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 History is oft times said to repeat itself. In fact each historical event is unique – so history doesn’t repeat itself, though it often rhymes. The latest rhyme arises out of the recent NATO summit in Wales. There the resolve of the United States and some other NATO countries to “do something” about the growing threat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) – and Canada’s pledge to participate in whatever this something is – bears a striking resemblance to NATO’s gradual involvement in Afghanistan beginning in 2003.

ISIS is without question a threat to whomever and whatever it deems to stand in the way of 2014 and the ancient Caliphate, whatever it means by that. No one is immune. From US President Barrack Obama to Russian President Vladimir Putin – and anybody else who stands in their way – ISIS had made clear that an orange jumpsuit awaits, along with a man with a jagged edged knife dressed in jihadi black ready to do the unspeakable deed in a high value video production. ISIS’s treatment of captured prisoners of war and religious minorities who fall under its sway, can only be compared to the Nazi SS in its universal brutality and atrocity. So yes, ISIS’s very existence is an affront and it ought to be eliminated.

But by NATO?

Debate will rage for years about the successes or failures of NATO in Afghanistan. There were both. But after more than a decade of involvement in Afghanistan, NATO will leave at the end of this year with the fundamental existence of Afghanistan as we know it ought or once knew it – at stake. Events may very well unfold more positively in the future. The South Korea that the UN saved in 1953 was a corrupt, poverty-ridden fascist-style regime whose only virtue was that it was not a part of Kim Jung II’s Communist North. South Korea has turned out very well in the long run, and Afghanistan may do the same.

But even so, NATO’s many weaknesses to Afghanistan will remain in the records and on the history books. Those weaknesses reflected NATO’s own weaknesses since the end of the Cold War when it’s very reason for existence – to defend western Europe from the Soviet Union – was called into question. NATO in the Cold War was a collective security organization dominated by the United States due largely to the obvious supremacy of American military power based on the strongest economy on earth. As a member of NATO, Canada discussed NATO’s strategic challenges, participated in NATO decision making and produced troops to achieve NATO’s military aims. But did Canada have the same voice in NATO as the United States? Of course not. Nor should it have. And that was even true of much stronger NATO nations such as the UK and France (which was sometimes in and sometimes out of NATO).

When the Cold war ended, the US began to downsize its military and European economic power grew by leaps and bounds, NATO’s political unity began to show significant cracks. Those cracks were obvious when some NATO countries went one way on the embargo of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and the effort to keep his planes from the air after the 1991 Gulf War and other NATO members went another. They widened even further during the NATO campaign in Serbia in 1999 and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. In Afghanistan there was little unity of political direction, almost no set NATO strategy and three types of NATO contributions to the ISAF mission: those NATO members who did nothing; those who contributed troops but hedged them round with caveats and those who went all in.

On the military level there were troops who could not patrol at night, medevac helicopters that could not venture into certain areas and air support that could not fly under certain pre-set altitudes. In some cases some NATO troops could not even communicate with each other because of differences in radio procedure or even kit. In others, caveats would not allow NATO troops to come to the aid of other NATO troops under fire.

The point is as simple as it is clear and we can see it every day in how NATO is, or is not, reacting to the war in the Ukraine. Military unity in a coalition is not possible without political unity and there is very little of that in NATO today regardless of what pronouncements come out of NATO summits. If NATO takes the time to learn from its mistakes in Afghanistan, it may be able to accomplish something against ISIS. Otherwise, we are in for a long, frustrating and possibly futile effort.

David Bercuson is a Fellow of CDEAI and Director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the UofC.
What is Canada to do about the Royal Canadian Navy? The woes about ship procurement won’t go away any time soon, and now there are serious disciplinary problems, problems major enough that a ship had to be ordered off an exercise and sent home. And even re-fitted frigates, the RCN’s best ships, are running into engine noise problems that would be a danger if they were in a war zone. What’s going on?

The procurement difficulties are the most serious threat to the RCN – and Canada’s – future. The Navy is supposed to get six to eight Arctic patrol ships that no one, except the Harper government, really wants or need. These ships cannot handle Arctic ice, so the best they can be is a replacement for the Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDVs). But they are scheduled to be built in Halifax starting in 2015. These ships certainly will be late coming into service, but they are the most likely vessels to be built for the Navy.

That’s because the replacements for the Navy’s supply ships (AORs) are years away. These Joint Support Ships initially were to be able to carry troops, vehicles, helicopters and supplies, but costs mounted and the present intention – subject to change, of course – calls for them to be replacements for the Protecteur-class AORs.

These are to be built on the West Coast as soon as the shipyard is capable of building them, contracts are let, and money is available. In other words, probably never.

The RCN’s present frigates are fine ships, the entire class now halfway through modernization refits. But they lack serious air defence capability, and the RCN’s aged destroyers that had this capability are gone. The frigates, some refitted vessels now suffering from engine noise difficulties, can sail into the 2020s, but the replacements, the Single Class Surface Combatant vessels supposed to be well into the planning stage, certainly won’t arrive before the 2030s, if ever, depending on the financial situation and which political party is in power in Ottawa. Then there is the never-never icebreaker, the Coast Guard’s John G. Diefenbaker, scheduled for West Coast construction someday. All in all, the prospect is at least 50-50 that ten years from now the Royal Canadian Navy will have a handful of Arctic Patrol Ships, some frigates at the end of their usefulness, no supply ships, and no capacity to operate in the Arctic—which is where the Harper government’s Canada First defence policy was to be centred. But that’s OK, there won’t be a harbor in the Arctic from which navy ships will be able to operate, yet another delayed project.

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Sailors can become unhappy for many reasons, but it is difficult to believe that some angst about the future of the RCN is not a factor in recent incidents. There were drunken sailors in Key West in 2012, not something to be surprised about. Sailors have always drunk too much in port. More seriously, a naval officer deserted one of Canada’s rusted out supply ships, HMCS Preserver, in Key West because, among other incidents in a “toxic working relationship,” a female officer urinated in his cabin. Then a naval officer passed secret intelligence information to the Russians, and an officer was discovered dead in a Seychelles hotel room in still unexplained circumstances. Another sailor was discovered unconscious in a Tanzanian hotel and taken to hospital where he also died. Again, no explanation has been offered, but there are too many officers and ratings in trouble.

The most serious incidents came when the RCN ordered HMCS Whitehorse back to Canada in July after a spate of incidents while the MCDV was participating in the annual RIMPAC exercises that involve the navies of our allies and, this year, China. Two imbroglios, details still unavailable, occurred on Whitehorse and a third occurred in downtown San Diego, California. One sailor was arrested by local police. Ordering a ship back to Canada was apparently unprecedented, and Vice-Admiral Mark Norman, the RCN’s leader, had to order special inquiries into what is happening.

the only change that will matter is for the government to sort out the ship procurement mess and assure the RCN that it will still be able to sail and fight in the next decades.

The Royal Canadian Navy has mutinies in its history, disturbances serious enough that a few years after World War II a major inquiry recommended major changes in training, attitude, and the treatment of the lower decks. Those efforts worked, making the RCN a thoroughly professional force. But now in an era where money is tight and ships are rusting out, morale seems to be breaking down, if these ugly incidents are any indication. There can be disciplinary fixes, yes, but it is not hard to believe that the only change that will matter is for the government to sort out the ship procurement mess and assure the RCN that it will still be able to sail and fight in the next decades.

J.L. Granatstein is a Fellow of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute.
When it comes to Western attempts at armed intervention, the record of recent years – in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya – speaks convincingly for itself.

Unprecedented gains by the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq have drawn the U.S. military back into the fray and have been accompanied by horrendous civilian carnage. The country is politically fractured and the state failing.

A controversial election in Afghanistan, with a highly contested outcome, has been followed by a putative deal on cobbled together a “unity” government. Meanwhile, another instance of “green on blue” insider killings has underscored the parlous prospects facing this “graveyard of empires” following NATO’s withdrawal.

Enough? Not quite. Although not covered nearly as prominently as developments in Iraq or Afghanistan, recent weeks have brought dissolution, civil war and generalized regression in Libya.

What to make of these events? Above all, it appears that costly Western experiments with the attempted imposition of military solutions in the face of complex, multi-dimensional civil conflicts have served mainly to make matters worse.

The latest example of this form of “blowback” is Libya, which is by all accounts in uncharted waters and descending into chaos. For the Libyan people, who until recently enjoyed Africa’s highest standing on the UN’s Human Development Index, this outcome represents an unmitigated disaster, with no end in sight.

Could such a catastrophe have been avoided?

Almost certainly.

Have decision-makers and opinion-leaders learned from their mistakes? Not likely. The burden of evidence from the misadventures in Afghanistan and Iraq was already clear at the time of the Libyan intervention, yet those lessons were ignored. Little wonder that the victory celebrations rung hollow.

If this all seems too discouraging, brace yourself. The larger picture is even more troubling.

Given the recent spike in the incidence and intensity of armed conflict globally, and with events in Gaza and Russia/Ukraine adding to editorial preoccupations this summer, it is easy to lose a sense of perspective. Daily
headlines notwithstanding, in the globalization era not only has the longer-term trend been towards a decline in organized violence world-wide, but many of the most profound challenges which imperil the planet and afflict us all are immune to military solutions. Climate change, public health, food security and resource scarcity, to name a few of these “wicked” problems, are rooted in science and driven by technology. Moreover, underdevelopment and human insecurity, far more than religious extremism or political violence, represent fundamental threats to world order.

In this context, it follows that the capability to generate, absorb and use science and technology (S&T) should play a crucial role in resolving differences, reducing inequality and improving security and development prospects. Addressing the needs of the poor, sustaining broadly-based development and bridging digital divides must in consequence become a pre-occupation of both diplomacy and international policy.

Bottom line? As a response to the negative attributes of globalization, especially the tendency to polarize at all levels, socializing costs while privatizing benefits, tools such as science diplomacy are indispensable.

Although scientific and technological capacity is essential to reducing poverty and encouraging development, and development is a precondition to security, S&T capability is largely alien to, and almost invisible within most institutions of global governance. Foreign ministries, development agencies, and indeed most multilateral organizations are without the scientific expertise, technological savvy, cultural pre-disposition or research and development (R&D) network access required to manage S&T-based issues effectively. If this is to change, diplomacy and development will have to displace defence as the international policy instruments of choice, with structural obstacles overcome and resources re-allocated accordingly.

Absent deliberate action to address the underlying causes of underdevelopment and insecurity, the future is grim. Lasting peace and prosperity will remain elusive, whereas more Libyas – and Iraqs and Afghanistans – are a near certainty.

We can surely do better than to reach, again, for the gun. There is an alternative way forward.

Daryl Copeland, Senior Fellow at the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, is an analyst, author, educator and consultant specializing in the relationship between science, technology, diplomacy, and international policy.
THE IRON DOME FOR PRIVACY: WE MAY HAVE FOUND THE IRON DOME FOR INFORMATION PRIVACY—IN A RATHER SURPRISING PLACE

by TOM KEENAN

Russian criminals accumulate 1.2 billion user names and passwords. The amazing snoopiness of intelligence agencies is revealed by Edward Snowden and others. You search for a Rolex watch on eBay and an ad for that very item pops up on Facebook.

Every day we discover more creepy ways in which our personal information is shared, sold, and even stolen. Many of these exploits, like the Russian caper, are beyond our control. Even if your password is 256 super cryptic characters, you are defenseless if the bad guys break into the server of your bank, online store, or healthcare provider.

Most people underestimate the power of today's algorithms to mine information about us from innocuous sources like tweets on Twitter and photos on Facebook. Computer processing power, and storage costs have been plummeting. The only limit on how our data can be sliced and diced for profit is the creativity of a new breed of data scientists.

Information leakage can hit you in the pocketbook. In September, 2000, Amazon conducted dynamic pricing experiments. In one case, a man reported buying a DVD for $24.49. He went back a week later and found the price had jumped to $26.24. When he removed the tracking cookie that Amazon used to identify him, the price dropped to $22.74.

A major travel site was caught in 2012 displaying pricier hotels to customers who used Apple computers. Their logic was that Cadillac tastes in laptops implied a penchant for snazzier hotels. The Chief Technology Officer of Orbitz, Roger Liew, confirmed the practice, telling the Wall Street Journal "We had the intuition, and we were able to confirm it based on the data."

Often, we are our own worst enemies in this data-hungry environment. As I explain in my new book, Technocreep: The Surrender of Privacy and the Capitalization of Intimacy, people on dating sites use pseudonyms like sexybabe235 or hungguy404 to try to preserve their

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privacy. Carnegie Mellon University professor Alessandro Acquisti took photos from a love-matching site and compared them to Facebook photos that carried real names.

Acquisti reported in 2011 that “about 1 out of 10 dating site’s pseudonymous members is identifiable”. Great strides have been made since then in facial recognition. Soon, a Google Glass user may see an instant display of your Facebook profile, the company you work for, even the ages of your children.

Creepy interaction with technology will become the norm. In Technocreep I suggest that concert-goers at Woodstock’s 50th anniversary, in 2019, may see the prices of t-shirts change based on the credit cards they are carrying. I also suggest that at the end of the festival, they might find their car’s smart license plate displaying “EXPIRED” if they have forgotten to renew. It’s fairly certain that they’ll be swatting away disposable camera-carrying drones to get a better view of the stage!

One way to fight back against Technocreep is to be “info-stingy.” Give HoH oHo as your postal code and 555-something as your home phone. Have multiple email accounts for different purposes, and be careful where you leave your DNA, even on a water glass.

Every day we discover creepy ways in which our personal information is shared, sold, and even stolen.

On a broader scale, I was inspired by Israeli computer scientist Keren Elazari’s talk at the recent DEF CON conference. She was quick to dispel the notion that the Iron Dome that protects Israel has been “hacked.” Yes, she said, some of the firms that built it were penetrated, but “that doesn’t mean someone in China can control the defenses over Tel Aviv.”

Elazari said she’s “proud to be called a Hacker,” and called for a return to the original use of that term, which meant someone who is very skilled and motivated to solve challenging problems, with no implication of criminal intent. “Let’s not let a few people who break into systems or sell zero days (new vulnerabilities in software) tarnish our reputation.” She praised those who find and reveal glitches in software, and the companies that pay them a bug bounty.

The Israeli missile defense system has done a spectacular job recently, even if the occasional missile does get past it. So ethical hackers who publicize every vulnerability they find may hold the key to the relatively safe use of technology.

Thomas P. Keenan, FCIPS, I.S.P., is a Fellow of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, an award winning journalist, public speaker, and professor at the University of Calgary and author of the new book, Technocreep: The Surrender of Privacy and the Capitalization of Intimacy. (www.technocreep.com)
Harper’s Defence Procurement Strategy Won’t Solve Procurement Anguishes

by Jean-Christophe Boucher

In February 2014, the Harper Government revealed a new “Defence Procurement Strategy” (DPS) in response to growing concerns that the Canadian military procurement policy was seriously dysfunctional. The generation-long drama of the Sea King Helicopter replacement, the failure of the F-35 acquisition, and the now over-budget and behind schedule 33 Billion National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy, seem to demonstrate that Canada is fundamentally unable to provide new military equipment in due time and within budget.

The DPS was meant to fulfill the Harper Government’s promise to ensure that defence purchases created economic opportunities within Canada and improved defence procurement outcomes. But, despite the good intentions revealed by this procurement strategy, the new DPS won’t solve the present challenges to Canadian military procurement.

The DPS focused on three core priorities. First, to supply the Canadian Armed Forces and the Canadian Coast Guard with the right equipment at the appropriate time by fostering continuous dialogue between industry and the government. DND would also publish a defence acquisition guide, and establish an independent third-party within DND to challenge the assumptions of basic military requirements.

Second, to leverage defence acquisitions to promote Canada’s economic growth, the DPS would focus on valued proposition to evaluate bids, encourage an export strategy to promote international sales, emphasize Key Industrial Capabilities (KICs), and create a Defence Analytics Institute to provide analysis on DPS.

Third, in order to streamline defence acquisition, the DPS would establish a Defence Procurement Secretariat with public Works, and increase DND’s purchasing authority beyond the current $25,000.

The first problem with the DPS is that the three objectives of the policy are fundamentally contradictory. There is no clear indication whether the priority is to supply both the Canadian Armed Forces and the Canadian Coast Guard with needed equipment in a timely manner or to use these...
purchases to promote Canada’s economic interests. The struggle between military needs (both in terms of equipment capability and timetable) and economic development will be especially visceral when dealing with “in-development” equipment. The current traumatic experience of replacing the current Royal Canadian Navy supply ships HMCS Preserver and HMCS Protecteur is a good example of how such conflict produces externalities.

Since 2004, the Canadian government has been announcing its intention to replace the RCN’s Protecteur-class Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment and supply Canada with a state-of-the-art modular ship to satisfy the current and future needs of the Royal Canadian Navy. In order to create jobs in Canada and foster domestic economic growth, the contract was awarded to Vancouver Seaspan Shipyard. In 2007, an internal National Defence review criticized the department’s procurement process and identified the JSS project as an unsuccessful procurement strategy.

A contract for three Joint Support Ships was awarded in 2008 with an estimated delivery date of 2012 to 2016. But, it quickly became apparent that the proposed budget of $2.3 billion was insufficient to purchase three ships and the project was cancelled. In 2010, the government re-launched the project with a delayed timetable, changed the requirements, reduced the number of ships to be built, and increased the budget to $2.6 Billion.

The first JSS is expected to hit the water in 2018, but the Parliamentary budget officer noted in his 2013 report that the project had not initiated its ‘engineering phase’. Consequently, there remains significant uncertainty on whether or not Vancouver’s shipyard will be able to comply with the schedule.

An update from Public Works in October 2011 suggested that the JSS would be operational by 2019-2020 – about four years after the two Protecteur-class oilers were scheduled to be decommissioned. In February 2014 the HMCS Protecteur suffered an engine room fire and will most probably never sail again, which means that while at sea, Canada will be unable to resupply its own vessels.

The government was able to fulfill its promise to promote Canadian economic interests through defence procurement, but the Shipyard has been unable to provide the Royal Canadian Navy with the equipment it needs.

Managing these two priorities will remain difficult. It is essential to the Canadian Armed Forces and Coast Guard that they receive reliable equipment in sufficient quantity. The Canadian government must look abroad to purchase these platforms at competitive price points and with guarantees on deliverability, irrespective of the domestic economic downsputs. We cannot expect the government to spend billions of public funds abroad without suffering undesirable political consequences, but without a clear procurement process that discriminates between military expediency and domestic economic development, Canada’s military procurement fiasco is bound to continue.

Jean-Christophe Boucher is a Fellow of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute and Assistant Professor at MacEwan University.
Since the Government of Canada introduced its plan to slay their deficit by 2015, many Canadian NGOs and think-tanks focused on international development have laid out a guilt trip condemning Canadians’ declining generosity to support the world’s impoverished. These organizations largely measure Canadians’ generosity in the global fight to eradicate poverty using the OECD’s definition of “Official Development Assistance” (ODA). It is a measure of rich country government’s assistance, largely delivered through developing country governments, multilateral organizations like the United Nations and the World Bank, or non-governmental organizations such as World Vision and Plan. This approach ultimately misses the proverbial forest for the trees.

A primary failure of Canada’s international development lobby stems from their use of ODA as a percentage of Canada’s economy (GNI) to define generosity. This commonly used calculation is an artificial measure that can rise and fall without any change in the dollars spent assisting people in developing countries.

If the Canadian economy were to contract, as it did after the financial crisis in 2008, and the money budgeted towards development were unchanged, as they were from 2008-2011, Canada’s ODA as a percentage of GNI would automatically increase. How would an impoverished child in Africa, Asia or Latin America benefit from this? There would be no more hot meals, access to basic education and health care or job prospects for their parents because of an increase in this measure. Yet we celebrate its increase and bemoan its fall.

The ODA/GNI ratio is also an extremely limited measure of Canadian’s generosity, because it incorporates only tax dollars appropriated for international development. While some international development organizations, like Engineers Without Borders, acknowledge that ODA is only a small part of Canada’s overall positive imprint on the developing world, the industry has avoided balancing their criticism of the government with tangible facts about the magnitude of our foreign direct investment, remittances and private donations.

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The North South Institute (NSI), an organization that has criticized the Government for reducing its ODA, highlighted the fact that in 2010 alone, remittances paid by Canadians to individuals in the developing world totaled $14.7 billion. The Statistics Canada Survey of Giving, Volunteering and Participating showed that in the same year, individual Canadians donated $879 million to internationally oriented charities. NSI also publishes details on the levels of Canadian foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries. NSI also published research stating that such FDI nearly doubled between 2001 and 2011 from $7.8 billion to $13.5 billion.

The inclusion of these numbers may allow Canadians concerned about the perception of their generosity to breathe a collective sigh of relief, but they too are false-positives. Canada’s international development efforts have long been measured in terms of charitable dollars and cents. This has placed it in a precarious position on the cusp of irrelevance for the Canadian government and individual donors wrestling with their own fiscal circumstances.

However, if we truly believe eradicating global poverty is both fundamental to Canadian values of strategic importance we should stop measuring how much we spend and spend more time maximizing the results of our investments.

Unless the international development industry re-imagines its narrative as a strategic imperative, that leverages remittances, private donors and foreign direct investment, and ultimately pays a dividend in the form of shared prosperity and security, it will continue to hang in the balance of budgets everywhere.

Ironically, it has played, and continues to play, such a role in places like Afghanistan where Canadian investments in infrastructure, women’s health and education are helping to develop a country that once was the epicentre of Al Qaeda’s global hate and terror operations. It has laid a path towards greater economic relations with countries such as South Korea, Brazil and India, which were recipients of Canadian development assistance less than a generation ago.

Canadians can and should take pride in their investments in international development. Their assistance has contributed to some remarkable results. For example, the government of Canada and Canadian organizations like Rotary, working with international partners, have largely eradicated polio with remaining cases isolated to Nigeria, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

However, if we truly believe eradicating global poverty is both fundamental to Canadian values and of strategic importance we should stop measuring how much we spend and spend more time maximizing the results of our investments.

Neil Desai is a Fellow with the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute and the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto and a former executive with the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development.
About a year ago, the venerable Foreign Affairs magazine declared “failed states” policies no longer useful because the so-called Global War on Terror (GWOT) was more or less officially dead. Although the idea of state failure has been around at least since Bill Clinton was president, it was the GWOT that launched state failure onto centre stage.

The justification for failed states policies was provided by the World Bank, among others, which argued that such states were the crucible for terrorist activities and vectors for the transmission of transnational conflict, crime and environmental instability. Just this year, the decade-old Fund for Peace announced that it was going to change its Failed States Index to the Fragile States Index.

Today Ukraine and Syria are locked in civil war, Iraq is no longer a functional state, Afghanistan is backsliding, Haiti remains in a state of paralysis, Pakistan stands vulnerable to violence and collapse, and several countries in Africa such as Libya, South Sudan, the Central African Republic are all facing imminent collapse. The latter conflicts are spreading to neighbouring countries such as Cameroon and along with Nigeria’s northern conflict could destabilize Western Africa even further. Surely failed states policies still resonate.

For their part, Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs John Baird and British Foreign Secretary William Hague announced earlier this year that Canada and the UK would invest in stopping animal poaching in Africa as a way of addressing that continent’s deep seated economic and political turmoil. Considering that Africa must create five million new jobs in the coming decade in order to address its demographic youth bulge and economic imbalances, Mr. Baird’s and Mr. Hague’s policy comes across as a quaint, if not superficial, response that is unlikely to have a significant impact on instability on the continent. Contrast that with Tony Blair’s and Paul Martin’s deep personal and intellectual investment in the problem; both individuals produced sweeping policy documents to fix failed states that were not picked up by their successors.

Failed states are “problems from hell” or “wicked problems” that defy simple easy solutions. Wicked problems require a high degree of international coordination, political capital, and shared knowledge to

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Failed states are “problems from hell” or “wicked problems” that defy simple easy solutions.

From the current government’s perspective, the new reality is straightforward and simple. Stephen Harper is not a problem solver. By his own admission, he eschews root causes and chastises those who might put them front and centre. In a speech Harper gave during a recent visit to Israel, he admitted he had no interest in helping to resolve the conflict in Syria. A solution to that conflict did not appear possible, so there wasn’t much point in trying.

Clearly, the distinction between global problems and enemies is not lost on Canada’s government. It is perhaps politically more profitable to focus on enemies than it is global problems. Consider that a world that separates enemies from friends is amenable to simple and simplistic policy options; it allows policy makers to lay the world’s problems at the feet of their so called "enemies".


Playing the “enemy” game may be fine for political purposes but the world needs problem solvers and global leadership. The world is full of looming threats and problems including state failure – that require full and collective engagement. Climate change is real, global inequality is real, failed states are real and they affect us today as well as future generations.

Failed states are the problems from hell that politicians are desperate to ignore lest they show how utterly unprepared they really are to think these things through.

David Carment is CDAFI Fellow and editor of Canadian Foreign Policy Journal. Teddy Samy is Professor of International Affairs at Carleton and Fellow of the North-South Institute. Their failed and fragile states project website is www.carleton.ca/cifp.
“Keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down” was how Lord Ismay, NATO’s first Secretary General (1952 to 1957), described the Alliance that has since become both the sword and shield of our liberal international order.

Recent events revalidate Lord Ismay’s trope except that Germany now needs to take on responsibilities within NATO commensurate with its leadership within Europe. The rest of the Alliance, including Canada, also need to step up their commitments. NATO leaders and their foreign and defence ministers meet this week in Wales to focus on a readiness action plan.

Leaders face immediate challenges on NATO’s eastern and southern flanks. Their priority is addressing the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its illegal annexation of Crimea. Sanctions are biting but they have not deterred continuing, blatant Russian incursions. Tit-for-tat sanctions mean that industry – including Canadian pork producers – are taking a hit. Yet Russian actions oblige more sanctions requiring more discipline and sacrifice.

Then there is jihadism. For British Prime Minister David Cameron, it is a “clear and present danger” and U.S. President Barack Obama has called for a coalition “to extract this cancer so that it does not spread”.

NATO’s longer-term challenges are twofold.

Firstly, a war-weary United States is tired of picking up the tab and having its call for burden-sharing ignored. American taxpayers cover three-quarters of NATO spending. At NATO headquarters in June, Mr. Obama said the U.S. “can’t do it alone.” Pointing to the “steady decline” in European defence spending, he expects every member “to do its fair share.”

Secondly, there is the challenge of persuading the rest of the Alliance to develop a credible rapid expeditionary capacity. Only a handful of NATO’s 28 members meet the defence budget spending target of 2 per cent of GDP (Canada currently spends 1 per cent).

All members voted for the 2011 operation to stop genocide in Libya. Less than half participated. Fewer than a third (including Canada) engaged in combat. Quality of contribution – rapid deployment without strings attached – matters more than the GDP target. But, argues defence

(Continued on page 19)
analyst Julian Lindley-French, 2 per cent well-spent on defence is better than 1 per cent.

The annual reports of successive NATO Secretary Generals’ chronicle the increasing asymmetries in members’ capability. NATO renewal requires boosting combat capability through joint procurement, training and logistics. It means modernizing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, and adapting to hybrid warfare.

NATO renewal starts with Germany, Europe’s dominant power. Germany still has stabilization forces in the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan; it contributed in Mali, but not in Libya. Even before the Ukraine crisis, Chancellor Angela Merkel’s grand coalition began reassessing German foreign policy. At the Munich Security conference this spring, German President Joachim Gauck argued it is invalid to use “Germany’s guilt for its past as a shield for laziness or a desire to disengage from the world. German leadership will have to persuade a public wary of activism. But recent events, says German-born Henry Kissinger, mean that “Germany is doomed in some way, to play an increasingly important role.”

Against this backdrop, Prime Minister Stephen Harper should make three points in Wales:

First, that Canada supports NATO readiness. Our reinvigorated Canada First defence strategy must include a robust expeditionary capacity. We need a fresh perspective on military procurement, with immediate attention to our navy and its maritime responsibilities.

Second, a closer transatlantic economic partnership is of paramount importance. The Canadian-inspired Article 2 of the NATO Treaty calls for closer economic ties. The now negotiated Canada-EU agreement (CETA) opens the door for business-to-business matchmaking through smart initiatives like the Enterprise Canada Network.

Third, a transatlantic energy-security partnership is valuable. The EU depends on Russia and the Middle East for its energy. Russia has shut off the tap to serve its ambitions. We should market the Energy East and Line 9 pipelines, new refineries and Atlantic terminals as strategic investments providing energy security to the EU.

The paradox of the liberal international order is that its reciprocal benefits and privileges depend on collective responsibility to uphold the rule of law and respect for norms – like not invading neighbours. But in making it inclusive, it tolerates scofflaws, like Russia (and Iran, Syria, North Korea). Free riders – China, Brazil, India, even Switzerland – not only refuse sanctions but use the opportunity to increase their commerce with Russia.

According to Mr. Kissinger, the international order depends on a “sense of legitimacy” and an equilibrium of power “that makes overthrowing the system difficult and costly.”

This week, NATO leaders must demonstrate collective political will and commit the necessary resources to sustain the security equilibrium. Canada can help show the way.

A former diplomat, Colin Robertson is vice-president of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute and a senior adviser to McKenna Long and Aldridge. He participated in NATO Allied Command Transformation sponsored workshops in Washington and Paris.
The situation in Ukraine may finally be approaching the political endgame framework to resolve the civil war. The NATO Summit in Wales clearly spelled out the West's position: NATO will strengthen its military posture with regard to its obligation to defend NATO Allies under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, including the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force and the rotation of Allied forces within the territory of its eastern member states such as Poland and the Baltic states. NATO will also reinforce its long standing partnership with Ukraine under the auspices of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and continue to cooperate with Ukraine on the modernization of its armed forces and their capacity for interoperability with NATO forces. NATO will not, however, offer Ukraine a fast track for NATO membership and NATO will not go to war with Russia over the future of Ukraine.

Essentially the endgame will work out the parameters for a neutral and non-aligned Ukraine or it will lead to a defacto partition of a Western and Eastern Ukraine. The latter may be considered to be the less desirable option for most stakeholders excepting a few radical Ukrainian separatists. Since independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine has struggled to define its path between east and west (i.e. Russia and Western Europe). This is not surprising in light of Ukraine's fractured history since the 13th century whereby Ukraine was broken into two essential halves: the west being ruled in succession by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Kingdom of Poland, and upon the partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, by the Austrian Empire, whereas eastern Ukraine was ruled by Russia.

Since independence Ukraine has been required to adapt itself as a modern European post-Soviet state in terms of political, economic and military transformation, but to do so living next door to a Russia that regards Ukraine as firmly within its sphere of influence. This particular challenge is magnified by the historical legacy that a portion of largely eastern Ukrainians see a natural partnership between Ukraine and Russia, a legacy reinforced by their economic dependence on Russia, as well as their cultural and linguistic ties. While these linkages are also manifest in parts of western Ukraine, a significant portion of western Ukrainians firmly believe that their partnership should be enhanced with Western Europe to the point of seeking both EU and NATO membership.

This cleavage was brought to the fore in the fall of 2013 when the question of Ukraine signing an Associate Status (Continued on page 21)
agreement with the EU led to political revolts in both western and eastern Ukraine. The inability since that time to find a political accommodation within Ukraine has triggered a most unfortunate civil war taking (at the time of writing) just under 3000 deaths, not counting the injured and displaced in the thousands. While not admitting it openly, Russian military and political support for the eastern Ukrainian rebels has significantly fueled the flames of this civil war.

The parameters for the endgame solution are essentially that while the West will not intervene militarily, Western economic sanctions will continue to be applied in a graduated response designed to influence Russia’s position on Ukraine. For Russia, the future political and economic status of Ukraine is perceived as a vital interest. That vital interest precludes Ukraine’s accession to NATO and the EU. In defence of this interest Russia appears prepared to pay the economic cost imposed by Western sanctions thus far. How far Russia is prepared to continue to absorb the pain remains to be seen, but it is important to recall this is a country that has a history of absorbing huge human, military and financial costs where its perceived vital interests are concerned.

A neutral and non-aligned Ukraine would accommodate Russian interests while allowing a unified and reform minded Ukraine the political and economic space to have cooperative relations with both the west and east. It is the basis for a realistic political solution.

Andrew Rasiulis is a former defence analyst for the Department of National Defence and is now a freelance consultant with Andrew Rasiulis Associates Inc.

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This is CDFAI’s sixth annual four-part Speaker Series starting in October and extending into winter 2015. The Institute is pleased to welcome ATB Corporate Financial Services as the 2014/15 Speaker Series Title Sponsor.

International relations and the flow of oil and gas are being closely examined and in some regions significantly realigned. Alberta crude and natural gas is being discounted as these new realities are being formed. Ultimately the geopolitics of energy will become more important to international security. The Ukraine and European sources of energy are but one significant example of this new reality.

Four outstanding experts will speak to a by-invitation-only audience on issues affecting Canada and this important topic. In order for the speakers to be candid, the “Chatham House Rule” (non attribution) will apply during the Question and Answer (Q&A) portion of the evening.

• This invitation for couples or individuals (maximum 125 guests) to enjoy the opportunity of a thought-provoking discussion over a great meal at the Calgary Golf & Country Club.
• Again this year, there will be limited opportunities for corporations to reserve tables of 10.
• Each presentation will be approximately 35 minutes, followed by dinner and Q&A session.
• Those in attendance will have an opportunity to engage with the speaker.
• The reception will commence at 6:00 and the evening will end at 9:15 PM.
• Business attire is requested.

Dinner Dates and Speakers:
• The four events will occur during the months of Oct, Nov 2014 and Jan, Mar 2015.
• So far three speakers have been confirmed—James Woolsey (former director of the CIA and sought after speaker on energy security) on Nov 20, Dr. Michal Moore (University of Calgary) on Jan 29, and Kevin Book (Managing Director of Research, ClearView Energy Partners LLC, Washington, DC) on Mar 3.

Each speaker will provide a different and personal view on the geopolitics of energy and the evolving world from a security and energy flow perspective. These four events promise to be timely, informative and thought provoking regarding matters of increasing importance to Alberta’s economy and to Canadian international relations and as the subject suggests, international relations including security.

Pricing:
• Corporate tables of 10 for the series—$15,000
• Individual tickets for the four-part series—$1,500
• A tax deductible charitable receipt for the donation portion of the ticket price will be issued.

For further information or to register, please contact Lynn Arsenault at 403-231-7605 or by email to larsenault@cdfai.org.
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