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MESSAGE FROM THE EDITOR

At the beginning of June, US President Barack Obama announced that he would ask Congress to approve a European Reassurance Fund of a billion dollars as a US show of commitment to Central and Eastern Europe in the wake of the ongoing Ukraine crisis. One can quibble with the amount of the fund – a billion dollars in defence spending doesn’t go very far these days and certainly not when spread over NATO’s Baltic and central and eastern European partners. But at least the US administration is not taking amnesia pills regarding the Russian annexation of the Crimea and Russia’s patently obvious support for the armed separatists in Eastern Ukraine who are waging war against the central government in Kyiv.

That is not the case with a number of EU and NATO nations in Europe who would happily wish the whole mess to go away so they might maintain business as usual with Russia. And who is to blame them? If Russia is willing to spend billions of rubles to buy warships from France, which needs the cash and the jobs, who can blame the French for being so accommodating? If the Czech Republic and Slovakia do not want an enhanced NATO presence within their borders so as not to risk the wrath of the Russian president, well, Moscow is a lot closer to them than is Washington. And if Germany is now scrambling to forge an energy strategy in the wake of its panicky decision to close down its nuclear power plants after Fukushima and is thus more reliant on the Russian “friendly” giant’s energy than ever, who can blame Berliners for not wanting to freeze in the dark next winter?

NATO still exists on paper, but without political unity its military “might” is an illusion. Which raises the question: isn’t Russia just using NATO expansion as an excuse to use military power to restore the dominance of the Tsarist empire in eastern and central Europe? And won’t it continue to use the same rationale or something like it to restore that same dominance in central Asia? And what about the Arctic?

David Bercuson is a Fellow of CDFAI and Director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the UofC.

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The World: A General Geography, by L. Dudley Stamp, was assigned in BC high schools during my youth. My teacher, Mr. Jenkins, had “read” geography at Oxford and taught us the geopolitics of Sir Halford J. Mackinder. His basic premise was Machiavellian: necessity is more important than desire. A geopolitical perspective on Russian behaviour regarding Ukraine provides some useful insights.

Like all land powers, Russia has always been anxious about invasion. Geographic insecurity is more fundamental than the regime, whether Czarist, Bolshevik, or Putin’s post-totalitarian autocracy, because for the most part Russia is unprotected by mountains, swamps, rivers, or oceans.

In particular, along the North European Plain, from the Pyrenees to St. Petersburg, there are hardly any natural barriers. Consequently Russia has always required defensive depth from the Baltic to the Black Sea and the Caucasus. This is one reason why the western political frontiers of Russia’s borderlands have varied so much over the centuries.

After 1945 Russia pushed its western front to central Germany. The end of the Cold War moved it 1000 miles east. At the centre of this reduction in strategic depth was Ukraine. The Orange Revolution during the winter of 2004-5 and its failure was therefore a major Russian victory. Had Ukraine increased its ties to the West, the disintegration of Russia would have been entirely possible. Certainly with the Baltic countries and Ukraine as part of NATO, Russia would have been indefensible.

Not that NATO in 2005 could have done Russia harm, but perhaps someday. Indeed, the Russians today believe the Kiev uprising was inspired, financed, and encouraged by Western intelligence services, absent which, following a few riots, things would have settled down and Viktor Yanukovitch would still enjoy power.

The first insight provided by geopolitics, then, is that Russian interests today are not focused on extending an ideological empire into the West, as arguably they were during the Cold War, but on restoring control over the former Soviet periphery. For the Russians, defensive geopolitical necessities require that Ukraine be neutralized, which means: not a member of the EU or NATO. Perhaps a Ukrainian federation would do the trick.

Going back to Soviet times, the Russians developed a three-phase strategy to reacquire its tenuous or endangered borderlands. First, organize local Russian populations and engage in classic Leninist agitation. Second, provide support for unofficial armed groups and then third, when the security situation grows precarious, follow up with a military operation. The procedure

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worked in Moldova (1989-91), in Lithuania (1990-91), in Georgia (1989-93 and 2008), and in Crimea. So far the first two phases have had useful effects in eastern Ukraine.

The Russians know perfectly well that the West does not have interests in Ukraine sufficient to risk war. The Americans may well have provided Ukrainian forces with new and sophisticated equipment for what they both call anti-terrorism operations, but they are hardly “running the show,” as Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov said. For their part, the Russians are certainly not prepared to fight the West either.

In fact, a successful long-term Russian strategy need not involve phase-three military intervention. All they need to do is raise the price of natural gas and wait until memories of the glorious revolution fade, fractious and corrupt Ukrainian politics reappear, and the IMF loan to relieve their sovereign debt causes great economic pain.

A second geopolitical insight is this: hurling moralizing thunderbolts at Russia and its president, as both the Canadian Prime Minister and his Foreign Affairs Minister have done is absurd when the West lacks the capability and the political will to act. If Canadian political leaders understood that Canada has a national interest they would understand that others do too.

Understanding the interests of your adversaries makes political compromise possible but self-righteousness is always de-stabilizing. Thus, understanding the geopolitics of the Ukrainian confrontation provided a golden opportunity for Stephen Harper and John Baird to keep quiet. Perhaps they could have sent some Ukrainian-Canadians to Kiev to discuss the benefits of federalism.

**Barry Cooper, FRSC, is a Professor of Political Science and Fellow, Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary.**
Another arrest warrant has been issued to bring former Pakistan president General Pervez Musharraf to trial on treason and murder charges. If found guilty, he could be hanged. While Musharraf was never a poster boy for democratic good governance whilst in office, does he really deserve this fate?

It was the government of current Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif that Musharraf overthrew in 1999 after Nawaz tried to dismiss the general himself for alleged adventurism in Kashmir against the traditional foe India.

In 2007, during a state of emergency so declared by the president, Musharraf arrested judges and effectively suspended the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Chaudhry had been a thorn in the side of the government and may have been behind an attempt to impeach the president in 2008. Memories linger long in Pakistan so Musharraf will have few friends among the judiciary even now.

The army remains a powerful force in Pakistan, both politically and economically if not necessarily militarily, although Pakistan remains a nuclear power. While Musharraf was a popular army leader in his day, even he wore out his welcome by retaining the post of army chief after he became president in 2001. That was undemocratic in its own right but it also slowed promotion opportunities in the army. So while the army likely still supports Musharraf as one of its own, its new leadership, appointed by Nawaz, will proceed cautiously.

The general himself faces several serious allegations: two murder charges, one against a nationalist Baloch leader.
who was killed in army action against so-called militants in Balochistan and one against a radical cleric who was involved in the Red Mosque stormed on Musharraf’s orders in 2007. The general is also accused of providing insufficient protection to former prime minister Benazir Bhutto on her return to Pakistan in 2007, which ended by her assassination later that year. The treason charge relates to Musharraf’s suspension of the constitution and running rough-shod over other democratic instruments and institutions.

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That is the case for the prosecution. In the president’s defence, after he threw his hand in with the West in 2001 following the Twin Towers attack, he gained some support with the US and other western governments while losing credibility with his own people and other Islamic forces in his zeal to fight the Taliban and others. It remains for history to judge whether he made the right choice and how effective he was in his support for the war on terror. But Musharraf supported the fight against militant radicalism where others might not have. Others would argue that the US government left him no choice. In comparison with the corrupt civilian administrations that had preceded Musharrafs’, his administration was no worse and some argue, better.

Today Musharraf is over seventy years old, and in less than robust health. His well-intentioned if misguided wish to return to Pakistan to lead the All Party Muslim League to electoral victory ended in failure at the polls in 2013. The charges against him have some validity but are not a slam dunk. The trial has a whiff of vendetta about it rather than seeing justice actually served.

But Musharraf is not blameless. He took the law into his own hands whilst in power and violated many principles of parliamentary democracy. But at this stage there is little point in retributive action. A reasonable outcome would be to deport him and ban him from returning to Pakistan. Anything else would set the army on edge against the new Nawaz government. This is neither necessary nor helpful as Pakistan faces a host of economic and political challenges as the new government continues to find its way.

David Collins is a fellow of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, a director of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute and a member of the programme advisory committee of the Canadian Ditchley Foundation.
Nobody can disagree with the Prime Minister’s decision to celebrate on May 9th Canada’s Armed Forces contribution to the war in Afghanistan. It would be silly to look at it from a small “p” political perspective. Not a single person in Canada should fail to salute our men and women in uniform’s contribution to that effort. And there is no doubt that during Mr. Harper’s tenure little effort has been spared to ensure an effective military contribution from our troops. This, however, should not exonerate the government from going through a full “lessons learned” exercise, hopefully in cooperation with various centers of expertise. Nor should it blind us as to the less than stellar long term perspective for the country where we lost a good number of people – dead or seriously maimed. This is our focus here.

In order to attempt the impossible, i.e. to come up with an objective assessment of Afghanistan’s future, one should discard a series of myths and replace them with approximations of reality:

Afghanistan has never been an existential threat to world security even when the Taliban harbored Al-Qaeda. But the initial action against the Taliban in the aftermath of 9-11 was both justified and successful. The fundamental mistake came when the objectives of the mission were continuously modified from defeating Al-Qaeda, to fostering nation-building, creating institutions of good governance, eradicating drugs, defeating the insurgency, and finally establishing quasi ex-nihilo a full fledge democracy – and then believing that it has happened. So today, Afghanistan remains a security risk at the tactical level but very little will be done about it.

The fight against terrorism determined Western security policy for the following decade. Yet, it never was a “strategic threat” in the Cold War sense of the word. Today, Afghanistan is left with the scars of the war against terror and these will affect the future of Afghanistan for years to come.

While the counter-insurgency operation against the Taliban was part and parcel of the war against terror, there is no doubt that despite thousands of allied casualties (not to mention the Afghan victims) and billions of dollars spent the Taliban will remain a force in Afghanistan and that the Afghan National Army (ANA) (Continued on page 11)
will never eradicate that force, particularly in the Southern part of the country.

In the latter days of the war, the Western powers tried in vain to engineer an agreement between the Taliban and the government of Kabul. It was delusional to think that the Taliban would ever want to negotiate with them. The real issue today is whether the Taliban will be able to reestablish control over most, if not all, of the country or if an agreement can be arrived at with Kabul on some kind of power sharing.

Afghanistan is not a democracy as Western leaders branded it and is unlikely to become one for decades to come – this does not mean that people would not aspire to it, at least those understanding its basic meaning of a government chosen by the people vs. a dictatorship. Even the latter might be more acceptable if it was better able to ensure security and stability as seems to be the case in several countries of the broader region. At best, with the recent elections, some form of majority representation emerged. But the issue is more basic: in a society overwhelmingly poor, illiterate or poorly educated, particularly women, there is no rule of law to speak of in Afghanistan, little respect or even understanding of human rights, a civil society in its infancy, no democratic institutions and governance foundations. Ethnicity, religious affiliations and tribal traditions dominate with an overarching culture of corruption and the influence of a drug based economy.

Western aid money is not making a sustainable difference in Afghanistan because the fundamental culture of the country has not been altered. So it is very likely that any - admittedly very real - short term gain will be wiped out over time. Another unfortunate illusion in this regard is that one cannot at the same time fight a war in a country, particularly of a counter-insurgency nature, and engage in a full scope reconstruction/national institution building. Destruction cannot run side by side with reconstruction.

Many observers have argued that the recent elections are the ultimate test of “the endurance of Afghanistan’s constitutional political order”. A failure would result in “an anarchy on Al- Qaida’s home turf, fueled by the world’s largest drug trade, on the doorstep of nuclear armed Pakistan”. (Paul D. Miller, Democracy in Afghanistan: the 2014 Election and Beyond, RAND Corporation 2014). This may be too exaggerated a view. Other views attempt to bridge excessive expectations with reality by suggesting accepting “what is good enough for Afghanistan” on the path towards democracy, thereby admitting that “Afghanistan has changed much less than the Western discourse about it.” (Frederic Grare, Afghanistan Post-2014; GMF-US policy brief, February 2014). While the West has focused on strengthening the ANA and police force, any success in Afghanistan will only come if a) there is a functional state and b) the people will have confidence in it. Only the Afghan can deliver that. Western assistance may have lost its credibility.

Ferry de Kerckhove has served as Canada’s High Commissioner to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Ambassador to the Republic of Indonesia, Director General, International Organizations with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and most recently served as Ambassador to the Arab Republic of Egypt.

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FOR BRAZILIANS, SECURITY IS THEIR NO. 1 CONCERN
by ROBERT MUGGAH

With the World Cup coming to town next week, Brazilians are busily preparing for a party. But keep your wits about you if you want to join in — these are dark days for Brazil.

The country now registers the highest homicide rate in more than three decades. According to recently released data, 56,000 citizens were violently killed in 2012. And 15 of the world’s 50 most dangerous cities are located there. Hardly surprising, recent polls suggest that security tops Brazilians’ agenda as the No. 1 concern, ahead of education and health. With all this bad news, you might think the federal government is busily preparing a national strategy to improve safety. You would be dead wrong.

Notwithstanding growing pleas for a new approach to public security, the government does not appear to be listening.\(^\text{1}\)

Notwithstanding growing pleas for a new approach to public security, the government does not appear to be listening.\(^\text{1}\)

What is especially tragic is that the latest surge in lethal violence was entirely preventable. At the beginning of the 2000s, homicide rates were steadily declining from roughly 28.9 to 25.2 per 100,000. But just before Dilma Rousseff became president in 2011, they began rising once more. This is partly because the federal government began systematically dismantling the country’s public security apparatus. For example, the national public security program known as PRONASCI was defunded shortly after the president’s election, resulting in less money for gathering evidence, reforming the police, fixing the country’s appalling prisons and preventing violence.

It was not supposed to be this way. Rousseff campaigned on a pledge to establish a national plan to reduce the number of killings. Her proposals were quietly binned the year she took office. Instead of focusing on problems at home, she launched a plan to bolster Brazil’s defence industry, already the largest in Latin America. She introduced new subsidies to the country’s largest companies to get on board. Brazil today is now the second largest exporter of firearms and ammunition in the western hemisphere, with many of those weapons used in the country’s killing fields.

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Rousseff’s five-point plan in response to the demonstrations patently ignored the issue. Even the previously existing federal program — Brasil Mais Seguro — has failed to register any meaningful domestic improvements, focused as it is on securing Brazil’s border and prosecuting a war on drugs. Instead, the president shrugs off criticism observing that public security is the preserve of Brazil’s 27 states. Yet with Brazil’s murder rate almost three times what the United Nations classifies as epidemic, the federal government cannot simply stand by and watch.

Brazilians must put public safety and security at the centre of the October 2014 presidential elections. At a minimum, the federal government needs to assume a greater responsibility and put a premium on preventing lethal violence. Preventing homicide and strengthening investigatory and prosecutorial capabilities have to be made a higher priority.

This will require structural reforms to the policing, judiciary and penal systems, including unifying national data collection systems so capital crimes can be identified and punished. The federal government should set clear standards and incentives for states to improve their record.

If Brazil is to make a real dent on reducing lethal violence, the federal government must own up to the sheer magnitude of the problem. Too often it skirts the issue at home and downplays the challenges it faces in international forums. But new research by leading experts in several major Brazilian cities such as Belo Horizonte, Recife, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo shows that improving security is possible. If the country is to make real progress, the federal government must implement strategies that value life rather than pursuing a policy of inaction.

Robert Muggah is the research director of the Igarapé Institute in Brazil, oversees research at the SecDev Foundation in Canada and is a fellow at the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute.
The end of the Afghan combat and training missions are part of the new reality for Canada’s Armed Forces. When an intense operational pace comes to a halt, especially one that engaged our air, naval and land forces, along with special force and reservists, the breather created can be a positive or negative force in terms of being ready for the next challenge to our security interests, or those of our allies. The ongoing crisis in Eastern Europe underlines how important having deployable human and strategic assets is in the context of our uncertain world. The present total strength of our forces, the poor status of our reserves, and the slothful stop and start approach to procurement make it unlikely that Canada would have the equipment and trained forces in place to support our foreign policy goals. We need a new approach.

This departure should be a medium-term policy of building our combined Canadian Forces to a united strength of 150,000 men and women under arms — with the mix being half regular force and reserves. The dreadfully slow procurement process now in place for the required new vessels for the Navy, Coast Guard, fisheries patrols and RCMP must be replaced with a more Churchillian “action this day” bias, especially for the frigates and supply ships essential to the deployability of the fleet. A long-term, multi-year goal of a 60-ship navy, roughly double our current force, can be put in place if both domestic construction options and foreign procurement are considered as equally viable options. The current Canadian Ship Building Strategy is all strategy, costing, design and negotiations, and actually

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produces no ships. It’s no strategy at all, unless the strategy is produced by accountants in Treasury Board whose real goal is to keep any actual money from being spent to begin with.

Without a clear and forward-leaning policy statement by Canada’s government, the natural tendency of the civilian bureaucracy at Defence, some of the uniformed leadership, and officials at the Treasury Board and finance ministry will be to grind down capabilities, reduce recruitment and training, and erode strategic redundancy.

The military also, bluntly, needs more men and women in uniform. Our needs for personnel, and the current high level of youth unemployment, offers us an excellent opportunity to recruit bright young Canadians who will see the value in the kind of hands-on, high-tech and highly skilled job training that a military career can provide. Canadians have always answered the call to service, and we must make sure that the military has the proper systems and procedures in place to not only attract motivated young citizens, but process their applications in a time sensitive and responsive manner.

It is also time, at long last, to begin the process of replacing our CF-18 fighter jets. These aircraft have served us well, but are increasingly outdated. As U.S. estimates for delivery costs of the F-35 have come down by billions of dollars, moving ahead with the procurement of these jets need not be subject to endless delay. Canada has already invested in this jet’s development, along with our allies. It’s time to move forward.

The last decade has seen considerable investment by Ottawa in important assets for the Air Force, the Army and training infrastructure. It was generated by an “action this day” mindset required by the exigencies of our troops in the Afghan theatre. But Canadian military assets have also deployed for humanitarian purposes where earthquakes, tidal waves, hurricanes and other disasters needed Canadian support and help. Our investments in the military have paid dividends, in lives saved, all over the world.

Without a clear and forward-leaning policy statement by Canada’s government, the natural tendency of the civilian bureaucracy at Defence, some of the uniformed leadership, and officials at the Treasury Board and finance ministry will be to grind down capabilities, reduce recruitment and training, and erode strategic redundancy (having more ways than one to get something done), ensuring that Canada has few options should a serious air, sea or land deployment be necessary.

Being for the rule of law, freer trade, human rights, democracy and the rest — as Canada is — requires a capacity to deploy real power, where and when needed. Now is the time to refocus on what our deployability requirements actually are, not hunker down and hope we can do less with less. That is not a defence policy, that is a policy of avoidance. Canadians deserve better than that.

Senator Hugh Segal is senior fellow of the Canadian Defence and Foreign affairs Institute in Calgary and Chair of the NATO Council of Canada. He sits on the Standing Senate Committee on Security and Defence.
Two decades ago, in a remote corner of Africa, far from the eyes of the western media, a massacre was unleashed like no other in modern times.

Within 100 days of violence, an estimated 800,000 people were killed in Rwanda.

Roméo Dallaire, now a senator, led the UN peacekeeping force when the genocide began. While he did everything in his power to protect Rwandans, many countries disregarded their legal responsibility to take action as signatories of the Genocide Convention.

Those responsible for the Rwandan genocide are of course the Rwandans who planned and implemented a nearly successful extermination of the ethnic Tutsi minority. The 20th anniversary offers an opportunity to dispel the myth that knowledge of the genocide did not penetrate the executive branch of government in national capitals across the globe.

Many historians and human rights activists have been critical of how western governments stood on the sidelines in 1994. Much of the blame is directed at the U.S. for not supporting the UN peacekeeping force.

Former U.S. president Bill Clinton has always remained tight-lipped about Rwanda. At a public speaking engagement in Toronto in 2009, Clinton was caught off guard when asked by Frank McKenna why he didn’t do more to help Rwanda. “It’s one of the two or three things I regret most about my presidency. By the time we thought of doing something about it, it was over... I don’t think we could have saved 800,000 lives [in Rwanda] but I think I might have saved 250,000 to 400,000. And that’s something I have to live with for the rest of my life.” Clinton responded emotionally.

While the U.S. bears the brunt of much criticism because it held a seat on the UN Security Council and had the military capacity to respond, attention needs to be
directed at other countries who abdicated their responsibility. Canada is no exception.

In 2009 the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies released a policy report that demonstrated the official narrative that Ottawa “did not know” what was taking place in Rwanda was more fiction than fact.

Former leader of the NDP, Ed Broadbent, as president of the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, travelled to Rwanda two years before the genocide took place. He was troubled by the hate speech being broadcast by local radio stations in Kigali against the Tutsi minority and upon his return met with officials at External Affairs to press the Canadian government to do something. No evidence was found that Ottawa acted on these early warning signs of genocide.

Canadian aid continued to flow into Rwanda and the country never received a diplomatic scolding. Another year passed before Canada offered up Dallaire to the UN in 1993. External Affairs did not share Broadbent’s warnings with the Department of National Defence.

Once the genocide began in April 1994 Canada moved one aircraft that was serving the UN operations in the Balkans to help ferry supplies between Nairobi and Kigali. Robert Fowler, deputy minister of Defence at the time, followed the situation closely and was the only high level Western official to travel to Rwanda in the midst of the crisis, visiting in mid-May. Upon returning to Ottawa he wrote a memo urging for a change in government policy and warned Canada’s inaction would be “irrelevant to the historians who chronicle the near-elimination of a tribe while the white world’s accountants count and foreign policy specialists machinate.”

The document eventually made its way to the Lester B. Pearson building where a deputy minister wrote across the first page of the memo in red ink “not in Canada’s national interest.” This terminated any possibility of Canadian leadership.

While Rwanda looms large in our national psyche because of Dallaire and his personal story of not giving up in the face of great odds, the simple fact is that Canada, like many other countries, abandoned Rwanda in its greatest hour of need.

The international community failed in protecting Rwandans because of the actions of national governments. While real progress has been made since with the creation of the International Criminal Court and the advancement of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, largely in part due to Canadian leadership, much more needs to be done. Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird recently spoke at the International Conference on the Prevention of Genocide in Brussels and reminded everyone in attendance that “states have a solemn duty to defend the vulnerable, challenge aggressors, protect human rights and promote human dignity, both at home and abroad.”

If Canada is serious about heeding the lessons of the Rwandan genocide and becoming an international leader in making “never again” a reality, then it must communicate to Canadians the importance of strengthening national and international mechanisms that improve global governance and protect human rights. It is the least we can do to honour genocide and mass atrocity survivors everywhere.

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EUROPEAN VOTERS FAVOUR INTEGRATION OVER DISTEGRATION
by COLIN ROBERTSON

In a united Europe, Henry Kissinger asked, who do you call for answers and action? If taking into account the elections of the European Parliament, as the last EU reform recommends, then Europe’s national leaders will likely name Jean-Claude Juncker as president of the European Commission later this fall. Mr. Juncker’s centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) won the largest bloc of seats in the EU parliamentary elections.

The elections, that spanned three days, represent the biggest exercise in multi-national democracy in the world. This year’s campaign included a series of debates, broadcast on 49 television channels throughout Europe, in which the Spitzenkandidaten – the parties’ “lead candidates” – discussed jobs, immigration and EU powers.

EU voter turnout (43 per cent), appears to be about the same as in 2009. Low by Canadian standards (61 per cent in our 2011 election), it varied country by country.

The success of Euroskeptic parties in the United Kingdom, Greece, Denmark and in France (where the far right National Front polled first) raises natural concerns. But the protest vote probably has more to do with national discontents than the direction of Europe. Pundits will debate its affect on the Scottish referendum this fall.

What is clear is that the majority of European voters cast their ballots not for the extremes but for those who favour European integration whether EPP, socialist, Green or liberal.

The centre-right and centre-left socialist parties remain the two largest parties, holding over 400 seats in the 751 member European Parliament.

Laws are produced by the European Commission (the executive branch) but Parliament has the right to amend, reject or approve these laws, including, for example, the Canada Europe Trade Agreement (if we can ever finish negotiations).

Calamitous wars in the first half of the twentieth century created collateral damage for the rest of the world as the European war graves of tens of thousands of Canadians demonstrate so movingly. Leadership in France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg determined to turn swords into ploughshares or, more precisely, coal into steel.

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Then French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman presciently observed of the 1951 Paris accord that “Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.”

Gradualism has created a European Union that now embraces over 500 million people in 28 countries.

A price of Mr. Schuman’s gradualism is a complex and often cacophonous EU governance that helped inspire Mr. Kissinger’s question of who to call. There is confusion, understandable, as between the European Council and the Council of Europe or the Parliamentary Assembly and European Parliament.

Then there are the presidents: one each for the European Parliament, European Council, European Commission as well as the presidency of the EU Council. Supporting them are seven institutions, 40 agencies and, in Brussels, over 50,000 bureaucrats.

Standard decision-making procedure is called “codecision.” Working in 24 languages, legislators produce 1.76 million pages of translation annually.

Europe has problems. The recovery from the financial crisis is incomplete. There are growing gulfs between rich and poor and inequities between northern and southern Europe. There is the demographic deficit – not enough babies and an aging population.

What is clear is that the majority of European voters cast their ballots not for the extremes but for those who favour European integration whether EPP, Socialist, Green or liberal.

The Ukrainian crisis and Russian aggression in Crimea has focused attention on European security. An EU common defence arrangement is still more farce than force. The EU can technically call on 1.5 million men and women at arms but its expeditionary capacity is marginal. NATO is still the default with the United States carrying most of the cost.

The European experiment has lifted millions of Europeans from poverty and authoritarianism. Africans risk their lives daily crossing the Mediterranean seeking the European lifestyle. Ukrainians took to Maidan Square for closer links to Europe.

A generation of millennials is growing up European. European passports and programs like Erasmus allow them to work and study throughout the EU.

Then there is Germany.

Successive German leaders, from Konrad Adenauer to Angela Merkel, are realizing Thomas Mann’s dream of a “European Germany” not a “German Europe.” Remembrance and atonement for the past is now part of its DNA. A tour of the Reichstag dome is both lesson and celebration of democracy. The foundations of Germany’s political parties – called stiftung – promote democracy abroad; this is something Canada could emulate.

Despite the gravest economic crisis in generations, European voters favoured integration over disintegration. By any comparison in European history the Schuman vision of a federal union is succeeding. The European idea is still more Ode to Joy than Sonata Pathétique.

Colin Robertson is a former diplomat and Vice President of the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute.

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Over the past decade, the security research domain has witnessed tremendous growth in respect to all aspects of information access and sharing. Notable progress has been made in developing successful approaches to tackle the problems of user authentication, password protection, network security, data encryption, and information privacy. In the field of security research, biometric-based authentication firmly established itself as one of the most reliable, efficient, and versatile tools for providing discretionary access control to a secure resource or system. But are we becoming more secure?

While state-of-the-art methods for biometric authentication are becoming increasingly more powerful and better understood, the same unfortunately cannot be said about the security of users populating on-line communities or Cyberworlds. With the huge popularity of on-line games, virtual words and social networking such as Facebook and Twitter, the number of users with virtual identities in on-line worlds has skyrocketed. And so has cybercrime. Essentially, almost any existing type of crime found in the real world (theft, impersonation, harassment, illegal sales of drugs and weapons, espionage, and organized crime) has a counterpart online. What can be done about it?

Ensuring safe and secure communication and interaction among users and, respectably, their on-line identities currently presents unique challenges to academics, as well as industry and the public. Security breaches, credit card fraud, identity theft, criminal on-line activities, and cyberbullying are just some of the Cyberworld security issues that plague society.

Despite the fact that those challenges are regularly making headlines in the news, government reports, and in the IT security domain, there is an appalling lack of effort to

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address this urgent problem. The efforts that do exist are currently limited to network security, password protection, encryption, database security and privacy policy-making efforts.

However, one of the most crucial components for ensuring on-line security – the relationship of online communication among users, and their identities in the real world – has been largely overlooked.

A systematic study and targeted effort to develop effective security solutions to this crucial concern is one of the novel directions of research in this domain conducted at the Biometric Technologies laboratory at the University of Calgary. Works by the researchers and collaborators of Biometric Technologies lab demonstrate the potential of using machine intelligence and context-based biometrics in the design of new generation security systems.

Another promising direction is the use of information fusion methods in the context of multi-modal biometric system. The recent book “Multimodal Biometrics and Intelligent Image Processing for Security Systems” published by IGI outlines a number of such methodologies. It argues for the use of multi-modal biometric system, rather than the traditional single biometric approach, coupled with advanced pattern recognition methods to better identify physiological and behavioral threats. It has been well established over the last decade that individual biometrics have a number of deficiencies, including issues of universality, uniqueness, changes over time, behavior state dependence, poor sample quality, and human error. Due to the fact that multi-modal biometric system can incorporate two or more individual biometric traits, the overall system recognition rate can increase significantly. This remains true even in the presence of erroneous, incomplete or missing data.

The new approaches have been recently introduced to biometric technology with implications for on-line security: exploring the capabilities of multi-modal biometric fusion methods in the context of Cyberworld user identity recognition; developing a set of metrics for identifying abnormal user behaviours through recognition of their physiological and behavioural traits; and introducing the notion of biometric cancellability in the context of Cyberworld authentication. These new approaches will provide a powerful and unique methodology for enhancing user-security in on-line communities, and society as a whole.

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Notice:
Canada & the World Speaker Series:
The Geopolitics of Energy

This is CDFAI’s sixth annual four-part Speaker Series starting in October and extending into winter 2015. The Institute is pleased to welcome ATB Corporate Financial Services as the 2014/15 Speaker Series Title Sponsor.

International relations and the flow of oil and gas are being closely examined and in some regions significantly realigned. Alberta crude and natural gas is being discounted as these new realities are being formed. Ultimately the geopolitics of energy will become more important to international security. The Ukraine and European sources of energy are but one significant example of this new reality.

Four outstanding experts will speak to a by-invitation-only audience on issues affecting Canada and this important topic. In order for the speakers to be candid, the “Chatham House Rule” (non attribution) will apply during the Question and Answer portion of the evening.

- This invitation for couples or individuals (maximum 125 guests) to enjoy the opportunity of a thought-provoking discussion over a great meal at the Calgary Golf & Country Club.
- Again this year, there will be limited opportunities for corporations to reserve tables of 10.
- Each presentation will be approximately 35 minutes, followed by dinner and Q&A session.
- Those in attendance will have an opportunity to engage with the speaker.
- The reception will commence at 6:00 and the evening will end at 9:15 PM.
- Business attire is requested.

**Dinner Dates and Speakers:**
- The four events will occur during the months of Oct, Nov 2014 and Feb, Mar 2015.
- So far three speakers have been confirmed—Dr. Michael Moore (University of Calgary), Kevin Book (Managing Director of Research, ClearView Energy Partners LLC, Washington, DC) and James Woolsey (former director of the CIA and sought after speaker on energy security)

Each speaker will provide a different and personal view on the geopolitics of energy and the evolving world from a security and energy flow perspective. These four events promise to be timely, informative and thought provoking regarding matters of increasing importance to Alberta’s economy and to Canadian international relations and as the subject suggests, international relations including security.

**Pricing:**
- Corporate tables of 10 for the series—$15,000
- Individual tickets for the four-part series—$1,500
- A tax deductible charitable receipt for the donation portion of the ticket price will be issued.

For further information or to register, please contact Lynn Arsenault at 403-231-7605 or by email to larsenault@cdfai.org.
Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute

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CDFAI was created to address the ongoing discrepancy between what Canadians need to know about Canadian international activities and what they do know. Historically, Canadians tend to think of foreign policy – if they think of it at all – as a matter of trade and markets. They are unaware of the importance of Canada engaging diplomatically, militarily, and via international aid in the ongoing struggle to maintain a world that is friendly to the free flow of goods, services, people and ideas across borders and to the spread of human rights. CDFAI seeks to inform and educate Canadians about the connection between a prosperous and free Canada and a world of globalization and liberal internationalism.

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