ABOUT CDFAI

A charitable organization founded in 2001, CDFAI disseminates materials and carries out activities to promote understanding and stimulate discussion of national defence and foreign affairs issues relevant to Canada. We are developing a body of knowledge to be used for Canadian policy development, media analysis and educational support.

Our distinguished network of Fellows supports CDFAI by authoring academic and policy papers.

MISSION

To be a catalyst for innovative Canadian global engagement.

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Article Summaries from the Assistant Editor

Sanctions and Myanmar’s “New Look” Government
Hrach Gregorian concludes that as a result of western sanctions on Burma, Chinese and Indian influence and investment have greatly increased in the country. To counter this influence and mistrust, the country turned to the west and began a gradual process of democratization to gain favour in the hopes that sanctions would be lifted.

Legislative Oversight and National Security
Hugh Segal urges Canada to address the fact that the country does not have any independent oversight of its national security and intelligence agencies. He recommends developing a system based on the UK model, stating that this would be a welcome and constructive addition to the security infrastructure of Canada.

Leadership Change in China
Rob Wright stipulates that the newly selected members of the Chinese Standing Committee of the Poliburo will continue to pursue the same economic and social direction set by the past members of the Committee and Harper will have to work hard to build relationships amidst the numerous nations vying for China’s attention.

Eurogeddon and the Stresses on European Unity
David Pratt warns that we must not underestimate the economic and security implications of the European financial crisis. As countries have become increasingly interdependent following WWII, the ongoing debt crisis has the potential to damage European unity, and wind back the clock on many economic and security gains dating back decades.

Where is the Big Honking Ship?
Eric Lerhe addresses the procurement challenges associated with acquiring Joint Support Ships, particularly Hillier’s amphibious “Big Honking Ships”. Unless defence policies and budget priorities are substantially modified the chances of acquiring this capability are slim.

Canada-Iran Relations
Frank Harvey states that the Government of Canada was right to cut off diplomatic relations with Iran as the country has continually demonstrated contempt for its obligations to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and toward Israel.

Retaking Canada’s Leadership in the Global Mining Industry
Sarah Meharg examines the demotion of Canadian mining companies as international leaders and recommends that if Canadian companies want to regain their leadership role they must adopt new business practices that work with the people of other countries, their economies and their cultural interests.

Pogo’s Land: The Challenge of UN Reform
Denis Stairs draws attention to Minister John Baird’s Oct 1 speech to the UN General Assembly in which he stated that Canada would no longer participate in “endless, fruitless, inward-looking exercises”. Canada cannot give up trying to work through the challenges of international organizations as this is essential to the task of statecraft.

Climate Change - Implications for National Security
Cam Ross states that the effects of climate change have a serious impact on national security. Canada must start taking the impact of climate change more seriously, especially as environmental challenges brought on by climate change will begin to take up more resources than ever before.

Canada’s Necessary Turn to the Pacific
Elinor Sloan demonstrates three reasons that make Canadian focus on the Asia-Pacific region necessary: China’s increasing military power; an overall shift in the US to focus from the Atlantic to the Pacific; and changing Canadian trade patterns towards Asia.

The ICSANT, GICNT and Canadian Policy Towards Nuclear Terrorism
Gavin Cameron examines some of the issues associated with the implementation of non-proliferation treaties. He concludes that many countries, including Canada, have started implementing treaties like the Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism, which favour working with like-minded states rather than all nations.
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Written by: David Bercuson

Toward the end of November the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy released footage of one of its J-15 fighter aircraft – roughly equivalent to the RCAF’s CF-18 fighter jets, making a take-off and landing on the Liaoning, an aircraft carrier that was little more than a hulk when purchased from Ukraine in 1998. The various fire control, communications and air launching equipment and operations of the new carrier are a closely guarded secret, but the carrier itself looks like a conventional Cold-War era diesel-electric powered carrier with a slanted flight deck and a take off ramp at the bow. The carrier is much smaller than a US Nimitz class fleet carrier and is said to have the capacity to carry some 30 of the J-15 aircraft.

Earlier in the year photos of the Liaoning appeared to show J-15 aircraft in the hangar deck (below the flight deck) visible through one of the large aircraft lifts on the port side of the carrier, but there was speculation in some quarters that the aircraft were dummies and that China was still incapable of actual flight operations. If anybody really believed that, the video clips released in November ought to prove that if China is not yet ready to deploy a modern and fully operational aircraft carrier, it isn’t long before they will be able to do so. In one of the sequences, the trapping of the J-15 looked eerily like the landing of an F/A-18 on a US navy carrier – tail hook down, the fighter neatly caught the cables stretched across the stern flight deck of the ship and came to rest only a few dozen metres from where it slammed down on the carrier deck.

Let no one doubt China’s self-proclaimed objective to eventually deploy a small fleet (a half dozen) of these aircraft carriers. China is already building a second carrier and training of Chinese naval pilots and flight deck crews is undoubtedly well advanced.

But what are China’s carriers going to do? Each US carrier battle group wields awesome power wherever in the globe US or allied interests are challenged. The US Navy today plays virtually the same global role of protector of international maritime commerce that the Royal Navy did from the age of Napoleon to the end of the Cold War. Will China help or hinder the pacification of the global common?

Does China now have ambitions to deploy carrier battle groups around the world’s oceans? How long will it be before Chinese navy carriers ply the Mediterranean, or the South Atlantic or, more likely, the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific. More to the point, will China as a global maritime power be interested in sharing responsibility for protecting free and innocent ocean passage or will it primarily aim to use its navy to intimidate its immediate neighbours in the Indo-Asian Pacific area?

One thing is certain – the new Chinese carriers, and the carriers that India will shortly acquire, herald a naval arms race in that corner of the globe the like we have not seen since the height of the Cold War. And all the while Canada proclaims itself an Asian-Pacific player but appears to be doing little or nothing to plan for the protection of Canadian maritime interests from Canada’s immediate coastal waters to the far corners of the Pacific. Realistically, there is little that Canada can do to affect the tilting balance of naval power in the Pacific, but at the very least, Canada should be examining ways in which it can help both the United States and allies in the region, such as Singapore, Australia and South Korea, cope with China’s rising naval might.

David Bercuson is the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Director of Programs, the Director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, and a former Honorary Lieutenant Colonel of the 41st Combat Engineer Regiment.
Sanctions and Myanmar’s “New Look’ Government

Written by: Hrach Gregorian (iPolitics, Nov 9)

Why, after almost 50 years of military rule, has the current Burmese (Myanmarese) strongman, Thein Sein, allowed the wedge of political and economic reform pry open his otherwise authoritarian state? The generals who benefit from state and informal corruption, patronage, monopoly rents, and drug and human trafficking are under no immediate threat of removal. In fact, the recent secession of hostilities with some of the country’s major rebel groups would appear to put the military brass even more firmly in the catbird seat. Although western sanctions have hurt, Burma’s economic situation is by no means dire. According to a 2011 Asian Development Bank report, when compared to near neighbours, Burma actually does better across a number of basic social and economic indicators. However, its overall economic record is dismal, despite abundant natural resource wealth.

A transformation of the sort Burma has initiated springs from many sources. Prominent among these would appear to be concern about the degree of Chinese social and economic penetration. Not only China, but India and other regional powerhouses have capitalized on western sanctions to advance their economic and geostrategic interests. For two decades, China has invested billions of dollars in infrastructure development projects while cheap Chinese consumer products have flooded Burmese markets. Wary of Chinese gains, India abandoned its western oriented human rights stance some time ago, and with its “Look East” policy built bridges to the military government. Current bilateral trade stands at over one billion, about one fourth of the figure for trade between Burma and China. In both cases, the balance of trade heavily favours Burma’s more powerful partners. Japan has recently stepped in with the promise of loans for a floundering project initiated in 2010 by Thailand’s largest construction conglomerate, Italian-Thai Development, to build a deep-sea port and Special Economic Zone in eastern Burma that when completed will be Southeast Asia’s largest industrial development complex.

By no means should the Burmese be cast as passive victims in the unfolding drama. In fact, the generals have proved rather adept at manipulating outsiders. They are also keenly aware of antipathy among significant sectors of Burmese society to severe environmental and social dislocations caused by large, foreign-initiated infrastructure projects. The most visible manifestation of local disaffection was the recent suspension by the Sein government of the $3.6 billion Chinese-led Myitsone dam project in northern Burma. Had the project gone forward, it would have resulted in the flooding of 766 kilometers of land and displaced 10,000 Kachin people in Kachin State. Although 90% of the power generated by the dam would have gone to China for a period of 50 years, the terms of the deal as a whole were not unfavorable to Burmese interests. The project simply increased popular resentment to a boiling point over perceived wanton treatment of local interests by external actors, including officials in Naypyidaw. A positive government response was unprecedented, and likely marked a critical turning point in the complex balancing act that has been the regime’s M.O.

A carefully orchestrated policy of political liberalization has led to rising economic engagement in Burma by Europe and North America. Sein has been wise to assume a low-key public posture in the process, allowing Burma’s most eloquent voice, opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, to carry the message of democratization to previously hostile capitals. With adoring publics now primed for change, western sanctions have been dropping like leaves in late autumn. So barring any backsliding, Burma is well on her way to joining a much larger community of nations, a transformation that will see her enjoy both dramatic economic growth and less reliance on regional hegemons. The law of unintended consequences appears to have produced the following sequence of events, if in a less linear fashion than described here. Roughly two decades of western sanctions failed to advance human rights and democratization in Burma while facilitating economic penetration by neighbours such as China. Growing distrust of Chinese, and to a lesser extent Indian, designs on Myanmar led the generals some time ago to think about using the US to

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balance a skewed power equation. This approach required opening the political system. Perhaps sanctions initiated all that has transpired since, although one would be hard pressed to argue there was any anticipation of the chain of events that followed adoption of restrictive measures.

Hrach Gregorian is President of the Institute of World Affairs (IWA) a non-governmental organization specializing in international conflict management and post-conflict peacebuilding and Associate Professor, Graduate Program in Conflict Management, Royal Roads University.

Canada & the World Speaker Series: Asia Pacific

CDFAI is hosting its fourth annual four-part Speaker Series which started in October. There are two more dinners to be held in the new year.

This series focuses on Canada’s relations with the Asia Pacific region, mainly those nations bordering the South China Sea and Japan.

The venue is the Calgary Golf & Country Club and the attendance is kept relatively small in order for everyone to engage the speaker in the moderated Q&A session.

The reception commences at 6:00 PM, with the dinner at 6:30 PM, and the evening ends by 9:15 PM.

The price for this series is $1,500 per person or $15,000 for a table of ten to the four events. CRA guidelines require a portion of each ticket purchased to be deducted from the tax receipt. (Charity Registration #87982 7913RR0001).

Dinner Dates and Speakers:

October 22, 2012: Jim Boutillier
“Defence & Security”
Special Advisor on Asia Pacific Security at the Maritime Forces Pacific Headquarters

November 20, 2012: Wendy Dobson
“Trade”
Professor at the Rotman School of Management and former President of the CD Howe Institute

February 5, 2013: Don Campbell
“Investment”
Senior Strategy Advisor at Davis LLP and former EVP at CAE who had a distinguished career with International Trade

March 7, 2013: Yuen Pau Woo
“Culture & Immigration”
President & CEO of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada

For tickets or information please contact Lynn Arsenault at (403) 231-7605 or larsenault@cdfai.org
The recent charging and guilty plea in a case of a junior Naval officer giving classified information to a foreign power reminds us all that Canada stands out from most of its G8 and NATO partners in one significant way. We do not have independent legislative oversight of our national security and intelligence agencies. This gap produces some serious challenges.

On March 23, 2011, the Special Senate Committee on Anti-Terrorism made observations within its report *Security, Freedom and the Complex Terrorist Threat: Positive Steps Ahead* regarding the issues and challenges facing Canada. A unanimous recommendation (recommendation number 16) dealt directly with this oversight deficiency, calling for a statutory legislative oversight committee, from both houses, appointed by the Prime Minister on the UK model. This reflects a bill (C-81) that fell off the Order Paper in 2005 proposing the same approach.

In a speech to the Parliamentary Centre (in November, 2011), I made the case, as Committee Chair, that the capacity and context of our national security engagement was diminished by this ongoing gap and this glaring difference between Canada and our most important allies. It is a view I still hold.

The United States has a plethora of intelligence and defence oversight committees in their Congress and Senate, a framework that I would not suggest for Canada. We have a different system of government and any approach we take must reflect that difference. But there is a Westminster model that could work well for Canada – one roundly endorsed and supported by the Cameron administration now in office and which reflects the important balance between secrecy and legitimate oversight.

In the UK, there is a Committee of Parliamentarians (which is different from a Parliamentary Committee) reflective of the main parties present in both chambers. Appointees are chosen by the Prime Minister and report annually to him on their work. That report is made public and when, or if, national security requirements demand there be some editing by the Cabinet Office of any part of the report then that information must be disclosed. Intelligence and national security matters are discussed on an organized and systematic basis, with heads of agencies appearing before the Committee of Parliamentarians to reflect on challenges, share insights, discuss plans, budgets and key competencies. The law establishing the Committee makes it legal for agency heads to share information. In Canada, no law allows any senior defence, intelligence, police or security official to share information with parliamentarians who do not have a security clearance as high as that of the official. In fact, the law makes the opposite assertion. Only Ministers have the clearance necessary to have access to this kind of frank discussion.

The UK system, established in 1994, and which has never had a leak regarding its proceedings, does not in any way dilute the Ministerial responsibility to parliament for the agencies that operate under his or her jurisdiction. Nor does it interfere in day-to-day operational issues or the important chain of command that exists in national governance.
security, defence intelligence or police agencies. Why would such an approach be of value in Canada?

First of all, it would move us beyond the retroactive, complaints-driven, limited role of SIRC (the Security and Intelligence Review Committee) made up of distinguished and trustworthy former elected officials or community leaders. They do good work. But they look backward and retroactivity is no way to look ahead. Beyond this, it would allow Canadian service heads an opportunity to discuss some of their medium and long-term intelligence and security concerns in a way that educates parliamentarians and provides them with a clear sense of the challenge framework. Conversely, this approach provides service heads with a sense of how legislators would react to some of the challenges and choices ahead. Moreover, with legislators from both houses who bring specific defence, police, community, government operations and business experience to their task, there would be benefit flowing both ways.

The absence of legislative oversight means that service heads and senior officers get to talk only to their superiors and inter-departmental counterparts, if at all. Often, if and when things go off track, fresh perspective and open-mindedness may well be diminished in these circles, to be charitable.

The Prime Minister deserves great credit for the new National Security Committee structure he has implemented within the Privy Council after the most recent federal election. A properly established Legislative Oversight Committee would be a welcome and constructive addition to the security infrastructure of Canada.

No intelligence or security official canvassed informally at the time of the Senate Committee’s report in March, 2011, seemed troubled by the proposition. There is no reason for a thoughtful government to be troubled by a statutory legislative review process where competence, discretion, judgement and legislators support and enhance the democratic underpinnings of the national security our officials are sworn to protect.

Hugh Segal served in the public and private sector for thirty-three years before being appointed by Prime Minister Martin to the Senate as a Conservative in 2005. He is an Adjunct Professor (Public Policy) at the Queen’s School of Business.

1 http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committees/403/anti/rep/rep03mari1-e.pdf
Leadership Change in China

Written by: Rob Wright

The world’s two largest superpowers have changed their leadership. The contrast in process is remarkable. Most Americans were beaten into political exhaustion by the seemingly endless US electoral process. Meanwhile, in China everything unfolded according to plan: after a week of private deliberations, and many months of internal political lobbying and infighting, the National Congress of Communist Party paraded, in careful order, the seven members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo onto the stage of the Great Hall of the People in Tiananmen Square. In doing so, they formalized decisions on Party leadership for at least the next five years.

In China, of course, the Communist Party has a monopoly on leadership. The government administers, but the Party appoints, the leaders from within its own ranks, controls the military and sets the direction for important decisions. The key decision making body of the Party is the Standing Committee which acts as a collective leadership and controls the levers in the second most powerful country in the world.

There were no major surprises in the seven appointments, but proponents of accelerated reform will be disappointed. Xi Jinping was confirmed as Party General Secretary and will replace Hu Jintao as President of China at the National People’s Congress next March. Li Keqiang will replace Wen Jiabao as Prime Minister. The other five members appointed to the Standing Committee suggest that the more conservative wing of the Party has maintained the balance of power. The signal sent to the Chinese people is not to expect significant change, at least in the short-term. It is unfortunate that the Party did not take the opportunity to appoint reform-minded members such as Wang Yang, the Party Secretary of Guangdong Province in southern China who has been seen as an innovative force for more rapid social, economic and political change.

Although change may be inevitable in China, it would be a mistake to assume that any significant moves will occur in the near term. The whole process of leadership change has been designed to ensure continuity and stability. The new team is already sending signals domestically and internationally that the direction of economic and social development in China will continue and that they will not tolerate actions that could lead to political instability.

The preoccupation of the new leadership over the coming months will be to confirm their credibility as effective stewards of the Chinese economy. They will recommit the Party to addressing issues of health care delivery, education, disparities in economic growth between the large cities and the countryside and the ongoing degradation of the environment, in particular air and water quality. Most importantly Xi Jinping in his acceptance speech has already sent the message that the senior Party leadership will deal quickly and harshly with corruption within the Party at all levels. The Party’s credibility has been seriously undermined by ongoing stories, widely read on Chinese social media sites, of enormous wealth and privilege accumulated by senior Party members and their families, including the families of the incoming President and outgoing Prime Minister. The purge of Bo Xilai, (the son of a revolutionary hero, former Mayor of Dalian, Minister of Commerce and Party Secretary of Chongqing, the largest municipality in China) was the clearest signal yet that the Party recognizes the

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vulnerability to its power if these problems are not seen to be addressed. (Although there is little doubt that Bo, like many senior Chinese politicians, has been for years enriching himself and his family through his political positions, his expulsion from the Party just before the Congress may also be attributed to his particular brand of political populism and leadership ambitions).

As Vice President and heir-apparent Xi Jinping has already traveled extensively over the last few years and met many world leaders. We should not expect any significant changes in China’s positions on major international issues. The leadership of China will welcome the recognition of the international community. They will want to be seen as cooperative on global economic issues, but will continue to draw “red lines” under those issues that they consider to be “core” Chinese interests, including Taiwan, Tibet and their ambitious and unsubstantiated territorial claims in the East China and South China seas. As usual they will strongly resist what they perceive as outside “interference” in their domestic affairs, including human rights and the absence of the rule of law.

After a slow start, the Prime Minister has recognized the importance of China to Canada and has moved on from his early public confrontations with Chinese leaders. The new leadership in China provides the Prime Minister and the Canadian government with a great opportunity to construct the basis for a solid relationship over the next decade. The competition from world leaders for China’s attention will be intense. The Prime Minister will be seeing a lot more of Xi Jinping at the G20 and other international meetings over the coming years. The best way to pursue Canadian interests in China will be through these high-level personal contacts and consistency of message. We can encourage change in China but we should be realistic in our expectations. The new Chinese leadership will continue to value Canada as an important and credible middle power with a good international reputation. They see us as a growing trade partner and a potential site for major Chinese investments. They would, in all likelihood, welcome an initiative to deepen our economic relationship. However they don’t like public confrontation and if their initiatives to invest in resource sectors become politicized we should expect that they will quickly back away and look for opportunities elsewhere.

Rob Wright served as Canadian Ambassador to China from 2005-2009. He served as the Ambassador to Japan from 2001-2005.
The terms “Eurogeddon” and “Eurodammerung” have come into vogue this year to describe the European financial crisis. While some might find them dramatic, the economic and security implications of what is unfolding in Europe should not be under-estimated.

The gravity of the sovereign debt crisis and the potential unravelling of the European monetary union threaten to set back the dream of European unity and wind back the clock on many economic and security gains dating back decades.

In the post war period, greater economic integration and security cooperation were seen by many as critical if Western Europe was to avoid yet another internal war and defend itself against the external menace of Soviet communism. As Lord Ismay, NATO's first Secretary General, stated in 1949, the purpose of the North Atlantic Alliance was "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down."

Economic integration followed the creation of NATO with the Treaty of Paris in 1951 and the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community. This in turn laid the foundations for the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and the European Economic Community.

The story of Europe in the decades of the Cold War was one of slow but steady economic and political integration. Tariff barriers came down, a customs union was established, agricultural, trade and transport policies were harmonized, the EEC expanded and the European Parliament gained more power.

The demise of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall had some unintended political and economic consequences for Europe. While Lord Ismay’s objective of keeping “the Germans down” militarily was achieved, keeping them down as an economic power was neither desirable nor possible.

Conjuring up the ghosts of the past, the prospect of a united Germany was viewed with alarm by the French and particularly Francois Mitterand. The French solution was to tie Germany ever more tightly to a united Europe. And for their part, the Germans were happy to oblige. For Helmut Kohl, German and European unification were “two sides of the same coin.”

It was not long before an aggressive plan for a European monetary union and deeper inter-governmental cooperation was hammered out in Strasbourg in December of 1989. Two years later, the Treaty of Maastricht was signed paving the way for the euro, creating the European Union and attempting to broaden and deepen intergovernmental cooperation in areas such as justice and a common foreign and security policy; although with the latter, national interests always seemed to trump a common position.

But the euro, when introduced in 1999, was built on an unstable foundation that had more to do with politics than...
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economics. With no common treasury, no shared fiscal policy or political union, and one interest rate for a set of very diverse economies, many critics felt it was only a matter of time before the euro’s weaknesses were exposed. As governments, companies and individuals steadily piled up debt during the last decade in places like Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain, all the conditions were present for a full blown economic crisis. Acting like an accelerant on insolvency, the sub-prime mortgage crisis hit in 2008 and banks in North America and Europe started failing.

The cost of borrowing has spiked upward and harsh austerity measures have had to be applied. There is mounting social unrest in Southern Europe and politicians are blaming other European countries and Europe generally for the current predicament. In a poll taken for the European Commission, trust in the European Union is at an all time low having fallen from a high of 57% in 2007 to 31% in 2012.

As Chancellor Angela Merkel struggles to reform Europe’s financial underpinnings, it is ironic that almost 70 years after the end of the war, Germany, which once brought Europe to the brink of destruction, may be the only country capable of saving it.

David Pratt is Senior Vice President of Public Affairs for GCI Canada. He is the former Advisor to the Secretary General and Special Ambassador for the Canadian Red Cross and former Minister of National Defence.

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CDFAI continues to enhance its ability to comment on Canadian international relations - events and policy - specifically in the areas of diplomacy, defence and international aid. To this end we have launched a new website featuring more content for interested Canadians and insights for the media and policy-makers. Our online presence continues to grow through Facebook, Twitter, Linkedin, and our Blog. The 3Ds Blog, moderated by Jack Granatstein, is becoming the go to source for information and analysis on Canadian defence and foreign policy. If you would like to contribute to the blog please send your submissions to contact@cdfai.org. We want to hear from you.

You can also join the conversation by visiting our Facebook page at http://www.facebook.com/CDFAI or following us on Twitter @CDFAI. You can also find us on Linkedin at http://www.linkedin.com/company/canadian-defence-and-foreign-affairs-institute.
So what are the chances of Canada acquiring General Rick Hillier’s “Big Honking Ship” or some similar amphibious capability? These vessels, currently in use by navies around the globe, regularly demonstrate their utility during disaster relief efforts and other operations. Yet in spite of their proven usefulness, sustained support for them from the Canadian military leadership, and a $35 billion national shipbuilding strategy; the reality is that unless defence policy and budget priorities are significantly reworked, the chances of the Canadian Forces acquiring such capability today are slim.

There are currently three separate options that Canada may choose to follow in order to acquire that capability: buy a second-hand amphibious ship, build one from scratch, or add some amphibious characteristics to another vessel. The Joint Support Ship concept followed the latter path, and in 2006 its design included the ability to refuel a frigate fleet, carry approximately 150 Army vehicles and transport them ashore under benign conditions using motorized barges carried by the ship. This $2.1 billion project founded when the two contractors who bid for the project were both unable to provide three ships with the full capability within the funds provided.

In 2010, the Joint Support Ship project was recast within the new National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS) with a $2.6 billion budget but with lowered specifications that provided two basic replenishment ships for the Navy with some very modest Army cargo carrying capacity — there was no longer the requirement to carry Army vehicles or get them ashore. Given the rising importance of the Arctic, the JSS specifications also insisted on a very modest ice capability. Recent indications are that the contractors will have difficulty delivering two naval replenishment ships that also have an Arctic and army cargo capacity within this funding.

The second option was to buy used. Here, Britain’s recent shedding of naval ships in 2011 appeared to offer a solution, so long as one could ignore the inevitable criticism that would arise from the Canadian government once again buying second-hand British naval vessels. Australia, however, quickly took up this opportunity and purchased for some $100 million (AUD) the HMS LARGS BAY, a 16,000 ton amphibious ship capable of embarking up to 600 troops and 150 vehicles. It had, however, no helicopter facilities and will undergo a major conversion to also provide it with command and control facilities. Some of this will come from the recently decommissioned amphibious ship HMAS MANOORA (ex- USS FAIRFAIR COUNTY (LST-1193)).

MANOORA, and its sister ship the HMAS KANIMBLA, outline some of the difficulties with buying used. While both ships were purchased in 1994 for a combined cost of $40 million (AUD) from surplus US Navy assets, they required some $400 million (AUD) in modifications and repairs. This work still proved inadequate, and both vessels continued to suffer hull and engine defects. The Australian Government offered both ships as dive wrecks to the Queensland provincial authorities this year.

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The final option is to buy new. The French MISTRAL is occasionally suggested as a possible option; and it would provide hangers, maintenance facilities, a landing deck and elevators for six helicopters, a drive-in dock for landing craft, and the ramps and storage for 150 vehicles. A full medical facility and joint operations room is also provided with accommodations for 450 troops. Indeed, a few years ago DND informally examined such a purchase and determined the construction cost (in Canada) of two of these vessels would approach $2.5 billion. This compares favourably with foreign build prices – the USS SAN ANTONIO, a single similarly sized American amphibious ship, reached $1.4 billion (USD) and the Russians are paying France €1.7 billion (or $2.1 billion) for two French-built MISTRAL.

However, a great deal of caution is required when comparing the construction cost of warships. Initial cost estimates are usually inaccurate, vary widely in what is included, and only reflect but a small part of the actual cost of the capability. Under Canadian procurement rules the government wisely insists that the full project costs include the first few years of logistic support, shipyard profit, project administration, and trials. This adds a further $1 billion to the $2.5 billion MISTRAL construction costs. Then one must include the costs for government administration, inspections, over a billion dollars to cover inflation, plus a 20% contingency fund (or insurance policy). When these various other costs were combined the project total surpassed $5 billion according to DND’s calculations.

This is but the tip of the costing iceberg. Experts argue that over the life of a vessel (or just about any major defence purchase) the personnel and operating expenses often exceed the initial purchase cost by a factor of two. This equates to a further $10 billion, and given that the Navy does not have 600 additional sailors to crew these vessels, this figure may be conservative. That $10 billion long term ownership cost (and likely more) would also apply if the decision was eventually taken to buy second-hand, given both the Canadian and Australian experience. Significantly, none of these amphibious ship options solve the navy’s pressing need to replace its two 40 year old replenishment ships. These must also be purchased and maintained.

Given the current global economic situation and the government’s goal of eliminating the federal deficit by 2015-16, it is difficult to see how an already financially strapped Canada First Defence Strategy can absorb an additional $11-$16 billion in expenses for new amphibious capabilities. It does suggest that if Canada is serious about acquiring new capabilities of such significance, and more importantly implementing a new component of the NSPS, it would be wise to begin with a defence policy review and then a re-working of the defence budget.

Eric Lerhe is a retired naval officer who served as the Commander Canadian Fleet Pacific from 2001 to 2003. Cmdre. (Ret’d) Lerhe is currently completing his doctoral degree at Dalhousie.

1 While the 2006 JSS project is frequently cited at $2.9 billion, over $800 million was for the ships’ 20-30 years of in service support. The project to acquire the three ships was set at $2.1 billion and of this only $1.6B was for actual ship construction. See Ken Bowering, “At Whatever Cost,” Ottawa Citizen, 11 Aug 2008. All further dollar values within this paper are in Canadian dollars unless marked (AUD), for Australian dollars, or (USD) for American dollars.
3 “Le Canada s’intéresse aux Mistral de DCNS” Reuters. 7 December 2010.
4 Confidential Interview, October 2012.
7 The cost escalation provisions to combat inflation over the 10 years of the project life were forecast to consume some $1.5 billion of the total project cost.
9 Several other commentators have come to the same broad conclusion. See Richard Bray, “New Hope for Canada’s ‘Big Honking Ship?’”, Frontline, no. 4 (2012), 10. See also Dave Perry, “The Navy after the Canada First Defence Strategy,” Canadian Naval Review, 9, no. 3 (2012).
Canada-Iran Relations

Written by:
Frank Harvey
(iPolitics, Oct 27)

Over a month has past since the Canadian government closed its embassy in Tehran and expelled Iranian officials from Ottawa. Now that the dust has settled, and former Canadian diplomats are no longer writing op-eds to express shock and awe at what they regard as an obvious affront to their relevance, it is probably a good time to carefully re-evaluate the move.

According to comments prepared for his July 2012 testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Daniel Byman (Director of Research at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institute) pointed out that Iran’s support for terrorism “has become more aggressive in recent years.” Iran spends hundreds of millions annually to support Lebanon’s Hizballah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas. Moreover, Tehran has shown “a renewed emphasis on terrorism outside the Israel/Lebanon/Palestine theater,” particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. In sum, Iran has directly supported activities and entities in Afghanistan that have facilitated attacks on Canadian and other NATO troops.

“Iran spends hundreds of millions annually to support Lebanon’s Hizballah and Palestinian Jihad and Hamas.”

The regime in Tehran fully embraces and explicitly endorses anti-Semitic policies in almost every pronouncement, interview or speech delivered by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad - there is nothing subtle, tactful or diplomatic about these statements. The Iranian government continues to provide direct support to the Syrian regime, its closest ally, despite widespread international and Canadian demands for Asad to step down, universal condemnation of the regime’s widespread human rights violations, and tens of thousands of deaths, and counting.

There is no sign of any diplomatic progress toward stopping Iran from refining (and ultimately deploying) weapons grade uranium, in direct violation of their non-proliferation obligations stipulated in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which are repeatedly highlighted by the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency in their voluminous reports, declarations, agreements and demands. Iran has essentially ignored all of them. Any critic who believes Canadian officials have been duped by some hyped-up WMD threats perpetrated by Israel or Washington should take the time to read these multilaterally sanctioned reports, or at least ask themselves why they don’t care, or can’t be bothered. These WMD threats also explain the very legitimate security concerns surrounding the safety of Canadian embassy officials and staff in anticipation of a highly likely military confrontation with Israel.

Diplomacy requires at least some reasonable expectation that officials in Tehran share at least some of the same values and interests. I have seen no credible evidence from any of Ahmadinejad’s statements or actions that speak to Canadian interests or values, or that privilege diplomatic solutions as a priority, so why stay? A strong principled signal from a prominent western nation to break ties with Tehran may not accomplish much, but it certainly crystallizes for many Canadians that we have a breaking point informed by values and interests that distinguish us from Ahmadinejad’s regime. For many Canadians, this principled position is worth far more than dozens of low-level diplomatic meetings or socials involving the Canadian Ambassador that would have done nothing but sustain a small part of the regime’s legitimacy. If Iran’s political and religious leaders are committed to developing a nuclear weapons capability (and there is a very compelling military-strategic rationale for acquiring this deterrent), then there is nothing any Canadian diplomat can do, say or threaten to alter this inevitability. Nothing!

And if the preceding analysis is not sufficient to justify the embassy’s closure, then consider another disturbing reason for Ottawa’s move - an increasingly urgent need to expel Iranian diplomats and staff from Canadian territory. In a recent report by CBC’s Brian Stewart, the closure may have been motivated by intelligence regarding the expansion of Iran’s diplomatic staff and the rapid proliferation of Iranian cultural centres in Europe, Asia and throughout the west. These efforts, Stewart reports, have raised serious concerns about the deployment of terrorist sleeper-cells establishing forward operating bases in anticipation of an attack by Israel or coalition forces.

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Iran’s Quds Force has been assigned responsibilities for “extraterritorial operations,” and the Deputy Chief Commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, General Hossein Salami, has explicitly warned in interviews with the Fars News Agency that “our nation is ready to rub the enemies’ snout into dust and send thousands of coffins to their cities. Any aggression against Iran will expand the war into the borders of the enemies. They know our power, and we won’t allow any aggression against our land.” How’s that for diplomacy?

Skeptics will no doubt read these statements as empty threats, but these critics should at least consider the warnings in Daniel Byman’s Senate testimony - “If Israel and/or the United States did a direct military strike on Iran’s suspected nuclear facilities, the Iranian terrorist response would be considerable.” The regime’s support for terrorism is designed, in part, “to keep its options open (and) to call in favors. We could expect attempted terrorist attacks around the world – Iran and Hizballah have shown a presence in every inhabited continent.” Byman’s conclusions are particularly ominous: “In the end, Iran’s lack of strategic options and desire to respond to what it sees as a hostile world will lead Tehran to continue to work with a range of terrorist groups and selectively use violence.”

Skeptics will no doubt read these statements as overreactions to a non-existent threat. If Iranian officials were found to be complicit in terrorist attacks on western targets, they will argue, the retaliation from the U.S. (and Canada) would be swift and devastating. But in the aftermath of two major wars and ongoing insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, at a cost of 10,000 coalition deaths and $3.7 trillion and counting, it is just as likely that the public backlash will be directed against western leaders for putting the country and the public at risk, again. If the Iranian regime is on the brink of collapse, why wouldn’t its leaders be willing to gamble in favor of launching these retaliatory strikes?

If Canadian officials have any reason at all to be concerned about Iranian sleeper cells, they have a clear, moral obligation to the Canadian public to expel Iranian officials. Case closed, even if critics reject all of the other very good (and independently sufficient) reasons described above.

Iran’s strategic options are informed, in large measure, by the regime’s need to establish counter-coercion leverage in an asymmetric war with very powerful enemies. This is not an irrational response from an unstable regime; it is a perfectly logical strategy designed to address their military weaknesses in preparation for what they regard as an inevitable Israeli/coalition attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. In the context of the Arab Spring, surrounded by an expanding number of regimes collapsing under revolutionary pressures to transform their governments, the Iranian regime is legitimately concerned about its own survival. And in light of successful US-NATO military activities in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and, soon, Syria, the obvious need to reinforce counter-coercion leverage to sustain the Iranian regime is becoming more pressing. Milosevic, Hussein, Mullah Omar, Khadafy and Asad did not have the capacity to inflict post-attack retaliations against western targets to raise the direct costs to coalition forces or to change their strategic calculations, but I suspect all of them wished they had the option. Regimes on the brink of collapse can be expected to do just about anything to survive, as Syria’s Asad is demonstrating.

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Retaking Canada’s Leadership in the Global Mining Industry

Written by: Sarah Meharg

In 2012, Canadian mining companies were quickly demoted as international industry leaders to a paltry sixth place. This quick descent in a few short months is not staid; we continue to fall in the rankings of nations to do business with.

Most attribute this decline to egregious human rights violations and environmental degradation committed by some Canadian companies in many of the countries in which they operate, however this is not the sole reason for our international decline. Increasingly, other up-and-comer countries like China are seeking extraction rights across Africa and other regions, and offering new thinking and investments in community and economic development projects in exchange for the rights. Perks include roads, theatres, and soccer stadiums. Canadian companies are still functioning under the ‘smash and grab’ perspective – get in, extract, get out – with little focus on the new ethos of community and economic development.

On 29 October in Ottawa, the North-South Institute (NSI) and Peace & Conflict Planners Canada (PCP) hosted the first of three discussions to identify research and policy recommendations for Canada to retake its leadership position in the global mining and extraction industry.

The discussion opened up to the group, representing non-governmental organizations, industry consultants, policy writers, and researchers. At the heart of the discussion was the realization that the Harper Government would not be switching directions related to throwing open the mining and extraction industry here in Canada, so it is incumbent upon Canada to create some solutions for the companies so that they affect positive change in communities – whether in Canada, or abroad – while improving their bottom line. Based on input from the group, it was established that we have a general expectation of mining companies to be responsible in a particular way, i.e. to uphold human rights, to protect the environment, and to give back to the communities in which they conduct extractions. However, these expectations are not shared by the companies, who often view the communities as obstacles to their mining and resource extractions.

People, their economies, and their cultures have become industry’s biggest challenge; one which they will never surmount.

If Canadian companies want to retake the leadership position in the global arena, they must adopt a new business practice that works with people, their economies, and their cultures to improve their own bottom line for shareholders. This is a major shift to their worldview – but one that must be imminent for Canadian companies to survive shoulder-to-shoulder with China in the developing world.

NSI and PCP are collaborating with industry experts and stakeholders to develop a social, cultural and economic program that helps both Canadian mining and natural resource companies become more profitable while improving their practices, as well as significantly benefiting affected communities for the long-term. The project aims to improve Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) practices and long-term community investments through the implementation of a “finance investment and lending” program. The program will support the development of cultural-economic-scientific business

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incubators that are community focused in the mining and natural resource communities.

The program is informed by five key perspectives on CSR in the mining and natural resource sector, and aims to establish a two-way profit system which integrates the priorities of each:

1. The importance of human and cultural interaction with the mining industry.
2. The role of national industry standards in the mining sector.
3. The need for a financial model that supports positive industry growth.
4. The importance of investment in local-level community development.
5. The role of international mining industry norms.

The objective is to build support for a financial investment system that allows mining and resource companies to invest in these Quick Impact Projects benefiting mining communities, as well as a permanent fund to facilitate investment in local economic development. The system will be based upon successful post-conflict reconstruction macro-economic systems.

Post-conflict economic reconstruction theory dictates that to protect and build a state, it is an imperative to secure its natural resources supply chain. In war, these important “life blood” assets are targeted for destruction in order to paralyze and destroy a country. After the Great War and the Second World War, mining assets and natural resources became a part of economic reconstruction priorities and policies, because the minerals and materials were desperately required to feed supply chains and energy needs. Perhaps of more importance was the ability for reconstruction economists to structure long-term investment finance models that allowed recovering countries to borrow against the inground assets.

Consumption rates guarantee these assets hold long-term growth value, and countries could borrow against the inground resources, and future extraction contracts, thereby freeing up the capital required to stabilize and reconstruct economies, industries and communities.

It is estimated that billions of dollars can be quickly accessed and strategically allocated through such a mechanism, creating significant wins for governments, industry actors, and affected communities, helping Canada retake its leadership role in the global mining and extraction industry. The next NSI-PCP co-hosted event will be held in January in Ottawa and will continue this dialogue to support an actionable program.

Sarah Jane Meharg is President of Peace & Conflict Planners Canada and serves as Adjunct Professor at the Royal Military College of Canada. She is Canada’s leading post-conflict reconstruction expert.

Open pit gold mine in Mexico
Photo Source: dominionpaper.ca
Pogo’s Land: The Challenge of UN Reform

Written by:
Denis Stairs
(Embassy, Nov 28)

Foreign Minister John Baird’s October 1 speech in the UN General Assembly has attracted a truck-load of controversies.

One of them has centered on his blunt assertion that the UN organization needs to “spend less time looking at itself, and ... more time ... on the problems that demand its attention.”

The Minister’s argument had, for him, a policy consequence. Canada, in future, could not, and would not, “participate in endless, fruitless, inward-looking exercises.”

As an expression of frustration, the Minister’s position is understandable. If the organization can’t decide how to fix itself, maybe it should put the institutional niceties to one side, and focus instead on the more responsible and rewarding task of meeting its primary responsibilities.

But as experienced foreign affairs hands like Daniel Livermore have pointed out, in the UN, as in political institutions everywhere, process and performance are inextricably linked. Mr. Baird’s position represents in that respect a remarkable departure from long-standing Canadian approaches to international organizations.

It also ignores the fundamental reality that UN institutions and the processes they embody are political creations, and the political community from which they come is the constantly evolving international community of member states. Of these, there are now 193.

To despair of the organization and the way it does its business – warts and all – is thus to despair of international politics itself. Even if the despair is well-founded, nothing can be accomplished by giving in to it. The unenviable, albeit unavoidable, task of a responsible statecraft is not to deny the realities of world affairs, but to live with them, work with them, tweak them here and there as opportunity allows, often with no more than a faint hope of getting the best out of them.

In complaining about the perennial navel-gazing at UN headquarters, Mr. Baird may have been thinking mainly of the antiquated composition and ham-stringing procedural rules of the Security Council, or the rhetorical abuses and irrepressible over-reach of the General Assembly, or perhaps the commonly alleged inadequacies of the Secretariat.

Let’s consider the last of these as an instructive example.

The UN Secretariat is an international “civil service” charged with supplying the UN’s organizational requirements in obedience to policies and directives issued by the Security Council, the General Assembly, and a host of specialized agencies that perform a wide variety of important functions, many of them related only indirectly, if at all, to the maintenance of international peace and security.

Incomprehension of the Secretariat is not unlike criticisms of government bureaucracies the world over. It is said to be inefficient and self-indulgent. Members of its staff are frequently held to be over-paid, process-bound, lacking in constructive initiative, and even under-qualified. Sometimes they appear to be nationally partisan, or inclined more to the cautious protection of their nests and turfs within the bureaucracy than to getting essential jobs done in responsible fashion.

Such charges, and others like them, run counter to what the most influential founders of the UN – Canadians prominently among them – hoped for in the early years.

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They aspired instead to the creation of a professional civil service in the British mold. Hence the provision of the UN Charter governing Secretariat appointments stipulates that “The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity.”

But the founders were not naïve. This was to be an international public service. Ideally it would be a meritocracy. But it had also to be reasonably representative; otherwise it would lack legitimacy across the political community it was intended to serve.

A second consideration was therefore added to the criteria for appointment: “Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.”

Canadians should have no difficulty understanding the reasons for adding this representational modifier to the meritocracy principle. Ask any Canadian Prime Minister who has had to compose a Cabinet.

But in the international context, the requirement carries amplified risks. Some of the governments of member states – particularly those suffering from a scarcity of well-trained public service staff – may be reluctant to nominate their best and brightest, whose skills they badly need at home. Others may use UN appointments as a means only of rewarding the politically faithful – or disposing of the politically inconvenient. Still others may think of their “representatives” as just that – “representatives”, rather than as non-partisan secondments to an organization charged with meeting, not national, but international responsibilities.

Such behaviour – not uncommon even in the developed world – compounds the weaknesses of bureaucracies everywhere. The problem is worsened by the clashes of expectation and organizational culture that inevitably afflict any truly international administrative apparatus.

It is exacerbated, too, by the fact that so many of the directives that bind the Secretariat come from multilateral diplomatic processes that often lead to their being vaguely and ambiguously phrased.

All this is inconvenient. It can be a source of waste, of delay, even occasionally of ineffectuality. But it’s an unavoidable part of the cost of doing international business through international institutions. Improvements can sometimes be introduced by fiddling with the procedures and adjusting the rules. In the right circumstances, moreover, strong leaders with the appropriate diplomatic skills can sometimes have a massive impact. In the end, however, the realities are what they are and they clearly limit the range of the possible.

The land of Pogo is the land of the human condition. It cannot be wished or exhorted away. Somehow it must be accommodated.

Canadians, proud custodians of an exceptionally diverse polity in a massive land, should easily understand why this is the case. So should their government.

“**To despair of the [United Nations] and the way it does its business—warts and all—it thus to despair of international politics itself.”**

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Canadians are an extraordinary bunch. Nowhere else on the planet will strangers have a riveting conversation about the weather within five minutes of meeting.

Regardless of our province, we seem to lay claim to the phrase ‘if you don’t like the weather, wait 10 minutes’. Be careful what you wish for.

Much has been written about climate change, especially about its causes. The Canadian scholars and scientists authoring this climate work are world class; however, what is missing in the discourse are the implications to Canada’s national security.

There is no doubt that Canada is being affected by climate change. 2012 has seen records crumble over heat (Maritimes and Ontario), drought (Prairies and BC) and snowfall accumulation (BC). Amazing scientific revelations of Arctic weather changes appear in increasing frequency.

The focus has been on the environmental here and now and not the longer-term security impact. Appreciating that the primary responsibility of government is to provide for the security of Canadians, UBC’s Margaret Purdy explains that one of the reasons why climate change is not considered a real security threat is “because security officials are preoccupied with today’s headline-grabbing files, not strategic issues.”1 Terrorism, Iran, and the South China seas might be the security flavours of the month; climate change is not.

In the international discussion around climate change, the term ‘militarization’ is increasingly prevalent. While environmentalists, upon hearing the term might flick the ‘off’ switch, the reality is that the military is the only national institution with the flexibility and resources to come to the assistance of civil authorities in times of great need. BC fires, Manitoba floods, and Quebec ice storms are obvious examples from the past.

National Defence takes these environmental threats seriously. Its January 2009 report, “The Future Security Environment 2008-2030,” deduces in a comprehensive chapter on climate “Deduction 11; Climate change will result in increasingly violent weather patterns, drought and natural disasters that will call for military support to assist victims around the world, ranging from humanitarian relief to full scale stability operations.”2 Surprisingly, two years later, the Government’s ‘Canada First Defence Strategy’ fails to mention the term climate change or discuss its long-term implications.

Purdy adds that “an enormous gap separates Canada and its closest international partners when it comes to taking climate change–security linkages seriously.”3 The UK government on the other hand, in 2008 said “Climate change is potentially the greatest challenge to global stability and security, and therefore to national security.”4 They believe so strongly in this that the UK has implemented a program to send officials overseas to promote discussion. One of these officials, Rear-Admiral Neil Morisetti, the UK Government Climate and Energy Security Envoy, has visited Canada frequently. At a 2010 School of Public Policy address in Calgary, he spoke of climate change as a national security concern and its potential of being a ‘threat multiplier’. In fact, climate change and its implications on security is part of the UK National Security Strategy.

While not the instigator of a conflict, changes to the climate will exacerbate the various threats. Loss of food, water, and habitat will cause regional chaos. Likely mass migrations of millions of people seeking safer, sustainable havens will cause regional strife. The Canadian conscience will want our ‘away team’ of military relief and aid to deploy, at a time when those scarce resources may be desperately needed domestically. What is clear is that when it comes to the environment and change, the past will be miniscule compared to the future.

In the context of developing a national security strategy, LGen Brent Scowcroft former National Security Advisor for two Presidents (Ford and HW Bush) recently said: “today’s decision makers are burdened by institutions and organizational habits of mind that were built for the Cold War, not for the 21st century”5

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During that Cold War, there was one opponent - the Soviets, who were reasonably predictable. Mother Nature is far from that.

One would hope our decision makers are not frozen in the one-threat ‘Cold War’ mentality; things are going to heat up.

Major-General (Ret’d) Cameron (Cam) Ross hold the honorary appointment of the Colonel of the Regiment of Lord Strathcona’s Horse (Royal Canadians). He is the President of HCR Security International Ltd., a private company which provides strategic advice to governments and the private sector.

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Canada’s Necessary Turn to the Pacific

Written by: Elinor Sloan

For almost twenty years Canada has spoken of playing a more active role in Asia-Pacific security. Strong statements to this effect can be found in the 1994 Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada’s Defence Policy and in the Defence White Paper that followed. Yet these perspectives faded in the decade and a half that followed. While the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy noted that the buildup of conventional forces in Asia-Pacific countries could have a significant impact on international stability, it made no policy commitments.

Today at least three developments have come together to make an increased Canadian focus on Asia-Pacific security necessary. One is the growing military power of China. The country is transforming its large, low-tech, static army into a smaller, more high-tech and mobile force; emphasizing its air force and navy; and equipping these forces with new power projection platforms. While capabilities change slowly, intentions can change quickly. In 2012 there was a succession of maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas involving China, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, and the Philippines. China’s interpretation of the rights of coastal states goes beyond the Convention on the Law of the Sea, and this has the potential to exacerbate growing tensions.

A second development is America’s response to China. The United States has officially documented the military rise of China for some years, but the Pentagon’s 2012 strategic guidance went further by announcing the U.S. military “will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.” Organizational and doctrinal changes alongside equipment investments tailored for the shift have already begun. America’s new strategy is designed to counter China, but it is also meant to bring stability to a region of major importance to international trade.

The third development centers on changing Canadian trade patterns. Since 2002, and even more precipitously since the 2008 recession, the United States has declined in importance as a trading partner for Canada. Whereas in 2002, 87% of our exports went to America, in 2011 the figure was 69.5%. Much of this delta is going to the Asia-Pacific region. How is this significantly increased volume of trade getting there?—by ocean and international shipping. For good reason the Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy has argued that a free and open global ocean commons is in Canada’s national interests: “Canada, more than any other country, relies on this global ocean order to enable the economy that brings such wealth into our country.”

The above three factors are closely linked. Should a conflict in the Asia-Pacific region escalate to include US military involvement, Canada would want to play a role because stability in the region, and free and open sea lines of communication, are so directly in our interests. Our goal would be to help contain conflict or maintain open sea lanes. The former scenario would likely call for contributing one or more frigates to a US-led force; the latter would likely require the deployment of a self-sufficient naval task group, including a command and control vessel, a frigate, a supply ship and a submarine. Although our 12 frigates are relatively new (1990s) and have been upgraded recently with new technology, and in 2013 three of our four submarines will finally be operational, the other assets have a less positive story. Within a few years our three command and control destroyers and two supply ships, all commissioned around

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Canada has started to act on its necessary turn to the Pacific. In summer 2012, Canadians held key command positions in the biennial Rim of the Pacific exercises. Defence Minister Peter MacKay has indicated Canada would redistribute military personnel from the Atlantic to Pacific, and work to establish a “permanent, visible presence” in the Asia-Pacific region. But all this requires assets. The national shipbuilding strategy, announced in 2011, calls for commissioning about 20 (combined frigate/destroyer) Canadian Surface Combatants and two or three Joint Support Ships by about 2020. The government must prioritize the strategy to ensure that it, unlike so many of Canada’s other military procurement plans, proceeds as promised.

Elinor Sloan is Associate Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science at Carleton University, specializing in US, Canadian and NATO security and defence policy. She is also a former defence analyst with Canada’s Department of National Defence.

“Should a conflict in the Asia-Pacific region escalate to include US military involvement, Canada would want to play a role.”

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The ICSANT, GICNT and Canadian Policy Towards Nuclear Terrorism

In 2005, the UN International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) opened for signatures, but attracted only slow support. In 2006, the Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) was launched. This US-Russia led coalition of the willing was much quicker to gain momentum. Canada has been one of the countries that were slow to take practical steps to ratify the ICSANT while being a strong early supporter of the GICNT. The present Canadian government has also pursued an increasingly skeptical policy towards UN multilateralism in general, characterised by criticism of the UN and by Prime Minister Harper’s decision in September 2012 to ignore a UN General Assembly meeting while he was in New York.

The ICSANT entered into force in 2007, a decade after the negotiation process for the Convention began. A number of states hoped the International Convention on International Terrorism (which would include a generally accepted definition of terrorism) would be in place (it remains in a draft form) before the ICSANT to enhance the latter’s effectiveness. The ICSANT extends the definition of nuclear terrorism beyond that found within the earlier Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, but is limited to threats posed by individuals rather than state-level programs, an additional source of contention in the negotiations. It obligates states to adopt domestic legislation to criminalize and prosecute violations of the Convention, but requires states only to "make every effort to adopt appropriate measures to ensure the protection of radioactive material", rather than imposing a clear set of obligations or standards that would permit effective enforcement of the Convention’s provisions. A further limitation on the enthusiasm with which states adopted the measure was the non-participation by the United States which, like Canada, has been a strong supporter of enhanced nuclear protection generally, but which has been slow to pass the domestic legislation that would permit ratification of the ICSANT.

The Canadian government introduced the necessary legislation to amend the Criminal Code only in March 2012. Combating nuclear terrorism does remain a priority for the government: the same month, it announced an additional $367 million in funding for the Global Partnership Program for 2013-18. It has been a strong supporter of the Proliferation Security Initiative, another non-traditional approach to countering proliferation. Skepticism applies not so much to nuclear terrorism as to the ICSANT specifically. Ratification of the Convention is an international obligation, but the Senate hearings into the Convention emphasized the danger of nuclear terrorism, rather than discussing the intrinsic merits of the ICSANT.

Canada was one of the initial 13 states that accepted the GICNT shortly after it was proposed by the United States and Russia. The Initiative is intended to enhance capacity building so that states fulfill their obligations under existing measures such as UNSCR 1373 and 1540. Participants share information and best practices to enhance their individual and collective efforts to counter nuclear terrorism, through events such as joint meetings and training exercises, of which there have now been over 50 under the Initiative. However, there are few metrics for assessing the success of the program. Moreover, of the 85 states that are participants in the Initiative, relatively few are from the Global South and several others have been passive members, regarding nominal participation as a relatively cost-free means of maintaining good relations with key states that place high importance on combating nuclear terrorism.

While the ICSANT presently has 115 signatories and 83 state parties, many countries including Canada have preferred to pursue less formal means, such as the GICNT, as a means of combating nuclear terrorism. The choice reflects both some of the problems associated with the Convention and the increasing inclination of countries such as Canada to pursue such goals through efforts with, as the announcement of the GICNT described it “like-minded states”, rather than all states.

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Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) Current Partner Nations:
(according to Wikipedia Dec 2/12)

| 2. Afghanistan                | 31. Iceland               | 60. Poland               |
| 3. Albania                    | 32. India                 | 61. Portugal             |
| 4. Algeria                    | 33. Ireland               | 62. Romania              |
| 5. Armenia                    | 34. Israel                | 63. Russia               |
| 6. Australia                  | 35. Italy                 | 64. Saudi Arabia          |
| 7. Austria                    | 36. Japan                 | 65. Serbia               |
| 11. Belarus                   | 40. Latvia                | 69. Slovenia             |
| 12. Bosnia                    | 41. Libya                 | 70. Spain                |
| 13. Bulgaria                  | 42. Lithuania             | 71. Sri Lanka            |
| 14. Cambodia                  | 43. Luxembourg            | 72. South Korea          |
| 15. Canada                    | 44. Macedonia             | 73. Sweden               |
| 16. Cape Verde                | 45. Madagascar            | 74. Switzerland          |
| 17. Chile                     | 46. Malaysia              | 75. Tajikistan           |
| 18. China                     | 47. Malta                 | 76. Thailand             |
| 19. Côte d’Ivoire             | 48. Mauritius             | 77. Turkey               |
| 20. Croatia                   | 49. Mexico                | 78. Turkmenistan          |
| 21. Cyprus                    | 50. Montenegro            | 79. Ukraine              |
| 22. Czech Republic            | 51. Morocco               | 80. United Arab Emirates |
| 23. Denmark                   | 52. Nepal                 | 81. United Kingdom       |
| 24. Estonia                   | 53. Netherlands           | 82. United States        |
| 25. Finland                   | 54. New Zealand           | 83. Uzbekistan           |
| 27. Georgia                   | 56. Pakistan              | 85. Zambia               |
| 28. Germany                   | 57. Palau                 |                       |
| 29. Greece                    | 58. Panama                |                       |
The Board of Directors, Advisory Council, Fellows, and staff at the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute would like to wish you a very Merry Christmas and a happy, healthy and prosperous 2013!
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Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute

CDFAI is a research institute focused on Canada’s international engagement in all its forms: diplomacy, trade, the military, and aid. Established in 2001, CDFAI’s vision is for Canada to have a respected, influential voice in the international arena based on a comprehensive foreign policy, which expresses our national interests, political and social values, military capabilities, economic strength and willingness to be engaged with action that is timely and credible.

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