Money, Mediocrity, and Making Change

A tale of two cities: Comparing progress in Boston & Lawrence

Photo credit: Lawrence Eagle-Tribune
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A tale of two cities: Comparing progress in Boston & Lawrence

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As Massachusetts begins an important conversation on education policy, political will and attention have been focused on the issue of money, with the Commonwealth’s capital clamoring for more funding. Meanwhile, in Lawrence—once the worst school district in the state—a series of bold reforms under state-appointed Receiver Jeff Riley have yielded dramatic improvements. By many measures, Lawrence now outperforms Boston, especially for Latinx and high-needs students. As of 2017, Lawrence’s four-year graduation rate was higher than Boston’s for Latinx and high-needs students; it outranks Boston in state rankings; and its economically disadvantaged students perform better on the state’s standardized tests than their peers in Boston. With Riley now leading the Commonwealth’s schools as Commissioner of Elementary and Secondary Education, Massachusetts has much to learn from this success. As the state considers a once-in-a-generation overhaul of public education, it should look to Lawrence and review lessons learned during its nationally-recognized turnaround.

Those lessons include

- The potential for the state to spur enormous progress by intervening in the districts most in need
- Increased resources shifted from the central office to the school level
- Effective partnerships with school management organizations
- Focus on recruiting and retaining highest-quality principals
- Reforming the teacher contract to prioritize effective use of funds
- Expanding learning time for all students
- The effectiveness of Lawrence’s reforms show that money alone is not the answer to school improvement.

Lawrence’s results before and after education reforms

<table>
<thead>
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<th>2010</th>
<th>2017</th>
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<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>High school</td>
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<td>graduation rate</td>
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<td>47%</td>
<td>72%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dropout rate</td>
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<td>9%</td>
<td>4%</td>
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</table>

Under control of a state-appointed receiver

- Extending learning time
- Nonprofit and charter school management organizations running schools and programs
- Replacing principals
- Reducing the central office

As Massachusetts contemplates a major influx of funding during the next legislative session, Lawrence’s turnaround experience should serve as an example—and raise key questions: how can additional funds be targeted to yield the greatest results for high-needs students?
Introduction

In 2019, Massachusetts and its capital city enter a pivotal year for public education, as a convergence of factors combine to shine a spotlight on both funding and performance. Lawmakers are almost certain to pass a major education funding bill after years of advocacy and a much-publicized deadline deal gone wrong last session.

In the corner office, Governor Baker enters his second term with clear support from voters—and a call from media outlets like the *Boston Globe* to spend some of his resulting political capital pushing for better results in education.

In Boston, the first superintendency of the Mayor Marty Walsh era ended poorly amid simultaneously abrupt and controversial changes to bell times and building construction plans. While political will and attention have been focused on these headline-grabbing issues of buildings and buses, recent Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) results paint a concerning picture of what is happening inside classrooms.

Meanwhile, the state will begin utilizing a new accountability system for schools and districts that coincides with the first full year of new Commissioner of Elementary and Secondary Education Jeff Riley’s tenure.

As policymakers and advocates look to make sense of these concurrent developments, they should look to Riley’s last position, as state-appointed receiver of the Lawrence Public Schools. The success that district has achieved since coming under state control in 2011 could point the way forward for Boston and communities around the state.

That success was highlighted in a report ERN distributed this Fall. The response we received repeatedly from candidates and policymakers was the same, homing in on one data point in the report: *Are public schools in Lawrence really better for poor and Latinx students than Boston? How can this be, when Boston spends a third more*, while Lawrence draws negative attention as a dystopia from around the state (remember the City of the Damned magazine cover?) and nation (including the Trump White House)?

To satisfy the interest during this vital year for public education, this report identifies key drivers of the Lawrence turnaround, and takes a deeper look at the comparison to Boston.

While comparing any two districts is complicated, some facts are clear: Boston Public Schools not only spends 36% more per pupil than Lawrence Public Schools, spending has been increasing at a far higher rate. On a critical and independent ranking of performance, the enumeration of the bottom 10% of districts by the state Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, Boston ranks well below Lawrence. And some key macro indicators—including graduation rates and aggregated results on the first two years of the new MCAS 2.0 test, show Lawrence outperforming Boston for poor students. Among both Hispanic and high-need students, Lawrence’s 4-year graduation rate is now higher than Boston’s.

There are no easy answers, but the findings of this report raise important questions for policymakers in Boston and on Beacon Hill.

As Massachusetts contemplates a major influx of funding during the next legislative session, Lawrence’s turnaround experience should serve as an example—and call into stark relief some obvious questions: how can additional funds be targeted to yield the greatest results for high-needs students? How will Jeff Riley leverage his experience in Lawrence to yield improvements throughout the state? And what does this experience mean for the birthplace of public education?
In 2010, Lawrence Public Schools was a failed system, with some of the worst education outcomes in the state. Its four-year high school graduation rate was 47%—meaning that less than half of high school students graduated. Less than a fifth of students scored proficient or advanced on the 8th grade mathematics MCAS, while only 50% scored the same on the 8th grade English language arts (ELA) MCAS. The dropout rate was 9.4% per year.

These difficulties proved to be intractable using existing strategies. Prior to receivership, Lawrence’s graduation rate was below 50% in every year for which data are publicly available, starting in 2006. Grade 8 ELA proficiency was consistently under 50%, and math proficiency in the same grade was consistently under 25%.

The Massachusetts Board of Elementary and Secondary Education intervened in 2011, placing Lawrence under the control of a state-appointed receiver. The receiver used a number of strategies—focusing on accountability, cutting the central office, building school management partnerships, strengthening the principal corps, reforming the teacher contract, and implementing real expanded learning time—to effect change.

The results constituted one of the most dramatic public policy successes of recent years in Massachusetts and the country cited, for example, by the New York Times as a beacon. Visiting Lawrence in 2014, then-U.S. Education Secretary Arne Duncan called Lawrence’s progress “truly inspiring,” saying, “The lessons for other schools in this state about what is possible is truly profound thanks to the work being done in Lawrence.” Randi Weingarten, President of the American Federation of Teachers, praised Lawrence for its spirit of “collaboration leading directly to student success.”

The graduation rate has increased by half. In 2010, 47% of students graduated on time. By 2017, that figure had risen to 71.9%. Over the same period, the drop-out rate—an alarming 9.4% in 2010—has plummeted to 3.7%.

Test scores have also improved. The percentage of students scoring advanced or proficient on the MCAS has steadily increased through receivership.

In terms of overall school quality, twelve of the city’s schools were classed as Level 1 or 2 in 2016—the highest levels in the state’s accountability system until a new system was adopted in 2018—versus only three in 2012. This constitutes a dramatic increase in the district’s ability to offer students an adequate education that meets their needs.

These successes were achieved with a growing student body that has remained diverse and reflective of a high level of need. Since 2010, Lawrence’s enrollment has grown from 12,285 students to 13,846 students by 2018. Over the same period, the Hispanic percentage of Lawrence’s student body has grown from 89.5% to 92.9%, and the percentage of students whose first language is not English has fluctuated between 70% and 80%, while the percentage of students in the English language learner program (ELL) has grown from 23.1% in 2010 to 34% in 2018. Recent changes to the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education’s method of calculating a student’s level of economic need make it difficult to track this metric over time, but in 2017, 64.1% of Lawrence’s students were economically disadvantaged.

At the same time, Lawrence has recruited a more diverse teaching force. Between 2010 and 2018, the number of Hispanic teaching staff in Lawrence grew from 348 to 416. While this number still comprises just above a fifth of total Lawrence teachers, the rising number of Hispanic teachers demonstrates a commitment to recruiting a more representative staff, which research has shown to benefit all students.1
Lawrence Outperforms Boston in Several Key Metrics

Test Results, Graduation Rates and State Rankings

This Fall, ERN released a Policy Brief focused on the Lawrence receivership. It included one specific—and frequently inquired—about statistic showing Lawrence outperforming Boston. Given the disparities in reputation and funding between the districts, many readers expressed surprise that Lawrence would even be competitive with Boston, never mind exceed its performance in key areas.

While comparing any two districts is a challenge and Boston does better in some areas, in three of the highest-level benchmarks Lawrence outperforms Boston for underserved students:

**TEST RESULTS**

Each year, Massachusetts administers a series of standardized tests to gauge student proficiency in mathematics and ELA. Over the past two years (2017 and 2018), the state has used a new test, MCAS 2.0. In test scores of student proficiency over this period, economically disadvantaged students in Lawrence (who, again, make up about 64% of the group) perform better than their peers in Boston, who constitute 58% of the student base there.

**GRADUATION RATE**

While Boston’s four-year graduation rate is slightly higher than Lawrence’s overall, Lawrence does better with historically underserved students: Lawrence’s four-year graduation rate is higher than Boston’s for both Hispanic/Latino students and high needs students.

**STATE RANKINGS**

The state calculates an overall ranking for each district based on student achievement and growth, a system used to calculate the bottom 10% of districts—29 districts in total. In this ranking system, Lawrence outperforms Boston: Lawrence is 27th from the bottom, while Boston is 16th from the bottom.

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**Lawrence & Boston Demographics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Total Students</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
<th>Economically Disadvantaged</th>
<th>English Language Learners</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lawrence</td>
<td>13,846 students</td>
<td>41.9%</td>
<td>92.9%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>52,665 students</td>
<td>64.1%</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
<td>31.7%</td>
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</table>
Graduation Rate Comparison

When it comes to improving outcomes for underserved students, Lawrence outperforms Boston by many metrics. And compared to Lawrence's improvements, especially for Hispanic/Latino and economically disadvantaged students, Boston's record is lackluster.

Lawrence’s overall graduation rate has risen by 25 percentage points in seven years

In 2010, fewer than half of Lawrence's students graduated on time (the 4-year graduation rate was 46.7%). For Boston, the rate was 63.2%—still unacceptably low, but well above Lawrence's.

In 2017, Lawrence's graduation rate had risen by 25 percentage points, which represented a 50% increase, and its total graduation rate had significantly narrowed Boston's advantage. Even more impressive: Lawrence now graduates Hispanic/Latino students and high-needs students at higher rates than Boston.

Lawrence's 4-year graduation rate among Hispanic/Latino and high-needs populations has surpassed Boston’s

Lawrence now graduates Hispanic students and high-needs students at higher rates than Boston.

These statistics are even more striking when considering the change over time in both districts.

*High needs graduation rate is not reported for 2010–2011
Test Score Comparison

MCAS 2.0, 2017–18, Grade 3–8 avg. | Lawrence vs. Boston

In the past two years, both Boston and Lawrence have used a new test, MCAS 2.0. For economically disadvantaged students, Lawrence outperforms Boston in both ELA and math when taking the average of the two years since the new test was implemented.

Lawrence is sending a smaller percentage of students to lower quality schools

One of the state's highest-level metrics for assessing educational quality is the school leveling system. From 2012 to 2017, the state used a descending, five-level system, whereby Levels 3-5 constituted the bottom 20% of schools in the state, including schools in receivership or under turnaround plans. Starting in 2018, the state introduced a new five-category system, in which the bottom two categories (together called "Schools requiring assistance or intervention") constitute about 15% of all schools.

While the two categorization systems cannot be compared directly against each other, it is clear from assessing Lawrence's and Boston's school level performance in 2012 and 2018 that significantly more students attended lowest-quality schools in Lawrence than in Boston in 2012; in 2018, the pattern is reversed, with Lawrence sending a smaller percentage of students to lowest-quality schools than Boston.

Key Takeaways

1 | Lawrence, considered the Commonwealth's worst school district before receivership, now performs at about the same level as Boston.
2 | By many metrics, Lawrence actually now does a better job of education its most vulnerable students than does Boston.
3 | While much work remains to be done, Lawrence has made significant gains over the period of receivership (2011–present), while Boston has made less substantial progress.
The context of each district’s spending patterns adds another layer to this analysis. In 2010, Lawrence spent $13,955 per pupil, compared to Boston’s $17,524 per pupil. Between 2010 and 2017, Boston increased its per pupil spending at a much greater rate than Lawrence. While Boston increased its per pupil spending by $2,779, or 15.8%, Lawrence increased its per pupil spending by just $932, or 6.6%. That is less than 1% per year, not adjusted for inflation.

Lawrence is spending far less per pupil than Boston

Boston’s spending is even more striking in the context of all districts in the bottom 10% per achievement as ranked by the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education—a group to which Boston and Lawrence both belong. Of these 29 districts, the average per pupil spending for 2017 was $15,043, slightly higher than Lawrence’s per pupil spending and much lower than Boston’s.

Lawrence, therefore, matched or surpassed Boston’s performance while Boston spent thousands of dollars more per student, increasing its spending by more over time, with a less needy population.
The receivership model used to drive improvement in Lawrence was authorized by Massachusetts’ 2010 An Act Relative to the Achievement Gap. The law paired updated accountability for schools and districts, as well as a moderate charter school cap lift, with increased funding for districts through the Obama administration’s Race to the Top competitive grant program.

With regards to receivership, the law empowered the Massachusetts’ Commissioner of Elementary and Secondary Education to recommend to the Board of Elementary and Secondary Education that any district in the bottom 10% statewide by performance be put under the governing authority of a state-appointed receiver. The district must be both low performing and, per the state Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, “not showing signs of substantial improvement over time.” If the Board places a district into receivership following the Commissioner’s recommendation, municipal officials are relieved of control, and a state-appointed receiver instead takes the helm.

Lawrence was an ideal candidate for receivership. Beyond its poor academic performance, the district also suffered from corruption, with the pre-receivership superintendent receiving jail time for an embezzlement conviction in 2012. The district was clearly failing to provide an adequate education to its students. The student body was 87% low-income, 79% English language learners (ELLs), and 90% Hispanic, meaning that the consequences of the district’s difficulties overwhelmingly fell on historically underserved groups. In 2011, at Commissioner Mitchell Chester’s recommendation, the Board appointed Jeff Riley to be the receiver.

Lawrence’s strong results during the receivership period demonstrate not only the potential for effectiveness of the receivership model, but also of the specific strategies used during receivership.

While Lawrence has put systems into place that allow for maximizing teacher quality, Boston's approach has been more ad hoc. Some Boston schools that have achieved notable turnarounds in recent years, such as the Trotter School, have often done so under models that allow them broad leeway with regards to these regulations. While Lawrence significantly reduced its central office staff to drive more resources into schools, Boston has not made a similarly aggressive effort. And while Lawrence has embraced its charter school sector and built strong partnerships deploying the best charters to serve the district, Boston has continued to largely turn its back on them despite national recognition that the city’s charters are the single highest performing such group in the nation.
School Management Partnerships

The Lawrence receivership is noteworthy for its collaborative spirit. The district brought in external nonprofits—and, in one case, the Lawrence Teachers Union—to run specialized programs and even whole schools. The three lowest-performing schools were placed under the management of outside organizations.

In building these partnerships, Riley tapped into the existing sector of education nonprofits operating in Lawrence—most notably, some of the region’s high-quality charter public schools. Working together with strong charter schools, such as the Community Day Charter Public School, the receiver sought to incorporate their successful practices into the district. He brought in nonprofit school management organizations—like the UP Education Network and Phoenix Charter Academies—to manage several district schools. These schools “retained neighborhood-based student assignments and a unionized teaching force” while benefiting from the innovation and flexibility common to charter schools. The schools operated by outside organizations were chosen because of their exceptionally low academic performance, and many students saw significant gains. Under the previous accountability system, one rose to Level 1, among the state’s top performers, and one rose to Level 2. The charter and district schools thus worked together to achieve better outcomes for students, and the receiver built his relationship with the charter sector on cooperative terms.

The situation in Boston has been less constructive. While the charter schools in Boston stand among the best in the United States, Boston Public Schools officials have consistently resisted their expansion, claiming that they drain funding from the district. Nonprofit school management organizations have been successful in turning around some Boston schools, like the UP Education Network, but this practice has not been implemented on the same institutional scale as in Lawrence.

Accountability Matters

The defining feature of receivership is a shift of governance powers from municipal officials to the state-appointed receiver. With concentration of governance powers into the hands of this one individual also comes a mandate from the state for systemic change—as well as accountability to the state.

The changes that bore fruit in Lawrence were driven by the high level of autonomy given to the receiver. The receiver had broad powers to reorganize the district to direct more resources to schools, and he institutionalized the collection and use of data on student achievement. He cut the central office by 40%, for example, in order to provide those funds to schools, and he oversaw a complete overhaul of Lawrence’s high school experience, building targeted programs like the High School Learning Center, which focuses on students at risk of dropping out or who otherwise need to recover credits.

Boston has not seen a similarly empowered leader with an accompanying mandate for change. Although the city’s most recent Superintendent came from outside Boston, his tenure did not lead to significant systemic changes for Boston Public Schools. An attempt to reorganize the district’s school bell times, for example, was unsuccessful. The current interim superintendent has displayed some willingness for systemic change, such as discussing closing underutilized schools, but even still, change has been gradual.
Principals Matter

The governance powers vested in the receiver also made possible broad changes to leadership at the school level. In just the first year of receivership, Riley replaced 35% of the district’s principals, then an additional 20% in later years. By doing so, he was able to select school leaders who were more change-oriented and mission-aligned. This focus on school leadership is consistent with research showing that principals are key drivers of student success by creating strong environments for learning and professional accountability.18

In addition to building his corps of principals, Riley also trusted them with greater autonomy. Lawrence raised its principal salaries and allowed principals to make decisions previously assigned to the central office, such as scheduling.

Reforming the Teacher Contract

One major tool of receivership was the ability to abrogate Lawrence’s existing teacher contract. A new contract was developed alongside Lawrence Teachers Union leadership and approved by union members.19

The contract focused on increasing autonomy and accountability at the school and teacher levels. Key to this aim was the implementation of school-level planning whereby each school had a Teacher Leadership Team (TLT) representing the school’s teachers. Together, the principal and TLT at each school set the work rules (like the schedule)—a departure from the practice of setting consistent rules at each school through an overall master contract. Paired with keeping central office control largely out of hiring, curriculum, professional development, and schedule-setting, this structure gave schools in Lawrence great freedom to do what they thought best for their students.

Under the new contract, all returning teachers were provided a one-level boost in the district’s new five-level career ladder (Novice, Developing, Career, Advanced, and Master), and starting salaries were raised by roughly $4,000. Rather than fixing advancement up the career level to longevity alone (as is the norm for public school districts), Lawrence allowed for differentiated pay, by which exemplary teachers are awarded for their excellence. Teachers could also receive stipends for work the district deemed desirable, such as leadership roles or teaching during expanded learning time.20 At the same time, the contract eliminated the many lanes that are in conventional contracts which raise pay for things such as master’s degrees and years served even though evidence shows weak to no gains for students related to these expensive lane increases.

Lawrence’s contract also allowed for different approaches at different schools. Instead of using a one-size-fits-all model, the receiver granted autonomy or exercised greater control based on the different schools’ needs. High-performing schools were given the greatest autonomies in matters like scheduling, teacher responsibilities, and administrative structures. Schools of middle-range performance were more closely managed by the central office with help from partner organizations, while the lowest-performing schools were directly managed by outside school management organizations brought in by the receiver. This flexibility allowed for tailored interventions at the most struggling schools without interrupting successful practices.
Reforming the Teacher Contract, cont.

Such autonomy would be difficult to achieve under traditional contracts, which are highly uniform and difficult to change. In Boston, the last negotiated teacher contract (in 2017) included no major reforms while increasing teacher pay such that the next contract is projected to push the average salary above $100,000.21

Under receivership, Riley could have eliminated collective bargaining entirely. Instead, he chose to engage with the Lawrence Teachers Union and develop a novel partnership with an unprecedented agreement.

Real Expanded Learning Time

One of the most influential strategies under receivership was real expanded learning time—which was codified in the new contract. When fully implemented, the approach has “added 200+ hours of instruction to all K-8 schools” in each school year for all schools except early childhood centers and high schools.22

And while standard instruction was significantly expanded, for students still lagging a considerable additional amount of support comes in the form of “Acceleration Academies” held during February and April vacations. Meant to help struggling students regain lost ground, the Academies allowed for intensive interventions and attention to individual students. While core academics receive a needed high focus, Riley and Lawrence educators have made sure to also emphasize time for other subjects and for arts, music, drama and sports.

In total, expanded learning drove significant improvements for student achievement.

A comparison with Boston's experience attempting to implement expanded learning time is instructive. In Boston, the district is constrained by contractual requirements and therefore has had significant difficulty adding time to the school day. Under a program started in the 2015-2016 school year, 45 Boston schools added just 30 minutes per day to their schedule, which constitutes 90 added hours to the 180-day school year (versus at least 200 hours added per year in each Lawrence school). While this program expanded to more schools in subsequent years, it is still limited: the school day is slated to increase by 40 minutes at 60 schools (including the initial 45) over a three-year period starting in 2015. Much of the expanded time will be devoted to additional teacher planning periods as opposed to instructional time for students. And with Boston's contractual arrangements requiring hourly pay rates for every additional minute while Lawrence pays a more reasonable annual stipend, it is no wonder that Boston both spends much more and gets much less even as both cities operate under AFT-approved contracts.
Approach to Funding and Improvement

Key to understanding Lawrence’s turnaround is the fact that it coincided with only small increases in annual funding. Far more crucial than any additional funding were the broad powers granted to the receiver and used well in areas such as governance, staffing, and scheduling. The ethos of the receivership was of making the most improvements possible with the resources the district had.

In Boston, by contrast, change has been arrested by the sentiment that reform must wait until additional funding is granted. At almost all levels, politicians have focused on funding more than reform, focusing on potential influxes to school funding through changes to the state’s Ch. 70 formula. Lawrence’s example shows that there must be more to the problem of improving schools than funding alone.

Per pupil spending over time, Lawrence and Boston

[Graph showing per pupil spending over time, with Lawrence spending rising from $14,887 to $20,333 and Boston fluctuating around $22,000.]

Conclusion

At a time when many education advocates are seeking more money for education without strong accountability measures to ensure that money is spent in ways that bolster student achievement, the comparison of Lawrence and Boston demonstrates that this focus is misguided. Lawrence’s improvements and Boston’s stagnation show that more money alone is not sufficient to drive improvements. To achieve results like Lawrence’s turnaround in communities across the Commonwealth, the state must demand changes to ensure that more funding translates into results for our most vulnerable students.
Appendix

Above, we have highlighted some key metrics to draw attention to Lawrence’s success and the potential for lessons learned in Lawrence to drive change in Boston. Lawrence’s success in improving graduation rates (especially for Hispanic and underserved students) and its comparative advantage in performance among economically disadvantaged students over the past two years were both achieved with much less money per pupil than is spent in Boston. That being said, the two districts display a range of performance across several metrics.

On the MCAS, the two districts perform similarly

PERCENTAGE MEETING OR EXCEEDING EXPECTATIONS

Lawrence’s Hispanic MCAS results over time compared to Boston’s

PERCENTAGE PROFICIENT & ADVANCED IN ELA (LEFT) AND MATH (RIGHT), GR. 10

Among Hispanic students, the gains are most impressive at the 10th grade level. As of this year, they have surpassed the 50% mark in both subjects, matching Boston’s performance in English language arts and narrowing Boston’s advantage in math.

2018 Lawrence’s high-needs MCAS scores compared to Boston’s

PERCENTAGE MEETING OR EXCEEDING EXPECTATIONS

Lawrence students meet or exceed expectations on the MCAS at higher levels than Boston students in 3rd Grade English language arts, 3rd Grade math, and 8th grade math.
Endnotes


2. Elsewhere in this report when comparing data from the state, we follow the state in using the term 'Hispanic/Latino.'


4. www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2014/11/06/12weingarten.html

5. www.brookings.edu/research/the-importance-of-a-diverse-teaching-force/

6. Per the MA Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, “high needs” refers to “an unduplicated count of all students in a school or district belonging to at least one of the following individual subgroups: students with disabilities, English language learners (ELL) and former ELL students, or low-income students.”

7. Data for high-needs graduation rates is available only from 2012 forward.

8. Per the MA Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, “high needs” refers to “an unduplicated count of all students in a school or district belonging to at least one of the following individual subgroups: students with disabilities, English language learners (ELL) and former ELL students, or low-income students.” The state designates 75.1% of Boston's students as "High Needs," versus 82.9% of Lawrence's students.

9. www.doe.mass.edu/level5/districts/faq.html

10. edpolicy.education.jhu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/AthirdwaymastheadFINAL.pdf


13. www.bostonglobe.com/research/massachusetts-charter-cap-holds-back-disadvantaged-students/

14. www.upeducationnetwork.org/about-


23. www.wbur.org/edify/2018/08/03/fact-check-education-funding