Ray Crabbe served in the Canadian Army for 35 years, serving in many distinguished positions including Deputy Chief of Defence Staff at National Defence Headquarters where he was responsible for CF operations and intelligence world wide. He is currently Chair of the Board of Directors of Southport Aerospace Corp.

2011: Peacekeeping Reloaded?



Written By: Cam Ross

Canada will reduce its commitment in Afghanistan in 2011. As Canadians consider their future role in the world they must not confuse facts with wishful thinking.

While the extent of Canada's withdrawal from Afghanistan has yet to be determined, Ottawa has clearly signalled that Canada will have a reduced combat footprint. The new NATO Chief wants Canada to stay the course but that is not likely to happen.

The reality is that there are four immovable truths.

First, the polls, while incredibly supportive of the Canadian Forces, reflect increasing calls to 'bring the troops home'.

Second, it was not just the Harper government that decided on the 2011 reduction. By astutely commissioning the Manley Panel, the Prime Minister laid the groundwork for a parliamentary vote to stay until 2011. A similar all-party agreement would have to be undertaken to change the current 2011 decision; this is highly unlikely.

Third, Afghanistan is expensive in dollars as well as human capital. At a time of soaring national debt, it will be increasingly difficult to rationalize such expeditionary

expenses. Also, we are entering an Arctic sovereignty era in which the military has a role. The cost will be immense.

Most importantly, the human cost in casualties and attrition from repeat tours is staggering. One combat unit's recent study revealed that over a 33 month period, troops were spending on average 22 months away from home. Afghanistan has placed the best small Army in the world under tremendous strain. At 19,000 soldiers, the entire Army fits into Calgary's Saddledome. 3,000 of those soldiers are in Afghanistan, 3,000 more are training to go, and another 3,000 have just returned home.

This is unsustainable.

"Canada has the 3rd highest toll on the UN's country casualty list behind India and Ghana."

Fourth, Afghanistan presents a political 'burr under the saddle' for a minority government, regardless of the party stripe. With a rebounding economy on the horizon, there will be a great temptation to hold an election within the year and the pressure on all parties to remove that Afghanistan 'burr' will be immense. The burr will be replaced by familiarity, 'traditional peacekeeping' – regardless of the logic of staying the course in Afghanistan.

Many Canadians believe that UN peacekeeping is our traditional overseas military role. It is falsely perceived to be 'safe'; it exemplifies our desire to compromise, to be nice ... Chretien's 'boy scouts to the world'. It is our 'comfort zone' as the NDP and others would say.

But what is 'traditional peacekeeping'? Too many UN veterans have vivid memories of being shot at and blown up whilst under the UN flag to believe the calm portrayed on the back of our \$10 bill, labelled Remembrance and Peacekeeping. Since 1948, traditional peacekeeping has cost us 114 lives; Canada has the 3rd highest toll on the UN's country casualty list behind India and Ghana.

Since the end of the Cold War, the demand for international intervention has grown almost exponentially. In June 2009, the UN had 93,216 military personnel deployed on 17 missions worldwide compared with only 12,084 personnel on 15 missions in 1999. The foreseeable future does not herald a rosier picture. The Haitis, Sudans, and Congos of the world will not be solved easily or overnight.



Photo Source : United Nations Photo
<http://www.unmultimedia.org>



sometimes needs a big bat. And that bat needs to be wielded by more than a hockey rink's worth of soldiers.

MGen (ret'd) Ross, a former UN Assistant Secretary General and Force Commander of UNDOF on the Golan Heights, is the President of HCR Security International Ltd.

Photo Source : United Nations Photo
<http://www.unmultimedia.org>

The face of peacekeeping has changed. With the exceptions of Italy and France, 18 of the top 20 peacekeeping contributors are developing countries. For a well-to-do country of 34 million, Canada's current contribution is abysmally small in numbers. Canada ranks #52 for UN peacekeeping with only 55 military personnel deployed on 10 UN missions.

"The peacekeeping of today is scarcely identifiable as the task defined in 1956 by Lester Pearson."

What is certain is that there will be increased interest in Canada returning to its perceived 'default' position, more for political expediency than sound foreign policy. A return to the UN fold will resonate well with the voters. A re-commitment to Haiti will be especially attractive for Quebec voters. To say no to the UN on the grounds that we don't 'do' peacekeeping any more would be unwise, especially at a time when Canada is aggressively seeking a January 2011 seat on the UN Security Council. And the response of "sorry, we have already given at the office" will no longer apply post 2011.

Peacekeeping reloaded? Probably. The peacekeeping of today is scarcely identifiable as the task defined in 1956 by Lester Pearson. Change that \$10 picture for one that depicts Canada's Armed Force as the capable warriors they are and stop deluding ourselves ... effective peacekeeping

The Permanent Joint Board of the North

Written By: *Stéphane Roussel*

This paper is partly based on Samantha L. Arnold and Stéphane Roussel, “Expanding the Canada-US Security Regime to the North?” in Sven G. Holtmark and Brooke A. Smith-Windsor, eds., *Security Prospects in the High North: Geostrategic Thaw of Freeze?*, NATO Defence College (Research Division), Rome, May 2009: 58-80.



Persistent attention to the sovereignty conflicts in the North, as well as the anticipated need for a stronger official presence in the region to provide governmental services, caught the attention of the Canadian public in recent years. While the two sovereignty conflicts with

Denmark are insignificant, the two others between Canada and the U.S. are more serious. One involves the maritime boundary in the Beaufort Sea, while the other involves the legal status of the Northwest Passage (NWP).

Canada has excellent relations with the United States, something Canadians tend to forget when conflicts arise between the two countries. In the past, the two governments have shown a considerable ability to resolve their conflicts in a satisfactory manner and to reach compromises that serve their mutual interests. There is no reason why they cannot resolve their differences in the Arctic.



Photo Source : “Arctic Shows its Beauty in Epic Sovereignty Patrol” www.ctv.ca

Since 2004, the Canadian government has announced a number of initiatives to reinforce its presence in the High North, including ordering new ice-breakers, buying helicopters, building port and training infrastructures, increasing the strength of the Ranger corps and conducting regular military exercises. These are certainly welcome initiatives that will enable the government to ensure an effective presence in this region and to meet its responsibilities.

"It is more realistic to focus on the prospect of creating a North American Arctic Institution."

Moreover, according to the 2008 CDFAI Annual Conference Poll, 44% of Canadians prefer a unilateral enforcement of Canadian claims while only 35% are in favor of a bilateral management of the NWP.

While this approach seems attractive to both politicians and the public, it is probably misleading and insufficient. Even assuming that these initiatives will in fact be implemented (which is far from guaranteed considering the costs involved and the “resources competition” of the mission in Afghanistan), another question arises: are these essentially unilateral measures enough to achieve the objectives the Canadian government has in the North? Probably not if they do not include a diplomatic offensive. They must be accompanied by the signing of agreements with other governments so that Canada's claims are recognized and government services are offered in the most efficient manner possible.

A number of researchers feel that this is a window of opportunity. While some of their work focuses on the possibility of building a multilateral institution complementing the Arctic Council, other are looking at the creation of a less ambitious regional and/or bilateral institution.

A multilateral institution is certainly an attractive option, but in the current context, difficult to construct. Moreover, many of the challenges faced by circumpolar states are probably easier to meet on a “regional basis,” i.e., by

making a distinction between Russian, European and North American Arctic regions. Hence, it is more realistic to focus on the prospect of creating a North American Arctic institution. One of the major advantages of this approach is building on the long and rich Canada-U.S. institutional experience in the area of defence and security.

Various proposals have been made to design a new institution, usually taking inspiration from three existing models in Canada-U.S.

bilateral relations. The first is that of the organizations for managing and maintaining marine transportation corridors, such as the St. Lawrence Seaway Management Corporation (see, for example, Brian Flemming's recent research paper published by the CDFAI). This is a Crown corporation responsible for maintaining navigation infrastructure in the St. Lawrence and ensuring the safety of ships that use the seaway. While probably relevant, such an organization lacks the authority to manage military resources, which make up the bulk of the government's presence in the Arctic. One of the major problems that such a project might raise is a strong opposition among the Canadian public because giving the U.S. any role in the management of Canadian waters will be perceived as a clear U.S. gain over Canada.

The second type of organization is NORAD, a joint defence command. In April 2006 NORAD was given a

marine mandate, but it remains more of a concept than reality since the Command has no control over any operational forces. Moreover, this option has the opposite problem of the first one in that it lacks the authority to manage tasks that are usually carried out by civilian organizations.

"There is no reason [Canada and the United States] cannot resolve their differences in the Arctic."

While these two first models can be implemented on a mid- and long-term basis, it is probably more promising to begin with an institution that can manage conflict and foster cooperation to face current and future challenges, both military and civilian. Hence, a third model, the oldest one in Canada-US relations, is a joint commission such as the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD), which was formed in 1940, and the International Joint Commission (IJC), founded in 1909. These two organizations work very well: they are responsible for making recommendations to both governments in their areas of jurisdiction; and they conduct studies aimed at avoiding over politicization of issues. Hence, a PJB-Arctic could act as a forum for defence and civilian departments as well as for representatives of local governments, and could address a wide range of issues.

Of course, the mandate of this organization must not conflict with the multilateral commitments of Canada and the U.S. government in the High North. That mandate must be worded in such a way as to enable other players to be invited or to add other areas of cooperation. The organization must therefore be flexible in both its membership and scope.

While the sovereignty issues seem intractable, creating a "habit of cooperation" and a forum in which these issues can be discussed will, over time, probably help in generating viable compromise and reduce the tension over it, especially among the Canadian population.

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Photo Source : "Arctic Ice Shelf Break-Off Not the Last: Expert"
www.ctv.ca

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Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute

CDFAI is the only think tank focused on Canada's international engagement in all its forms: diplomacy, the military, aid and trade security. Established in 2001, CDFAI's vision is for Canada to have a respected, influential voice in the international arena based on a comprehensive foreign policy, which expresses our national interests, political and social values, military capabilities, economic strength and willingness to be engaged with action that is timely and credible.

CDFAI was created to address the ongoing discrepancy between what Canadians need to know about Canadian international activities and what they do know. Historically, Canadians tend to think of foreign policy – if they think of it at all – as a matter of trade and markets. They are unaware of the importance of Canada engaging diplomatically, militarily, and with international aid in the ongoing struggle to maintain a world that is friendly to the free flow of goods, services, people and ideas across borders and the spread of human rights. They are largely unaware of the connection between a prosperous and free Canada and a world of globalization and liberal internationalism.

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