FEATURED ARTICLE

CANADA’S FOREIGN POLICY NEEDS FOCUS ON ARCTIC

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Prime Minister Trudeau’s position on the use of Canadian air assets in the bombing campaign against ISIS (or ISIL, or Daesh) raises more questions than it answers and begs answers from the new prime minister himself.

Throughout the election campaign Mr. Trudeau repeated the mantra that if elected, he would withdraw the six-pack of CF-18s currently flying bombing missions against the unmitigated evil of this group of pitiless murderers which has declared war on all of us. He never explained why. Whenever asked the straight-forward question “if you aren’t prepared to use force against these people, just who would you use force against,” the answer was always evasive. A majority of Canadians supported the air campaign when it started about a year ago and still do now. It’s a good guess that even more are perfectly happy to continue killing or containing Daesh after the horrors of the Sinai air bombing, the November 13th massacre in Paris, and other Daesh predations in Beirut and other places.

There is no indication that Mr. Trudeau is a religious or moral pacifist and thus against the use of force in principle. Indeed “insiders” have declared that Canada will keep its tankers and reconnaissance aircraft in the region to help those aircraft which will continue the bombing campaign. That makes little sense. If we are against the use of force to contain Daesh, why are we directly willing to aid those who are prepared to do so? As any fighter pilot knows, when a tanker is needed to carry out a mission, any old tanker will do – US, Canadian, British, etc. No tankers, no missions. As for our CP-140s, they have long been configured to guide bombers to hit ground targets as they did in Libya. They may not pull the trigger on the sniper rifle, but they do call out the windage and elevation for the sniper who is actually doing the shooting.

Mr. Trudeau says that he is going to carry through with his promise because Canadians gave him a mandate to do it. That’s not a viable explanation. Canadians voted for him and his party for a lot of reasons last October, but the mission in the Middle East was hardly high on anyone’s political agenda. And besides, that vote took place before Daesh’s last round of murder and mayhem.

The people around Mr. Trudeau claim that all the major leaders he has talked to are ok with his projected withdrawal. That is no doubt a fig leaf. The French are increasing their bombing and so is the United States. British Prime Minister Cameron is going to ask his Parliament to approve British entry into the campaign. So, they are happy that they are moving in one direction while Mr. Trudeau is moving in the exact opposite way? More likely they are loathe to interfere in the internal politics of another nation by telling the prime minister of a sovereign country that they don’t agree with a decision he has made in the wake of an election.

There is a possibility that Mr. Trudeau has decided – and is telling Canada’s allies – that Canada’s training mission (currently consisting of fewer than 60 soldiers) will be considerably ramped up as the jets are withdrawn. But training is fraught with problems of its own as the US and other countries have found out in Africa, Iraq and other places. You can train until you are blue in the face, but if the trainees are not motivated to fight, they won’t, no matter how well trained or equipped. Daesh’s triumphs over the Iraqi army shows that. And as our new Minister of National Defence himself has declared, a nation that wishes to “train” had better know who they are training and what the blowback can be in a place where so many armed groups are competing and killing each other.

Most Canadians no doubt wish the new government well, especially it is most important task, to defend Canada, its people, its interests and its allies. The new government – Prime Minister Trudeau – might start by explaining why he is so determined to get Canadian jets out of the region.

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For some time now Canada’s approach toward the Arctic has been parochial and sovereignty-obsessed. Canada’s Arctic foreign policy is long overdue for some refining and refocusing. It should be reflective of the political, economic and environmental landscape of today’s Arctic, and respond proactively to the challenges and opportunities ahead.

Much can be learned from the early 1990s when Canada made its most significant contribution to regional Arctic politics by leading the establishment of the Arctic Council and ensuring that indigenous peoples across the Arctic be politically represented in circumpolar affairs.

Yet today’s circumpolar north is very different than that of the early post-Cold War years. The Arctic has become global with new actors and challenging issues that require greater regional cooperation and dialogue in an era of multiple regional transformations.

Three ideas can kick-start the reflection process on Canada’s new Arctic foreign policy approach.

First, it is imperative that Canada repairs its diplomatic ties with Russia on Arctic issues. Until recently, Canada and Russia both considered each other as logical partners in the Arctic, with similar Arctic human development, stewardship and security challenges. Russia’s intervention in Ukraine has changed that. But while the US and other Arctic states have largely compartmentalized their relations with Russia in the region, the Conservative government’s “principled stance” left Canada playing the role of spoiler, for example in the long delay of establishing an Arctic Coast Guard Forum.

Re-engaging with Russia on Arctic affairs not only makes practical sense, but would strengthen and support Russian moderates working towards greater internationalism. Whatever threat Russia poses to Canada’s Arctic security – and many experts determine it to be minimal – engagement is the best option for mitigating it.

Second, regional governance should be enhanced and reflect the emergence of new issues and actors in the region. The Arctic Council has been the most prominent institution in the region, forging regional cooperation and stability by uniting policymakers from all Arctic states, indigenous organizations and non-Arctic observers (states (Continued on page 7)
and organizations) to work collaboratively on common concerns and goals related to environmental protection and sustainable development.

But while the new Liberal government should continue to support, fund and reinforce the Arctic Council in its current form, Canada also has an interest in supporting and funding alternate institutions to address needs that the Arctic Council’s limited mandate and structure leave unfilled.

A new Arctic strategy should therefore include the role of relevant Canadian provinces and territories and indigenous organizations as allies in developing and implementing Canada’s foreign policy objectives through international linkages at the subnational level, where health, education, infrastructure and economic development progress is ultimately led.

Québec is a good example illustrating the rise of subnational actors in circumpolar affairs. With its Plan Nord, the Couillard government has expanded the province’s diplomatic relations with Iceland, has joined the Arctic Circle Assembly and has signed new agreements on northern related issues with the European Arctic countries through the Nordic Council of Ministers.

The Yukon and the Northwest Territories have also increased their engagement internationally with Alaska as a way to stimulate local and regional economic development, through the Arctic Caucus of the Pacific Northwest Economic Region (PNWER). Inuit Nunangat has an even longer history of international collaboration with Greenland, Alaska and Russia.

This process can create a new pattern and network of subnational governance that reflects local and regional realities that the federal government should recognize and take part in: shared powers and competencies can be beneficial to all actors involved. The federal government could therefore be a facilitator assisting substate actors to be more engaged on the circumpolar stage.

Third, the kinds of partnerships Canada seeks in the region needs to include not only issues of environmental and marine cooperation but also those promoting sustainable development. Under the Conservatives, Canada made this a focus of its 2013-5 Arctic Council Chairmanship, to the dismay of some environmentalists. But fundamentally, a focus on development is sound and necessary for the Canadian North and should not be abandoned simply because the previous government favoured it.

To that end, cross-Arctic sectors and areas of innovation that Canada should be promoting in its foreign policy could include renewable energy; housing and design; food systems; telecommunications; tourism; transportation and infrastructure; science and innovation; and northern focused technologies.

All of those areas and sectors should give impetus to stronger multilevel and multiregional circumpolar cooperation that are not only interesting for local and regional economies in Canada; as common policy concerns, they open a window of opportunity to reinforce regional stability based on interconnected interests.

At the foreign policy debate during the past federal election campaign, the three leaders were asked to share their respective ideas on Canada’s role in the circumpolar north. All leaders focused on Canadian domestic northern issues: none had any vision in respect to Canada’s international role in the Arctic. It is therefore not surprising that new Foreign Affairs Minister Stéphane Dion’s mandate letter from the Prime Minister had no mention of the Arctic as a priority area for Canada. That unfortunate situation needs to change.

Increased cooperation and dialogue with traditional and non-traditional Arctic actors has been and will continue to be beneficial to Northerners and Canada as a whole. Innovative policies on Arctic economic development, science and collaborative measures that enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of regional stewardship are good areas in which to commence the policy shift.

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“Wir schaffen das.” We can do it.

It was a remarkable moment when Chancellor Angela Merkel announced that Germany would open its doors to all refugees that reached the country. Everyone was surprised, not least because Chancellor Merkel is famous for not surprising anyone—except those who underestimate her political skills. She is admired more for her patience and prudence than for any visionary boldness.

Not this time. As Germany prepares for the 500th anniversary in 2017 of the birth of the Protestant reformation, it is worth remembering that Merkel is the daughter of a Lutheran pastor who moved from West to East Germany to look after his congregation: “We can do it” may not have the ring of Martin Luther’s famous “Here I stand: I can do no other” but it may come to be seen as the defining moment of her extraordinary political career.

The initial surge of pride in their own generosity eroded quickly in Germany as the full ramifications began to sink in. With daily counts of 10,000 refugees – the size of a small city – crossing into the country, there may be as many as a million claimants before year’s end. And the same numbers or more are anticipated for next year. There are many questions but few answers. How and where will the refugees be housed? How will the medical and educational systems cope with such a human tsunami? What about security—could terrorists be slipping into the country? In what ways will this sudden influx change Germany’s way of life and thinking? Feminists worry about Muslim attitudes towards women, Jews about anti-Semitism. Over 70% of the people arriving are young men on their own, many of whom have grown up knowing nothing but violence.

Failure to get on top of the crisis could end the career of the world’s most powerful woman.

Still, to Germany’s great credit, thousands of volunteers are working to exhaustion; many communities have reacted quickly, efficiently and charitably.

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So far, so good, but with daily pictures of endless lines of refugees walking towards Germany, public support for Merkel and her CDU Party is falling. The rank and file are not happy; the Bavarian CSU Party, a sister party of the CDU and a member of the governing coalition, has been bitingly critical; they have now papered over some of the differences, but the threat to break up the government remains in the background. Right-wing groups have been emboldened. Even the social democratic SPD Party, Merkel’s main coalition partner in Government, has been calling for restrictions. Failure to get on top of the crisis could end the career of the world’s most powerful woman.

There is no easy way out. A package of corrective measures has been adopted and the tightening up process has begun. Economic migrants, mostly from the Western Balkans, will be returned. Claimants from countries like Afghanistan where there is localized strife but safe areas elsewhere in the country may be sent home. Transit zone screening will be established to expedite both the selection of genuine refugees and the quick return of those who don’t qualify. None of these measures, however, will make an impact quickly on the enormous numbers on the move.

A fairer distribution of refugees across Europe is still a long way off.

The situation within the European Union is even worse. Political solidarity, agreement on common values and a respect for EU rules have been washed away by the wave of migrants. Mutual blame games and unilateral actions have been rampant. It is only now that the EU has started to manage the flows better, assisting smaller countries with their border security, financing and setting up processing centers in Greece and elsewhere. Turkey has been asked to help channel the flow — many of the migrants are coming from camps in Turkey — and is exacting a steep political and financial price.

A fairer distribution of refugees across Europe is still a long way off. Sweden and Germany, on a per capita basis, are taking in the most. Italy and Greece are swamped by arrivals and simply wave migrants through on their way to other countries. Slovakia has offered to accept 200 Christians only. Hungary does its best to frighten refugees away. Poland has taken in very few — and just elected a harshly anti-immigrant party. Xenophobic right-wing nationalism throughout Europe is on the rise.

This is the ultimate stress test for the EU and it may not survive in its current form. Already, one of the most beloved and visible achievements of European unification — the free movement of people — is vanishing; within the EU, national border controls in some countries are back. Nobody wants a “fortress Europe” but, faced with a neighborhood in turmoil and a growing divide between have and have nots across the Mediterranean, much stronger controls on the outer borders of the EU may be the only option.

Reasserting a measure of control will take time, but democracies tend to be impatient. Merkel has provincial elections next spring and federal elections in 2017. The challenge before her is huge: keep her coalition working and the German political “middle” on her side while also holding Europe together. Germany and Europe will be changed substantially by the refugee crisis but Merkel, the pastor’s daughter from East Germany, has experienced enormous changes in her own lifetime and this has given her confidence that her fellow Germans can and will adapt.

As has she: after following public opinion for 10 years, she now firmly leads from the front. There she stands, she can do no other.

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“BOOTS ON THE GROUND”: WHAT DOES THIS ACTUALLY MEAN ANYMORE?
by BERND HORN

Intuitively, the statement “boots on the ground” is self-explanatory. In the realm of international relations and military intervention “boots on the ground” or, in more precise language, the commitment of ground forces to an operation, was the acid test of commitment to an alliance or coalition. This benchmark of obligation is not hard to comprehend. By deploying ground troops each country is not only committing national treasure, it is also potentially committing national blood, which entails a number of nuanced risks ranging from domestic criticism to entanglement in conflicts, as once blood is shed it is difficult to pick up and run without risking censure for not valuing the life that has been lost. As such, it becomes a catch-22 as the death toll mounts. Moreover, once committed on the ground it is more difficult to pull out without the appearance of abandoning one’s allies, which also normally entails sanctions, covert as they may be.

The dilemma of becoming embroiled in a quagmire, or trying to escape through a “cut and run” strategy, opens a government to criticism from every angle. Domestically, it is seen by the public as an insult to those who have been lost and their families. The cry of “did they die in vain” will echo far and wide. In addition, the media will seize on a decision to withdraw as ironically indecision regarding whether or not to commit forces in the first place, as well as strategic incompetence. Importantly, international allies will rail at being abandoned and expected to shoulder the risks, costs and burden of ensuring global stability. Concomitant, any hopes of maintaining a “seat at the table” and influencing world events will evaporate with a withdrawal, thus negating any benefits that were derived from committing to supply ground forces in the first place.

It is this array of pitfalls that drives governments to carefully consider committing “boots on the ground.” Not surprisingly, many prefer to offer aircraft or ships instead. Again, it is not hard to understand why countries choose this course of action (and why others consider it tokenism). Although in no way pejorative, or meant to diminish the vital role of the Navy or Air Force, the fact is the likelihood of becoming embroiled in a quagmire such as Vietnam, the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq or Syria, is extremely less probable with only ships and aircraft. Their operations normally entail less risk and less exposure to potential enemy action. Importantly, they can be more easily extracted for those exact reasons. One need only look at the amount of media focus normally extended to solely naval or air operations. For example, Canada’s commitment to the Kosovo air campaign or the naval

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campaign in the Gulf as part of the “War on Terror” was largely overlooked by the public, the media, as well as our Allies.

Predictably then, after long, drawn-out, costly counter-insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, most governments, and particularly their publics, are war weary and very reluctant to be drawn back into any international conflict that could result in entanglement. Equally not surprising, as persistent conflict festered on the globe, particularly in North Africa and the Middle East, Western governments insist that they will not commit “boots on the ground.”

This decision is totally understandable. However, the definition seems to have morphed. For instance, when Western governments finally decided something needed to be done with regard to the Islamic State in Iraq, they quickly qualified that their decision to intervene would not entail the deployment of ground troops. Yet, most if not all, already had special operations forces (SOF) on the ground or very close by ready to move at a moment’s notice. Interestingly then, SOF, although constituting a national presence on the ground of a foreign country, is not considered by governments, or apparently their public and the media, as qualifying as “boots on the ground,” which apparently now refers only to large, conventional combat unit deployments. As such, SOF has once again proven its strategic utility. Highly trained, agile, rapidly deployable SOF forces that operate in small teams represent a relatively low cost and low risk solution for military intervention. Moreover, their small footprint and media resistant character allow governments to bend the definition of “boots on the ground” and achieve the effect they require without creating angst for their domestic and/or international audiences.

Dr. Bernd Horn is an adjunct professor of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, as well as an adjunct professor of history at the Royal Military College of Canada. He is a Fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.
Five years into a National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS) that has barely started to build a ship, and with the election of a Prime Minister who has promised to inject new life into the process, it is useful to step back and assess the approach. One way to do so is to take a page from the Australian experience.

In August 2015 the Australian government announced it would invest $39 billion (AUS) in ships over 20-30 years, committing to a permanent naval shipbuilding industry in Australia and a continuous build plan of major surface vessels. Prior to this, Australia commissioned a study to answer an important question: Knowing it had to acquire 15 major warships and 35 smaller vessels over the coming decades, should Australia support a naval shipbuilding industry or buy ships from foreign shipbuilders?¹ The study looked at three scenarios — build in-country, build partially overseas and partially in-country, or build entirely at a foreign shipyard — and found that building the ships in Australia would cost 30 to 40 percent more than in a foreign shipyard.

But the premium on “made in Australia” could be substantially reduced if the country: developed a steady and predictable production of ships over the long term, starting a new surface combatant about every 18 months; bought mature warship designs and made minimal changes to the design once production started; and, set the process up such that the ship designer and shipbuilder formed an integrated team, ideally with the ship designer subcontracted to the shipbuilder. Based on learnings from Australia’s troubled Air Warfare Destroyer program, the idea is to ensure the ship design can be accommodated by the shipyard, and that the designer is invested in the overall build outcome.

How does Canada’s shipbuilding program measure up to these criteria? On the face of it, pretty good. Developing a steady and predictable production of ships over the long term is a primary reason for the NSPS. It involves establishing a strategic relationship with two Canadian shipyards, one each for combat and non-combat vessels and, when announced in 2010, spending $35 billion over 20-30 years to build 28 major ships and a hundred or so (Continued on page 13)
smaller vessels. After several years of shipyard preparation, the continuous build has finally begun. On the East Coast the first Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship (AOPS) is now under construction, to be followed by the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC). The challenge will be to ensure the CSC program proceeds expeditiously, such that there is no break in production between the last AOPS and the first CSC. On the West Coast, construction of fisheries vessels is underway, to be followed by the Joint Support Ships (JSS), a polar class icebreaker, and other ships for the Canadian Coast Guard.

As for the integrated team, Irving Shipbuilding of Halifax is the prime contractor for the AOPS and the CSC, with ship designers subcontracted to Irving. This suggests the problems encountered by Australia will be avoided. But the designer and builder for the JSS are separate. The government contracted for a design with ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems Canada, and then provided the design to Seaspan Shipyards of Vancouver to build. The fact that the designer is not subcontracted to the builder could pose problems if it turns out the design is not fully compatible with the shipyard.

Unlike the Australian case no cost/benefit analysis of shipbuilding options preceded the NSPS announcement. But anecdotal evidence suggests the “buy in Canada” premium is significant. Despite this, Canada ruled out the idea of having the vessels built in other countries, and indeed Australia also opted to pay the premium. It turns out creating and keeping skilled jobs, and minimizing dependence on foreign sources, are powerful forces. Yet Canada’s approach will be self-defeating if, as the Auditor General believes, the extra cost means the number of ships have to be cut back. A steady and predictable production of ships over the long term is critical to the current strategy. It is instructive that Australia’s total shipbuilding commitment over the next 20-30 years is actually $89 billion (AUS), including $50 billion for submarines. Absent a change of course, the new government will have to make good on its promise to invest more in Canadian shipbuilding.

1 John Birkler, et al., Australia’s Naval Shipbuilding Enterprise (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015)


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Even before Prime Minister Trudeau stated that Canada was back on the world stage, international affairs pundits were suggesting how that may happen. While issues of climate change, refugees and Canada’s role in the war against ISIL require immediate attention, other issues such as Canada’s future place in Asia will require thoughtful consideration. This includes a renewed look at Canada’s moribund relations with North Korea.

North Korea, officially the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, is a failing Stalinist state that continues to develop nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them even though it cannot feed its own people. Its human rights record is among the worst in the world. Its profound repression and brutality pose a danger that extends beyond its borders and there is every indication that things will get worse before they get better.

Canada and other like-minded nations established diplomatic relations with North Korea in 2001 to support South Korea’s President (and Nobel Peace Prize winner) Kim Dae-jung’s “Sunshine Policy” of engagement with North Korea. This recognition was driven by a broadly shared unease about North Korea as a failing state, especially in the light of serious starvation in the late 1990s and subsequent massive international humanitarian efforts.

Since 2005 Canada has provided some $17.7M in humanitarian aid mainly through the Red Cross and UN Agencies. Canada is fully supportive of UN sanctions against North Korea; but, since there has been no significant bilateral trade in the past, Canadian sanctions remain symbolic rather than substantive. Despite UN sanctions, North Korea tested a third nuclear device, fired off a series of missiles, put a satellite into space (seen as a precursor to mastery of inter-continental missile technology) and has threatened to reactivate the Yongbyong nuclear reactor, source of its nuclear weapon raw material. North Korea’s nuclear program remains its main source of power and leverage...

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In 2010 the Harper government adopted a short-sighted policy of “controlled engagement” with respect to North Korea. It directed Canadian officials not to talk to their North Korean counterparts except on issues of regional security, human rights, inter-Korean affairs and consular matters. In practice, however, this has meant no bilateral interaction. As a result Canada has become, at best, a marginal player on the North Korean file while North Korean instability and unpredictability remain a global security threat.

Despite previous dire predictions about its imminent demise, North Korea has not yet imploded. North Korea survives through bombast, bombs and missiles, tyrannical control of its people and through clever manipulation of its neighbors and few friends. None of North Korea’s objectives (lifting of sanctions, direct talks with the US, economic support from South Korea and Japan) have been achieved, nor will they be in the foreseeable future. While there are indications that North Korea’s control over information seeping in from the outside world is slipping, internal repression remains brutal.

Despite regular North Korean provocations against South Korea, that include recurring threats to turn Seoul into “a sea of fire”, South Korean President Park Geun-hye has remained calm. She continues to push her three-part initiative for peaceful unification on the Korean Peninsula (humanitarian, co-prosperity, integration). In parallel President Park launched her Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative which seeks to address the “soft security” agenda including nuclear safety, energy, environment, health and cyberspace.

As part of its new strategic partnership with South Korea, Canada should support South Korea’s initiatives by re-engaging with North Korea and identifying niches where Canada could contribute in drawing North Korea out of its belligerent hermit shell. This re-engagement must be done in consultation with South Korea, the US, China, Japan and other like-minded players. Ultimately Canada should be in position to help Korean unification happen.

By re-engaging North Korea, Canada would re-establish credibility and expertise on North Korean issues, an important building block in reasserting Canada’s political and economic commitment to Asia. Canada would support South Korea in its security challenges with the North. This is a key element to Canada’s closer long-term multi-faceted bilateral relationship with South Korea, including knowledgeable support for South Korea’s policy of unification with the North. Canada could make some modest impact on North Korea by engaging Pyongyang regularly at a high level. This requires the Canadian Ambassador to North Korea and senior officials to regularly convey Canada’s concerns to senior North Korean cadres on issues such as nuclear proliferation, human rights, cyberspace and regional security. Canada could then engage China, the US, Russia and Japan with credibility, and not just on the North Korea issue, but with respect to the overall Asian security situation. As North Korea becomes a greater liability, China has to be convinced that relations with South Korea and inevitable unification are in China’s long-term strategic interest.

In the worst case scenario Canada needs to be prepared for a North Korean implosion in order to make the right disaster relief and humanitarian decisions. When unification, through implosion or by peaceful settlement, eventually does occur, Canada must be in position, with other countries and UN agencies, to offer expert help in such areas as health, agriculture, human rights, good governance and security. It is in Canada’s interest to be there.

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Over the last six months or so Crimea hasn’t been in the news that much. Then on Friday, a few electrical pylons on Ukrainian soil carrying electricity throughout the peninsula were toppled by several well-placed bombs. The next day the entire peninsula and part of Ukraine were cut off from electricity. More than three quarters of Crimea’s 2.2 million people have been without power since then. Generators supplying electricity to hospitals and government buildings continue to run, but schools and university are closed and rolling black outs are in effect.

According to observers the pylons were blown up by tank mines. Crimea remains vulnerable to more attacks. The peninsula relies on Ukraine not only for electricity but fresh water, gas and telecommunications. On November 23rd citing concerns about “terrorist threats,” Ukraine’s internal affairs Minister Avakov, announced that repairs would be done to just one of the two damaged transmitters. The one sending electricity to Crimea would not be repaired. It is not clear if this decision is intended to punish the people of Crimea or is part of strategy to bring Crimea back under Ukrainian control.

The head of the Tatar’s religious council or Mejlis, Mustafa Dzhemilev has been unequivocal, stating that the Tatars, who have imposed a blockade on Crimea, would allow repairs but in turn demanded the release of political activists in Crimea. The Tatar are a Muslim minority in Crimea comprising about 13% of the population and living mostly in four northern sub-regions of Crimea. Citing harassment, discrimination and persecution under Russian rule they are working to escalate tensions on the peninsula while the world comes to terms with Russia’s claim to Crimea.

The chances of Crimea returning to Ukraine are extremely low. Since the spring of 2014, Crimea has clearly become more “Russified.” Now with an increasingly marginalized Muslim Tatar population, there is talk of a Dagestan-style low intensity conflict pitting Tatar radicals against the Russian government. In reality a number of events have (Continued on page 17)
unfolded over the last year making the current situation, more unstable.

In the summer of 2014 water delivery to Crimea through the North-Crimean Canal was cut off, significantly affecting crop production in Northern Crimea. In September of this year Tatar activists working with Ukrainian political activists and members of Ukraine’s notorious “Pravyi Sektor” (“Right Sector”) blockaded the flow of goods coming from the mainland to Crimea. Though the blockade grabbed the media’s attention it had little effect in mobilizing the Ukrainian government and people against Russian’s control of Crimea. Kiev, wary of the Pravy Sektor’s increasing influence in the security and politics of the country, neither openly supported, nor criticized the blockade.

According to some sources, the blockade has impacted some areas in Crimea and has triggered inflation on food stuffs but it hasn’t had the devastating impact on the flow of goods into the peninsula. The blockade is more likely to trigger smuggling and illicit cross border criminal activity exacerbating an already tense situation.

What are the implications of these increasingly destabilizing events? First, the blockade and the power shortage signal a clear escalation in the conflict. Russia is not standing idly by as Crimea succumbs to the same kind of uncontrollable violence that plagued Eastern Ukraine. In July 2015, Russia launched its power bridge project that will provide enough electricity to Crimea, by laying a 14 km underwater cable from Krasnodar Russia to the peninsula. The first phase of the project will supply electricity by the end of 2015. This action will cut dependence on Ukraine even more.

Secondly without any firm statements denouncing the bombings as sabotage or the blockade as illegal, the Ukrainian government is demonstrating its weakness in the face of gangs and right wing political opportunists. Still reactive, but not pro-active, Kiev is demonstrating it simply does not have a road-map for reintegrating Crimea’s population into Ukraine. For the people of Crimea, Kiev’s implicit support of the blockade and indifference to the bombings is just another step in their alienation from Ukraine.

For their part, the Tatars are walking a thin line. Historically the Mejlis has not been a politically active organization preferring accommodation with Crimea’s political leaders over confrontation. But under pressure to be more effective and outspoken in defending Tatar rights, that strategy has clearly changed. Should the Tatar population become more radicalized, Crimea is likely to see even more Russian control over the peninsula. Moscow will run Crimea much like they have done in the North Caucasus quashing dissent, political organisation and minority rights.

Naturally any effort at further integrating Crimea into Russia is viewed with suspicion by Kiev. Visits from French parliamentarians and discussions between German, Italian and Crimean parliamentarians earlier this year were welcomed by Crimeans who feel doubly punished by sanctions and Kiev’s recalcitrance. Meanwhile Crimeans cannot visit Ukraine to see their relatives or apply for foreign visas. This adds difficulties to the already complicated life of the Crimean population and further strengthens anti-Ukrainian feelings even among those who might be open to Western engagement. Crimea it would seem is fast becoming a lost cause for Kiev.

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Like many Canadians and our media who tried to read the tea leaves of the new Cabinet by who was in, in what post, and equally who was not; so too have emissaries of friends, allies and adversaries tried to frame what this new government means.

This is entirely normal, particularly with the new Prime Minister making his initial foray at several international conferences. Foreign leaders will not only take their personal measure of Mr. Trudeau but foreign emissaries are attempting to frame their respective government’s approaches to Canada as well.

It isn’t only about divining how Canada will act internationally; all nations have interests in reciprocal trade and in many cases compete for major investments here in Canada. For example, will the new government be favourable to foreign investment in Canada and in which sectors? Will Canadian naval shipbuilding be open to collaborative construction? Will Canada’s emphasis on climate translate into a move away from a resource-dependent economy disfavour certain sectors?

Internationally, beyond the headline items of Canada’s withdrawal from the ISIS mission, what will new approaches mean and in what areas of the world.

Understanding these issues help foreign governments understand where they might seek to collaborate. Beyond these issues, understanding the personalities of various ministers is a hot topic of discussion too.

How Whitehall, the Hill and the Élysée perceive ambassadorial access to the Prime Minister has much to do with the effectiveness.

However, only several weeks into power and still in the midst of a transition while handling some very important promises such as the settlement of Syrian refugees, it is still far too early to tell. The majority of ministries are still in the process of briefing their ministers let alone having barely begun the process of hiring key ministerial staff and the Prime Minister’s office staff.

It is still far too early to crystallize what grains of tea leaves fully mean except in broad strokes.
So far, this government has signaled that it will place a renewed emphasis on provincial/federal relations, the plight of indigenous peoples, care of veterans, climate change, enacting its promised tax changes, and honouring its refugee pledges.

There are however a series of appointments to come which will fill many blanks for Canadians and others.

In no particular order, this will include the following changes. First, a host of ambassadors need to be appointed, most importantly those to the United Nations, the United Kingdom, the United States and France. It will be telling if appointments are drawn from the diplomatic service or from the political and business realms where ambassadors will be seen more as more directly conveying the new government’s intents. How Whitehall, the Hill and the Élysée perceive ambassadorial access to the Prime Minister has much to do with the effectiveness.

The acme of good policy is often listening to things you don’t wish to hear.

The hiring of ministerial staffs, namely Chiefs of Staff and Senior Policy advisors will be telling as well. In the previous government, appointments were often maligned, even by Conservative MPs with their references to the “kids in short pants.” Staff were seen to be hired for their ideological and political purity rather than the generation of sound policy. This often created frictions between the public service and ministerial staffs particularly in Foreign Affairs and Defence. The acme of good policy is often listening to things you don’t wish to hear.

Thirty five Parliamentary Secretaries were named Dec 2. In the previous government they often served as its public face. With increased openness from the new Cabinet, this may change, but these individuals still represent the next generation of cabinet appointees.

Finally, throughout the campaign, the Liberals promised a new style in the function of Parliament, empowering members of parliament more, and giving real powers in legislative formation to the Common’s committee structure. The Chairs of various committees of the House have yet to be named, and if committees are empowered as the new Prime Minister has suggested, then committee heads will be key players in how legislation is formed, altered and revised. Further, the party indicated it will create an all-party committee to oversee the operations of every department and agency with national security responsibilities. This would represent a significant change to Parliament’s role and has the potential to greatly enhance the confidence in our security institutions.

Notwithstanding much which has been written on where Canada will be heading under the new government, the first weeks after Parliament resumes will be telling indeed.

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The new Prime Minister-designate, Justin Trudeau, promised during the recent election campaign to put Canada back on the peacekeeping map. This promise was linked, in part, to the call made by President Obama at the UN in September for an enhanced and revitalised peacekeeping role for the UN. Among suggestions from commentators has been that a renewed Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC) might be a priority consideration within the foreign and defence policy tool box.

A dedicated centre for peacekeeping, or to use an alternate phrase, Peace Support Operations, would be a demonstrably visible symbol of the new government’s declared intention to re-orient Canada’s defence and foreign policy in the more traditional diplomatic helpful-fixer/bridge-builder role. It would also serve a very practical purpose in assisting developing countries desirous to play an increased peacekeeping role within the UN. Such countries often have the people power to contribute peacekeepers, but lack the required staff and technical skill sets required by modern peacekeeping forces.

The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) currently has a Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) in Kingston, Ontario which provides excellent training for CAF members deploying on missions abroad. Similarly, it also trains foreign military personnel in limited numbers, as well as officials of Global Affairs Canada (GAC) who are deploying as part of peacekeeping missions. The primary mission of the PSTC is nevertheless to train Canadian personnel for overseas missions. This is commensurate with the primary mission of the CAF to carry out operational missions on behalf of the government of Canada.

Peacekeeping capacity building is also a role assigned to the CAF, but it is a supporting role, and of necessity addressed as such in terms of resource priorities. A re-established PPC would have as its mandate the primary mission of capacity building amongst developing countries as part of Canada’s revitalised international outreach. To be successful it would need a firm partnership with the CAF/PSTC to ensure that the result would be synergistic in terms of Canada’s commitment to enhance peacekeeping under UN auspices.

(Continued on page 21)
The PPC partnership would also need to be firmly linked to GAC in that department’s mandate to build international peacekeeping capacity. The GAC partnership would bring in the diplomatic and policing sides of the peacekeeping equation, which is fundamental to conflict resolution. The PPC would in effect forge together the Government’s declared intent to foster UN peacekeeping capacity within one centre of excellence.

In giving consideration to this option, it is necessary to understand why the original PPC closed its doors in 2013. The PPC was originally founded as a result of an election campaign promise by former Prime Minister Chrétien in 1994. The promise attempted to achieve two policy objectives simultaneously; first the mitigation of unemployment due to the closure of CFB Cornwallis (in Cleminsport, Nova Scotia), and secondly, the creation of a centre of excellence for peacekeeping training and education. The flaw in this plan was the decision that the PPC would be established as a non-governmental organization and would become self-funding within five years after an infusion of $10 million in grants by the Department of National Defence and the then Department of Foreign Affairs International Trade and Development.

The selection of the former base as the new location for the PPC was a significant challenge due to infrastructure issues and geographic distance from the nearest international airport in Halifax. This being said, it was the premise that an institution such as the PPC could eventually become self-funding that was its downfall. In 2012 the Federal Government informed the PPC that funding would cease and that the Centre would indeed be required to become fiscally self-sufficient. There was never a solid business case for such a premise and the PPC was forced to close its doors in 2013.

Should the newly elected Government be desirous of re-establishing the PPC, a critical decision should be to put the Centre on a solid financial base and thereby provide it with the sustained funding required of such an organisation. The primary international clients would be from developing countries and their participation would need to be funded by Canada as part of its peacekeeping capacity commitment. Participants from developed countries would of course pay their way.

The matter of location would need to be given great thought as there are pros and cons of returning to the Annapolis Valley or seeking a more central location such as Halifax or even Kingston, alongside the aforementioned PSTC.

One factor that needs to be clearly understood in these deliberations is that the primary mission of a renewed PPC would be to undertake comprehensive peacekeeping capacity building within developing countries themselves. Capacity building is understood as first and foremost giving the development tools within partner country institutions to undertake their own training and education in peacekeeping. Therefore the Centre’s location in Canada would be to support this primary mission. There would nevertheless remain the requirement to bring together clients, both international and Canadian to the Centre’s headquarters for higher level educational events to support the overseas capacity building mandate.

A renewed PPC founded on a sustainable funding formula, mandated to undertake international peacekeeping capacity building in training and education, within a firm partnership with the PSTC, GAC, and by extension the policing element of peacekeeping, would be an appropriate demonstration of the incoming Prime Minister’s declaration that Canada is indeed back in terms of international support to the UN’s peacekeeping mandate.

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ANNE McGRATH
Anne McGrath is the National Director of the New Democratic Party and was Chief of Staff to Official Opposition New Democratic Party leaders Jack Layton, Nycole Turmel, and Thomas Mulcair.

BOB FOWLER
Bob Fowler was Canada’s longest serving Ambassador to the United Nations. He also served as Canada’s Ambassador to Italy.

DAVID PRATT
Hon. David Pratt served as the Minister of National Defence from 2003-2004 and is an independent consultant.

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Hon. Dan Hays is a Senior Partner with Norton Rose Fulbright. While serving in the Senate he was appointed Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate.

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General (Ret’d) Raymond Henault served as Canada’s Chief of the Defence Staff from 2001-2005, and as the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee from 2005-2008.

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