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CDFAI Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute

ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE

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

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Article Summaries from the Assistant Editor

Is the Afghan Conflict Spreading to Tajikistan?

Aurélie Campana illustrates that due to the continued conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the surge of violence in Tajikistan has gone largely unnoticed. While the repercussions of this violence are as yet unknown, NATO must remain aware of the situation to prevent upsetting the volatile political climates of Tajikistan's neighbours.

Un investissement méconnu : la réouverture du Collège Militaire Royal de Saint-Jean

Dany Deschênes explains that the main goal of RMC Saint-Jean is to recruit French-speaking officers, provide basic training for post-secondary education and ensure a higher retention of bilingual officers. Deschênes questions if RMC Saint-Jean's status as a post-secondary institution is actually inhibiting its ability to recruit French-speaking officers.

The Challenge of Strategic Planning for Canadian Security: The Naval Example

Denis Stairs investigates the difficulty of comprehensive, long-range security planning specifically in the context of the Navy. He concludes that because of political and economic pressures, as well as the varied priorities of the military, the navy may not get the budget it needs.

Arms and Power

John Ferris considers the proposed purchase of the 65 F-35's, suggesting that new military purchases will be made across the world as states seek to maintain their status, Canada must consider its own military capability, and its priorities, as a middle power.

Are Canadians Becoming "Dogs" in a Northern "Manger"?

Brian Flemming discusses the changing layout of Canada's Arctic sovereignty. He demonstrates that we must start to think strategically about our claims, and interests, in the Arctic before it is too late.

Face-to-Face

Gordon Smith explains the importance of face-to-face meetings at the G8 and G20. This interaction leads to relationships and discussions that cannot be held over teleconferences. Instead, meetings should be arranged that allow for the convenience of leaders to attend and are relatively easy to secure.

DND Policy Censors Scholars

Anne Irwin exposes the Department of National Defence's new contract that stipulates all research must be approved by DND. This practice will discourage unbiased research and confirms the stereotype of the military as a closed and secretive society.

Deception and Intent

Ralph Sawyer infers that Canada's propensity for fair play and equal access approach towards its international relations has resulted in neither, because negotiations and relationships are largely ruled by deception according to Sun Tzu's *Art of War*.

The Sudan: A Test for the West in Africa?

Marie-Joëlle Zahar examines the 9 January, 2011 referendum for the self-determination of the Sudan. This referendum will be pivotal for the state of Sudan, which could be left a failed state, and its relations with the Western World.

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

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Dan Hays has been a member of the Macleod Dixon law firm since his call to the Bar in 1966. He is the current Chair of the firm and has been active in different practice areas, most recently in corporate, commercial and international operations. He was appointed to the Senate of Canada by Prime Minister Trudeau in 1984 and retired from the Senate in 2007.



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General (Ret'd) Henault has a long and distinguished career with the Canadian Forces and is the longest-serving 4-Star General in CF History. From June 2001 to February 2005, Gen. Henault served as Chief of the Defence Staff, a period marked by the highest operational tempo for the Canadian Forces in 50 years including those generated by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

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Message from the Editor-in-Chief

Written by:
David Bercuson

The Canadian government made the right decision in deciding to continue a Canadian presence through a training mission in Afghanistan after 2011, but it made the decision in the wrong way: without a vote of Parliament. Ironically, the Official Opposition Liberal Party was culpable in setting this poor precedent.

With the exception of Canada's declaration of war against Germany in September 1939, Canadian governments never sought Parliamentary approval for the deployment of Canadian troops into war zones from 1945 until 2006. Both the Liberal and Conservative parties followed this practice. Strictly speaking, and in accordance with the written words of our constitution, the executive branch (i.e., the Governor in Council – the cabinet) doesn't need the permission of Parliament to do so. But, participating in a war without the support of Parliament runs the risk that the people of Canada, who not only pay for the war, but send their sons, daughters, husbands and wives into harm's way in fighting that war, will not support the effort with any real degree of enthusiasm, if at all. Put another way, the evolution of Canadian democracy ought to make parliamentary votes on troop deployments to war zones mandatory.

In all of Canada's post-Second World War deployments, governments simply announced the decision to send troops to war. Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent sent Canadian troops to Korea in 1950 in a radio address to the country. There were no votes on any of the peacekeeping missions Canada's troops undertook, even the contentious ones in the Balkans in the 1990s, the 1991 Gulf War or the 1999 air war against Serbia.

The Liberals, under Prime Minister Jean Chretien, introduced the notion of the "take note" debate in the 1990s, when the House of Commons would set time aside from its regular business to have a debate – really a discussion – over a troop commitment already made, but with no vote taken. The first vote on whether or not to deploy troops ahead of the actual deployment took place in March of 2006, when newly elected Prime Minister Stephen Harper called for a vote in the House of Commons over whether or not to extend Canada's mission in Afghanistan to 2008. In 2008, another vote was taken in the House that extended the mission to 2011.

But now there is to be no vote on extending the mission beyond 2011 because, the Prime Minister suggests, the mission will be restricted to training the Afghan Army "behind the wire" and will thus involve no combat. The strong implication is that there is no more need to vote on this "non-combat" mission than there was to deploy troops to Haiti in the aftermath of last January's earthquake.

But there is a very significant difference between the need to act quickly to deploy troops in times of emergencies, either natural or man-made, and the deliberate extension of a mission in a war zone, even if that mission is designated as non-combat. Canadians may not fight in Afghanistan after 2011, but they will be helping NATO and Afghanistan in a fight and they will be living and training in a war zone where they will still be subject to mortal danger. Simply put, the excellent precedent that Prime Minister Harper established in 2006, and reiterated in 2008, is now being undone by he himself.

But the Prime Minister isn't alone in turning the clock back on troop deployment. The Liberal Opposition is going along right with him. In fact, the Liberals themselves mooted the idea of a training mission last summer after Liberal foreign affairs critic Bob Rae visited Afghanistan. This newest mission extension, then, won't be voted on because neither the Liberals, nor the Conservatives, want to test their party's mettle in a House of Commons debate and vote. It's a sweetheart deal all the way.

There is some comfort here for those who believe that Canada has paid too high a price in Afghanistan to simply walk away. Both major national parties are on the same side of the issue and that is good. It would have been even better to see the MPs of both major national parties standing side by side in a new vote of affirmation of the nation's commitment to the cause.

David Bercuson is the Director of Programs at CDFAI, the Director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary and the Honorary Lieutenant Colonel of the 41st Combat Engineer Regiment.

Is the Afghan Conflict Spreading to Tajikistan?

Written by:
Aurélie Campana

As military and political developments in the Afghanistan-Pakistan (Af-Pak) region continue to attract substantial attention in NATO countries involved in the counter-insurgency operation in Afghanistan, the recent upsurge of violence in Tajikistan has gone almost unnoticed. Armed clashes between the Tajik army and Islamic militants, as well as terrorist attacks, have been on the rise. Experts are concerned about this escalation of violence and some even fear the spill-over of the Afghan conflict into this impoverished country. Even though this scenario seems unlikely today, violence will likely continue to mount creating a new zone of instability in the Afghan neighbourhood thereby compromising NATO's Northern Distribution Network that runs through several Central Asian countries including Tajikistan.

Since the end of a five-year civil war between pro-government factions and a loose coalition of nationalist and so-called Islamic groups in 1997, Tajikistan has been living a fragile peace. Beset by ethnic and religious fragmentation, and plagued by endemic corruption, the country has developed into a full-fledged authoritarian state. Its president, Emomali Rahmon, has silenced the opposition with the tacit approval of both Moscow and Washington. But the stability heralded by the Tajik authorities remains elusive and the government control over the Pamir region, an Islamic stronghold bordering Afghanistan, continues to weaken. Since 2009, sporadic violence has given way to more acute fighting between security forces and Islamic militants.

Three interrelated factors explain the recent upsurge of violence. Firstly, the battle for control of the flow of narcotics trafficked through Tajikistan has fuelled social tensions, as well as clan and group rivalries. The 1,300 kilometre-long Afghan-Tajik border, which passes through a mountainous zone, has been almost entirely unguarded since the departure of the Russian troops in 2005. Drug smugglers, as well as militants, easily transit through this porous corridor. Secondly, Tajikistan is highly vulnerable to the developments in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The recent increase of insurgent attacks in the Northern part of Afghanistan caused instability in Tajikistan, while the military operations in Pakistan forced some Central Asian militants, formally recruited by the Taliban, to return home. The resulting expansion of Islamic movements in the region is also connected to a larger insurgent strategy to sabotage NATO supply routes in Central Asia. While terrorist and insurgent attacks are least likely in the stable republic of Kazakhstan, the recent history of violent Islamic uprisings puts Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan at higher risk.

The arrival of an estimated few hundred well-trained, equipped and networked jihadists in Tajikistan may give Islamic groups new momentum in a time when interest in radical Islam is on the rise in Central Asia, particularly in Tajikistan. Underground Islamic organisations professing jihad have adapted their recruiting strategies to capitalize on the social and political frustrations voiced, mainly, by youth who denounce the corruption, growing inequalities and Rahmon's authoritarian rule. The internal political situation in Tajikistan provides the third explanation for the mounting violence. Although, for now, Islamic groups represent a minority of the population, they may emerge as the most credible opponents to the regime that is getting progressively more repressive.

Today, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) certainly represents one of the main threats to stability in the region. This organization, said to be affiliated with Al-Qaeda, since its creation in 1998 was mainly active in Afghanistan under the Taliban regime and in Pakistan after 2001. The IMU has recently redirected a large part of its activities to Central Asia where its leaders, having fought on the nationalist/Islamic coalition side in the Tajik civil war, retained strong connections with the Islamic Tajik networks. In the month of September alone, the IMU was blamed for the suicide bombing of a police station in the city of Khujand and claimed responsibility for the ambush of a military convoy in the Rasht Valley.

While we cannot yet speak of a spillover of the Afghan conflict into Tajikistan, the latter's situation is getting increasingly more complex. Russian and American support for Rahmon has certainly helped him consolidate his grip on power. Nevertheless, this new upsurge of violence highlights the weakness of the Tajik state, as well as illustrating the unforeseen consequences of the Afghan conflict in Central Asia. The intensification of violence may first affect Russia, which is fighting a multifaceted insurgency in the North Caucasus; however, NATO must keep an eye on Tajikistan, which may become increasingly more unstable, upsetting the volatile political climates in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Aurélie Campana is Assistant Professor in Political Science at Laval University, Quebec City. She holds the Canada Research Chair in Identity Conflicts & Terrorism. She is also a member of the Institut Quebecois des Hautes Etudes Internationals.

Un investissement méconnu : la réouverture du Collège Militaire Royal de Saint-Jean

Written by:
Dany Deschênes

Depuis quelques années, le gouvernement conservateur réalise plusieurs investissements majeurs au sein des Forces canadiennes (FC). Reposant sur la stratégie de défense *Le Canada d'abord*, qui se veut un plan détaillé de modernisation des FC, de nombreuses annoncent ont été faites jusqu'à présent. Plusieurs d'entres-elles ont connu un écho important dans l'opinion publique. L'achat du F-35 est le dernier de la liste.

Malheureusement, une décision importante prise par ce gouvernement demeure méconnue du public et j'oserais presque dire au sein même des FC: l'annonce le 19 juillet 2007 de la réouverture du Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean. Inauguré le 28 mai 2008, cette infrastructure éducationnelle de première importance, au sein de l'Académie canadienne de la Défense, représente un outil essentiel pour répondre aux exigences de formation et de leadership que l'on demande aux futurs officiers au regard de la stratégie de la défense formulée dans *Le Canada d'abord*.

"Depuis quelques années, le gouverement conservateur réalise plusieurs investissements majeurs au sein des Forces canadiennes (FC)."

D'une perspective générale, le système des collèges militaires propose des avantages particuliers aux FC. Par exemple, ces institutions sont un l'endroit unique où l'on offre une formation post secondaire aux élèves officiers dans l'optique qu'ils deviennent des militaires de carrière. Plus globalement, on promeut « une vision commune de la profession des armes, de l'éthos militaire commun qui étaye le leadership au sein des FC et de la nature de plus en plus interreliée des opérations ». Ces arguments, tirés du rapport Withers de 1998 sur le futur du Collège militaire royal du Canada, demeurent tout aussi pertinents aujourd'hui.

Or, le collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean répond aussi à d'autres fins. Malgré un cadre sécuritaire différent, les considérations qui menèrent à l'ouverture du Collège en 1952 ressemblent étrangement à celles qui ont poussé le gouvernement conservateur à rouvrir le Collège en 2008 afin de corriger l'erreur de sa fermeture en 1995. L'ambition d'augmenter le recrutement d'officiers francophones; la volonté d'assurer une formation de base nécessaire à la poursuite d'études post secondaires et la capacité de pourvoir à une meilleure rétention d'officiers bilingues de haut niveau sont les principales raisons qui, comme en 1952, ont milité en faveur d'une institution francophone post secondaire. Il n'est pas surprenant qu'à l'annonce de sa réouverture, le Commissaire aux langues officielles, Graham Fraser se réjouissait : «Pendant 43 ans, cet établissement a fourni un excellent milieu d'apprentissage et de formation aux recrues francophones ainsi qu'un environnement d'immersion exceptionnel aux anglophones désireux d'améliorer leur maîtrise du français».

Cependant, il y a une différence majeure entre 1952 et 2008 : le statut éducationnel. En 1952, on mettait sur pied un établissement universitaire tandis qu'en 2008, il s'agit d'une institution post secondaire et de première année universitaire en fonction les différents systèmes d'éducation des provinces canadiennes. Un aspect intéressant de la nouvelle formule est de répondre correctement à différents enjeux. Offerts dans les deux langues officielles, les programmes sont généralement de deux ans et sont constitués, dans la terminologie employée par le Collège, par l'*Année préparatoire* et la *Première année*.

Pour les étudiants du Québec, le Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean est ni plus ni moins qu'un cégep. Les programmes généraux offerts sont ceux de science nature et de sciences humaines. Après les deux années d'études, on peut obtenir un diplôme d'études collégial (DEC) du ministère de l'Éducation, du Loisir et du Sport du Québec dans l'un ou l'autre des programmes.

Pour les étudiants des autres provinces canadiennes, ces programmes de deux ans sont articulés de manière à répondre à des besoins scolaires différents. L'*Année préparatoire* est requise pour ceux et celles qui ont besoin de cours préalables pour être admis directement à la première année universitaire. De son côté, la *Première année*, comme son nom l'indique, est une première année universitaire qui offre les mêmes programmes d'études de première année (universitaire) qu'au Collège militaire royal du Canada à Kingston. Ainsi, des étudiants peuvent être admis sans passer par l'*Année préparatoire* s'ils respectent les conditions d'admission. Comme on peut le

(Continued on page 8)

(Continued from page 7)

voir, cette structuration des deux années au Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean permet d'adapter des réalités éducationnelles différentes sans nuire à l'élève officier.

À mon sens, la réouverture du Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean offre des outils précieux aux FC. Il favorise une standardisation des normes de formation pour les élèves officiers et pour ceux qui le désirent, décerne un diplôme pour des études collégiales (cégep). Il jette les bases de la culture organisationnelle générale des FC et de l'éthos militaire. Comme le souhaitait le responsable des langues officielles, il devrait permettre de répondre avec plus d'acuité aux enjeux du bilinguisme et du fait français, valeur essentielle de l'État canadien, dans les FC.

Malgré tous ces avantages, on se doit de constater, du moins au Québec et je soupçonne que la situation est identique sinon plus prononcée dans le reste du pays, que la réouverture du Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean demeure surtout connue que dans un cercle restreint de personnes. Contrairement à 1952, la réouverture du Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean n'a pas provoqué, jusqu'à présent, un solide engouement parmi les francophones du Québec et des autres provinces canadiennes. Pour ma part je m'interroge sur un point : son offre incomplète au point de vue des études postsecondaires, c'est-à-dire uniquement un niveau cégep dans le cas du Québec et une situation hybride pour les autres provinces canadiennes, et non pas un niveau universitaire complet tel que le Collège l'offrait jusqu'en 1995, est-elle un facteur qui freine un accroissement significatif des élèves officiers francophones? Cette question mérite d'être posée.

Dany Deschênes has been a risk and crisis management consultant since 2010 and currently serves on the Board of Governors of the Collège Militaire Royal de Saint-Jean. He is a former Assistant Professor at L'Ecole de politique appliquée de l'Université de Sherbrooke and columnist for *Le Multilatéral*.

Officer cadets of the Royal Military College Saint-Jean march off the field during Remembrance Day ceremonies at McGill University in Montreal on November 11th
Photo Source: www.globalnews.ca

The Challenge of Strategic Planning for Canadian Security: The Naval Example

Written by:
Denis Stairs

As hardened veterans of strategic security planning exercises understand all too well, their fate is to play a mug's game. The future security environment, after all, is hard to know. At the level of operational specifics it is *impossible* to know and our attempts to predict it are notoriously unreliable. When Canada's defence policy was subjected to fundamental review by the Liberal Government of Jean Chrétien in the middle 1990's, no one would have identified a prolonged intervention in Afghanistan in the early 21st century as a serious prospect, even if they thought such scenarios might be useful 'hypotheticals' for training purposes. Long-range strategic planners are thus condemned to do their job in an ignorance qualified only by a perennially misleading knowledge of the past.

The folk in government who make the final decisions, in any case, are often indifferent to what even the most knowledgeable of their professional advisers have to say and there have been suggestions that this has been especially true of those who run Canada's government now. They are distracted by other things. They have little time to acquire the information upon which considered reflection depends and their minds are frequently cluttered with untutored prior conceptions – conceptions sometimes held so firmly as to shut their thinking down.

Such realities call to mind the wry poem composed by George F. Kennan not long after he left his job in 1949, as the first Director of the fledgling Policy Planning Staff of the US State Department. As he reported in his memoirs 18 years later, he found himself reflecting "on the occasional successes and frequent failures [his] staff had experienced…in its efforts to enrich the intellectual and decision-making processes of the United States government." In so doing, he was led to think of "the bee, planting his pollen here and there, then flying on and never seeing or knowing the fruits of his little labor." With this homely metaphor in mind, he began his poem by addressing his fellow planners thus:

Undaunted drones of the official hive,
In deep frustration doomed to strive,
To power and to action uncommitted,
Condemned…to course the foggy bottoms of the mind,
Unaided, unencouraged to pursue
The rare bloom, the deeper hue,
The choicer fragrance – these to glean
And, having gleaned, to synthesize
And long in deepest reticence to hide…
Until some distant day – perhaps – permitted,
Anonymous and unidentified,
The Great White Queen
at last
to fertilize.

Kennan's offering was not intended as a display of total defeat. There was room for hope, for

…the Great White Queen
Made fruitful by your seed,
[might] yet create
So dazzling and so beauteous a brood
That worlds will marvel, history admire….[1]

Still, this was a far from optimistic assessment of the planning function, particularly coming from the author of the containment doctrine – arguably the single most influential strategic policy rumination in the West during the latter half of the 20th century. It ultimately became *too* influential in fact, for Kennan himself later thought it far too crudely interpreted and far too mindlessly deployed by those who were in charge of making the most momentous of security policy decisions. Ultimately, he believed, it came to have particularly tragic consequences in Vietnam.

The underlying problem, of course, was that the containment analysis could be used to give intellectual cover to any of a wide array of diverse responses to what were perceived as manifestations of an integrated, and centrally orchestrated, Soviet threat. Not surprisingly, decision-makers at the practical level often find strategic doctrines especially helpful when they make room for – well – "flexible response." They make the case without tying the hand.

To repeat, therefore, comprehensive long-range security planning is extremely difficult and in the end it is not even clear that the conclusions that emanate from it are the real

(Continued on page 10)

(Continued from page 9)

drivers of policy at all. They are prone, in any case, to coming after, not before, the guiding facts – or the procurement wish-lists! Hence, the old saw about Generals constantly preparing their charges to fight the last war. They don't, after all, *really* know – not 'for sure' at any rate – what the next war will look like; therefore, they focus, not unreasonably, on the most recent examples. Nor is the tendency confined to the Generals and their staffs. Politicians and pundits alike now commonly assert, for example, that classical inter-state wars are miseries of the past and that even traditional peacekeeping operations in the UNEF mode have become obsolete. Afghanistan, they confidently claim, represents a newer and more complex reality and the only one beyond our own shores that we really have to worry about.

Well…. maybe. But then again, maybe not. Only time will tell.

Whatever the future holds, the relentless persistence of uncertainty ensures that the functions planning documents *actually* perform, intentionally or otherwise, are often very different from the ones we *assume* they perform. For example, they can provide intellectual rationalizations for both general policies and specific decisions (e.g. procurement decisions) that would have been made in any case. In effect, they help policy-makers explain to themselves, and to others, *why* they are doing what they would in fact be doing even in the absence of the considered intellectual explorations that planners are expected to generate.

George F. Kennan
February 16, 1904—March 17, 2005
Photo Source: www.wikipedia.org

That was certainly true of Kennan's 'Containment Doctrine', which Kennan didn't intend as a strategic 'doctrine' in the first place. Instructively in the naval context, it was also true of the famous *Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany,* composed by the British diplomat, Sir Eyre Crow in January 1907. Crowe's argument made an elaborate case for the British attempt to countervail the growth of German naval forces in the early 20th century. The memorandum was in no way responsible for the naval arms race of the period, as so many critics assumed once its existence became publicly known, but it did serve to rationalize British resistance to the growth of German power in coherent – if somewhat self-serving – terms. The Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, found it particularly comforting.

Because they provide rationalizations of this sort, planning documents that are couched at broadly strategic levels of generalization can also be deployed as ammunition, both offensive and defencive, in never-ending battles for resources – battles that may be waged with political leaders, rival bureaucracies, competing services within the armed forces establishment itself and opinion leaders in the public at large. As the post-moderns might have it, they supply a kind of 'discourse' that allows debates over resource allocations to proceed in respectable, intellectual style, even if the practical outcomes are determined largely by other factors.

This argument should not be overdone. Comprehensive planning exercises do have a place in the development of security policy, but the substantive decisions that emerge in the wake of them (or in tandem with them) often have much less to do with the results of intellectual inquiry at the strategic level than with the other forces at work. Prominent among the latter must be counted:

1. the inertias of bureaucracy;
2. the dead weight of past decisions, and the bargains they reflect, in settling the size of the budget, the allocation of resources within it, the scope and composition (in the case of the navy) of the existing fleet, the long-term commitments made to allies and others and all the rest;
3. political circumstances, the ones that change and the ones that don't, both at home and abroad;
4. the impact (on occasion) of the interplay of idiosyncratic personality factors at the top of the political, public service and armed forces hierarchies; and
5. the unnervingly unpredictable effects of what Harold Macmillan once ruefully described as "Events, dear boy, events."

(Continued on page 11)

(Continued from page 10)

The influence of these factors, and others like them, may be especially noticeable in contexts like Canada's. In the first place, Canadians enjoy a very high level of security no matter WHAT they do, not least of all because of the powerful American incentive to protect them whether they like it or not. Happy is (or certainly should be) the country whose supporters of defence spending find it useful to deploy, as a component of their argument, the need for "defence against help" – an assertion we are now hearing yet again as part of the case for acquiring new fighter aircraft.

In the second place, except in a few areas bearing on small-scale security concerns of the purely local sort, Canada is not, and cannot be, the player that determines the security outcome in the end. As a result, the contributions it makes are most often made in tandem with others and with results that can rarely be more than marginally helpful (assuming things turn out well). Being centrally significant is not, as a rule, a likely Canadian prospect.

In these seemingly perennial circumstances, intellectual answers to the questions, *How much should we spend?* and *What should we spend it on?* are indeterminate, or nearly so. The questions themselves, that is, are existential. That being the case, the 'answers' that win the day in concrete form flow more from the interplay of exogenous forces than from thought processes of the kind we associate with enterprises in rational planning.

HMCS Halifax en route to Haiti
in January 2010
Photo Source: www.wikipedia.org

This is true everywhere, albeit in varying degree; however, to repeat, it may be especially true in Canada. The Israelis, to use the textbook countervailing example, have a much harder security time of it and they face much more demanding security challenges than Canadians; and precisely because they do, their decision-makers aren't greatly bothered by the kinds of questions that preoccupy their Canadian counterparts. They are too close to what they regard as their vital operational requirements on the ground to be diverted from a focus on the practical essentials.

Given all this, we should pity the planner. Perhaps we should pity the Canadian planner most of all, even if we have to concede that any 'real world' catastrophe that resulted from planners in Ottawa getting it seriously wrong would probably count for relatively little in the grand scheme of things.

But even if what the planners can reasonably hope to accomplish is tightly limited in practical terms, they still have to do their job. They must think. They must write. They must try to muddle through.

All of that brings us to the dilemma confronting naval planners (among others) in Ottawa at a time when the DND is reflecting on the longer-term evolution of Canadian defence policy. The looming termination of Canada's battlefield commitments in Afghanistan makes their task more urgent. The challenges posed on the one hand by the aging of expensive equipment in all three services, and on the other by the problem of recruiting and retaining highly skilled personnel, make it more difficult. Domestic resistance to the purchase of big-ticket military items, as reflected in the controversy over the recent F-35 procurement announcement for the Air Force, makes it more daunting still. Delays in the planning process have inevitably ensued. But in broad outline, at least, there are increasing indications of what some of the current thinking, moving target though it may be, might look like.

Naval planners seem to be starting from the assumption that the three core tasks of Maritime Command are to defend Canada, to contribute to the defence of North America and to contribute, as well, to international peace and security at large by helping to defend the global system and the regulatory arrangements that are increasingly required to support it. These responsibilities the navy shares with the other armed services and indeed with other departments of government, but its particular environmental responsibility is the sea. The sea is the domain whose peace and security it seeks, with others, to promote. The sea is also the domain within which, and from which, it operates.

There can be little surprise in this three-part categorization of the core strategic purposes of Canada's navy, or indeed of the defence establishment as a whole. The first – the defence of Canada – could go without saying. It *is* the Department of National Defence, after all. The same is true of the second – contributing to the defence of North

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America – although, there is a case for reminding the citizenry from time to time of its importance. Canadians too often fail to recognize that one of the fundamental requirements of Canada's security lies with persuading the Americans that we have the job reasonably in hand. The "defence against help" argument has become a *cliché*, but that's precisely because it's so obviously true. A trifle undignified, perhaps, but it's true all the same.

The third of the three core purposes – contributing to international peace and security at large – could also go without saying, but for a different reason: Canadians have internalized it; it has become a collective habit of mind. Governments display indifference to it at their peril, but while the enterprise may be both morally appealing and very much in our interest, it is not actually *essential* to us at all. We could survive very nicely without it, even if we might not have much cause for being pleased with ourselves if we left the job entirely to others.

"As hardened veterans of strategic security planning exercises understand all too well, their fate is to play a mug's game."

The three core purposes are in any case very familiar. Almost all of Canada's defence policy documents at the strategic level over the years since World War II have made essentially the same points. They have done so, true enough, with minor variations in the ranking and the vocabulary. An additional geographical category, the North Atlantic area, was usually highlighted, for example, during the decades of the Cold War, and for political reasons 'peacekeeping' was occasionally assigned special prominence, but the fundamental structure of the strategic priorities list has been relatively constant throughout. There should be no surprise in this, because the primary determinants of these matters are geographic and geography doesn't change. What really counts in the end, as commercial retailers like to put it, is "location, location, location."

It is true that the practical import of the geographical factor has to be reassessed from time to time in response to technological innovation, notably in transport and weapons systems, but perhaps not so much as we might think. In the inter-war period a population understandably disillusioned by the horrors of World War I was not surprisingly attracted to the notion that Canada was located far away from "flammable materials" and protected from them on three sides by oceans and on the fourth by a friendly great power. We think differently now, but the years between the wars may have been the aberration and even then the proposition was ultimately proven wrong. Certainly it seems unlikely that General Montcalm ever thought of the Atlantic Ocean, two-and-a-half centuries ago, as a shield that protected New France from events on continents far away. From his point of view, thinking of the sea as a roadway crowded with predatory highwaymen in British clothing might have been closer to the mark.

Debating points aside, the important point to notice about the three strategic priorities is not so much that they are the familiar outcome of the application of geopolitical premises to the Canadian case. It is, rather, that they are true to their *genre* in leaving room for just about anything; therefore, for the planner, the serious intellectual action really has to take place at lower levels of abstraction.

None of this is intended as criticism. Arguments have to be "set up," or "framed," as the current jargon has it. Planners are tied to practical affairs, but in starting their work, they still have "to get ready, to get set, to go." Their primary objective is not, in any case, to be original. Their primary objective is to be relevant, and persuasive, from the standpoint of the apparatus they serve.

In the context of security policy planning, moving down the ladder of abstraction in pursuit of practical relevance takes the analyst next to an assessment of conditions in the international environment. The general thrust of naval thinking at the moment is focused, to some extent, on evolving hazards close to home (as in the Arctic, for example), but it also takes note of the intensifying need for the construction and enforcement of effective regulatory regimes in areas overseas (areas in which commercial shipping is being disrupted by piracy come readily to mind). Hence there is an emphasis on protecting a "regulated ocean commons."

Similarly, the now quite long-standing argument that the security and prosperity of Canada at home depend in part on the general welfare of societies abroad, feeds into the proposition that naval forces can make major contributions in the form of disaster relief, humanitarian assistance and other development-related activities as ingredients of military diplomacy. In some situations, maritime forces can also play a role in conflict prevention and, in the final resort, they may be required to participate in combat operations to secure control of the sea approaches to conflict zones, to project power ashore, to provide surveillance and other intelligence services, and so on.

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There is no reason to quarrel with this description of what is happening in the world and it has two implications that may be of particular relevance to the naval interest. The first is that it helps to sustain the argument that Canada needs a navy that is capable of operating anywhere around the world. The second is that it feeds harmoniously into the dominant Ottawa consensus, which is that future overseas security challenges will be multi-dimensional and hence will require a co-operative "whole-of-government" response.

With the possible exception of small-scale challenges very close to home none of the naval undertakings that are being identified with developing trends in the international environment are enterprises that can be successfully accomplished by Canadian forces alone. In many situations, there may be little prospect of their being successfully accomplished at all. The dilemma raised by the question of how much in concrete terms we should actually be doing, therefore, remains unresolved by the environmental analysis.

Having said that, the analysis does have an impact on – or at least it coincides with – the kind of wish-list that uniformed naval authorities, unless inhibited or pre-empted by exogenous forces, might like to propose to the political leadership. The list would rest on the fundamental notion that Canada should maintain a capacity in the maritime environment (as in others) to respond to a wide array of different eventualities, that it be able to do this simultaneously at home and abroad, and that, in addition, it have a task group at the ready for dealing with unexpected, but important, contingencies. Such a capability connotes the maintenance of a balanced, multi-purpose fleet. In the time-frame of the next two decades, this would require building on the platforms already envisaged in the *Canada First* Defence Strategy, a strategy that entails the modernization of the *Halifax* class frigates, the construction and deployment of a new fleet of ships designated specifically for Arctic Offshore Patrol, the acquisition of new Joint Support ships and the eventual replacement of the current *Victoria* class submarines. At the same time a design process would be launched for the development of a fleet of flexible, multi-purpose, Canadian Surface Combatants intended as replacements for the modernized frigates as the extended shelf-life of the latter comes to its final end in the 2030s and 2040s. The Surface Combatants would incorporate enhanced technologies affecting propulsion systems, precision weapons and guidance systems, surveillance and communications capabilities and all the rest. More radically, they would also be constructed in a flexible, 'plug-and-play' modular style that would permit their primary functions to be re-arranged in relatively short order, depending on the kinds of missions assigned to them at any particular time.

The practical implications of all this obviously include an ever-increasing dependency on technologically sophisticated and highly trained crews whose skills are certain to be very attractive to labour markets in the private sector. Hence, there will be no escaping the need to enhance the navy's terms of employment. Quality costs.

Assuming the architectural and engineering requirements are feasible, this kind of vision is immensely attractive because it comes closest to dealing with the central dilemma of naval planners – namely, that they do not know, and cannot know, what specific security challenges are really coming down the pike. All they can know with confidence is that challenges there will surely be. It follows that Maritime Command will need, as always, some countervailing instruments in its toolbox. These, in turn, need to be rendered as versatile as possible, given the resources that will be made available.

But the resources may be the rub.

That's because "events", political and economic events most of all, may ensure that the navy won't get the budget it needs if it is to acquire and deploy the flexible but expensive tools it would like to have.

Pity the planner.

[1] George F. Kennan, *Memoirs: 1925-1950* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), pp. 469-470.

This article has been adapted from a panel presentation at the Security and Defence Forum Fall Annual Conference hosted by Dalhousie's Centre for Foreign Policy Studies in Halifax on October 1-2, 2010. The conference dealt with the question, *Is There Life Abroad after Afghanistan? The Future of Canadian Expeditionary Operations*.

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Arms and Power

Written by:
John Ferris

Canadians are debating whether F-35 Joint Strike Fighters must be purchased to replace aging CF-18s, so to preserve our sovereignty and policy. Some commentators have turned the debate into comedy by arguing that the purchase is needed to protect us from 50 year old Russian bombers, or that it will cause an arms race across the Arctic. None of them has put the issue in its real context, as part of the biggest development affecting military power on earth. In 2010, states confront a strategic dilemma: the need to purchase new equipment so to counter the rust-out of old and to handle great programs of rearmament formulated during boom time within the tight budgets bequeathed by the bust. Only some states will succeed in this task. Talk is cheap, weapons are not. Will is rare.

During the 1990s, states across the world cashed a peace dividend, stretching the age of weapons and minimizing procurement. Their equipment moved toward obsolescence all at the same time. By 2001, the need to replace clapped out kit loomed across the earth, but defence budgets then jumped for other reasons. Western states almost doubled their military spending between 2000-2008, while that of China trebled and Russia's rose by 25% in 2008 alone, though most of that increase was lost to inflation or operational costs. Even during those years governments were shocked to find how so much could buy so little. Navies and air forces were in crisis, as numbers of personnel and kit plummeted to allow recapitalization. Western ones had to explain why they needed new equipment, when they already had the world's best, and threats were so weak and so far away. The USN, a vaunted 600 ship navy in 1989, has 300 in 2010. Since 2001, the USAF has slashed personnel to produce tiny numbers of its next two generation of fighters, the F-22 and F-35 — 183 F-22s have eliminated 20,000 airmen, almost 10% of its personnel. These pressures drove western states to develop aircraft by international consortia, including the F-35. Washington's refusal to take that step with the F-22, so to maintain the secrecy of stealth technology, shaped its astronomical unit cost of $339,000,000 per aircraft, ten times that of current estimates for the F-35. For similar reasons, to create budgetary space for capitalization, between 1990-2009, Russia cut its army by 70%, to 500,000 men, as China did its army by 20% and its air force by 50%.

Major states announced ambitious programs of rearmament. Most had only just begun when the recession struck. Since 2009, military budgets across the world have fallen taking ambitions with them. Despite strenuous opposition from the USAF, defence contractors and politicians, the Pentagon closed the production line for F-22s. The greatest casualties, so far, are the policies of the second ranking military powers in the west, Britain and France. Britain, locked by unbreakable contracts into completing two 60,000 ton aircraft carriers, plans to do so by eliminating half its surface warships and every naval fighter before completing the first carrier, operating QUEEN ELIZABETH only with helicopters and selling it as soon as the sister is complete; and only then, in 2020, having a carrier with fighters. Meanwhile, it will enter a condominium with France, which also has gutted its naval

CF-18 over CFB Bagotville
Photo Source: www.wikipedia.org

program, where each state will own a single carrier, and share one whenever the other is being refitted, with the owner having right of veto over any action it might undertake. These arrangements, while creative, will be hard to handle. Even if they work they signal a reduction by half of the conventional forces that France or Britain can project beyond Europe.

Over the next decade, a struggle will occur between the economic power and political will of major states, embodied in procurement; the outcome will be measured in the

(Continued on page 15)

(Continued from page 14)

quantity and quality of conventional forces. The only safe bets are that the United States will remain the greatest of great powers, that China will rise in relative strength, perhaps ten years faster than anyone might have predicted in 2007, and that any country that fails in rearmament will fall in power, which many will do. Thus, Russian rearmament programs may produce just another Potemkin village. The efforts of states to achieve these ends, and their success compared to their rivals, will add uncertainty to the world order. Nothing quite drives a state toward desperation than fear that it is declining while a rival is rising.

These developments make Canada an odd duck - a growing military power. We have avoided the dilemma confronting other states, because of the sobriety of our financial and defence policies, for the past generation. If we were to adopt the military policy propounded even by the NDP, and merely retain our present capabilities, we will be one of the few powers able to project power beyond its borders. If, as the Conservatives and, probably, the Liberals, want, we do buy 65 F-35s, we will become a bigger airpower than ever since 1965. Our debate about military procurement has focused on the Arctic and defence against aid, when the point is that we will have more power than we know what to do with; or, on the assumption that F-35s are needed to participate in some international coalition, when we will be stronger and most of our hypothetical allies weaker than today. In fact, all we need in order to be a medium sized world power until 2050 is an aircraft carrier; oddly enough, one may be available at a fire sale across the water. We might think about the consequences: with middle power, comes great responsibility.

An F-35 Lightning II, marked AA-1, lands
At Edwards Air Force Base, California
Photo Source: www.wikipedia.org

"Talk is cheap, weapons are not. Will is rare. With middle power, comes great responsibility."

John Ferris is a Professor of History, and a Fellow at the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary. He is a specialist in military and diplomatic history, as well as in intelligence.

Are Canadians Becoming "Dogs" in a Northern "Manger"?

Written by:
Brian Flemming

One of Aesop's famous fables is that of the dog in the manger. The dog that cannot eat straw refuses to give it to a starving donkey that *can* eat it. The moral of the story is: don't hang onto things that can benefit others, but that you cannot, or will not, use yourself. This country's everyone-is-out-of-step-but-our-Johnny claim to the Northwest Passage (NWP) may be turning Canadians into "dogs" in a "northern manger".

There is no doubt when the NWP was frozen solid year-round that Canada's claim that the passage was inside our internal waters made sense. The counter-claim by the majority of the world – notably the US and the EU – that the NWP was an international strait, open to innocent passages by warships or commercial traffic, was then faintly ridiculous.; however, today with the rapid melting of the northern ice and, soon, even the entire Arctic Ocean, it may be time to re-visit the wisdom of our claim. As John Maynard Keynes famously said: when the facts change, I change my mind. Well, the facts are changing very quickly. A change of the Canadian mind may be in order.

"Canada must now think about abandoning its lonely claim to the NWP in return for international cooperation in opening and managing the passage"

Prime Minister Stephen Harper has, laudably, put Canada's north high on his agenda and has shown his commitment by going north personally each year for the past few years. But his policies have largely left the future of the NWP out of the discussion, other than to re-assert our claim to the waters of the passage. The summer of 2010 was an embarrassment for that claim. Of the two dozen or so ships that attempted a full, or partial, passage through the NWP this year, three ran aground. Poor charts were blamed. Ottawa has been slow to promise better charts.

All government charting efforts today are focussed on surveying the Arctic seabed in preparation for the formal claim Canada must make by 2013 under the Third United Nations' Law of the Sea (UNCLOSIII) treaty to the northern continental shelf. Meanwhile, the Northern Sea Route (NSR) over the top of Russia has seen commercial ships begin to transit that passage. The wild card in the northern navigational picture is that the entire Arctic Ocean appears to be opening at an unforeseen pace. Some scientists predict the Arctic Ocean will be open six months out of the year by 2025, or earlier.

The Great Recession has foreclosed, for the foreseeable future, any prospect that Canada could make a deal with the United States to share in the costs of putting navigational aids along the NWP and to help Canada to manage the passage. The possibility of other developed countries, other than Russia, helping us is also fading. Only emerging powers, such as China, may possess the financial wherewithal, and the political will, to join with Canada in developing the NWP as a serious shipping corridor. Indeed, in March of this year, little noticed by the Canadian press and the public, Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo said China should, because of its large population, have a significant share of the Arctic Ocean and its resources, regardless of what the UNCLOSIII treaty says. That is a claim Canada cannot ignore, but one that may offer opportunity.

Other Asian powers such as Japan and India may be willing to help Canada pay for sophisticated NWP navigational systems, but, perhaps, only if they are granted privileged access to the vast energy resources in our North, including the fabulous possibilities for exploiting our methane hydrates; however, a Canadian rethink of its Arctic policies might proceed, there is no question, at present, that the NSR is well ahead of the NWP in its quest to become a viable international passage as the ice in the Russian Arctic melts as quickly as Canada's, but overhanging the northern navigational futures of both the NWP and NSR is the melting of the entire Arctic Ocean.

If melting proceeds, at the rapid rate claimed by some reputable scientists, it may be a foolish expenditure of scarce Canadian tax dollars to install expensive navigational systems, and to chart better, the NWP at a time when both the NWP and NSR could be put out of business by future passages through the high seas of the Arctic Ocean for much of the year. Going from the Atlantic

(Continued on page 17)

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Ocean to the Pacific, or vice versa, via an over-the-top, North Pole route may be much safer, and more insurable for commercial ships than trying to transit the tortuous passage of the NWP.



Northwest Passage
Photo Source: www.athropolis.com

The facts in the North are changing, fast. However reluctantly, Canada must now think about abandoning its lonely claim to the NWP in return for international cooperation in opening and managing the passage. Such help may have to be tied to preferential access to energy resources in Canada's north. Indeed, if Canada does not start to seriously consider altering its increasingly out-of-date policy on the NWP, Canadians may wind up looking like foolish 21st century dogs in the manger.

Brian Flemming, CM, QC, is a CDFAI Fellow and an Honorary Fellow of Dalhousie's Schulich School of Law's Marine and Environmental Institute. He advised the Canadian government at the Third UN Law of the Sea Conference.



Face-to-Face



Written by:
Gordon Smith

Unsurprisingly, after $1 billion, give or take, was spent on two summits in Canada last summer people have questioned whether we really need such events. Can't leaders just talk on the telephone, or by video over the Internet? Aren't these events just photo-ops and security nightmares? Instead, maybe the leaders could get together for a few hours when the General Assembly of the UN meets every September.

This article will argue that face-to-face meetings of leaders matter. Indeed, they are essential in a world without world government, but with substantial and growing interdependence, not to say mutual vulnerability. Government leaders need time together, some of which is, and ought to be, devoted to eating and drinking together. It is helpful that their spouses get to know each other. This helps personal relationships develop. Pleasant surroundings make a difference.

I base my argument primarily on my time as a Sherpa, or Personal Representative, of the Prime Minister, in my case with Prime Minister Chretien in 1995, 1996 and 1997. Canada hosted the G7 summit in 1995 in Halifax. President Chirac hosted the next summit in 1996 in Lyon. The third summit, known as the Summit of the Eight – as distinct from the G8 – as the G7 was not quite prepared at that point to have Russia as a full member, was held in Denver.

I also worked for Prime Ministers Trudeau and Mulroney, and they were equally masters of cultivating personal relationships amongst leaders. All three former Canadian leaders knew how to "work" an international conference room. Since leaving Ottawa in 1997 I have continued to work on summitry and, in particular, Paul Martin's idea that there should be G20 summits at leaders' level. I believe, therefore, that what I write in this article still applies.

The mandate of a Sherpa in the summit context includes both the capacity to find the right path on substantive issues and, critically for summits if they are to succeed, for the Sherpa to know the mind of their leader. Sherpas prepare meetings. They need to know when to push and when to make concessions. They draw up agendas, negotiate as much as they can what leaders will confirm at the summit and brief their leaders repeatedly on the lead-up to the summit and at the actual event. Indeed, the Sherpas are generally "in the room", although not at mealtime when the leaders are on their own. (This can lead to a degree of nervousness amongst Sherpas, something not unknown to the present author.) For it all to work, Sherpas must develop chemistry amongst themselves.

The purpose of summits is to help break global deadlocks by finding ways of working together, agreeing what can be agreed and trying, at least, to understand the position of others when no agreement is possible. To do this one needs perspective; one needs to understand what lies behind the position of others. Indeed, one needs to develop a degree of empathy. One needs to understand where others are coming from on a particular issue. Frames of reference differ from state to state.

Leaders see each other as equals, in the sense that in their government there is only one leader and it is them. They enjoy talking about their cabinet colleagues (as I am sure their cabinet colleagues like to talk about their leaders). They compare notes.

What this means is that, in my experience, leaders enjoy (and more importantly benefit from) "hanging out" together. The benefit comes in their ability to solve problems that their ministers and their officials cannot solve. A great deal of tacit bargaining goes on and some explicit bargaining too: "If I do this for you, could you do this for me?" Of course, the understandings are rarely that explicit.

The point is they have to know each other in order to understand each other and they can only resolve big problems, or better work together to keep problems small, if they understand each other well. Leaders are politicians (even from non-democratic countries). They like to deal with others directly and they do so by obtaining the measure of their counterparts.

As mentioned above, when I was directly in this business, Russia was coming in to the fold, gradually. Strobe Talbott, now President of the Brookings Institution, has written a superb book, *The Russia Hand*, which details the relationship between presidents Clinton and Yeltsin. The way in which the former played the latter, using as bait

(Continued on page 19)

(Continued from page 18)
membership in the summit, is fascinating. It took at least five years from the first appearance of President Gorbachev at a summit (Naples) to full membership and even then G7 finance ministers continued to meet without their Russian counterpart.

It would be a mistake to think that summit discussions, at least in my experience, go through the agenda from top to bottom. Rather they focus on points that remain to be resolved and give leaders an opportunity to look forward. The great bulk of the communiqué, or whatever the final document is called, will never be discussed at all. That is what Sherpas (and in the case of the G20, Ministers of Finance) are for. I have never heard a leader complain that there is nothing for them to do because all the problems have been resolved!

G8 Dinner
Photo Source: www.guardiian.co.uk

It is also my experience that leaders like to talk about, and will talk about, whatever is on their mind. Events of the day can, and do, trump formal agendas. I remember well in Halifax at a dinner (no Sherpas around) when President Chirac embarked with his counterparts on drafting a United Nations Security Council resolution on Bosnia. My Japanese colleague exploded at the Sherpa dinner table. How could my French colleague allow this? What were other leaders thinking when they joined in? We did our best to explain that our leaders did not seek an inter-departmental consensus before taking an initiative.

Personalities and relationships are critical amongst leaders, as they are for people in every day life. Some people are easy to get along with and some aren't. Sometimes there is good chemistry and sometimes there isn't. In some ways culture is important – calling each other by first name is an example. In some cultures it is difficult. Of course speaking English is a big advantage, but really good interpretation can work quite well. For it to work it must be in real time, which is difficult, particularly in informal settings like dinner, and of very high quality, but still, something is lost.

Although not dealing with modern summitry, the best description I have read of the interaction amongst leaders and officials is in the superb Margaret MacMillan book, *Paris 1919*. She provides a wonderful analysis of personalities and their interrelationships. Too often this kind of rich analysis is not found in the literature. Yet to understand outcomes, good and bad, the interaction amongst leaders, their hopes and fears, their power and weaknesses, are of critical importance.

Therefore, let's not throw out the baby with the bath water. Let's ensure that there are future summits, but in locations that are easily secured (and don't involve a physical move by everyone in the middle). Or, do it in New York in September, as Paul Heinbecker has recommended in his new book *Getting Back in the Game*. But if it is in New York, a couple of hours, or even a day, won't do it. Leaders need time together, time to get to know each other. This obviously takes longer and is much more complicated when summits are of twenty plus leaders.

There is an enormous challenge in going from a G8 (that in fact had nine or ten leaders present, thanks to the arrangements to suit the European Union) to a G20 (that in fact in Seoul will again have other leaders invited, not to mention the heads of various international organizations). It will be critical, if summits are to work as they have with smaller numbers in the past, for there to be no prepared statements and for the discussion to be just that, a discussion. Certainly the dinners cannot be the same – there is no hope of a single discussion with 25 people around one (or several) tables. As there will be several meals, at least the seating plan can be varied.

The larger number of countries participating points to the need for longer meetings, probably ranging over three days. The reality is that this in turn will (or should) mean fewer summits, and is another argument for fusing the G8 into the G20, and incorporating summits on security or climate change into the G20.

We know in our own lives how important personal relationships are. Face-to-face contact matters. We should not be surprised that it matters for leaders as well.

Gordon Smith is Director of the Centre for Global Studies and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Victoria. He is a former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Canada and Ambassador to the European Union and NATO.

DND Policy Censors Scholars

Written by:
Anne Irwin

Almost every time over the last two decades that I have presented my research with the Canadian Forces in an academic, or public, setting someone in the audience has asked me what sort of censorship or restrictions on publication were imposed by the Department of National Defence. So far I have been able to say that, although I understood myself to be subject to the Official Secrets Act and that my research proposal had been reviewed, no one had placed any restrictions on the publication of my findings. This was true as well for all the graduate students whose research with the Canadian Forces I supervised. A new policy imposed by the Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis changes this and imposes dangerous restrictions on academics doing research with military personnel.

All external academics applying to conduct research involving CF personnel must now sign a contract prior to beginning the research that stipulates:

> "no papers, articles and/ or conference presentation will be published without the DND sponsor's prior review. Furthermore, [the applicant agrees] that DND/CF reserves the right to insist on clarification/amendment/change of any factual detail of the paper that could harm the Department/CF were it allowed to be published as presented. I also agree that DND/CF reserves the right to insist on discussion/presentation of alternative interpretations of results as it considers necessary/appropriate."

"This is a dangerous and unacceptable policy that will deny both the military and the Canadian public the benefit of unbiased scholarly research."

This is a dangerous and unacceptable policy that will deny both the military and the Canadian public the benefit of unbiased scholarly research. Any scholar publishing research on the Canadian Forces should now include a disclaimer that the article has been reviewed and approved by the DND/CF, which will confirm the perceptions many Canadians have of the military as a closed and secretive society and will jeopardize the credibility of any published research.

Photo Source: www.anzacsite.gov.au

For at least the past five years there has been a requirement for scholars wishing to conduct research with military personnel to submit a research proposal to a technical and ethical review by the DND / CF Social Science Research Review Board (SSRRB). This is reasonable and responsible and no academic would consider this to be out the ordinary. Although it was an unwieldy process and one that was biased against qualitative research, and particularly unwelcoming of the type of ethnographic research that I and my students do, it was not impossible to get through and, despite the frustrations, all of my students were finally approved to conduct research, although all of them were required to make some alterations to their research designs. The process does ensure that all research conducted by external scholars is valid, reliable and of value to the DND/CF. It also protects the welfare of the subjects of the research.

External applicants have also been required to submit copies of published findings. This is also reasonable and responsible. It meant that the DND/CF would reap the benefit of any research that they had authorized and it gave the Department the opportunity to rebut publicly any findings that they disputed. The Department's research scientists and internal scholars are well able to write

(Continued on page 21)

(Continued from page 20)

critiques of research findings whose facts, or interpretations, they dispute.

Photo Source: From the website, www.visitarea51.com

During the 1990s, when I began doing anthropological research with the Canadian military, there were no policies in place to review external research proposals, or to submit research findings to the DND Yet, this was the infamous "decade of darkness" when the DND was under intense scrutiny by the media and was wary of outsiders. It is terribly ironic that the DND/CF is now instituting censorship of independent research just when claims are being made about a more open and less defensive military.

This policy is a dangerous blow to open and honest civil-military relations in Canada. All external research with the CF will be suspect of having been altered by the Department. The policy will further discourage independent, unbiased, research. It will confirm the stereotype of the military as a closed and secretive society and it will deny to the military, and the Canadian public, the benefit of scholarly research on the Canadian military. It is to be hoped that this new policy is not evidence of a retrogressive move back to the secretive days of the 1990s, when, paradoxically, there were fewer restrictions on independent research.

Anne Irwin is an Adjunct Assistant Professor of Anthropology at the University of Calgary and was the university's first CDFAI Chair in Civil-Military Relations. A graduate of the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College's Militia Command and Staff Course. She served in the Canadian Forces Reserves from 1972 to 1987, retiring as a Military Police officer with the rank of Major.

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Deception and Intent

Written by:
Ralph Sawyer

History has repeatedly proven the North American penchant for trusting others, for deeming people truthful and nations credible, painfully fallacious. Moreover, contrary to common belief, deception has been successfully practiced for millennia in Western civilization, often with astonishing success, and the populace continues to be almost incessantly entangled by fraud and inundated with misinformation. Nevertheless, deception continues to be disdained in Canadian and American military affairs and disparaged in their practice of international relations.

The antique military writings of Frontinus and Polyaenus, both devoted to stratagems rather than strategy or tactics, encompass hundreds of examples of deception culled from Greek and Roman conflict. Even though they initiate a tradition that continued through tenth century Byzantium, was later revived by Machiavelli, and achieved perfection with operation Fortitude prior to D-Day, Western theoretical discussion has been inexplicably lacking. In contrast, stratagems and deception have always been crucial factors in Chinese military practice, as well as core components of traditional martial thought and state practice.

Highly authoritative, contemporary PRC military and political science writings continue to deem deceptive measures applicable in all realms, particularly business and international relations. Desirable effects include causing errors in anticipation, assessment and planning; misdirecting and obfuscating so as to create opportunities for surprise and unorthodox attacks; enervating and frustrating, compelling the enemy to waste resources while eroding spirit and will; and maximizing gains while minimizing losses, essentially through wisdom and techniques rather than force and clashes.

The first articulation appears in the infamous *Art of War*, a work probably compiled in the fifth or fourth century BCE that, while traditionally attributed to Sunzi (Sun-tzu), reflects a lengthy heritage of combat experience and contemplation: "Warfare is the Tao of deception. Thus, although you are capable, display incapability. When committed to employing your forces, feign inactivity. When your objective is nearby, make it appear distant; when far away, create the illusion of being nearby."

Sunzi's pronouncement initiated unremitting efforts to conceptualize and apply deception to warfare, many of which are preserved in China's copious military writings. Essentially adopting a case study approach, from the Tang dynasty onward, martial texts frequently illustrated their theoretical discussions with examples of successful historical practice. Methods thought to be particularly effective include appearing incompetent; feigning chaos and disorder; fostering arrogance and disdain; and adversely affecting assessments and causing misperceptions, including through disinformation, whether broadly disseminated or planted by Sunzi's "dead" agents.

However, being extremely plastic, no single approach or measure was ever mandated for any particular situation. For example, concealment is a fundamental technique and masking strength and thereby surprising the enemy, competitors, or even partners conveys obvious advantages, but creating the illusion of much greater power, magnifying strength to overawe or cower, is sometimes more effective, particularly in non-combat situations. Conversely, hiding weaknesses and vulnerabilities such as sickness, fewness of numbers, loss of morale and lack of supplies, has invariably been considered crucial in warfare, business and international relations, yet a façade of weakness can be exploited to unexpectedly catch the enemy unprepared.

Although secrecy makes deception possible there is an inherent, though not always visible, reciprocal relationship because deception preserves secrecy. According to the ancient, but still much quoted Chinese military writers, secrecy results in being formless and unfathomable, being "inscrutable," a characteristic long (and now politically incorrectly) ascribed to Orientals in general, though primarily out of complete ignorance of their language and culture. Thus Sunzi concluded: "The pinnacle of military deployment approaches the formless. If it is formless then even the deepest spy cannot discern it or the wise make plans against it." Two centuries later the *Six Secret Teachings* asserted: "In employing the army nothing is more important than obscurity and silence. In planning nothing is more important than not being knowable. The greatest affairs are not discussed and the employment of troops not spoken about." Accordingly, calls from the US for "transparency in PRC military affairs," as in the much

(Continued on page 23)

(Continued from page 22)
delayed 2010 Pentagon report on Chinese military power, are naïve if not laughable.

Over the centuries more abstract formulations of the inter-relationship of secrecy and deception would appear, including this enigmatic passage from the *Taipai Yinjing*:

> "Those who excelled at employing the army could not have achieved victory nor engaged in battle without deceit and subterfuge. Plans are concealed in the mind but affairs are visible in external traces. One whose thoughts and visible expression are identical will be defeated; one whose thoughts and visible expression differ will be victorious. When your mind is filled with great plans, display only minor concerns. When your mind is planning to seize something, feign being about to give something away. Obscure the real, cast suspicion upon the doubtful. When the real and doubtful are not distinguishable, strength and weakness will be indeterminable. Be profound like the Mysterious Origin free of all images, be an abyss like the unfathomable depths of the sea."

Soaring into even more esoteric, but still much pondered realms, a later enunciation concluded that "shadows have shadows within them, but shadows also have reality within them. Within the real there are shadows, within the real there is reality. Thus reality and shadow complete each other, ever attaining the inexhaustible." Nevertheless, deception has always been thought to be most effective when it accords with expectations or desires and therefore seems plausible, extreme tendencies to imaginative creations being scrupulously avoided.

In the context of business negotiations and international affairs, particularly China's thrust to conclude agreements not to weaponize space and preserve open access to the Arctic – the latter dramatically in contrast to their efforts to deny such access to the South China Sea – China's historical propensity to employ false treaties and peace negotiations, coupled with contemporary PRC doctrinal emphasis upon such practices, deserve notice. A Ming dynasty formulation that has attracted renewed attention and been deemed applicable to these realms states: "Whenever about to engage an enemy in battle, first dispatch some emissaries to discuss a peace treaty. Even though the enemy assents to the talks, the way you each understand the language in the proposals will invariably not be the same. Then, relying upon their indolence and laxity, select elite troops and suddenly strike them, for their army can be destroyed."

In war, and other analogous situations, the prospect of peace immediately ameliorates tension and undermines alertness; provides a window of opportunity for "realists" unencumbered by concepts of truth, credibility and virtue; and delays inimical aggressive actions by exploiting the desires of people who cleave to hope, love righteousness, or simply seek to avoid the inconvenience of conflict and disruption of warfare. Ironically, after decades of vehemently condemning Confucianism, PRC oligarchs have initiated a dedicated program to revitalize the Master's core teachings in order to counter the hedonism and unruliness rampant in Chinese society, including his emphasis upon righteousness and credibility or fidelity to one's word.

Nevertheless, this theoretical orientation to duplicity and recently revealed experience fosters the impression that in common PRC practice, especially large commercial contracts (such as were executed with Australian natural resource suppliers), the quest for profit and advantage begins, rather than ends, with the conclusion of an agreement, as would be commonly understood in the West. (Contract and treaty negotiations also provide the means to acquire information and manipulate others.) Although, certainly not unique to the PRC, the practice of deception is well sustained by articulated positions, primarily in the prestigious theoretical journals devoted to international relations and military affairs. Moreover, it is an orientation that thoroughly accords with the ancient Chinese idea of achieving victory, however the latter may be defined, without combat, through wisdom, knowledge, and cleverness.

Finally, as business developments attest and clashes over NAFTA have shown, rather than confined to just being deliberately fostered by enemies or competitors, differences in treaty interpretations may naturally arise or be prompted by clashes in economic interests among partners and allies. Commentators in *The Globe and Mail* and other publications have recently noted that the Canadian propensity for fair play and equal access frequently result in neither for Canada. To this should perhaps be added the tendency to believe others and attribute benign motives, especially in treaties and contracts, even when unwarranted.

Ralph Sawyer is an independent historical scholar, lecturer, radio commentator and consultant to command colleges, think tanks, intelligence agencies and international conglomerates. He has specialized in Chinese military, technological, and intelligence issues for nearly four decades, much of which have been spent in Taiwan, Korea, Japan, China and Southeast Asia.

The Sudan: A Test for the West in Africa?



Written by:
Marie-Joëlle Zahar

2011 is a pivotal year in the Sudan. The month of July will mark the close of the transitional period ushered in by the signing on 9 January, 2005 of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that brought the longest war in Africa, the conflict between North and South Sudan, to an end. Between January and July, three important milestones are scheduled that will not only constitute a test for the country's leaderships (both North and South) but also, more importantly, for Western powers.

While the eyes of the international community are riveted on the 9 January 2011 referendum for the self-determination of South Sudan, this article argues that Western countries, including Canada, ought to pay equal attention to the other two milestones of the agreement: the Abyei referendum and the popular consultations in South Kordofan and Blue Nile States. Western governments have a vested interest in not only following, but accompanying, the various processes that are currently unfolding in the Sudan. This is important for principled, as well as strategic reasons, and might well prove a test of the Western governments' credibility on the African continent.

From the moment it was signed, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement faced daunting challenges. The first, and not the least, was the untimely death of John Garang, leader of the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and one of the deal's architects, only six months into CPA implementation. Other challenges followed, some technical, others political. The CPA had laid out an ambitious program intended to achieve two goals through democratic transformation: render unity attractive to Southerners and address the country's huge developmental asymmetries. Yet, it only allotted six years to the achievement of substantive progress, in a context characterized by deep suspicions, limited political skills and lack of political will. The war in Darfur, and the subsequent indictment of President Bashir by the International Criminal Court in July 2008, did not make matters any easier. The first post-conflict elections, in April 2010, illustrate the overall pattern of CPA implementation: although there were achievements, most had to be wrested out and, in the process, the parties accumulated new grievances and slowly drifted further apart.

This is the context of 2011. Between January and July, three milestones are planned by the CPA, marking the end of the transition period. The first will most likely take place on 9 January, when Southerners vote in a referendum on self-determination. The outcome is almost certain. Given the bumps on the road of CPA implementation, Southerners will likely decide to go it alone. The referendum raises two immediate issues for Western governments. First, its orderly and timely conduct is a must if the basic democratic rights of Southerners and the respect of the terms of the CPA are to be upheld. Second, minimal procedural requirements must be respected to give the outcome legitimacy. A Kosovo scenario, with all the implications of a unilateral declaration of independence, must be avoided at all costs. Not only would the ruling National Congress Party dispute the outcome, the African Union might raise objections given its concern about opening the Pandora's box of the continents' internal borders.

Western governments are aware of the stakes and are actively involved in preparing for, and overseeing the process, leading to the referendum. A high-level Sudanese delegation toured Canada this summer to learn from the Canadian experience with referenda. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade has urged the Sudanese to prepare adequately for the referendum to be credible while reiterating its support for the timely conduct of the exercise. Unfortunately, the other milestones do not seem to garner the same level of international engagement.

The CPA mandates two other important milestones that are due to happen before the end of the transitional period: a referendum for the disputed, oil-rich region of Abyei, in which inhabitants will decide whether to join the North or the South and popular consultations for the two States of South Kordofan and Blue Nile as a prelude to renegotiation of their relationship with Khartoum. To understand the significance of these two milestones, we need to go back to the CPA. In accepting the contentious 1956 independence boundaries as the basis for the agreement, the SPLM/A accepted the exclusion from the South of three areas, heavily represented in the movement and that had been profoundly affected by the war: the areas currently known as the Nuba Mountains (located in South Kordofan); the region of Abyei (also in South Kordofan); and the State of Blue Nile.

The Abyei referendum was intended to be held simultaneously with the referendum on South Sudan. This is highly unlikely. Despite international arbitration to

(Continued on page 25)

(Continued from page 24)
demarcate Abyei's boundaries, the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) still rejects the results. The Abyei Referendum Commission has yet to be established. South Kordofan has yet to hold parliamentary elections because of intense disagreement over the results of the census ahead of the April 2010 contest. Blue Nile is a bit further ahead and voter education is taking place there in preparation for the Popular Consultations. But time is running out, deadlines are accumulating and the outcome of both processes is increasingly uncertain. With all eyes on the South, and in light of these delays, there is a high likelihood that these two milestones will not be afforded equal consideration and support by outsiders. They should.

Even if the international community ensures the orderly holding of the 9 January 2011 referendum, and though it may be willing to continue its current efforts in support of state-building in South Sudan, it must also ensure that the two other milestones are carried out in timely and orderly fashion. Each of these is intimately linked to items that rank high on the agenda of Western governments. All three speak to Western commitments to democracy in its most basic form: protecting the right of people to make their voices heard. All three will also impact human (in)security across the Sudan. Given the current condition of the institutions of South Sudan, its level of underdevelopment, and the instability of neighbouring countries, the referendum on Southern self-determination will result in a fragile state that will have to be sustained and supported if it is not to become failed. Of all aspects of international engagement with the Sudan, this seems the most likely to be sustained.

The referendum is expected to weaken the leverage that international actors can exercise on the regime of Omar al Bashir – already many international organizations and bilateral donors seem to be downsizing their activities and presence in the North and refocusing efforts on the South. Yet, the North is where the referendum might have ominous results and where a strong and sustained Western engagement might make a difference not only for the region, but for the credibility of stated Western commitments to the values of democracy and human security.

Following the secession of South Sudan, many expect the regime in Khartoum to clamp down on opponents. Not only will the NCP emerge relatively stronger than any of its remaining challengers, it may want to send a clear signal to those, emboldened by the independence of the South, who might be tempted to follow suit. The worsening situation in Darfur seems to lend credence to these fears. No other crisis situation has embodied Western verbal commitments to human security as Darfur. Yet, in spite of widespread recognition that the Darfur conflict amounted to genocide, Western governments have been lukewarm to put boots on the ground. Any drawdown in our military and political presence in Darfur would drive the last nail into the coffin of the West's commitment to human security. It would also potentially harm the relationship with the African Union whose troops bear the brunt of the UNAMID deployment.

Many worry as well that Khartoum will renege on its commitments towards the people of Abyei, Blue Nile and South Kordofan. There are also concerns that the SPLM/A will lose its ability and willingness to affect these outcomes following independence. Yet observers widely agree that the popular consultations in Blue Nile and South Kordofan are the most obvious entry point into the democratic transformation of the Sudan, forcing the government to address the demands of marginalized regions for more say in decision-making and for a fairer share of national resources. The Canadian government, and other Western powers, have made much of democracy promotion in recent years. Supporting this process is a golden opportunity to put words into action, all the more so because there is a genuine grassroots movement for change. Leaving the populations of Blue Nile and South Kordofan to fend for themselves would send the wrong signal. It would suggest that Western powers are not interested in values per se. It would feed perceptions that the West was only interested in the fate of South Sudan where the majority of the population is Christian and animist and where, incidentally, most oil reserves are located. Regardless of their fairness, these perceptions would strengthen already deeply-held beliefs that Western powers have abandoned Africa and that they are only interested in reengaging where their direct interests are at stake.

This can do irreparable damage to the advancement of foreign policy objectives such as Canada's, which put a premium on connections between democracy promotion and international security. We need to recognize that democracy and security are linked in a myriad ways. Leaving the populations of northern Sudan alone to deal with the consequences of the separation of the South will not only have a deleterious impact on their security, it will also affect their belief in democracy and weaken the West's credibility to intervene in future instances of gross violations of human rights in the Sudan and on the whole continent.

Marie-Joëlle Zahar is Associate Professor of Political Science and Research Director at the Réseau francophone de recherché sur les opérations de paix (ROP), at the Université de Montréal. She is currently lead consultant on a DFAIT-funded project in support of the popular consultations in Blue Nile and south Kordofan States for the Forum of Federations.

Message from the President

As 2010 comes to a close, I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for your interest and support of CDFAI. It has been a busy year for us, which is reflected in our numerous successes': CDFAI was ranked fourth in Canada in the University of Pennsylvania's 2009 "Global Go-To Think Tanks"; we were sole sourced by DFAIT to prepare a report on capacity building for a G8 Sherpa's meeting prior to the G8/G20 meeting hosted in Toronto; and we expanded the presence of CDFAI by opening an office in our Nation's Capital.

The launch of our Ottawa office in September has expanded CDFAI's voice in its mission to educate Canadians. This office is headed up by our new Vice President, Colin Robertson, a former diplomat with a distinguished career in the Foreign Service, and our Program Coordinator, Sarah Magee.

CDFAI continued in its tradition of providing groundbreaking research. We produced several major papers, including the landmark study on the future of Canada and peacekeeping, NATO's Strategic Concept and why CIDA needs to be reinvented. These three studies were featured in the media and have been reviewed by both the government and many leaders of Canadian industry.

Finally, the Board of Directors, Advisory Council, Fellows and staff at CDFAI wish everyone sincere best wishes for the holiday season and 2011.

Robert S. Millar

NEW PAPERS RELEASED

CDFAI has recently released two Quarterly Research Papers. The first, *The 'Dirty Oil' Card and Canadian Foreign Policy,* by Paul Chastko, Director of the International Relations Program at the University of Calgary, focuses on the worlds increasing energy needs and Canada's development of the oil sands. With a lack of green energy alternatives countries will continue to rely on oil well into the future; therefore, Canada and the United States must ensure that the discourse relating to the oil sands does not pit energy and the environment against one another. The second paper, *Canada's International Policy Statement Five Years Later,* by Andrew Godefroy, a CDFAI Research Fellow, focuses on whether or not the IPS can be considered a success or failure. Godefroy offers a qualified yes in his analysis as Canada has become reengaged in the international community. What is clear, he argues, is that international policy must be created with a reflection on the past and guided by the institutionalization of best practices in the future.

2010/2011 SPEAKERS SERIES

To follow up CDFAI's successful Afghan Speakers Series of 2009-2010 at the Calgary Golf and Country Club, the Institute has focused on Canada and the World: China. The first speaker in this series of four was Ralph Sawyer, a specialist in Chinese military, technological and intelligence issues. He analyzed Canada and China's defence relations in the context of the Sun Zu's *Art of War*. The second speaker in this series will be Pierre Fournier, a geopolitical analyst with the Bank of Canada. The third and fourth speaker dinners will be held early in the new year.

If you are interested in attending the remaining events or for more information on the Speakers Series, please contact Lynn Arsenault at larsenault@cdfai.org or by phone (403) 231-7605.

CDFAI Senior Research Fellows

DAVID BERCUSON
David Bercuson is Director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary and Program Director for CDFAI.

COLIN ROBERTSON
Colin Robertson is Senior Strategic Advisor for the U.S.-based law firm of McKenna, Long and Aldridge. A former foreign service officer, he was part of the team that negotiated the Canada-U.S. FTA and NAFTA. He is also President of the Canadian International Council: National Capital Branch.



DEREK BURNEY
Derek H. Burney is Senior Strategic Advisor to Ogilvy Renault LLP in Ottawa, Chairman of the Board of CanWest Global Communications Corp, and a Visiting Professor and Senior Distinguished Fellow at Carleton University. He also served as Canada's Ambassador to the United States from 1989-1993.

HUGH SEGAL
Hugh Segal served in the public and private sector for thirty-three years before being appointed by Prime Minister Martin to the Senate, as a Conservative, in 2005. He is an Adjunct Professor (Public Policy) at the Queen's School of Business.

J.L. GRANATSTEIN
J.L. Granatstein is one of Canada's most distinguished historians focusing on 20th Century Canadian national history.

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Elinor Sloan is Associate Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science at Carleton University, specializing in U.S., Canadian, and NATO security and defence policy. She is also a former defence analyst with Canada's Department of National Defence.

FRANK HARVEY
Frank P. Harvey is University Research Professor of International Relations at Dalhousie University. He held the 2007 J. William Fulbright Distinguished Research Chair in Canadian Studies at the State University of New York (Plattsburg).



GORDON SMITH
Gordon Smith is Director of the Centre for Global Studies, and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Victoria. He is a former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Canada and Ambassador to the European Union and NATO.

MIKE JEFFERY
A retired member of the Canadian Forces and a former Army Commander, Mike Jeffery is a consultant focusing on defence, security, and strategic planning.

DENIS STAIRS
Denis Stairs is Professor Emeritus in Political Science and a Faculty Fellow in the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University. He specializes in Canadian foreign and defence policy, Canada-US relations and similar subjects.

DAVID PRATT
The Honourable David Pratt, P.C. is currently a consultant. He is the former Advisor to the Secretary General and Special Ambassador for the Canadian Red Cross and former Minister of National Defence.

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DAVID CARMENT
David Carment is a Professor of International Affairs at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University. In addition, he is the principal investigator for the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Project (CIFP).

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Barry Cooper, FRSC, is a Professor of Political Science and Fellow, Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary.

DANY DESCHÊNES
Dany Deschênes has been a risk and crisis management consultant since 2010 and currently serves on the Board of Governors of the Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean. He is a former Assistant Professor at L'Ecole de politique appliquée de l'Université de Sherbrooke and columnist for *Le Multilatéral*.

MARK ENTWISTLE
Mark Entwistle is currently Vice-President, International and Government Affairs with ExecAdvice Corporation. A former diplomat, he served as Canada's Ambassador to Cuba from 1993-1997 and is a leading expert on Cuba.

JAMES FERGUSSON
James Fergusson is Deputy Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, and an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Manitoba.

JOHN FERRIS
John Ferris is a Professor of History, and a Fellow at the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary. He is a specialist in military and diplomatic history, as well as in intelligence.

BRIAN FLEMMING
Brian Flemming, CM, QC, DCL, is a Canadian policy advisor, writer and international lawyer. He established the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA), and served as its Chairman from 2002 to 2005.

ANDREW GODEFROY
Andrew Godefroy is a strategic analyst and historian specializing in Canadian foreign, defence, and technology affairs. He has been a member of the Canadian Army Primary Reserve since 1993 and currently holds the Canadian Visiting Research Fellowship in the Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War at Oxford University.

SHARON HOBSON
Sharon Hobson has been the Canadian correspondent for *Jane's Defence Weekly* since April 1985. For the past decade she has also been a regular contributor to *Jane's Navy International* and *Jane's International Defence Review*. She is also the 2004 recipient of the Ross Munro Media Award.

ROB HUEBERT
Rob Huebert is Associate Director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies and Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Calgary.

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Anne Irwin is an Adjunct Assistant Professor of Anthropology at the University of Calgary and was the university's first CDFAI Chair in Civil-Military Relations. A graduate of the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College's Militia Command and Staff Course, she served in the Canadian Forces Reserves from 1972 to 1987, retiring as a Military Police officer with the rank of Major.

TAMI JACOBY
Tami Amanda Jacoby is Deputy Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies and Associate Professor in the Department of Political Studies at the University of Manitoba.

WHITNEY LACKENBAUER
P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Ph.D., is Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of History at St. Jerome's University. He specializes in Arctic security and sovereignty issues, modern Canadian military and diplomatic history, and Aboriginal-military relations.

ERIC LERHE
Eric Lerhe is a retired naval officer who served as the Commander Canadian Fleet Pacific from 2001 to 2003. Cmdre. (Ret'd) Lerhe is currently completing his doctoral degree at Dalhousie

GEORGE MACDONALD
LGen (Ret'd) Macdonald retired from the Canadian Forces as Vice Chief of the Defence Staff in 2004. He then joined CFN Consultants in Ottawa where he continues to deal with defence and security issues.

SARAH JANE MEHARG
Sarah Jane Meharg is the Senior Research Associate at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Ottawa and is Adjunct Professor at the Royal Military College of Canada. She is Canada's leading post-conflict reconstruction expert.

ALEXANDER MOENS
Alexander Moens, the author of *Foreign Policy of George W. Bush*, is a Professor of Political Science at SFU and a Senior Fellow at the Fraser Institute in the Centre for Canadian American relations.

ROLAND PARIS
Roland Paris is the University Research Chair in International Security and Governance, and Founding Director for the Centre for International Policy Studies, at the University of Ottawa. His research interests are in the fields of international security, international governance and foreign policy.

STEPHEN RANDALL
Stephen J. Randall, FRSC, is Professor of History at the University of Calgary. He is a specialist in United States foreign policy and Latin American international relations and politics.

CAMERON ROSS
Major-General (Ret'd) Cameron Ross is the President of HCR Security International Ltd. Prior to 2003, he served with the Canadian Forces in command and operational appointments, as well as overseas.

STÉPHANE ROUSSEL
Stéphane Roussel is Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM) and the Canada Research Chair in Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy.

RALPH SAWYER
Ralph Sawyer is an independent historical scholar, lecturer, radio commentator, and consultant to command colleges, think tanks, intelligence agencies and international conglomerates. He has specialized in Chinese military, technological, and intelligence issues for nearly four decades, much of which have been spent in Taiwan, Korea, Japan, China, and Southeast Asia.

RON WALLACE
Dr. Ron Wallace recently retired as Chief Executive Officer of a Canadian-US defence manufacturer. He has worked extensively internationally, including the Arctic regions of Canada and Russia, where he gained experience in northern engineering and environmental research.

MARIE-JOËLLE ZAHAR
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(Continued on page 31)

(Continued from page 30)

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