ADVANCING INSECURITY: HOW THE “WAR ON SCIENCE” HAS UNDERMINED CANADA—AND OUR PLACE IN THE WORLD [P.6]
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Most Canadians understand how important trade is for the country, but few understand why, or the vital link that connects trade and security. Since the 1840s at least, a central aim of Canadian policy has been the search for markets. We have always been too underpopulated, with too large a land mass, and huge climatic and geographical challenges, to be self-sustaining in any way. If we cannot sell our products or services abroad, and if we cannot attract foreign investment, we will not be able to sustain our standard of living. Unlike the United States, to which we most often compare ourselves, we simply do not have a large enough consumer base to rely on our own markets in Canada to keep things humming.

What many Canadians don’t see is how important security is in maintaining and promoting trade. In some ways, the connection between trade and security is simple and straightforward. Take the Caribbean as one example. That sea and the island nations in and around it, has long been a focus of Canadian trade and investment. In Montreal, Toronto and other major cities in central and Atlantic Canada, island peoples have also settled in Canada in large numbers. Tourist traffic is heavy, especially in winters. Caribbean migrants send funds to their families. Canadian banks and other service companies have long operated there. For the size of the population in the Caribbean, Canadian trade both to and from the region is sizable.

What do the Caribbean nations want from Canada other than trade? They want our help in learning how to secure their islands and their home waters against all manner of threats, especially related to the flow of narcotics from South America, through the Caribbean to both Canada and the United States. Canadian governments, both Liberal and Conservative, have long known that. Thus a Canadian patrol frigate is almost always part of the ongoing narcotics interdiction program, working alongside local forces as well as the United States Navy and Coast Guard. Canadian soldiers have played key roles in both peace enforcement and disaster response, especially but not exclusively in Haiti. The Canadian Army is engaged in small but ongoing and important special forces training in that country.

Last June we (Canadian Global Affairs Institute) published two papers, one by former Canadian diplomat Marius Grinius and the other by former commander of Canada’s Navy on the west coast Eric Lehre. The Grinius paper addressed ways that Canada might strengthen its commercial ties in the Asia-Pacific region, while the Lehre paper addressed ways that a stronger and more capable Royal Canadian Navy might help enhance Canadian security and prosperity. We did not direct the authors what to write (we never do), so it was especially interesting that one major observation made by Marius Grinius was that a more robust Canadian naval presence would help build friendships and ties with Asia-Pacific nations which are struggling with an apparently more aggressive and expansionist China. Eric Lehre made exactly the same point from his own perspective. Not that Canada could substantively bulk up Asia-Pacific naval defences against Chinese claims in the East and South China Seas (let alone the Indian Ocean), but that at the very least an ongoing Canadian presence with port calls and exercises with area fleets would show Canada’s sensitivity to their concerns and, again, make friends and influence commercial decisions there.

Canada will never have a large enough military to offer substantial security to friends and allies in different spots of the world. But by picking those spots carefully, and committing real and ongoing resources, we also help ourselves build the trade and investment ties that are so important to Canada.

David Bercuson is Director of the Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, Area Director, International Policy for the School of Public Policy, University of Calgary and Program Director, Canadian Global Affairs Institute (formerly Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute).
Foreign policy issues rarely figure centrally in electoral politics, and in the public and media mainstream science is an even more distant outlier. That's unfortunate, because science policy matters. Years of resource reductions, and the centralized political control and manipulation of all public communications have deeply corroded Canadian democracy, governance and public administration.

Less visible - yet of at least equal consequence - has been the damage to Canada’s global brand wrought by the government’s ill-conceived war on science and rejection of evidence-based policy and decision-making.

Among the warrior nation wannabes in Ottawa, spin rules. Ideology has displaced rationality.

Scientific capacity is critical in treating the central problems of the globalization age, including climate change, resource scarcity, diminishing biodiversity, public health, alternative energy and environmental collapse. These issues are immune to the application of armed force, and best addressed through the practice of science diplomacy.

Since 2006, however, Canadian science - its practitioners, institutions, and ethos - has taken a beating. Science diplomacy has been eschewed, and the free flow of Canadian-origin scientific information obstructed or blocked, particularly when that data underscores the negative consequences of energy production and industrial development. In one comprehensive survey, twenty-five per cent of respondents reported that they were forced to modify their research for non-scientific reasons. Public funds have been set aside to investigate the charitable status of environmental groups, while anti-science views, ranging from climate change denial to vaccine refusal to creationism, have become commonplace.

Science - and the culture of fact and experimentation that science supports - contributes to development and security, and reinforces democratic well-being. Public access to scientific findings checks propaganda and the (Continued on page 7)
arbitrary exercise of political power, while scientific values and methods encourage openness and transparency (through the publication of research findings), merit (through peer review), and civic values and citizen empowerment (through the expression of critical and diverse perspectives). Attacking science, and the ability of scientists to communicate freely, undercuts empirical knowledge creation, understanding and the democratic process, and blunts a key tool in the management of international relations.

The deception and dissembling now displayed so prominently in national politics may be attributed at least in part to the war on science.

Scientific information is controlled through censorship, the elimination of unpalatable research programs, and the muzzling of scientists. For example:

- High-level science advice had been removed from central agencies and is non-existent in DFATD, despite trends to the contrary most everywhere;
- Science-based departments, funding agencies and NGOs have faced crippling budget cuts and job losses - 1,075 jobs at Fisheries and Oceans and 700 at Environment Canada alone;
- Opaque, underhanded techniques, such as the passage of the Omnibus Budget Bill C-38 in June 2012, have weakened, reduced or eliminated scientific bodies, programs and legislative instruments. These include the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, the Fisheries Act, the Navigable Waters Protection Act, the Nuclear Safety Control Act, the Parks Canada Agency Act, and the Species at Risk Act;
- Canada has withdrawn from the Kyoto Protocol and earned distinction as a “Lifetime Unachiever” and “Fossil of the Year”, while promoting heavy oil/tar sands, pipelines, asbestos exports, and extractive industries generally;
- The long-form census was abolished - against the advice of everyone dependent upon that data - prompting the resignation of the Chief Statistician;
- Rare science books have been destroyed and specialized federal libraries and archives closed or down-sized;
- Commercially-promising, business-friendly, applied R&D has been privileged over knowledge-creating basic science in government laboratories;
- Scientists have been publically rebuked, are prevented from speaking freely about their research findings to the public, the media, or even their international colleagues, and are required to submit scholarly papers for political pre-clearance.

Conservative government policies have knocked back Canadian science at a time when we need it most. Canadian democracy has been subverted, and the country left vulnerable and exposed to the whole host of science-based, technologically-driven global threats.

A spate of high-profile commentary on Canada’s tarnished reputation and transformed international role has recently attracted attention. And indeed, the closing of the Canadian mind has been troubling.

National science policy plays directly into the capacity to deliver science diplomacy. With the scientific community under siege, that group cannot adequately contribute to the achievement of international policy objectives. Moreover, scientific research informs and conditions society’s ability to understand and engage with the natural world. To break the link between science and society is to alienate the polity from the nature.

If we are to achieve our promise in the area of science diplomacy, Canadians cannot abide those solitudes. Ideology can never substitute for evidence.

There is an alternative to stumbling blind into an uncertain future.

To improve our security, restore our democracy and strengthen our defences against the vexing challenges which imperil the planet, the war on science must end.

Now is the time to take back Canada.

Former diplomat Daryl Copeland is an educator, analyst and consultant; the author of Guerrilla Diplomacy, a Fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute and a Policy Fellow at the University of Montreal’s CERIUM. Follow him on Twitter @GuerrillaDiplo.
MONEY CAN’T BUY HAPPINESS IN CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY
by JEAN-CHRISTOPHE BOUCHER

During the federal election campaign of 2006, then-candidate Stephen Harper announced his intention, if elected, to overhaul Canadian defence policy. Much of the Conservatives’ view on defence policy was comprised in the “Canada First” document produced by Gordon O’Connor in 2006, which underlined the intent of a future Harper government to increase the overall budget of the Department of National Defence (DND) and put forward an ambitious, almost herculean, program of military procurement.

The Conservatives squarely blamed the Liberal government for the demise of the Canadian Armed Forces, irrespective of the fact that it was the Paul Martin Liberal government who first increased defence spending by a sizable $4 billion in its 2004-2005 budget. An elected Conservative government would essentially end what then-Chief of Defence Staff General Rick Hillier characterized as the “decade of darkness” and invest massively in its national defence. In effect, between 2006 and 2014, the defence budget rose from $15 billion to $19 billion in constant dollars. Although the Harper government announced in 2011 that DND’s budget would be trimmed by roughly $2 billion, defence spending in real dollars has grown by ten per cent in the last nine years. Moreover, complementing this growth in real dollars, the Harper government announced a series of military procurement projects that increased Canada’s capital investment in equipment by more than $60 billion over the next twenty years.

Despite such substantial investments, national defence has remained a thorn in the Conservative political side. Indeed, between 2006 and 2015, several successive military procurement failures weakened the Conservative government of Stephen Harper. The list is long and involves the acquisition of key platforms for the different arms of the Canadian forces: the F-35s, the replacement of the half-century old Sea Kings helicopters, procurement of new fixed-wing Search and Rescue aircrafts, the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS) that would overhaul a good proportion of the Royal Canadian Navy, and the acquisition of logistic vehicles for the Canadian Army. These procurement projects highlighted the difficulty for the Canadian government to align its national defence objectives, the needs and desires of the Canadian Armed Forces, and the fiscal reality of the Canadian treasure.

(Continued on page 9)
Beyond the simple problem of funding national defence, these successive procurement fiascos have emphasized a profound administrative dysfunction of the Government of Canada’s bureaucracy. The principal problem hounding Canada’s national defence may not be a lack of resources, as many commentators argued since the 1990s, but a more profound struggle in formulating and implementing a sensible and realistic Canadian defence policy in general. In essence, as commentators emphasize DND’s ‘funding problem’ and the Government of Canada deploys significant efforts (in treasure at least) to remedy this situation, we underscore other problems plaguing the Canadian Armed Forces and, ultimately, Canadian defence policy. In other words, the emphasis on military budgets has overpowered any discussion and debate on the nature and appropriateness of Canadian defence policy.

Canadian defence policy elites, either civilian or military, try to hold up a fantasy: that Canada can maintain a multi-purpose combat-ready force on the cheap. The “multi-purpose combat-ready” mantra hides the fact that Canadian defence policy operates in a policy void, one that fails to identify priorities (being ready for everything is in short arguing that everything is a priority) and allocates limited resources for these priorities. The consequences are serious.

Without clear priorities, political elites are able to use defence policy to promote secondary objectives such as being re-elected. The current procurement complications are influenced in part by a Canadian government that insists that such spending produces economic benefits at home despite the fact that such requirements inflate prices by twenty to forty per cent. Conversely, without clear political leadership steering defence policies, the military responds by filling this vacuum with their own bureaucratic interests. Again, the procurement fiasco highlights this phenomenon. Faced with vague political guidelines, the Canadian armed forces identify equipment needs based on flexibility (hence more expensive) and adopt capability-based planning which allows one to think military issues in relations with present or probable threats. For example, the F-35 offers the Royal Canadian Air Force a first-strike capability useful to participate in international operations with allies, a task much more thrilling than patrolling the Canadian North.

In the end, any sober conversation on defence policy in Canada (one would wish political parties would address this issue during the present federal elections) should start with articulating a defence policy. Increasing military expenditures will not make this fundamental problem disappear. It will only exacerbate tensions between a Canadian military struggling with insufficient funds to accomplish its multi-purpose combat-ready objective, Canadian policy makers who will send our military in harm’s way without proper training and equipment, and a Canadian public who will challenge a significant increase of the national defence budget.

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In Carl von Clausewitz’s treatise “On War”, war is defined as the extension of politics by other means—that is violent means. The essence of his philosophy is that violence is used to advance and achieve political ends. Although Clausewitz wrote in the aftermath of the Napoleonic experience, his central thesis remains valid today as we look to understand and respond to the current phenomenon of terrorism and insurgency within our contemporary “global village”.

Terrorism and insurgency as a de facto form of warfare has been present since ancient times. While not formally recognized as war in the traditional sense (a declaration of conflict between recognized states), terrorism and insurgency is today the most prevalent form of de facto warfare. While conventional state vs. state warfare cannot be ruled out as an instrument of politics in the contemporary world, its practical application is very limited, particularly where nuclear-weaponized states are concerned. In the latter case, given that the existence of nuclear weapons essentially rules out the use of maximum force for absolute political objectives, nuclear power states have been forced to restrain their conventional wars to limited space, effort and objective. The armed clashes between India and Pakistan in recent years illustrate this point.

As traditional state vs. state warfare has markedly receded in our global village of interconnectivity and economic interdependence, political entities and non-state actors have emerged to wage war through terrorism and insurgency against the established order. Witness the near conventional-level war being waged by ISIL in the Levant, the insurgency of Boko Haram in Nigeria and the pointed terrorism against the staff of Charlie Hebdo in France by Muslim extremists. This is the contemporary reality of war that we are challenged to address.

Unlike traditional state vs. state warfare, terrorism and insurgency fall within a grey zone of politics by other means. The initial stage of any violent action by a political entity against the established order is declared by the establishment to be a criminal act, variously described as "evil" and "ruthless". The contest between the two entities will determine over time whether the terrorist organization remains as such and is unable to progress its political agenda, or whether through the test of wills and effectiveness of the violence they will manage to influence and change the established order.

Historically, we have examples of both. Terrorist organizations that failed to progress their political
agendas and thereby remained functionally criminal in status are notably the Red Brigades in Italy, the Red Army Faction/Bader Meinhof Gang in Germany and the FLQ in Canada. In these cases, the anti-terrorist measures taken by the established order were sufficient to defeat the insurgent organization and prevented those organizations from reaching a political critical mass sufficient to alter the status quo.

Conversely, the IRA/Provisional IRA and its political wing, Sinn Fein, emerged from a classic terrorist organization in its war with the British Government to being an effective political player affecting political change consistent with its agenda. The IRA played this role in the Easter Uprising of 1916 and the terrorist campaign that followed, leading to the creation of the Republic of Ireland. The Provisional IRA’s terrorist campaign led eventually to the Good Friday Agreement, and Sinn Fein was admitted officially into the governing institutions of Northern Ireland.

In this case, the long-running terrorist campaign or war led to a stalemate, which in turn encouraged a level of political compromise in order to resolve the conflict. Terrorism as war was therefore at least partially successful as an instrument of politics.

Today a multitude of terrorist and insurgence groups provide a very serious challenge to the international world order. The challenge requires a comprehensive understanding and response appropriate to a particular threat. Each political entity that uses violence to advance its political agenda should be countered with a measured response aimed to defeat the threat whilst not unduly creating conditions for larger-scale threats and conflict. In other words, counter-terrorist measures require strategic-level approaches that address the particular socio-economic, religious or ideological elements that may be inherent to the particular challenge in question.

Depending on the particular threat, the response requires a diligent application of state and international community resources ranging from police, the military, intelligence, humanitarian, economic and political capabilities. In this way we may be best placed to counter war in the global village.

Andrew Rasiulis, a Fellow with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, is a former defence analyst for the Department of National Defence and is now a freelance consultant with Andrew Rasiulis Associates Inc.
WHY DEFENCE MATTERS IN THIS ELECTION
by GEORGE PETROLEKAS

Normally, in Canadian elections, defence is an afterthought. In the past decade, defence featured because of our engagement in Afghanistan. This time, defence may form, in part, the path to power.

More than any other party, the heretofore unseen NDP defence platform will have much to do with whether the party forms the government.

For years, the NDP has functioned as the social conscience of the nation. Its base of committed voters historically has not been large, but NDP policies have influenced every other party’s social platforms for decades. But to affect other parties’ platforms is not the route to power, only to influence.

In the 2012 election, the NDP captured the imagination of many Canadians, particularly in Quebec, vaulting the NDP to official Opposition status and putting the party within striking reach of forming a government. But its being on the cusp of power induces fears in some that a NDP government would displace what is positioned as a more principled and muscular vision of the country.

For the Liberals, an outlook that appears to be at variance with the grand liberal internationalist viewpoints appears to be struggling to find a foundation on which to rest. Is it activist? Is it isolationist? Is it globally responsible? These elements do not seem clear at all so far in this campaign.

To achieve power, the NDP will have to balance its perceived root philosophies with enough centrist positions to attract on-the-fence Liberals, and even some Conservatives willing to take a chance on Thomas Mulcair as prime minister. It is doing so with middle-of-the-road economic positions, but will have to be seen as more centrist on the defence file as well.

The NDP has narrowed its margin of manoeuvre, given its current stand on the anti-ISIS mission by declaring its first act would be to bring the troops home – in contrast to what most Canadians believe. In three national polls conducted during the mission-extension debate, a majority of Canadians (as many as 74 per cent) supported the air campaign and its extension. In earlier polling by Ipsos Reid, Canadians agreed that “everything possible”

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needs to be done to stop ISIS from establishing its self-declared caliphate – the Islamic State, as the group now refers to itself – and that included putting Canadian boots on the ground. Surprisingly, this pro-mission support was echoed in Quebec as well.

The whole NDP history on defence will be ridiculed by Conservative Leader Stephen Harper, including its long campaign to have Canada leave NATO during the Cold War. Mr. Harper won’t do that with Mr. Trudeau, because previous Liberal governments decided to send Canada to Afghanistan. As such, Mr. Trudeau’s current ideas on interventions abroad will be questioned.

And so for the NDP, the tipping point to power may indeed become the position it will take on its vision for the Canadian Forces.

NDP Leader Thomas Mulcair will likely try to offset a perception of weakness in this area by outlining a comprehensive defence policy, likely reaffirming peace missions and care for veterans. It would go over well as many centrist Canadians have not abandoned the attachment to Canada’s blue-beret past.

The Liberals, in comparison, have a far more difficult task in front of them. So far, they have not been able to carve an identity that is clearly identifiable in the minds of voters. If anything, they have minutely calibrated on the edges, but not enough to create a discernible difference. No air strikes for example, but far more training of advisers.

If the Liberal position is unclear with respect to current engagements, so far, there has been little indication from either the NDP or the Liberals on what kind of military Canadians should be entitled to or how they would use it, except to say that fixing the Royal Canadian Navy would be a priority.

Mr. Harper is not immune on this file, either. Given past experience on the F-35, various procurement delays, and veterans, Mr. Harper generally gets a free ride because of perception of being action-prone abroad; the deep defence cuts of the past two years glossed over in part by rhetoric, and his willingness to use the Forces in the Ukraine, in support of NATO and also against ISIS.

And so, with an engagement in Iraq and Syria ongoing, the present budget insufficient to afford the military we have, let alone the military we envision, the ultimate differentiator between the three parties may indeed be what they envision for Canada’s military.

George Petrolekas is a Fellow with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. He has served in Bosnia and Afghanistan and has been an adviser to senior NATO commanders.

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When it began, many analysts predicted the Crimea crisis would lead to armed conflict. Dire warnings from the West, especially in American academic circles, regarding continued Russian expansion into mainland Ukraine were imprecise and unhelpful. Today, more than a year after the referendum, Crimea is de facto Russian territory and unofficial dialogue between the West and Crimea is beginning to unfold.

Looking back, we see now that the crisis might have been better managed. Though Ukraine’s leaders were surprised at the speed of events, Kiev seemed unable and unwilling to engage in negotiations with Russia, as a way of probing and understanding the country’s broader strategic goals. Few, if any, politicians in Kiev and Western capitals were prepared to entertain alternative scenarios for resolving the crisis, refusing even to contemplate increased autonomy for Crimea.

Apart from the threat of sanctions there was little interest in responding to the economic situation in Crimea or engaging the Crimean people themselves. Choosing to take the lead in challenging Moscow, the USA, focused all its diplomatic muscle on threatening and punishing Russia. In the lead-up to March 16 2014 referendum, the world was treated to a steady stream of grave pronouncements from the State Department, mostly from John Kerry and Samantha Power, vilifying the Russian leader. The almost maniacal enthusiasm with which American media, academics, and policy-makers took up the anti-Putin mantra came as both revelation and disappointment. It was clear there was no depth or strategy to their response. Vladimir Putin’s every word was dissected and the usual analogies were resorted to, with the leader described as both Hitler and Stalin. Though skilfully crafted and impressive in their rhetoric, they had little impact on their intended target.

Western policy was aimed primarily at punishing Putin or coercing him into a desired course of action while dismissing the factors that persuaded him to send his forces into Crimea. John Kerry, for example, repeatedly sought to discredit Putin’s claims that he had intervened at the request of the Crimean leadership and that he was concerned about the safety of the Russian population in the peninsula. The only kind of overture made to the Crimean people themselves consisted in warning them they were being manipulated by Russia for its own interests. Suggestions that the referendum was a sham (Continued on page 15)
and had succeeded only because it was held at gunpoint completely missed the point. The Americans, it seemed, were not interested in what the people of Crimea wanted; and what the majority of them clearly wanted was to not be part of Ukraine. Russian strategy, at the time, consisted of questioning the legitimacy of the Kiev government’s claim to Crimea based on precedent, experience and Crimean sentiment. Surveys showing strong Crimean support for Russia suggest this was a strategy favoured by the majority.

John Kerry argued that the whole of Ukraine should have been given the opportunity to vote on the issues involved, while Kiev declared the referendum illegal. Neither of these responses was adequate, given the lack of mechanisms for enforcing corresponding solutions on all the parties concerned. Simply put, if the United States was serious about finding an alternative to Russian annexation, the conditions that followed from this should have been clearly laid out by its lead diplomats. Apart from the threat of sanctions, no meaningful or adequate legal or political mechanism of enforcement was proposed to curb Russia. Even the sanctions did not produce their intended effect and UN resolutions proved impotent.

Negotiations might have focused on the long-term political and economic viability of Crimea remaining within a weak Ukraine economy. The West could have more clearly spelled out the costs of Crimean absorption into Russia. With a population of just over two million, a dependent economy, and poor water and electricity supplies, the peninsula has now become something of an economic burden to Russia. There were bailouts and aid packages for Kiev, but the economic and political benefits that would accrue to the Crimeans from staying in a unified Ukraine were never properly explained to them.

Another reason for a breakdown in diplomacy was an unwillingness to address Russia’s legitimate security concerns. Even when part of Ukraine, Sevastopol was a ‘city with special status’ and the area in which it was included was a distinct municipality, separate from Crimea. The majority (over seventy per cent) of the city’s residents are ethnic Russians. In addition, it is home to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet (and formerly also to the Ukrainian Naval Forces).

None of the solutions mentioned were easy choices, and it may be that none were obvious to the parties in conflict, who were acting under immense pressure to avoid a full-blown crisis. Nevertheless, there is strong evidence to show that deeply divided groups can reach negotiated solutions through political and territorial compromise. History also shows that such solutions often only present themselves after years, if not decades, of war.

Even in the absence of meaningful diplomacy, Crimea managed to come away from the crisis virtually without violent incident. Was this simply luck? What would have happened if Putin’s forces had not scrambled into Crimea? There is little doubt that Crimea would have sought independence anyway; and a good chance violence would have ensued, meaning Crimea could easily be a bloody battleground like Eastern Ukraine. In retrospect, it is clear that the West underestimated Crimea’s importance to Russia. Putin’s actions come across as clearly pre-emptive in nature: in the context of his fear that he was about to lose the peninsula to a pro-Western government—and along with it a long-standing arrangement for leasing naval facilities.

Meanwhile Crimea is becoming more fully “Russified.” With an increasingly marginalized Muslim Tatar population, there is talk of a Dagestan-style low intensity conflict. Even if Tatars were to become fully radicalized, and thus far there is little to suggest they are, such a scenario is unlikely. If anything, Crimea is more likely to see Russian management akin to Chechnya. Russian authorities will run the peninsula from Moscow much like they have done in the North Caucasus. Naturally any effort at further integrating Crimea into Russia and increased engagement by the West in support of that will be viewed with suspicion by Kiev. Visits from French parliamentarians and discussions between German, Italian and Crimean parliamentarians are welcomed by Crimeans who feel doubly punished by sanctions and by Kiev’s recalcitrance. So far Ukraine has not taken any retaliatory measures, though its leaders have suggested that dialogue between Crimea and the West would carry “consequences.” Meanwhile Crimeans cannot visit Ukraine to see their relatives or apply for foreign visas. This adds difficulties to the already complicated life of the Crimean population and strengthens anti-Ukrainian feelings even among those who might be open to Western engagement.

David Carment is a Professor of International Affairs at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University. He is a Fellow with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.
As the parties prepare for the last lap of the election campaign, and as the candidates prepare for the Foreign Policy/Defence debate, voters who care about defence issues are probably confused - and they should be. If one wants a strong Canadian defence, who should one vote for? Ordinarily, one would vote for the party that is right of centre, as they tend to be the ones that are more pro-military. However, after nine years of holding the reins, the Conservative Party has shown to be far better in talking about defence than in managing defence. A quick review of the major challenges and policy decisions suggests that it is time for a change, but to which alternative?

The Conservative Party came into power with a nationalist vision of defence policy: the Canada First Defence Strategy [CFDS]. If one remembers its contents, one will realize how little of the CFDS has been implemented. To be fair, the CFDS ran head first into the financial crisis of 2008-2009. The suddenly constrained budget meant that it would be hard to fulfil the various promises. That, as well as other changed circumstances (end of the Kandahar mission, a more aggressive Russia, American defence costs), meant that Canada needed a new defence strategy, and the conversations in Ottawa kept suggesting that one would be forthcoming. Thus far, nothing. Which means making decisions either based on an obsolete plan, overcome by events, or based on no plan at all.

Instead, the Conservative policy has been to focus on messaging. The best way to understand why there has been a commitment to keeping the size of the Canadian Armed Forces the same even as equipment breaks down (no more supply ships) and ground operations end is appreciating the desire to look strong by saying that there are a hundred thousand or so people in uniform (including reserves). The problem is that personnel represent about half of the defence budget, so one way to manage the declining expenditures over the past few years would have been to cut the size of the force. Instead, the government has kept the force size the same, leading to cuts in training and maintenance.

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cuts in training and maintenance. This raises risks for those who do get sent to do operations, whether that is flying over Iraq and Syria, or sending broken ships to distant missions.

The problem is that neither of the main opposition parties has articulated an alternative approach. To be fair, the New Democratic Party has been very sharp on the F-35 file, so one could imagine that they would be prepared to make a decision. What that decision would be is not known, but they would be making an informed decision. On the other hand, neither opposition party is going to raise inconvenient questions about the long-delayed National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy, since changing anything here would endanger votes in Nova Scotia and British Columbia.

The key NDP position on defence is the call for more peacekeeping. The key question I raise here is, as always: how to pay for it? Given the recent stance that the NDP plans to balance the budget, it is not clear how the party would pay for a higher pace of operations that more peacekeeping would represent. Cutting the F-35 would not really help in the short term since the most of those costs are in the long term AND the NDP would still have to find another plane. Perhaps the peacekeeping efforts would be paid for by the money saved by ending the various missions in and over Iraq and Syria, which seems likely if the NDP were to govern.

The Liberals have stances that are similar to the NDP: more peacekeeping, more criticism of the F-35, and avoiding discussion of the ship-building program. They have been more willing to support the use of force, but they have not really enunciated a new defence stance. They do benefit from having a former general in Andrew Leslie as a prominent candidate. Gordon O’Connor demonstrated that generals do not always make successful defence ministers, but Leslie was a far more successful general than O’Connor, so there is that. Like the NDP, they are far better at criticizing the mistakes made by the Conservatives than proposing their own defence strategy. The Liberals also face a key handicap: many of the procurement problems of today are legacies of procurement decisions/failures made by the Liberals when they were last in power.

So, we are left with no attractive options. The current government has mismanaged the defence file. The two opposition parties have not proposed any good solutions to the enduring challenges that the government faced. The question that remains to be answered in the last month of the campaign is: can any of these parties articulate a defence strategy and a reasonable way to cover the costs?

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WARMER RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA WILL BACKFIRE ON THE U.S.

by ROB HUEBERT

This weekend in Alaska, U.S. President Barack Obama will host a number of countries with interests in the Arctic. The event – called GLACIER (Conference on Global Leadership in the Arctic: Co-operation, Innovation, Engagement and Resilience) – brings together the eight members of the Arctic Council and other countries, such as China and Japan, that have interests in the Arctic region.

The meeting creates a very interesting dilemma for Canada.

The quicker Western countries move to “normalize” relations with the Russians, the less incentive they will have to return it to the Ukrainians.

The Americans, and particularly U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, have been very explicit that they see this meeting as a means of improving relations with the Russians in the Arctic. They see a necessity to delink Russian military action in Ukraine from their actions in the Arctic region.

The dilemma for Canada is that while it is in its Arctic interests to ensure that all states – Russia included – play by the rules of the game in the region, it is not in Canada’s larger security interests to see Russian actions in Ukraine validated as a fait accompli as the Americans and other Western states move on to other issues on which there is agreement.

The U.S. position is that the Russians have been playing by the rules of the game when it comes to the Arctic and that it is in American interests to ensure that this behaviour continues. Specifically, the Russian willingness to continue to abide by the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the rules that establish their extended continental shelf in the Arctic is something that needs to be encouraged. This encouragement, in the view of the Americans, needs to come in a more welcoming international environment regarding the Arctic. As such, the forthcoming meeting, while nominally focused on the issues of climate change and the Arctic, has an equally important but less explicit

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objective of demonstrating American willingness to work with the Russians in the Arctic.

The problem for Canada is that during its recent chairmanship of the Arctic Council, it maintained a much cooler relationship toward Russia as part of its condemnation of Russia’s use of military force to annex Crimea. Except for the Arctic, Canada and the United States have taken similar actions to both publicly condemn the Russian intervention and to take similar action to respond. Both have enacted the same sanctions against Russia. Canadian and American military forces have also been sent to NATO allies that border Russian territory as a means of reassurance. Canadian and American troops have also been sent into Ukraine to assist in the training of Ukrainian troops in their fight against Russia. These are substantial efforts to demonstrate North American opposition to the redrawing of European land boundaries by military action.

Yet, when it comes to the Arctic, the American position has been much more conciliatory. It is true the Russians have been playing by the international rules for the determination of their extended continental shelf in the region, but they have also been dramatically increasing their military action in the Arctic region. This has included the deployment of military aircraft near and into the aerospace regions of several of the Arctic states – Canada and the U.S. included – and has included the deployment of submarine forces into the waters of many Arctic states. They have also dramatically increased both their training exercises and have begun to accelerate their plans to rebuild most of their Cold War Arctic bases.

It is not clear why the Americans believe they can maintain sanctions and other actions to express their concern regarding Russian activities in Crimea, but that they can ignore increased Russian military action in the Arctic and attempt a reconciliation regarding the region. This inconsistency in American policy means that when it comes to the Arctic, Canada is increasingly isolated and characterized as being unnecessarily belligerent to Russia.

The problem is the Russians are making no plans to return the Ukrainian territory they have taken by military force. The quicker Western countries move to “normalize” relations with the Russians, the less incentive they will have to return it to the Ukrainians. Efforts to “normalize” – or some may say appease – Russia will have the long-term effect of demonstrating that under the right conditions, Russia can use military force on its borders and then engage the Western powers on other issues to de facto validate its military actions. It should be apparent that the logic of this will create a more dangerous international system for Western powers in the future.

Ultimately this is why it is so confusing to see the Americans rush to re-engage the Russians in the Arctic – as if their actions in the Ukraine had never occurred.

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TO STOP RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM, INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST CONFRONT SAUDI ARABIA

by KYLE MATTHEWS

What do refugees need? Shelter, food and medicine tend to be immediate humanitarian requirements. What did Saudi Arabia offer Germany at the start of the refugee crisis that expected to see over one million people seek asylum in the heartland of Europe? **200 mosques.**

While this is a shameful display of Riyadh’s seemingly heartless foreign policy, especially given the fact that Saudi Arabia has accepted zero Syrian refugees, it does not surprise those inside and outside of government who work on religious extremism and counter-terrorism issues.

Saudi Arabia is a Sunni Muslim country that practices a very conservative form of Islam known as Wahabbism. The country also goes to great lengths and spends vast sums of oil money to promote Wahabbism across the world.

Why should we be concerned? In a recent column in *The New York Times*, journalist Thomas Friedman explained “Nothing has been more corrosive to the stability and modernization of the Arab world, and the Muslim world at large, than the billions and billions of dollars the Saudis have invested since the 1970s into wiping out the pluralism of Islam — the Sufi, moderate Sunni and Shiite versions — and imposing in its place the puritanical, anti-modern, anti-women, anti-Western, anti-pluralistic Wahhabist Salafist brand of Islam promoted by the Saudi religious establishment.”

The recent release of the “**Saudi cables**” by WikiLeaks has led to an increasing number of worrisome facts about the Saudi Arabian government and their influence on the world stage as an agent of religious extremism. It seems the Saudis have been funding Islamic schools and other organizations that promote Wahhabism around the world in places like India and Canada.

At first glance it may not seem so problematic that a foreign government is helping to create places of worship and to educate youth in another country's jurisdiction. But an obsession on spreading and promoting a particular strain of Islam that is diametrically opposed to equal rights for other sects and religious groups should be seen as deeply unsettling to all, for obvious reasons.

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From Mali to Nigeria, Pakistan to Syria, Egypt to Libya, Canada to France, extremism and violence are often linked to the particular Wahhabist ideology and belief system that emanates out of Saudi Arabia.

Writing in *Foreign Policy* magazine, Daniel Benjamin of the respected Brookings Institution argues more bluntly that “Wahhabism has been a devastating invasive species in Islam’s enormous ecosystem — it’s the zebra mussel, the Asian Tiger mosquito, and the emerald ash borer wrapped into one. The consequences have been fateful: A solid line of causation from the slaughter in Islamic State-controlled Iraq and the tragedy of 9/11 traces back directly to Saudi evangelization and the many radical mosques and extremist NGOs it spawned.”

While the world is outraged and united in putting pressure on Saudi Arabia to release blogger Raif Badawi, who criticized religion and was sentenced to prison time and 1,000 lashes, more must be done if the international community is serious about reducing extremism and terrorism. Here’s a suggestion: follow the ideology, not the victims.

Last year the Canadian Senate authorized the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence “to study and report on security threats facing Canada.” An interim report was released last July. One section of the report, focused on foreign influences in Canada, noted that “[to] promote their own fundamentalist brand of Islam – Wahhabism – here in Canada, the committee has heard that wealthy Saudis, Qataris and Kuwaitis are using charities as conduits to finance Canadian mosques and community centres.”

While countries should take a united front in pressuring Saudi Arabia to cease and desist exporting fundamentalism, there are additional “reciprocity” strategies that national governments should and must follow. If a particular country has a horrible track record of religious freedom (or none at all) then all efforts should be placed on preventing that country and its citizens from interfering in the religious affairs of other states.

Austria, for example, recently amended a law, to include provisions that it believes will help curb the violent extremism in the country. Originally made in 1912, the law now makes provisions seeking to protect Austrian society at-large.

What are the Austrians doing? The new law includes provisions that regulate the funding of Imams and religious organizations such that no foreign funding can support the organization for more than a year.

While this may be too aggressive of a solution for some, it is surely an easy first step that can be taken to prevent foreign governments and religious institutions from interfering in other countries domestic affairs.

In the meantime, this is also moment for the international community to shine the spotlight on Saudi Arabia’s hypocrisy and demand that it, as one of the wealthiest countries in the Middle East, begin to use its national resources for the good of humanity by taking in Syrian refugees, rather than exporting Wahhabism. Religious extremism is powering conflicts that lead to the mass displacement of people. It must no longer be tolerated.

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Anne McGrath is the National Director of the New Democratic Party and was Chief of Staff to Official Opposition New Democratic Party leaders Jack Layton, Nycole Turmel, and Thomas Mulcair.

BOB FOWLER
Bob Fowler was Canada’s longest serving Ambassador to the United Nations. He also served as Canada’s Ambassador to Italy.

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Hon. David Pratt served as the Minister of National Defence from 2003-2004 and is an independent consultant.

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Canada & the World Speaker Series: The Use of Energy for Geopolitical Ends

This is Canadian Global Affairs Institute’s (formerly CDFAI) seventh annual four-part Speaker Series starting in October and extending into February 2016. The Institute is pleased to welcome back ATB Corporate Financial Services as the 2015/16 Speaker Series Title Sponsor.

With the precipitous drop in the price of crude oil over the past several months, is it only because of supply and demand or are there other factors at play? Oil and gas pricing is being closely watched by several producing nations and the use of energy for geopolitical ends is becoming more obvious. What really was behind the Saudi price drop? How will Europe handle Russia’s aggression when it needs Russian petroleum products? What about the future of the oil sands and fracking?

Four experts will speak to a by-invitation-only audience on issues affecting Calgary, Alberta and Canada on this important topic. In order for the speakers to be candid, the “Chatham House Rule” (non attribution) will apply during the Question and Answer (Q&A) portion of the evening.

- This invitation provides for couples or individuals to enjoy the opportunity of a thought-provoking discussion over a great meal at the Calgary Golf & Country Club.
- Again this year, there will be limited opportunities for corporations to reserve tables of 10.
- Each presentation will be approximately 40 minutes, followed by dinner.
- Those in attendance will have an opportunity to engage with the speaker during a one hour Q&A session.
- The reception will commence at 6:00 and the evening will end at 9:15 PM.
- Business attire is requested.

**Dinner Dates and Speakers:**

- **Jan 20, 2016 – Sarah O. Ladislaw** Director and Senior Fellow, Energy and National Security Program - Centre for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, DC)
- **Feb 23, 2016 – Dr. Ariel Cohen** Director, Center for Energy, Natural Resources and Geopolitics at the Institute for Analysis of Global Security (Washington, DC)

Each speaker will provide a different and personal view on the use of energy for geopolitical ends. These four events promise to be timely and informative regarding matters of increasing importance to all who have an interest in our oil and gas sector, our economy and, as the subject suggests, international relations including security.

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- A tax deductible charitable receipt for the donation portion of the ticket price will be issued.
- If you are unable to attend certain events, we will offer your donated ticket to graduate students at the University of Calgary.

For further information or to register, please contact Carri Daye at 403-231-7605 or by email to cdaye@cgai.ca. or register online at www.cgai.ca.
Canadian Global Affairs Institute

The Canadian Global Affairs Institute focuses on the entire range of Canada’s international relations in all its forms including (in partnership with the University of Calgary’s School of Public Policy), trade investment and international capacity building. Successor to the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI, which was established in 2001), the Institute works to educate Canadians about the importance of having a respected and influential voice in those parts of the globe where Canada has significant interests due to trade and investment, origins of Canada’s population, geographic security (and especially security of North America in conjunction with the United States) or the peace and freedom of allied nations. The Institute aims to demonstrate to Canadians the importance of comprehensive foreign, defence and trade policies which both express our values and represent our interests.

The Institute was created to bridge the gap between what Canadians need to know about Canadian international activities and what they do know. Historically Canadians have tended to look abroad out of a search for markets because Canada depends heavily on foreign trade. In the modern post-Cold War world, however, global security and stability have become the bedrocks of global commerce and the free movement of people, goods and ideas across international boundaries. Canada has striven to open the world since the 1930s and was a driving factor behind the adoption of the main structures which underpin globalization such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the International Trade Organization and emerging free trade networks connecting dozens of international economies. The Canadian Global Affairs Institute recognizes Canada’s contribution to a globalized world and aims to educate Canadians about Canada’s role in that process and the connection between globalization and security.

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