

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Announcement

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Background

A charitable organization, founded in 2001, CDFAI develops and disseminates materials and carries out activities to promote understanding by the Canadian public of national defence and foreign affairs issues. We are developing a body of knowledge to be used for Canadian policy development, media analysis and educational support. Our network of distinguished Canadian Fellows supports CDFAI by authoring research and policy papers.

Mission Statement

To be a catalyst for innovative Canadian global engagement.

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Article Summaries from the Assistant Editor

Threat Manipulation, Distorted Intelligence and War: Using History to Disprove a Popular Theory of the 2003 Invasion of Iraq

Frank Harvey examines the real reasons for the 2003 invasion of Iraq and dismisses the often touted theories that the invasion hinged on "1) operational linkages between Saddam and al-Quaeda leading to 9/11, 2) the attempted acquisition of aluminum tubes used in centrifuge enrichment programs and 3) the attempted purchase of uranium yellowcakes from Africa."

Global Summitry: Under Construction

Mark Entwistle debates the place and purpose of both the G8 and G20, emphasizing that Canada must work to help maintain the validity of, and its membership in, the G8 if it hopes to continue to "punch above its weight."

Investing in Ideas: Modern Strategic Development in Support of Defence Policy and Practice

Andrew Godefroy questions whether or not we are taking the necessary time to develop clear strategy to tackle new security and defence challenges. He stipulates that we must look to the past and invest in new ideas that will reach beyond an election cycle so that our strategy is not defeated "by lack of tolerance, patience and foresight."

Reducing CF Command & Control Overhead — Is Structure the Issue?

Mike Jeffery looks at transformation within the Canadian Forces, specifically command and control. He notes that if real change, which is effective and sustainable, is to occur "real evolution and unity in thinking" is necessary.

The Major Commission of Inquiry and 'Connecting the Dots'

Eric Lerhe reviews the report on the Major Commission of Inquiry on the Air India Flight 182 bombing. He concludes that this report, while good at identifying some of the problems with counter-terrorism measures, offers the unfortunately weak recommendation that "the role of the National Security Advisor (NSA) be enhanced" as the primary solution.

NORAD of the North

George Macdonald remarks on the proposal found in *Open Canada: A Global Positioning Strategy for a Networked Age* to expand NORAD for control of the Arctic region. While there are many questions raised by this, Macdonald concludes this would "respond to Canada's interests in the North in a timely manner and will further reinforce the value of bi-national partnership with the United States."

Canada's Post-2011 Commitment to Afghanistan

Elinor Sloan discusses the ongoing mission in Afghanistan and the need for the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police to form an effective security force capable of ensuring security within the Afghan borders; however, Canada's role in this may be to pull out and re-group.

Decline of the American Empire

Cameron Ross suggests that the American Empire may be on the decline and, like all great empires, it will end with a bang and not with a whimper; however, Canadians must start to think of what will happen to Canada, following a decline in our great neighbor to the south.

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Message from the Editor-in-Chief

Written by:
David Bercuson

The recent announcement that Canada would move ahead with the purchase of 60 Joint Strike Fighters (F-35) to replace the aging fleet of CF-18s was not a shocking surprise to anyone who follows Canadian defence issues. The current CF-18 fleet has been through a number of upgrades since the late 1990s and won't be phased out for at least another seven years.

But, although their avionics and other systems are as modern as can be, the airframes are over a quarter century old and the aircraft itself is late Cold War vintage at best. So they have to be replaced.

Or do they?

Some of the objectors to the Joint Strike Fighter buy believe that Canada no longer needs fighter aircraft at all. That is pretty narrow thinking. Canada is the second largest country in the world and makes claims for sovereignty over large areas of the ocean floor hundreds of kilometers from Canada's actual coast line. Canada needs "an airplane that can shoot" to at least show a token presence over Canadian skies to serve notice to anyone who chooses to fly in those skies without Canadian permission that Canada stands ready to guard its sovereignty. That responsibility – guarding our sovereignty and the interests and lives of our citizens – is the single most important function of the Canadian state.

Now, at the cost of these aircraft, estimates vary as to the overall contract with maintenance included, but at least $12 billion will be involved, Canadians might believe that the purchase is a very costly token indeed. But 60 aircraft is about the absolute minimum that a nation as large as ours can get away with. The Australians, for example, will purchase 100 of them. When the hard arithmetic of aircraft deployment is done, 60 aircraft will equip one operational training squadron and perhaps three more squadrons on top of that. Generally one aircraft flies for every three in the fleet while maintenance is being done on the other two. In the Kosovo air war of 1999, Canada's then approximately 100 CF-18s were only good for 18 or so operational aircraft at any one time. The air force's ability to attract, train and hold advanced fighter pilots is also a major factor underlying this problem of getting more flying out of fewer aircraft.

But why the F-35? And why a sole source contract? These two questions are somewhat harder to answer.

The F-35 is indeed a very good fighter. Or at least it promises to be. The straight version of the aircraft (normal take-off and landing) ordered by the U.S. Air Force and other customers (now including Canada) has performed well in tests and the fighter is definitely "fifth generation", or brand-new in concept and not a Cold War legacy, or extension of a Cold War legacy, as are most of the "new" fighter aircraft operating around the world today. But a fighter such as the "Super Hornet", a Boeing product flown by the U.S. Navy that appeared about a decade ago and which is far superior in every way to the original A/F-18 Hornet, might well have fulfilled Canadian requirements. Australia is buying those also as a fill-in until the F-35 is ready. And there are a number of other aircraft, the Swedish Saab, the French Rafael and the Eurofighter Typhoon, that also may have filled the bill. None of these are as advanced as the F-35, but all are finding markets in other countries.

There may be very good reasons for a sole source contract for the F-35, but they are not obviously apparent. That was not the case with the purchases of the C-130J, the C-17, the M777 light howitzer or the RG-35 "Nyala" family of mine-resistant vehicles. In each of these cases, no real alternative existed and there were compelling reasons to move quickly on the contract. Given the age of the CF-18 fleet, there is certainly reason to move ahead with new fighter aircraft. But no reason whatever was given as to why the F-35 was so superior for Canadian needs that no competition was even considered.

David Bercuson is the Director of Programs at CDFAI, the Director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, and the Honorary Lieutenant Colonel of the 41st Combat Engineer Regiment.

Threat Manipulation, Distorted Intelligence and War: Using History to Disprove a Popular Theory of the 2003 Invasion of Iraq

Written by:
Frank Harvey

One of the more popular theories running through standard historical accounts of the 2003 Iraq war stipulates that distorted intelligence and exaggerated claims about "imminent" threats were largely responsible for the war. According to this version of history, neoconservatives and unilateralists in the Bush administration either lied about, or exaggerated, the facts surrounding the following three intelligence estimates: (1) operational linkages between Saddam and al-Qaeda leading to 9/11, (2) the attempted acquisition of aluminium tubes used in centrifuge enrichment programs, and (3) the attempted purchase of uranium yellowcakes from Africa. All three intelligence estimates were shown after the war to be largely baseless and seriously flawed, but these errors, according to the standard narrative found in most books on the subject, were known to administration officials, but ignored. Congressional leaders, the argument goes, inadvertently relied on these false estimates to defend their support for the October 2002 authorization and, since authorization was a crucial step towards war, the war itself can be blamed on these distortions and those responsible for their fabrication.

This version of the case history is particularly appealing to any Democratic or Republican Congressmen wanting to distance themselves from any responsibility for the war: the fewer and more identifiable the intelligence errors, the easier it is to track and apportion blame onto those pushing these particular exaggerated claims. However, assigning extraordinary causal weight to these three intelligence errors, rather than so many other estimates that were compiled over a decade of data gathering and intelligence assessments, biases the case in favour of accepted wisdom by buttressing the 'neoconservative leadership' theory of intelligence manipulation and war. By focusing on a small, manageable (and more controllable) part of the intelligence failure record all we really need for proof are examples of prominent neoconservatives spinning these specific estimates.

But what are the implications for this popular account of the war if these three intelligence estimates were irrelevant to the positions articulated and defended by most participants and Congressmen at the time? What if these items were largely unrelated to the rationales offered by those on both sides of the aisle who supported the President's decisions at each stage to return inspectors with a strong, coercive threat of military force backed by

2003 Iraq Invasion
Photo Source: www.PBS.org

Congressional authorization? These findings would pose a serious challenge to conventional wisdom.

With respect to actually assessing claims regarding the direct causal relationship between congressional authorization and politically manipulated intelligence on aluminium tubes, uranium and Saddam-9/11 linkages, the key questions are these: what collection of specific historical facts would we need to observe that would allow us to confirm or disconfirm this central claim? More specifically, how many officials (Democrats, Republicans, neoconservatives, UNSCOM or UNMOVIC inspectors,

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members of the Labour and Conservative parties in Britain, and so on) accepted what proportion of the hundreds of intelligence estimates compiled over a decade of U.S.-U.K.-U.N. inspections, and with what degree of confidence? Were these general impressions, suspicions and concerns sufficient for Congress to authorize force and endorse the Bush-Powell-Blair strategy at each stage? And, more importantly, how relevant to the course of events were aluminium tubes, uranium and Saddam-9/11 linkages when compared with everything else the regime was suspected of hiding?

Space constraints preclude a more detailed treatment of the techniques available for answering these questions, but one straightforward method in the case of U.S. decision-makers would be to track (through, for example, content analysis) references to these three items in Congressional debates on the resolution authorizing the use of military force (from Congressional records, October 8-10, 2002). Speeches defending a vote to deploy military troops are very risky, career defining moments that typically establish political legacies. The content of these speeches arguably constitutes the best case these officials can extract from all available evidence and intelligence to defend one of the most important votes they will ever cast. Logically, we would expect these officials to highlight in their speeches the most relevant information, data and intelligence they believe is crucial to establishing their case. Any indication that uranium, aluminium tubes or operational links between Iraq and al-Qaeda (in preparation for the 9/11 attacks) were largely *absent* from these speeches or completely ignored altogether would raise serious doubts about this crucial part of standard accounts of history.

A total of 52 senators gave 76 speeches to defend their vote. Only nine of the 52 senators made reference to uranium or aluminium tubes in their speeches – six were Democrats, three of whom opposed authorization (Robert Byrd WV, Bob Graham FL, Ted Kennedy MA), and three supported the President (Joe Lieberman CT, Joe Biden DE, and Byron Dorgan ND). The other three senators who made reference to these estimates were Republicans (Susan Collins ME, Kay Bailey Hutchison KY, and Olympia Snowe ME). Leaving aside the three Democrats who opposed authorization (they dismissed these items with references to alternative interpretations included in the full 2002 National Intelligence Estimate and its Appendix), there were a total of only six out of 52 senators who referenced these items in the most important speech of their political careers. This hardly constitutes anything approaching compelling empirical evidence that these distortions were necessary to obtain authorization or to 'sell' the war. Even a significant majority of Republican senators considered these three items to be irrelevant to the case they were making in support of authorization, because the case *without* these distortions was more than sufficient to justify their vote.

"How relevant to the course of events were aluminum tubes, uranium and Saddam-9/11 linkages?"



Iraq Invasion April 2003
Photo Source: upload.wikimedia.org

With respect to references to al-Qaeda: only 15 out of the 29 Democrats who voted in favour of authorization made references to al-Qaeda, but none of them accepted the distorted claims regarding *operational* linkages associated with the planning and execution of 9/11. Joe Biden and Hillary Clinton delivered speeches that actually downplayed the operational links between al-Qaeda and Iraq, but, like almost everyone else, defended the position that Saddam's links to terrorism in the Middle East were serious enough (sufficient, along with everything else

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on record) to be concerned. Joe Lieberman, Al Gore's choice for Vice President, was one of the only Democrats who raised the possibility of stronger links between Iraqi regime officials and al-Qaeda, but even he refused to draw a direct connection between Saddam and 9/11. Not one of the remaining Democrats who voted in favour of the resolution authorizing force made *any* reference to al-Qaeda or Saddam-9/11 linkages – their support did not depend on that distortion.

The historical record actually disconfirms the standard assertion that an 'imminent threat' and other elements of distorted intelligence were necessary for Congressional support. None of the speeches drew direct linkages between Saddam and 9/11, except for those who dismissed this claim as silly, the latter a position shared by senior members of Tony Blair's administration. Additional evidence raising doubts about the necessity of distorted intelligence shows that none of the three exaggerated estimates played any role in justifying Operation Desert Fox (the 1998 bombing campaign against Iraq), or the 98-0 U.S. Senate vote in favour of the 1998 Iraqi Liberation Act – in fact, the speeches endorsing the act looked very similar to those delivered in October 2002.

"The fewer and more indentifiable the intelligence errors, the easier it is to track and apportion blame."

A more relevant approach to linking intelligence errors with decisions surrounding Iraq should focus on structural and institutional impediments to intelligence collection that were far more serious, widespread and difficult to control. The scope of intelligence errors, as distinct from distortions pushed by Cheney and neocons in the Pentagon, were considerably more entrenched across both Democratic and Republican administrations, a product of failed inspections, years of deception and strategic ambiguity practiced by Saddam Hussein, and the absence of inspectors since 1998. In relation to these problems, the three distortions played almost no significant role. Moreover, there were so many other societal, political, institutional, diplomatic and strategic reasons (unrelated to these distortions) that explain the bipartisan support both Clinton (1998) and Bush received for their Iraq policies.

Proponents of the standard account, therefore, are faced with a difficult dilemma: they cannot quote Cheney's references to aluminium tubes to explain his push for unilateral pre-emption while ignoring the absence of these distortions in the speeches defending authorization. They may have been relevant to Cheney's preferred strategy, but the evidence clearly shows that they were *not* necessary (indeed, they were largely unrelated to) the actual multilateral, U.N. based policies adopted by Bush, Blair and Powell. The conventional story is based on a serious misreading of the historical record and an unsubstantiated assertion that has never been subjected to careful empirical analysis. In fact, most of those who supported the Bush-Blair multilateral, U.N. based strategy *rejected* the 'imminent threat' case being put forward by Cheney, Wolfowitz, Perle and others. These exaggerations and misrepresentations, especially Saddam's links to 9/11, were *rejected* by those pushing the coercive multilateral strategy to work with the U.N. to return inspectors. That strategy ultimately set both countries on a path to war. Neoconservative distortions were irrelevant.

Frank Harvey is University Research Professor of International Relations at Dalhousie University. He held the 2007 J. William Fulbright Distinguished Research Chair in Canadian Studies at the State University of New York (Plattsburg).

CDFAI Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute

Global Summitry: Under Construction

Written by:
Mark Entwistle

The usual spectacle played out at the June G8 and G20 summits: peaceful protests on the street hijacked by vandals in black, police response, and world leaders meeting far from the maddening crowd to the eternal frustration of the international media. The criticisms of summitry are oft repeated, but does anything of value come from this summitry process, especially at such a staggering cost in the post-9/11 security environment?

The G8 sits in a unique space in global governance, between the crisis management of the United Nations Security Council and the bureaucracy of other multilateral bodies. It channels focused bilateralism in an atmosphere of relative trust between partners. When the G8 rises to meet its modern potential, it can be a catalyst for change. The political will of leaders can be mobilized under the glare of the unique public scrutiny and the resources of national bureaucracies harnessed like no other event on the international calendar. This is in marked contrast to the lumbering pace of other multilateral processes.

An example of this potential has been past G8 attention to the future of Africa, starting at the Kananaskis Summit in 2002 and intensified at the Gleneagles Summit of 2005. 42 million more children are now in school. It has been estimated that since 2004, the old G-7 has put about $14 billion of new money into sub-Saharan Africa and met about 61% of its Gleneagles pledge to double aid to that region. That proportion would be significantly higher if Italy were removed from the calculation. Despite the ongoing need for much more effective accountability at both the donor and recipient ends, this is an achievement that simply would not have been possible had the G8 not acted.

The G8 remains a unique institutional animal, while the G20 is a different beast altogether.

The G20 has the voices of new influential global players at the table, is focused principally on global finance issues, but is less capable of coordinating action on the international political and security agenda that so often captures the attention of the G8. It is more formal in style, partly because it is so much bigger, but partly because of the different kinds of actors. This is the G20's potential Achilles Heel as a piece of global architecture, where the useful intimacy of the G8 could be lost to cataloguing of set piece policy positions if the G20 enters into subject areas beyond global finance.

The noise is louder than ever about the imminent demise of the G8, to be replaced by the extended family of cousin G20. This is unlikely in the near future, although we are now seeing an evolving division of labour in the global architecture. This division of labour demands close attention though, because, if not handled with care, certain important global issues could fall between the wide cracks. The immediate sacrifice could be international development assistance where certain leading members of the G20 do not share the relative cohesion of the G8 regarding the value of accountable and effective foreign aid, or the historic attention to the challenges facing Africa. The most useful interim arrangement would be for the G20 to focus on the trade and investment components of development assistance, leaving traditional foreign aid to the G8. If international development as a global policy issue were to be "transferred" to the G20 in its entirety, it would require a real structural mechanism to compel countries like China, India, Saudi Arabia and others to participate constructively and not obstruct the kind of progress that could be made elsewhere. The latter eventuality would be a wholly preventable loss. The two working groups on development and anti-corruption established at the Toronto G20 summit this past June are important structural steps, but it is critical that they be chaired effectively with a fulsome agenda.

As for Canada, its national interest is clearly best served by the survival of the G8 where its membership allows it to punch above its weight; its presence is highly diluted in the G20. In Prime Minister Stephen Harper's apparent analysis, the G8 must retain relevance and credibility in order to be saved, along with timely attention to international security issues, the area where it had a track record and was relevant in international development. Hence, Mr. Harper's initiative on maternal, newborn and child health, the low-hanging fruit of the least performing Millennium Development Goals.

In a curious historic twist, the interests of Canada, the G8 and international development advocates have become entangled.

Mark Entwistle is currently Vice-President, International and Government Affairs with ExecAdvice Corporation. A former diplomat, he served as Canada's Ambassador to Cuba from 1993-1997 and is a leading expert on Cuba.

Investing in Ideas: Modern Strategic Development in Support of Defence Policy and Practice

Written by:
Andrew B. Godefroy

The Prussian military philosopher, Carl von Clausewitz committed nearly three decades of his life to producing his seminal and enduring work, *On War*; however, the chances of a soldier having the same amount of time to produce such a strategy today is highly unlikely. One only has to witness the mere eighteen months U.S. President Barack Obama gave to General Stanley McChrystal to achieve strategic coherence and win the war in Afghanistan.

The development of strategy in support of defence policy and practice, essentially the ways, means, and ends, requires an investment in time if it is to be of any real use. Yet the development of strategy, and its application to practical problems, has been made more difficult in recent years as a result of the modern practice of attempting to quickly boil down complex ideas and environments into ambiguous and questionable terms. Redefining the nature of conflict when it has endured, or attempting to identify the many changing characteristics of conflict with a single buzzword, simply belittles the complexity of the subject. Worse, it also creates the impression that the strategies required to address conflict today, and into the future, can be easily constructed without much serious thought and in a very short period of time.

Yet like so many other 'out of the box' solutions, strategy buzzwords suffer from a painful lack of depth and quickly reveal their shortcomings when placed under serious scrutiny. In other cases still, their application may prove detrimental and further obfuscate an already complicated and difficult analysis. The new U.S. Future Army Capstone Concept released in December 2009, for example, is but one poignant case of where strategy and warfare buzzwords can fall horribly short of the mark. Anchoring itself on the hypothesis that the future security environment will supposedly consist of new 'hybrid wars' and 'hybrid enemies', the document's lengthy title *The Army Capstone Concept – Operational Adaptability: Operating Under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict, 2016-2028*, betrays the true impotence of the concept it offers. What exactly is an, 'era of persistent conflict'? Was the U.S. Army previously always operating under conditions of certainty and simplicity? Unfortunately, the document leaves one wondering if these questions were even considered, or how exactly hybrid warfare addresses them.

The failure of a wide range of catchy terms such as 3 Block War, Fourth Generation Warfare, and more recently, Hybrid Warfare, has interestingly begun to incite a degree of backlash from policy makers, planners and practitioners who are feeling increasingly betrayed by the flippant application of such terminology to characterize complex environments and problems. Though one can really only blame oneself for allowing convenience to overtake vigilance in accepting such ideas without much verification, their failure can also serve as a valuable lesson for how the situation might be ameliorated.

Traditionally, a common practice with developing strategic concepts has been to study history, which may explain to some degree why an increasing number of scholars and practitioners of strategy have called for a return to the more serious study of this subject as a guide. After all, the great Clausewitz, who according to some estimates studied no less than 132 campaigns in his preparation of *On War*, seemed to have made good use of the lessons of history in developing his venerable codex. Thus, more and more strategists are inclined to put their trust in historical precedence rather than invention, speculation, or conjecture, which means that history may need to play a greater role in the development of future strategic development. Yet, even this approach will not be without its challenges.

"History should not be used to solve strategic problems. Instead, its purpose is to reveal knowledge."

To be fair, modern strategic development is subject to the political imperatives of the day, and despite a tradition of

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longer-term strategic development and approaches, these days it seems strategy needs to be developed rather quickly given that the average political election cycle in the west is approximately every four years. But what if the strategy of our adversaries is to simply drag a conflict out beyond the length of an election cycle? Should we allow our strategy to be defeated by a lack of tolerance, patience, or foresight?

The misuse and abuse of history in developing strategy is also a common problem. History should not be used to solve strategic problems. Instead, its purpose is to reveal knowledge that can aid in the development of strategy. One thing that history has repeatedly shown us is that successful strategies require serious investment and time. They cannot be thrown together in weeks or months, or in the span of a single journal article or paper.

Planners, policy makers, and practitioners wishing to avail themselves of the wisdom of the past, and how it contributed to the development of strategy, must have a solid grasp of the current body of theory and case studies that go beyond merely abbreviated and encapsulated ideas. Such knowledge, frankly, is necessary for the successful interpretation of the past in ways that are applicable to finding solutions to current defence and foreign affairs problems. An investment in ideas is an investment in time itself, but in the end, it is also an investment towards developing successful strategy.

Andrew Godefroy is a strategic analyst and historian specializing in Canadian foreign, defence, and technology affairs. He has been a member of the Canadian Army Primary Reserve since 1993 and currently holds the Canadian Visiting Research Fellowship in the Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War at Oxford University.



Carl von Clausewitz
Photo Source: www.ciepfc.fr

Reducing CF Command & Control - Is Structure the Issue?

Written by:
Mike Jeffery

In a recent public statement, the Chief of Defence Staff, General Natynczyk, indicated that the Canadian Forces have too much overhead and consideration is being given to re-assigning some headquarters personnel to field units. These proposed changes are the latest in a long line of adjustments affecting the CF's command and control (C2) structure and are indicative of the challenges faced in trying to maintain effectiveness and efficiency in a large complex system.

For years there has been a pervasive view that, for a relatively small force, the CF has too much overhead and should be able to run the military on far fewer and smaller headquarters. It has often been suggested that the CF needs to flatten the organization, as has been done in business.

Canadian Soldiers fire M777 155 mm Howitzer
Photo Source: www.wikipedia.org

There is no question that the goal implicit in such views is a sound one. Any organization, in particular a military force, has far too few resources to squander on non-productive bureaucracy. However, the C2 requirements of the CF are based on a complex set of factors and care must be taken to avoid simplistic and one dimensional solutions. While the goal of reducing overhead in CF C2 is realistic, the real solution may not be found in structural change.

CF Transformation

In 2005, General Rick Hillier launched an effort to transform the CF. A key factor in his vision was the strong belief that, in the pursuit of economy, demanded by years of austerity, the effectiveness of CF command and control had deteriorated and was not up to the challenges faced in the 21st century. In particular, he believed that, given its limited capacity, the National Defence Headquarters' principal focus was on the strategic and political demands of operations and too little time or effort was spent on the operational needs of deployed forces. As a consequence, deployed commanders lacked the focused and responsive national support essential to ensure their success.

To correct the problem as he saw it, Hillier re-oriented the CF to be much more operationally focused and invested in additional C2 capacity. This saw the establishment of four new operational level commands, located outside of National Defence Headquarters with the commanders reporting directly to the CDS.

There is strong evidence that, as a result of these changes, the operational effectiveness of the CF has improved and both General Hillier and General Natynczyk have espoused the virtues of the new structure. As both have stated, given the increased tempo of international operations and the domestic demands of a post 9/11 world, it is questionable whether the CF could have succeeded with the old C2 model.

But this increased operational effectiveness came at a price: a large and growing demand for personnel, as each of the new operational commanders sought to ensure the effectiveness of their HQs. The result has been the redistribution of many of the best quality staff officers within the CF with the consequent loss of capacity at many points in the structure and a significant increase in stress on the system. Some have suggested that the problem is a transitional one and that, as the system adjusts, sufficient new personnel would be developed to meet the needs. But it is clear the appetite is too great for the CF's sustainable capacity. The new C2 structure may be more effective but it is not efficient.

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The Immediate Fix

As implied in the CDS' public statement, the rationalization of the operational command structure would provide an immediate, albeit limited, fix to the problem. There has been much debate within the CF about the wisdom of four commands and many alternative approaches considered. But there is little doubt that there are more efficient options. Whatever compromise structure is adopted, it should be able to meet the needs of both international and domestic operations and demand a significantly smaller overhead; however, any move to broader structural change, in particular with an economy imperative, is fraught with considerable danger as additional restructuring options are unlikely to realize any real savings. Importantly, they risk seriously eroding current C2 effectiveness.

C2 Structural Requirements

Command and control of military forces must focus on a variety of important, and often conflicting, structural requirements. A C2 capability must first and foremost provide for effective control of military operations both at home and abroad, taking into account the types of operations envisaged and the environment within which they will occur. Equally vital, it must provide for the effective and efficient generation of forces, both service specific and joint forces. It should also be structured to manage the business of defence and to ensure the best possible interface with government partners and international allies. Finally, it must allow the CDS to command all of these in a coherent manner and have the capacity to effect all functions simultaneously.

The challenge faced by the CF has been, and continues to be, the development of a Joint C2 model that balances these, often conflicting, requirements. Historically, the resultant compromise C2 model has favoured the specialized generation requirements of the services and their specific operational environment. The reality is the majority of CF effort domestically is in the force generation realm and this is where the C2 capacity is required. Joint C2 models, while perhaps cheaper, have had a domestic operations focus and have been seen as less effective in the generation of forces. As a result, the solutions have tended to favour a service centric approach. In all cases the resultant models have lacked capacity in the C2 of domestic operations.

There is no question that, in order to improve its efficiency while maintaining effectiveness, the CF must shape its C2 in a new direction. This may well lead to a new C2 model, but experience shows that there will be no simple structural solutions.

Future C2 Capability

Effective solutions to the C2 challenge require looking beyond the structural components of the CF and at all components of C2 capability, namely: doctrine, technology and the critical human element. In short, the CF has to look at its C2 requirements through new eyes. The objective should be an integrated C2 structure, supported by a common doctrine, appropriate technology and trained personnel, which assures effective C2 of the CF, while maintaining a level of efficiency that guarantees sustainability over time. This means achieving a common or integrated CF C2 capability.

Any real progress in realizing this objective demands major cultural change. Despite years of discussion on the need for greater integration, including the current philosophy of greater "jointness", the CF is still at its heart three services; albeit, the growth of a SOF capability is adding a fourth to that list and the emerging importance of cyber may add a fifth. Attempts to change this have run into subtle but significant resistance. From the service perspective, the move to greater integration is seen as a threat to the bona fide needs of maintaining and generating effective maritime, land and air forces. In blunt terms, the CF move to greater integration is seen as one of homogenization where the lowest common denominator triumphs. From the CF vantage point, the services are intransigent and unwilling to subordinate themselves to the greater good.

As long as this polarized state exists, the real opportunities for increased C2 efficiency are limited. What is needed is a unified vision that would allow the shaping of the CF, and in particular its C2 structure, in a manner that would optimize both effectiveness and efficiency. Clearly, such change will mean compromise, but if launched from a vantage point of respecting the genuine requirements of all parties, and taking an evolutionary approach to change, there is potential for a real win-win scenario.

"It has often been suggested the CF needs to flatten the organization."

Such an approach should focus on the development and implementation of a true "Joint" force generation process and managed readiness programme for the CF. Recognizing the bona fide service requirements, in an integrated force generation process, would move the services closer together in doctrinal and philosophical

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terms. In time, this should see a greater integration or sharing of capabilities, leading to a reduced demand for service headquarters and an improvement in overall efficiency. Such a shift could see the emergence of true joint commanders responsible for force generation at the operational level. This change would still see the requirement for service specific capability development and force generation, but could simplify the processes.

Progress also requires maximizing the benefits of technology. There is a view that technology could enable command and control of all forces from a single point; however, such an approach is inherently unstable as, even in this age, C2 over great distance has its limits. But there is real efficiency potential in technology, although the CF has not realized those benefits. In part this is a reflection of the maturity of the current generation of C2 systems. But, more importantly, it is a reflection of the lack of real evolution and unity in thinking with respect to command and control. This is also a cultural issue, but perhaps more significantly a matter of leadership.

To date, CF technology investment has focused primarily on improving information reach and automating staff functions. The approach to command and the staff processes that support it have remained largely unchanged for years. Technology should facilitate the streamlining of processes and reduce workload and the numbers of staff officers required to meet a commander's C2 needs. In time, it should also significantly enhance commander's ability to command. But this won't happen until those commanders are prepared to better understand the technology, display a willingness to adjust their own approach to command to better utilize it and demand real increases in effectiveness and efficiency.

Summary

All of this means a significant change in culture and the development of a much higher level of trust amongst the key stakeholders. The CF needs to achieve a greater degree of unity amongst its senior leaders on developing effective and efficient C2 for the CF. It also means a greater level of cooperation across service and functional lines, which ensures that the quality of forces generated will be maintained. And commanders need to develop the CF C2 system to a point that they can truly trust in the technology and reduce their reliance on such people intensive processes.

At the end of the day, the more effective and more efficient "transformed" CF that General Hillier envisaged is achievable and the current resource focus may be exactly the impetus needed to get there. However, the solutions are not to be found in short term structural fixes. They require the unity of the senior leadership in charting a long term course to greater integration and the personal commitment of senior commanders to really change how they command and control.

Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team
Photo Source: www.wikipedia.org

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The Major Commission of Inquiry and 'Connecting the Dots'

Written by:
Eric Lerhe

This June the Major Commission released its report on the bombing of Air India Flight 182. It is a punchy, compelling document that concludes with sixty-four recommendations for improving anti-terrorism coordination, prosecuting terrorists, upgrading aviation security and tracking terrorist financing. It is also the most exhaustive examination ever of our Canadian counter-terrorism capability. I use the present tense here intentionally, as the Commission did not restrict itself to probing our manifestly weak capability in 1985. Rather, this inquiry wisely examined our counter-terrorist capability today and focused its recommendations on repairing what is still a severely compromised security architecture.

I will not attempt to review the entire Commission report in this brief article. Rather, I will focus on what it says about the most central part of any successful counter-terrorist effort – the ability to 'connect the dots.' This term was popularized by the United States' 9-11Commission[1] and referred to the ability to extract relevant intelligence from anywhere in the government on a terrorist activity, see the relationships between its elements and identify the opportunities to defeat it. That report then identified ten "missed opportunities" where, had the CIA and FBI shared data on the 9-11 plotters, analysts may have been able to connect the dots and thwart the attacks.[2]

The Major Commission found precisely the same problem underlay our failure to prevent the bombing of Air India flight 182:

> Various agencies of government had extremely important pieces of information that, taken together, would have led a competent analyst to conclude that Flight 182 was in danger of being bombed by known Sikh extremists.[3]
>
> The institutional arrangements and practices of information-gathering agencies were wholly deficient in terms of internal and external sharing of information, as well as analysis.[4]

The Major Commission's value does not end there. Rather, their report makes clear that cooperation with regard to information sharing remains problematic – protestations to the contrary by the various agencies notwithstanding.

> The strategy adopted for two decades by CSIS and the RCMP when responding to external review has generally been to argue that any problems in interagency cooperation that may have arisen in the past had since been resolved through initiatives that had been implemented to improve cooperation. As revealed by the RCMP's submissions to Rae, the message of "that was then, this is now" was never particularly accurate, despite its repeated invocation. The RCMP explicitly admitted that many of the challenges faced in 1985 still remained in 2005, despite the earlier messages, including that given to SIRC in 1992, that all cooperation problems were resolved.[5]



Air India Flight 182 Memorial
Photo Source: www.wiikipedia.org

The report concludes the problem remains today: " Twenty -four years after the terrorist attack on Flight 182, there

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remains a worrying lack of integration and coordination among government agencies on national security matters." This lack, especially as it relates to information sharing, has also been pointed out by the 2006 Arar Commission, the Standing Senate Committee on Defence and Security in its 2007 report, the 2008 RCMP report on Project SPAWN covering airport security and the 2009 Auditor General's report on intelligence and information sharing.[7]

Having correctly come to the same conclusion on the urgent need for better coordination and information sharing as these other studies, the Major Commission then offers a single surprisingly weak recommendation to address this: that role of the National Security Advisor (NSA) be "enhanced."[8] Regrettably, the report then goes about increasing this senior bureaucrat's responsibilities without giving her any tools to do so. Thus, she is:

> "to supervise and, where necessary, to coordinate national security activities,
>
> to resolve, with finality, disputes among the agencies responsible for national security; and,
>
> to provide oversight of the effectiveness of national security activities."

Yet the NSA is given no legislative or budgetary authority over the agencies she must supervise and oversee other than by benefit of her privileged position within the Privy Council Office and her control of the Communications Security Establishment. Complicating this is the fact that all the key anti-terrorist agencies, CSIS, the RCMP, the Canadian Border Service Agency, were intentionally placed under the legislative and budgetary authority of the Minister of Public Safety in 2003 and 2005 to improve leadership and coordination.

The Major Commission briefly examined the more logical solution of having that minister coordinate security activities and especially those of the RCMP and CSIS but found:

> Both agencies at times seem to be more powerful than their Minister. This is because Public Safety, as a direct descendant of the former Ministry of the Solicitor General, may be seen as insufficiently senior within government to take the lead on complex national security matters.[9]

The logical answer to the cooperation and coordination problem is for the government to assign a more forceful and competent minister rather than to pretend a senior mandarin can "supervise" and "oversee" the work of Ministers and their departments. Thankfully, there is the barest hint that this more sensible route may be taken with the recent announcement that a team of three ministers and not civil servants will be preparing the government response to the Major Report.[10] That report has amply demonstrated national security is a ministerial responsibility that cannot be delegated to the bureaucracy.

[1] United States, *The 9-11 Commission Report-The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States*, at http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/ Accessed 3 Jun 2007.
[2] See chapter 11 and 13 of the 9-11 Commission Report.
[3] Canada, *Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182*, (Major Commission) (Ottawa: PWGSC, 2010), Volume 1, Chap 3, p. 96. at http://www.majorcomm.ca/en/reports/finalreport/volume1/ Accessed 4 Jul. 2010.) A review of the reports pages 91-99 provides detailed case-by-case substantiation of this conclusion.
[4] Major Commission, "Key Findings of the Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182," p. 1.
[5] Major Commission, Vol 1, Chap. 1, p 142-3.
[6] Major Commission, Vol 3, Chap. 2, p. 18.
[7] Canada, *Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar – Analysis and Recommendations, Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar*, 2006, p. 331; Canada, *Canadian Security Guide Book 2007 Edition, Coasts - a Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Defence and Security,* (First Session, 39th Parliament, March 2007), p. 64–65 and Chapter 5 – Problem 7 "Slow Progress in Information Sharing; Canada, *Project SPAWN - A Strategic Assessment of Criminal Activity and Organized Crime Infiltration at Canada's Class 1 Airports*, (Ottawa, RCMP, 10 Dec 2008). p 5, 15, and `16; and Canada, *Status Report of the Auditor General to the House of Commons, Chapter 1, National Security: Intelligence and Information Sharing,* (Ottawa, Office of the Auditor General, 2009), p. 2, 3, 13, 14, 28 and 29.
[8] Major Commission, Vol 3, Chap. 2, p. 47.
[9] Major Commission, Vol 3, Chap. 2, p. 31.
[10] Colin Freeze, "A Damning Indictment of a Broken System," *Globe and Mail,*(18 Jun. 2010), p. A1, A8.

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CDFAI Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute

NORAD of the North

Written by:
George Macdonald

In early June, the Canadian International Council released an innovative report on Canadian foreign policy titled *Open Canada: A Global Positioning Strategy for a Networked Age*. One of the recommendations made by the talented GPS Project panel concerned the expansion of NORAD "for control of North America's Arctic waters and skies".[1] The report explained that we need to be able to monitor what goes on in the Arctic using modern technology, that we cannot do this alone, and that we should exploit the existing NORAD partnership to this end. This makes good sense.

Emphasis on the Arctic has escalated dramatically in the past few years. With a shrinking ice pack, accessibility to the North is increasing and the option of transiting Arctic waters as an alternative to the Panama Canal will eventually become economically attractive, albeit for a short shipping season. Moreover, the region is rich with resources and Canada is reinforcing its claim to them through mapping of the continental shelf and increasing Canadian activity throughout the Arctic. The rehabilitation of the deep sea port at Nanisivik, the acquisition of a fleet of Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships and the establishment of a training facility at Resolute Bay are all initiatives by the Government to strengthen the military presence. Overall, there appears to be general agreement that the protection of Canadian vital interests in the North is dependent on our ability to exercise our sovereignty in the region. This involves an ability to monitor activity through persistent surveillance and to take appropriate action when necessary. While it is unlikely that this will actually result in defending against an actual attack, it could well involve search and rescue operations, policing of Northwest Passage transits, apprehension of polluters and providing security to Northern inhabitants as required.



North American Air Defence Centre
Photo Source: aviationexplorer.com

In 2006, the NORAD Agreement was modified to include the mission of maritime warning, which consists of:

> Processing, assessing, and disseminating intelligence and information related to the respective maritime areas and internal waterways of, and the maritime approaches to, Canada and the United States, and warning of maritime threats to, or attacks against North America utilizing mutual support arrangements with other commands and agencies, to enable identification, validation, and response by national commands and agencies responsible for maritime defense and security.[2]

The Arctic Ocean must surely be considered as a maritime approach to Canada and the United States, even if this is a fairly recent epiphany. Moreover, the sharing of information gathered in monitoring of maritime movements throughout the North, and the warning of any threats, is consistent with the terms of the existing agreement. Conceptually, it would seem, that NORAD operations could be extended to include Arctic waters.

The obvious impediment to this is the difference in points of view regarding the maritime boundary between our two countries in the Beaufort Sea and the recognition of the Northwest Passage as an internal Canadian waterway.[3] Some progress in resolving the former issue has been made, at least in clarifying the positions of each country, the process to follow and a possible compromise solution. The second issue is more

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difficult. Given the fundamental difference of position between Canada and the U.S., the aggressive pursuit of a solution does not appear to be in either's interest.[4] But does this really matter? Why can we not cooperate together to protect our sovereignty and provide security even with these issues outstanding?

For over fifty years now, NORAD has served both partners admirably in executing aerospace warning and control over our airspace, including Northern skies. We have in place an agreement for maritime warning. Although it was intended to address the more traditional approaches to the continent in the Atlantic and Pacific, there is no reason why the same process could not be applied to Northern waters. Binational information sharing and coordination of a response, when necessary, is a core competency of NORAD operations and need not be impeded by the entrenched difference of views regarding maritime boundaries or access. Canada should take the initiative to introduce this extension of NORAD operations into the responsibilities of the current command. There would be limited, if any, demand for resources not already extant, or planned, to carry out these duties. Importantly, agreement to do them will respond to Canada's interests in the North in a timely manner and will further reinforce the value of our binational partnership with the United States.

[1] Canadian International Council, *Open Canada: A Global Positioning Strategy for a Networked Age,* June 2010, p. 60.

[2] Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America On the North American Aerospace Defense Command, signed 28 April 2006, Article 1, para 2b, found at http://bing.search.sympatico.ca/?q=norad%20agreement%202006&mkt=en-ca&setLang=en-CA

[3] The main issue in the Beaufort Sea relates to the projection of the land boundary into Northern waters. The Northwest Passage disagreement emanates from Canada's insistence that these waters are internal to Canada and the US position that they are international waters, connecting two oceans.

[4] The Canadian International Council, *Open Canada: A Global Positioning Strategy for a Networked Age,* June 2010, p. 62 speaks to this. "The two countries would have to agree to forego an all-or-nothing approach in favour of the de facto "agree-to-disagree" policy now in place. Canada understands the U.S. cannot accept the Canadian position because it could form a precedent in the Strait of Malacca off Southeast Asia or the Strait of Hormuz off the Persian Gulf, both critical global shipping routes. Freedom of the seas is critical to U.S. national interests and those of other major maritime nations. The U.S. understands that Canada cannot surrender its claim and has the legal responsibility to ensure the disputed waters are used safely. An agree-to-disagree policy serves the interests of both countries, especially given that neither can be certain how a dispute over the Northwest Passage would play out in an international court. Both risk losing, which is why neither has pressed the point.

LGen (Ret'd) Macdonald retired from the Canadian Forces as Vice Chief of the Defence Staff in 2004. He then joined CFN Consultants in Ottawa where he continues to deal with defence and security issues.

Canada's Post-2011 Commitment to Afghanistan

Written by:
Elinor Sloan

The preeminent consideration in thinking about a potential role for Canada in Afghanistan after 2011 is that instability there remains a security threat to our country. The fact the Taliban provided haven to al Qaeda before the 9/11 attacks clearly demonstrated that disorder in a failed or failing state can create a security threat to other countries, including Canada. This is not always the case. There are many failed states around the world that, while humanitarian tragedies, do not pose a threat to global security in general or Canada in particular. But it is the case with Afghanistan; therefore, it is in Canada's security interest that Afghanistan becomes a stable, functioning state.

Arriving at a stable Afghanistan will ultimately require progress in a whole range of areas, including governance, rule of law and human rights, and economic and social development, but an important prerequisite to any of that is increased security. The Afghanistan compact of 2006 between Afghanistan and the international community placed security first on its list of interdependent pillars of activity. In the short-term increased security will involve a combination of two things: counterinsurgency measures by foreign forces against the Taliban, and indigenous force development. In this latter area, the requirement is for the creation of a professional, well-trained, Afghan National Security Force (ANSF), made up of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). In the long term, the goal is for these indigenous forces to be capable of ensuring security and stability within Afghanistan's borders on their own, thus allowing for the withdrawal of foreign forces.

Canada's role to date

Of these two broad roles, counterinsurgency operations and training indigenous forces, a large part of Canada's effort in Afghanistan to date has been devoted to counterinsurgency. Canada officially has about 2800 personnel deployed in Afghanistan, with the single biggest component being the battle group of about 1,000 soldiers based in Kandahar, conducting counterinsurgency operations. Another 450 personnel are part of the Air Wing at Kandahar airfield, which uses unmanned aerial vehicles and helicopters to support the battle group. Other major units include the Provincial Reconstruction Team of about 300 soldiers in Kandahar City itself, and an Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) of around 200 soldiers that works with the Afghan National Army in Kandahar Province. All told, there are some 300 Canadian Forces (CF) members in the various headquarters in Kandahar and Kabul. The remaining personnel include military police, health services support, and the national support element.



Canadian Troops in Afghanistan
Photo Source: images.theglobeandmail.com

Canada's extensive involvement in the combat aspect of counterinsurgency began after it moved its forces south to Kandahar in the summer of 2005. This was arguably a necessary move because the mission needed to be carried out and Canada was one of only a handful of NATO countries willing to undertake so dangerous an operation. There was at that time a relatively small U.S. military force of about 10,000 troops conducting counterinsurgency operations in the south and east of the country under Operation Enduring Freedom.

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The new circumstances

These circumstances have changed dramatically in recent years. The United States sent an additional 2,000 troops to Afghanistan in 2008 and 22,000 troops in 2009, most of which went to southern Afghanistan, including Kandahar province. The U.S. is now in the process of sending 30,000 more troops, tasked with protecting key cities and towns in the southern and eastern parts of the country, exactly where the bulk of Canada's commitment is located. Logically speaking, then, this could free up the CF to change the nature and location of its commitment. By the end of 2010 there will be 100,000 U.S. forces in Afghanistan, double what there was under the Bush administration. There will also be about 45,000 other allied troops, up from about 38,000 in mid-2010, for a total foreign force level of almost 150,000 troops. The increased force size is good news for stabilizing Afghanistan; it is the sort of commitment that was necessary from the beginning many years ago, "the forgotten war".

"A new mission should be established that encompasses several hundred specialist trainers and advisors charged with training Afghan military and police units."

Apart from increasing the size of its commitment to Afghanistan, the United States has changed its strategy. Last fall General Stanley McChrystal, the former commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, released an assessment that concluded stability in Afghanistan would not come from killing more Taliban fighters, but rather by building up an indigenous capability to secure the country. "A foreign army alone cannot beat an insurgency", was his bottom line. The Obama administration subsequently adopted a plan put forward by General McChrystal to increase the size of Afghanistan's security forces, and this approach remains in place under the new commander, General David Petraeus. Under the plan, the ANA will grow from about 110,000 soldiers at the start of 2010 to 171,600 by October 2011, while the ANP will grow from around 90,000 personnel to 134,000 over the same time period – a roughly 50% increase in the size of the ANSF in the space of less than two years.

The training effort in Afghanistan

All this activity is being carried out by U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, which dates to 2002, and the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan, which was created in 2009 at NATO's 60th anniversary summit. Both commands are based in Kabul, and now form one seamless headquarters. Their mission is to generate and sustain the ANSF, develop leaders and establish an enduring institutional capacity that will enable accountable, Afghan-led security. To this end, it strives to bring ANA soldiers to a capability level, or "milestone", such that they can patrol alongside foreign troops and then transition to being able to conduct independent operations. The ANA, working with the ANP, is to take responsibility for protecting areas that have been cleared of insurgents from being re-infiltrated. At the July 2010 Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan, the Afghan government committed to a phased approach to exercising full authority over its own security, with the goal that by 2014 the ANSF will be able to lead military operations across the country.

Afghan recruits begin the training process by being organized into ethnically balanced training battalions that undergo basic warrior training in Kabul for eight weeks. The best of these go on to undertake up to 12 weeks of advanced training, and the best of those go on to be trained as non-commissioned officers (NCOs) – the sergeants and warrant officers that form the core element of any well-trained army. Soldiers and NCOs then meet up with Afghan officers to form a "Kandak," an Afghan infantry battalion between 600 and 800 troops in size, which at this stage is paired with one of NATO's OMLTs (U.S. versions are called Embedded Training Teams or ETT). For 7 weeks the OMLT, or ETT, mentors the Kandak, a tremendous undertaking when one considers a typical unit comprises only 35 to 40 ISAF soldiers, at the end of which the Kandak, if it achieves the minimum capability milestone, is fielded to one of the Afghan brigades around the country.

Canada plays an important role in this massive training effort. We have a handful of personnel at the combined training headquarters in Kabul and the Canadian OMLT, (noted above, which in practice is broken down into six smaller units, also called OMLTs) first deployed in 2005. NATO's website indicates there are about 150 (25-40 person) OMLTs operating in Afghanistan. Thus, training Afghan security forces is not a new mission for Canada, for NATO or for ISAF as a whole, which includes countries

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like Australia that are not part of NATO; rather, the change lies in the dramatically increased emphasis on training.

A well trained Afghan army is central to the future security and stability of Afghanistan and the Pentagon has concluded that the key to rapidly deploying the Afghan army is to pair newly trained battalions with NATO units. Yet, NATO has struggled to get enough force commitments to undertake this mission with trainers accounting for less than 3% of foreign troops. Estimates are that ISAF needs, at a minimum, an additional 40 military training teams. Notably, these OMLTs need to be made up of troops with the necessary specialist skills to help the ANA rebalance from being an infantry centric force to one that also encompasses specialist skills and an air force. In practical terms, this means that Western soldiers are in less demand than trainers, who are typically at the master corporal, sergeant, warrant officer, captain and major level.

Afghanistan Police
Photo Source: afghanistan.foreignpolicyblogs.com

Canada's opportunity

In thinking about a future mission for Canada in Afghanistan, the government cannot ignore the fact that after almost five years in a war zone the CF's resources, particularly those of the army, are overstretched. There is a need to regroup, bring some of our troops home to train our own new recruits and devote funds to refurbishing or buying new equipment. Continuing on at our current force level commitment is probably not an option. A second domestic reality to consider is that polls indicate a majority of Canadians either want Canada to leave Afghanistan or change the nature of our commitment to one of a less dangerous "peacekeeping" nature.

The new circumstances in Afghanistan create an opportunity for Canada as to what contribution it can make to building stability in Afghanistan. As a participant at the recent Kabul conference, Canada fully supported the Afghan government's objective for the ANSF by 2014. After October 2011 the ANSF will stop growing in size, but it will continue to need training and development for the better part of a decade in order to achieve the level of quality required to truly be a self-sustaining army and air force. The deployment of 300-400 specialist trainers and advisors – engineers, signalers and communicators, logisticians, mechanics, air frame technicians, etc. – would have an impact well out of proportion to the actual numbers deployed. When Canada's current commitment comes to an end, a new mission should be established that encompasses several hundred specialist trainers and advisors located in or near Kabul, charged with training Afghan military and police units over a period of at least three years. Such a mission would be eminently feasible and would constitute a tangible, visible, enduring contribution to Canadian and Afghan security.

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Decline of the American Empire

Written by:
Cameron Ross

Derek Burney, in a recent CDFAI article on Canada-U.S. relations, said that the U.S. "seems to be in a deep funk." While the moods of societies vary over time, the deepness of the current 'funk' is worrisome. Is it the harbinger of the precipitous fall of a great empire? Canada is so tied to U.S. fortunes that the mood swings of our neighbour should be closely watched.

Much has been written about the rise and fall of the American Empire. Contributing factors to the doomsayers' argument are: historic, economic, and political.

Historically, Niall Ferguson cogently argues that great empires do not gradually fade away but disintegrate brilliantly. The Roman Empire collapsed dramatically over a period of a single generation of 50 years. Over that timeframe, the population of Rome declined by three quarters. The 276 year old Chinese Ming dynasty fell in less than ten years. The demise of the 250 year old British Empire started with the loss of its naval supremacy in WWII. Within 10 years, by the 1956 Suez Crisis, Britain had lost almost all of its colonies and its global reach. The downfall of the USSR (questionably an 'empire') was spectacularly dynamic. Realization of a bankrupt regime resulted in the crash of the USSR within five years of Mikhail Gorbachev's assumption of power.

Deeper analysis of these historic examples reveals underlying economic catalysts. Helpful in illustrating this analysis are Thomas Cole's five paintings titled "The Course of Empire" (1833-1836). The 3rd painting "The Consumption of Empire" best describes our current state. Opulence and consumption would be modern day 'tags'. The 4th painting "Destruction" bleakly portrays an Empire's calamitous fall.

The 2nd factor contributing to the fall of an empire is economic. The U.S. deficit in 2010 is forecasted at $1 trillion or 11% of GDP – the highest post WWII. U.S. debt (the accumulation of deficits) is expected to soar to over $14 trillion by 2019 with interest rates rising by then to over 15%. Iraq and Afghanistan wars have amassed a cumulative total expenditure of $1 trillion. Add a BP oil spill and a stimulus package or two, the sums become staggering.

Economists would argue that perceptions count as much, if not more than real monetary figures. U.S. consumer confidence is plunging. Such confidence will be further eroded if the U.S. government does not come to grips with debt management. Credit rating agency, Moody's warned in March that U.S. Treasury Bond ratings may drop to higher risk 'double A' rates. The chorus of reputable investment advisors in the U.S. and Canada to abandon stocks for liquid assets is not comforting news. While U.S. immigration softens the blow the debt burden falls on fewer shoulders, as will the burden of increasing elder health care.

The political factor is arguably the most depressing and the one that will have the greatest impact on consumer/ voter confidence. In the November elections, the Democrats are likely to lose their hold on Congress and the Senate. Although charismatic, President Obama seems to be lurching from one credibility issue to the next; this is a slippery slope. As Rex Murphy poignantly observes, Barack Obama is "rapidly dwindling into a spectator of his own presidency". Furthermore, it is not surprising that consumer pessimism is fuelled by political bipartisanship that is destructively intense. The issue is not just one of personalities. Regulatory oversight failings (BP oil spill) have legitimately questioned the adequacy of the central government. And the problems are not just at the federal level; witness the financial demise of California. As the 15 July Economist proclaims, "Where has all the greatness gone."

The potential demise of the U.S. has several implications for Canada. Foremost are trade, foreign, and defence policies. As a commodity exporter whose dependency on foreign trade is three times the OECD average, we would be wise to diversify as quickly as possible. Appreciating that the future is in Asia, developing west coast terminals for increased commodity exports is vital to Canadian interests and our collective quality of life. Foreign and defence policy must be in lock-step with our national economic interests. Expeditionary activities such as peacekeeping should be pegged in the 'desirable' and not 'essential' category.

Sir John Glubb (Glubb Pasha) reminds us in his excellent dissertation 'Fate of Empires' that the average age of an Empire is about 240 years. If the Declaration of

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Independence of 1776 marked the start of the American Empire, then we have six years left.

Major-General (Ret'd) Cameron Ross is the President of HCR Security International Ltd. Prior to 2003, he served with the Canadian Forces in command and operational appointments, as well as overseas.



The Savage State
Thomas Cole (1833-1836)



The Arcadian or Pastoral State
Thomas Cole (1833-1836)

Photo Source: www.wikipedia.org

The Consummation of Empire
Thomas Cole (1833-1836)



The Destruction of Empire
Thomas Cole (1833-1836)



Desolation
Thomas Cole (1833-1836)

Announcements

Report Urges the Canadian Government to Reevaluate CIDA

In May, CDFAI released a report by Dr.'s Barry Carin and Gordon Smith that contended CIDA suffers from a range of institutional problems, which constrain its ability to deliver aid effectively, flexibly, and in a focused manner. They call for changes to CIDA and new approaches to Canadian development assistance that would focus more on providing incentives to, and encouraging greater competition among, organizations delivering development assistance. Dr. Carin is the Associate Director of the Centre for Global Studies, Director of Globalization and Governance at the University of Victoria, and Dr. Smith is a Senior CDFAI Research Fellow as well as the Executive Director of the Centre for Global Studies and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Victoria. This paper, "Reinventing CIDA" is available for download at www.cdfai.org.

Speakers Series

This year CDFAI will be engaging in two specialized, Calgary based, speakers series. The first focuses on the G8 — G20 and will feature four prominent speakers. The first speaker will be Gordon Smith on September 20, followed by Tom Bernes on November 15, with Paul Heinbecker and Barry Carin following in the new year. This series is being developed in partnership with the University of Calgary's School of Public Policy and Centre for Military and Strategic Studies. The second series will focus on Canada and China. This series will launch on September 27, with Ralph Sawyer initiating the discussion. More details will follow on these exciting events.

China's Strategic Behaviour

In June, CDFAI released a quarterly research paper by Elinor Sloan: "China's Strategic Behaviour". Dr. Sloan is a senior CDFAI research fellow as well as an Associate Professor of International Relations at Carleton University. Her paper assesses China's strategic behaviour and what it means for the United States. As China continues to be referred to as a *Nation on the Rise*, understanding the reasons behind China's military build up is both important and necessary. This paper is available for download at www.cdfai.org.

Staff Changes

CDFAI would like to welcome Lynn Arsenault as the new Administative Coordinator, Sarah Magee as the new Program Coordinator, and Colin Robertson as Vice President based in Ottawa. Sarah will be joining Colin as we work towards creating an Ottawa presence for CDFAI. More details will follow soon on these developments.

CDFAI Senior Research Fellows

DAVID BERCUSON
David Bercuson is Director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary and Program Director for CDFAI.

COLIN ROBERTSON
Colin Robertson is Senior Strategic Advisor for the U.S.-based law firm of McKenna, Long and Aldridge. A former foreign service officer, he was part of the team that negotiated the Canada-U.S. FTA and NAFTA. He is also President of the Canadian International Council: National Capital Branch.

DEREK BURNEY
Derek H. Burney is Senior Strategic Advisor to Ogilvy Renault LLP in Ottawa, Chairman of the Board of CanWest Global Communications Corp, and a Visiting Professor and Senior Distinguished Fellow at Carleton University. He also served as Canada's Ambassador to the United States from 1989-1993.

HUGH SEGAL
Hugh Segal served in the public and private sector for thirty-three years before being appointed by Prime Minister Martin to the Senate, as a Conservative, in 2005. He is an Adjunct Professor (Public Policy) at the Queen's School of Business.

J.L. GRANATSTEIN
J.L. Granatstein is one of Canada's most distinguished historians focusing on 20th Century Canadian national history.

ELINOR SLOAN
Elinor Sloan is Associate Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science at Carleton University, specializing in U.S., Canadian, and NATO security and defence policy. She is also a former defence analyst with Canada's Department of National Defence.

FRANK HARVEY
Frank P. Harvey is University Research Professor of International Relations at Dalhousie University. He held the 2007 J. William Fulbright Distinguished Research Chair in Canadian Studies at the State University of New York (Plattsburg).

GORDON SMITH
Gordon Smith is Director of the Centre for Global Studies, and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Victoria. He is a former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Canada and Ambassador to the European Union and NATO.

MIKE JEFFERY
A retired member of the Canadian Forces and a former Army Commander, Mike Jeffery is a consultant focusing on defence, security, and strategic planning.

DENIS STAIRS
Denis Stairs is Professor Emeritus in Political Science and a Faculty Fellow in the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University. He specializes in Canadian foreign and defence policy, Canada-US relations and similar subjects.

DAVID PRATT
The Honourable David Pratt, P.C. is currently a consultant. He is the former Advisor to the Secretary General and Special Ambassador for the Canadian Red Cross and former Minister of National Defence.

CDFAI Research Fellows

BOB BERGEN
Bob Bergen is Adjunct Assistant Professor, Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary and a former journalist.

JOHN FERRIS
John Ferris is a Professor of History, and a Fellow at the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary. He is a specialist in military and diplomatic history, as well as in intelligence.

AURÉLIE CAMPANA
Aurélie Campana is Assistant Professor in Political Science at Laval University, Quebec City. She holds the Canada Research Chair in Identity Conflicts & Terrorism. She is also a member of the Institut Quebecois des Hautes Etudes Internationals.

BRIAN FLEMMING
Brian Flemming, CM, QC, DCL, is a Canadian policy advisor, writer and international lawyer. He established the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA), and served as its Chairman from 2002 to 2005.

DAVID CARMENT
David Carment is a Professor of International Affairs at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University. In addition, he is the principal investigator for the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Project (CIFP).

ANDREW GODEFROY
Andrew Godefroy is a strategic analyst and historian specializing in Canadian foreign, defence, and technology affairs. He has been a member of the Canadian Army Primary Reserve since 1993 and currently holds the Canadian Visiting Research Fellowship in the Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War at Oxford University.

BARRY COOPER
Barry Cooper, FRSC, is a Professor of Political Science and Fellow, Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary.

SHARON HOBSON
Sharon Hobson has been the Canadian correspondent for *Jane's Defence Weekly* since April 1985. For the past decade she has also been a regular contributor to *Jane's Navy International* and *Jane's International Defense Review*. She is also the 2004 recipient of the Ross Munro Media Award.

DANY DESCHÊNES
Dany Deschênes is an Assistant Professor at L'École de Politique Appliquée de l'Université de Sherbrooke, specializing in international security. He also is a columnist for *Le Multilatéral*.

ROB HUEBERT
Rob Huebert is Associate Director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies and Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Calgary.

MARK ENTWISTLE
Mark Entwistle is currently Vice-President, International and Government Affairs with ExecAdvice Corporation. A former diplomat, he served as Canada's Ambassador to Cuba from 1993-1997 and is a leading expert on Cuba.

ANNE IRWIN
Anne Irwin is an Assistant Professor of Anthropology and the CDFAI Chair in Civil-Military Relations at the University of Calgary. A graduate of the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College's Militia Command and Staff Course, she served in the Canadian Forces Reserves from 1972 to 1987, retiring as a Military Police officer with the rank of Major.

JAMES FERGUSSON
James Fergusson is Deputy Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, and an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Manitoba.

TAMI JACOBY
Tami Amanda Jacoby is Deputy Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies and Associate Professor in the Department of Political Studies at the University of Manitoba.

WHITNEY LACKENBAUER
P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Ph.D., is Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of History at St. Jerome's University. He specializes in Arctic security and sovereignty issues, modern Canadian military and diplomatic history, and Aboriginal-military relations.

ERIC LERHE
Eric Lerhe is a retired naval officer who served as the Commander Canadian Fleet Pacific from 2001 to 2003. Cdr (Ret'd) Lerhe is currently completing his doctoral degree at Dalhousie

GEORGE MACDONALD
LGen (Ret'd) Macdonald retired from the Canadian Forces as Vice Chief of the Defence Staff in 2004. He then joined CFN Consultants in Ottawa where he continues to deal with defence and security issues.

SARAH JANE MEHARG
Sarah Jane Meharg is the Senior Research Associate at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Ottawa and is Adjunct Professor at the Royal Military College of Canada. She is Canada's leading post-conflict reconstruction expert.

ALEXANDER MOENS
Alexander Moens, the author of *Foreign Policy of George W. Bush*, is a Professor of Political Science at SFU and a Senior Fellow at the Fraser Institute in the Centre for Canadian American relations.

STEPHEN RANDALL
Stephen J. Randall, FRSC, is Professor of History at the University of Calgary. He is a specialist in United States foreign policy and Latin American international relations and politics.

CAMERON ROSS
Major-General (Ret'd) Cameron Ross is the President of HCR Security International Ltd. Prior to 2003, he served with the Canadian Forces in command and operational appointments, as well as overseas.

STÉPHANE ROUSSEL
Stéphane Roussel is Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM) and the Canada Research Chair in Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy.

RALPH SAWYER
Ralph Sawyer is an independent historical scholar, lecturer, radio commentator, and consultant to command colleges, think tanks, intelligence agencies and international conglomerates. He has specialized in Chinese military, technological, and intelligence issues for nearly four decades, much of which have been spent in Taiwan, Korea, Japan, China, and Southeast Asia.

RON WALLACE
Dr. Ron Wallace recently retired as Chief Executive Officer of a Canadian-US defence manufacturer. He has worked extensively internationally, including the Arctic regions of Canada and Russia, where he gained experience in northern engineering and environmental research.

MARIE-JOËLLE ZAHAR
Marie-Joëlle Zahar is Associate Professor of Political Science and Research Director of the Francophone Research Network on Peace Operations at the Centre for International Research and Studies at the Universite de Montreal. She is a specialist of militia politics and war economies; she also researches the dynamics of post-conflict reconstruction.

Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute

CDFAI is a research institute focused on Canada's international engagement in all its forms: diplomacy, the military, aid and trade security. Established in 2001, CDFAI's vision is for Canada to have a respected, influential voice in the international arena based on a comprehensive foreign policy, which expresses our national interests, political and social values, military capabilities, economic strength and willingness to be engaged with action that is timely and credible.

CDFAI was created to address the ongoing discrepancy between what Canadians need to know about Canadian international activities and what they do know. Historically, Canadians tend to think of foreign policy – if they think of it at all – as a matter of trade and markets. They are unaware of the importance of Canada engaging diplomatically, militarily, and with international aid in the ongoing struggle to maintain a world that is friendly to the free flow of goods, services, people and ideas across borders and the spread of human rights. They are largely unaware of the connection between a prosperous and free Canada and a world of globalization and liberal internationalism.

In all its activities CDFAI is a charitable, nonpartisan organization, supported financially by the contributions of foundations, corporations and individuals. Conclusions or opinions expressed in CDFAI publications and programs are those of the authors and speakers and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute staff, fellows, directors, advisors, or any individuals or organizations that provide financial support to CDFAI.

CDFAI Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute