Realising Country Ownership Post-2015?

June 2015

Shannon Kindornay, together with: ActionAid
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Preface

Will the post-2015 agenda support country ownership of development processes? This question has been of central concern for me as I have worked to keep abreast of global negotiations on the new agenda for sustainable development, including its financial framework. The run-up to the 2015 conferences - Addis Ababa, New York and Paris – started well ahead of the final declarations yet to come, with statements and papers crowding everyone’s desks, including my own. With just a few weeks to go before the first test of the post-2015 agenda in Addis Ababa, the time seemed ripe to review the current state of play on country ownership. Having followed the aid effectiveness agenda through its latest incarnations from Paris to Busan, my point of reference into this discussion is how the post-2015 agenda can and is likely to support country ownership going forward. Importantly, I asked for the opinion of an expert colleague: Shannon Kindornay, Adjunct Research Professor at Carleton University, who agreed to work with me by bringing her academic experience and wisdom to the discussion.

For quite some time, most of the discussions in practitioners’ circles have been broadly focused on the role of the aid and development effectiveness agenda in the post-2015 context – Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and Financing for Development (FFD) included. Roughly speaking, the idea on the table was that the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC), established at the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4), would play a significant role in the implementation of the new agenda. The notion that the GPEDC could focus on the “how” of post-2015 was quite popular... until the moment differences over the how and what effectiveness looks like re-emerged following the lull in discussions ushered in by HLF4 where a shaky agreement on principles was made between traditional and non-traditional providers of development cooperation. At the same time, it also appeared clear that a more pertinent conversation should rather be about the impact of the FFD and SDGs negotiations on the effectiveness agenda and in particular, whether or not the conferences in Addis Ababa and New York would generate new interest and the political space to revive efforts to improve the quality of development cooperation.

In this spirit, it seemed appropriate to start with a purposeful reading of the key documents that are informing the ongoing global negotiations. The ambition of the review was to track references to the notion of country ownership as well as their significance and operational impacts. The basic concept was to produce a document to highlight potentials and shortcomings in the current negotiations benchmarked against a key notion – that ownership and the leadership of development processes belongs to countries and it should not be undermined but rather reinforced through post-2015 outcomes. In the context of the negotiations, it also implies that national responsibility and national ownership are two faces of the same coin.

A comprehensive review of how the notion of national ownership has evolved over time falls outside the scope of this paper as does the task of providing a CSO recipe to realize it: other colleagues and players are better positioned to fill such blanks. In this report, there is more space dedicated to explaining the intricacies of the ongoing discussions and, for this reason, there are strong references to the actual documents and language therein.

There are a number of important takeaways from this work. My initial attitude was fairly negative in the sense that I could not get any positive feeling from draft conclusions for the Addis Ababa and New York conferences: there appeared not to be a real push to make sure that the effectiveness agenda could inform the new global partnership in its entirety. The principles of ownership, transparency and accountability, inclusiveness and focus on results appeared to be mostly relegated to discussions on international public finance. The reading this paper offers tells a different story insomuch as it highlights that at least the notion of ownership is no longer confined to a niche – respect for country ownership...
appears in chapeau texts and as a general guiding principle for post-2015. Nevertheless, the presentation and strength of commitments to support the notion of country ownership vary across post-2015 texts, from the OWG proposal to the FFD drafts and the zero draft text for the New York Summit. The most advanced integration of the notion of country ownership as a key principle for post-2015, as articulated by the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing, has lost traction in the course of negotiations.

The role of national ownership in the post-2015 agenda will require ongoing efforts to understand, preserve and strengthen it. For sure, there are immediate challenges that require all interested parties to join forces: devising practical ways to measure progress on ownership, for instance beyond the system adopted in the HLF4 monitoring framework, working-out concrete action plans and improving impacts at the local level. I hope this paper will keep the discussion moving forward.

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Contents
Preface .................................................................................................................................................. ii
Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................................... v
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Country Ownership in the Lead Up to Post-2015 ........................................................................... 2
Assessing Country Ownership Post-2015 ...................................................................................... 5
Key Findings ..................................................................................................................................... 7
Implications for Post-2015 and Ongoing Negotiations ................................................................. 18
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 23
References ....................................................................................................................................... 25
Annex 1. Framework for Assessing Ownership Commitments ...................................................... 28
Acknowledgements

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Introduction

In September 2015, governments will agree to a set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to guide the international communities’ efforts over the next 15 years following on commitments made at the Rio+20 United Nations (UN) Conference on Sustainable Development in 2012. To support these efforts, governments will set out commitments related to financing and other means of implementation for the SDGs at the Third Financing for Development Conference in July 2015 in Addis Abba. Negotiations are well underway though critical aspects of the agenda, such as how the SDGs will be effectively implemented and monitored at subnational, national, regional and global levels, and concrete financing commitments, remain.

An important guiding principle of the SDG negotiation process has been the notion that countries will have space to adopt and implement the SDGs according to their national context. Indeed, The Future We Want, the outcome document from the Rio+20 conference in which governments agreed to establish a set of SDGs, is clear:

Sustainable development goals should be action-oriented, concise and easy to communicate, limited in number, aspirational, global in nature and universally applicable to all countries, while taking into account different national realities, capacities and levels of development and respecting national policies and priorities (UNGA 2012, Resolution 66/288, Annex, para. 247, emphasis added).

In this context, the question of how countries will own the SDGs as they move forward on implementation is of critical importance. The international community has a long history of committing to the principle of country ownership in international development cooperation, most notably through UN and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) fora, including the Monterrey Consensus, Paris Declaration and most recently, the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC).

Before the SDGs and associated financing and other means of implementation commitments are finalized, there is a need to examine official documentation framing the SDGs and Financing for Development negotiations to assess the space given to the notion of country ownership and the actual meaning attached to it. This paper seeks to unpack commitments to country ownership post-2015 by addressing three key questions:

1) To what extent is ownership being emphasized in the context of Financing for Development and SDG discussions?
2) How is ownership understood in official documentation?
3) What concrete commitments have been made to ensure country ownership post-2015?

To address these questions, this paper maps out and critically evaluates references to ownership in official documentation informing post-2015 negotiations against a framework based on available operational definitions of country ownership. It identifies where gaps exist, and where additional commitments may be needed to ensure country ownership of the emerging sustainable development agenda.

The report makes a number of valuable contributions. First, it draws attention to and provides analysis on an important aspect of the post-2015 agenda which has not received a lot of attention to date. While discussions have been grounded in an understanding that the SDGs must allow space for national priorities and recognize national level capacities, no systematic examination of commitments to country ownership has been conducted to date. The report examines country ownership against well-established ownership principles and unpacks commitments to ensuring policy space post-2015 in practice. Second, the report includes an analysis of “ownership enablers” – the national and global factors that enable
countries to exercise ownership over development processes through, for example, less reliance on external financing and a stable global economic environment. In this way, the report broadens the conversation on ownership to move beyond principles and commitments historically made in the context of improving aid effectiveness to include broader, systematic and country-level factors that help and hinder country ownership. The report takes stock of key commitments to domestic resource mobilization, capacity development, external financing, global regulatory reform and reforms of global institutions. In this respect, the report also provides an overview of commitments to date related to financing and other means of implementation. Finally, the report serves as an important analytical contribution that can inform governments’ positions in the ongoing negotiations as well as inputs from civil society and other stakeholders concerned with strengthening country ownership post-2015.

Following the introduction, the report is structured into four key parts. First, the report discusses the importance of country ownership for realising development outcomes and unpacks historical commitments in this area. The report then presents the framework that informs this report. Following the presentation of key findings, the report offers an analysis of key implications for post-2015 and offers recommendations for ongoing negotiations.

Country Ownership in the Lead Up to Post-2015

Following the failures of structural adjustment policies in the 1990s, including the use of conditionalities in the provision of development financing (OECD 2009b), the concept of country ownership grew out of a consensus that in order for development policies and programs to be effective and for aid to successfully support development efforts, they must be owned by governments (Booth 2011; OECD 2009a). No definitive definition of country ownership exists and the concept is used in different ways, making it sometimes difficult to pin down the real implications of country ownership for development actors. It can be used, for example, as a substitute for prerogatives of national sovereignty or as an entry point in terms of country management over aid relationships. Civil society organizations and other stakeholders have used it as an entry point to demand access to policy spaces under national control. In its most basic form, country ownership typically denotes leadership on the part of governments and other national stakeholders to design, draft and implement development policies and programs, which development partners can then support (see, e.g. Booth 2011; Buiter 2007). For the purposes of this paper, country ownership is understood as the extent to which developing countries (broadly understood as including government and national stakeholders) own development priorities, including their ability to define, lead and implement their preferred model of development. This definition draws from historical understandings of country ownership, a concept which has evolved over the past two decades as noted below.

Country Ownership in United Nations Discussions

Though the OECD has historically dominated conversations on country ownership under the aid effectiveness agenda (discussed below), the need for country ownership has been well established in the UN. A 2007 review of the United Nations Development Agenda, which examined decisions of major

1 See Jerve (2002) and Booth (2010) for historical overviews of ownership in international development cooperation.
2 See Cluster A - WP-EFF (2011) for a discussion.
conferences and summits held between 1990 and 2005, revealed that national ownership of country
development strategies was the principal and most consistently articulated recommendation (UNDESA
2007, 11). In the area of financing for development, the 2002 Monterrey Consensus and the 2008 Doha
Declaration both recognized the importance of country ownership.

The UN Economic and Social Council’s (ECOSOC) Development Cooperation Forum which was
established in 2007 to support more inclusive and democratic governance international development co-
operation, has also highlighted the need for additional efforts to support country ownership over
development processes (see, e.g. ECOSOC 2008). The ECOSOC President’s summary reports of
Development Cooperation Forum discussions have consistently emphasized issues related to country
ownership, recognizing the need for inclusive and multi-stakeholder country-driven ownership over
development priorities, that no one size-fits-all approach exists for development cooperation, and the
need to support and improve mutual accountability at the country level (ECOSOC 2008; 2010; 2012;
2014). Recent conferences, including the 2011 Fourth UN Conference on Least Developed Countries and
Rio+20 have similarly highlighted the importance of country ownership.3

High Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness
The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness placed ownership at the heart of efforts to increase the
effectiveness of aid.4 Over 100 countries endorsed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, agreeing to
five pillars for improving aid effectiveness: ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results,
and mutual accountability (OECD 2005).5 Under Paris, donors agreed to harmonize and align their
official development assistance around the national development plans drafted by developing countries.
At the time, the concept of ownership was largely understood in terms of developing country government
ownership. It was based on the logic that developing countries needed to exercise leadership over
development policies, strategies, implementation, and coordinate development activities (OECD 2005). In
turn, donors agreed to draw conditions from developing countries’ own priorities and align their assistance
to development plans (OECD 2005). Paris also included commitments to managing for results and mutual
accountability. Efforts were to be guided by a results focus and donors and recipients would be
accountable to one another.

At the 2008 High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF) in Accra, where it was revealed that progress
had not been as fast and as broad as originally anticipated (Wood et al. 2008; OECD 2008a), the concept
of ownership was broadened alongside attempts to accelerate action. Participants recognized that there
was a need to include the role of parliamentarians, local governments and civil society organizations in
owning development strategies (OECD 2009a). The resulting Accra Agenda for Action made reference to
these actors, as well as reaffirmed donor commitments to reduce conditionality6 (OECD 2008b). It
strengthened commitments to improve the delivery of aid through stronger country ownership of
development, greater predictability of aid and better use of country systems. The notion of mutual

3 The first principle of the Istanbul Program of Action “stresses that the ownership and leadership of and the primary responsibility
for their development lies with least developed countries themselves” (UNGA 2011, paragraph 17) while the Rio+20 outcome
document notes the recognizes “the importance of efforts by developing countries to strengthen leadership of their own
development, national institutions, systems and capacity to ensure the best results for effective development by engaging with
parliaments and citizens in shaping those policies and deepening engagement with civil society organizations [and ... that] there is
no one-size-fits-all formula that will guarantee development effectiveness” (UNGA 2012, paragraph 259).
4 Prior to the Paris Declaration, International Monetary Fund-World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers were established also
with the aim of enabling developing countries to ‘own’ their development strategies, prepared in partnership with donors and
domestic constituents, and then supported by donors (Booth 2010).
5 See Booth (2008; 2011) for critique of the extent to which the Paris Declaration and subsequent commitments to aid effectiveness
effectively addressed the issue of ownership.
6 Donors agreed to switch from prescriptive conditions on how and when aid is spent to conditions based on developing countries’
own development objectives and to make conditions public, as well as review good practice on conditionality jointly with recipients.
accountability was also affirmed to mean accountability to citizens in donor and recipient countries, as well as each other.

At the 4th HLF (HLF4) in Busan, South Korea in 2011, it was revealed that only one of the targets set in Paris had been met (coordinated technical assistance on capacity building). It was noted, however, that substantial progress had been made on ownership. The 2011 Monitoring Evaluation claimed that the number of ‘sound national development strategies’ in place had tripled since 2005 (2011, 16). Similarly a quarter of developing countries had high-quality results-oriented frameworks in place. Nevertheless, a review of ownership and accountability carried out in the lead up to Busan noted that greater efforts are still needed to move from country executive ownership to inclusive ownership, promote a culture of accountability and support capacity development (Cluster A - WP-EFF 2011). The review (2011, 8-9) made a number of recommendations to promote inclusive ownership, including:

- respect the diversity of policy perspectives from different national stakeholders;
- strengthen parliamentary processes;
- provide, promote and monitor an enabling environment for CSOs;
- coordinate local, regional and national levels in the context of effective decentralization;
- focus on people and relationships in international cooperation;
- ensure access to a diverse sources of knowledge;
- increase monitoring and evaluation;
- create longer term relationships and foster capitalization of experience by limiting the rotation of donor officials in developing countries; and
- focus on capacity development and learning from experience.

Busan included further commitments on ownership, namely the principle of “ownership of development priorities by developing countries” recognizing that development partnerships can only succeed if led by developing countries (HLF4 2011, 3). Three other principles – a focus on results, inclusive development partnerships, and transparency and accountability – were also agreed to. These principles are meant to guide actions that will “deepen, extend and operationalise the democratic ownership of development policies and processes” (HLF4 2011, 3). Commitments were also made around supporting institutional strengthening in developing countries, the creation of nationally owned results frameworks drawn from countries’ own priorities and goals, support for statistical capacity building, untying aid, use and strengthening of country systems as key to building effective institutions, and support for parliamentarian, local governments and civil society.

Following Busan, the GPEDC was established to monitor commitments. The 2014 review of progress noted that while previous achievements on ownership had been sustained, it was too early to show translation of commitments on ownership to use of countries’ own results frameworks7 (OECD/UNDP 2014). Importantly, the review also showed the development cooperation providers have made little progress on use of country systems, even in instances where country systems were stronger. The First High Level Meeting of the GPEDC was held in Mexico in April 2014. The Communique from the meeting reaffirmed commitments made in Busan, noting the need to ensure that “ODA is aligned to national priorities and strategies and tailored to country-specific situations and needs” and committing to “invigorate efforts to strengthen and use country systems as the default approach […]” (GPEDC 2014, paras 8-9).

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7 Country ownership is measured in terms of development cooperation focused on results that meet developing countries’ priorities, aid on budgets which are subject to parliamentary scrutiny, use and strengthening of developing country systems and aid untying (OECD/UNDP 2014).
Learning from the Millennium Development Goals in the Lead-up to Post-2015

A number of efforts have been made to ensure that the post-2015 framework is based on lessons learned from the experience of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), including with respect to country ownership. An important critique of the MDGs is that they served as a top-down development agenda that was established through little consultation with developing countries and then imposed on them (Higgins 2013; UNSTT 2012). Influential in international and national agendas, the MDGs led to the creation of rigid national policy agendas, focussed on international benchmarks, rather than respecting local conditions and complexities in the development process (UNSTT 2012; see also Easterly 2009).

Based on this past experience, there has been recognition that governments (national and local), international institutions, civil society, media, academics and the private sector should be involved in the creation and implementation of the SDGs (GSP 2012; HLP 2013; UNGA 2014 b). In addition to the significant national, regional and thematic consultations carried out by the UN to inform the post-2015 agenda, the SDGs are being negotiated at the inter-governmental level through a transparent and inclusive process. Compared to the creation of the MDGs and notwithstanding the capacity and resource challenges developing country governments and non-state actors may face in engaging in international discussions and negotiations (Kindornay and Samy 2012), the SDGs have afforded greater opportunities for ensuring that the international agenda reflects developing country priorities compared to the MDGs.

An important aspect of negotiations has also been ensuring that the SDGs offer space for country differentiation in practice. From the outset, there has been an expectation that countries will have space to implement the SDGs in accordance with their national priorities and capacities, though how this will work in practice is still not clear. The importance of ownership at the sub-national level has also been recognized with local governments, civil society and private sector actors calling for an important role in the translation of the SDGs to sub-national levels (see, for example, CLGF 2013). As stakeholders move toward final negotiations on the SDGs, the need to allow countries to tailor the SDGs to their national circumstances has been well-established.

Assessing Country Ownership Post-2015

The Framework

A framework was established to systematically assess country ownership in official documentation informing post-2015 negotiations. Table 1 below provides an overview of the key components used (see Annex 1 for full description). The framework is structured to move beyond an examination of references to policy space and ownership in broad terms. In addition to examining direct mentions of “ownership” in official documents, the framework includes key principles and actions aimed at supporting country ownership as articulated through various HLF and UN commitments, such as inclusivity and participation, alignment, use of country systems, and mutual accountability. However, the framework also moves beyond ownership principles to capture key enablers of ownership. It is based on an implicit recognition that the realisation of country ownership goes beyond commitments to support nationally-owned development strategies. The ability of a country to exercise ownership also relies on other key factors, such as the global economic environment and internal capacities (OECD 2009a). The framework looks at references and commitments to ownership enablers including domestic resource mobilization, capacity

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8 For example, it is unclear whether countries will have space to set their own level of ambition on global targets, as suggested by the High Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (2013), or whether they will be required to measure progress on global targets, which will be complemented by a set of nationally relevant targets as suggested by the Sustainable Development Solutions Network (2015).
development, debt relief, global reforms in areas such as trade and taxation, technology transfer and external financing, *inter alia*. The inclusion of ownership enablers in the framework helps to inform practical ways of understanding ownership in relation to different modalities of development cooperation as well as broader systemic issues.9

The categories included in the framework are not mutually exclusive. For example, donors agreed to make use of country systems in various HLF as a means to support capacity development. Nevertheless commitments related to capacity development and use of country systems have been treated separately in the framework to ensure all commitments related to capacity development are captured by the framework.

### Documents Assessed
The review is limited to several official inputs into the Financing for Development and SDG negotiations (Table 2). It includes the latest draft negotiating texts for the SDGs and the Financing for Development conference, the report of the Inter-governmental Committee on Financing for Sustainable Development, the Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals (OWG) proposal for the SDGs, the Secretary General’s Synthesis Report and the two official regional positions which have been put forward – namely from Africa and the European Union.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Addis Abba Accord Revised Draft</td>
<td>Released May 7, 2015, second draft of the Addis Ababa Accord which will be agreed to at the Third Conference on Financing for Development in July 2015. Outlines a global framework for financing sustainable development and addresses other means of implementation associated with the SDGs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report of the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing</td>
<td>The Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing was established by the General Assembly in June 2013 to propose options on an effective sustainable development financing strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transforming Our World by 2030 - a New Agenda for Global Action (Zero Draft Outcome Document, UN Summit 2015)</td>
<td>First draft of the outcome document for the UN Summit in September 2015, released June 1. Includes an opening declaration, Sustainable Development Goals and targets, a section on the means of implementation and the global partnership as well as a section on follow-up and review. Three annexes are included which address proposed revisions to 21 of the 169 targets proposed by the OWG, the possibility of establishing a Technology Facilitation Mechanism, and the opening text from the OWG’s proposal as a reference for negotiators.</td>
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9 See Annex 1 for details on how each enabler relates to country ownership.
Table 2. Documents assessed according to ownership framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>Open Working Group proposal for Sustainable Development Goals</td>
<td>Outcome document from the OWG. Outlines the link between the SDGs and the Rio+20 outcomes, provides context for the SDGs and proposes 17 SDGs with 169 corresponding targets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Road to Dignity by 2030: Ending Poverty, Transforming All Lives and Protecting Planet</td>
<td>Synthesis report of the UN Secretary-General on the Post-2015 agenda. Served as an input into the SDG negotiation process, providing a synthesis of inputs from within and outside the UN system on the post-2015 agenda and making forward looking recommendations on the outcomes for September 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development After 2015</td>
<td>Published on 5 February 2015, the European Commission Communication, sets out the Commission’s views on the new global partnership. The communication informs European Union positions in preparations for the Financing for Development conference and the SDG negotiations.</td>
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Conducting the Assessment

Once the framework was established, it was tested against two documents – the OWG SDG proposal and draft Addis Ababa Accord – and further refined where appropriate. As a result of the initial test, capacity development and mutual accountability were added as separate categories to the framework to ensure commitments in these areas were effectively captured. The framework was then populated with direct quotes and summary information from the documents.

Based on the populated framework, each document was then assessed in terms of the extent to which it explicitly mentions ownership, integrates aspects of ownership throughout commitments and makes action-oriented commitments. Documents which were strongest on ownership tended to explicitly reference ownership principles,\(^{10}\) include ambitious, action oriented commitments to realise ownership principles, integrate provisions to ensure ownership throughout substantive commitments – for example, by noting a specific commitment should be in line with national circumstances and priorities – and include commitments to ownership enablers.

Key Findings

Overall References to Country Ownership

The notion of country ownership is clearly present across key inputs into the Financing for Development and SDG negotiations, though variation exists in terms of the strength of commitments (Table 3).

The Addis Ababa Accord revised draft and Report of the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing (ICESDF) both explicitly mention ownership principles and make references to respecting country priorities and circumstances throughout. Given the nature of these documents, they also include reference to commitments related to ownership enablers. The revised Addis Ababa Accord notes that national sustainable development plans, supported by integrated national financing strategies, should be at the heart of sustainable development efforts and that national policy space must be respected (2015, para. 8). The first principle in the ICESDF’s recommendations is to “[e]nsure country ownership and leadership in implementing national sustainable development strategies,

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\(^{10}\) Based on mentions of aspects of ownership (i.e. alignment, use of country systems, etc.) rather than explicit reference to aid and development effectiveness principles developed through the OECD-Development Assistance Committee-led HLF processes which are not universally accepted by all countries (see Kindornay and Samy 2012 for a discussion).
along with a supportive international environment” (2013, 13). The report goes onto include specific recommendations for development partners, such as better coordinating international public finance and increasing joint planning and programming based on country-led strategies and coordination arrangements (ICESDF 2013, 13). While the Addis Ababa Accord also refers to specific commitments related to supporting ownership such as alignment, use of country systems and aid untangling, in comparison to previous commitments, particularly through HLF, the language tends to be more generic and less action-oriented, as discussed below.

The OWG proposal includes no explicit reference to ownership, including in the chapeau text. Nevertheless, there is clear language that captures elements of ownership, notably target 17.15 on respecting policy space. Given the nature of the document, targets are also included that capture ownership enablers, some of which are linked to specific goal areas in addition to those captured by Goal 17 on the means of implementation. Draft zero of Transforming Our World by 2030 goes beyond the OWG proposal in terms of references to ownership. In addition to the OWG targets, it includes an explicit reference to national ownership as key to achieving the SDGs though language related to ensuring country ownership is not strongly integrated throughout in comparison to other documents examined. There is no reference to ownership principles though the draft notes that countries should have space to determine priorities, which should be protected, in the implementation and monitoring of the SDGs.

The Secretary General’s synthesis report notes that ownership underpins the SDG agenda and makes clear reference to some of the key principles. Considerations related to ownership are not integrated throughout the report. The report refers to ownership enablers in the framework though recommendations for action-oriented commitments are not consistently made throughout. With respect to ownership principles, no recommendations are made for action oriented commitments but rather the report recommends that the SDGs be implemented according to certain ownership principles broadly.

The Common African Position clearly refers to country ownership. However the articulation of specific components of ownership is lacking though references to respecting policy space are made frequently. The position also calls for a number of concrete actions, such as ensuring development partners align efforts to national and regional priorities, and meet existing commitments to improve the quality and predictability of external financing. While commitments related to ownership enablers are made throughout the document, considerations related to ensuring ownership are not consistently integrated across commitments.

The European Commission Communication refers to ownership principles, notably those under the HLF processes though it does not explicitly mention all principles that European Union countries have previously agreed to. References to ownership are not integrated throughout nor are specific action-oriented commitments, notably those previously made at HLF4, mentioned. Commitments, including specific action-oriented commitments, are made however, to ownership enablers.
### Table 3. Summary: Extent to which ownership is a strong component of key post-2015 inputs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Commitment to ownership</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Addis Ababa Accord Revised Draft</td>
<td>Explicit references to ownership principles as well as many references to the need to respect country circumstances throughout. References such as according to country circumstances and national plans, and taking differentiated approaches are peppered throughout. Given nature of the document, commitments made throughout to all ownership enablers in the framework. Action-oriented commitments related to supporting country ownership tend to be weaker than previous commitments and recommendations, particularly in HLF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report of the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing</td>
<td>Clearly places ownership at the heart of financing discussion and recognizes the need to ensure tools are tailored to country circumstances and according to established principles. In fact, the first principle of the strategic approach put forward in the report is country ownership and leadership over national sustainable development priorities. Ownership principles are explicitly mentioned in a number of instances, including the need for alignment, ownership, inclusive partnerships and mutual accountability. Recognition of the national and global factors that enable country ownership, particularly in the area of financing, is interwoven throughout the document. Offers concrete recommendations throughout for the broad financing agenda, typically qualified by considerations for country ownership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transforming Our World by 2030 - a New Agenda for Global Action (Zero Draft Outcome Document, UN Summit 2015)</td>
<td>One explicit reference to national ownership as key to achieving the SDGs though ownership language is not strongly integrated throughout. Provision related to ownership (i.e. country space to determine priorities and commitment to respect country priorities) made in sections on application of SDGs to national level, particularly for target setting, and in follow-up and review processes. No reference made to principles such as alignment, aid untied, predictability, mutual accountability or use of country systems though a number of targets focus on building capacity of country systems as noted in OWG proposal. Explicit language in opening text that notes each country circumstance is different and includes commitment to respect national policies and priorities and provide adequate space for economic growth (para. 19). Commentary related to OWG targets noted above applies to this document as well.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Working Group proposal for Sustainable Development Goals</td>
<td>No explicit reference to ownership. No reference made to principles such as alignment, aid untied, predictability, mutual accountability or use of country systems though a number of targets focus on building capacity of country systems. However, strong and explicit language in opening text that notes each country circumstance is different and that countries should own the SDG agenda and have space to identify their own national targets. Indicator 17.15 explicitly recognizes the need to respect policy space and country leadership. References to the need for international support and technical cooperation are throughout the document and in nearly all goal areas with the exceptions of goals 4, 5, and 14. Global reforms captured though strongest references pertain to trade, technology transfer and ensuring global economic stability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Road to Dignity by 2030: Ending Poverty, Transforming All Lives and Protecting Planet</td>
<td>Explicit reference to key principles of ownership and clear reference to ownership as underpinning agenda. Articulation of key aspects of “democratic” ownership, including participation, strengthening national accountability systems, and the roles of parliament and local government included. Ownership principles are not integrated throughout each section though the report captures enablers of ownership. Welcomes the report of the ICESDF, which is very strong on ownership. Refers ownership enablers at global and national levels. Action-oriented, specific recommendations for commitments are present for some though not all ownership enablers and absent for ownership principles.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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9 Paragraph 69. We will align activities with national priorities, including by reducing fragmentation, untie aid to the maximum extent, particularly for LDCs, promote its results orientation and use and strengthen country systems, use pooled finance mechanisms, increase predictability, reducing transaction costs and build genuine and inclusive partnerships, and increasing transparency and mutual accountability.

10 Section III, paragraph 2. All member states will engage voluntarily in review processes, taking into account different national realities, capacities and levels of development and respecting national policies and priorities. As national ownership is key to achieving sustainable development, outcomes from national-level processes will inform reviews at both regional and global levels (emphasis added).

11 Target 17.15. Respect each country’s policy space and leadership to establish and implement policies for poverty eradication and sustainable development.

12 These goals are related to education, gender equality and oceans, seas and marine resources respectively.
### Table 3. Summary: Extent to which ownership is a strong component of key post-2015 inputs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Commitment to ownership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common African Position on Post-2015</td>
<td>Clearly references national ownership but only in a few parts of the document and does not spell out what ownership entails though policy space is mentioned frequently. Mentions nearly all aspects of ownership. Has commitments throughout to ownership enablers. Position has a significant focus on participation in global decision-making processes and equitable and fair representation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development After 2015</td>
<td>Clearly makes reference to aid and development effectiveness principles agreed to at HLF4 and concept of ownership. Ownership considerations are not integrated throughout commitments nor are specific action-oriented commitments to ownership principles reaffirmed. There is room for stronger language on use of country systems and alignment though these are technically a part of development effectiveness principles. Recognizes need for country-led strategies and strong on democratic ownership, i.e. participation and inclusion. Refers to all ownership enablers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### How is Ownership Understood?

Official documentation refers to ownership in terms of policy space for defining and implementing the SDGs, including financing strategies, and recognizes that governments have primary responsibility for their own economic and social development, supported by the international community. The documentation reveals a number of ways in which ownership is understood and expected to be supported post-2015. Figure 1 provides an overview.

The importance of ensuring the SDGs are implemented in accordance to national plans, priorities and capacities is explicitly and implicitly referenced across the documentation. For example, the OWG SDG proposal states that the SDGs should “take into account different national realities, capacities and levels of development and respect national policies and priorities. [...] Targets are defined as aspirational global targets, with each Government setting its own national targets guided by the global level of ambition, but taking into account national circumstances” (UNGA 2014a, para. 18; see also UNGA 2015b). The Common African Position points out that the Post-2015 development agenda should “ensure policy space for nationally tailored policies and programmes on the continent” (African Union 2014, 2). The need for differentiated approaches to financing and implementation, including support for capacity development, is also emphasized (UNGA 2014a; 2015; ICESDF 2014; European Commission 2015). Nationally owned sustainable development strategies, including financing frameworks, are emphasised in the Addis Ababa Accord revised draft, Secretary-General’s Synthesis Report and the report of the ICESDF. The two key negotiating documents – the zero draft Transforming Our World by 2030 and the revised draft of the Addis Ababa Accord – specifically commit to respecting a country’s policy space and leadership.

In addition to references to policy space, national priorities, capacities and country leadership, well-established principles of aid and development effectiveness are also reference by most of the documents. The Secretary-General’s Synthesis Report, ICESDF, European Commission Communication and African Common Position refer to specific principles, including ownership, alignment and accountability, though do not consistently refer to all principles as outlined in the framework.

In addition to overarching principles and statements which tend to frame official documents, aspects of country ownership are also peppered throughout commitments. Across the documentation, substantive commitments often include language such as “in accordance with national policies” or “capacities.” Commitments related to the creation of social protection systems, for example, tend to refer to “nationally-appropriate” social protection systems (UNGA 2014a; 2015a; b) while commitments related to taxation and domestic resource mobilization refer to efforts in accordance with national capabilities and circumstances (UNGA 2015a).
Commitments to Ensure Country Ownership Post-2015

This section provides an overview of the commitments and trends emerging across the various components of ownership identified in the framework above. It begins with a discussion of principles, followed by an analysis of ownership enablers.

Participation and Inclusivity
There has been increasing recognition that development agendas should be developed through a broad and participatory approach at the country level. This includes ensuring space and support for parliaments, local government and civil society to play a role in development of national plans and accountability processes – or what is often referred to as democratic ownership.

The strongest references to principles of participation and inclusivity are seen in the ICESDF report, Secretary-General’s Synthesis Report, European Commission Communication and Common African Position. The principle is well-articulated in the ICESDF report which recommends that governments:

Adopt a multi-stakeholder, people-centred and inclusive approach to achieve tangible results on the ground. Consultations with all stakeholders, including civil society and the private sector, will enable Governments and policymakers to better appreciate the diverse needs and concerns of people in the formulation and implementation of sustainable development policies at all levels. In this regard, gender equality and the inclusion of marginalized groups, such as indigenous peoples and persons with disabilities, must be ensured. […] Planning and execution of budgets should be based on transparency, legitimacy, accountability and participation of citizens, consistent with country capabilities and circumstances. Furthermore, fiscal decentralization can strengthen local governance and create local ownership for the disposition of funds. (ICESDF 2014, 14; 19).
The Secretary General, European Commission and African Union emphasize the importance of inclusivity and participation in the review and implementation of sustainable development plans, as well as with respect to ensuring accountability. Like the ICESDF report, the Secretary General and European Commission also note the importance of national stakeholders such as parliaments, local government and civil society (UNGA 2014b, paras. 94; 149; European Commission 2015, 4). The Common African Position recognizes the need to improve the enabling environment for civil society (2014, para. 89).

The OWG proposal, draft zero Transforming Our World by 2030 and Addis Ababa Accord revised draft refer less to participation and inclusivity in comparison to other documents. The OWG proposal includes targets 6.b under water and sanitation and 11.3 for the goal related to cities and human settlements which refer directly to local participation. Target 16.7 calls for responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision making at all levels. Transforming Our World by 2030 makes a number of references to the need to ensure a multi-stakeholder approach to SDG implementation as well as follow-up and review (UNGA 2015b, paras. 36-7; III. 5). Importantly, one of the principles suggested by the zero draft to inform follow-up and review is that review processes will be “open and inclusive, supported by an enabling environment for the participation of all people and stakeholders” (UNGA 2015b, para. II.3.c). The revised draft of the Addis Ababa Accord recognizes the need for “appropriate local community participation in decisions affecting their communities, based on country circumstances” in the localization of sustainable development priorities and activities (UNGA 2015a, para. 31). Nevertheless, in comparison to other official inputs, language related to ensuring participation and inclusivity – or democratic ownership – in the implementation of the SDGs could be strengthened and made more explicit in the negotiated outcome documents.

Alignment and Use of Country Systems
Alignment of external support to national sustainable development strategies and use of country-led coordination arrangements and systems are perhaps among the most obvious manifestations of support for country ownership. Though the actual language of “alignment” is not always used, commitments to support nationally-tailored sustainable development plans are present across official documentation. The Addis Ababa Accord revised draft states that:

We [governments] will spend our resources efficiently and effectively in support of country-owned national sustainable development strategies and the SDGs;
encourage the targeting of ODA to countries where the need is greatest, in particular LDCs [least developed countries], LLDCs [land-locked developing countries], SIDS [small-island developing states] and African countries, in accordance with their national priorities; and encourage and promote effective multi-stakeholder partnerships to support country-driven priorities and strategies building on lessons learned (UNGA 2015a, paras. 27, 52, 65; see also para. 117).

The ICESDF calls on governments to communicate their strategic frameworks and for donors to improve their management and coordination of international public support based on country-led strategies and coordination arrangements (2014, 17; 30). The Common African Position notes that international partners have a responsibility to honour their commitments and support country-led strategies, including aligning efforts as appropriate (2014, paras. 12, 77). The European Commission highlights principles of country ownership, but does not explicitly mention alignment. The OWG proposal (and by extension zero draft

15 See, for example, UNGA (2014b, paragraphs 77, 127 and 149); African Union (2014, paragraphs 79 and 99) and European Commission (2015, 4; 15, and Annex, 4).
outcome document for September 2015) consistently makes reference to commitments in accordance with national definitions and circumstances. 16

While the commitment to align international support with national strategies is present across the documents examined, there seems to be less attention to use of country systems. The Secretary General’s report notes that all financing flows should “build stronger country ownership and lead to greater use of country strategies and systems” (2014b, para. 101) and the Addis Ababa Accord revised draft refers to the use and strengthening of country systems in the section on improving the quality of international public finance. Such language is noticeably lacking in other official documentation.

**Aid Untying and Predictability**

Aid untying presents greater opportunities for local procurement and value for money while improving aid predictability enables developing countries to better plan and coordinate development efforts, thus supporting ownership over implementation processes. Very few specific references are made to the need to untie aid and improve the predictability of external financing across the documents. The Addis Ababa Accord revised draft includes commitments to “untie aid to the maximum extent, particularly for LDCs” and to “increase predictability” as part of efforts to improve the quality and effectiveness of international public finance (UNGA 2015a, para. 69). It also encourages South-South providers to provide regular and timely information to developing country partners to improve predictability (UNGA 2015a, para. 54). Target 1.a in the proposed SDGs calls for ensuring the mobilization of resources from a variety of sources in order to provide adequate and predictable means for eliminating poverty (emphasis added). Though aid and development effectiveness principles are noted in the Secretary General report and the European Commission Communication, aid untying and predictability are not explicitly mentioned alongside other principles such as mutual accountability, results, inclusive partnerships and ownership. The Common African Position, perhaps unsurprisingly given the reliance on external financing by many countries on the continent, is explicit on the need to improve predictability though it does not refer to aid untying. The African Union has called for implementation of existing commitments to promote the quality and predictability of financing, including in the areas of climate change financing, official development assistance and innovative financing (African Union 2014, paras. 74-76).

**Mutual Accountability**

Mutual accountability refers to accountability between governments and their citizens and to each other for development results. The use of mutual accountability frameworks enables development partners to hold one another account for their commitments with the aim of building trust and “promoting predictable, cost-effect and transparent development cooperation that is country-led and inclusive.”17

With the exception of the OWG proposal and zero draft Transforming Our World by 2030, all documents make reference to the concept of mutual accountability and the need for it to be strengthened. 18 The Addis Ababa Accord revised draft notes the importance of mutual accountability both in the context of North-South and South-South flows while the ICESDF notes that there is a need for “more harmonized and coherent mutual accountability, with improved data collection and strengthened monitoring, while ensuring country ownership” (2014, 14). The Secretary General’s report and the European Commission Communication note that mutual accountability is critical and should include all stakeholders such as development partners beyond governments, like the private sector, which will play an important role in

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16 See targets 1.2, 5.4, 5.a, 9.2, 9.4, 10.b, 12.7, and 16.10 for example.
implementing the SDGs. The Common African Position highlights mutual accountability in terms of accountability between governments and citizens and between development partners.

Capacity Development
Capacity development is critical to enabling developing countries to design and implement – or own – policies and programs, as well as for ensuring other national stakeholders, such as civil society, parliaments and local governments, are able to contribute to national development processes. Of the various principles and enablers of ownership examined through the framework, commitments and references to capacity development were considerable. Capacity development is strongly referenced across all reports both in broad terms and with respect to specific, actionable commitments.

Box 1 provides an overview of the key, substantive areas in which commitments or recommendations related to capacity development have been made across the documents. Though there is no explicit mention of untying support for capacity development or ownership over diagnostic tools for determining institutional capacity, the notion that capacity development should be demand driven is also present in some documents. The Addis Ababa Accord revised draft notes that capacity development should be carried out in support of national sustainable development strategies while the European Commission Communication emphasizes that capacity development must be demand driven.

Box 1. Commitments and recommendations for capacity development post-2015

- Development planning and implementation
- Strengthening human resources and national institutions, including parliaments, supreme audit institutions, and local government
- Taxation, including engagement in international cooperation in this area
- Domestic resource mobilization
- Foreign direct investment (FDI) promotion
- Capital account management
- Financial institutions
- Debt management
- Management of external financing
- Capacity to establish and implement private-public partnerships
- Agriculture
- Management of water resources and ecosystems
- Education and training
- Innovation, technology development and transfer
- Trade promotion
- Manage and finance disaster risk
- Climate change related planning and management
- Water and sanitation related activities and programs
- Early warning in health
- Violence and human trafficking
- Data collection and statistics
- Support for peer-learning

Financing Post-2015
Access to sufficient national and international public and private finance is important for enabling developing countries to implement development plans. In this context, domestic resource mobilization provides a means for countries to reduce reliance on external funding which often comes with conditions, in theory, affording them greater space and control over development processes. There is no question that domestic resource mobilization is a central pillar of discussions on the financing and implementation of the SDGs. The ICESDF (2014, 17) report notes the central role of domestic resource mobilization in reinforcing country ownership and financial autonomy. Though primarily a responsibility of each national government, recognition exists that domestic resource mobilization also requires a supportive international environment (UNGA 2014b, para. 91). In terms of specific commitments in the negotiating texts, the Addis Ababa Accord revised draft encourages countries to set out nationally defined domestic revenue targets to be reached by 2025.19 Under the proposed SDGs, target 17.1 refers to the

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19 Compared to the first draft text, the commitment has been weakened. The draft zero text states: Countries with government revenue below 20 per cent of GOP agree to progressively increase tax revenues, with the aim of halving the gap towards 20 per
commitment to “strengthen domestic resource mobilization, including through international support to
developing countries, to improve domestic capacity for tax and other revenue collection.”

Debt reduction also has implications for country ownership. Developing countries have greater domestic
resources to implement their development plans when debt repayments are reduced. With the exception
of the Common African Position which makes no reference to debt, all reports recognize the importance
of addressing debt management and improving debt sustainability, emphasizing shared responsibility of
debtors and creditors (ICESDF 2014, 21; 43-44; UNGA 2014b, para. 116; European Commission 2015,
7). Provision to support further debt relief of heavily indebted poor countries have also been included the
negotiating texts for the Financing for Development and the SDGs. The current draft of the Addis Ababa
Accord includes an entire section on debt which emphasizes prudent debt management, ongoing efforts
related to debt relief and restructuring, and the responsibilities of debtors and creditors for preventing and
resolving unsustainable debt situations (UNGA 2015a, paras. 80-89). The SDGs include target 17.4,
which is to “Assist developing countries in attaining long-term debt sustainability through coordinated
policies aimed at fostering debt financing, debt relief and debt restructuring, as appropriate, and address
the external debt of highly indebted poor countries to reduce debt distress.”

Finally, the provision of external financing will be critical to realising the SDGs in many countries, and as
noted above, has potential to support country ownership when aligned to national priorities and plans and
delivered through country systems. Across reports and negotiating texts there is a clear recognition that
while the design of policies and plans post-2015 will happen at the national level, international support
and cooperation will be required to realise sustainable development outcomes in alignment with national
priorities and needs. As with capacity development, a significant number of commitments have been
made to external financing and technical assistance, though concrete figures have yet to be announced
(Box 2).

Given the substantive nature of the negotiations this is unsurprising. The documents examined note the
importance of all sources of finance, including official development assistance, private finance, South-
South cooperation, though international cooperation is the broad term frequently used. A number refer to
the increasing use of aid as a catalytic resource for development and recognize that it has an important
role to play in leveraging additional finance from the private sector and supporting innovation. In this
context, blended financing mechanisms, pooled multilateral funds and private sector partnership have
been emphasized as important modalities. Such mechanisms offer potential to leverage additional
financial flows, as well as realise development outcomes through multi-stakeholder partnership. As noted
by the ICESDF (2014), it will be important to ensure that blended and innovative funding modalities align
with national development plans post-2015.

cent by 2025, and countries with government revenue above 20 per cent of GOP agree to raise tax revenues as appropriate
20 The European Commission Communication also includes encourages governments to achieve optimal levels of revenue. The
European Commission (2015, 7) and African Union (2014, para. 23) also note the importance of reforming national tax systems,
including to ensure fair taxation.
Box 2. Commitments to external financing and technical assistance post-2015

Addis Ababa Accord Revised Draft
- Infrastructure (para. 13)
- FDI promotion (para 44)
- Increase official development assistance, including commitment to allocate 0.7% of GNI in ODA by 2020 (para. 51)
- 0.15 to 0.20% of GNI to LDCs (para. 51)
- Implement existing commitments, including on climate finance (para. 56)
- Encourage participation in innovative financing mechanisms (para. 60)
- Funding for education (para. 67)
- Trade support (paras. 76-77)
- Domestic technology development (para. 104)
- National science, technology and innovations (para. 108)

Proposed Sustainable Development Goals
- 1.a. Ensure significant mobilization of resources from a variety of sources to end poverty
- 2.a. Increase investment [...] agriculture
- 3.c. Substantially increase health financing
- 6.a. Expand international cooperation and capacity-building support in water and sanitation
- 7.a. Enhance international cooperation to facilitate access to clean energy research and technology and promote investment in energy infrastructure and clean energy technology
- 8.a. Increase Aid for Trade support for developing countries
- 9.a. Enhance financial, technological and technical support [...] for infrastructure
- 10.b. Encourage official development assistance and financial flows, including foreign direct investment [...] in accordance with their national plans and programmes
- 11.c. Financial and technical assistance for building sustainable and resilient buildings
- 12.a. Support developing country capacity to move towards more sustainable patterns of consumption and production
- 13.a. Implement the climate financing commitments
- 15.a. Mobilize and significantly increase financial resources from all sources for biodiversity and ecosystems
- 15.b. Mobilize significant resources from all sources and at all levels to finance sustainable forest management
- 16.a. Strengthen national institutions, including through international cooperation [...] to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime
- 17.1. Strengthen domestic resource mobilization, including through international support to developing countries
- 17.2. Implement fully official development assistance (ODA) commitments (ODA to GNI)
- 17.3. Mobilize additional financial resources for developing countries from multiple sources
- 17.8. Fully operationalize the technology bank and science
- 17.9. Enhance international support for implementing effective and targeted capacity-building to support national sustainable development plans
- 17.18. Enhance capacity-building support for high-quality, timely and reliable data
- 17.19. Support statistical capacity-building in developing countries

Global Reform

The need for global reforms to address illicit capital flight and corruption, improve cooperation on taxation, establish an open and fair multilateral trading system and promote economic stability has been well established, particularly through successive UN commitments including the Millennium Declaration, Monterrey Consensus and Doha Declaration. Systemic issues set the rules of the game in which countries work to achieve sustainable development outcomes in a highly globalized world. From the perspective of country ownership, action in these areas can contribute to increasing the amount of resources and space developing countries have to realise the SDGs.

Though estimates vary on overall amounts, agreement exists that corruption and illicit capital flight reduce resources available for development (see, e.g. Tax Justice Network n.d.; Global Financial Integrity 2015). Related, improved cooperation on tax matters also holds potential to reduce tax evasion, further bolstering resources available to developing countries. In the area of trade, a level playing field offers opportunities for governments to increase revenues as the economy grows through increased trade. Finally, the 2008 Global Financial Crisis served as a stark reminder to developing and developed countries alike on the importance of ensuring economic and financial stability. Countries around the world faced a credit crunch and many had insufficient reserves to mitigate the negative impacts of the crisis. Coupled with rising food prices and less capacity, developing countries were disproportionately impacted.
Policy space for addressing the crises was severely limited, not least of all by the lack of domestic and international finance.

All documents noted the need for reforms to reduce financial volatility, including reforms of the international monetary and financial system. The revised Addis Ababa Accord commitments governments to "continue to strengthen international coordination and coherence of macroeconomic policies to enhance global financial and macroeconomic stability, and prevent financial crises, acknowledging that national policy decisions can have systemic and far-ranging effects well beyond national borders, including on developing countries" (UNGA 2015a, para. 92). Target 17.13 embodies this commitment under the proposed SDGs.

In addition to considerations for ensuring global economic stability, commitments have been made to address illicit capital flight and corruption, and improve international cooperation on taxation. All documents highlight the importance of these issues and the need for further and deeper cooperation in these areas, though the key inputs into financing discussions – the revised Addis Ababa Accord and ICESDF – denote more attention to these issues given the nature of the content they address. The revised Addis Ababa Accord includes commitments to address tax evasion, ensure more concerted international cooperation, provide support for developing countries to participate in automatic tax exchange, and upgrade the UN Committee on Tax to an intergovernmental committee (UNGA 2015a, paras. 20, 21, 23-6). In addition, the document asks that the UN, International Monetary Fund and World Bank develop a definition of illicit flows and track them. It also calls for countries that have not ratified or acceded to the UN Convention against Corruption to do so. For its part, the proposed SDGs include target 16.4 which calls for a significant reduction of illicit financial and arms flows as well as the strengthening of recovery and return of stolen assets. While the importance of supporting developing country tax systems is noted through target 17.1, the proposed SDGs do not include commitments to international cooperation on taxation at the global level.

The discussion and commitments related to trade in the documents examined largely resemble those under the Millennium Declaration, Monterrey Consensus and Doha Declaration. They call for an open, non-discriminatory, predictable and equitable trading system, the need to complete the Doha Development round, and to ensure better access to technology and medicines in developing countries. An emphasis on harmful subsidies, particularly those which are environmentally harmful such as for fossil fuels, and reducing other trade distortions is also apparent across document. In addition to their commitment to implement the Bali package on trade facilitation, the European Commission Communication calls on all developed and emerging economies to provide duty-free and quota-free market access to LDC products. The Common African Position also notes the need for infrastructure projects to facilitate intra-African trade and to ensure that accession to the World Trade Organization is carried out with respect to countries’ level of development. The revised Addis Ababa Accord devotes ten paragraphs to trade related issues and includes a commitment to increase world trade, including exports from developing countries and to duty-free quota-free market access for LDCs (UNGA 2015a, paras. 70-9). Trade related provisions are peppered throughout the draft OWG proposed SDGs. Trade related targets have been included under goal 2 on hunger and sustainable agriculture, goal 3 on health, goal 10

21 See UNGA (2015, paragraphs 37 and 92; 2014b paragraphs 80, 95, 103, 113 and 114), ICESDF (2014, 18; 25; 41); African Union (2014, paragraphs 22, 71, and 86); European Commission (2015, 6).
22 The target reads: Enhance global macroeconomic stability, including through policy coordination and policy coherence. In addition, targets 2.c and 10.5 also capture elements of global economic stability.
23 See ICESDF (2014, 17, 18, 42, 43); UNGA (2014b, paragraphs 80 and 115); African Union (2014, paragraph 73); European Commission (2015, 7-8; Annex, 3).
24 UNGA (2014b, paragraphs 80, 95 and 102); ICESDF (2015, 19, 40); African Union (2014; paragraphs 26, 77, 80-3 and 86); European Commission (2015, 5, 9-10).
on inequality, and 14 on water resources.\textsuperscript{25} Goal 17 on global partnership and the means of implementation includes three trade-related targets.\textsuperscript{26}

**Global Governance**

Reform of global institutions to ensure more representative and inclusive decision making in global governance has been a long-standing issue. Global institutions including multilateral development banks, the International Monetary Fund and UN agencies serve as important partners in development whose governance and operating structure impacts possibilities for country ownership. Given the influential role such organizations play at the national level, developing countries have called for reforms of global institutions to ensure greater representation and thus, reflection of developing country priorities, particularly in terms of organizational priorities and how engagement in development occurs.\textsuperscript{27} All documents note the need for global governance reform to ensure fair representation, strengthen developing country voice and improve transparency.\textsuperscript{28} The Common African Position is the most vocal on this issue, which is perhaps unsurprising given that African countries tend to be among the most marginalized in institutions of global governance, both in terms of their formal position with global institutions and their capacity to participate. The Common African Position refers to the need for reforms of global institutions no less than in six instances, and calls for effort to ensure “that the global governance architecture is inclusive, responsive, legitimate, democratic, equitable and accountable […] and] promotes ownership, reliability, equality of states, leadership and accountability” (African Union 2014, paras. 77, 79; see also paras. 14, 20, 92). The revised Addis Ababa Accord includes commitments to broaden and strengthen developing country voice and representation in global economic governance (2015, para. 94), a commitment which is echoed by target 16.8\textsuperscript{29} under the proposed SDGs.

**Implications for Post-2015 and Ongoing Negotiations**

The assessment of country ownership revealed that most principles and enablers of ownership are included across key official documentation in the post-2015 process. An important implication of this is that the concept of ownership should guide international cooperation and implementation of the SDGs post-2015. Nevertheless, ensuring country ownership post-2015 may require moving beyond the traditional rhetoric of ensuring policy space to include concrete commitments to ownership principles and practical steps to realise them as well as more actionable commitments on ownership enablers. The findings suggest a number of areas where gaps exist and provisions related to country ownership could be strengthened in the final outcomes from ongoing negotiations.

**Ownership Principles**

**Capturing All Principles of Ownership in Negotiated Outcomes**

Typically, ownership principles, such as participation and inclusivity, alignment and mutual accountability are included in the documents assessed. However, some principles could be more explicitly included in the final outcome documents from Addis Ababa in July and New York in September.

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\textsuperscript{25} Targets 2.b, 3.b, 10.a and 14.6.

\textsuperscript{26} Targets 17.10, 17.11, and 17.12.

\textsuperscript{27} See Besada and Kindornay (2013) for an overview.

\textsuperscript{28} UNGA (2014b, paragraph 95); European Commission (2015, 6); ICESDF (2014, 40-1).

\textsuperscript{29} Target 16.8 Broaden and strengthen participation of developing countries in global institutions.
The Addis Ababa Accord and Transforming Our World by 2030 refer less to inclusivity and participation compared to the other documents assessed. The Addis Ababa Accord and Transforming Our World by 2030 should clearly articulate the importance of participation and inclusivity in the preparation of national sustainable development plans and financing strategies. While Transforming Our World by 2030 includes some language to this effect on implementation and follow-up and review, it could be strengthened, particularly drawing from the language in the ICESDF report. Given the emphasis that is being placed on national sustainable development plans, inclusivity and participation in their creation will be critical to ensuring that such plans are useful, meaningful, legitimate and promote change. In this context, governments will need to ensure that an enabling environment exists for inclusive participation by national stakeholders including parliamentarians, local government, civil society and the private sector.

In addition, key negotiating texts make little to no reference to use of country systems as an important mechanism for delivering external assistance and supporting country capacity, and thus ownership, post-2015. The Addis Ababa Accord currently includes the commitment to use and strengthen country systems in the context of improving the quality of international development finance (2015, para. 69). However, stronger and more explicit wording on the use of country systems as the default option in the implementation of the SDGs could be more effectively integrated throughout the Addis Ababa Accord, recognizing that the use of country systems is central to capacity development efforts broadly and should be a central aspect of international cooperation beyond aid. In addition to existing commitments to implementing the SDGs in accordance with national plans, capacities and circumstances, Transforming Our World by 2030 should also include explicit commitments to alignment and the use of country systems as well as broader principles of ownership which are noticeably lacking in the declaration text.

Ambitious, Actionable Commitments to Realise Ownership
As noted above, most commitments to principles of ownership are included across the documents with the exception of the OWG’s proposal for the SDGs and Transforming Our World by 2030, and many commitments have been qualified to state “in accordance with national priorities.” However, is this approach sufficient for ensuring country ownership post-2015?

One way to strengthen commitments to ownership in the existing negotiating texts would be to couple principles with specific new and reaffirmed commitments to implementation. Such an approach may also provide a means to avoid backsliding on previous commitments. For example, the Addis Ababa Accord currently includes the commitment to untie aid “to the maximum extent possible” and to improve predictability. However, official development assistance providers have already agreed to “accelerate [] efforts to untie aid [and] in 2012, review [] plans to achieve this [as well as] improve the quality, consistency and transparency of reporting on the tying status of aid” (HLF4 2011, 5). In 2011, they also agreed that those who had committed to the Accra Agenda for Action would improve medium term predictability and provide regular, timely rolling three-to-five year indicative forward expenditure and/or implementation plans by 2013 (HLF4 2011, 7). An opportunity exists to establish a more ambitious agenda for country ownership through post-2015 negotiations. In lieu of a more ambitious approach, at the very least post-2015 commitments should not backslide on previous gains. Commitment to ownership principles and the means of realising them should be at least as ambitious as those which have been previously made.

Another important area where concrete commitments to realise country ownership may be warranted is around the promotion of multi-stakeholder partnerships and the use of blended and innovative financing mechanisms. The Addis Ababa Accord revised draft commits governments to “encourage and promote effective multi-stakeholder partnerships to support country-driven priorities and strategies building on
lessons learned” (2015, para. 65) and notes that “PPPs should not replace or compromise state responsibilities, and should include clear accountability mechanisms” (2015, paras. 65; 48). It also notes that innovative financing mechanisms should be disbursed in line with internationally agreed development effectiveness principles and respect developing country priorities and contexts (UNGA 2015a, para. 60). Transforming Our World by 2030 similarly makes broad commitments to multi-stakeholder partnerships going forward, particularly in the implementation of the SDGs. While the references to country priorities and development effectiveness principles are welcome here, the commitment, and others like it, are without specific commitments on how such efforts will be conducted to guarantee alignment with government priorities and ensure use of country systems in practice. Committing to the incorporation and coordination of multi-stakeholder partnerships with national SDG financing strategies could serve as a practical means ensure alignment with government priorities and use of country systems going forward.

Transforming Our World by 2030 is largely silent on these issues, even in the section on means of implementation and global partnership. **Transforming Our World by 2030 and the Addis Ababa Accord should make explicit commitments to actions which give concrete expression to principles of country ownership and reaffirm and strengthen existing commitments.**

**Ensuring Ownership is Central to Negotiated Post-2015 Outcome Documents**

In comparison to the negotiated texts, ownership is a more centralized and integrated aspect of preparatory papers for post-2015 (notably the ICESDF and the Secretary General’s synthesis report). Importantly, the concept of ownership goes beyond improving the quality international cooperation. Indeed, the ICESDF report moves beyond notions of ownership as an issue related to aid provision, but refers to it as the first strategic principle underpinning financing strategies for the SDGs, which are central to implementing national sustainable development plans.

Notwithstanding the mentions to nationally-owned sustainable development plans in current negotiating texts, principles related to country ownership are current articulated in the section on improving the quality of international public finance in the Addis Ababa Accord. **However, given the emphasis on national priorities, capacities and circumstances that has underpinned post-2015 discussions, ownership principles have broad applicability to the full sustainable development agenda, moving beyond aid.** The concept of country ownership may have originated as an aid management tool, but it has broader applicability in the post-2015 context. Indeed, country ownership should underpin all aspects of the SDG agenda from the setting of national priorities to the management and coordination of all financing flows. Ownership principles should not be relegated to sections on international public finance but clearly articulated as part of the chapeau for negotiated texts and integrated throughout commitments made.

National sustainable development plans and integrated financing strategies have been couched at a central means of implementing the SDGs at the national level. Yet, the current negotiating documents do not actually include a commitment by countries to prepare national sustainable development strategies or plans. **Given the stress on national sustainable development plans as underpinning the implementation of the SDGs, commitments to establish such plans should be included in the negotiated outcomes.** Countries, particularly those which rely heavily on external financing, will need to demonstrate leadership in the preparation of such plans through inclusive and participatory processes

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30 *Transforming Our World by 2030 (UNGA 2015b, paragraph 4) states: Building on existing reporting and planning instruments, such as national sustainable development strategies, we encourage all member states to develop ambitious national responses to the SDGs and targets as soon as possible.*
behind which the international community can align their efforts. Such plans will need to effectively articulate national priorities in relation to the SDG agenda, set appropriately ambitious national level targets, set forward financing and implementation plans, identify financing and capacity gaps where additional support is needed, and establish mechanisms for monitoring results. Importantly, given the need to localize the agenda, provisions will also need to be made to enable decentralization and downward ownership over the implementation of the SDGs. In countries with less capacity, the international community will have a supportive role to play in the establishment of national level plans.

Ownership Enablers

The significant focus on capacity development in post-2015 discussions is welcome and responsive to developing country priorities. The recognition that the SDGs will be implemented in accordance to national capacities is important for ensuring that commitments are ambitious and realistic, recognizing countries’ individual starting points. The integration of commitments related to capacity development throughout SDGs draws attention to capacity gaps, and can serve as a starting point in setting out an agenda for action post-2015. The Addis Ababa Accord currently stresses the “importance of preparing country needs assessments for the different needs and priority areas that would allow for greater transparency and efficiency of implementation by linking needs and support, in particular in developing countries” (2015, para. 117). While this commitment is welcome, this commitment could be strengthened by including language aimed at ensuring that such capacity assessments are country-led and based on nationally defined results frameworks and strategies to ensure that capacity development efforts are demand-driven.

The current focus on capacity development in the Addis Ababa Accord and Transforming Our World by 2030 should be maintained. This includes the broad recognition that capacity development is necessary for realising the SDGs and the integration of provisions related to capacity development across thematic areas. Current commitments could be strengthened by including more explicit language guaranteeing that capacity development efforts will be demand-driven post-2015.

The commitments to capacity development, external financing and global reforms will need to be coupled with strong systems of follow-up and review, learning from the previous experience of MDG monitoring (Kindornay and Twigg 2015). The Addis Ababa Accord and SDG commitments are set to be matched with systems for monitoring progress, reviewing commitments and promoting accountability. The revised Addis Ababa Accord makes reference to the importance of transparency and publishing “timely, comprehensive and forward-looking information on development activities in a common, open, electronic format, as appropriate” noting existing initiatives such as the International Aid Transparency Initiative (UNGA 2015a, para. 117), that provides a framework for publishing information on financing for development flows. The publication of timely, comprehensive and forward looking information through a common standard is key part of transparency and mutual accountability, as noted at HLF4 and reaffirmed in the most recent High Level Meeting of the GPEDC. The provision of timely, comprehensive and forward looking information supports SDG follow-up and review, but also enables developing countries to budget, plan and coordinate in a more efficient and informed way.

The follow-up and review process should include a strong mechanism to take stock of specific commitments to capacity development, external financing and global reforms, monitor progress, identify gaps and promote accountability. This could include tracking overall progress globally, but also specific commitments made by individual countries or groups of countries, particularly given that
commitments related to the global enabling environment for sustainable development will require action from countries in line with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.  

Risks

Moving forward, there are a number of risks in the current framing of the post-2015 agenda. The strong recognition that each country is responsible for its own sustainable development outcomes squarely places responsibility on the shoulders of governments to their citizens. While the locus of implementation and accountability will happen at the national level, a key risk is that countries will be held accountable for outcomes that are determined by a wide range of factors outside their control and for which some countries have more responsibility than others, such as establishing a stable global economic environment and providing external financing, as noted above. It will be critical to ensure that all stakeholders are held accountable for their commitments post-2015, and that national level progress is understood within the broad context of progress on the establishment of a supportive and enabling global environment. “Part of the follow-up and review framework will necessarily need to be about the support governments give to each other; how governments collectively put in place a global environment that supports, or at the very least does not undermine, the SDGs” (Kindornay and Twigg 2015, 3). All stakeholders bear some responsibility for national outcomes on sustainable development.

Given that realising the SDGs is a shared responsibility among members of the international community – a point which is clearly made in the Addis Ababa Accord and Transforming our World by 2030 – mutual accountability is an important principle going forward. Notwithstanding the avoidance of the term “accountability” in post-2015 discussions, global follow-up and review will need to be coupled with strengthened and updated systems of mutual accountability at the country level to reflect post-2015 commitments going forward, including commitments to support country ownership over the agenda, align efforts to national sustainable development plans and financing strategies, and engage a wide range of stakeholders in implementation and review processes. Such frameworks should not only examine progress against the realisation of goals but also capture issues related to the means of implementation – in other words, provision of external finance and technical assistance, and support for domestic resource mobilization and taxation for example. As pointed out in a recent review of monitoring, review and accountability for development cooperation post-2015 however, many developing countries will require support to develop appropriate national monitoring systems in this regard, including institutional capacity development (Bester 2015).

Another important risk is with respect to how the SDGs are implemented at the country level. While they should be nationally owned, a risk exists that government may choose more or less ambitious approaches to SDG implementation. As noted in Kindornay and Twigg (2015, 3), participatory national planning processes offer an important way to help governments determine and appropriate level of ambition for national progress. Strong and inclusive national and local monitoring and review systems,

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32 The terminology of “accountability” has been removed from much of the lexicon of post-2015 negotiations with some member states arguing that “accountability” is not appropriate for an intergovernmental process given that sovereign states are accountable to their citizens, not each other (IISD Reporting Services 2015). The notion of “mutual accountability” also suffers from historically being derived through the OECD-led aid effectiveness process, notwithstanding the fact that the UN Development Cooperation Forum essentially serves as the lead on this issue through UNDESA’s biennial review of global accountability which began in 2009. See http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/newfunc/dcf_account2.shtml for more information on the UN Development Cooperation Forum’s work related to mutual accountability.
citizen-led monitoring, the creation of open and inclusive space for dialogue, and the establishment of an enabling environment for broad participation by all national stakeholders also holds potential to promote an ambitious approach to realising the SDGs at the national level and ensure broad country ownership.

**Conclusion**

This report has offered an assessment and analysis of commitments to country ownership post-2015. It highlighted the need for strong commitments to country ownership in the chapeau texts of the Addis Ababa Accord and the SDGs, as well as the inclusion of ambitious, action oriented commitments aimed at realising country ownership in practice. The report welcomed the extensive commitments to key enablers of ownership, including capacity development and external financing, but noted that strong systems of monitoring and review will be needed to promote accountability going forward. The report also highlighted the dual-edged risk related to country ownership over the SDGs. On one hand, the focus on the country level is important for ensuring ownership, but may also reduce the onus on the international community if national level progress is not properly understood within the context of overall commitments to establish an enabling environment for sustainable development and to support countries with less capacity to realise sustainable development outcomes. On the other hand, the translation of the SDGs to the national level and the focus on country space is critical to ensuring country ownership but may afford governments the opportunity to adopt targets which are not sufficiently ambitious. Participatory planning processes and effective systems of follow-up and review will be needed to mitigate these risks.

The Addis Ababa Accord and SDGs outcome document will serve as important roadmaps for the international community post-2015 – and as such, should include appropriate language and actionable commitments on ownership. Yet, the extent to which countries own the SDG agenda will depend on the extent to which commitments translate into action. The experience of the HLF processes suggests that greater efforts continue to be needed on the part of development partners to support country ownership, including changes to the ways in which they provide support to developing countries. At the same time, leadership at the country level will be critical to providing a set of policies and plans behind which domestic and international stakeholders can support the implementation of the SDGs.

A number of recommendations arise from this study. Going forward, post-2015 outcome documents could be strengthened in the following ways:

- Commit to create national sustainable development strategies to guide post-2015 implementation at the country level, including financing strategies where appropriate. Countries, particularly those which rely heavily on external financing, will need to demonstrate leadership in the preparation of such strategies through inclusive and participatory processes behind which the international community can align their efforts.

**Ownership Principles**

- Commit to country ownership as a central pillar of the SDG process and broaden commitments related to ownership principles to go beyond international public finance.
- Make explicit commitments to actions which give concrete expression to principles of country ownership and reaffirm and strengthen existing commitments.
- Clearly articulate the importance of participation and inclusivity in the preparation of national sustainable development plans and financing strategies, as well as monitoring and review processes.
- Include stronger and more explicit wording on the use of country systems as the default option in the implementation of the SDGs in the Addis Ababa Accord.
• Include explicit commitments to alignment and the use of country systems as well as broader principles of ownership in Transforming Our World by 2030.

Ownership Enablers

• Maintain the current focus on capacity development and include commitments to ensure efforts are demand-driven by countries receiving support.
• Ensure the follow-up and review process includes a strong mechanism to take stock of specific commitments to capacity development, external financing and global reforms, monitor progress, identify gaps and promote accountability.
• Strengthen and update systems of mutual accountability at the country level to reflect post-2015 commitments going forward, including commitments to support country ownership over the agenda, align efforts to national sustainable development plans and financing strategies, and engage a wide range of stakeholders in implementation and review processes.
• Ensure inclusive participatory national and sub-national planning and follow-up and review processes at the country level.
References


Annex 1. Framework for Assessing Ownership Commitments

Table 1 provides an overview of the framework used to assess commitments to country ownership post-2015. It includes a description of each component and the rationale for inclusion. The table also provides a non-exhaustive snapshot of commitments and affirmations made for each component in UN and OECD processes, notably those related to financing for development and aid and development effectiveness.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
<th>Commitments/Affirmations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ownership</td>
<td>Direct references to the word “ownership.” Developing countries own development priorities and define the model of development they want to implement.</td>
<td>Based on recognition that developing countries must “own” development efforts for them to be successful.</td>
<td>• High Level Fora 1-4 • Monterey Consensus • Doha Declaration • High Level Meeting of the GPEDC</td>
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<td>Principles</td>
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<td>Participation and inclusivity</td>
<td>Development agendas should be developed through a broad and participatory approach at country level. Includes ensuring space and support for parliaments, local government and civil society to play a role in development of national plans and accountability processes.</td>
<td>Based on recognition that the concept of ownership needed to be broadened to include all stakeholders involved in development and accountability processes.</td>
<td>• High Level Fora 1-4 • Doha Declaration • High Level Meeting of the GPEDC • Future We Want</td>
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<td>Alignment</td>
<td>Official development assistance providers to align efforts to national development plans prepared by developing countries.</td>
<td>Based on recognition that development interventions are more likely to be successful when they coincide with developing country plans.</td>
<td>• High Level Fora 1-4 • Monterey Consensus • Doha Declaration • High Level Meeting of the GPEDC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Use of country systems</td>
<td>Refers to using country-led coordination arrangements and reducing the use of parallel implementation units. Includes use of country public financial management systems as “default option” (HLF4 2011), modalities such as budgetary support, and efforts to support country-led strategies for capacity development.</td>
<td>Seen as an important way to strengthen and support capacity within countries, in turn supporting the ability of countries to develop and implement their own plans and priorities.</td>
<td>• High Level Fora 1-4 • Doha Declaration • Future We Want • High Level Meeting of the GPEDC</td>
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<td>Aid untying</td>
<td>Refers to commitment by development partners (donors) to take efforts towards untying aid.</td>
<td>Based on recognition that untying aid presents more opportunities for local procurement and can improve value-for-money.</td>
<td>• Monterey Consensus • High Level Fora 2-4 • Doha Declaration • Future We Want • High Level Meeting of the GPEDC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Predictability</td>
<td>Developing countries to strengthen budgeting capacity and donors to provide regular information on aid to expect and when it will be received.</td>
<td>Enables developing countries to better plan and coordinate development efforts, thus supporting ownership over implementation processes.</td>
<td>• Monterey Consensus • High Level Fora 2-4 • Doha Declaration • Future We Want • High Level Meeting of the GPEDC</td>
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<td>Mutual accountability</td>
<td>Refers to commitment by donors and recipients to be accountable to their citizens and each other for development outcomes.</td>
<td>The use of mutual accountability frameworks enables development partners to hold one another account</td>
<td>• High Level Fora 1-4 • Future We Want • High Level Meeting of the GPEDC</td>
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<td><strong>Enablers</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Capacity development</strong></td>
<td>Refers to efforts by developing countries and development partners to improve capacities in developing countries to realise development outcomes.</td>
<td>Enables developing countries to design and implement policies and programs.</td>
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<td><strong>Domestic Resource Mobilization</strong></td>
<td>Refers to commitments by developing countries to raise and development partners to support efforts to raise domestic resources in developing countries.</td>
<td>Developing countries have greater space and resources to implement their development plans by generating greater government revenue and reducing reliance on external funding.</td>
<td>• Monterey Consensus</td>
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<td>• High Level Fora 2 and 4</td>
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<td><strong>Debt relief</strong></td>
<td>Refers to commitments by donor countries to provide debt relief to developing countries and for developing countries to better manage their debt and build reserves.</td>
<td>Developing countries have greater domestic resources to implement their development plans by reducing debt repayment.</td>
<td>• Millennium Declaration</td>
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<td>• Monterey Consensus</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>External financing and technical assistance</strong></td>
<td>Refers to commitments to increase aid and development finance to developing countries. Includes commitments aimed at meeting the international target of 0.7% ODA to GNI for OECD-DAC development assistance providers.</td>
<td>Developing countries have greater resources to implement development plans.</td>
<td>• Millennium Declaration</td>
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<td>• Future We Want</td>
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<td><strong>Global reform – corruption and illicit capital flight</strong></td>
<td>Refers to efforts to stem corruption and illicit capital flight which reduce resources available for development. Includes, for example, efforts to combat money laundering, tax evasion and international bribery.</td>
<td>Developing countries have greater resources to implement development plans by stemming illegal financial outflows.</td>
<td>• Monterey Consensus</td>
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<td><strong>Global reform – taxation</strong></td>
<td>Refers to commitments aimed at improving international cooperation and information exchange on tax matters.</td>
<td>Developing countries will have greater resources to implement development plans through efforts to stem tax evasion.</td>
<td>• Monterey Consensus</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Global reform – trade</strong></td>
<td>Refers to commitments to establish an open, equitable, rule-based, predictable and non-discriminatory trading systems.</td>
<td>Based on recognition that steps are needed to ensure developing countries can fully benefit from international</td>
<td>• Millennium Declaration</td>
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34 The OECD/G20 project on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting also exists. It includes actions to create domestic and international instruments to address tax gaps. See [http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps-about.htm](http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps-about.htm) for more information.
<table>
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<th>Component</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
<th>Commitments/Affirmations</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| Global reform – economic stability | Refers to commitments to enhance macro-economic and financial stability in countries and globally. | Based on recognition that global stability is a key component of creating an enabling environment for development. Includes international cooperation aimed at avoiding future financial crises and steps by countries to build necessary reserves to mitigate against global shocks. | • Monterey Consensus  
• Doha Declaration  
• Future We Want |
| Global reform – governance and transparency | Refers to commitments to reform institutions of global governance to ensure the equitable and fair representation of developing countries and transparent decision-making. | Based on recognition that international financial institutions and standard setting bodies – which play a significant role in development – should be reformed to enable developing countries a greater voice to ensure policies and agendas better reflect developing country priorities. | • Doha Declaration  
• Future We Want |