<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MIDDLE EAST POLITICS</td>
<td>P.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TROUBLING IRANIAN INFLUENCE</td>
<td>P.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCING OUR NEW NAME</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFLECTING WHO WE ARE &amp; WHAT WE DO!</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CANADIAN GLOBAL AFFAIRS INSTITUTE</td>
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<tr>
<td>THE NEED FOR A REAL LEADER’S DEBATE ON DEFENCE</td>
<td>P.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFLECTIONS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND CANADIAN INTERESTS</td>
<td>P.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THANK YOU TO OUR SUPPORTERS:
CONTENTS

5 Message from the Editor
by DAVID BERCUSON

6 COVER STORY
The Need for a Real Leaders’ Debate on Defence
by HUGH SEGAL

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: Will It Survive?
by MARIUS GRINIUS

8 Reflections on European Security and Canadian Interests
by DAVID COLLINS

10 How to Make Latin American Cities Safer
by ROBERT MUGGAH

12 The Strange Coalitions of Middle East Politics
by BARRY COOPER

14 Still Lazy After all these Years: Public Intellectuals and the Iraq War
by FRANK HARVEY

16 Latin America’s Troubling Iranian Influence
by CANDICE MALCOLM

18 Defence Budget 2015: the promise of long-term funding, but short-term deficits remain
by DAVID PERRY

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The Dispatch Volume XIII • Issue II
MESSAGE FROM THE EDITOR

Readers will notice that The Dispatch is now published by the Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI), which is the new name for Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). The official date for the changeover is June 22, 2015, although CDFAI will still be used as we phase the old name out and bring the new name in.

CDFAI has had a successful run. With a small number of people and an always restricted budget, we have reached our fifteenth year having created some seven hundred projects including policy papers (archived on our website), polling, journalism courses, conferences and symposia. The results of our policy research have gone directly to the federal governing parties and opposition as well as the media, academia, business, the provinces and interested individuals, here and abroad. Canadian Global Affairs Institute is Calgary-based with an office in Ottawa since 2010. We partner regularly with other like-minded organizations and have a strategic partnership with the University of Calgary's School of Public Policy.

We now have thirty-four fellows from one end of Canada to the other, a full-time senior research analyst, David Perry, a prestigious Advisory Council that meets twice a year and a governing board. We are a non-profit, non-advocacy institute with Canada Revenue Agency approval to issue charitable receipts for donations. Our mailing list exceeds seven thousand and our fellows publish op-ed pieces in just about all of Canada’s major newspapers (hard copy and electronic) and appear on TV and radio.

With all this success, then, why are we changing our name? The main reason is that we have expanded the scope of our activities. We believe as strongly as ever that Canada must have an active and energetic foreign policy in order to access the key markets Canadians need to sell goods and ideas abroad. We fully recognize that the United States will always be Canada’s number one trade and defence partner. But we also believe that Canada must reach out across the world to find sources for investment, markets, and global partners to complement our relations with the United States. We also see defence issues as one part of a continuum of tools that Canada must sometimes use to make an impact in places in the world that matter to Canadians. Thus, we are certainly not abandoning our ongoing study of key defence and foreign affairs issues; rather, we are adding trade, economics, investment, development and peacebuilding to our idea portfolio.

We are still Canadian but we also believe that we must be global in our outlook as we try to shape Canada’s position in the world and therefore, we now have fellows based outside of Canada. Our core values remain unchanged: we believe in the free movement of people, ideas and goods across international boundaries and for that reason Canada must do what it can to maintain as open a world as possible. In these ways, we will continue to serve our national interests as well as project our values of democracy, negotiation, multilateralism, compromise and, when necessary, combine with likeminded allies to secure international peace. We believe the change in name underlines our content and our constant striving to add our voice to the ongoing debate about Canada’s place in the world.

David Bercuson is Director of the Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, Area Director, International Policy for the School of Public Policy, University of Calgary and Program Director, Canadian Global Affairs Institute. (formerly Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute).
It would be a great leap forward if, in the coming federal election, there was a separate debate on national defence and security. The denizens of debate negotiation and management at the networks and political parties may not have the freedom or courage to make it so but it would be of immense value nonetheless.

While there is usually a passing reference to some defence matter in the two 90 minute debates that previously took place in each of our official languages (and that would be two more mentions than the entire issue of poverty received in the 2011 English language debate), the nature of the world we share makes those passing mentions deeply insufficient.

Political parties may say they will commit to financing for procurement or modernization of our Armed Forces. But the true dynamic on defence issues, as we have seen in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Ukraine and the battle against ISIS, is usually unpredictable before the onset of an international crisis – which is precisely why a TV and multi-platform debate on defence is crucial.

These interests should not be set aside for the shallow promises and empty rhetoric of stump campaign speeches.

Knowing where leaders stand on having rapidly deployable forces, the nature of our alliance engagement and obligations and the readiness and conditions for any deployment is a legitimate expectation of the voters in a parliamentary democracy. And, if a panel of questioners with defence expertise and experience were those to question the leaders, it would be better than having a TV personality, however bright and well-researched, manage the debate by himself or herself. Viewers and listeners have the right to know how much or how little prospective prime ministers comprehend about the core choices and base expertise needed to understand the military perspective. Viewers and listeners, as well as readers of the ensuing debate coverage, would benefit, in our present Canadian geostrategic context, from having answers to these questions:

- What is the actual defence strategy in the Arctic in the face of increased Russian installations and apparent adventurism elsewhere?
- Are we able to manage our global and domestic defence interests with a total of sixty thousand men and women, of whom only a small fraction are combat trained or ready?

(Continued on page 7)
Why are the Armed Forces Reserves reducing in size at the precise moment this critical training and supplementation link with the citizenry at large is most vital?

Why is naval procurement so slow and why do government departments on this file seem to be more at war with each other than committed to helping Canada prepare to deploy reasonable sea power?

Is the Department of Defence, organized in the same fashion since the time of Paul Hellyer (the 1960's Defence Minister who pushed the disastrous "unification" strategy for our Armed forces), as an inter-mingling of civilian and uniformed members, properly structured for present challenges?

What is the strategy best-suited to our vast geography, huge borders and critical infrastructure exposure – are we getting it right?

These are not the sorts of questions that can get any meaningful engagement in a small fraction of a national three or four leader ninety minute debate, with each leader getting sixty seconds to respond. This set-up only trivialises what could well be survival issues in the long term. And, even if the negotiations around leaders' network debates are rigid and fractious, making real progress for a defence debate impossible between the party leaders, then a debate between defence spokespersons for the respective parties (including both incumbent and prospective Defence Ministers) would be of great value, making plain the strategies of all parties on this issue.

In the same way as an appointment with the gallows can focus one's mind, so too would a nationally televised debate on defence and security focus all the parties and the media on the need for policy coherence, depth and acuity on the legitimate defence interests of a modern, geographically large, three ocean trading and dynamic multi-ethnic democracy. These interests should not be set aside for the shallow promises and empty rhetoric of stump campaign speeches. They merit real debate by the men and women selling the voters' trust.

Hugh Segal is Master of Massey College, Fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute and a Senior Fellow at the Munk School of International Affairs.
THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME: WILL IT SURVIVE?
by MARIUS GRINIUS

Next week 189 states, including Canada, will meet at the United Nations in New York City to review the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT, in force over the past forty-five years, has long been called the “essential cornerstone for the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament”. It is a three-pillared bargain between the five nuclear weapon states (the P5: United States, Great Britain, France, China and Russia) and the non-nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty. The P5 have committed to eventual disarmament in exchange for non-nuclear weapons states’ commitment to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons. All states party to the Treaty have the right to access peaceful nuclear technology, including nuclear energy. In many respects the NPT has been a success story. Dire predictions that there would be numerous states armed with nuclear weapons have not happened, though some nuclear outliers such as India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel remain.

In 2010 the NPT review conference produced a final consensus document which listed sixty-four “actions”, distributed among the three pillars, to be implemented in due course. While there has been some progress in the non-proliferation and nuclear technology pillars, little has happened in terms of nuclear disarmament. This has not prevented the P5 from giving as positive a spin as possible on their disarmament “actions”.

When the P5 met in London in early February they noted how the P5 Process contributes in developing mutual confidence and transparency. They discussed efforts to achieve entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and reiterated their support for the UN’s disarmament machinery. The P5 welcomed their ongoing negotiations with Iran and stressed their resolve for a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. They expressed their support for efforts to hold a conference to establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Finally they looked forward to a “consensual, balanced outcome to the 2015 review Conference, which would do much to enhance the P5’s continuing efforts to strengthen the NPT.”

While the P5 have a collective self-interest in achieving a successful 2015 review conference, their actions elsewhere undercut claims of progress on the disarmament pillar. NATO’s strategic concept continues to uphold the need

(Continued on page 9)
for nuclear weapons for its collective security. Russia’s military doctrine, updated last December, reiterated its reliance on nuclear weapons. Similarly, while China has long stated that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons, its military doctrine remains opaque. The CTBT will not happen anytime soon. As for UN disarmament machinery, the United Nations Disarmament Committee has not produced any useful study in decades and the Conference on Disarmament has been frozen in procedural wrangling for some seventeen years. No breakthrough is anticipated.

Among the agreed 2010 “action” items was the conference to establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East that would start in 2012. This has not happened, nor is there any indication it will anytime soon. Such a negotiation is further complicated because, by definition, weapons of mass destruction also include chemical and biological weapons. Neither Israel nor Egypt adheres to the Chemical Weapons Convention or the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention. Wars rage in Syria and Iraq and an Iran/P5 plus Germany final agreement is not guaranteed.

Furthermore, no treaty covers tactical nuclear weapons whose use would have disastrous global implications.

The U.S. has gone from 31,255 nuclear warheads in 1967 to 4,760 operational warheads in 2014. Russia’s nuclear arsenal has shrunk from 30,000 weapons to about 4,300 operational warheads. Critics argue, however, that current U.S. and Russian levels remain far too high. Furthermore, no treaty covers tactical nuclear weapons whose use would have disastrous global implications. U.S. and Russian plans to modernize all three elements of their nuclear triad (intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missile submarines and nuclear-armed bombers) also challenge the disarmament pillar. China has announced a 10% increase in military spending but the budget allocation for nuclear forces is not clear.

Will the 2015 NPT review conference fail? As always, there will be pressure on the P5 to do more on the disarmament pillar. This time it will include a growing momentum to negotiate a Nuclear Weapons Convention to outlaw nuclear weapons, much like the chemical and biological conventions. With virtually zero prospects for a Middle East conference, a CTBT or reinvigorated UN disarmament machinery, a Nuclear Weapons Convention will demand attention, notwithstanding P5 arguments that negotiation of such a convention would only be a distraction. Non-nuclear weapon states, including Canada, who are concerned that failure to achieve consensus at the review conference will add to the unravelling of the non-proliferation regime, will be expected to work hard to ensure that the conference muddles through with some veneer of success. The P5 talk about strengthening the NPT. Yet in 2010 they vehemently opposed a modest initiative by Canada, and supported by most states, to establish a small Implementation Support Unit for the NPT and to create a more effective review process. Perhaps in 2015 the P5 will support such an initiative, if only to stave off what otherwise may well be a failed conference and further unravelling of the non-proliferation regime.

A former diplomat, Marius Grinius has served numerous roles, including Ambassador to South Korea, and Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. He also served as the Canadian Head of Delegation to the 2010 NPT Review Conference. He is now a Fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.
REFLECTIONS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND CANADIAN INTERESTS
by DAVID COLLINS

Recent years have seen considerable turbulence in Europe, ranging from continuing fallout from the banking crisis in Greece to threats to territorial integrity by Russia and terrorist action in France. The management of these various crises cannot be left just to Europe; they affect the rest of the western world too. Yet there is considerable debate, not least in Canada, as to how the challenges can best be tackled and by whom.

The continuing imbroglio in Ukraine causes concern as we try to understand and manage the intentions and brinkmanship of Russia. There are several conflating issues at stake. On one hand, Russia argues that it has been betrayed by both NATO and European nations in the so-called drive east to support those countries that have expressed a wish to join Europe. In retrospect, NATO overtures to Ukraine and Georgia could have been handled better, as it was not clear that either country would quickly qualify to join. Under President Putin, Russia seeks to re-establish itself as a great power with a noble history and a country that deserves respect in the world community, despite its anti-democratic and human rights records.

By annexing Crimea in March 2014, Russia laid down a marker, which despite the predictable diplomatic condemnation and economic sanctions from the international community, was not picked up by the west. In other words, Mr. Putin got away with it. Whether this has bolstered his resolve to continue provocative behaviour in countries such as Moldova remains to be seen. Some argue that there is little rational decision making in Moscow these days. Certainly the history in eastern Ukraine in recent months gives us pause. The conflict has continued to burble on with periodic ceasefires that rarely hold. But with Russia denying involvement in supporting the rebels, with whom can one properly negotiate?

Of course, the situation in Ukraine is not clear either. A year into the new administration the country is still distressed. President Poroshenko is an oligarch who has just dismissed a former ally in the Donbass region bordering Donetsk, where much of the fighting with separatists has occurred. A fellow oligarch, former Governor Kolomoisky was on the front line in the fights in the east and saw the president as weak against the threat. But by dismissing a powerful governor cum oligarch, Poroshenko has not rid himself of competition; he has probably contributed to instability not only in Donbass but in the country as a whole. Throughout this difficult

(Continued on page 11)
period, the West has made clear that it is not prepared to intervene militarily in Ukraine though humanitarian aid, financial support and non-military supplies have been made available. While the supply of arms to Ukraine has not been definitively ruled out, this option is being held in reserve.

Our collective challenge now is to engage Russia on a basis that allows us to understand her interests and gives her an opportunity to re-join the international community where the rule of law is respected.

Should this unsettling situation, seemingly without resolution as it becomes another frozen conflict, concern Canadians? It seems clear that the Canadian response, such as it has been, has been calibrated partly in response to the demands of over one million Canadians of Ukrainian origin. While containment in Ukraine is not a policy that any western country should aspire to, it seems that is what we might wish for. Should there be further Russian aggression in its near-abroad: the Baltics, Moldova and the Caucasus, it seems evident that there would have to be an escalated NATO/European response, especially if NATO’s Article V is violated. Our collective challenge now is to engage Russia on a basis that allows us to understand her interests and gives her an opportunity to re-join the international community where the rule of law is respected. I am not sure how likely this would be in the short term. I am reminded of my involvement with the NATO/Russia Council (now suspended) some years ago. Within NATO our approach was to manage this relationship through diplomatic (i.e. civilian) channels with military support. The Russian view was that the dialogue should be led by their military with modest diplomatic support. Despite best efforts, we were never on the same page. In the current situation there is some evidence that Russia best understands forceful responses as much as it did in the Cold War. Europe and NATO have to be very explicit that Russia will not get away with the creeping and provocative aggression that we have seen since the illegal annexation of Crimea such as sabre rattling in the Balkans or provocative exercises in the Arctic and proactive enhanced surveillance in the North and Black seas. In the face of threat, NATO needs to demonstrate resolve and not just diplomatically. Military spending, falling since the end of the Cold War needs to be stabilised if not increased. The notional target NATO sets for member nations is 2% of GNP to be spent on defence; Canada barely manages 1%. Surely there must be room for us to demonstrate better our resolve and support Allies?

Canada should continue to lend democratic support to Ukraine. As a member of NATO we should bolster the sense of transatlantic solidarity that Russian actions have prompted and use multilateral fora, as well as bilateral diplomacy to continue to hammer home to the Russians that further aggression is simply not in their interest. Of course, Mr. Putin is a master at manipulating the differences of opinion among western nations. One can but hope that he doesn’t push his luck too far.

David Collins is a retired Canadian ambassador who served twice in NATO, in Turkey and Romania. He was an observer in the 2014 Ukrainian presidential election. He is a fellow of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, a director of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute and a member of the programme advisory committee of the Canadian Ditchley Foundation.
Latin America cities are among the most violent and insecure on earth. The regional homicide rate is three times the global average and citizens consistently rank their neighborhoods as among the world’s most dangerous. The statistics are disconcerting: 43 of the 50 most murderous cities in the world are located there.

Fortunately, the times may be changing. After decades of heavy-handed crime prevention – mano dura in the vernacular, Latin American cities are turning things around. Elected officials, private business people and civil society groups are experimenting with new approaches. In the process, they are helping to reshape the global debate on urban safety.

This revolution in urban crime prevention generated some spectacular declines in murder and victimization. The first step was to craft a new culture of citizenship, encouraging locals to regulate themselves and one another. In Bogota, for example, street mimes delivered “behavior cards” for those who broke rules. City planners also started-up women’s nights, introduced new public spaces, and created observatories to track crime.

These soft measures were complemented with harder investments in security and development. For example, civic leaders across Latin America doubled down on community-based policing and gun collection programs. They also invested successfully in conditional cash transfer programs, early childhood support for single female-headed households and afterschool activities for at-risk young males.

The impacts are impressive. Once Mexico’s most dangerous city, after a massive social intervention Ciudad Juarez homicide ranking dropped to 37th position in 2014. Owing to the introduction of high-quality public transport and a rash of social interventions, Medellin’s murder rate fell by more than 80 per cent from its high in 1991. Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo also witnessed declines of 65 and 70 per cent respectively over the past decade.

These achievements are all the more remarkable given the region’s perfect storm of risk factors. Already one of the world’s most urbanized societies with roughly 80 per cent of the population living in cities, the region faces turbo-urbanization, swelling youth bulges, soaring inequality and high levels of impunity. Other dangers include drug trafficking, an abundance of illegal firearms, the rise
of cyber cartels and gangs, and social norms that tolerate violence.

The change in approach began in the late 1990s when violence was peaking in Latin America. Rather than fight crime by deploying more police and soldiers, some enlightened mayors began a radical counter-experiment instead. They took a closer look at the evidence. They wanted to know how violence was distributed geographically, at what time of day and week it occurred, and who was most likely to kill or be killed. What they discovered was surprisingly straightforward.

For one, they learned that urban violence exhibited epidemic properties. It tended to be hyper-concentrated in specific areas, including low income and rapidly growing settlements. They also found out that specific types of people were most likely to be affected by violence, not least young, black, and unemployed males. Also, violence tended to be most prolific on weekends, around pay-days, and wherever alcohol and drugs were widely available.

These mayors were not afraid to look around the world for ideas and possible solutions. And through trial and error, they found that well-coordinated, high-dosage interventions directed towards a relatively small number of “hot” people, places, and behaviors was more effective in preventing and reducing urban violence than either large-scale police deployments or loosely coordinated, low-dosage interventions for large numbers of people without regard to risk.

Although facing monumental challenges, Latin American mayors, private actors and civil society groups are setting the pace for urban safety. Their cities are a veritable laboratory of innovative ideas, new technologies and promising results. The focus is increasingly on building resilience, rather than emphasizing repression alone. And while integrated approaches to violence prevention are challenging to sustain, they have proven to be the most likely to make Latin America’s cities safer.

Robert Muggah is the research director of the Igarapé Institute. He is also a fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. He recently delivered a TED Talk on fragile cities.

(Continued from page 12)
THE STRANGE COALITIONS OF MIDDLE EAST POLITICS
by BARRY COOPER

The Middle East is the most politically unstable region in the world. Partly as a result, politics there are more complex than anywhere else. The many long-term structural divisions means the contribution of Israel to this particular mix is relatively minor.

The fundamental regional fault line persists in the historic ethnic divisions among Arabs, Turks and Persians, along with the often destabilizing presence of western powers in the region. To take just one example, the Arabs have not forgotten the Ottoman domination of their lands and neither side has forgotten the role played by Western powers in carving up the Ottoman Empire – arguably to the detriment of both Turks and Arabs.

Second in importance are sectarian divisions within Islam between Sunnis and Shiites, along with nominally secular regimes in Syria and Egypt, and from time to time in Turkey as well. Iran faces no challenge from any other Shiite state, but among Sunnis the aspirations of Saudi Arabia to leadership are limited both by their internal and external problems.

Internally, the transition to the third generation of modern Saudi kings has not yet been completed. Moreover, the ulema or clerical class has never been able to reconcile the non-political Salafism that has supported the House of Saud for generations with a more activist and militant jihadism directed outside the kingdom.

For the Saudis the greatest source of instability is the current American engagement with Iran.

Beyond their borders the Saudis face opposition from the equally Salafist Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which aims to establish an Islamist republic. In one sense the ulema in the kingdom is a clerical version of the MB, which makes any rapprochement risky both for the Saudis and for regimes such as Turkey that have been influenced by the Brotherhood.

For the Saudis the greatest source of instability is the current American engagement with Iran. They see this change in U.S. foreign policy, whatever the outcome regarding the Iranian nuclear issue, as the loss of an

(Continued on page 15)
historical ally, patron, and protector. As a result they have been willing to undertake a price war with shale producers in the U.S. (and oil sands producers in Canada) as well as unilateral military initiatives, most recently the air campaign against the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen. Without the use of ground forces however, the Houthis are unlikely to be defeated. Thus the threat to the Saudis’ southern border may exist indefinitely, especially since a negotiated settlement, which the Saudis oppose, would entrench Iranian interests there.

If sectarian confrontation between the Sunnis and Iran over the IS increases, it opens up more opportunities for the IS, which no one wants.

Then there is the complexity caused by the Islamic State (IS). The initial Sunni hopes that the Syrian civil war would diminish Iranian influence and the IS would be a militant Sunni counterforce to Iran have been disappointed. Indeed, the rise of the Islamic State has revitalized the projection of Iranian power that had diminished in 2012 with the consolidation of a relatively independent Iraqi government and the near collapse of the Assad regime.

In one sense the IS is just an extreme faction of the minority Sunni community in Iraq and Syria. But as the perpetrator of some spectacular killings, it helped galvanize Shiite opposition, thus enabling Iranian military advisors to regain influence in the Iraqi army. The Iranians have even cooperated with American (and Canadian) air power against the IS. If sectarian confrontation between the Sunnis and Iran over the IS increases, it opens up more opportunities for the IS, which no one wants. But if the IS is degraded, the chief beneficiary will be Iran. The current Saudi problem is that they cannot oppose the Shites and Iran without first defeating the IS, and restoring their position as the leading Salafist regime and major supporter of militant Sunni jihadism.

This makes for some strange coalitions. The Saudis cooperate with Iran against Muslim Brotherhood-style Sunnis in Syria but oppose the Iranian proxies in Yemen.

Similarly Saudi Arabia and Turkey cooperates against the IS and against the Assad regime, which, with Iranian support, prevents Turkey from projecting power south into the Arab world. But the Saudis cannot defeat the IS without help from Turkey, which is unwilling to follow Saudi leadership anyhow, and has been muted in its criticism of Iran.

Western, mostly American, support of Iran in Syria against the IS, which helps Assad, coupled to opposition to Iran in Yemen looks like a classic balance-of-power strategy. This means that the fraught rhetoric from Washington regarding Iranian nuclear ambitions does not prevent cooperation when and where it is useful. That may be the only unambiguous element of politics in the region.

*Barry Cooper* is a professor at the University of Calgary and Fellow with the University’s Centre for Military and Strategic Studies. Dr. Cooper is the author, editor or translator of over 30 books, and he writes a regular column in the Calgary Herald. He is a Fellow with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.

(Continued from page 14)
STILL LAZY AFTER ALL THESE YEARS: PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS AND THE IRAQ WAR

by FRANK HARVEY

Judith Miller, the Pulitzer-prize winning journalist who covered Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) program for the New York Times (NYT) prior to the 2003 war (and got fired for it) is currently touring the U.S. promoting her new book, The Story: A Reporter’s Journey. Her objective is to set the historical record straight by explaining how she, and almost every other journalist at the time, got most of the big facts about Iraq’s WMD program so terribly wrong - in essence, Miller argues, she was accurately reporting catastrophically bad intelligence. She is right about being wrong.

The reviews of Miller’s book have been mixed, but she did receive one particularly tough grilling from the Daily Show’s Jon Stewart - he spent most of the segment challenging Miller’s NYT reporting on aluminum tubes and their possible connection to Saddam’s nuclear ambitions. Stewart was relentless, citing one of Miller’s own sources, nuclear weapons expert David Albright, who believed the tubes were actually for conventional rockets and not part of a nuclear centrifuge program. Despite Albright’s expert opinion and his agreement to go on record, Miller excluded the information in her front page NYT story. Her harshest critics remain convinced, therefore, that she played a decisive role in marketing the neocon’s WMD narrative to the American public and congress. Without these exaggerations and lies, her critics proclaim, the U.S. congress would never have endorsed a resolution in October 2002 authorizing President Bush to use military force.

Paul Krugman and Stephen Walt recently defended the same “Bush lied, people died” interpretation of history in two separate articles published by the New York Times, both slamming Jeb Bush and the other twenty-five Republican leadership candidates for repeating the ‘intelligence failure’ story. For Krugman, that narrative is false: “The Iraq war wasn’t an innocent mistake, a venture undertaken on the basis of intelligence that turned out to be wrong....We were, in a fundamental sense, lied into war.” Stephen Walt issued the same proclamation: “The war in Iraq was a failure of policy, not intelligence. The Bush administration decided to topple Saddam Hussein and then concocted a bogus case to justify war.”

(Continued on page 17)
Now, with respect to bogus pre-war intelligence estimates, critics have focused primarily on false claims about operational linkages between Saddam and Al-Qaeda before 9/11, Saddam’s attempt to acquire aluminum tubes used in centrifuge enrichment programs, and the regime’s attempt to purchase uranium precursors (yellowcake) from Africa. Congressional leaders, including Hillary Clinton, John Kerry and almost every other prominent Democratic lawmaker, inadvertently relied on these false estimates to defend their support for authorization. Remove the exaggerations and we have no war.

But what if these three intelligence estimates were largely irrelevant to the positions articulated by those in congress when they defended their support for war? One straightforward approach to answering that question is to examine the content of congressional speeches delivered in October 2002 when the war resolution was being debated. Keep in mind, speeches defending an authorization vote are career-defining moments, so we would expect politicians to include in these speeches the strongest and most compelling information, data and intelligence they can find to explain and justify their vote. By implication, if aluminum tubes (or any other exaggerated claims) were largely ‘absent’ from these speeches, these findings should raise serious questions about the history being pushed by Stewart, Krugman and Walt.

Of the seventy-six war resolution speeches delivered in the U.S. Senate, only nine Senators made reference to aluminum tubes or uranium - six were Democrats, three of whom ‘opposed’ authorization (Robert Byrd, Bob Graham and Ted Kennedy), and three supported the president (Joe Lieberman, Joe Biden, and Byron Dorgan). The remaining three senators who made reference to the tubes or uranium were Republicans (Susan Collins, Kay Bailey Hutchison and Olympia Snowe). In other words, exaggerated intelligence estimates about aluminum tubes and uranium were ‘not’ included in the speeches of a significant majority of Senators, on both sides, when they presented their best case for authorization. There were also very few references to operational linkages between Saddam and Al-Qaeda, and these same patterns played out in the war resolution speeches delivered in the House of Representatives. In fact, references in House speeches to aluminum tubes were made in the context of highlighting the debate between the Pentagon and Department of Energy regarding weaknesses in that case.

Now, if U.S. lawmakers (and British parliamentarians, for that matter) did not rely on the neocon’s cherry-picked intelligence exaggerations, then what other information did they include in their speeches that convinced them authorization made sense? The answer to that very important historical question encompasses a much larger and far more tragic collection of facts and intelligence errors (and failures) compiled over a decade of conflict with Iraq that spanned dozens of reports produced by several U.S. intelligence organizations across three U.S. administrations and two UN inspections regimes since 1991, all reinforced by similarly mistaken estimates produced by other Western intelligence organizations (including Britain’s). Aluminum tubes were largely irrelevant to the case for war.

Moreover, the Iraqi regime was plagued by its own serious intelligence errors. For his part, Saddam Hussein was always more concerned about regional threats from Iran than the mounting threat from U.S. and U.K. military deployments - he wanted Iranian officials to retain suspicions about his WMD capabilities by destroying evidence of his own disarmament. This was the very same evidence he was obligated to provide the United Nations in compliance with UN Resolution 1441. That strategic blunder was compounded, as he later admitted to FBI interrogators, when he mistakenly assumed U.S./U.K. attacks would be limited to airstrikes alone.

It’s probably very comforting to believe that this catastrophe was driven by a small number of brilliant neocons pushing their own agenda by tricking everyone with a few cherry-picked intelligence estimates strategically processed through a few articles written by a single NYT journalist. It’s an appealing narrative because the solution is so simple: just fire them and solve the problem. But the real history of this war is considerably more complex and tragic, and far more difficult to sell, especially if Jon Stewart, Paul Krugman, and Stephen Walt steadfastly refuse to buy (or remember) any of it. That’s just lazy, and more than a little ironic considering the accusations about ‘bogus intelligence’ they continue to launch against the former Bush administration.

Frank Harvey is the Eric Dennis Memorial Chair of Government and Politics at Dalhousie University and a Fellow with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.
“He was more valuable dead than alive. It was symbolic.”

That’s the last thing you expect to hear when you sit down with a prominent political figure of a major country. But during my hour-long conversation with a leading member of the Argentinian opposition, Congresswomen Cornelia Schmidt-Liermann, she repeated this sentence several times.

I visited Schmidt-Liermann in her office in the National Congress of Argentina exactly three months after state prosecutor Alberto Nisman was shot dead in his Buenos Aires apartment.

Nisman’s death is particularly troubling because of his work as the lead investigator into one of Argentina’s unsolved mysteries: Iran’s involvement in the 1994 terrorist attack at a Jewish community centre in Buenos Aires that killed 85 people. Nisman’s original findings led to indictments against seven high-ranking Iranian officials and a now deceased member of Hezbollah.

As a high-profile public figure investigating a dark aspect of Argentina’s history, Nisman received constant threats. Nevertheless, he fearlessly continued his inquiry.

Nisman moved on to a new, albeit related, investigation into Argentinian President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s involvement in the cover up of the 1994 bombing. Nisman accused the Kirchner administration of striking a deal with Iran to shield and protect the indicted terrorists.

“He was killed, not because he had too much information—his research is now known—he was killed because his death has more value than his life.”

Only a few days after releasing the findings of his investigation, and on the eve of his public testimony, Nisman was found dead.

“Nobody expected him to die the moment he was about to be in congress,” said Schmidt-Liermann. “He was killed, not because he had too much information—his research is now known—he was killed because his death has more value than his life.”

(Continued on page 19)
“The symbolism of the prosecutor being killed before he is scheduled to appear before the government—it has an impact—it sends a message,” said Schmidt Liermann.

Now, months later, we are still no closer to justice for the slain prosecutor. The government investigation has yet to determine basic, but contested, facts such as whether Nisman’s death was murder or suicide.

“We forget too easily and too quickly,” Schmidt-Liermann told me in her office. “But I hope the significance of the death of Nisman, and what he represents, will wake up the public.”

Nisman’s research on Iran should serve as a wake up call, not just for Argentina, but also for the entire Western Hemisphere. Experts believe the Islamic Republic is once again increasing its activities across the region.

Joseph Humire, co-editor of the recent book “Iran’s Strategic Penetration of Latin America,” and my colleague at the Center for a Secure Free Society, has been studying Iran’s covert activities in the Americas.

“The network has expanded,” Humire told me. “A regional network—created and nurtured by former Iranian cultural attaché to Argentina Mohsen Rabbani—now has presence in every country in the region, including the United States and Canada.”

Rabbani is widely believed to have master-mined the 1994 bombing.

In a separate study, “Canada On Guard: Assessing the Immigration Security Threat of Iran, Venezuela and Cuba,” Humire rings the alarm bell on the threat of Iran’s maturing network in North America.

Humire points to a 2011 Canada Border Services Agency report, which exposes Latin America as the main prior embarkation region for improperly documented asylum seekers coming from Iran into Canada.

According to Humire, radicalized Islamists are using a state-sponsored immigration scheme to get into Canada. These individuals arrive in Venezuela, where they receive government documentation such as visas, passports, or even birth certificates. They then fly to Canada and claim to be Venezuelan refugees – despite sometimes lacking basic Spanish language skills.

Humire says it is plausible these immigration irregularities, as well as reported money laundering schemes involving Iranian agents and Middle Eastern financial institutions in Canada, were key factors in Canada’s decision to close the Iranian Embassy in Ottawa in 2012.

“There were likely continual warnings, and Iran seems to have repeatedly violated Canada’s requests, to the point where expelling Iran’s diplomats was necessary,” said Humire.

Whether the closing of the Iranian Embassy will diminish the Islamic Republic’s network in North America remains to be seen. What cannot be contested, however, is the influence of Iran’s Ayatollahs in Latin America has steadily moved north. Concerns that were once confined only to Argentina are now flourishing throughout the Western Hemisphere.

The death of Alberto Nisman is both symbolic of Iran’s broad influence and of Argentina’s collapsing judicial capabilities. It is also a real warning.

The terrorist threat from Iran still lurks beneath the surface and throughout the Americas.

Candice Malcom is an international Fellow with the Center for a Secure Free Society and a regular columnist with the Toronto Sun. She is also a Fellow with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.
DEFENCE BUDGET 2015: THE PROMISE OF LONG-TERM FUNDING, BUT SHORT-TERM DEFICITS REMAIN
by DAVE PERRY

After five years of slashing the defence budget, the Harper Government is promising, if reelected, to restore the funding it removed from the military's coffers.

This plan faces two problems. Even if DND sees every penny of this increase, it still has to deal with a massive hole in its finances for years to come. The 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) pledged twenty years of long term predictable funding. That promise evaporated in short order.

As the federal government undertook deficit reduction after 2010, DND shouldered much of that deficit-fighting burden, leaving DND almost $4 billion short of what it would have had this year alone under CFDS. In total, approximately $45 billion in funding was removed from defence through 2026.

In the 2015 Budget, the government is promising to give DND a roughly $12 billion increase over that same timeframe. In truth this will only restore about one quarter of the money that was cut from defence during deficit reduction.

The government’s pledges stretches into the distant future with the full $12 billion promised requiring over a decade to accrue - at least three election cycles from now. Real world events make it extremely difficult for any government to stick to long-term defence budget promises. Besides, the people making these promises now will likely not even remain in political life by then.

If this revised funding plan survives, it will give DND meaningful year-over-year real increases, providing the long-term fiscal stability that defence planners always seek. It will also close the gap between the current defence funding line and the original CFDS plan sometime towards the end of the next decade. On both of those fronts, this budget could be good news for the military.

In the meantime, the military remains billions short of the funding the CFDS promised. The bureaucracy has been working on a renewed defence strategy for years but a finished product has not yet been approved. With no new plan, the relief promised in Budget 2015 won’t take effect for two years and it will only accrue slowly, leaving the military short on cash for another decade.

(Continued on page 21)
The annual, automatic funding increase for DND, known as the “escalator” will see its budget rise every year by three per cent. This is actually the second time the Harper Government has increased DND’s escalating budget increase, but their record the first time suggests that similar long-term pledge should be treated with some healthy skepticism.

The 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy saw the escalator rise from 1.5 to two per cent in 2011. To its credit, the Government stuck to this commitment in the face of the economic downturn. Bizarrely, however, this didn’t prevent the government from simultaneously chopping billions in funding as the government cut federal spending.

Paradoxically, the defence budget was being cut at the same time that it was being raised by two per cent a year. So the record shows that long-term promises of defence budget increases go out the window the moment a government runs into financial difficulty. The last pledge of long-term, predictable defence funding was supposed to span twenty years and lasted only three. There is no reason to think this new commitment will be any easier to keep.

Even after Budget 2015, whoever forms the next government faces a defence plan that is unaffordable. A new defence strategy is needed to provide either an infusion of funds or indicate what aspects of the 2008 CFDS should be scrapped so that defence can square the desired ends with its fiscal means. Either option could put the military on a sound fiscal footing which the annual funding increase outlined in Budget 2015 could make sustainable over the long term.

David Perry is the Senior Analyst of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. Perry’s latest paper, “Defence Budget 2015: A Long-Term Funding Increase… Maybe” is available online at www.cgai.ca.

This graph shows the change in time to the original CFDS funding, before and after Budget 2015. The dotted blue line “Adjusted CFDS” is the original CFDS funding plan, adjusted downward to account for the creation of Shared Services Canada and the Communications Security Establishment as independent agencies. The red line “Defence Budget pre-Budget 2015” shows the impact of all of the budget cuts, operating budget freezes, and capital re-profiling that occurred since 2010. The green line “Defence Budget post-Budget 2015” indicates the impact of Budget 2015 to defence. The area shaded in grey represents that additional $11.8 billion in cumulative funding provided to DND. The area shaded pink represents the portion of the CFDS funding that DND appears to have permanently lost and represents DND’s contribution to the balanced budget.
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Bob Fowler was Canada’s longest serving Ambassador to the United Nations. He also served as Canada’s Ambassador to Italy.

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