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Since its creation in 2001, the Calgary-based CDFAI has set its mission to be a catalyst for innovative Canadian global engagement. In 2010, it opened an Ottawa office to reach out to parliamentarians, senior policy makers and the diplomatic service.

CDFAI produces high quality public policy research related to Canadian international relations. The Institute’s research is designed to raise the level of knowledge and appreciation about issues of Canadian defence, development and international aid. This work was recognized by the University of Pennsylvania’s 2012 survey of the go to Think Tanks around the World ranking CDFAI 4th in Canada.

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**Keystone, Through Obama’s Eyes**
Brian Bow reviews the arguments against the Keystone Pipeline and the groups that champion them. He concludes that the Obama Administration will likely approve Keystone, but they aren’t anxious to do so, especially given the reluctance by the Harper government to put a more environmentally friendly face on the oilsands.

**Terrorist Threats and Precautionary Principles**
Aurélie Campana posits that terrorists still have the ability to directly, and indirectly, disrupt and interfere in Western nations’ domestic and foreign policy; therefore, nations are no longer able to rely on reactive policies to deter possible terrorist threats.

**Manning Verdict Leaves the Big Issues Untouched**
Daryl Copeland examines the case of Bradley Manning leaking hundreds of thousands of classified documents to Wikileaks and concludes that a movement from an overly restrictive interpretation of the need to know to a free-for-all over the copying and distributing of secret information amount to an accident waiting to happen and asks where the accountability really lies.

**Why Not Missile Defence?**
James Fergusson demonstrates that, contrary to expectations, the Harper government will not reverse policies related to Ballistic Missile Defence; however, given that fears related to non-participation, including the idea that it would damage the NORAD relationship have not appeared and suggests that the US does not believe that Canada’s participation is necessary to fulfill their defence requirements.

**Coming Soon — War Over Syria**
Frank Harvey predicts what will happen in the aftermath of the chemical weapon attacks in Syria. He argues that Assad will escalate attacks against Syria’s civilian population and may attempt to draw Israel into war and this will be exploited by the coalition to justify the need to continue the campaign against him until the regime falls.

**Whither Canadian Defence Policy?**
George Macdonald investigates the Canada First Defence Policy released in 2008 and determines that despite many changes in the circumstances that existed when the policy was first implemented the policy itself has not changed. He concludes that a realistic assessment of what can be done within the current and projected defence budget is needed now or the capacity of the Canadian Forces will continue to be compromised.

**The Commonwealth is More Important to Canada than Sri Lanka**
John Noble considers Harper’s plan to boycott this year’s Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in reaction to the human rights violations in Sri Lanka following their long and bloody civil war. As the Commonwealth meeting is one of the best platforms for Canada to promote its own interests, he concludes that Harper would find more value in attendance than boycotting.

**Mexico’s Challenge**
Stephen Randall studies the current situation of the new Mexican government as it seeks to expand ties with China, strengthen bilateral ties with Canada, and maintain its position within Latin America, while working with the Obama administration to address the complex challenges of border security, immigration, arms and narcotics trafficking. Immigration remains at the heart of Mexico’s challenges and the jury is still out on whether or not effective dialogue with the US is possible.
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It might be argued that the current government had a coherent and logical Arctic policy when it was first elected in early 2006. In the general election that first brought it to power, Stephen Harper and other Conservative leaders spoke a great deal about “using or losing” the Arctic and laid out promises of a greater defence presence in the Arctic. It seemed that the real challenge to Canada’s hold on the north was military. Were the Russians finally coming? Were the Danes about to invade Hans Island? Were the Americans going to send a carrier battle group to the Beaufort Sea to enforce their boundary claims in waters that could hide billions of barrels of oil? No one would say. But in the weeks and months after the election victory, and in many subsequent visits to the north – particularly during Operation Nanook, the annual late summer military exercise there – the PM and his erstwhile defence minister spun out the new military strategy.

Canada would build six to eight offshore Arctic patrol vessels to guard our northern waters. Canada would build a deep water port and refueling facility near the eastern end of the Northwest passage. Canada would hone its northern military capabilities through a regular series of Arctic exercises. Canada would beef up and re-equip the Aboriginal Canadian Rangers. Canada would finally build a heavy icebreaker.

Some people who knew the history of Canada’s presence in the Arctic knew that there was and is no military challenge whatever to Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic Archipelago. Any challenges that might have arisen – from the United States, no less – were settled by the end of the Second World War not so much due to US fear of Canadian military might, but because the US needed, and wanted, Canadian cooperation in building northern defences against the Soviet Union. It was far more important to have Canada working in conjunction with the US to build continent-spanning radar lines, for example, than it was to lay claim to some rocky outcrop in the archipelago that may have gone undiscovered for centuries.

Nor is there, today, any military challenge to Canadian sovereignty over the waters that lie within the archipelago. The Trudeau and Mulroney governments of the 70s and 80s deftly nailed down Canadian claims to jurisdiction over those waters through diplomatic means.

There is a US challenge regarding the waters of the Northwest Passage itself (wherever they are said to be since there are at least two routes that may soon be commercially viable). But that challenge grows from the principle dearly held by the US that a passage between two international waters is itself international. But even here, the US is not seeking for the Northwest Passage to become a lawless stretch of water and recognizes that with Canadian land on both sides of the passage, only Canada can exercise practical control over the passage – who (other than innocent passage vessels) goes through it, in what, and when. Or is able to know what’s going on inside it. Again, weapons are not called for.

In any case in early September it was revealed that the once promised refueling base Canada was going to establish in Nanisivik, Nunavut was being delayed because the private company that once held the land was dragging its feet on an environmental cleanup and that no remedial work had been done on the site since 2009. In the meantime the proposed Arctic patrol ships remain mired in controversy as to how much Arctic they will be able to handle and what military capabilities they will really have. The heavy icebreaker remains a plan, and the army is having budget problems replacing snowmobiles for its northern army reserve units and Rangers.

Many of these problems will eventually be sorted out. But at the end of the day there is a lesson to learn from all this. Canada’s military capabilities in the far north may be marginally greater today than they were ten years ago, but Canada’s sovereignty in the north remains unchallenged by other nations. It turns out that what really counts in keeping the far north a part of Canada is to help the local population build a thriving civil society that will never want to sever itself from the rest of us.
The Obama administration will probably approve the Keystone XL pipeline extension. The president’s July 24 remarks about the number of jobs the project would create were certainly provocative (and flanked by fact-checkers), but they do not necessarily represent a definitive repositioning. The White House has staked out climate change — not job creation — as the pivotal criteria, and the State Department study that found no significant, negative effects is all Obama needs to set the stage for an eventual approval. Those derisive comments about Keystone jobs are better understood as an effort to hit back against ongoing Republican criticism of the president’s “failure” to approve the pipeline back in January.

Despite Prime Minister Harper’s insistence that Keystone approval was a “no-brainer,” Obama has always had lots of good reasons to say no, and fewer reasons to say yes.

Polls show a majority of Americans want Keystone to go ahead. We might ask how many of them really understand what it is and what its implications might be. But the bigger question is which Americans are calling for Keystone to go ahead, and what incentives the president has to make those people happy. More detailed polling shows that most Keystone supporters are self-identifying Republicans. This is no accident, as the GOP leadership clearly decided to make this a wedge issue in late 2012, and has been hammering it on Fox and other right-leaning media.

In the central states, where the pipeline would be built, there are pockets of opposition, as in the Nebraska Sandhills, but across the region there is broad support. But of course most of those supporters are Republicans, many of whom believe that Keystone was a done deal before the White House interfered. They see the GOP as their champion on this issue, and will give credit to Republican lawmakers if the pipeline is ultimately approved. Democrats know they have virtually no prospect of winning much of anything in places like Nebraska and Kansas, no matter what happens with Keystone.

Obama and the Democrats have a lot more at stake in the Midwest. Ohio was pivotal in 2012, and will be again in 2016. And Democrats face potential trouble in Iowa, Michigan, and possibly even Minnesota for 2014. But approving Keystone won’t score the White House many points in these places, because the purpose of the pipeline extension is to break Alberta oil out of the regional market it’s been trapped in, and that would push up oil prices all over the Midwest.

Organized labour? Probably not. The AFL-CIO has been publicly supportive of the project, as long as there is a commitment to try to keep refining jobs in the US. But unions are divided on the issue, and none are likely to advise their members to withhold support from the Democrats if Keystone fails.

If there is one group whose votes are “up for grabs” on this issue for Obama and the Democrats, then it is self-identifying environmentalists (and thus young voters, more generally), and most of them are strongly opposed to Keystone. In fact, many would look on a rejection of Keystone as only a partial redemption of Obama’s environmental record, not as a special effort that ought to be rewarded. Still, there will be many in the White House arguing for a rejection, in order to shore up the support of environmental NGOs and environmentally-oriented Democratic voters. Why not give them what they want?

To make Canada happy? The Obama administration has never been all that interested in Canada, and doesn’t share the Harper government’s priorities. Obama has been signaling for months that he wanted Harper to make Keystone approval easier for the White House, by putting a more environmentally-friendly face on the oilsands, and instead got “ethical oil” and total refusal to even talk about the concept of carbon pricing. Harper has been in sync with US positions on other issues, like support for Israel and the F-35, but while these things score points with some in Washington, they don’t really count for much with the current administration.

So Obama is not exactly desperate to do this favour for Ottawa, and it shows. The Harper government and TransCanada have responded by telling Americans that there are other ways to get Alberta oil to world markets: a pipeline across British Columbia and on to Asia, the “threat” to ship the oil south to the Gulf Coast by rail instead, and now Energy East — a plan to send the oil by pipeline to Quebec and New Brunswick, and from there to the rest of the world. Pointing out these other options may spur the Republican leadership and other Keystone supporters to work harder, but it probably doesn’t give Harper or TransCanada any new leverage in the White House. If a rejection of Keystone isn’t the end of the world for Canada, then maybe Obama — and the Democratic Party leadership more broadly — doesn’t have to feel so bad about bowing to domestic political pressures on this issue. If TransCanada were to go with Energy East instead of Keystone, the only tangible effect on the US would be the loss of some refining and transshipment business in states that are out of Obama’s reach anyway. If anything, Energy East might bring a sense of relief to the White House, if only because it would mean fewer Canadians hanging around, badgering the president to make tough choices, then adding insult to injury by calling them “no-brainers.”
Terrorist Threats and Precautionary Principle

Written by: Aurélie Campana

The Obama administration’s decision to temporarily shut down several of its diplomatic missions in the Middle East and Africa, as well as issue a worldwide travel alert over an Al-Qaeda threat raises several issues. This decision was implemented following the interception of electronic communications between operatives of Al-Qaeda central and its affiliated organization Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Although embassy closures for security reasons have happened in the past, the extent of the recent shut down is unprecedented. For security reasons, the State Department refused to give more details about the possible targets, the type of attacks, or the source of the threat, but presented the information as specific and highly credible, indirectly pointing to AQAP as an issue of particular concern. Recent developments in Yemen, as well as extensive use of armed drones to eliminate AQAP operatives, and several failed AQAP attacks over the last years indicate that this organization is the most likely suspect, especially given Al-Qaeda central’s structural and operational weaknesses.

Most of the US and Western media uncritically relayed the information about the high probability of a terrorist attack over US embassies. Nevertheless, some analysts expressed scepticism, not about the nature of the threat, but about the US answer. Some even underlined that the threat has not dramatically increased recently. Even if the degree of the threat remains difficult to assess given the paucity of reliable sources, the Obama administration has without doubt implemented precautionary principles to combat terrorist threats.

The over-politicization of the Benghazi consulate attack that saw the death of the US ambassador to Libya in September 2012, the heated debates over the CIA and NSA secret surveillance programs, and the feelings of vulnerability that permeated American society following the Boston attacks have undoubtedly influenced domestic and foreign policy. In addition, the recent prison breaks in Libya, Pakistan and Iraq that saw the escape of some senior Al-Qaeda operatives has raised significant concerns, especially as Al-Qaeda has claimed credit for two escapes in Iraq. Finally, the ongoing war in Syria, including the role played by Jihadi groups, has contributed to a deep and widespread feeling of insecurity at the hands of an almost invisible enemy with constantly changing faces.

Whatever the degree of the actual threat, the US reaction proves that terrorist organizations still have the ability to directly, and indirectly, disrupt and interfere in Western nations’ domestic and foreign policy. The sensitivity to terrorism around the world remains high, and as a result governments can no longer afford to rely on, or design, policies that are primarily reactive. Given the high politicization of security-related issues, and the possible international ramifications of any decision, they have to be proactive to demonstrate their commitments to deterring possible terrorist threats.

While the very notion of a successful terrorist attack remains highly debated, these recent developments indicate that terrorist groups can be effective at creating policy changes and some political instability without carrying out a single attack.

The way governments react to the threat of a possible attack can sometimes have more of an impact than the terrorists’ operational capabilities and their aptitude to technically innovate to defeat security measures in the “terrorist equation”. As any political risks should be minimized, the answer formulated at the highest level of the State may contribute to give terrorist groups more visibility than they would have had without these exceptional measures. In a sense, these side effects represent a lesser risk than keeping secret sensitive information about a potential attack.

Photo Source: actforamerica.wordpress.com
Manning Verdict Leaves the Big Issues Untouched

Written by: Daryl Copeland  
(Globe & Mail, July 31)

T here is something for almost everyone in the judgement delivered yesterday against Bradley Manning, the army private who single-handedly conveyed hundreds of thousands of classified diplomatic documents and military battlefield reports to the so-called whistleblowing web site WikiLeaks.

This is the largest unauthorized transfer of government-origin classified information ever recorded.

Manning’s detractors - those who see him as a criminal and a traitor - will look with satisfaction upon his conviction on charges of espionage, computer fraud, possession of restricted documents and theft. These could bring him a total of over 100 years behind bars.

Manning’s defenders - those who see him as a patriot and a hero - will be relieved that he was acquitted on the two most serious charges of aiding the enemy. Daniel Ellsberg, for instance, commented that: ‘It could’ve been worse – a lot worse, not just for Bradley but for American democracy and the free press on which it depends’.

Whatever the sentence, the mixed messages implied by the judgement may end up satisfying no one completely.

Manning’s lawyer, David Coombs, was ambiguous: “We won the battle, now we need to go win the war... Today is a good day, but Bradley is by no means out of the fire.”

WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, himself a fugitive and holed up in the Ecuadorian embassy in London, described the verdict on Twitter as “dangerous national security extremism.”

If reflecting on what to make of the verdict seems difficult, consider this. The most critical issues of public policy raised by the Manning case have yet to be broached:

Government secrecy versus the public’s right to know. Confidentiality, and the protection of sensitive sources is essential to effective diplomacy. On the other hand, taxpayers are underwriting the costly generation of intelligence and analysis, and should in principle have access to material they have paid for. There is a delicate balance here; citizens have a right to know, but not all information needs to be free. How, then, to best manage the trade-offs, and to find a reasonable equilibrium between competing public goods?

In a statement about why he revealed the documents, Manning said he acted to expose American diplomatic deceit, as well as the U.S military’s “bloodlust” and disregard for human life. He claimed that he wanted to start a debate on foreign and defence policy, and that he chose information that was dated and would not harm the interests of the United States. The US government, for its part, maintains that Manning’s disclosures flaunted the law and have seriously compromised security.

These fundamental issues of civics and statecraft, which rise well above the particulars of the judgement, deserve to be better ventilated.

Exposing the costs of the Global War on Terror. It can be argued that the most serious threats and challenges facing the planet have little to do with religious extremism or political violence, and flow instead from a constellation of issues which are rooted in science and driven by technology. Climate change, diminishing biodiversity, pandemic disease, and resource scarcity afflict us all, while the likelihood of being involved in a terrorist incident is roughly the same as being hit by lightning or drowning in the bathtub. But another way, there are no military solutions to the most vexing problems of globalization, yet the lion’s share of international policy resources continue to be allocated to defence, rather than to diplomacy or development.

Manning’s release of the Iraq and Afghanistan war logs, and especially the Apache helicopter gun sight video of the killing of a Reuters crew in Baghdad, have helped to illuminate the inner workings of Global War on Terror. Together with the disastrous outcomes associated with the armed interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and memories of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, the Koran burnings, drone strikes on civilians, and various other atrocities associated with war, Manning has underscored the consequences of misplaced priorities on the part of the US and its NATO allies - including Canada.

If his actions stimulate a long overdue debate about the true nature of security, the public interest will be well-served.

Obama’s record on whistleblowing. Since taking office less than six years ago, Obama has pursued more espionage charges against government employees than all other past presidents combined. It was therefore unsurprising that when Manning pleaded guilty earlier this year to several lesser offences that would have brought him about 20 years of imprisonment, the government refused to bargain and opted instead to prosecute the most serious charges.

By throwing the book at, and making an example of Manning, Ed Snowden and all other alleged whistleblowers, the US administration clearly hopes to send an intimidating chill throughout the civil service, and in so doing reduce the incidence of leaking.

Is this strategy, in combination with the imposition of curbs on civil liberties and constitutional rights, transforming the erstwhile land of the free into a something disturbingly Orwellian - a national security state? Not an insignificant query.

Accountability versus responsibility. Manning copied the classified “Cablegate” material in several tranches onto a Lady Gaga DVD. He then transmitted that digitalized data to Julian Assange, who by cutting publication deals with five of the largest media organizations in the world leveraged his possession of the

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material to propel himself to celebrity. Those events have had profound consequences, and they may well illustrate the element of immediate responsibility for the disclosures. Yet it must be asked: where is the more extended institutional and personal accountability in all of this? Who designed and approved the data management system that allowed low level operatives like Bradley Manning access to such sensitive information? Manning, moreover, was reportedly considered mentally unstable by his employer, had been demoted for punching a woman officer in the face, and was about to be discharged. Given that there were apparently hundreds of thousands of people with similar clearance and access, Manning could be considered a scapegoat for an event which was virtually inevitable. In that case, his conviction amounts to shooting the messenger.

The 9/11 Commission Report identified a lack of coordination among law enforcement and security agencies, and criticized the inadequate sharing of intelligence between organizations that resembled sealed information silos. Clearly, remedial action was required, but moving from an overly restrictive interpretation of the need to know to a free-for-all with no control over the copying and distribution of secret information amounts to an accident waiting to happen. This inexcusable failure of oversight represents a colossal lack of judgement and discretion at senior management levels.

Manning is being held legally responsible, but the larger questions remain unaddressed. Where is the accountability for the decisions which made these disclosures possible?

Like so many of the thorny issues begged by the Manning case, the answers are nowhere in sight.

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CDFAI Speaker Series  
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Why Not Missile Defence?

Written by: James Fergusson

Contrary to expectations, the Harper government has not reversed policy and moved to participate in the US missile defence program. It passed on two recent opportunities to do so. The first was NATO’s announcement of an interim missile defence capability for Europe at last year’s Chicago Summit. The second was last spring’s North Korean war scare that brought missile defence out of purgatory, and, if only briefly, back onto the public defence agenda.

The government’s reasons for silence on missile defence are relatively simple. There is no real missile threat from North Korea (or Iran, the other state on the ballistic missile/nuclear proliferation list). Similarly, Russia and China, which possess the capability to target Canada and North America, are not adversaries. A public debate on missile defence would thus be politically problematic and arouse the currently silent opponents to reiterate the old Cold War arguments of missile defence generating an arms race, poisoning relations with Moscow and Beijing, and weaponizing space.

Nor is the Department of National Defence likely to be keen on adding missile defence to its responsibilities. Facing significant cuts that threaten procurement and operational requirements, missile defence would require a re-allocation of money and personnel, even if the costs would be relatively low.

The government and National Defence can also reassure themselves that in a worst-case scenario, the US will not allow a Canadian city to be destroyed. Politically, the repercussions of failing to protect a Canadian city when such a capability exists would be far too high.

Strategically, with forward-deployed missile defence components in the Pacific and Europe, the US has no choice but to intercept missiles before the actual targets can be identified. This may also be the case for the ground-based system deployed in Alaska. In effect, Canadian policy-makers can rely upon the longstanding belief that for the US to defend itself, it has no choice but to defend Canada.

It is also questionable what Canada would gain by a policy reversal. In previous negotiations, the US refused to offer a formal, legal guarantee to defend Canada. In a public debate, the government would have to admit that participation would mean little to the actual defence of Canada. In effect, Canada would have to acquire its own missile defence capability to guarantee its defence, and the costs of doing so would be significant, even if the US offered a subsidy under traditional NORAD infrastructure funding arrangements.

Fears that non-participation would significantly damage, if not destroy NORAD have also not materialized. Missile defence has been successfully managed in the relationship between NORAD and US Northern Command (NORTHCOM). Co-located with NORTHCOM, NORAD, and thus Canadian personnel, provides ballistic missile early warning to Northern Command’s missile defence mission, as NORAD, and Canada has done for Strategic Command and US nuclear deterrent forces since the 1960s.

It also suggests that the US does not see Canadian participation as vital to their defence requirements. Unless or until Canadian territory becomes strategically significant for US operational missile defence needs, Canadian participation is irrelevant, and US pressure non-existent.

Whatever potential US resentment about Canada as a missile defence ‘free rider’ has also been offset somewhat by Canada’s contribution to the US Space Surveillance Network (SSN). Earlier this year, Canada deployed a space-based optical sensor, Sapphire, which, among other roles, supports NORAD’s early warning mission, and thus, by extension, US missile defence.

In a public debate, the government would have to admit that participation would mean little to the actual defence of Canada.

Unless some significant changes occur relative to these considerations, one should not expect this government, or any future government, to reverse course on missile defence. This is not to suggest that Canada shouldn’t reverse policy for other political and strategic reasons, or that the logic underpinning non-reversal is uncontestable. Regardless, Harper’s silence on missile defence, contrary to many academic and media assessments of his radical agenda to transform Canada, indicates this government is more like its predecessors than most are willing to admit.
Coming Soon — War Over Syria

Written by:
Frank Harvey
(National Post, August 28)

Everyone has an opinion about what the Obama administration and NATO allies ‘should’ do to address the chemical weapon attacks in Syria. What follows is a straightforward prediction about what Western leaders ‘will’ do.

Barring a significant change of heart by Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad to relinquish his hold on power, and in the absence of clear evidence of the regime’s intentions to seriously curtail its military and chemical attacks against the insurgency and civilian populations, US/NATO military intervention is inevitable.

How do I know? Because the exact same action-reaction sequence unfolded prior to similar interventions in Bosnia (1995), Iraq (Operation Desert Fox, 1998), Kosovo and Serbia (Operation Allied Force, 1999), Iraq (Operation Enduring Freedom, 2003), and Libya (Operation Unified Protector, 2011). Each of these interventions was preceded by an almost identical set of domestic and international pressures that compelled the US and key allies to launch military strikes — the crisis in Syria is following an unalterable path-dependent script, and the same serious miscalculations are being made by the Assad regime.

In each case officials in Washington began by issuing preliminary deterrent threats hoping to convince the regime in question to de-escalate their attacks against a growing insurgency, or to comply with some UN no-fly-zone or disarmament resolution. But these initial threats almost always fail because none of the pre-conditions for successful deterrence were present, namely: a credible commitment to address the crisis, the capability and willingness to enforce serious consequences for non-compliance (for example, by positioning US and NATO military assets in the region), and evidence of the resolve to follow through with retaliatory strikes if clearly articulated demands are not met.

Weak (red-line) threats not only fail to control these crises they often lead to an escalation in the violence, this time in the form of chemical weapon attacks on Syria’s civilian population. As in past cases, images of these incredible atrocities will begin to filter through broadcasts and social media, shifting public opinion in favour of doing more, and political leaders in the House and Senate (and across Western capitals) will see enormous political value in supporting an approach that could arguably prevent further atrocities — pictures of the devastating effects of the Sarin gas attacks will strengthen these preferences.

Obama will continue to adjust his strategy in line with these political pressures by issuing ever stronger threats (and demands) as a way of re-establishing US credibility, all backed by much clearer, and increasingly more credible, commitments to impose higher costs on the Syrian regime. Once these explicit threats are issued there is no turning back. The latest stage in the path dependent sequence now includes deployment of four US Navy destroyers to the eastern Mediterranean Sea. US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel has been tasked with updating military plans for a Syria operation, and US Secretary of State John Kerry has begun the process of building the coalition-of-the-willing by engaging in talks with NATO allies, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

Once a sufficiently robust coalition is engaged, the next stage will be an attempt by Secretary of State Kerry to negotiate a UN mandated no-fly-zone, although Obama will not be deterred by the absence of a UN Security Council resolution. These moves will be followed by gradually more devastating strikes against Syria’s military infrastructure, beginning with the country’s air defences, and will escalate to direct attacks against assets held by Syria’s leaders. The intervention will focus exclusively on a coalition air campaign and will not include the deployment of US ground troops.

Bolstered by the mistaken assumption that support from Russia and China constitutes sufficient protection against a sustained US/NATO military attack, Syrian leaders will respond initially with a few temporary (and meaningless) moves to de-escalate the violence. Over time, however, the regime will be forced to probe for weakness in the international community’s resolve by mounting new attacks against an emboldened insurgency, if only to sustain the regime’s diminishing hold on power. In the end, and judging by their decision to use chemical weapons, the regime is unlikely to meet US/NATO demands.

Faced with a devastating air-campaign, no ability to impose significant costs on the US or NATO forces, and the imminent collapse of his regime, Assad will most likely escalate attacks against the country’s civilian populations and may attempt to draw Israel into the fight, all in an effort to expand the war, produce a catastrophic humanitarian crisis, splinter the coalition, and turn Western public opinion against US foreign policy. But the very same images Assad believes will push public opinion in his direction will also be exploited by the coalition to justify the need to continue the campaign until the regime falls. Slobodan Milosevic, Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi made the same mistakes, and Assad will suffer the same fate.
Whither Canadian Defence Policy?

Written by:
George Macdonald
(Canada.com, August 19)

The Canada First Defence Strategy, released in May 2008, remains unchanged even though many of the circumstances that existed when it was written have evolved. In 2008, the Canadian Armed Forces were still very much occupied with a large contingent of personnel in Afghanistan, fighting in a combat situation that was becoming increasingly unpopular with the Canadian public. The transition to a smaller training mission centered around Kabul has now all but removed the mission from our consciousness, even though almost 1000 personnel continue to serve in what can only be assessed as a dangerous country.

The defence budget has also taken some hits as a major target for a deficit-fighting government trying to limit federal discretionary spending. These reductions have affected operational budgets for the most part and capital spending on major new equipment remains protected in order to execute the listed CFDS initiatives. So we have, for example, a situation where the (now past) Commander of the Canadian Army raises the alarm about not having enough funding to conduct training and maintain skills hard-won in Afghanistan and, at the same time, a large project to purchase a fleet of close-combat vehicles for about $2 billion. While having modern equipment is helpful, we should be comfortable that it will meet a need that is consistent with the government’s defence policy and that the allocation of resources will be balanced enough to ensure adequate training and support will also be available to safeguard its effective employment. And what employment might that be?

If world events suddenly precipitated circumstances where another large combat mission was potentially needed, would Canada be as ready to stand up to the plate as we were in the months following 9/11? (Indeed, would the Americans be as aggressive in their actions if a similar scenario played out again?) Do we remain as concerned about the threat of terrorism as we should be, given the incidents that have occurred in allied nations since 9/11? Do we have an adequate understanding of other threats that could demand a military reaction? Do we understand the implications for Canadian security of the many instances of strife and conflict in the world? Is our ability to deal with cyber-attacks anywhere near what it needs to be to ensure the security of our power supply, electricity, transportation system, and healthcare?

Overall, we should be asking ourselves if we are being realistic in assigning the necessary priority to the defence and security capabilities we will need in the future, however uncertain it might be. This is certainly easier said than done, but demands regular, concerted focus if we are serious about what capabilities we need and how we might employ them.

This is not a new dilemma. Unexpected developments such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, a world recession, terrorist attack or major natural disaster, all with fallout implications for our economy and security will continue to occur. Sometimes the best we can do is hedge our bets to develop capabilities that will be as multi-purpose, efficient and effective as possible. Defence resources should be dedicated to nurturing capabilities that will have the highest probability of being useful, recognizing that we will likely be employing them in a multi-national effort, working closely with like-minded nations. This was the case, for example, in the support provided to the Libyan air campaign.

By almost any measure, then, it is time to review, modify and re-issue the Canada First Defence Strategy. A failure to recognize that circumstances have changed since it was issued will almost certainly result in the procurement of capabilities that are less relevant to future operations than they were initially thought to be. New technologies are evolving. Funding is not as available as previously projected. Major defence projects have fallen behind their anticipated procurement dates, and the need for personnel to deploy to a combat zone is not readily apparent at this time.

A reaffirmation of our defence priorities, with a realistic assessment of what can be done within the current and projected defence budget, is needed now. Otherwise, the prevailing uncertainty surrounding defence procurement, and the lack of direction in how funding should be allocated, will continue to compromise the real capability of the Canadian Armed Forces to the detriment of the public it serves and the missions it might be called upon to fulfill.
The Commonwealth Is More Important to Canada than Sri Lanka

Prime Minister Harper has made known that without major reforms he intends to skip this year’s Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Colombo, Sri Lanka as a protest against human rights violations in that country in the wake of a long and bloody civil war. Harper plans to boycott unless substantial reforms are pursued in the country. But Harper will not be the first Canadian Prime Minister to skip a CHOGM. His predecessor Paul Martin did so in 2005, preferring to stay home and negotiate the Kelowna Accord with Canada’s First Nations. Given Harper’s emphasis on human rights in Canadian foreign policy many would argue that boycotting the Colombo CHOGM is the right thing to do. Others have suggested that the Commonwealth and Francophonie are no longer as important to Canadian foreign policy as they once were and we should focus our attention elsewhere.

Canada was a driving force in the creation of the modern Commonwealth. Prime Ministers Louis St Laurent, Diefenbaker, Pearson, Trudeau, Mulroney have all played roles in this unique organization, grouping more than one quarter of the world’s population, but not including any of the super powers. St Laurent found a way for newly independent former British colonies that chose republicanism over monarchy to remain part of the Commonwealth. His role in the Suez crisis was also a successful effort to keep the Commonwealth from coming apart following the British invasion of Egypt. Diefenbaker’s concerns over human rights led to his call for the exclusion of South Africa from the Commonwealth until such time as it renounced apartheid. Pearson was a force behind the creation of a Commonwealth Secretariat independent from the British Foreign Office. Trudeau was initially sceptical of set piece speeches by CHOGM leaders, but came to see the value of the unscripted retreats and used the 1977 retreat at Gleneagles, Scotland to hammer out a compromise on sporting contacts with South Africa that saved the 1978 Edmonton Commonwealth Games from a boycott by African countries. Mulroney stood up for the United States with CHOGM leaders and also stood up to Margaret Thatcher on the issue of South Africa, thereby establishing his credibility with most Commonwealth leaders from Africa, Asia and the Caribbean.

CHOGMs aren’t about relations with the country hosting a particular meeting. The host country can’t block any Commonwealth Head of Government from attending, however badly they may be in world standing. That was the case for the 1977 CHOGM in London when the British were mortified that Ugandan President Idi Amin might show up. They were relieved when he didn’t come. The host leader can’t control the meeting agenda or what leaders say and that is an opportunity for PM Harper.

CHOGMs are about relationships with all Commonwealth leaders, starting with the Queen who is Head of the Commonwealth. Queen Elizabeth II will not be going to Colombo, but will be represented by Prince Charles. Skipping such a meeting with our future head of state doesn’t exactly square with Harper’s emphasis on strengthening our connections with the monarchy.

None of the other old Commonwealth countries (Britain, Australian, and New Zealand) have indicated they will boycott the Colombo CHOGM. Nor will the leaders of rising Asian economic powers like India and several ASEAN countries that Harper has been courting. PM Harper’s absence will be noted, but the message it sends to most Commonwealth leaders will have nothing to do with human rights in Sri Lanka and more to do with Harper’s general disinterest in the Commonwealth. Some will no doubt take Harper’s absence as a snub to them rather than a stand of principle.

If the prime minister genuinely wants to send a message about human rights in Sri Lanka and other Commonwealth countries he should go to the CHOGM and spell out his views to the assembled leaders, and publicly to the assembled Sri Lankan and world press. That would be far more effective and embarrassing to Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa and some other Commonwealth leaders than an absent Prime Minister, who can be totally ignored. The French have a saying in diplomacy “les absents ont toujours tort” (those who are absent are always wrong). In effect Harper has recognized this in his changed policy towards China, which he first tried to ignore and now engages on a variety of fronts including human rights. China of course is an economic superpower and can’t be snubbed or ignored for long. Sri Lanka is a much smaller country. But Canada was the major source of finance for the Tamil insurgents in Sri Lanka and their Canadian-Tamil supporters have a remarkable degree of success in courting Canadian politicians of all political stripes. Harper has also publicly stated that he will not endorse a boycott of the Sochi Olympic Games because of Russia’s human rights violations towards gays. He was right to do so.

Harper could also use the meeting to shore up relations with many Commonwealth leaders both in the collective discussions and in one-on-one meetings. It is an opportunity to meet many leaders whose countries he will never visit and even promote Canadian business interests in those countries at the highest level.

The Commonwealth and Francophonie are the only two international organizations where Canada has a much larger role to play than in any UN organization. Their biennial summits provide considerable opportunity to promote Canadian interests and values. But to do that we have to be a player rather than sitting on the sidelines marching to our own solitary drum and thinking it will be heard half way round the world. Harper should go to Colombo and beat his drum loudly.
Mexico’s Challenge

Written by: Stephen Randall (iPolitics, August 8)

Mexico’s historical dilemma has long been captured in the old saying “so far from God and so close to the United States.” Some Canadians share that perspective, but reality is otherwise for both nations, whether the issue is border security, trade and investment or immigration. The country that separates Canada and Mexico has been the key trading partner, source of direct investment, security partner, and both the source and target for the migration of people for the past century. Both Mexico and Canada try from time to time to distance themselves from their common neighbour, whether on economic or foreign policy issues. When there have been successes in doing so they have been limited to the margins of policy. Such is the current situation as the new Mexican government of President Enrique Peña Nieto of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) seeks to expand ties with China, strengthen bilateral ties with Canada, maintain its position within Latin America, and at the same time work with the Obama administration to address the complex challenges of border security, immigration, arms and narcotics trafficking.

The Peña administration has focused on a range of domestic economic reforms designed to make the country more open and attractive to foreign investment, especially in the oil sector, seeking to liberate the industry from the more than seventy years of monopoly control by PEMEX. At the same time he has aggressively reached out to China. His immediate predecessor Felipe Calderón had a strained relationship with Beijing, in part associated with Mexico’s hosting of the Dalai Lama in 2011, and in part the result of Mexico’s support for Taiwanese sovereignty. One of Peña’s first official foreign trips was to Beijing to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping, and in June 2013 Xi Jinping travelled to Mexico City where the two leaders concluded what is popularly known as the Tequila Agreement, in part because that is one of the Mexican products the country hopes to market in China. Mexico’s need to improve its trade relationship with China is acute. There is a massive imbalance in Mexico-China trade. In 2012 the value of Mexico’s imports from China was $57 billion (US), but it exported to China less than $6 billion (US) in goods. In contrast Mexican exports to Canada in that year were more than $25 billion and to the United States more than $277 billion.

Peña has also signaled his intention to continue to enhance the bilateral relationship with Canada, building on the updated Canada-Mexico Joint Action Plan concluded under President Calderón in 2010. That plan identified as priorities “fostering competitive and sustainable economies; protection of citizens of both countries; enhancement of people to people contacts; and the projection of the partnership regionally and globally.” The Mexican relationship with China and Canada pales into relative insignificance when compared with the challenges it faces dealing with the United States over immigration and organized crime. Both Barack Obama and now Peña inherited the Merida Initiative concluded under the George Bush administration to provide US financial assistance to support Mexican military, law enforcement and judicial officials in countering narcotics related organized crime. By 2012 the US Congress had appropriated approximately $1.6 billion for the program, but the rising levels of violence in Mexico with the intensified military campaign between 2007 and 2011 raised concerns and criticism on both sides of the border. With the easing of that campaign homicide rates have declined dramatically in previous hot spots such as Ciudad Juarez, where they declined 75% in 2012. Obama has sought to weaken its level of engagement in the internal Mexican conflict, stressing in his May 2013 meetings with President Peña that Mexico needs to set its own course in dealing with its security challenges.

Organized crime in Mexico and associated border challenges are long term issues that defy easy solution. Immigration reform for both countries also cries out for attention. For Mexico the US treatment of and attitudes toward the estimated eleven million undocumented immigrants, the majority of whom originated in Mexico, has long festered. The hope that NAFTA would create a sufficiently sustainable economy on the Mexican side of the border to discourage migration to the United States has never been realized. The current debate in the US Congress over immigration is at the heart of the debate about relations with Mexico, the Mexicans, and other Hispanics who reside in the United States. Republicans are torn between wanting to improve their electoral success with the Hispanic population and opposing any resolution that would appear to grant amnesty to people they consider criminals. Republicans continue to focus on border security, and Democrats go along in the hope that the trade-off will result in meaningful immigration legislation.

The jury remains out.
CDFAI Distinguished Research Fellows

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David Bercuson is Director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary and Program Director for CDFAI.

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Colin Robertson is Senior Strategic Advisor for the US-based law firm of McKenna, Long and Aldridge. A former foreign service officer, he was part of the team that negotiated the Canada-US FTA and NAFTA.

FERRY de KERCKHOVE
Ferry de Kerckhove has served as Canada's High Commissioner to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Ambassador to the Republic of Indonesia, Director General, International Organizations with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and most recently served as Ambassador to the Arab Republic of Egypt.

HUGH SEGAL
Hugh Segal served in the public and private sector for thirty-three years before being appointed by Prime Minister Martin to the Senate as a Conservative in 2005. He is an Adjunct Professor (Public Policy) at the Queen’s School of Business.

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J.L. Granatstein is one of Canada’s most distinguished historians, focusing on 20th Century Canadian national history.

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Andrew Leslie is currently Senior Vice President with CGI and a partner in InnovaNord, a strategic consultancy and cyber resilience practice. He first joined the Army Reserves in 1977, and in 2003 was promoted to Major-General and deployed as the Deputy Commander of ISAF and Commander Task Force Kabul, Afghanistan, following which he was promoted to Lieutenant-General while appointed Chief of Land Staff and Commander of the Land Forces (Army), and in 2010 became the Canadian Forces Chief of Transformation. He retired from the Canadian Forces in 2011.
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Daryl Copeland, a former diplomat, teaches at the University of Ottawa’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs and is Visiting Professor at the London Academy of Diplomacy (UK) and Otago University (NZ). He specializes in the relationship between science, technology, diplomacy, and international policy.

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FRANK HARVEY
Frank P. Harvey is University Research Professor International Relations with Dalhousie University, was appointed Eric Dennis Memorial Chair of Government and Politics in 2013. His book, Explaining the Iraq War: Counterfactual Theory, Logic and Evidence (2011, Cambridge University Press), received the 2013 Canadian Political Science Association Book Prize in International Relations.

ROB HUEBERT
Rob Huebert is Associate Director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies and Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Calgary. In November 2010, he was appointed as a director to the Canadian Polar Commission.

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David Pratt is an independent consultant. Most recently he spent five months in Baghdad, Iraq as a Senior Parliamentary Expert with the USAID sponsored Iraq Legislative Strengthening Program. From 2004-2008 he served as Special Advisor to the Secretary General of the Canadian Red Cross. He served as Canada’s 36th Minister of Defence in 2003-04.

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**MARK COLLINS**
Mark Collins is a former diplomat with postings in Pakistan (1975-77), and Yugoslavia (1984-87). He retired from his career as a public servant following a posting with the Canadian Coast Guard from 1997-2002. He is now a prolific blogger and contributes extensively to CDFAI’s 3D’s blog.

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George Macdonald retired from the Canadian Forces as Vice Chief of the Defence Staff in 2004. He then joined CFN Consultants in Ottawa where he continues to deal with defence and security issues.
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