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About CDFAI

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Canadian Defence
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On the Future of Canadian Military Intervention

James Fergusson draws parallels between Canada's commitment in Afghanistan to the Nixon Doctrine that arose during the United States commitment in Vietnam. He concludes that an informal Nixon Doctrine may become the foundation for future Canadian military commitments.

U.S. Homeland Security Ten Years after 9/11: Lessons for Canadian "Beyond the Border" Negotiators

Frank Harvey demonstrates that fears surrounding security *failures*, rather than *successes*, have dominated people's perceptions of the Global War on Terror, because of this Canada must continue to develop and maintain new security measures in order to keep our relationship with the United States healthy.

The Harperization of Canadian Foreign Policy

Brian Flemming questions what kind of foreign policy Canada will see under Stephen Harper, concluding that Harper has had a breathtaking political career thus far, but the real test will be if he can become a pragmatic and strategic statesman.

Right v. Might v. Iran

Hrach Gregorian scrutinizes the current political climate in Iran and concludes that it is unlikely external political pressures will bring an end to its burgeoning nuclear program or blatant human rights abuses, instead change is more likely to come through the mobilization of the country's predominantly youthful, pro-western population.

The CF's Growing Capability Challenge

Mike Jeffery demonstrates that during Canada's decade of service in Afghanistan support increased exponentially for the Canadian Forces, but the question of whether or not the CF will maintain its defence capability in these difficult economic times remains to be seen.

Remembering Task Force Orion

Anne Irwin reflects on her tour with Task Force Orion, noting that this was a landmark moment not only in civil-military relations, but also in how serving men and women perceive their roles as soldiers.

Libya, the F-35 Debate and Some Other New Trends

Eric Lerhe examines the government's decision to purchase the F-35 aircraft. He indicates that a lack of detailed rationales have led to the public outcry against the purchase, but concludes that the F-35 is the only aircraft that will meet Canada's future defence needs.

The Art of Alliancemanship

Colin Robertson discusses the practice of aliancemanship between Canada and the United States, emphasizing that this relationship gives us a significant advantage at not only the US bargaining table, but the international one as well.

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Ray Henault has a long and distinguished career with the Canadian Forces and is the longest-serving 4-Star General in CF History. From June 2001 to February 2005, Gen. (Ret'd) Henault served as Chief of the Defence Staff, a period marked by the highest operational tempo for the Canadian Forces in 50 years including those generated by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.



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Message from the Editor-in-Chief



Written by:
David Bercuson

Many Canadian officers have developed a negative view of NATO's military capabilities after Canada's experience in Kandahar. General (ret'd) Rick Hillier himself, former Chief of the

Defence Staff, wrote in his 2009 memoir: "It had become increasingly clear to me [by early 2008] that NATO was set up to do almost anything but run an operation like that in Afghanistan. NATO is based on consensus... that kind of consensus is simply not possible when you're trying to win an up-close and personal battle like the one in Afghanistan."

Hillier's view, likely shared by many others, is ironic given that Canada's re-entry into Afghanistan in 2003 as the leading ISAF nation in Kabul was only possible through partnership with NATO. In fact, NATO's participation was crucial to Canadian involvement because Canada simply did not have the resources to carry out the commitment to ISAF (then a UN mission) made by Prime Minister Jean Chretien in February 2003. At that time the US was actively looking for a way to get NATO involved in Afghanistan and Canada provided the opportunity.

Canada also shifted its mission out of Kabul, to Kandahar, a part of a general NATO/ISAF expansion out of Kabul and into Afghanistan's rural areas, first to the relatively quiet north and west, then to the more problematic south and east.

Why then did so many Canadian soldiers sour on NATO? There were many reasons for the alienation, but the most important was, no doubt, the problem of national caveats. Caveats are restrictions placed by governments on their military operations in coalition campaigns and Canada is no stranger to the concept. Canadian governments placed many caveats on Canadian military contingents during the peacekeeping era and even in Kabul under NATO. Caveats are not only irksome to coalition commanders, they eat away at the very foundations of a coalition enterprise. When restricted by a national caveat, a contingent commander must either refuse certain missions handed to him by his operational commanders, or check with his national capital before moving ahead. That checking can take many hours, even days. It may have

had some operational relevance on peacekeeping missions where not much happened most times, but it is positively dangerous in a war when speed is often essential.

In effect ISAF was not one coalition fighting force that peaked at about 45,000 soldiers in 2007/2008 but a plethora of national commands with different limits and conditions on how and where they were to be used. In the first major confrontation between ISAF forces and the Taliban in September 2006 in Operation Medusa, Canadian Brigadier General David Fraser commanded Canadian, US, British, Afghan and Dutch troops, but several other national contingents, some based relatively close by, were unavailable to him.

Canadians found other problems with NATO/ISAF from equipment that was not compatible to the distribution of air assets to constant rotations of command. But why were any of these shortcomings a surprise? The decision making establishment in Ottawa can rely on several intelligence agencies both inside and outside the Departments of National Defence and Foreign Affairs and the Privy Council Office and a number of analysis and policy branches. Were they not aware of the problems that could arise in a NATO operation? Did no one read General (ret'd) Wesley Clark's book *Waging Modern War*, in which he recounts the many issues he had to deal with when, as NATO commander in Europe (SACEUR), he led the Serbia/Kosovo air operation in 1999?

It is all too easy to blame NATO for the problems Canada ran into in Kandahar. Perhaps the real problems began in the failures of Canada's own defence policymakers to do a thorough analysis of what a NATO operation would entail.

David Bercuson is the Director of Programs at CDFAI, the Director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, and the former Honorary Lieutenant Colonel of the 41st Combat Engineer Regiment.

On the Future of Canadian Military Intervention



Written by:
James Fergusson

After four years of direct military intervention in Vietnam, the Nixon administration announced a new doctrine for war on the periphery. At its core, the

Nixon doctrine stated that America's allies, formal or informal, would be expected to provide the ground forces to fight an internal insurgency, or an attack from another local or regional power. The United States would provide a range of support to their allies efforts and needs, including money, equipment, trainers and military advisors, and potentially American air power.

The new doctrine reflected the ongoing process of Vietnamization, and was evident in the role American airpower played in defeating the 1972 North Vietnamese spring offensive. The major driving force behind the doctrine, however, was domestic public opinion opposed the use of American ground forces to fight a war in place of local indigenous forces. While the United States would abandon its ally in 1975, the doctrine remained largely in place for the rest of the Cold War, as evident in Africa, Latin America and Afghanistan.

There are significant differences between the American experience in Vietnam and the Canadian experience in Afghanistan, especially concerning the absolute magnitude of the two wars and the military commitments entailed. Even so, the American and Canadian experiences contain significant similarities. Both represent major military burdens on their respective ground forces. While the size of Canada's ground commitment pales beside the American, Canada has seen roughly a third of its army committed to the war in Afghanistan in six month rotations over five plus years in Kandahar. Canadian casualties relative to the number of troops deployed and the size of the Canadian Army are comparatively not too dissimilar. The wear and tear on equipment holdings can also be considered comparable.

Certainly, the morale of the two forces at the conclusion of their ground commitments is markedly different. Nonetheless, the respective conditions of each Army suggest a need for significant 'breathing space', rather than another major ground force commitment overseas for the foreseeable future.

Domestically, Canada has not faced major anti-war demonstrations in the streets, as occurred in the United States from 1966 onward. Nonetheless, public opinion on the war has been divided. Following the announcement that Canada would end its combat role in 2011, division has moved to majority opposition. It is unclear, however, whether this opposition is directed primarily to the use of Canadian troops to fight a war that should be the responsibility of local forces, or much wider in nature. If the absence of any significant opposition to the training mission is any indication, then the former may be true.

In effect, the conditions that led to the promulgation of the Nixon doctrine in 1969 are in place for a similar decision in Canada, and the decision to undertake a training role is consistent with a Nixon doctrine, as is the current Libyan commitment under a United Nations' humanitarian mandate. Similarly, Canada decided to provide only limited logistical support to the UN sponsored African Union led mission to the Sudan, ensuring that any potential fighting would be left to the local forces.

Of course, one should not expect the current government to promulgate publically a formal doctrine that limits Canada's future overseas military commitments to a support function. There is little political value to be obtained from such a public announcement and potential costs in terms of allied relations in general, and relations with the United States in particular.

This does not mean that Canadian activism will come to an end. Current and future governments, like their predecessors, are unlikely to eschew international demands for Canadian participation overseas, especially if such demands are a product of the United Nations in conjunction with Washington and Brussels. Indeed, Canadian discretion relative to overseas conflicts resides only in the type of capabilities to be committed. Of course, given similar discretion undertaken by many NATO allies in Afghanistan, pressure for Canada to commit ground forces in future overseas conflicts will not disappear. Nonetheless, an informal Nixon doctrine may become the foundation for future Canadian military commitments and at a minimum should be part of any future debate about Canada's contribution to international security efforts.

James Fergusson is Deputy Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, and an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Manitoba.

U.S. Homeland Security Ten Years after 9/11: Lessons for Canadian “Beyond the Border” Negotiators



Written by:
Frank Harvey

Commenting on the Arab Spring during a recent airing of his CNN talk show, GPS, Fareed Zakaria made the following observations:¹

Since 9/11, al Qaeda has been unable to launch a single attack in the United States. Small groups of people inspired by it have managed a few smaller attacks in some cities in Europe and the Middle East and Asia, but even these have been getting fewer and fewer and further and further between. Most terrorism is now the product of lone, would-be suicide bombers rather than an organized political movement with a central figure or central organization. Political support for al Qaeda, Islamic terrorism and suicide bombings has been dropping in every Muslim country in the world on which we have polling data. If the Arab world becomes more Democratic, those numbers will continue to fall. So can we all take a deep breath, stop cowering in fear of the impending caliphate, and put the problem of Islamic terrorism in perspective? It's real. But it is not going to take over the world any time soon.

“Security failures, not successes, dominate perceptions of progress in the war on terrorism.”

Of course, Zakaria's assessment of the numbers is largely correct. The problem with his advice, however, is that security *failures*, not *successes*, dominate perceptions of progress in the war on terrorism. Our emotional reaction to the thought of even a single security failure determines how we interpret and respond to risks; our reactions are almost never a product of rational assessments of the statistical probability of many more successes. We buy insurance because of our emotional reactions to the thought of low probability events, not by rationally calculating the very high statistical odds that we will never experience a traumatic, life-threatening crisis. The large number of healthy people, in other words, does not determine the propensity to buy health or life insurance.

The significant proportion of people who lose money at casinos does not determine a gambler's perception of the risks, or the number of tourists who visit Las Vegas. The number of people who have never experienced a crime does not determine our fear of crime. And the tens of millions of children who are not abducted by strangers do not determine our exaggerated fear of this highly improbable event – the few publicised abductions determine our reactions.

With respect to exaggerated fears of terrorism, therefore, the number of people who successfully escaped the Twin Towers on 9/11, or the very large number of planes that landed safely on that day, or the even larger number of New Yorkers (and Americans) who lived perfectly normal lives on 9/11, or the very positive outlook on al-Qaeda portrayed by Zakaria, do not determine our fears of terrorism, or the counter-terrorism policies we adopt to address them. Inevitably, it is the failures, suicide bombings, deaths, collapsed buildings, crashed planes and falling bodies, etc. that create and sustain our suspicions, anxieties, doubts, fears and policies. For instance, a significant majority of the almost 1.9 billion Muslims who do not support terrorism, the 9/11 attacks, Osama bin Laden (and his successor), or suicide bombings will never be as relevant to our perceptions (or the priorities of policy-makers) as the actions of 19 individuals on 9/11. These failures will always be more relevant. Security measures are designed to deal with the infinitesimally small number of criminals who might break the law, not the billions who don't – all laws, regulations and security policies are designed to deal with the few defectors.

The other problem with Zakaria's argument is that the *absence* of fear is not a precondition for peace, stability or enhanced security strategies, nor is it a panacea for well reasoned and informed policy analysis. In fact, the absence of fear consistently leads to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people worldwide each year from smoking, drinking and heart disease at a cost of billions in medical care. With respect to international politics, the absence of fear can lead to dangerous levels of complacency and/or hostility. Almost every security failure or foreign policy crisis is preceded by some underestimation of an impending threat or risk – the absence of fears of German expansion, for example, precipitated the

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underlying conditions for World War II. It was the absence of fear (or a failure to imagine the threat) that set the stage for 9/11. It was the absence of concerns about a direct homeland attack that prevented Washington from taking earlier actions against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Conversely, it was the presence of fear of al-Qaeda after 9/11 that led to the intervention in Afghanistan, which in turn reinforced fears of WMD proliferation and terrorist reprisals in the lead up to the Iraq war. Fear can simultaneously be a cause and effect, and it can motivate us to do the right or wrong things. Contrary to Zakaria's simplistic analysis, therefore, the objective should not be to diminish or eliminate fear; the goal should be to understand when, and under what conditions, fear produces positive or negative outcomes.



Photo Source: phlmetropolis.com

The implications of these tendencies are profoundly important for understanding Washington's consistent security priorities over a decade after 9/11 – security policies are typically influenced by concerns about a few failures, and by the public's *perceptions* of major threats, rather than the statistical probabilities and risks tied to these threats. Washington will continue to design security measures, not on the basis of straightforward assessment of risks and probabilities, but on the basis of political calculations of anticipated public or media reactions to security failures. Those responsible for US security and public safety understand that they are more likely to pay a much higher political price for casualties caused by terrorism than deaths caused by, for example, car accidents: ten deaths from a terrorist attack are more disturbing (and, therefore, more costly to fix) than the thousands of accidental deaths on the American roads for which the government is assigned no direct responsibility.

Moreover, the American public (and Congressional leaders compelled to follow these pressures) will always demand and expect significantly higher investments to fill security gaps tied to terrorism and typically overlook, or downplay, the importance of investing in safety measures that would save so many more lives. In fact, most drivers are likely to prefer higher, rather than lower, speed limits, fewer, not more, patrol cars on highways, and smaller, not larger, fines for speeding or failing to wear a seat belt. It follows, then, that political officials will inevitably be more motivated to spend billions to protect citizens from exaggerated risks and threats that are more disturbing to the public and are much less inclined to invest similar amounts to reduce highly probable risks to public safety that are seriously underestimated, if not completely ignored: for example, paying for stricter enforcement of speed limits; stronger regulatory regimes for the tobacco and fast food industries; public awareness campaigns to encourage healthier diets and eating habits, etc.

With respect to Canadian policy implications, these realities are directly relevant to the current round of "Beyond the Border" negotiations. Many Canadian officials responsible for crafting the latest bargaining strategy remain entrenched in the conventional wisdom expressed by Zakaria and many others – i.e., they tend to believe that terrorist threats are obviously exaggerated, so the solutions to enhancing two-way trade across the border should simply focus on changing, reversing, or stopping wasteful security measures. Like Zakaria, critics in Canada who continue to point to wasteful US-Canada border security measures find it hard to understand why officials in Washington cannot simply implement policies based exclusively on the statistical probabilities of specific terrorist attacks, or the limited (non-existential damage) they can cause. These views are reinforced by the fact that the US has arguably experienced close to a perfect homeland security record, so why can't US officials relax, get a life and re-institute a healthy trade relationship. If these Canadian perspectives continue to dominate the current round of "Beyond the Border" talks, Canadian negotiators will inevitably fail in their efforts to resolve the border problems.

There is a desperate need in Canada to groom security entrepreneurs, not another collection of Canadian trade experts reminding their counterparts in Washington, as per Zakaria's instructions, that the threats from al-Qaeda and related statistical probabilities of a serious terrorist attack are diminishing. American officials have always been (and will always be) more willing to sacrifice Canada-US trade in the interest of US security, despite the costs

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to the Canadian or American economies brought on by border security architecture. By co-opting US concerns for security, and by taking the lead on identifying, investing in and developing the right kinds of security measures, Canadian negotiators will have a much more effective impact on managing mutually beneficial economic prosperity – the focus should be on ‘managing’ the relationship rather than ‘resolving’ or lifting the security-related impediments to trade.

¹<http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1103/06/fzgps.01.html>
FAREED ZAKARIA GPS Unrest in the Arab World; U.S. Budget Battles
Aired March 6, 2011—10:00 ET



Photo Source: chitchatmagazine.com

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The Harperization of Canadian Foreign Policy



Written by:
Brian Flemming

The late Chicago journalist, Sidney Harris, was famous for columns in which he made fun of how peoples' terminology changed, depending on where they stood. For example, in

commenting on someone's political philosophy, Harris would write: I am "principled"; you are an "ideologue"; he is a "foaming-at-the-mouth fanatic".

Canadians may want to remember these fine distinctions whenever Prime Minister Stephen Harper speaks about adopting "principled positions in our dealings with other nations, whether popular or not", as he did at the recent national convention of the Conservative Party. That is because those seemingly innocuous words may show Harper is preparing to inject a strong whiff of "morality" into Canadian foreign policy. And this introduction of more morality into our foreign policy may, as it develops, represent a turning away from Canada's historic foreign policy objectives, ones grounded more in "national interests", or honouring treaty obligations, than ones based on "morals", or abstract "principles".

Throughout the history of international relations, there has always been a tension between those countries that were Wilsonian and who, therefore, sought "morality" in their international relations and those states that were Metternichian or Kissingerian and who desired only to achieve ends that were in the national interest of their respective countries. Now that Harper has finally won his majority in Parliament, and will be in charge of Canadian foreign policy for more than four years, his longstanding wish for a more "principled", i.e. a more moral foreign policy could lead, over time, to the promulgation of a new Harper Doctrine, one more in tune with Harper's deep Reform roots than with his shallow, centrist, Progressive Conservative ones.

A crucial clue as to what might be coming in Canadian foreign policy occurred when Harper appointed John Baird

as his foreign minister. Long known as (the very effective) "pit bull" for Harper during five difficult minority years in Parliament, nothing in Baird's political past appears to have prepared him for this post, other than his fierce personal loyalty to Harper. Harper, like so many first ministers before him, seems to be preparing to call the foreign policy shots while using Baird as his "principled" bully in the international arena. If that is indeed Harper's objective then this was a ministerial appointment made in heaven.

The first major challenge for Harper's "principled" foreign policy will come with the negotiations of Beyond the Border, the perimeter security and trade agreement with the Americans. Thus far, Minister of Public Safety Vic Toews has been the lead negotiator with Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano on this front. Will the PM now give Baird control of the negotiation?

Probably not. Accordingly to what looked suspiciously like a PMO leak to John Ibbitson of *The Globe and Mail* in early July, Toews and Napolitano are getting along famously and plan to release "more than two dozen proposals aimed at easing border congestion and improving security" in the autumn.

If true, this is a wise course of action because release of a comprehensive agreement might give opponents of the new arrangements a larger and easier target at which to shoot. The smaller package approach may also mean that limited, focussed agreements may fall short of being treaties that would require legislation in both Canada and the US. This would help avoid a bitter ratification debate in a deeply divided Washington. And this piecemeal approach will be easier for Baird to accept if he is not to be the PM's lead negotiator for Canada on this important initiative.

The chief stumbling block for any Harper Doctrine of "principled" international relations will be the PM's passion for secrecy and his habitual tilt towards non transparency on important issues. A more "moral" foreign policy, by its very nature, needs the sunshine of openness because, to succeed, it must bring the Canadian populace clearly and publicly onside with new policies. The free trade agreements of a quarter century ago were successfully

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"Harper may finally be taking some baby steps towards a more open prime ministership and may, therefore, be able to bring Canadians more readily onside with his potentially controversial agreements with Washington."

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concluded partly because they were negotiated in an open way. Many difficult aspects of the Beyond the Border negotiation will need the evolving approval of Canadians. By planning a rollout of proposals, as the Ibbotson article predicted, Harper may finally be taking some baby steps towards a more open prime ministership and may, therefore, be able to bring Canadians more readily onside with his potentially controversial agreements with Washington.



Photo Source: flickr.com

In his breathtakingly successful political career so far, Harper has proven to be a superb tactician. The question now is: can he morph into becoming a pragmatic, strategic statesman? The perimeter and security negotiation will show whether Harper is finally starting to make a tortuous transition from secrecy to openness in the conduct of Canadian foreign policy.

Brian Flemming is an international lawyer who is a Fellow of the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute and an honorary Fellow of Dalhousie University's Marine and Environmental Law Institute.

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Right v. Might v. Iran



Written by:
Hrach Gregorian

Among the four subjects that constitute Canada's current policy toward Iran, human rights and the Islamic Republic's nuclear program figure most prominently. Canada has been consistent and

unambiguous in its support of UN resolutions demanding that Iran suspend uranium enrichment and all other activities that can lead to the weaponization of nuclear power. It has been yet more forceful in its condemnation of Iran's human rights record, repeatedly calling on the Iranian authorities to respect all applicable national and international laws. Iran has essentially ignored Canadian charges regarding its nuclear program, other than to dismiss them as baseless, and simply towing the US-Israeli line. It likely calculates, and not without good reason, that beyond sanctions the western powers will take no action, including the use of military force, that will prevent it from continuing to pursue its ambitions. The regime also understands that there is broad consensus at home on nuclear policy. This is a matter of national pride and sovereignty about which little disagreement is voiced across the political spectrum. However, Iran's response to Canadian charges regarding human rights violations has been far more energetic.

In 2007, the Islamic Republic released a 70-page "Report on Human Rights Situation in Canada" charging Canadian law enforcement with "routine unlawful strip and beatings (sic)," and the government in general with a host of human rights violations, from the abridgement of women's rights to discriminatory practices toward aboriginal peoples, refugees and immigrants. More recently, the Iranian Foreign Ministry condemned the RCMP for its "inhuman" treatment of protestors on the occasion of the 2010 G-20 summit in Toronto. "The repeated violation of the citizens' rights during the Toronto demonstration and assault and battery against the protesters is not an issue to keep mum about," said a Ministry spokesman. To further signal its concern for the rights of Canadian citizens, the Iranian government summoned Canadian Embassy officials in Tehran to meet with authorities in the Foreign Ministry to discuss the matter.

"Without a stable centre of gravity the regime remains vulnerable to attack, both from without and more importantly, from within."

So, what's going on here? The discourse may be misleading because both sides use the same words. To avoid semantic confusion, which may result in false assumptions about the moral equivalency of the actions of the two governments, it is here recommended that the reader consult Victor Klemperer, *The Language of the Third Reich: A Philologist's Notebook*, George Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, and the idea of the "Big Lie" as used by Hitler in *Mein Kampf* to blame Jews for Germany's defeat in the First World War. The Islamic Republic's outsized response to criticism from Ottawa reflects, in part, Canada's high reputation in the domain of human rights, but it also grows out of domestic political concerns, where such criticism may have a greater impact on the regime's fortunes than tighter economic sanctions. Fissures in Iranian society and governing circles have led to a state of paranoia and insecurity, with major figures competing for influence and the mantle of leadership. This is partially due to the fragmented nature of the Islamic Republic since its inception in 1979. In the three decades that followed, extreme repression was used to eliminate (liquidate) all potential opponents of the regime. The result was a steady shrinking of the top echelons of the political class.

The contested presidential election results of 2009, and the subsequent lowering of the hammer on what remained of a "liberal" elite, marked a major turning point in the young republic's history. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei decided the time had come to be rid of all deviation from the path of righteousness, including Ayatollah Rafsanjani's so-called centrist policies. Post-election violence provided a pretext to purge the system of what remained of reform minded politicians.

From his first election as President in 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has served as an ideal vehicle for realizing Ayatollah Khamenei's highly conservative agenda, but after seven years in power, the puppet has come to contest the power of the puppeteer. This has led to a bitter contest between two reactionary camps vying to determine the future of Iran. In the one camp is Khamenei and like-minded clerics. They are closely aligned with the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution (IRGC), or Revolutionary Guard, a military and paramilitary organization with vast economic interests, especially in oil and telecommunications. In the other is the Ahmadinejad cabal, with ties to the Hojjatieh, a viciously anti-Baha'i sect

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dedicated to hastening the arrival of the apocalypse, which will produce the Mahdi, redeemer of Islam. The Mahdi is purported to have a deputy, an earthly assistant, it is reported that both Khamenei and Ahmadinejad have claims on this title.



Photo Source: wired.com

Messianism forms one part of the puzzle; old-fashioned power politics accounts for much of the rest. Ahmadinejad and his close confidant, Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, who many argue is the brains behind the throne, believe the clerics have lost their credibility, and have been working to marginalize Khamenei and company. Younger leaders, like Mashaei, want to see a transition to an Iranian versus an Islamic republic, arguing that the latter is incapable of governing a complex, modern state. The struggle has become more public with recent attacks on Ahmadinejad and his allies by senior figures in the Revolutionary Guards and the propaganda machine surrounding the supreme leader. The battleground for the two factions is the IRGC, the Basij (the IRGC's domestic storm troopers), the Interior Ministry, and the Ministries of Defense and Security.

This is a dangerous situation that neither side can afford to escalate. The President knows he will lose in a direct

showdown with Khamenei, and the Ayatollah dares not risk removing the chief executive, lest a highly fractious, mismanaged system becomes more unstable. Time is not on the side of either party. Without a stable center of gravity the regime remains vulnerable to attack, both from without and, more importantly, from within. It will sooner implode in the face of domestic opposition that can exploit its miserable record on human rights to mobilize the country's predominantly youthful, pro-western population than external pressure, whether sanctions or a military attack on its nuclear facilities, which would be a godsend uniting the people behind the regime and silencing even its home grown critics.

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The CF's Growing Capability Challenge



Written by:
Mike Jeffery

Introduction

As the CF completes its withdrawal from our combat mission in Afghanistan, ending a decade of operations in that region, it will need to chart a course that builds on the lessons learned over the past decade and meets the challenges of a new era. But in so doing, it must face some old problems. How it addresses these issues will very much shape Canada's defence capability for the future.

A Decade of Growth and Recognition

The past 10 years have been a period of growth, success and national recognition for the CF. Operational achievements in Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf and now Libya, to name just a few, have set a new benchmark for CF performance. This period has also seen the emergence of new capabilities such as Special Operations Forces and Unmanned Airborne Vehicles, while confirming the criticality of capabilities such as intelligence and fire support that previously had been allowed to languish. Perhaps most important of all, it reconfirmed for those who had any doubt that, while a military can be used for many things, first and foremost, it must be able to fight.

In resource terms, this period also saw a great increase in funding and support for the CF. The budget has grown from a low of \$9.4B in 1998 to a projected high in 2011 of \$21.3B.¹ Perhaps more significantly, the defence budget moved out of its historic position at around 1% of GDP and is currently assessed to be 1.5% of GDP. That doesn't put Canada in the big leagues of defence spending, but it is certainly a more credible position. We have also seen the procurement of a range of new equipment, from C17's to Tanks, and more purchases have been announced. Finally, there has been an increase in the size of the CF, albeit growth has been constrained.

Perhaps most significant, the period has seen a great resurgence in the confidence and morale of the members of the CF. After a particularly difficult time in the 1990's, the growth in capability and the successful participation in combat, along side our NATO allies, has restored the

credibility and personal self worth so essential to the fighting men and women. This, of course, has been bolstered tremendously by public support. This period saw the Canadian people embrace the CF in a way they hadn't in half a century and, of all changes, this is perhaps the most important to our national security.

For those with a clear memory of the 1990's these are heady times for the CF and it is with some trepidation that I sound a cautionary note. But sound it I must.

An Uncertain Future

It would be understandably comforting to view the next decade as a continuation of the past 10 years, but one would be naïve to do so. The reality is that the context for Canadian defence and security is likely to undergo major changes over the next few years, which will pose new and significant challenges for the government and, in particular, the CF's leadership.

The Global Context.

It sounds proforma to say that we face an increasingly uncertain world, but that is the reality. NATO's new strategy² is a reflection of this change, as the member states of the alliance recognize the need to face new and varied threats to their security. Most significantly, a growing global economic crisis has the potential to change the current world order and threaten the stability of the global system. With economic uncertainty, the risk of increased security threats is very real and while this strategy is an essential step in transforming our collective security, it belies the risk of a growing capacity gap to implement it.

The greatest concern here must be the risks faced by the US. As the power that underpins NATO's strength and arguably the stability of the western world, the increasingly tenuous economic situation in the US must be seen as a major threat to global security. There seems to be general agreement that the US is on an unsustainable fiscal course³ and there must be little doubt that the nation will soon have to reduce its expenditures and significantly decrease its military capacity. While such reductions are unlikely to move the US out of first place in defence spending or capability terms, they will have an effect on the global balance of power and, significantly, the capacity of the alliance.

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Canada's Challenge.

At the same time, Canada is facing its own challenges: the skyrocketing price of health care, the greying of the population, an aging infrastructure and environmental degradation to name just a few. And while our national economic situation may be better than most, it is not, in absolute terms, very good. With a projected budget deficit of \$36.2B in 2010-2011⁴ and debt of \$562B, the nation must address economic issues as a priority. And, given our reliance on the US economy and that nation's challenges, it would be unrealistic to believe the situation will get better in the short term. In this context, the Federal Government will face many difficult decisions and an increasing pressure to fund areas other than defence.

Canadian defence funding levels are currently much better than just a decade ago but signs of change are evident. In the short term, DND is undergoing a strategic review that sees the government targeting at least 5% savings,⁵ although there are indications that it could be higher. I think we can reasonably forecast that, as the government looks to balance the budget, DND will face some serious belt tightening.

Over the longer term, while there is no current indication of a sea change for defence funding, it is unlikely the growth trends we have seen recently will continue. Ultimately, we have to ask whether Canadians, facing declining services and rising costs, will be willing to see more of their tax dollars going into the military.

Adapting to a Changing Situation

As the CF looks to its post Afghanistan future, it faces some difficult decisions. The Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) provides a good framework for CF capability development going forward. However, the resource issue is the critical consideration in achieving it and it will require tough choices to meet the governments defence objectives, while living within its means.

Given the changing global environment and the range of risks expected to be faced, the questions for the CF leadership are: what capability does the CF need in order to meet the national defence objectives and, given the resources available, how best does it meet those requirements? Or, stated a different way, what is the best combination of people and weapon systems of particular

capabilities, according to an appropriate operational strategy, for the kind of conflict the CF expects to face?

In answering these questions the military should not ignore the past decade of experience. This means incorporating the lessons learned and maintaining the relevant expertise and capabilities developed through that period. The CF also has to be able to invest in new capabilities to meet the needs of a changing conflict environment and to capitalize on new technologies.

But addressing these capability issues in the light of a constrained budget isn't the whole problem.

Rising Costs and Affordability.

The other side of the resource equation is the fact that the cost of defence is going up. In part this is due to the historically higher levels of inflation in defence procurement.⁶ But mostly, these increased costs are due to replacing old systems with new and more expensive technology. The result is that a modern weapons platform, be it a fighter, a frigate or an armoured fighting vehicle, will possess greatly increased capability over its predecessor. But at a capital and a sustainment cost that is often many times higher. As a consequence, the CF can afford far fewer replacement systems. This numeric reduction may be offset by the new systems superior performance and capability, but such offsets have their limits. The reality is the CF must accept significant cost increases for fleet replacements to maintain a minimally viable fleet size.⁷

In addition, given the fact that most major weapons platforms are produced by very few suppliers, the cost situation may well be exacerbated by the global economic situation. With nations facing tough economic decisions, there is a real potential for reduced or cancelled equipment purchases to negatively impact economies, resulting in increased costs to all buyers.

The other big challenge the CF faces is maintaining its personnel base. Arguably the greatest limitation the CF faces today, either in terms of operations or maintaining capability, is the growing shortage of people.⁸ Given the changing national demographic, the CF is facing stiff competition for Canadians entering the workforce, as its traditional recruitment base shrinks and the size of the youth cohort in Canada plateaus. As the competition for

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“The growth in capability and the successful participation in combat, along side our NATO allies, has restored the credibility and personal self worth so essential to the fighting men and women.”

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talent goes up so will personnel costs, which will put more pressure on the budget. Without an adequate supply of intelligent, energetic, young talent, and the dollars to pay them, the CF will not be able to maintain its capabilities.

In short, rapidly rising costs in an environment of increased austerity pose major difficulties for the CF's key task of maintaining appropriate defence capability.

The CF Leadership Challenge.

There is no doubt that the current CF leadership faces challenges every bit as difficult as those of the 1990's. The situation demands an all encompassing view of the defence problem and innovative solutions for the future.



Photo Source: airforce.ca

For many years, the military strategy has been to maintain a core combat capability that provides a basic defence framework for Canada; principally the defence of our maritime and air approaches and a small, deployable maritime, land and air capability for expeditionary missions. It has been shown to be a pragmatic concept that has served the nation well. Departure from this strategy is fraught with considerable risk and government must be cautious in considering any sea change.

But sustaining this capability base in a manner that is also relevant to the changing security environment and with the resources likely to be available, is not going to be easy. It will require a careful balancing of the capabilities to be maintained and will ultimately mean establishing some

tough priorities. Trying to be all things to all people will not work.

In the final analysis, transforming the CF and maintaining a viable defence capability for Canada will demand vision and a risk management approach that accepts gaps while taking into account the potential for the unknown. As the old saying goes, the real challenge is not to get it all right but to avoid getting it badly wrong

But the challenge is not limited to the CF leadership's prowess at force development, or their ability to make tough choices. Rather, their problem is one of national proportions. There was a time when these issues were almost exclusively the business of the CF leadership and few questioned their expertise and advice. But the CF will increasingly need to contend with a growing interest in the need for, and cost of, military capability. Canadians long ago stopped accepting the wishes of political leaders just because they said so and military leaders can expect similar treatment. Whether it's billions of tax dollars for new aircraft, ships or AFVs, the essentiality of the requirement and best value for money are factors Canadians will want to understand. As part of that dynamic, the CF will need to articulate whether the threats we perceive are as serious as we believe them to be. If Canadians are to sacrifice for defence capability, they need to be convinced of the need.

Summary

Given Canada's defence requirements and the resource issues faced, I have no doubt that a legitimate argument can be made for maintaining or even increasing the defence budget. But the nation faces real economic challenges and the government will have to make some tough choices. This means that Canada's defence strategy and the CF's requirements for resources, must be clear and credible to all stakeholders.

In the final analysis, the ability of the CF to maintain an effective defence capability rests largely on the government's ability to convince Canadians of the essentiality of Canada's role in maintaining global security. But it also depends on the CF's ability to maintain its credibility as an effective and valued national institution. This means being able to transform the CF while providing the nation with best value for the dollars it has invested.

¹ National Defence Report on Plans and Priorities 2010-2011.

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² See “Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation” adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon 19-20 November 2010.

³ On 4 October 2010, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke delivered a speech before the Annual Meeting of the Rhode Island Public Expenditure Council in Providence, Rhode Island. In the speech, he warned about the current state of the government finances concluding that the situation is dire and “unsustainable”. There have been many such calls since.

⁴ See 2011 Federal Budget Chapter 5—Plan for Returning to Balance Budget, June 6, 2011.

⁵ DND was directed to submit a strategic review in 2010 to cut five per cent from its budget. Although no decisions have been announced on that plan, it is anticipated that, given the governments stated intent that “the Strategic and Operating Review will support the return to balanced budgets” the defence budget will address at least 5% of the target reduction.

⁶ See Professor David Kirkpatrick, RUSI Defence Systems, Oct 2008. He argues that “defence inflation is likely to be consistently about three percentage points above the GDP deflator”. While this assessment has been debated, a review of the extensive literature on the subject would suggest a general assessment that defence inflation is considerably higher.

⁷ See LGen Ken Pennie, Strategy and the F-35, Frontline Defence Issue 3, 2011 for a articulation of the challenge of balancing numbers and capability.

⁸ For more in depth view of the author’s assessment, see Mike Jeffery, The Competition for People—the Military’s Next Big Challenge, CDFAI “The Dispatch” Winter 2009 (Vol VII, Issue IV)

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Remembering Task Force Orion



Written by:
Anne Irwin

In early August of this year former members of Task Force Orion held a reunion, timed to coincide with the 5th anniversary of the deaths of Corporal Chris Reid, Sergeant Vaughn Ingram, Corporal Bryce Keller and Private Kevin Dallaire. To my great regret, family commitments prevented me from attending, but the event, combined with the fact of the end of Canada's combat mission in Afghanistan, inspired me to reflect on the tour and the impact it had on Canadian civil-military relations and on the self-image of Canadian servicemen and women. It is no exaggeration to state that the Afghanistan tour from February 2006 to August 2006 was a watershed event in civil-military relations in Canada. The tour also caused a sea-change in how members of the military, especially those serving with Task Force Orion, perceived their roles as soldiers. For those who served with Task Force Orion, the tour will always be one of the most intense and memorable experiences of their lives.



Photo Source: afpp-international.com

To the majority of the Canadian population the Canadian Forces prior to 2006 were largely irrelevant. Most Canadians subscribed to the myth of Canadian peacekeeping, the belief that the primary role of the CF was to perform peacekeeping missions under the auspices of the UN. The commitment of troops to Afghanistan was largely ignored and few Canadians knew or cared that members of the CF were going to be involved in what was soon to be a combat mission. The response of the University of Calgary's risk managers to my proposed research in Afghanistan was emblematic of

this ignorance: While Afghanistan was considered too dangerous an environment in which to conduct research, the fact that I would be constantly under the protection and in the company of the Task Force was considered to be enough of a mitigating factor that my research was approved. At the beginning of 2006 even senior members of the CF deemed it appropriate for me to participate fully as a researcher with the Task Force.

Members of the CF who were serving overseas with Task Force Orion had all joined a military that had not served in combat for more than a generation. Many of these soldiers themselves had bought into the myth of Canadian peacekeeping. Many of them had served on previous peacekeeping missions, but their training had been devoted to war fighting. Their self-perception was a complex and contradictory mix of thinking of themselves as professional warriors, well-trained, but experienced, in peacekeeping of various kinds. Many of the soldiers whom I had studied in the years prior to 2006 regretted that they had not had the opportunity to be tested in a combat environment, whether as individuals or as combat units. Others had expressed to me the belief that only fools would want to go to war or to be involved in true combat.

As late as March and April of 2006 soldiers serving with the Task Force talked about how much like a training exercise the tour was: Some of them waiting for the climactic final simulated battle that would precede the radio signal "Endex" (marking the end of the exercise.) In May of 2006, I witnessed an interaction between section commanders and a platoon commander during which section commanders, complaining about the extreme demands on the troops, argued in response to the Platoon Commander's comment, "this is war, gentlemen", that Canada had not declared war and that this was not war.

Over the course of the tour, however, these attitudes changed dramatically. As the death toll rose and as the tempo of the tour increased, the Canadian public came gradually to the realization that members of the CF were involved in counter-insurgency warfare, in part due to the largely positive media attention. Although the mission itself remained controversial, public support for the CF grew to an extent arguably not seen since the second world war. This was reflected in reports in August of an upsurge in recruiting.

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As for the soldiers themselves, a new sense of pride in their professionalism became evident. They had indeed been tested, as individuals and as combat units, and had performed beyond what anyone could have asked. Yet, interestingly, a number of soldiers expressed concern over the motivation of those seeking to join the Forces under these new circumstances, suspecting them of seeking the thrill of combat. Those who served on that watershed tour share a bond that was forged under extreme conditions. Many are suffering from physical and psychological wounds that will affect them the rest of their lives. Many returned to Afghanistan for two or three more tours, but the 2006 tour will remain a profound experience. It is my fervent hope that now that the combat mission is over the Canadian public and the government of Canada will forget neither the veterans of the Afghan mission nor the currently serving members of the CF.



Photo Source: army.forces.gc.ca

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Libya, the F-35 Debate and Some Other New Trends



Written by:
Eric Lerhe

With the election of a Conservative majority government one might expect the Canadian debate over the F-35 purchase will soon come to an end.

I do not think so, if only because the 'sticker shock' of a \$9 billion defence purchase will continue to upset many. There is also a prevailing sense that the rationale for having such a costly 5th generation aircraft has not been made. DND's assertion that their in-house expert review of the competing aircraft only lead to one satisfactory aircraft, the F-35, has not been convincing to many. When you spend \$9 billion to purchase and \$7 billion to maintain a capability, hard data is needed. In addition to better arguments, one might also hope a continuing debate on the F-35 would raise broader issues of Canadian defence policy. I will turn to some of these at the end of this piece.

A discussion of the F-35 can be difficult when much of the high cost comes from a heavily classified capability like stealth. On the other hand, the internet has thousands of entries for aircraft stealth and only a few hours work is

needed to produce something like the following rough table to fill in what the government could not provide on the F-35 purchase.¹

There are hundreds of factors that will alter these radar cross-section and detection range figures. These include radar frequency, aircraft aspect (whether it is pointing at the tracking radar or not), configuration (are its bomb doors open?) and height to name but a few. However, I am confident that the rough orders of magnitude displayed in the table will hold up to scrutiny as there is a surprising level of agreement on them on the internet.

The table's collective data is quite startling. For example, a new F/A-18E/F is over fifteen times stealthier than our older CF-18. That you can improve a design that much is impressive, but if you want really significant increases in stealth a new design seems to be required. The F-22's radar signature is reportedly 1,000 times smaller than the F-15 it replaces.² The F-35 radar cross-section is likely 1,000 times smaller than that of our existing CF-18.

The resulting impact of a smaller radar cross-section (RCS) on detection range shown in the table may not initially appear as dramatic. Their effects certainly are. For example when an attacking aircraft's RCS falls down

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	Radar Cross-Section (Square Meters)	Detection range (Kilometers from an air defence radar)
Airliner, B-52	100 (car)	370
B-1, F15	10	300
F/A-18A, CF-18	5	270
F/A-18C/D	1 (man)	200
Typhoon	.5	100
F/A-18E/F	.3	80
F-117	.1 (small bird)	38
B-2, F-35, F-22	.01-.005 (insect)	18

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to 1 square metre (F/A 18 C/D) and the range at which it can be detected falls below 250 kilometers, one can no longer rely on ground alert interceptor aircraft, our traditional approach, to successfully defend an area against it.³ If detection comes this late, there is not enough time within a 15 minute alert posture to launch and make it to intercept.⁴ To overcome late detections, one is forced to rely on airborne combat air patrols for defence realizing this will eat up 10 to 20 fighters to maintain two on station over one vital point.

The other option is to rely on thousands of surface-to-air missile and gun systems (like the Libyans do). These systems must be placed very close, that is within 5 kilometres, of each vital point. However once detection ranges fall to the F-117's 38 kilometres detection range, missile and gun systems will fail 99% of the time because they cannot move from detection, to target identification (friend or foe?), to missile launch quickly enough to make an intercept on a fast closing fighter bomber. The F-117 first flew 30 years ago.

This was all proven to dramatic effect during the first Gulf War as this assessment makes clear.

A typical non-stealth attack package in Desert Storm required 38 Air force, Navy, Marine and Saudi aircraft to enable 8 of those aircraft to deliver bombs on three aim points. Yet at the same time, only 20

stealthy F-117s simultaneously attacked 37 aim points successfully in the face of a far more challenging Iraqi surface-to-air defensive threat. The difference was more than a 1,200 percent increase in target coverage with 47 percent fewer aircraft.⁵

The US Air Force then devoted itself to stealth aircraft and proceeded to eliminate apparently unnecessary supporting aircraft.⁶

This direction was reassessed after two successful Serbian intercepts of F-117 stealth aircraft in 1999 during Operation Allied Force. One was damaged and returned to base while the other was actually shot down. The latter was achieved at very close range, using an older missile system operating at a lower than normal frequency range, allegedly when the F-117 had a malfunction that kept its bomb doors open, during a period when US electronic intelligence support aircraft were unable to provide warning of this unusual Serbian missile radar activity.⁷ The fact that over eighteen aircraft were then put at risk to rescue the downed F-117 pilot soon suggested to the US Air Force that even stealth aircraft should now receive extensive electronic warfare support from other aircraft.⁸

Off Libya this year, the air war began with cruise missiles and the B-2 strikes followed with non-US aircraft like the CF-18, Rafael, Typhoon, Tornado, F-16 and Étendard aircraft. These latter aircraft took over most of the

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


Photo Source: navy-matters.beedall.com

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bombing work as the US withdrew its attack aircraft and transitioned to a supporting role on 28 March 2011. It seems clear, however, that the European owners of these aircraft were able to convince the US to keep its electronic warfare support aircraft in the campaign.⁹ This electronic warfare capability is rare to non-existent outside the US military.

What then does this mean for Canada? First, stealth is required now. Further, once the majority of allied air forces convert to stealth aircraft they will have zero interest in a nation still operating older aircraft with 1000 times their radar cross section flying anywhere near them. Surprise would be totally lost. In fact, the only role of a CF 18 in a few years will be as a diversion or decoy. Second, all fighter bombers, including stealthy ones, need the support of the limited number of electronic warfare aircraft available. One can safely predict that a future air campaign commander will dedicate his scarce electronic warfare assets to the most capable aircraft flying against the most defended targets deep in enemy territory. Finally, older designs like the F/A-18 can be made stealthier, but this seems to have peaked with the F/A-18 E/F. While 15 times stealthier than the CF-18, the F/A-18 E/F's radar cross section is ten to fifty times larger than that of an F-35 with stealth part of its original design.

Canada could, of course, decide not to participate in these types of air operations noting that the Libyan air defence network hardly provides the most complex, or difficult, of scenarios. In the past such a Canadian decision would have rested on the assumption that the US would pick up the slack. This is now a doubtful option. The US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mullens, has declared that US debt is "the single biggest threat to our national security."¹⁰ The US Secretary of State indicated that America expects allies to take greater responsibility for meeting the security threats in their region.¹¹ As a result, NATO, and particularly the European allies, were expected to carry the weight of the Libyan campaign.

The Libyan campaign has shown that even when genocide is directly threatened only a small number of NATO nations, seven in this particular case, will be able to quickly muster the will and the equipment for the attack mission. The US Secretary of Defence also noted this very limited allied response in Libya, the continued overreliance on the US elsewhere and the uneven European commitment to Afghanistan. He then predicted "a dim, if not dismal, future" for NATO if these types of imbalances were not addressed.¹²

Prime Minister Harper has recognized this changed security landscape stating "we will have to be prepared to contribute more" in the face of a "diminishing" US ability to "single-handedly shape outcomes and protect our interests."¹³ This all means Canada must have a military capable of operating overseas with our allies. In that regard the evidence seems overwhelming that the F-35 is the only aircraft that will meet what will soon be mandatory levels of stealth for the long-term. Thankfully, the Canada First Defence Strategy's capital plan provides that aircraft if, perhaps, in less numbers than was desired. Moreover, the Canada First plan also replaces aging ships and land equipment. These too are needed and must meet the evolving standards of modern warfare. What seems clear, however, is that the public needs more forthright and more detailed rationales for each of these multi-billion dollar buys than they have seen to date.

¹ I found none of this material from government sources and, instead, relied most heavily on the following sites covering aircraft radar cross section: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/stealth-aircraft-rcs.htm> accessed 9 July 2011; www.f-16.net/f-16_forum_viewtop-t-3018-start-30.html accessed 9 July 2011 and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stealth_aircraft accessed 9 July 2011.

² Hardy, Scott A., LCDR, "The Search of Air Dominance: Stealth versus SEAD," Paper presented at Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell, Alabama, April 2006, p.20.

³ Sendstad, Ole, Jakob; LCDR Thomas Siensvick; Arne Cato Jeanssen, "Area Air Defence as a Network Enable Capability for the New Norwegian Frigates," Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 1 Sept 2006.

⁴ This is true even if the defending fighters are at an airfield 80 kilometers from the point they must defend—a relatively ideal scenario.

⁵ Lambeth, Benjamin S., *The Transformation of American Airpower*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000 p. 156.

⁶ Hardy, p. 9, 16.

⁷ Hardy, p. 17.

⁸ Hardy, p. iv, vi, 11, and 16.

⁹ These include F-16 CD and EF-18G aircraft tasked to jam and destroy Libyan radars and U-2, E-8, and P-3 and EC-130 elint or recce aircraft. _____, "US Still Flying Strike Missions in Libya," Defence Web, 4 July 2011, at http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=16859:us-still-flying-strike-missions-in-libya&catid=56:diplomacy-a-peace&item accessed 9 July 2011.

¹⁰ Mullins, Mike, Admiral, "Address to Government Executive Media Group," JCS Page, <http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?ID=1591> accessed 4 June 2011.

¹¹ Haas, Richard, F., "A Conversation with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton," *Council on Foreign Relations*, 8 Sept 2010, at <http://www.cfr.org/diplomacy/conversation-us-secretary-state-hillary-rodham-clinton/p22896> accessed 11 July 2010.

¹² _____, "Head off NATO's 'dismal future'" *The Globe and Mail*, 12 June 2011.

¹³ Whyte, Kenneth, "In Conversation: Stephen Harper," *Macleans.ca*, 5 July 2011 at <http://www2.macleans.ca/2011/07/05/how-he-sees-canada%E2%80%99s-role-in-the-world-and-where-he-wants-to-take-the-country> accessed 11 July 2011.

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The Art of Alliancemanhip



Written by:
Colin Robertson

While serving at the UN during the Cold War era, we were discussing with some Eastern Bloc colleagues what it was like to be a neighbour to a superpower. One of my compatriots was going on about the arrogance and indignities of living beside the American elephant. After listening for a while an older Polish diplomat turned to me with a half-smile and said: "Would you rather be us?"

The ongoing anxieties of aliancemanhip notwithstanding, living beside Uncle Sam has served Canada well as an ally, partner in trade and investment, and as a fellow steward of our shared environment. We've developed a model for 'neighbourliness' that set an early example for disarmament (the Rush-Bagot Treaty on the Great Lakes), joint and effective institutions (International Joint Commission), doing big 'projects' like the St. Lawrence Seaway and dealing with Acid Rain, as well as aliancemanhip through NORAD and NATO have all worked to our mutual security and economic benefit.

Fortunately for us, America will remain the principal power well into the 21st century, especially now that it is addressing its Micawber-like finances. Its preponderant military capacity makes it, and often obliges it, to be both an international lifeguard and global policeman. A combination of humanitarian obligation – the Balkans, East Timor, Haiti and Libya – a war of necessity, Afghanistan, and a war of choice, Iraq, has exacted a high price in blood, treasure and national comity. American enthusiasm for interventionism has dulled.

Meanwhile, the four horsemen of the Apocalypse continue to create havoc. To their traditional brew of war, famine, disease and pestilence, we've added the contemporary threats of nuclear proliferation, global warming, cyber warfare, pandemics and new-age terrorism. We can anticipate more calls on the international community to meet the challenges of 'natural' disasters and the needs of failed and failing states. While we can rely on the US as first-responder, a weary and more wary America has already served notice that it expects that the rest of the international community will do their part and to contribute more than just words and sanctimony.

Canadian capacity at the sharp edge depends mostly on the Canadian Forces. This means sustained recruitment and training for our men and women who serve. It also means continued investment in their kit: purchasing the planes that fly over our skies and laying the keels for the ships that guard our sea-lanes, as well as building the tanks and carriers necessary for our expeditionary forces. The Canada First Defence Strategy, with its more muscular commitment to our security, including a visible presence in the Arctic, goes a long way to providing the necessary vision to keeping our homeland 'safe'. The test for our leadership is to meet the timetable for recruitment of people and procurement of kit that we need to hold up our end as a reliable ally and trusted partner.



Photo Source: rechargenews.com

For American leadership, the relationship with Canada starts with our security partnership. Since Franklin Roosevelt met with Mackenzie King in Kingston in 1938, the US has pledged to protect Canada. In return, Canada must do its part to protect itself, with the implicit understanding that if we don't do our part, the Americans will do it for us. There is also an explicit recognition, through our willing and active participation in NATO, that Canada is committed to collective security. In practical terms, this means helping the US bear the burden of global responsibility when things go bad.

Managing this relationship involves what Mackenzie King called the art of 'aliancemanhip'. It's a continuing challenge, not just keeping up with American innovation in the art of warfare, but in defining the nature of Canada's role when America goes abroad in 'search of monsters'.

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Do we join the 'coalitions of the willing'? If not, how far do we take our distance from the conflict? We visibly sat out Vietnam and Iraq but we were hardly neutrals in either instance. This is the price of collective security, something that our forefathers worked hard to achieve with the creation of NATO. It's a concept that has served Canadian interests very well even though we have sometimes failed to hold up our end.

The end of the Cold War changed how Americans view their global security relationships. When, in the wake of 9-11, the curtain came down on the 49th parallel we found ourselves on the other side of what is increasingly a thickening border. Its uncomfortable, costly and mutually disadvantageous.

But for Americans, security comes first. Anxieties about another attack, coupled with mythology on where the 9-11 terrorists came from, means that American confidence in Canadian reliability as an ally and security partner will depend on how we secure our perimeter and manage homeland security.

Drawing on the experience of NORAD, recreating a security perimeter for the 21st century will require joint sharing and pooling of information related to law enforcement, intelligence and migration. It means continuing investment in our intelligence and law enforcement agencies. It also means a joint 'smart' cyber-approach with built-in resiliencies to our vital arteries: our grids, pipelines, bridges, roads, rail and air systems.

We've a trump card in jobs, something Americans are desperate to create. Going back to the days of Mackenzie King and through the Autopact, Free Trade Agreement

and NAFTA we've created the world's biggest bilateral trading relationship. Now we need to reinforce the chain dynamic that creates jobs in both our countries by addressing our border and the regulatory thicket that takes away from our competitive edge. The rest of the world is not waiting for us to get our act together.

Dealing with the U.S. is time-consuming. Occasionally it involves expense, although not nearly as much as it would if we were not friends, partners and allies. It can be frustrating, in part because we're not a problem in American eyes and, therefore, not of urgent or immediate concern.

Learning and practicing the art of 'alliancemanship' is well worth the investment and the entrée it gives us in Washington. When we play our hand well, and forget the chip on our shoulder, we deal with Americans better than anyone else. Importantly, we can also leverage our relationship to our advantage in the wider world and then parlay this back to the Washington table, with even advantage to our interests.

And, as John Holmes, that world-wise, diplomat-scholar told me years ago, when we're really on our game with Uncle Sam, we can also tell him when his breath is bad. Not something my Eastern Bloc colleagues ever dared do to their superpower neighbour.

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
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CDFAI was created to address the ongoing discrepancy between what Canadians need to know about Canadian international activities and what they do know. Historically, Canadians tend to think of foreign policy – if they think of it at all – as a matter of trade and markets. They are unaware of the importance of Canada engaging diplomatically, militarily, and with international aid in the ongoing struggle to maintain a world that is friendly to the free flow of goods, services, people and ideas across borders and the spread of human rights. They are largely unaware of the connection between a prosperous and free Canada and a world of globalization and liberal internationalism.

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