Spring 2009

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Message from the President - Robert S. Millar

Happy New Year and welcome to the first edition of 2009 “The Dispatch.” We hope you all had an excellent holiday and are rested and ready for the new year. We will be continuing to improve “The Dispatch” over the coming months and we appreciate your feedback so please don’t hesitate to send us your comments.

In this edition of “The Dispatch,” there are two feature articles. The first, by J.L. Granatstein addresses the Americanization of the Canadian military. The second, by David Pratt, discusses the importance of a mobilized citizenry in times of crisis. The other seven articles cover an array of topics from the effects of the new Obama administration to how states become classified as failing. I encourage you to read each of them.
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About Our Organization

Institute Profile

CDFAI is a research institute pursuing authoritative research and new ideas aimed at ensuring Canada has a respected and influential voice in the international arena.

Background

CDFAI is a charitable organization, founded in 2001, and based in Calgary. CDFAI develops and disseminates materials and carries out activities to promote understanding by the Canadian public of national defence and foreign affairs issues. CDFAI is developing a body of knowledge that can be used for Canadian policy development, media analysis, and educational support. The Fellows program is a group of highly experienced and talented individuals who support CDFAI by authoring research papers and essays, responding to media queries, running conferences, initiating polling, and developing outreach and education projects.

Mission Statement

To be a catalyst for innovative Canadian global engagement.

Goal/Aim

CDFAI was created to address the ongoing discrepancy between what Canadians need to know about Canadian foreign and defence policy and what they do know. Historically, Canadians tend to think of foreign policy - if they think of it at all - as a matter of trade and markets. They are unaware of the importance of Canada engaging diplomatically, militarily, and with international aid in the ongoing struggle to maintain a world that is friendly to the legitimate free flow of goods, services, people, and ideas across borders and the promotion of human rights. They are largely unaware of the connection between a prosperous and free Canada and a world of globalization and liberal internationalism. CDFAI is dedicated to educating Canadians, and particularly those who play leadership roles in shaping Canadian international policy, to the importance of Canada playing an active and ongoing role in world affairs, with tangible diplomatic, military, and aid assets.
Article Summaries from the Assistant Editor

The End of British Influence on the Canadian Army
Jack Granatstein examines the Americanization of the Canadian Military as a result of the close relationship that Canada and the United States shared following the second World War.

Re-thinking Emergency Management and Citizen Engagement
David Pratt examines whether or not the U.S and Canadian governments can cope with another man made or natural disaster. He stipulates that without an engaged citizenry we will have a difficult time combating these security threats.

Recession, Rust-Out and Rearmament
John Ferris looks at the decline of the United States and stipulates that the development of military kit by rival nations will add to uncertainty in the new world order.

2008/2009 Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Fragile States Index
David Carment offers us a comprehensive review of the instability of states in the world and how that ranking is established.

A Question of Drift
James Fergusson says that Canada’s continental defence policy has been adrift since Canada created Canada Command and opted out of missile defence.

Whither U.S. Foreign Policy under an Obama Administration?
Stephen Randall questions where the emphasis of American foreign policy will rest under the Obama administration, and whether or not he will be able to succeed in his goal for change while managing the U.S.’s current commitments.

Letter to the Prime Minister Regarding Cuba
Mark Entwistle calls on Prime Minister Stephen Harper to warm-up Canadian-Cuban relations before the Obama administration begins to normalize the U.S.’s official attitude toward Cuba.

Afghan Bleeding Leads Have One Redeeming Value
Bob Bergen looks to the media in order to impart the level of concern that Canada should feel as a nation at war. This message grows in strength and potency as the death tolls of Canadian soldiers mount.

Visit us on the web: www.cdfai.org
Message from the Editor-in-Chief

David Bercuson is the Director of Programs at CDFAI, the Director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, and the Honorary Lieutenant Colonel of the 41 Combat Engineer Regiment.

Canadians who pay attention to what happens outside our borders have known for some time that a struggle for the waterways and the sea floor of the high Arctic has been looming of late.

In the summer of 2007 Russia – then flush with oil cash – put on an entertaining display of their renewed great power aspirations when they used 30 year old technology to plant a Russian flag on the floor of the Arctic Ocean at the North Pole. They have also spent huge sums of money on exploring the Arctic sea bed so as to be able to sustain claims that large chunks of the ocean floor, including masses that practically abut Canada, are theirs.

The United States has continued to refuse to make any concessions on its claim that the Northwest Passage is an international waterway and has lately started to take some action to back up its own claims to the high arctic. Plans are afoot – and money has been allocated – to refit both its Polar 8 coastguard ice breakers while former president George W. Bush, in one of his last acts before leaving office, reiterated the long-stated U.S. claim that any passage that allows vessels to move from the Atlantic to the Pacific is an international waterway.

After years of doing little or nothing to sustain Canadian claims to portions of the Arctic seabed and to the Northwest Passage, the current Canadian government, two years ago, announced the beginning of the establishment of a permanent land and naval presence in the arctic, but in a cost-saving measure in the summer of 2008, cancelled plans for Arctic Patrol vessels. So far those plans have not been revived.

At least two European nations – Denmark and Norway – are themselves looking north in the expectation that fabulous new wealth will be found on, or under, the Arctic seabed and are preparing to make claims of their own. Just a few weeks ago NATO Secretary-General Jan de Hoop Scheffer, warned about a possible division within NATO over conflicting Arctic claims. He urged Canada, the U.S., Denmark and Norway to find a way to resolve their own conflicts and work with Russia to prevent the north from becoming a new flashpoint for international conflict.

For Canada, there are two tracks that must be followed in the immediate future to ensure that a vital national interest – control over our northern waterways and access to our northern Arctic sea bed resources – be protected.

First, plans for a permanent and effective military presence all through the Arctic Archipelago and the waters of the archipelago must be pushed ahead as quickly as possible. This means land, sea and air assets backed by satellite and long-range UAV capabilities. Claims advanced in the absence of such capabilities will not be taken seriously by anyone.

Second, Canada ought to approach the United States NOW to begin settling the outstanding issues that separate the two countries in the north. The disputed boundary issue – who owns what part of the Beaufort Sea – cries out for some sort of final international arbitration. The disagreement over ownership of, or jurisdiction over, the Northwest Passage can be tackled by some sort of negotiated condominium type arrangement such as the St. Lawrence Sea Way Authority. Canada and the U.S. may be NATO partners with Denmark and Norway, but neither of the two latter countries are North American and neither have vital national interests in maintaining law and order in the Canadian north. As far as Russian ambitions are concerned, strength - and unity between Canada and the U.S. - is the key to achieving a reasonable modus vivendi with our mutual cross-polar neighbour.
ANNOUNCEMENTS

**Perrin Beatty Dinner**

On 20 January, CDFAI hosted a dinner in Calgary at which Perrin Beatty shared his views on the changes in the Canadian economy and the relationship between Canada and the U.S. at this time of economic downturn. Perrin Beatty is a member of the CDFAI Advisory Council, former minister of Defence and the President and CEO of the Canadian Chamber of Commerce.

**Nexen Series Paper Released**

Patrick Lennox has just released the latest paper in the Nexen Series: "Piracy off the Horn of Africa." In this paper, Dr. Lennox, the J.L. Granatstein Post Doctoral Fellow at the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, discusses piracy off the coast of Somalia and argues that it is directly related to the failure of the Somali state. He outlines what a comprehensive solution to this piracy must look like. This paper is available for download on our website at: www.cdfai.org

**Future Publications**

In March CDFAI will be releasing the first of its 2009 Quarterly Research Papers, "Connecting the Dots' and the Canadian Counter-Terrorism Effort - Steady Progress or Technical, Bureaucratic, Legal and Political Failure?" In this paper Eric Lerhe (Cmdre Ret'd), CDFAI Fellow, argues that the success of the Canadian counter-terror efforts is dubious and examines the reasons for this failure.

**2009 Annual Ottawa Conference**

Planning has already begun, with a new format, for the Annual Conference to be held in Ottawa in November, 2009.

**2008 Ottawa Conference Website has been updated with summaries and photos**

http://www.cdfai.org/conf2008
Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hope of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry commanded the Canadian battle group that operated in Kandahar for seven months in 2006. Colonel Hope has published an article in which he wrote about the American soldiers of Devil Company of the 2nd Battalion, Fourth Infantry Regiment, who were under his command: “I was proud of these Devil soldiers. Later, as I reflected upon this, I realized that, at some point in the past decade, we have had a fundamental shift in the culture of the Canadian infantry, making us identify most readily with the American, and not British, soldiers.” Devil Company, he says, was “easy to work with, reliable, and very professional. Perhaps the biggest similarity was that they wanted to fight, unlike the soldiers of other countries who remained very risk-averse.” Implicitly, that sounded like criticism of the British, and indeed some senior Canadian officers were privately very unhappy with the performance of British troops fighting in Helmand province in 2006.

It was, and is, unusual for a Canadian officer to heap public praise on the U.S. Army whose leaders, Hope says, “demonstrated decisiveness and tenacity, and [whose] soldiers performed battle drills quickly and with great effect.” Hope is only one voice, but he is correct. The U.S. Army is the best in the world today, the best equipped, the most experienced, probably the best trained.

“The U.S. Army is the best in the world today, the best equipped, the most experienced, probably the best trained.”

Hope’s few words tell us where the Canadian Army is today in its relationship with the U.S. and U.K. It also tells us that the army’s very close relationship with the British military lasted well into the 1990s. The RCAF had been Americanized by the mid-1950s and the RCN had certainly sailed the same way by 1962. Why did the army stay loyal to its traditions for so long?

Canada and Britain emerged from World War II as the closest of allies, and Canadians fought under British command in Northwest Europe, Italy, and Asia. But the war changed everything. Britain’s defeat on the Continent in 1940 forced Canada to turn south for protection, the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, created in August 1940, being the first North American defence alliance. Significantly, when Canada prepared a division for service in the projected invasion of Japan in 1945, it was organized on American lines and equipped with U.S. weapons. Why? As General Andrew McNaughton, the Defence Minister and a cautious man in dealing with the Yanks, said, “One of the primary reasons . . . was to obtain experience with the United States system of Army organization and U.S. equipment in view of the obvious necessity for the future to co-ordinate the defence of North America. . . ” The future was American.

The Soviet threat kept Canada and
the U.S. working closely together on continental defence, and the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 and the despatch of troops to Europe in 1951 cemented Canada’s reliance on its neighbour. Yes, the Canadian NATO brigade, just as Canada’s Korean War brigade, served with the British, but very significantly, the soldiers in Korea refused to eat British rations and insisted on American. Brigadier J.M. Rockingham "explained that my cooks had been trained to cook American rations and my soldiers had become used to them and liked them very much." Armies march on their stomachs and, whenever they could be secured, the Canadians now simply refused to march with British rations. That was a harbinger of the coming changes. American equipment too was increasingly coveted. This was because U.S. equipment was better than the Second World War-pattern British material used by the Canadian forces. For example, the steel helmet used by Canadian forces offered no cover for the back of the neck and was so awkward that it was almost impossible to run while wearing it. "The less said about the present helmet the better," wrote a battalion commander. The American helmet, by contrast, offered better protection and could even be used for cooking over an open fire in a pinch. No Canadian wept when the U.K. helmet was scrapped in the late-1950s. Nonetheless, Canada bought British Centurion tanks in the 1950s and used them for more than two decades. Still there remained big differences between the Canadian and U.S. armies. The army commitment to Germany under the British Army of the Rhine had been pushed through by the anglophile Chief of the General Staff, General Guy Simonds, one of the few victories he won over the U.S.-leaning Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, General Charles Foulkes. Simonds had complained in 1947 that the American "military authorities made plans based entirely on potential enemy capabilities, whereas it was the practice in Canada to take into consideration not only capabilities but probabilities." Simonds tried to maintain the filial links with the British forces and even created the Regiment of Canadian Guards. The Anglo-Canadian alliance was implicit and informal; Simonds wanted it to be more, but that would not happen, and the Suez Crisis of 1956 made this clear. The U.K. government had not taken Canada into its confidence as it planned its strike at President Nasser’s Egypt, and the sense of shock in Canada was pronounced when Anglo-French aircraft attacked Alexandria, followed belatedly by soldiers. Whatever their case, London and Paris’ timing was execrable, the attacks coming just days before a U.S. presidential election and while the USSR’s iron heel was being applied to Hungary. Ottawa’s instinctive response was to try to save Britain from its folly, and foreign minister, Lester Pearson tried to turn the invaders into a United Nations peacekeeping force. This ideafoundered quickly, and Pearson then called for the creation of the first large U.N. force. That effort worked and won Pearson a Nobel Peace Prize. The military significance of Suez for Canada was real. Pearson offered troops for the U.N. Emergency Force, a battalion of
the Queen’s Own Rifles of Canada. The Egyptians protested—how could their citizens distinguish between the British invaders and the Canadian peacekeepers? The name reeked of Empire, the uniforms were similar, and the flag carried by Canadian soldiers had the Union Jack in the corner. There was much logic in this complaint, and it took a major diplomatic effort to persuade Nasser to let Canadian logistics troops into UNEF.

Pearson learned from this experience. When he came to power in 1963, he moved to give Canada its own flag, and his government pushed through the unification of the Canadian Forces with a distinctive uniform. The lessons of Suez indeed.

Nonetheless, the army remained relatively untouched by the pull of the U.S. The British model of mustached officers with their swagger sticks remained the better one, or so Canadian soldiers continued to think. The regimental names, the links to British units, the royals as colonels-in-chief, even mess kits made by London tailors (on credit, of course)—all such things kept the ties alive even as the world changed. But unification was nonetheless a major blow, dealing a killing blow to the Army’s system of corps and its distinctive and much loved uniforms, buttons, and badges. The dark green uniform homogenized the Canadian military and weakened the army’s psychological defences against Americanization. It was, one officer unhappily said, “an attempt to cleanse the forces of their Britishness,” a trait deemed “contrary to the cause of Canadian unity.” The 1970 stand down of regiments like the Black Watch, the Queen’s Own, and the Guards further diluted Britishness.

But for another thirty years the army continued to resist the southward pull. It was still “lieutenant” and “khaki”, not “lootenant” and “kakki.” The ties, like the pronunciation, began to disappear under the strain of the 1990s. The army had been reduced in strength by successive cuts, and as the Cold War ended, it could not despatch a fully equipped battalion, let alone a brigade, to participate in the first Gulf War. Then came Somalia and failures in command by senior officers. Simultaneously there was Former Yugoslavia where, while some units performed very well in action against Croatian regulars, others, handicapped by post-Somalia rules of engagement, found themselves referring to the Judge Advocate General for permission to smoke, let alone fight. The Canadian units were abbreviated as Canbat I and II, for Canadian battle groups I and II. They were known to British troops in theatre as the “Can’t bats,” and it was largely true.

The dismal 1990s turned the army inwards, and it determined that it was ill-educated and ill-equipped. The events of 9/11 made clear that this was no longer adequate, and the Martin and Harper governments began re-arming the military. The psychological change had already occurred and looking south for the model and finding it in a U.S. Army that had regenerated itself after Vietnam was both appropriate and necessary. The names of Canada’s infantry regiments remain, redolent of Empire, but little else of the past is still there. We are friends and allies, but the British army is no longer the model.

J.L. Granatstein is one of Canada’s most distinguished historians focusing on 20th Century Canadian national history.
All too often attention to emergency management issues comes hot on the heels of a major, natural or man-made, disaster. The “after action” reports invariably talk about lines of communication, accountability, intra and intergovernmental coordination and funding for the promotion of emergency management. As a potentially significant “force multiplier,” the voluntary sector has a vital but, up until recently, largely overlooked role in preparedness, mitigation and response. Moreover, what is missing from the discussion on emergency management, and what is critical in terms of our resilience as a society, is how we transform the attitudes of citizens to ensure that they assume an appropriate amount of the responsibility for their own safety and security.

A recent article by Stephen E. Flynn in *Foreign Affairs* entitled “America the Resilient – Defying Terrorism and Mitigating Natural Disasters” addresses this vital issue of citizen engagement. Flynn observes that when it comes to the perils of the 21st century, such as terrorism or natural disasters, the American government and people are generally unprepared. The same observation could just as easily be applied to Canadians. Even more troubling, said Flynn, is that the American public has been shunted to the margins by a post 9/11 U.S. administration that has failed to draw on the “legacy of American grit, volunteerism, and ingenuity in the face of adversity.” The very nature of these challenges, he adds, is that they require “the broad engagement of civil society” and can only “be managed by an informed, inspired, and mobilized public.” Societal resilience, traditionally a great national strength, has been allowed to slip. As he notes:

...this reservoir of self-sufficiency is being depleted. The United States is becoming a brittle nation. An increasingly urbanized and suburbanized population has embraced just-in-time lifestyles tethered to ATM machines and 24-hour stores that provide instant access to cash, food, and gas. When the power goes out and these modern conveniences fail, Americans are incapacitated.

The way to build resilience, according to Flynn, is through volunteers. The U.S., he says, needs the type of resilience displayed by Londoners as bombs rained down on their city during the Second World War. “Volunteers,” he said, “put the fires out, rescued the wounded from the rubble, and then went on with their lives until the air-raid warnings were sounded again.” Building this type of resourcefulness, he insists, requires providing adequate support to various groups including “the National Guard, the American Red Cross, public health officials, firefighters, emergency room staffs, and other emergency planners and responders.” Hurricane Katrina represented something of an epiphany for western governments on a wide range of emergency management issues – not the least of which was the role of the voluntary sector. It is worth recalling that Katrina was one of the five deadliest hurricanes, as well as the costliest disaster in American history. It claimed more than 1,800 lives and was responsible for over $80 billion in property damage. The manner in
which U.S. federal, state and local governments responded to the need for evacuations, food, shelter, water and medicine provoked immediate and widespread criticism. In addition to the terrible loss of lives and property, the political damage to the presidency of George W. Bush was immense – perhaps rivalling the Iraq War. If President Bush could have retracted any statement from his time in office it might have been his congratulatory remark to Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Director Michael D. Brown. “Brownie,” he said, “you’re doing a heck of a job.” Within two weeks, Brown was forced to resign.

The subsequent U.S. congressional Select Committee investigation entitled “A Failure of Initiative” released in February, 2006 identified:

failures at all levels of government that significantly undermined and detracted from the heroic efforts of first responders, private individuals and organizations, faith based groups, and others…the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina show we are still an analog government in a digital age…woefully incapable of storing, moving, and accessing information – especially in times of crisis.9

As one of the principal conduits for citizen engagement, the voluntary sector, and in particular the American Red Cross, was not spared criticism. The report stated that “Contributions by charitable organizations assisted many in need, but the American Red Cross, and others, faced challenges due to the size of the mission, inadequate logistics capacity, and a disorganized shelter process.”6 From a “force multiplier” standpoint, it is worth pointing out that the American Red Cross deployed almost a quarter of a million workers – 95 percent of whom were volunteers. It opened 1,400 shelters, provided 3.8 million overnight stays and served 68 million meals and snacks to about four million people.

Still, there was significant criticism from a variety of sources. An editorial in The New York Times on December 4, 2005 entitled “Re-examining the Red Cross” noted that “some victims and volunteers complained that the organization’s response to the disaster was slow and tangled in red tape.” The paper called for congressional hearings “into the Red Cross’s role in our overall strategy for dealing with catastrophes.” It wasn’t long before a wide ranging shakeup of the organization occurred both at an operational and governance level. By May 2007, President Bush signed legislation that completely overhauled the governance structure of the American Red Cross.

The events of September 11 and Hurricane Katrina prompted significant institutional change regarding emergency preparedness and response within both the U.S. Government and the American Red Cross as a key player in the voluntary sector. These efforts have spilled across our borders because of the extent to which the emergency management work of the Canadian and American governments, and their respective voluntary sectors, intersect. Lessons learned in the U.S. are extremely important to Canadians. Significant policy changes have occurred in Canada, with the creation of the Department of Public Safety as well as the adoption of Canada’s first National Security Policy in April 2004. Although the Harper government has built on some of the measures taken by the previous government, progress on many facets of emergency management appear painfully slow.

The most recent study from the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence entitled, “Emergency Management in Canada” has highlighted the shortcomings of Canada’s approach to emergency management issues. While it did not directly address the issue of citizen engagement in the body of the report it
did make some important concluding comments on the subject. The report noted:

The Committee recognizes that it has focused almost entirely on what governments should be doing. In future we will broaden our focus to determine whether the Canadian public might be able to muster more energy and savvy in gearing up to protect themselves, their families and their neighbours.7

The concluding sentence in the report, although harsh, is perhaps cause for optimism if we presume the Senate committee’s work will have an impact. It states: “…our confused governments shouldn’t be counted on to confront the multitude of potential disasters that could come down the pipe. An alert and prepared citizenry is going to have to be part of Canada’s capacity to respond.”8

In fact, as the committee report observes, there is a growing awareness by governments at all levels of the need to work more closely together to build capacity and resilience within civil society. The Department of Public Safety’s “Get Prepared” program on personal and family emergency preparedness is definitely a step in the right direction. Wider societal resilience is based not only upon the self-sufficiency of individual citizens, but also on the collective benefit that accrues in a society that has a well organized and well trained cadre of citizens whose talents would serve to “supplement or substitute” the efforts of governments in a major emergency. This is an important and necessary public policy goal. A pertinent question is: “How can this be accomplished?”

Hopefully the Senate Committee, and others at all levels of government, will begin to draw the important link between the voluntary sector and individual preparedness. As Flynn noted earlier, the voluntary sector has enormous potential to train and mobilize individual citizens for their own safety and security, as well as organize them in support of local authorities. Whether it is with the Canadian Red Cross (CRC), St. John Ambulance or other similar organizations, it is time for governments to actively engage with the sector more substantively so that Canada will have the depth and capacity to respond to a major disaster like Katrina.

As a relatively large national player in the voluntary sector, the CRC, like its American counterpart, has done marvellous work in the past ten years in a wide variety of disasters and emergencies. Unlike the American Red Cross, it has not been tested with a Katrina or anything on a similar scale. Would it be up to the task? The simple answer is: “We don’t know.” However, what we do know is that governments must begin to work more closely with the voluntary sector to better understand its challenges, needs and potential.

One of the lessons of recent history is that the scale and complexity of today’s humanitarian crises require a much more integrated approach by all concerned — including the voluntary sector. Building stronger ties helps to engender greater cooperation, coordination and access to additional resources — both human and materiel. With a constellation of various threats to safety and security governments at every level need to ensure that they, and their partners, are ready. A comprehensive disaster management plan, whether national or local, requires an engaged and well prepared citizenry. It must also be supported by a voluntary sector whose assistance can be properly organized, resourced and deployed to build resilience at every level.

2. ibid. p. 3
3. ibid. p. 2
4. ibid. p. 6
5. A Failure of Initiative, Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, US House of Representatives. Executive Summary of Findings, p. 1
6. p. 5
8. Ibid. p. 142

The Honourable David Pratt, P.C. is currently working in the development industry as a Vice President for Business Development. From 2004-2008, he served as Special Advisor to the Secretary General of the Canadian Red Cross. Mr. Pratt served as an elected representative at the municipal, regional and federal levels for 16 years and was Canada’s 36th Minister of National Defence.
Recession, Rust-Out and Rearmament

Written By: John Ferris

According to conventional wisdom, during 2009, one order of world power is ending. In particular, the United States is reconsidering its strategies of 1989 and 2001. Initial indications are that the Barack Obama administration will maintain far and away the largest military expenditure on earth, but still cut it well below the level of inflation, forcing bitter budgetary battles and killing some programmes. The United States will remain an unmatched military power for decades to come, but its power is declining, and hyperpolarity vanishing, for reasons beyond its control. Other states, especially India, China and Russia, are exercising their weight. Underlying this process is an overlooked topic. The first general rise since 1989 in the size and quality of armed forces is occurring as all major states pursue great programmes of rearmament to counter the rust-out of kit. Only some will succeed, especially given the impact of the financial meltdown of 2008-09. Talk is cheap, weapons are not. Rust has slept longer in Canada than elsewhere, but this phenomenon is world wide.

After 2000, military budgets jumped, but since have stalled - that is, fallen. Western states almost doubled their military spending between 2000-2008, while that of China trebled, and Russia’s rose by 25% in 2008, but most of that increase is lost to inflation. Governments are shocked to find how so much can buy so little. All navies and air forces are in crisis, as numbers of personnel and kit plummet to allow recapitalization. Western ones must explain why they need new equipment, when they already have the world’s best, and threats are so weak and far away. The USN, a vaunted 600 ship navy in 1989, has 300 in 2009. Since 2001, the USAF has slashed personnel to produce tiny numbers of its next two generation of fighters, the F-22 and F-35 - 183 F-22s have eliminated 20,000 airmen, almost 10% of its personnel. These pressures have been reinforced, as events in the Middle East led the United States and Israel to reverse policies, and cut air budgets, to buy more infantry. They have driven western states to develop aircraft by international consortia, including the Eurofighter and the F-35. Washington’s refusal to do so with the F-22, so to maintain the secrecy of stealth technology, has shaped its astronomical unit cost of $339,000,000 per aircraft. After squeezing all other programmes to subsidise two aircraft carriers, Britain has just deferred construction of these warships for two years. France is considering canceling one of its two aircraft carriers. It has slashed its soldiers by 17% to buy new kit. For similar reasons, between 1990-2009, Russia cut its army by 70%, to 500,000 men, as China did its army by 20% and its air force by 50%. Moscow and Beijing have linked their status as powers to massive new arms programmes, like the Indo-Russian project for a fifth- generation fighter aircraft, intended to compete where American power is strongest. If these aims fail, so will their policies.

The context is notable. Over past decades, Taiwan
had the maritime and air ability to block Chinese invasion. Even in 2000, its 450 modern fighters outclassed China’s 2500; however, China has scrapped its old kit and acquired better aircraft and surface-to-surface missiles (900 in 2008), with cruise missiles under development. By 2020, or earlier, this power will outweigh Taiwan’s defences, no matter what technology Washington sells it, Taiwan will also not be able to match the rise in Chinese airpower. Then the competition will be the United States, admittedly, on terrain where it is strong and China weak - sea and air power. Similarly the United States recently has made massive sales of state of the art weapons to its allies, especially in the Persian Gulf, needing means to keep Iran in check. So too have France and Britain. Since 1992, Russia has led in the transfer of advanced military technology, so to salvage its military-industrial base, the only area where its firms can compete on world terms. Its exigencies have broader outcomes. India has licenses to build, or has entered into joint ventures, with Russia on much modern equipment, like the Sukhoi-30 MKI aircraft and the T-90 tank, while China has acquired leading Russian aircraft, missiles, destroyers and submarines.

Over coming decades a struggle will occur between the economic power and political will of major states embodied in military procurement; the outcome will be measured in the quantity and quality of conventional forces. The only safe bets are that the United States will remain the greatest of great powers, that any country which fails in rearmament will fall in power, and that many will do so. Their efforts to achieve these ends, and their success compared to their rivals, will add uncertainty to the base of a new world order. Nothing quite drives a state toward desperation than fear it is declining while a rival is rising. These matters will decide power, and all of its consequences, for years to come.

John Ferris is a Professor of History, and a Fellow at the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, at the University of Calgary.
The quarterly review

2008/2009 Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Fragile States Index

Written By: David Carment

The table presented below shows the latest results of the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy’s (CIFP) state fragility index. The current analysis uses data from more than 70 indicators that have been selected from an initial list of more than 100, with indicators selected on the basis of their relation to state fragility and their level of country coverage. State fragility is defined as the extent to which a state can or cannot provide the basic functions of governance to its population. Broadly understood, good governance also refers to the activities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society groups that play important roles within a state; accordingly, measures for these elements also appear within the index. However, ultimately it is the presence or absence of a functional government that distinguishes functional from fragile and failed states. Given this fact, state performance forms the heart of CIFP’s fragility index. State weakness in any of the areas of authority, legitimacy and capacity (ALC) is a cause for concern, with implications for the stability of the country. Each is briefly described in turn.

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Authority

Any functional state must possess the ability to enact binding legislation over its population. Further, that state must be able to provide a stable and secure environment to its citizens and communities. This security is a necessary prerequisite to the realization of public, private, and civil society interests. States lacking in authority may be unable to exercise control over the full extent of their legal territory; such states will have difficulty responding effectively to security threats, whether internal or external.

Legitimacy

Legitimacy refers to the ability of a state to command public loyalty to the governing regime, and to generate domestic support for that government’s legislation and policy. Such support must be created through a voluntary and reciprocal arrangement of effective governance and citizenship founded upon principles of government selection and succession that are recognized both locally and internationally. States in which the ruling regime lacks either broad, voluntary domestic support or general international recognition suffer a lack of legitimacy.

Capacity

Capacity refers to the power of a state to mobilize public resources towards productive ends. States with a satisfactory level of capacity display a basic competence in political and economic management and administration with governments capable of regulating domestic affairs and conducting international transactions. They also possess the basic infrastructure required of a modern state, including functional transportation and communication networks.

In comparing these results from our initial analysis,1 Sudan is now ranked as the most fragile state followed by Afghanistan and the Congo. In 2006 Burundi was ranked as the most fragile state followed by the Congo and Afghanistan. Somalia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Burundi, Haiti, Pakistan and Liberia round out the top ten most fragile states. In examining the authority rankings we see that Afghanistan is ranked top most with Sudan, Iraq, Burundi and the Congo ranking out the top five. Legitimacy rankings portray a different set of concerns with Iraq ranked the least legitimate, followed by Somalia, Afghanistan, Sudan and Eritrea in the top five. Finally, capacity rankings indicate that Comoros is top ranked with Ethiopia, Djibouti, the Congo and Sudan completing the top five. In comparison to prior rankings there is a greater concentration of fewer countries with high risk scores in all three categories of authority, legitimacy and capacity suggesting that for a few countries - Afghanistan, Iraq, the Congo and Sudan in particular - their overall situation has deteriorated. It is also worth pointing out that a large percentage of the most fragile states come from sub-Saharan Africa. Exceptions to this include of course Iraq and Afghanistan but also Yemen, Pakistan, Haiti, Myanmar, West Bank and Gaza. For full reports, a complete methodology, rankings and policy briefs, please visit www.carleton.ca/cifp.


David Carment is a Professor of International Affairs at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University. In addition, Carment is the principal investigator for the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy project (CIFP).
There is little doubt that the election of Barack Obama to the Presidency has changed the political atmosphere surrounding the Canada-U.S. relationship. If the media’s reports of the Canadian publics’ adulation of the incoming President is to be believed, the Canadian government will be able to manage the relationship much more easily than in the recent past. No longer will any appearances of close relations with Washington be an anathema. Instead, close relations with the new Administration in general, and President Obama in particular, is likely to be highly welcomed, if not sought after.

Beneath this new atmosphere in Canada, there is a sense that all of the problems confronting the relationship with the United States will simply disappear after January 20th because all past problems were a function of George W. Bush and his neo-conservative minions. Obama and the Democrats in control of Congress will restore a sense of normalcy to the relationship.

Within this mind-set it is important to point out that most of the problems were Canada’s doing when it came to the North American defence and security relationship. The Bush Administration, for all intents and purposes, provided successive Canadian governments with a ‘blank sheet’ to define this relationship in the wake of 9/11. The Canadian government did take initiative in proposing new measures to ensure the border remained open to the free flow of goods and people with varying degrees of success, and this initiative reflected the primacy of economic considerations in Canadian policy.

At the same time, evidence indicated that the United States was open to a fully integrated defence and security relationship with Canada, that would have supported, if not enhanced, the border initiatives; NORAD could have been readily expanded into the maritime and land sectors, and Canada could have signed on to the U.S. missile defence program. Combined, Canada could have quickly ensured a presence and voice in all areas of North American defence and security. Moreover, all these steps could
have been taken during that brief post-9/11 honeymoon enjoyed by the Bush Administration. Instead, the Chrétien government moved cautiously on the continental front. It sought to finesse the integration impulse through the establishment of the Binational Planning Cell and Group (BPC/G) to examine future options for continental defence cooperation, and explicitly put the issue of missile defence beyond the BPC/G’s mandate. The U.S. response, essentially, was to establish a separate operational defence command – Northern Command – for North America.

The government then took the initiative to begin discussions (negotiations) on Canadian participation in the U.S. land-based missile defence program for the defence of North America, with a basic agreement on the steps forward inherited by the Martin government. The Martin government sought to finesse the issue by agreeing to participate in the early warning function, but it then issued a blunt no to anything more.

Following missile defence, the Martin government established Canada Command – a mirror of Northern Command. This decision created a complicated and problematic North American defence structure of two national commands and one binational command, that has yet to be fully worked out.

The subsequent Harper government agreed to the indefinite renewal of NORAD, and established a policy position of No Harm to NORAD, but provided no clear indication of exactly what this entailed. As for missile defence, the government awaits a formal invitation from the U.S. to re-engage (this will likely never occur).

In effect, the defence relationship since 9/11 has been adrift with little, if any, strategic Canadian direction. As it drifted, the U.S. responded through a series of unilateral decisions with Canada following suit. The net result was the erosion of Canada’s longstanding strategically important binational defence relationship. Even though NORAD continues, North American defence is on the road to re-nationalization.

Little, if any, attention is being paid to the implications of re-nationalization for Canada’s strategic defence and security interests. Do not expect the new Administration to pay any attention to this drift to re-nationalization. North American defence will be near the bottom of US priorities. In this sense, the ball remains in Canada’s court to define this relationship by placing it directly on the bilateral agenda, and close binational defence cooperation has arguably been more important for Canada than the U.S.. Unfortunately, it also resides near the bottom of the Canadian bilateral agenda. As a result, the drift is likely to continue for good or ill. In the near future, Canadians may come to wonder what happened to Canada-U.S. defence relations.

James Fergusson is the Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at the University of Manitoba.
Whither U.S. Foreign Policy under an Obama Administration?

By: Stephen Randall

As the new Democratic administration of Barack Obama takes power in the United States there continues to be much speculation about what the campaign rhetoric of “change” will mean in terms of actual United States foreign policy. Although it may be dangerous to speculate there are sufficient signals from the campaign, and the kind of people that the new president has been appointing or nominating for key foreign policy offices, to justify some suggestions.

The evidence to date suggests that change may be more one of tone than of substance, with some exceptions. The global challenges that the new president’s administration has to confront are not so different from those of his predecessor, and, among others, they include: the deepening international financial crisis; international terrorism; the dangers of nuclear proliferation, with the particular challenges of Iran and North Korea; environmental change; weak and failing states; international crime, especially narcotics trafficking; the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, and the renewed aggressiveness of Putin’s Russia. The phased withdrawal of troops from Iraq and redeployment to Afghanistan was already underway at the end of the Bush administration, and Obama made it clear from the outset of his campaign that he viewed Afghanistan as the “real” war on terror. His selection of Robert Gates as Defense Secretary will provide clear continuity in defense policy, even though Gates has spoken of the need for the United States to avoid the “militarization” of its foreign policy and the need to be more flexible in its responses to global challenges. Gates has also articulated far more concern with democratic change and human rights issues than his predecessors in the Bush administration. Obama’s selection of Hillary Rodham Clinton as Secretary of State was in part a decision based on domestic politics, yet her statements in her confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee made very clear that she is already in control of her portfolio. She stressed that the Obama administration would pursue a foreign policy based on Smart Power, employing all of the tools available, not just military, to achieve U.S. foreign policy goals, a clear swipe at the outgoing Bush administration. Her commitment that policy would focus on making America secure reinforced a sense of continuity in foreign and defense policy reflecting the continuing preoccupation in the United States of the sense of vulnerability following 9/11. In that area there is no departure in focus or tone from the Bush administration, although one might expect shifts in the measures employed to achieve that security. When questioned about the recent Israel-Hamas confrontation, she reiterated a predictable support for Israel as the U.S. leading ally in the Middle East, but softened her position with her expression of sympathy for all of the victims of the conflict. Obama’s nominee as Attorney General, Eric Holder, Jr., also touched on a sensitive issue in that critical intersection between civil liberties and foreign policy in his confirmation hearings: the issue of torture. Pressed by the committee on the issue he stated categorically that waterboarding was torture and would not be used under an Obama administration.

Obama’s appointment of former NATO commander Brig General (ret) James L. Jones as National Security Advisor will reinforce the commitment to improving European relations, and it also signals the importance the administration will place on increasing NATO’s role in
the Afghanistan conflict. Obama and Clinton made it clear during the primaries where they stood on the need to close the terrorist detention centre at Guantanamo; it would be difficult for Obama’s administration to back away from that commitment, or not to constrain the CIA-operated rendition flights that occasioned so much domestic and foreign criticism.

One of the unknowns, as the new administration takes office, is the extent to which Clinton’s bitterness over the criticism of her by Obama’s foreign policy staff during the campaign will isolate those individuals from having an impact on policy. Susan Rice, Bill Clinton’s Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, and Obama’s nominee as ambassador to the United Nations, is a case in point. Samantha Power, one of Obama’s early foreign policy advisers, had already lost her credibility in the Obama and Clinton camp with her critical statements about Senator Clinton.

The main regional concentrations of the new administration will continue to be Europe, the Near and Middle East and Asia, specifically China. A critical challenge for Obama’s administration will be building the kind of international collaboration that might defuse the dangerous momentum of Iran toward the development of nuclear weapons. His administration will also have to find the means to have Pakistan deal more effectively with al-Qaeda in its northeastern provinces. Without a strong commitment from Pakistan to that objective the capacity of the U.S., and its allies, to contain, let alone defeat, the insurgents in Afghanistan will be compromised. How Obama deals with the situation he inherits early in 2009 in the Israel-Hamas conflict will be closely watched by those who fear he will not be sufficiently supportive of Israel. On the basis of the presidential campaign it is likely that an Obama administration will devote more attention to Latin America and Africa, the former of which (except for the war on drugs in Colombia) was badly neglected during the Bush years. At least an improvement in the relationship with Mexico might be expected as the result of the appointment of Bill Richardson as Secretary of Commerce, since Richardson is widely viewed as the most prominent Mexican-American politician in the United States. Practical domestic politics may preclude an Obama administration from further liberalizing the relationship with Cuba. After making rather sympathetic statements on the Cuban relationship early in his campaign Obama shifted to the centre to protect the Florida and New Jersey vote with the result that it is likely his administration will do little more than to continue with the liberalization of family visits and remittances to family members from the United States.

The areas of particular concern to Canadians include border security, trade, investment, and the direction of U.S. environmental policy with its potential impact on Canadian natural resource development. The passage by Congress in 2007 of the Energy Independence and Security Act has raised the spectre of restraints on U.S. imports from the Alberta oil sands, and there is widespread recognition that the new administration, as well as Congress, will be far more progressive on environmental policies than was the Bush administration. Given the U.S. commitments to addressing demands for more energy independence, more environmentally sensitive policies, and renewing employment opportunities for redundant workers in U.S. manufacturing establishments, the need for close Canada-United States cross-border collaboration has never been greater. The fact that Obama has already announced an early official visit to Canada is a clear signal of the importance of the bilateral relationship.

Stephen J. Randall, FRSC, a specialist in United States-Latin American Relations, is Director of the University of Calgary Institute for United States Policy Research.
Letter to the Prime Minister Regarding Cuba  

Written By: Mark Entwistle

Dear Sir,

Canada has had an unbroken official diplomatic relationship with Cuba for 64 years and throughout the tumult of the 1959 Cuban Revolution. This span has been in some ways a testament to a certain grittiness and determination in the history of Canadian diplomacy because there were times, especially in the 1960s, when we were quite alone in Havana and far from our usual set of friends and allies. The antagonism of our largest trading partner regarding this position has ebbed and flowed from quite sharp to more passive but has been a constant consideration. The reasons for Canada’s longstanding policy of engagement in Cuba are multiple and multi-layered but that is a subject for another day.

There are those in Canada who believe mistakenly, that this unique relationship, and the bilateral trade that has accompanied it over the decades, bestows on Canada a magical “special relationship” with Cuba that protects our interests there by osmosis. A special relationship we have, but it is not a privileged relationship. To think otherwise is a Canadian myth. But our relationship with Cuba remains still a valuable diplomatic asset, especially in our hemisphere.

You are now the custodian of that asset, that can no longer be taken for granted. For the first time in five decades there are a number of moving pieces that affect the Canada-Cuba equation that threaten to steal out from under Canada the fruits of those many years of engagement in Cuba. Our long-term investment in that relationship could be squandered on your watch.

Those new developments are taking place simultaneously both in Washington D.C. and in the capitals of the Americas.

In the United States, we can no longer assume inertia in U.S. policy on Cuba in the Barak Obama era. The freedom to create our own space in Cuba, without the real presence (and competition) of the United States - a quite unique experience for Canada anywhere in the world - is coming to an end parallel to a process of rethinking Cuba policy now well underway in the new Administration of President Obama. All aspects of U.S. Cuba policy are under formal review, a process begun informally before inauguration as the Obama transition team studied the workings of Bush Administration Cuba policy in various government agencies. No radical turn is in the immediate works, but the American tone has softened already; the domestic political equation in south Florida has shifted after November 4, 2008, and a new openness to other policy options is evident. Every imaginable American international affairs think tank and publication has offered its own blueprint for new
Cuba policy and all are based on some degree of engagement. Starting with his easy-to-deliver campaign promise to ease restrictions imposed by the Bush Administration on travel by Cuban-Americans to visit their families and to send remittances, it is expected that the President could make further unilateral adjustments to U.S. Cuba policy as an indication of a different way of doing foreign policy and as a bridge in a grander plan to construct a new latino electoral coalition for the Democratic Party.

In the not distant future, the prospects for U.S.-Cuba rapprochement and eventual normalization of relations will come into clearer focus. The implications for Canada are ironic. A more agile American Administration could move right around the positioning of a more flat-footed Canadian government despite 50 years of working with revolutionary Cuba.

At the same time, our hemispheric neighbours and partners, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, have collectively decided that the time has simply come to move on issues related to Cuba. Any fear of punitive U.S. reaction seems long gone. At the first meeting of the Latin American and Caribbean Summit for Integration and Development (CALC), held on December 17, 2008 in Brazil, attended by 33 countries, with Cuban President Raúl Castro present but former U.S. President George W. Bush not even invited, the rest of the hemisphere called unanimously for Cuba’s full integration and acceptance. At a recent meeting of leaders of CARICOM and Cuba in Havana, every single Head of Government of the Caribbean attended. Calls for the return of Cuba to the Organization of American States (OAS) will be made again at the OAS General Assembly this summer, led by countries like Honduras.

Canada has the window of opportunity right now to step up before the historic momentum on integration of Cuba renders its voice that of a Johnny-come-lately. The prestige garnered to Canada in the hemisphere for leadership on this issue would be substantial and cost-free.

You might consider two concrete steps to seize the moment and not squander Canada’s diplomatic asset: take a Canadian leadership position on a proposal to revoke the old 1962 resolution that suspended Cuba from the OAS to, at least, have Cuba at the table in the premiere hemispheric multilateral forum; this can be done without any preconditions for Cuban adherence to the OAS’ human rights protocol, especially since the United States itself is not a signatory, nor is Canada, and it will happen regardless sooner or later; and, visit Havana yourself as soon as possible where you will be in good company as the Presidents of Argentina and Brazil have just been and the President of Chile will go shortly; but please do not make the fundamental mistake of former Prime Minister Chretien in focusing almost exclusively and aggressively on an American-style human rights agenda, but rather seek to expand Canada’s natural role as a trusted long-term resource as Cubans themselves make decisions about change.

Mark Entwistle specializes in the intersection of politics and foreign policy, and is a leading expert on Cuba.
Afghan Bleeding Leads Have One Redeeming Value

Written By: Bob Bergen

I f it bleeds, it leads: the whole idea is to sell newspapers.

There is no doubting the journalistic aphorism when it comes to Canada’s war dead and wounded in Afghanistan.

Everyone has seen the pictures of the ramp ceremonies from the Kandahar Air Field.

Everyone has seen the profiles of soldiers who gave their lives and, if families and friends were willing to talk to journalists, has learned what kind of people they were and what was thought of them.

Everyone has seen the pictures of the hearses driving along Ontario’s 401 “Highway of Heroes” as they make their way from Trenton, Ontario, to the morgue in Toronto.

Everyone has seen the pictures of those standing on the highway’s overpasses, waving Canadian flags.

Everyone has seen the pictures of the soldiers’ families and friends sobbing at the funerals.

As a result, it is a truism that every Canadian soldier who dies in Afghanistan can die at least four times in the news media.

Given that 107 Canadian soldiers have died in Afghanistan at time of writing (there will inevitably be more at time of publication) and that there is the potential for soldiers to die up to four times in hundreds of newspapers across Canada, that’s a lot of bloodshed and misery shared with a nation coast to coast.

But, what are we to make of that?

Joseph Stalin said that a single death is a tragedy; but a million deaths is a statistic.

History teaches us some valuable lessons in that regard.

One of the worst days in Canadian military and journalism history was August 19, 1942.

On that day, of 4,963 Canadians embarking on their first live action in Europe landed on the beach at Dieppe; only 2,210 returned. The rest of them, 807, were killed in action, 100 died of wounds, 586 were wounded and 1,874 were taken prisoner.

Canadian journalists were “embedded” with the troops that day to the point that they wore military uniforms and were in the landing craft with them.

One of them, the Canadian Press’s Ross Munro, wrote a stirring narrative of what he witnessed that was published in hundreds of newspapers in Canada and the United States. He wrote: “There was heroism at sea and in the skies in those hours, but the hottest spot was ashore, where the Canadians fought at close quarters
with the Nazis. They fought to the end, where they had to, and showed courage and daring.

They attacked the Dieppe arsenal of coastal defence. They left Dieppe silent and afire, its ruins and its dead under a shroud of smoke."

His work was hailed as a masterpiece and one of the greatest stories of the war.

He was lauded by *The New York Times* that said he wrote “rattling good” stories. “It is sensible of the authorities to let him (the war correspondent) see for himself and to tell what he sees,” the newspaper said; however, Munro defied the “if it bleeds it leads” maxim.

He failed to mention the slaughter, or that Dieppe was not left in smoking ruins.

It wasn’t until days later that the grim truth emerged and newspapers across Canada began running lists, day after day, of the names of hundreds of soldiers who were killed or missing.

Those soldiers had names, but that’s all. To those who didn’t know them, the names were devoid of humanity; mere statistics.

A million didn’t die, but Stalin was still right.

Those solders were buried at Dieppe while their families, by the hundreds, in Canada grieved out of public sight and scrutiny. By the war’s end, the families of 44,927 soldiers, sailors, and airmen mourned that way.

Canada was a nation immersed in grief on a scale unimaginable in 2009.

Newspaper practices were different in the 1940s, but even if they had not been, it is not possible to imagine them profiling hundreds of soldiers every day.

It’s hard to imagine them doing that now; we hope and pray that they will never have to.

Canadians in 1940 didn’t have to be told Canada was at war, but because it is not on the same scale, Canadians have had to be told the country is at war in Afghanistan.

That the war dead news from Afghanistan vastly overwhelms the Canadians’ success stories is a regrettable reality given the nature of the media beast; however, as the casualties mount and as painful as the news coverage of them can be, the truth that Canada is at war has finally sunk in.

In the case of Afghanistan, that is the one redeeming value of bleeding leading.

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CDFAI is the only think tank focused on Canada’s international engagement in all its forms: diplomacy, the military, aid and trade security. Established in 2001, CDFAI’s vision is for Canada to have a respected, influential voice in the international arena based on a comprehensive foreign policy, which expresses our national interests, political and social values, military capabilities, economic strength and willingness to be engaged with action that is timely and credible.

CDFAI was created to address the ongoing discrepancy between what Canadians need to know about Canadian international activities and what they do know. Historically, Canadians tend to think of foreign policy – if they think of it at all – as a matter of trade and markets. They are unaware of the importance of Canada engaging diplomatically, militarily, and with international aid in the ongoing struggle to maintain a world that is friendly to the free flow of goods, services, people and ideas across borders and the spread of human rights. They are largely unaware of the connection between a prosperous and free Canada and a world of globalization and liberal internationalism.

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