TRUMP AND FOREIGN POLICY: ALL BETS ARE OFF [P.8]

Source: Narcity/Rabble

CANADA AND TRUMP HAVE COMMON GROUND IN ENERGY [P.10]
### Published by the

**Canadian Global Affairs Institute**

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The Dispatch is the official communiqué of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. Comments and subscription requests are welcome and should be sent to contact@cgai.ca.

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The most important issue of global affairs now confronting Canada is the decision of American voters to select Donald J. Trump as the 45th president of the United States. So much of what Canada tries to do in the world, so much of Canada’s economic, trade, and foreign policies are impacted by the United States, that Canada simply must wait until the new administration is in place on January 21st before we have a clearer idea of what lies in store for us with our number one international consideration – Washington, DC. Let’s look at two examples that should be forcing our international policymakers to work very late in several ministries in Ottawa these days.

Without a strong NATO, Canada will have only one military ally for the first time since the summer of 1949. Canada was one of the original three nations to take part in the secret discussions begun in Washington in early 1948 which eventually led to NATO – the United States and the United Kingdom were the others. Why? Because we were important to the alliance in a dozen ways and the new alliance taking shape was important to us.

Mr. Trump laid down broad hints during his campaign that he was unhappy with freeloading in NATO. He never mentioned Canada, but Canada is one of the most obvious freeloading culprits in the Alliance. The question for Ottawa today seems pretty straightforward: is Canada going to start to take NATO’s 2% of GDP spending target seriously – a target we agreed to – or are we going to ignore that target and wait to see what Mr. Trump comes up with by way of leveraging us to do so?

What if Mr. Trump forces, through a fundamental restructuring of the alliance, that a nation’s place – and opinions – are weighted by how much of the NATO burden they assume? It’s doubtful he will destroy NATO, especially these days when the US is no longer the hyper-power it was a decade or two ago. But NATO could become a “pay to play” organization and that would force Ottawa to make some difficult decisions about Canada’s place.

For another example, consider the Super Hornet-sized football that Mr. Trudeau just kicked five years down the road. A very good airplane in its day, but its day began in 1997 and is drawing to a close with its best customer, the United States Navy. It’s been an open secret in defence circles that the Boeing assembly line for this aircraft is about to close. Maybe Canada will get the last 18 of them. Or maybe Canada will get the ex-Australian ones at a bargain basement price as they switch over to the F-35s they have ordered.

Old planes can be upgraded. We ought to know since we did it for our Sea Kings for decades and are now doing it for our CF-18s. But hang all the new wizardry and gadgetry you want on a twenty-year-old airplane and its basic design is still twenty years old, ready to take on the challenges of twenty years ago.

What if Mr. Trump and his new Secretary of Defence ex-Marine general “Mad Dog” Mattis sees through Mr. Trudeau’s partisan political sleight of hand – about as hard to see through as looking through a clear glass window – and decide that their northern frontier (which is also our northern frontier) needs an air defence that is at least as good as the one they themselves are adopting, late or not, more expensive than originally intended or not? Or is there anyone in Ottawa who detects some US Plan B for some other fighter that is still so secret that not even the United States Navy, Marines, and Air Force don’t know about it?

And what if Mr. Trump tells Mr. Trudeau that his already outdated “new” air force of 18 Super Hornets just won’t fit the bill for NORAD and that Canada had better get with the program or the US will lower the boom on cross-border security cooperation? Unconventional? Sure is, but then so is Mr. Trump. The old curse “may you live in interesting times” has caught up with us and I am certain we are completely unready.

David Bercuson is Director of the Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, Area Director, International Policy for the School of Public Policy, University of Calgary and Program Director, Canadian Global Affairs Institute.
Almost nobody saw it coming. I didn’t either. Donald Trump will be the next US President commencing next January. He proved most electoral theories wrong and beat Hillary Clinton despite his unconventional campaigning style, inexistent governing experience, thin campaign spending, and limited support among leaders of his party. Experts are just starting to understand why Trump won, but at least three factors seemed to have played a role in the most surprising electoral outcome in US history since “Dewey defeats Truman” in 1948.

First, with his protectionist views on trade, Trump reshuffled Republican and Democratic electoral coalitions. His opposition to trade deals such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) enabled him to win just enough votes in the Great Lakes region to secure the Presidency. During his campaign, he promised to build a wall between the United States and Mexico, but he needed to break down another wall to win the White House, a « Blue Wall » composed of 18 states plus the District of Columbia that had tilted Democratic since 1992. And Trump did exactly that.

As I am writing these lines, results show that he won Pennsylvania by 70 000 votes, Michigan by 12 000 votes and Wisconsin by 27 000 votes. These three states ultimately delivered him the Presidency, which means Clinton was approximately 110 000 votes short of becoming the first US female President (out of 120 million votes). When one considers that Bernie Sanders’s protectionist views helped the Vermont Senator to win Michigan and Wisconsin during the Democratic primaries, Wikileaks revelations that Clinton opposed free trade in public but not in private might have cost her the election.

Clinton’s inability to fully mobilize Barack Obama’s electoral coalition also helped Trump. Democrats often argue that demography is on their side and that minorities, women, and young voters identify more with their party than with Republicans. They also thought

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Bernie Sanders’s popularity among Millennials combined with Trump’s inappropriate comments about women (the “grab ‘em” video), and antagonism toward Latino immigration and the Black Lives Matter movement would boost Clinton’s chances.

Exit poll answers to the question “which candidate quality mattered most?...

Surprisingly enough, Trump got better numbers among Hispanics and African-Americans than Mitt Romney in 2012, while Millennials and women voted at higher percentages for Obama in 2012 (60% and 55%) than for Clinton this year (55% and 54%). There is a debate on the factors that explain Clinton’s difficulty to fully mobilize these electorates (she was viewed less favorably than the 44th President, many liberal Democrats thought she was too mainstream compared to Bernie Sanders, etc.). But one thing is clear: Obama’s electoral coalition did not automatically become Hillary’s. Only 89% of self-identified Democrats voted Clinton while 90% had backed Obama in 2012. Though a controversial figure in his party, Trump was more successful in uniting republican voters than Clinton was with Democrats (90% of Republicans voted for “The Donald”).

These two competing visions between Democrats who said “look at the facts” and Republicans who asked “how are you feeling?” ultimately favored Trump.

The third factor that accounts for Trump’s victory is that, in the end, this election was about change. Exit poll answers to the question “which candidate quality mattered most?”, a plurality of voters (39%) said “can bring change”; among them, 83% tilted for Trump. During the Democratic National Convention last Summer, Democrats insisted that the US economy is in great shape since unemployment is under 5%. A few days before, during their own national convention, Republicans had taken a different road, arguing that low unemployment rates don’t matter when Americans feel their lives and country are in a miserable shape. These two competing visions between Democrats who said “look at the facts” and Republicans who asked “how are you feeling?” ultimately favored Trump.

On the economy, the problem for many voters was not that they were unemployed, but that the jobs created during the Obama Presidency were not as good as the ones that existed before the 2007-2008 financial and economic crises. For these same electors, the problem with Hillary Clinton was not that she was not ready to be President, but that she did not depart from the recipes they felt had prevented them from living the American Dream (open borders, free trade, etc.). In an electoral cycle, where resentment against political and economic elites was unusually high, Trump’s assertion that Clinton “had experience, but bad experience” resonated more with the electorate than what pundits, experts, scholars, and professors had expected. This is why almost nobody saw Trump coming. And why I didn’t either.

Frédérick Gagnon is Chairholder of the Raoul Dandurand Chair, Director of the Center for United States Studies, and Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Québec in Montreal. He is also a Fellow with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.
Now that Donald Trump is set to be sworn in as the next president of the United States, the Canadian government needs to move rapidly to reassess its foreign policy. Five fundamental and deeply related challenges loom large.

Getting real

Canada benefits from lucky geography both in terms of trade and security. Time and again, however, we seem to be surprised by the basic tenet of international affairs: Nations don’t have friends — only interests. Whether it’s softwood lumber, energy and pipelines, border security, immigration, water resources, NAFTA or any other issue, the rule remains the same: If the U.S. shares our interests, we’ll reach favourable agreements — if not, we won’t.

And all of these issues are up for grabs with Mr. Trump. Some may break our way and some may not. We need a realistic reassessment of our global and continental positions. Foreign policy by slogan (“Canada is back”) may make us feel good at home, but it’s no substitute for a hard-nosed assessment of what we need from our international relations and how to get it.

It’s about trade

Since exports account for fully one third of our GDP, what we really do need from our foreign policy is free and open markets, with enforceable rules. Despite heated national debates over the details, good trade agreements are clearly in Canada’s interests.

But the future of our trade policy agenda really turns not on our own ongoing national debate, but on whether Mr. Trump actually tears up both NAFTA and the Trans Pacific Partnership, as he has vowed to do. In anticipation, we need to prepare for another protracted and fractious period of negotiations. Our CETA trade agreement with Europe is an important step forward. But nearly 80 per cent of our trade takes place with the U.S.; no market is more vital to our economic survival.

The energy and environment paradox

Our positions on energy and the environment are about to be revealed as highly paradoxical. Whether or not carbon pricing will actually reduce greenhouse gas emissions to
the admirable levels required under the Paris Accord, the new Canadian tax will certainly add a cost for our industries.

Mr. Trump campaigned on pledges to rescind the U.S. commitment to the Paris Accord, to deregulate the U.S. energy industry and to look favourably upon the proposed Keystone XL pipeline project. North American energy production likely will flourish if he follows through — and CO2 emissions will increase as a result.

The just-announced National Energy Board review, aimed at putting environmental restrictions at the forefront of energy industry regulations in Canada, could put our companies at an even greater competitive disadvantage with U.S. counterparts. In short, we need to take a hard look at where we are headed.

A lack of muscle

A key problem is that we don't currently have the resources to change our foreign and defence policy approaches in any significant way, as the Trudeau government’s 2016 budget clearly showed. Decades of pleas from diplomats and soldiers for more capacity-building have yielded only the conclusion that there isn’t more to give.

Yet Mr. Trump has said that he will be looking to allies for greater security commitments — including commitments to meet the NATO defence-spending target of 2 per cent of GDP. Canada currently spends just below one per cent. Not being willing — or able — to double our defence budget will again make our “Canada is back” rhetoric ring hollow — and solidify the view that Canada is not a first-rank security partner. As a G7 country with a $2 trillion economy, Washington will see us as punching well below our weight.

Brave new world

This is the macro challenge: The Great Power era is back — but it's shifting. This time the Great Game includes a wholly different dimension: the rise of China as a regional and global power, and as a geopolitical rival to the U.S. India is also a nuclear-armed emergent power, while Japan, of course, is now closely aligned with western interests.

Our own security interests will remain firmly planted in the U.S. and NATO alliances. But given our immigration patterns, we certainly have a vital stake in trading freely with Asia and supporting careful management of east-west relations. Russian adventurism in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, and China’s maneuvers in the South China Sea, could be particular problems. If the Trump administration pursues a softer line on Russia — over Syria, for example — this could helpfully forestall closer Russia and China strategic alignment. But in return, Russia could gain more breathing room in Eastern Europe — perhaps even in the high Arctic. The strategic consequences could be tectonic.

In sum, with the imminent Trump reset in Washington, it’s time now for an urgent and realistic look in Ottawa at how Canadian foreign policy can best serve our interests in this brave new world.

Three-time Canadian ambassador Randolph Mank was director for policy planning during the last Canadian foreign policy review. He is currently a Fellow of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute and the Balsillie School of International Affairs, and serves on the board of the Canadian Chamber of Commerce in Singapore.
Energy will be a top issue in Canada-US relations in a Trump administration. We need to reach out now—to the Trump transition team, Congress and state governments—to find common ground, and identify the points of convergence.

On energy, Donald Trump promises in his ‘America First Energy Plan’ to rescind President Obama’s executive orders on climate, including the Climate Action Plan, and to encourage Trans Canada to renew the Keystone XL pipeline permit application. Mr. Trump also promises to save the coal industry, lift moratoriums on energy development, revoke restrictions on new drilling technology, cancel the Paris Climate Agreement, and ensure any new regulation is “good for the American worker.”

While there are obvious areas of disagreement with the Trump administration around climate change, especially the promise to rescind the Paris Agreement, we need to find areas where we can work together. Canada is currently the biggest foreign supplier of energy to the US. In 2015, we provided 10 percent of the natural gas consumed in the US, 43 percent of its crude oil imports, 30 percent of the uranium used in its nuclear-fueled plants, and two percent of US electricity consumption. Canadian energy is safe, secure and reliable.

Canada’s billions of tonnes of coal reserves represent potentially more energy than all of our oil, natural gas and oil sands resources.

Canada’s energy industry is increasingly about innovation and the application of technology. Operational excellence and environmental performance are completely compatible, observed General Electric CEO Elyse Allan last month while accepting the Energy Council of Canada’s ‘Person of the Year’ Award. Allan, like most Canadian energy industry CEOs, believes that Canada can achieve energy superpower status through its leadership on innovation.

‘Clean’ coal may be a dream today, but with investment in research and development, it may become a reality, and we have an incentive to figure it out. Canada’s billions of tonnes of coal reserves represent potentially more energy

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than all of our oil, natural gas and oil sands resources. The University of Alberta is home to the Canadian Centre for Clean Coal/Carbon and Mineral Processing Technologies, and collaborative research with a Trump Department of Energy would seem an obvious opportunity. We should work with like-minded states as well. California is already a partner in a cap-and-trade system with B.C., Quebec, and Ontario, through the Western Climate Initiative.

Mr. Trump has promised, as one of his first legislative actions, a 10-year, trillion-dollar American Energy and Infrastructure Act that will leverage public-private partnerships and private investments. The American Society of Civil Engineers has identified US $3.6 trillion worth of pressing projects in America, all of which promise considerable bang for our bucks in terms of jobs and improved competitiveness. The list of projects includes repairing bridges, airports, dams and levees, seaports and waterways, mass transit, and freight rail, as well as energy pipelines and the electrical grid, most of which we share with the US. There are obvious opportunities in the Trump plan to complement Canadian government infrastructure programs, and so advance North American competitiveness.

Sustaining an integrated North American approach to clean energy, conservation, and climate mitigation will also serve our own economic objectives. Royal Bank of Canada CEO Dave McKay recently observed that Canadians are polarized about resource development, “when we should be focused on how cleanly we can produce it, how safely we can transport it, and how wisely we can consume it.”

Canadian leadership, federal, provincial, and municipal, needs to recognize and inform Canadians, that when responsibly harvested, our energy resources, including oil and gas, are our national inheritance. Telling the Canadian story means using the tools of social media with facts and science-based evidence. Elements in the Canadian story-line would include:

- fossil fuels and big hydro projects will be part of our energy mix for decades to come;
- the role that the oil sands, pipelines, and big hydro projects play in North American energy independence;
- the innovative work of Canadian Oil Sands Innovation Alliance in reducing the oil industry’s land and carbon footprint and water usage—technology that has application globally;
- responsible energy development accords, developed through compromise and consensus (but consensus is not unanimity), that work for indigenous people and environmentalists, and contribute to jobs and prosperity; and
- Canada’s approach to carbon pricing (tax, levy, or cap-and-trade) and how this fits into our international climate change obligations.

There is a tendency in some quarters to assume the worst about a Trump administration and weep about what might have been. This is a mistake. There will be differences, and we should be identifying the potential conflicts and figuring out how to manage them. Where we disagree, we don’t have to be disagreeable. We also need to remember that, Olympic hockey finals aside, on almost every issue with the US we can identify American partners. In advancing Canadian positions, our success rate rises proportionately with the ability to make them congruent with American positions.

Canadian leadership should pro-actively take the initiative with the Trump transition team, and identify the opportunities for cooperation on energy and infrastructure. If we get this right, mutual confidence will make it easier on the trade file. When the new Congress meets on January 3, 2017, and when the Trump administration takes office on January 20, we need to be ready for action.

Colin Robertson is a senior advisor to Dentons LLP, a former Canadian diplomat, and Vice-President and Fellow with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.
The world is still digesting the election of Donald Trump as the American president. It will be some time before the impact of his election will be fully understood. But what is already known is that he has achieved the Republican nomination as well as the Presidency by trusting on his own counsel and challenging orthodox wisdom. He will no doubt continue to disregard conventional wisdom and the advice of those outside of his immediate circle and do things “his way” to “make America great again.” So, what then can we expect in regards to his policies regarding the arctic?

First, it is highly probable that the United States will return to a policy framework that is significantly more oriented towards unilateralism rather than multilateralism. As a result, the support of the Arctic Council, that has been one of the major elements of the Obama Administration, will likely decrease. Trump will support the Arctic Council only so much as it directly supports American interests, as he understands them. Thus, any effort towards cooperation simply for cooperation sake should not be expected to continue. Nor should anyone think that there will be any effort by Trump to ratify the United National Law of the Sea Convention. This means that the United States will remain outside the process of determining the outer limits of their continental shelf in the Arctic region.

Second, Trump has also indicated a support for the development of North American based energy supplies. He has stated on record his support for the construction of new pipelines and the development of new North American based supplies. This will undoubtedly mean a decrease of support for measures dealing with a mitigation of climate change and a greater focus on developments of North American energy sources, including those in the Arctic. There could also be a renewed search for new energy sources in Alaska. How quickly this is done will depend on market forces that will

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entice companies such as Shell to return. But the Trump administration can encourage a return and improve the business environment by decreasing the existing regulatory system and reducing any new policies meant to protect the environment for the sake of promoting oil and gas development.

Third, and most confounding will be his policies regarding arctic security. On the one hand, he has continually expressed an admiration for Russian President Putin and his tendencies to personalize his policies means this could lead to a new relationship between the Russians and the Americans, which may result in a greater willingness to work with the Russian government. But on the other hand, he has also criticized the NATO alliance and suggested that the United States may no longer support it unconditionally. He has singled out the Baltic States as “not pulling their weight.” Such messaging may act to encourage the Putin administration to try to separate these states from the alliance through some of the techniques learned in Ukraine. If this happens, western security arrangements may be undermined, which may embolden Russian military actions in Europe, including in the arctic region. If this was to occur, arctic regional security may be at risk.

It is of course too soon to know with any certainty which paths Trump will actually take, but given his propensity to do what he says he will do, it is probable that we will soon see an American arctic policy that will be more unilateral, more focused on resource development, and much more uncertain regarding military security. Under the Obama administration, the United States had moved from being a “reluctant arctic power” to one that was increasingly active as an engaged partner in the region. It is probable that Trump will soon return the United States to the more normal policy of ignoring the Arctic except in terms of Alaskan politics.

Rob Huebert is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Calgary and a senior research fellow with the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies. He is also a Fellow with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.

Source: Marinelink.com/Russian Military (mil.ru)
The TPP, at least its current form, is dead. It was on life support throughout the US election but president-elect Donald Trump has driven a stake through its heart with his announcement that he will initiate the process for the US to withdraw from the deal on Day 1 of his presidency. And that will effectively end the TPP as we know it. The terms state that the agreement will come into effect two years after signature (which took place in February of 2016) provided that at least six of the twelve countries, representing 85 percent of the total GDP of the partners, ratify the deal. The US and Japan alone represent about 80 percent of the GDP total, creating a de facto veto for both countries, with the US (62% of the GDP total) being able to singlehandedly derail the agreement.

Meanwhile, the Japanese seem remarkably reluctant to accept the reality. Prime Minister Abe made a “Hail Mary” attempt to get Trump to reconsider his TPP position when he became the first foreign leader to meet the president-elect after his stunning victory on November 9. But Trump’s campaign rhetoric against the TPP gives him virtually no room for manoeuvre, (not that he appears to want to manoeuvre). Japan’s ambassador to Canada, meanwhile, is claiming that the TPP is not “completely dead,” and is urging Canada to ratify it, as Japan’s Lower House has done. Japanese reluctance to let go of the TPP is understandable as it was the centrepiece of Abe’s reform of the Japanese economy, the lever he needed to get Japanese legislators to make the difficult choices necessary to reform Japan’s largely protected economy.

But ratifying the TPP at this stage is a non-starter for the Trudeau government. The government has succeeded in strategically “ragging the puck” on the TPP ever since getting elected, setting up a series of cross-country consultations to hear the concerns that Canadians have with the agreement, negotiated by the previous government. Nevertheless, if the US Congress had been on board, the TPP would have proceeded and Canada would have ratified it post haste. We could not afford to stay out of an agreement that includes critically important trading partners like the US, Mexico, and Japan. Now that this agreement has met an untimely end, there is nothing that Canada can do to revive it.

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Not that the demise of the TPP is the worst possible outcome for Canada, although over the longer term it is worrying to see the US turn its back on opening markets in Asia, ceding leadership to, of all countries, China. Canada joined TPP belatedly when it became clear that Mexico was going to be admitted to the negotiations. That was strictly a defensive move by Canada, a means of protecting our access to the US market through NAFTA. After Mexico and Canada joined the TPP negotiations, Japan jumped in, providing another positive goal for Canada, namely improved access to the Japanese market at a time when the US was also negotiating access.

Canada and Japan had already begun bilateral negotiations toward a trade agreement, negotiations that were suspended when both countries became TPP negotiating partners. Now that the TPP has ended up DOA, it is time to resume those bilateral negotiations. Asked about this, the Japanese ambassador to Canada is reported to have said that the negotiations could be picked back up if the TPP fails, but now is “not the right moment.” Added Ambassador Kenjiro Monji: “If the government said we (were starting) bilateral (agreements), then it would send a signal that we have completely abandoned the TPP, domestically and to many other countries.”

This position may suit Japanese domestic politics for the moment, as the Upper House still has to ratify the agreement, but will not be sustainable for much longer. With the TPP no longer a viable option, Japan may well explore the possibility of a bilateral deal with the US. After all, the tough negotiations over autos and agricultural products have already been concluded within the framework of the TPP. It is impossible to predict the response of the Trump administration, although Trump has alluded to the possibility of negotiating more bilateral agreements in place of the TPP that he has sworn to tear up. If US-Japan negotiations get launched shortly, Canada risks being sideswiped and put in the slow lane – as happened with Korea where, once negotiations began between Korea and the US, ongoing negotiations with Canada were in effect suspended. We were left at the altar while the US and Korea concluded and implemented their agreement (in 2012), and it was only with much effort that talks on the Canada-Korea FTA were resumed, leading to a successful conclusion in 2014, with that agreement entering into force on January 1, 2015. Canada cannot afford to have a repeat of the same scenario.

It should, in fact, be easier to conclude a bilateral agreement between Canada and Japan than between Japan and the US. Canada does not particularly care about most of Japan’s sensitive agricultural sectors, such as rice, nor does Japan have much to lose in allowing Canada to retain its supply management policies for dairy, eggs, and poultry. It is a shame that the opportunity to dismantle these economically inefficient policies will be missed, but while both countries can focus on areas where trade barriers can be removed, there are still areas of potential friction. For instance, Canada will need to be careful on the automotive front. Recall that the final round of TPP negotiations was almost scuttled because of the automotive rules of origin agreed to by the US and Japan without consulting Canada, rules that could have inflicted damage to Canada’s automotive manufacturing base. Using the deadline pressure of concluding the negotiations, Canada’s negotiators were able to secure amendments that met, or at least went some way to meet, Canada’s bottom line on this issue. It will be a tough negotiation, but for both Canada and Japan, concluding a bilateral agreement quickly would send a positive signal at a time when market liberalization seems to be on the back foot, and the forces of protectionism are growing, in the U.S. and elsewhere.

In the wake of the demise of the TPP, Japan should set aside its ambivalence and resume bilateral negotiations with Canada with a goal of concluding an early agreement – and Canada should press hard for Japan to do so. It is in Japan’s interest to establish a free trade beachhead in North America, and in Canada’s interest to open new markets at a time when our NAFTA access may be threatened by protectionist forces in the United States.

Hugh Stephens is a distinguished fellow at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada and an executive fellow at the School of Public Policy at the University of Calgary. He is also a Fellow with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.
There are many ways to view the election of Donald Trump in Europe, all of them bad. Let’s start with the two fundamental pillars of post-war European stability, security, and prosperity—NATO and the European Union.

NATO has been the bedrock of European security for almost 70 years. It essentially de-nationalized European armies—most notably Germany’s—and helped manage the Cold War standoff in Europe with the Soviet Union. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it anchored many Eastern European countries in a stable security architecture. The much used Russian argument that NATO expansion is part of a policy of encirclement can be sustained only if one accepts that the countries of the former USSR are part of their legitimate sphere of influence and the West should stay out.

Led by successive American administrations, the West has consistently rejected that position; the worry now is that, in Trump, the Russians may have finally found their man. There is a fear that Putin will offer the real estate developer a “condominium” deal he will find “very beautiful”, a kind of Yalta 2.0 where Russia reasserts its authority over its near abroad (and Syria) and the West looks after its interests in West and Central Europe. Trump’s intemperate statements on how he may not defend the Baltics and, by extension, the rest of NATO unless they pay more for defence is shaking the Alliance to its core.

His overt appeals to racism, xenophobia, religious intolerance, misogyny, anti-Semitism, and authoritarianism have appalled European moderates.

The second pillar, the European Union, has been under severe stress from many different directions but not, so far, from the United States. That is changing. Trump’s championing of the Brexit and his enthusiastic embrace of Nigel Farage—the first foreign politician to meet with the President-elect—not only underlines his deep ignorance of international trade but also breaks with over 60 years of staunch American support for European integration. The anti-EU forces in Europe are encouraged.

There is more. His threat of unilateral action on tariffs and other international trade obligations could plunge the world into a global depression; the Peterson Institute for...
International Economics has run the numbers on his trade policy and concluded he would push the US into deep recession with a loss of 4 million jobs. The “beggar thy neighbour” contagion would spread across the globe. As for the globe itself, his climate change denial and other environmental policies could have devastating effects on the planet.

There is also the matter of how he got this far. His overt appeals to racism, xenophobia, religious intolerance, misogyny, anti-Semitism, and authoritarianism have appalled European moderates. He is the new poster boy for far-right politicians here, a distinction he shares with Putin. People talk openly of parallels with the 1930’s; if France were to go with Le Pen next year, people fear, then “Europe” as both an institution and an ideal would be finished. Trump’s surrogates may describe some of his language as campaign “devices” but, as the Europeans know well, once you let these demons loose, it is exceedingly hard to get them back in the bottle.

What he might actually do is still an open question; he is already backpedaling on some key commitments and this is only the first few weeks. There is also a hope that the Republican Congress may help to constrain some of his more egregious promises, but Europe and the rest of us may get caught in their trade-offs.

It is against this background that we should read Angela Merkel’s unprecedented conditional offer of cooperation: “Germany and America are bound by common values — democracy, freedom, as well as respect for the rule of law and the dignity of each and every person, regardless of their origin, skin color, creed, gender, sexual orientation, or political views. It is based on these values that I wish to offer close cooperation, both with me personally and between our countries’ governments.”

Well put.

Gary Soroka was a member of the Canadian Foreign Service until his retirement in 2009 and is currently living in Berlin, Germany. He is a Fellow with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.
The advent of the new Trump administration in the US and its implications for renewed spending by NATO to contain the Russian revanchist threat in eastern Europe and Russian adventurism in the Middle East will coincide with the report in Canada by the Defence Policy Review Advisory Group established by our Minister of National Defence (MND). This is not so much about chickens coming home to roost as it is about new pathways for Defence doctrine being created for Canada and her allies.

While the MND deserves immense credit for establishing the advisory group and the exemplary quality and experience of its membership, he cannot be blamed for his colleague, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, failing to do the same. While a rational approach to points of departure for a new government's foreign and defence policy might well have argued for a foreign policy review, the failure to do so must reflect decisions already made by the Trudeau brain trust and the Prime Minister, well before last year's votes were counted.

Beyond economic sanctions and symbolic prophylactic NATO deployments in the eastern Europe region, Russia has faced no real costs for its illegal invasion and annexation of Ukrainian Crimea or the mini-genocide it is raining down from the air on innocent civilians in Syria as it enables and protects the war crimes-prone Assad regime. Neither barrel bombing of playgrounds, attacks on schools or hospitals, shelling of civilians from Syrian and Russian aircraft, or missile launches from the Mediterranean-based Russian Navy, seemed to have moved President Obama out of his self-righteous, self-reverential reverie.

The failure to engage Russia or dilute its clear aggression and cruelty, in violation of international law in Syria and the Ukraine's territorial integrity, to which Russia was a signatory with others, is a seminal and signal sign of weakness. As Russia's economic challenges internally continue in a measure of free fall and Mr. Putin follows the age-old Russian pathology of seeking diversionary outside enemies, the strategic challenge is real.

How this will mesh with the American president-elect's clearly stated embrace of Henry Kissinger's search for detente with Russia is unclear. Having agreed with the NATO Secretary General on both the durability and importance of the NATO alliance in a telephone call reported publicly on the nineteenth of November, and the need for its members to actually make good on their spending commitments, the incoming American administration will need to calibrate its detente pursuit in

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some way. The answer may well be to separate out the middle eastern Russian posture from its pugilistic Eastern European posture. There are risks to both sides here, in which Canadian air, sea, land and Special Forces are implicated with those of other NATO allies.

The countries of the free world cannot be assured of the long-term survival of the liberal democratic global norm where measures of democracy, rule of law, tolerance, and the two core freedoms from want and fear thrive by us standing down in face of Russian aggression, or the authoritarian "Eurasian Culture" actively now promoted by Putin as an alternative to western democracy. Difficult economic times in Europe, the wealth gaps in the US midwest, the UK, and the falling economic prospects in Russia have already exacted their toll in referenda, elections, and Russian military adventurism.

As was the case after World War II in Europe, where a mix of military capacity through NATO and the Marshall Plan used strategic capacity and investment in standards of living and democracy to contain Soviet totalitarianism, the nations of the liberal democratic world may well be facing this kind of dual challenge.

Failure to see and contain the risk of inaction does create a bit of a Czechoslovakia-1938 sense of critical choices unaddressed and courage diminished, at the potential of huge human and strategic future costs.

It is not the sort of option our newish and most promising prime minister in Canada, his incoming American colleague, or the new prime minister of the United Kingdom should blithely embrace. Their respective foreign and defence ministries and legislator colleagues, from all parties, should be forthright in discouraging the kind of passivist excess that will make the west's geostrategic context and our prospects for continued freedom way worse.

Hugh Segal, Master of Massey College at the University of Toronto, is a Fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute and chair of the NATO Association of Canada.
H ot on the heels of his high-profile visit to China and attendance at the G-20 summit in Hangzhou, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau successfully hosted the Global Fund replenishment conference in Montreal, addressed the UN General Assembly in New York, traveled to Belgium to sign the CETA in October, and most recently made stops in South America and Africa.

Amid this whirlwind of activity, Canada’s peripatetic PM will undoubtedly attract renewed domestic and international attention. Not unlike their treatment of fellow celebrities Bill Gates and Bono, an adoring media is almost certain to dole out continued exultation.

While such adulation is not entirely unwarranted, a closer look at the government’s first year in office suggests that a more critical assessment of its diplomatic and international policy performance may be in order.

Trudeau is fond of emphasizing that “Canada is back” on the world stage. While repeating that mantra may represent good communications practice, after a decade of foreign policy retrogression the substantive case is proving somewhat more difficult to make. The Canada to which the PM refers has been a long time gone. The erstwhile honest broker, helpful fixer, compassionate aid donor, purveyor of creative policy ideas and provider of good offices morphed during the Harper years into the Colossal Fossil, an obstruction to progress, a pariah to be avoided.

The ongoing effort to reconnect with a storied internationalist past, while understandable, won’t in itself be enough. Moreover, while distinct in tone and content from the warrior nation wannabe preoccupations of the Harper Conservative years, when it comes to overall strategic orientation and attention to the health of the diplomatic ecosystem, some elements of the new government’s record suggest demonstrable cause for concern.

A gathering of dark clouds, largely overlooked to date but the result of deliberate policy decisions, may test Trudeau’s ability to credibly project his trademark “sunny ways” into the future.

It has been several decades since the last burst of Canadian international activism — Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy’s Human Security Agenda 1996 – 2000. During that period, Canadian leadership helped bring to fruition the Land Mine Ban Treaty, International Criminal Court, the Kimberly Process to curb trafficking in “blood diamonds”, and efforts to regulate the trade in small arms and address the problem of children in conflict.

The Canadian-convened International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty produced its influential Responsibility to Protect report in 2001, but in subsequent years this country has been largely absent from the world stage. With the exception of the Harper

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government’s controversial foray into maternal, newborn and child health and participation in ill-starred military interventions in Afghanistan and Libya, Canada’s once ubiquitous presence in the international arena became almost spectral.

To be sure, the Trudeau government taken some significant steps, both symbolic and substantive, to modify this country’s international engagement. On key files such as multilateralism, climate change, pipelines, energy, and environmental protection, directions have been changed and real progress achieved. So, too, as regards relations with the USA, Mexico, the BRICS, the opening to Iran, and a putative return to peacekeeping operations. Diplomats, like scientists, have been unmuzzled, and are once again afforded the confidence, trust, and respect required to engage in unscripted conversations. The foreign ministry has been re-christened Global Affairs Canada, and the curiously conceived “Sovereign’s Wall” in the lobby of the Pearson Building decommissioned, with the oversized portrait of the Queen removed and the magnificent Pellan canvases restored.

Still, restoring the country’s place in the world will take more than these gestures, plus a good showing at the COP 21 climate change talks in Paris, turning up at various international meetings (G20, Commonwealth, APEC, G-7, NATO, NAFTA), hosting the UN Secretary General, and resettling several tens of thousands of Syrian refugees. All of that, plus upbeat references to Canadian diversity and resourcefulness in Davos and elsewhere won’t be enough to secure election to the UN Security council in 2021.

Remarkably little been said about the mechanics, retooling, and resources which will be essential to support a return to progressive diplomatic activism Sooner or later, the lack of reform and significant reinvestment in international policy institutions, and a faltering commitment to human rights, arms control, and non-proliferation are bound to be noticed. So, too, with the unnecessary intervention in Syria/Iraq, and the incoherent approach to arms exports. The controversial decision to proceed with the $15 billion Saudi arms deal for light armoured vehicles was badly mishandled, as was the flip flop on ISIL’s genocidal practices.

The matter of Canadian treatment of Afghan detainees, and the possible commission of war crimes and violation of international humanitarian law, remain unfinished business of the first order. Even spending on official development assistance, despite a marginal increase in the last Budget, remains well below 2011 levels, leaving Canada near the bottom amongst OECD countries, and light years distant from Pearson’s commitment of .7 percent of GDP.

The deployment of a battle group, frigate and fighter jets to the Baltics under NATO auspices, and a possible defence cooperation agreement with Ukraine, will almost certainly be seen as provocative; both have a distinctly retro, Cold War era feel. On these issues, as well as matters related to free trade (TPP, CETA), Middle East peace and conventional European security, the new boss looks disturbingly like the old. All of this undercuts much of the PM’s rhetoric and raises some unsettling questions.

What to do?

By way of concrete ideas for global initiatives – and these are at present notable for their absence – a resumption of international peacekeeping training and an intensification of efforts to reach out to the countries of the Asia Pacific, possibly including a resumption of Track II activities related to the South China Sea dispute under ASEAN auspices, would reinforce the steps already taken. The Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada has produced some useful new thinking on future Canadian strategy, and Trudeau’s recent visit to China and decision to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank should help to anchor a larger reset in this crucial region. Another possibility – ideally in the context of a broader emphasis on science diplomacy – would be for Canada to lead in negotiating an international convention on the management and stewardship of the world’s freshwater resources.

If the PM is to translate his considerable celebrity and charisma into actual international influence – the ability to achieve specified outcomes – and in so doing avoid the risk of plunging into the perilous “say-do gap”, deliberate action will be required. He will need clear priorities and an agenda, a strategy, and a plan. Moreover, while defence and development reviews have been launched, all elements of the diplomatic ecosystem – the foreign ministry, foreign service, and diplomatic business model – remain under severe stress. The energetic pursuit of full spectrum diplomacy – traditional, public, digital, guerrilla – would generate efficiency and effectiveness gains far beyond those which have been realized to date.

The government’s thinking about the crucial diplomatic dimension, and about international policy and grand strategy more generally, remains ambiguous. The UN speech would be a good place to address these shortcomings and begin to set out the way ahead.

Daryl Copeland is a former Canadian diplomat, an educator, analyst, consultant, the author of Guerrilla Diplomacy: Rethinking International Relations’ (Lynne Reinner, 2009). He is also a Fellow with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.
The Trudeau government’s announcement of its way forward on fighter jets can be taken as a positive indication of its attitude toward the military in general. Unhappy with Harper’s ‘risk-management’ of Canada’s fighter commitments, Trudeau’s ministers are looking to buy an interim fleet of jets immediately, and are launching a competition to acquire a larger than previously planned fleet of fighters once the Defence Policy Review is finished. The Liberal message on fighters is clear – the Royal Canadian Air Force did not have enough jets to live up to Canada’s alliance commitments so they have acted swiftly to provide them new resources immediately.

This is a positive indication of the government’s thinking as the Department of National Defence’s policy review is briefed to Cabinet for decision. The message from DND will be clear - without an injection of tens of billions of dollars in new funding, there will be a long list of defence commitments that Canada won’t be able to meet.

While the Prime Minister has declared that ‘Canada is back’ internationally, fiscally, the Department of National Defence is back in the Red. It needs another $20 to $50 billion dollars to translate previous policy direction into the Capital equipment needed to execute it. In addition, like the rest of the country, Defence faces a massive, multi-billion dollar infrastructure deficit by virtue of its vast, and antiquated real estate holdings. Finally, it is short by several thousand positions.

If it doesn’t get another few billion dollars more for its budget each year (over time), National Defence can’t afford to maintain the current status quo, let alone support a “Canada is Back” foreign policy. The need for more money isn’t a function of how much more Canada would need to spend on defence to meet its commitment to NATO of spending 2% of Gross Domestic Product on the military. Neither is it some self-interested bureaucratic desire to expand budget line. It’s a question of whether Canada wants a military that can keep doing the same types of things that it has over the last few decades, or whether the Trudeau government is willing to accept one that does less.

How did this situation come to pass?

Successive governments, both Conservative and Liberal, have progressively asked much of our armed forces but given them less than required to deliver on it. At the same
time, the ability to understand fully the impact of budget choices historically was much weaker than it is today. Cumulatively, successive governments added additional demands without removing old ones, in a defence environment where costs escalate at a rate significantly higher than they do in the general economy. Consequently, when this government assumed office more than a year ago, they inherited a defence deficit not of their own making.

To be clear, the situation to date is not the result of Prime Minister Trudeau cutting the defence budget, because he directed his Minister of National Defence to “maintain current National Defence spending levels, including current planned increases.” They’ve stuck to that plan so far, but as they’ve now learned, that plan won’t cut it.

Without an injection of funding, the Canadian military will atrophy, reducing our ability to provide for our own defence or further our interests in the world.

What this government has shown with its fighter decision is that it would surely find that situation unpalatable. If their strong desire for Canada to live up to its defence commitments in the fighter domain applies to the rest of the military, then DND is about to receive a major budget increase.

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The Board of Directors, Advisory Council, Fellows, Management and Staff at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI) would like to wish you all the best of the holiday season and a happy, healthy and prosperous 2017!
The world’s political landscape is undergoing seismic changes. Nation states are likely to remain the central actors in the coming decades. There will be no single hegemonic force but instead a handful of countries – the US, Russia, China, Germany, India, and Japan chief among them – with semi-imperial tendencies. Power and influence will be more widely distributed across non-state networks including vast conurbations of mega-cities and their peripheries.

Nation states are making a comeback. The largest ones are expanding their global reach even while shoring-up their territorial and digital borders. There are no guarantees that these vast territorial states and their satellites will become more liberal or democratic. Mega-trends like climate change, migration, terrorism, inequality, and rapid technological change are bound to ratchet-up anxiety and, as is already painfully apparent, reactionary populism.

It was not supposed to be this way. Throughout the 1990s scholars predicted the decline and eventual demise of the nation state. Globalization was supposed to hasten their irrelevance. With the apparent triumph of liberal democracy, spread of free-market capitalism, and minimal state interference, Francis Fukayama prophesied the end of history and, by extension, the end of authoritarian nation states.

Yet rumors of the death of nation states were greatly exaggerated. The end of history has not arrived and liberal democracy is not on the ascendant. According to Misha Glenny, Fukuyama and others underestimated Western hubris and the greed of financial capitalism that contributed in 2008 to one of the most serious political and economic crises since the Great Depression. “These shocks”, he argues, “enabled alternative [governance] models to reassert themselves ... with China and Russia most importantly ... and the consolidation of illiberal democratic nation states.”

Far from experiencing a decline in hard power, the larger nation states are shoring-up their military capabilities. The top ten spenders in 2015 included the US, China, Russia, India, Japan, and Germany. Some of these countries are clearly preparing for confrontations in the coming decade. They are not alone. Global defense expenditures increased steadily since the late 1990s and topped $1.6 trillion last year. These trends are set to continue.
These same nation states are also continuing to dominate economically. The above-mentioned countries also register the largest GDPs in 2015. If adjusted for purchasing power parity, China comes out above the US and Russia also rises up the rankings. These countries are also likely to remain the top performers in 2030, alongside Brazil, Canada, France, Italy, Mexico, Indonesia, and others. Barring a spectacular collapse of global markets or armed conflict, they will continue laying the rails of international affairs.

Nation states are clearly not the only forms of political and economic organization. They are already ceding sovereignty to alternate configurations of governance, power and influence, including digitally enabled networks. These include vast metropolitan regions that are rivaling nation states in political and economic clout. Many cities are rapidly forging cross-border partnerships and integrating transportation, telecommunications, and energy-related infrastructure.

Most nation states will endure in the coming decades. There are, however, a number of ways in which they will come under strain.

First, the reconfiguration and redistribution of power among a handful of nation states is already disrupting the global order. Established twentieth-century powers such as the US and EU are ceding importance and influence to faster-growing China and India. Old alliances forged after the Second World War are giving way to new regional coalitions across Latin America, Asia, and Africa. While these reconfigurations reflect underlying economic and demographic changes, they also increase the risk of conflict breaking out.

Second, the de-concentration of power away from nation states is giving rise to parallel layers of governance. Indeed, nation states themselves are busily establishing legal and physical enclaves to contract out core functions to private entities. There are already more than 4,000 registered special economic zones spread out around the world. While some have been more successful than others, these para-states deliberately fuse public and private interests and pose interesting questions about the purchase of state sovereignty.

Third, nation states and para-states will come under pressure from decentralized networks of non-state actors and coalitions. Alongside large multinational companies are constellations of NGOs, unions, religious groups, and others. Working constructively with, rather than against, these networks will be one of the key tests for nation states. The spread of new technologies offer up new ways of imagining deliberative democracy. They also carry risks of disruption ranging from wiping out low-skill jobs to facilitating new types of warfare, terrorism, and crime.

Fourth, nation states are seeing power devolved to cities. The relentless pace of urbanization is partly to blame. The number of large and medium-sized cities has increased tenfold since the 1950s. Today there are 29 megacities with 10 million residents or more. And there are another 163 cities with more than 3 million people and at least 538 with at last 1 million inhabitants. Not surprisingly, the geography of power is shifting with cities increasingly competing with each other and nation states, including over water, food, and energy.

There are myriad challenges facing nation states in the coming decade and a half. Having survived 368 years, they have proven to be remarkably resilient modes of political, social and bureaucratic organization. But given the scale and severity of global challenges - and the paralysis of countries and multilateral institutions to respond - there are dangers that nation states are becoming anachronistic and hostile to humanity’s collective survival. Cities and civil society networks constitute powerful political and economic nodes of power and influence. The question is whether the latter will be any better at channeling collective action to address tomorrow’s threats.

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The Institute was created to bridge the gap between what Canadians need to know about Canadian international activities and what they do know. Historically Canadians have tended to look abroad out of a search for markets because Canada depends heavily on foreign trade. In the modern post-Cold War world, however, global security and stability have become the bedrocks of global commerce and the free movement of people, goods and ideas across international boundaries. Canada has striven to open the world since the 1930s and was a driving factor behind the adoption of the main structures which underpin globalization such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the International Trade Organization and emerging free trade networks connecting dozens of international economies. The Canadian Global Affairs Institute recognizes Canada’s contribution to a globalized world and aims to educate Canadians about Canada’s role in that process and the connection between globalization and security.

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