

Exhibit A

(Part 2, Pgs. 675 - 923)

Exhibit 23

(ATF Quarterly Roll Call Lesson Plan)

LESSON PLAN OVERVIEW

COURSE: QUARTERLY ROLL CALL
LESSON: A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATIONAL FIREARMS ACT
DEVELOPED BY: FIREARMS TECHNOLOGY BRANCH
DATE DEVELOPED OR REVISED: JULY 2012

PURPOSE: To better understand the National Firearms Act, to recognize the proper and improper means of disclosing tax information and to ensure that the “Staples” requirement is met for criminal cases.

LESSON OBJECTIVES:

The student will be able to:

1. Understand the history and background of the NFA.
2. Firearms subject to regulation under the NFA.
3. Understand when making, transfer, and special occupational taxes are required to be paid.
4. Understanding the registration provisions of the NFA
5. The unlawful disclosure of NFA tax information to outside law enforcement agencies and the failure to comply.
6. Understand relevant court decisions and proving knowledge of possession in a criminal case.

METHODS: Lecture w/Questions; Power Point Presentation; Guided Discussion.

EQUIPMENT: Whiteboard; Projector; Computer

MATERIALS: INSTRUCTOR MATERIALS
Instructor

STUDENT MATERIALS
Statute and regulations

ROOM SET-UP: Classroom Style

NATIONAL FIREARMS ACT

TIME: 45 minutes

INTRODUCTION

STATE Objectives.

I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. NFA enacted in 1934 during Prohibition. Proliferation of machineguns, short-barrel weapons to assist bootleggers in their trade.

B. Congress not yet comfortable with their authority to regulate commerce, so responded by putting NFA in Internal Revenue Code.

C. NFA requires registration of all "firearms" as defined in the statute. We will discuss those weapons later. Imposition of prohibitive taxes on making and transfer of weapons in hope of taxing them out of existence. A \$200 tax was substantial in 1934.

D. As originally enacted, NFA required all possessors of firearms to register them. Failure to register would subject the possessor to criminal penalties.

E. In 1968 in Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968), the Supreme Court held that the provisions of the NFA that required possessors to register their firearms and, in doing so, disclose to the government their unlawful possession, violated the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment.

1. Congress responded by amending the NFA in Title II of the GCA of 1968 so that only a maker, manufacturer or importer may register firearms, but not a mere possessor.

2. The NFA was also amended to include section 5848, which provides that no information obtained from an application or registration shall be used as evidence against the submitter in a criminal proceeding with respect to a violation of the law occurring prior to or concurrently with the filing of the application or registration.

3. The 1968 amendments also established a 30-day amnesty period that allowed possessors of firearms to register them. Since the Haynes case resulted in all pending prosecutions for NFA violations being terminated, the amnesty period did not do any further damage to such prosecutions.

II. FIREARMS SUBJECT TO THE NFA

A. "Firearms" defined in 26 U.S.C. § 5845 to mean:

1. Shotgun with a barrel or barrels of less than 18 inches in length.

NATIONAL FIREARMS ACT

2. Weapon made from a shotgun if the modified weapon has an overall length of less than 26 inches OR a barrel or barrels of less than 18 inches.

3. Rifle with a barrel or barrels of less than 16 inches.

4. Weapon made from a rifle if the modified weapon has an overall length of less than 26 inches OR a barrel or barrels of less than 16 inches.

5. Any other weapon.

6. Machinegun.

7. Silencer.

8. Destructive device.

B. Section 5845(a) exempts from the definition of "firearm" any "antique firearm" (defined in section 5845(g)), and any device (other than a machinegun or destructive device) which, although designed as a weapon, the Secretary finds by reason of the date of its manufacture, value, design, and other characteristics is primarily a collector's item and not likely to be used as a weapon.

1. Weapons removed from the NFA as collector's items are listed in ATF Publication 5300.11, "Firearms Curios or Relics List."

C. Weapon made from a shotgun and weapon made from a rifle.

1. If weapon has no stock, does not meet the definition of "rifle" or "shotgun" in § 5845(c) or (d). If stock has been sawed off, resulting weapon is weapon made from a rifle or weapon made from a shotgun. See photos.

D. Stocked handguns - Pistols with attachable shoulder stocks are classified as short-barrel rifles.

E. "Any other weapon" defined as: A weapon or device capable of being concealed on the person from which a shot can be discharged through the energy of an explosive, a pistol or revolver with a smooth bore barrel designed or redesigned to fire a shotgun shell, weapons with combination shotgun and rifle barrels 12 inches or more, less than 18 inches in length from which only a single discharge can be made without reloading. THIS CATEGORY IS A CATCHALL CATEGORY FOR CONCEALABLE WEAPONS THAT DON'T FIT WITHIN ANY OTHER CATEGORY.

1. Transfer tax of \$5 - (\$200 for other types of NFA firearms § 5811(a)).

2. Example - Marble Game Getter - combination rifle and shotgun barrels from which only a single discharge can be made; H&R Handygun - smooth bore shot pistol.

NATIONAL FIREARMS ACT

3. Tear gas gun, pen guns, gadget devices (holster gun), "secret agent" type devices, such as cane guns, belt buckle guns, umbrella guns, briefcase guns.

F. Machinegun defined in § 5845(b):

1. Any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot automatically more than one shot without manual reloading by a single function of the trigger.

2. The frame or receiver of any such weapon. ("frame or receiver" defined in 179.11)

3. Any part designed and intended solely and exclusively or combination of parts designed and intended for use in converting a weapon to a machinegun.

4. Any combination of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled if the parts are under the control of a person.

5. Recent problems with imported parts kits that include improperly destroyed machinegun receivers.

G. Destructive device defined to mean:

1. Explosive, incendiary, or poison gas bomb, grenade, rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces, missile with explosive or incendiary charge of more than ¼ oz., mine, or similar device. (Molotov cocktails regulated as incendiary bombs.)

2. Any weapon which will expel a projectile by the action of an explosive or other propellant, the barrel or barrels of which have a bore of more than ½" in diameter, excluding sporting shotguns or shotgun shells.

3. Any combination of parts designed or intended for use in converting any device into a destructive device.

4. The term DOES NOT include any device which is neither designed nor redesigned for use as a weapon, such as signaling, line throwing, or safe devices, e.g., 37 mm flare guns. See ATF Rul. 95-3, which held that 37mm flare guns possessed with antipersonnel ammunition (wooden pellets, rubber pellets, bean bags) are destructive devices which must be registered.

5. Striker-12/Streetsweeper and USAS-12 shotguns classified in ATF Rul. 94-1 and 94-2 as destructive devices. 12-gauge shotguns that are nonsporting. Rulings were issued prospectively as to transfer tax, which resulted in giving possessors an opportunity to register. Registration period closed on May 1, 2001.

NATIONAL FIREARMS ACT

H. Silencers defined in section 921(a)(24) to mean: any device for silencing, muffling, or diminishing the report of a portable firearm; any combination of parts designed or redesigned and intended for use in assembling or fabricating a firearm silencer; and any part intended only for use in such assembly or fabrication.

1. Firearms Technology tests silencers with a sound meter to determine whether there is any measurable diminishing of the report of the firearm. However, case law indicates that a silencer does not need to work well or at all to be classified as a silencer. U.S. v. Syverson, 90 F.3d 228 (7th Cir. 1996) - by using language in the definition "any device for silencing, muffling, or diminishing" the report of a firearm, Congress indicated that it intends to regulate all devices purporting to serve as silencers, not just those devices that actually work to silence firearms.

III. TAXES

A. 26 U.S.C. § 5811 - imposes a transfer tax of \$200 on most NFA firearms. \$5 transfer tax on "any other weapon."

B. 26 U.S.C. § 5821 - imposes a making tax of \$200 on makers of firearms.

C. 26 U.S.C. § 5801 – imposes a Special Occupation Tax (SOT) on persons engaged in the business of manufacturing, importing or dealing in NFA firearms.

D. Exemptions from making and transfer taxes in §§ 5852, 5853, 5854 (transfers between FFLs, transfers to and from government agencies).

IV. REGISTRATION

A. 26 U.S.C. § 5841 requires that the Secretary maintain a central registry of all firearms in the United States which are not in the possession or under the control of the United States.

B. § 5841(e) requires that registrants retain proof of registration which shall be made available to the Secretary upon request.

C. § 5841(b) provides that manufacturers, importers, and makers must register each firearm he manufactures, imports, or makes. This provision prevents mere possessors from registering.

1. Exception in regs for firearms seized by or abandoned to a law enforcement agency. These agencies may register such firearms on ATF Form 10 tax-free. Such registrations are restricted so that the firearm may not be transferred out of the law enforcement community.

D. § 5812 makes it clear that a firearm may not be transferred until the transfer application has been approved by ATF. Section 5812 also provides that applications to transfer firearms will be denied if the transfer, receipt, or possession of the firearm would place the transferee in violation of Federal, State, or local law.

NATIONAL FIREARMS ACT

1. Section 5812 implemented in the regs at 27 C.F.R. § 179.85. Requires that the transfer application include a certification from the local chief of police, sheriff of the county, head of State police, State or local district attorney or prosecutor, or such other person whose certificate is acceptable to the Director (some judges have been found to be acceptable).

2. Every court to consider challenges to the law cert requirement to date have found that it is a valid interpretation of the statute and that signing the certificate is a discretionary action on the part of State and local officials. U.S. v. Steele, 755 F.2d 1410 (11th Cir. 1985); Westfall v. Miller, 77 F.3d 868 (5th Cir. 1996); Lamont v. O'Neill, 135 F.Supp.2d 23 (D.D.C. Feb. 5, 2001); 285 F.3d 9 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

V. DISCLOSURE RESTRICTIONS

A. 26 U.S.C. § 6103 makes it a felony for an employee of the United States to disclose "returns" or "return information."

B. Disclosure to the taxpayer or designee of the taxpayer is permissible.

C. The statute includes a number of exceptions to the prohibition, including disclosure to other Federal agencies whose official duties require such disclosure upon their written request.

1. Ask for official request
2. Ask for letter from other agency acknowledging requirement to safeguard info

C. Disclosure to State and local law enforcement agencies is generally not permitted, with the exception of disclosure in certain emergency circumstances involving imminent danger of death or physical injury to any individual.

D. FTB classification of weapons as NFA firearms is considered to be tax information. As stated above, such information may not be disclosed to State and local law enforcement agencies.

VI. RELEVANT COURT DECISIONS

A. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994) - Court reversed a conviction under § 5861(d), holding that the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that his rifle had the characteristics that brought it within the statutory definition of "machinegun." Case involved an internally converted AR-15 rifle. DOJ takes the position that the same mens rea requirement applies to all NFA prosecutions.

1. Improvised devices, such as silencers and bombs - fairly simple to meet Staples standard if there is evidence the defendant is the one who made the weapon.

2. Short-barrel weapons may be more difficult to meet standard, especially if the barrel length is close to legal length.

NATIONAL FIREARMS ACT

B. U.S. v. Meadows, 91 F.3d 851 (7th Cir. 1996)- defendant convicted of possessing firearm not registered to him, a short-barrel rifle. Relying upon Staples, the court reversed the conviction, finding that the government failed to prove that the defendant knew the weapon had a rifled bore.

C. Prior to submitting to FTB for determination, make sure you are able to prove the defendant knew he possessed an NFA weapon.

Exhibit 24

*(How Firearms Registration Abuse & the “Essential
Operational Mechanism” of Guns May Adversely Affect
Gun Collectors)*

How Firearm Registration Abuse & the "ESSENTIAL OPERATIONAL MECHANISM" of Guns May Adversely Affect Gun Collectors

by Eric M. Larson

This article addresses firearms registration abuses by the federal government, and recent efforts to ban some guns on the basis of "their essential operational mechanism." Both issues may adversely affect gun collectors.

My concerns about registration evolved from my research on smooth bore pistols, which was published in two series of three-part articles in *CADA Gun Journal* (August, September and October 1994; and April, May and June 1995).

In 1997, my research triggered a Congressionally-directed audit of the firearms registration practices of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF)—the first ever by an outside entity. This audit is occurring because of my testimony before a Congressional subcommittee regarding the BATF's administration of the National Firearms Act (NFA) of 1934, and involves mismanagement, misconduct and criminal wrongdoing.

The NFA is designed to control firearms thought to be mainly used by criminals by requiring registration of the firearms, and using prohibitive taxes to reduce their manufacture, distribution, and ownership. It is a harsh federal law to discourage illegally manufacturing, selling or possessing hand grenades, machine guns and similar weapons, and the cutting down of conventional shotguns or rifles (regardless of their caliber) to make concealable firearms. Any vio-

lation of the NFA is a felony carrying a 10-year, \$10,000 fine penalty upon conviction.

NFA firearms are controlled under Title II of the Gun Control Act of 1968, and are said to have no legitimate sporting purpose. NFA firearms are often referred to as "Title II" firearms. Conventional rifles, shotguns, pistols and revolvers, which are considered to be sporting firearms, have considerably fewer legal restrictions and are controlled under Title I of the 1968 Act.

In 1934, a provision that would have included pistols and revolvers under the NFA failed to pass the Congress by a single vote. For technical reasons (because they were deemed concealable, but *not* to be pistols or revolvers) the Treasury Department ruled in 1934 that a small group of unusual or specialized firearms fell under the NFA. Most were relatively low-powered small-game guns, such as Marble's Game Getter Gun, the smooth bore .410 H&R Handy-Gun, and various animal trap guns. They were not—even in 1934—normally identified as "gangster weapons." Most others, such as knife-pistols, were obsolete long before 1934 and were designed more as gimmicks or gadgets than as firearms. All are

classified as "Any Other Weapon" (AOW) under the NFA. I estimate that fewer than 17,000 still exist today. AOWs manufactured in the United States in or before 1934 are among the rarest of firearms, and are highly prized by collectors.

What some people have told me regarding their discovery of one of these AOWs (usually a Game Getter or Handy-Gun) in the estate of a parent or other relative was disturbing. Upon attempting to transfer the ownership, ATF alleged the firearm was not registered—rendering it illegal contraband that nobody can own. But, after searching, some people said they found the registration. ATF then allegedly declared an error had been made, and processed the transfer. It is well-known that ATF will not allow any firearm, even a rare collector's item, to be voluntarily re-registered.

On April 30, 1996, I testified before the House Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations, which funds the BATF. This opportunity occurred because the Collectors Arms Dealers Association (CADA) included me as a witness, at the invitation of its then-President, L. Richard Littlefield. I'd known Dick since about 1989.

Dick was aware of my research and thought it was time to make a case for a more reasonable treatment of these guns, as the law provides. Indeed, in 1938, 1945 and 1954, the Congress amended the NFA to provide for a more lenient treatment of many of these firearms, and in 1960 unanimously declared that all AOWs were mainly "gadget-type and unique weapons, which are often sought after by gun collectors," and unlikely to be used by criminals.

Under the Gun Control Act of 1968, the Congress provided that BATF could administratively remove such firearms from the NFA if it determined they are mainly collector's items and are not likely to be used as weapons. Under the 1968 provision, BATF may have administratively re-

moved 50,000 to 100,000 firearms from the NFA. Most are valuable shoulder-stocked Luger and Mauser semi-automatic pistols, or short-barreled Marlin or Winchester "trapper" carbines. After their removal, virtually none have been used by criminals.

"... under Mr. Magaw's logic, BATF could outlaw the Ruger 10-shot semiautomatic target pistol because "there is no practical difference between the two types of weapons in terms of design and function."

My intention in testifying in 1996 was to: (1) put a well-researched case on record disclosing the law and legislative history that supports a more reasonable treatment for "Any Other Weapon" firearms which were manufactured in the United States in or before 1934, and (2) provide BATF with an opportunity to do the right thing. Perhaps predictably, BATF did absolutely nothing, although I also presented some evidence that BATF had made errors in its record-keeping on these guns.

So I came back and testified again on April 8, 1997, almost a year later, before the same subcommittee. This time, I provided more details of evidence I mentioned briefly in my 1996 testimony, by documenting credible instances of mismanagement, misconduct and wrongdoing by BATF in administering the NFA. I found evidence that BATF employees have: (1) destroyed firearm registration documents rather than work on them; (2) illegally registered nearly 2,500 NFA firearms after the 1968 amnesty period expired; (3) since 1981, continued to allow thousands of machineguns and other NFA firearms to be registered to people that BATF knows are dead; and (4) added firearms to the NFA database because owners confronted BATF with regis-

tration documents, for which BATF lost or destroyed its records. In 1996, a federal district court dismissed five convictions for possession of unregistered NFA firearms on appeal because of the unreliability of BATF's firearm registration records. Significantly, BATF did not appeal the dismissals.

In May 1997 I complained to the Treasury Department Inspector General (IG), and requested an investigation. The IG responded by referring my complaint to BATF—which was something like putting my request into a bottle and consigning it to the ocean off Cape

Horn. I made a further complaint to the Congress that the IG simply wasn't doing its job, and that BATF would probably simply exonerate itself. In early October 1997, the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight directed the IG to independently audit the BATF's firearm registration practices. Further information about my 1997 testimony and the current IG investigation may be found on the Internet at the following address: <http://www.cs.cmu.edu/afs/cs.cmu.edu/user/wbard-wel/public/nfalist/index.html>

How this case turns out will be critically important for gun collectors and the issue of firearms registration by the federal government. What happens when the government messes up the registration records? And what happens when the BATF breaks the law? At the least, in my judgement, the Congress will unquestionably not allow machineguns and similar firearms to continue to be registered to persons that the BATF has stated are dead.

Just as critical, in my judgement, is the issue of banning firearms on the basis of "their essential operational mechanism." I have quoted this phrase from a White House press

Continued on page 78

78 March 1998



Continued from page 19

release dated November 15, 1997. It contains the text of a Memorandum to the Secretary of the Treasury, directing him to conduct a 120-day review of "whether modified semiautomatic assault-type rifles are properly importable under the statutory sporting purposes test," and to suspend all imports of these guns during the 120-day period.

I am concerned about how the BATF will ultimately interpret political directives such as this one, because of its past activities involving handguns that are designed to fire .410 shotgun ammunition. As I will show, there are important similarities and potentials for abuse of discretion.

During the early 1990s, I unsuccessfully petitioned ATF to remove the smooth bore H&R Handy-Gun from the NFA. There is no credible evidence that the Handy-Gun would be likely to be used as a weapon. Indeed, there are more than a dozen handguns designed to fire .410 ammunition on the market today. None are subject to the NFA because their barrels are rifled; however, more importantly, none have been identified as weapons of choice by criminals. A single-shot .410 is a perfect small-game or rodent gun, and not good for much else.

In a letter to me dated July 20, 1994, BATF Director John W. Magaw denied my appeal. The reason, Mr. Magaw stated, is that there is no "practical" difference between an H&R Handy-Gun and a sawed-off shotgun. Interestingly, Mr. Magaw rejected my contention that there was no "practical" difference between an H&R Handy-Gun versus the .410 Thompson Contender pistol, a popular sporting firearm. "We fail to see the basis for this comparison," he wrote, "because the Contender pistol is not a smooth bore shot pistol subject to the NFA."

Mr. Magaw's statement regarding the .410 Contender is "interesting" because for 16 years, BATF field agents took exactly the opposite position—despite the fact that no less a person than then-BATF Director Harold A. Serr had ruled that the .410 Contender was not subject to the NFA. Mr. Serr made this ruling in an official Memorandum dated February 11, 1969, which was distributed throughout BATF, including all ATF agents and other employees with law enforcement or regulatory responsibilities.

Nevertheless, on June 18, 1969, BATF agents Cecil Wolfe and Paul Westenberg (Washington, D.C., national office) and Victor Fezio (Boston Office) threatened Kenneth Thompson and Warren Center, of Thompson/Center Arms, that BATF would

rule the .410 Contender to be an NFA firearm if they didn't stop manufacturing it. "Terminate production," Mr. Wolfe said, and instructed: "Whatever your story will be, please refrain from giving the impression that the 'Contender' is a firearm under the NFA." Mr. Wolfe's threat was flat out illegal, but effective. Mr. Thompson and Mr. Center complied, as do virtually all people who are threatened with either a criminal action or the economic disruption of their livelihood by a federal law enforcement agency with unlimited resources.

Mr. Wolfe's threat worked until 1985, when a Freedom of Information Act request by attorney Stephen P. Halbrook revealed the existence of the February 1969 memorandum.

Production of the .410 Contender soon resumed. Today, the .410 Contender is one of at least a dozen different modern handguns designed to fire .410 shotgun ammunition being currently manufactured and sold in the United States today. None are subject to the NFA because their barrels are rifled. Perhaps most importantly, none have to my knowledge ever been identified as weapons of choice used by criminals. I believe there are hundreds of thousands of modern .410 handguns in circulation today—the vast majority tucked in a fishing tackle box or hunting jacket to take on a hunting or fishing trip, for use against snakes, vermin or small game. I have found no credible evidence that any of these guns are commonly used in street crimes, or that they are weapons of choice by criminals.

In a 1981 prosecution, BATF argued in federal court that it was legally impossible for a firearm such as the smooth bore H&R Handy-Gun and a sawed-off shotgun to be regarded equal under the NFA. The law, BATF argued, requires a firearm like the Handy-Gun to be given "special and more lenient treatment" than a sawed-off shotgun. (In this particular case, a person sawed off the barrel of a 12 gauge shotgun, installed a pistol grip, and claimed it was an AOW.) The BATF presented an ironclad case that a sawed-off shotgun and an AOW are not identical, and cannot be identical according to law and legislative history. Although a sawed-off shotgun, a .410 H&R Handy-Gun, and a .410 Contender are all capable of firing identical ammunition through a barrel of nearly identical length, those shared characteristics are legally meaningless regarding their legal classification as firearms.

A similar example makes the point another way, and also illustrates why BATF's position is legally incorrect. Consider that the NFA prohibits the unauthorized cutting down of a conventional shotgun or rifle (regardless of caliber) to make a concealable firearm. Thus, a person who sawed off the barrel of a Ruger 10-22

carbine to a length of 10", and fashioned its stock into a pistol grip, would violate the NFA if he or she did not pay a \$200 tax to "make" the firearm, as well as obtain advance approval from BATF before making it. Note that a standard Ruger 10-shot semiautomatic target pistol with a 10" barrel is functionally identical to the sawed-off carbine. That is, each firearm is a semiautomatic, capable of firing 10 rounds of .22 caliber ammunition through a 10" barrel, and is concealable on the person.

It is clear, however, that the Congress, by requiring that a \$200 tax be paid to "make" a concealable firearm by cutting down a conventional rifle or shotgun, requiring advance permission to "make" such a firearm, and requiring its registration, that the Congress intends to reduce the legal manufacture of firearms made by cutting down conventional shotguns or rifles. The Congress has not, however, enacted a prohibitive tax and burdensome legal restrictions upon the manufacture and sale of a concealable, 10-shot semiautomatic firearm with a 10" barrel, such as the Ruger .22 caliber target pistol.

Yet, under Mr. Magaw's logic, BATF could outlaw the Ruger 10-shot semiautomatic target pistol because "there is no practical difference between the two types of weapons in terms of design and function." In this example, the point is clear and the language is much less emotional—and no less correct than in the example involving an H&R Handy-Gun. It is legally incorrect for Mr. Magaw to use the terms "design and function" to place a firearm in some classification that is different from what the Congress has specifically defined. Should an ordinary, perfectly legal .22 Ruger semiautomatic target pistol with a 10" barrel be outlawed simply because a sawed-off Ruger .22 semiautomatic carbine with a 10" barrel and a pistol grip is capable of firing the same ammunition and is also concealable? If Mr. Magaw's logic were followed, then BATF could probably successfully outlaw virtu-

ally every sporting firearm in the United States.

Which bring us to 1997, and the White House memorandum to the

"In my judgement, gun collectors are on the verge of facing the gravest—and, perhaps, the most bizarre—challenge ever concocted by the government."

Treasury Department regarding "Importation of Modified Semiautomatic Assault-Type Rifles," which was written at the order of President Bill Clinton. Again, consider the language: "Manufacturers have modified many of these weapons banned in 1989 to remove certain military features without changing their essential operational mechanism" (emphasis added).

I believe this is a pretty slippery slope. I predicted this would happen and said so in an article in the June 1995 issue of *CADA Gun Journal*, and I quote:

"The NFA is relevant to any citizen who owns a sporting firearm—not just to people who choose to own a gun for self-protection. The "assault weapon ban" has lots of regulatory tensions, because "assault weapons" are classified as Title I firearms. NFA firearms—machine guns, and the like—are classified as Title II firearms. Under the Gun Control Act of 1968, firearms that don't have a "sporting purpose" are supposed to be classified under Title II. This is why I believe there will be continuous difficulty over how so-called "assault weapons" are regulated. And if past history is any guide, ATF will misapply the law to include sporting firearms exempted from the 'ban.'"

In my judgement, gun collectors are on the verge of facing the gravest—and, perhaps, the most bizarre—challenge ever concocted by the government. Namely, how can one differentiate between collector's item semiautomatic firearms and so-called "assault weapons" if the basis for making a decision is "their essential operational mechanism"? It seems to me that "their essential op-

erational mechanism" is obviously identical. Where does that leave us?

To confront the "essential operational mechanism" issue, I have explained why firearms like Marble's Game Getter Gun and the smooth bore H&R Handy-Gun are valuable historical artifacts, and the fact that the Congress determined in 1960 they are mainly collector's items and unlikely to be used as weapons by criminals. Why are they valuable historical artifacts? In short, they: (1) were created at a time when there were virtually no laws regarding firearm design; (2) are very specialized firearms that had a limited commercial market even at the time they were manufactured; (3) unlike any other NFA firearm, the Congress repeatedly lessened controls on them, although the NFA virtually destroyed the retail market for these types of firearms; (4) represent a unique niche in U.S. firearms evolution, design and genealogy, and there's nothing else like them; and (5) are extremely rare—I believe that fewer than 17,000 still exist. Yet, in 1997, these pre-1934 AOWs are still controlled as strictly as machineguns. I am committed to trying to achieve a more reasonable treatment under the law for these particular AOWs.

Given the difficulties I have encountered, I believe that gun collectors are on the verge of beginning to experience serious problems in explaining to the government why certain semiautomatic rifles are collector's items. I also believe that gun control law and policy should be guided by facts, rather than by emotional appeals which bear no relationship to the particular firearms being regulated. ■

Eric M. Larson is a contributing Editor to the *Blue Book of Gun Values*, the *Standard Catalog of Firearms*, the *Official Price Guide to Antique and Modern Firearms*, and has been a Life Member of the National Rifle Association of America since 1968. His research has been published in *The Gun Report*, *Machine Gun News*, *Guns Illustrated*, and he is author of *Variations of the Smooth Bore H&R Handy-Gun: A Pocket Guide to Their Identification*. A journalist and demographer by training, he graduated with honors in 1974 from the University of Texas at Austin, where he also earned a Ph.D. and three master's degrees.

Exhibit 25

**(U.S. Government's Brief in Support of Cross Motion For
Summary Judgment And In Opposition to Plaintiff's
Motion For Summary Judgment)**

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
EVANSVILLE DIVISION

FREEDOM ORDNANCE MFG., INC.,)	
)	
Plaintiff,)	
)	
v.)	Case No. 3:16-cv-243-RLY-MPB
)	
THOMAS E. BRANDON, Director,)	
Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms)	
and Explosives,)	
)	
Defendant.)	

**BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

Freedom Ordnance Manufacturing, Inc. ("Freedom") is a firearms manufacturer headquartered in Chandler, Indiana. In this case, Freedom challenges a decision by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives ("ATF") that a device Freedom seeks to manufacture and market is a "machinegun" as defined under the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b). ATF's decision is not arbitrary and capricious, but is supported by the administrative record. Based on the foregoing, ATF is entitled to summary judgment.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS NOT IN DISPUTE¹

Freedom Ordnance Manufacturing, Inc. (“Freedom”) is a federally-licensed firearms manufacturer with its principle place of business in Chandler, Indiana. (Docket No. 1 ¶ 2.) Freedom designed an Electronic Reset Assist Device (“ERAD”) for commercial sale to the general public. (Docket No. 1 ¶ 9.) The purpose of the ERAD, as described by Freedom, is to “improve firearm design” to assist the firearm user’s “ability to continually pull the trigger in a rapid manner when a high rate of fire is desired.” (Administrative Record (“AR”) 0025; Patent documents.)

The Firearms and Ammunition Technology Division (“FATD”) of ATF, through its Firearms Technology Industry Services Branch (“FTISB”), provides expert technical support to ATF, other Federal agencies, State and local law enforcement, the firearms industry, Congress, and the general public. ATF, Firearms Ammunition and Technology (2017), available at <https://www.atf.gov/firearms/firearms-and-ammunition-technology>. FTISB is responsible for technical determinations concerning types of firearms approved for importation into the United States and for rendering opinions regarding the classification of suspected illegal firearms and newly designed firearms. *Id.*

There is no requirement in the law or regulations for a manufacturer to seek an ATF classification of its product prior to manufacture. *See* Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, National Firearms Act Handbook 7.2.4 (2017), available at

¹ As discussed in Legal Background, Section D, the typical Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 standard and procedural structure does not apply in an APA review case. Accordingly, the Defendant is not required to marshal evidence showing material issues of fact in dispute and the typical “Statement of Material Facts Not In Dispute” does not apply, but is offered for factual context. Specific sections of the Record are cited in the relevant portions of the Argument section.

<https://www.atf.gov/firearms/national-firearms-act-handbook>. ATF, however, encourages firearms manufacturers to submit devices for classification before they are offered for sale to ensure that the sale of such devices would not violate the Federal firearms laws and regulations. *Id.* ATF responds to classification requests with letter rulings that represent “the agency’s official position concerning the status of the firearms under Federal firearms laws.” *Id.* at 7.2.4.1.

A. The November 2015 Submission

In November 2015, Freedom submitted a request to FTISB to examine a “trigger reset device.” (AR 0002; 0005 – 17 (photos of submission).) Freedom submitted a prototype of the device, along with correspondence, and a Bushmaster Model XM15-E2S AR-type firearm to be used in testing the prototype. (*Id.*)

FTISB closely examined and tested the prototype. (AR 0003.) As part of the examination, FTISB staff fired an AR-type rifle² with the prototype attached. (*Id.*) FTISB staff noted two instances of machinegun function with the prototype device attached. (*Id.*) Specifically, FTISB found that trigger reset device, when attached to the test weapon, converted it into a weapon that fired automatically – “firing more than one shot without manual reloading by a single function of the trigger.” (*Id.*) Based on the examination and testing conducted, FTISB determined that the trigger reset device was a “machinegun” as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b), and notified Freedom in a letter dated March 23, 2016. (AR 0002 – 4.)

B. The April 2016 Submission and October 27, 2016 Classification Decision

² FTISB ended up using an ATF AR-type firearm to field test the prototype device because it noted a deformity in the Bushmaster Model XM15-E2S AR-type firearm submitted by Freedom. (AR 0003.)

In April 2016, Freedom submitted a new sample prototype of its trigger reset assist device (referred to as the “ERAD”). (AR 0001.) According to Freedom, the new sample prototype “is a total redesign” of the initial prototype. (AR 0001.) In the submission, Freedom included two sample prototypes of the device, along with 9-volt lithium batteries, and DVDs showing demonstrations of live firing and disassembly of the device. (*Id.*) Although Freedom did not explicitly request a classification from FTISB on its prototype, FTISB treated the submission as such because the letter referred back to the Agency’s March 23, 2016, classification and stated that Freedom “worked very hard to correct” the issues identified in the March 23, 2016, letter. (*Id.*)

On or about September 7, 2016, Freedom submitted a supplemental letter to FTISB in support of its April 2016 request for classification of the ERAD. (AR 0018 – 24.) The supplemental materials included a letter from Freedom’s counsel setting forth Freedom’s position that the ERAD should not be classified as a machinegun. (AR 0018 – 24.) The supplemental materials also included a sixteen minute demonstration video of the ERAD, and written materials, including Freedom’s purported patent application for the ERAD. (AR 0018; AR0025 – 46.) In the video, Freedom states that the ERAD permits the shooter to discharge 450 to 500 rounds per minute. (AR 0047.)

FTISB examined that submission and supplemental materials, including the demonstration video. (AR 0070 – 71.) Specifically, FTISB disassembled and examined the two sample ERAD prototypes. (*Id.*) FTISB examined each component part of the ERAD and its design features and characteristics. (AR 0071 – 72.) FTISB staff also conducted field testing of the ERAD by attaching it to and firing from commercially-available Remington and

PMC rifles and a Bushmaster Model XM15-E2S AR-type firearm. (AR 0072.) During the test-fire portion of the examination, staff observed machinegun function six times. (*Id.*) Specifically, FTISB personnel observed that a single pull of the ERAD trigger - designated as the “primary trigger” - initiated the firing sequence, which caused firing until the trigger finger was removed. (AR 0073.)

By letter dated October 27, 2016, FTISB issued a classification on Freedom’s ERAD trigger system. (AR 0070 - 82.) In the eleven-page letter, FTISB described (1) the composition of the trigger and grip assembly, including its several constituent parts; (2) FTISB’s process for examining and testing the ERAD trigger system; (3) its observations of the ERAD trigger system functionality and the firing effect that was produced when the ERAD was applied to a firearm (*i.e.*, the prototype sent by Freedom) and test-fired; and (4) a breakdown of the firing sequence with and without the ERAD, including several accompanying illustrations. (*Id.*)

FTISB concluded that the ERAD is properly classified as a machinegun. Significantly, FTISB found that “the firing sequence is initiated by a pull of the primary trigger and perpetuated *automatically* by shooter’s constant pull and the reciprocating, battery-powered metal lobe repeatedly forcing the primary trigger forward.” (AR 0073.) Thus, “[a] single pull of the trigger by the shooter therefore starts a firing sequence in which *semiautomatic* operation is made *automatic* by an electric motor.” (*Id.*) FTISB found that because the shooter does not have to release the trigger for subsequent shots to be fired, the firing sequence is continually engaged as long as the shooter maintains constant rearward pressure (a pull) on the trigger and the motor continues to push the shooter’s finger forward. (*Id.*) In other words, as long as the trigger is depressed, the firearm continues to fire until either the trigger finger is removed, the

firearm malfunctions, or it runs out of ammunition. (*Id.*)

FTISB therefore concluded that the installation of an ERAD on a semiautomatic firearm causes that firearm to shoot automatically (through the automatic functioning made possible by the electric motor), more than one shot, by a single function (a single constant pull) of the trigger. FTISB therefore properly concluded that the ERAD is classified as a combination of parts designed and intended for use in converting a semiautomatic rifle into a machinegun under 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b). (AR at 79-80; 80-82.)

**THE COURT MUST STRIKE AND DISREGARD
FREEDOM'S EXTRA-RECORD EVIDENCE**

Freedom brings its claim under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704, challenging ATF's decision that Freedom's ERAD device be classified as a machinegun. (Docket No. 1; Docket No. 24.) As discussed further below, review of the agency's decision under the APA is conducted using an arbitrary and capricious standard, and the Court's review is limited to the administrative record lodged by the agency. *Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion*, 470 U.S. 729, 743-44 (1985) ("The task of the reviewing court is to apply the appropriate APA standard of review, 5 U.S.C. § 706, to the agency decision based on the record the agency presents to the reviewing court."); *Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe*, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) ("That review is to be based on the full administrative record that was before the Secretary at the time he made his decision."), *overruled on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders*, 430 U.S. 99 (1977); *Highway J Citizens Grp. v. Mineta*, 349 F.3d 938, 952 (7th Cir. 2003) ("the reviewing court considers only the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially [in that court].").

In support of its motion for summary judgment, Freedom submitted the declarations of

Michael Winge (Pl.’s Ex. D, Docket No. 24-4) and Richard Vasquez (Pl.’s Ex. E, Docket No. 24-5). Mr. Winge is one of the owners of Freedom Manufacturing. (Pl.’s Ex. D, Docket No. 24-4.) Several paragraphs of his declaration recount correspondence between FTISB and Freedom, which is already contained in the Administrative Record and which is the best evidence of its contents. (See Pl.’s Ex. D, Docket No. 24-4, ¶¶ 18 – 20.) The remaining paragraphs contain Mr. Winge’s opinions about the ERAD and his arguments regarding why the ERAD should not be classified as a machinegun. Mr. Winge’s opinions are merely that – his opinions – and are not part of the official record containing the information upon which ATF relied in issuing its decision. The Court should strike and disregard these opinions because the Court’s review is limited to the administrative record lodged by ATF. Freedom did not challenge or move to supplement that administrative record; therefore, it is complete. *Highway J Citizens Grp.*, 349 F.3d at 952; *see also United States Postal Serv. v. Gregory*, 534 U.S. 1, 10 (2001) (“a presumption of regularity attaches to [g]overnment agencies’ actions.”); *Spiller v. Walker*, No. A-98-CA-255-SS, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13194, *26-27 (W.D. Tex. July 19, 2002) (“any legal conclusions and post-[decision] evidence within the declarations and argumentation offered simply to contest the agencies’ experts are not admissible.”).

Richard Vasquez appears to be a witness who was retained by Freedom to provide his expert opinion regarding the ERAD’s classification. (Pl.’s Ex. E, Docket No. 24-5.) Expert reports are generally not permitted in an APA review case. *Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC*, 435 U.S. 519, 555 (1978) (“the role of a court in reviewing the sufficiency of an agency’s consideration . . . is a limited one, limited both by the time at which the decision was made and by the statute mandating review.”). Both the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit

have emphasized that “the focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court.” *Camp v. Pitts*, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973); *Cronin v. USDA*, 919 F.2d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 1990) (“it is imprudent for the generalist judges of the federal district courts and courts of appeals to consider testimonial and documentary evidence bearing on those questions unless the evidence has first been presented to and considered by the agency.”); *see also Airport Cmty's Coal. v. Graves*, 280 F. Supp.2d 1207, 1213 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (holding that APA was intended to preclude “Monday morning quarterbacking”).

The Vasquez Declaration simply criticizes the agency’s analysis, but under the APA the Court must allow the agency to rely on its own experts’ opinions even if a plaintiff has other expert opinions. *Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council*, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989) (“When specialists express conflicting views, an agency must have discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions of its own qualified experts, even if as an original matter, a court might find contrary views more persuasive.”). Therefore, even if a so-called “expert” conclusion would contradict the agency’s expert’s conclusions, this Court can give it no force. *Greenpeace Action v. Franklin*, 14 F.3d 1324, 1335 (9th Cir. 1992).

Based on the foregoing, the Court must strike and disregard the Winge and Vasquez Declarations.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. The National Firearms Act and Gun Control Act

The National Firearms Act of 1934, 26 U.S.C. Chapter 53, and the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. Chapter 44, comprise the relevant federal framework governing the firearm

market. The Gun Control Act generally makes it unlawful for a person to transfer or possess a machinegun manufactured on or after May 19, 1986. 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). ATF is charged with administering and enforcing both the National Firearms Act and the Gun Control Act. 28 C.F.R. § 0.130(a)(1)–(2).

18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(4) states that it shall be unlawful –

(4) for any person, other than a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed collector, to transport in interstate or foreign commerce any destructive device, machinegun (as defined in section 5845 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986), short-barreled shotgun, or short-barreled rifle, except as specifically authorized by the Attorney General consistent with public safety and necessity;

Accordingly, with the limited exception of State, Federal and local law enforcement agencies, it is unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machinegun manufactured on or after May 19, 1986. Moreover, machineguns must be registered in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record and may only be transferred upon the approval of an application. 26 U.S.C. § 5812. The National Firearms Act makes it unlawful to manufacture a machine gun in violation of its provisions. 26 U.S.C. § 5861(f). Specifically, the National Firearms Act requires that a person shall obtain approval from ATF to make a National Firearms Act firearm, which includes a machinegun. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5922, 5845(a). Similarly, licensed manufacturers are required to notify ATF by the end of the business day following manufacture of a NFA firearm. 26 U.S.C. § 5841(c), 27 CFR 479.103.

B. The Definition of a Machinegun

The National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b), defines a machinegun³ as

³ Although more commonly spelled “machine gun,” the applicable statutes use the spelling “machinegun.”

any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger. The term shall also include the frame or receiver of any such weapon, any part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun, and any combination of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under the control of a person.

See also 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (stating same).

The Gun Control Act incorporates the National Firearms Act's definition of machinegun and defines machinegun identically to the National Forearms Act. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(4).

Both statutory definitions of a machinegun therefore include a combination of parts designed and intended for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun. *Id.* This language includes a device that, when activated by a single pull of the trigger, initiates an automatic firing cycle that continues until the finger is released or the ammunition supply is exhausted. *See* ATF Rule 2006-2 (AR at 630-32.)

C. The Administrative Procedure Act

The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires that the Court “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions” that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The “scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). The Court must be satisfied that the agency has “‘examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” *Alpharma, Inc. v. Leavitt*, 460 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting *State Farm*, 463 U.S. at 43). The agency’s decisions

are entitled to a “presumption of regularity,” *Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe*, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971), and although “inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one,” *id.* at 416.

Federal courts are particularly deferential towards the “scientific determinations” of the agency, which are “presumed to be the product of agency expertise.” *Franks v. Salazar*, 816 F.Supp.2d 49, 55 (D. D.C. 2011) (quoting *Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983)). The Court’s review is confined to the administrative record, subject to limited exceptions not at issue here. *See Camp v. Pitts*, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (“[T]he focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court.”). *See also Sig Sauer, Inc. v. Jones*, 133 F. Supp. 3d 364, 371 (D.N.H. 2015), *aff’d sub nom. Sig Sauer, Inc. v. Brandon*, 826 F.3d 598 (1st Cir. 2016) (recognizing that classification determinations “require expertise that is well within the ATF’s grasp” and that “its conclusions are entitled to substantial deference from a reviewing court.”) (citing *Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council*, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989)).

D. Summary Judgment in APA Cases

Under the APA, “courts are to decide, on the basis of the record the agency provides, whether the action passes muster under the appropriate APA standard of review.” *Fla. Power & Light Co.*, 470 U.S. at 743-44. Because extra-record evidence and trials are inappropriate in APA cases, courts decide APA claims via summary judgment based on the administrative record the agency compiles. *Cronin*, 919 F.2d at 445 (“Because the plaintiffs are not entitled to present evidence in court to challenge the [decision-maker’s] decision . . . , there will never be an evidentiary hearing in court.”); *Nw. Motorcycle Ass’n v. USDA*, 18 F.3d 1468, 1472 (9th Cir.

1994).

Although summary judgment is the procedural mechanism by which the Government is presenting its case, the limited role federal courts play in reviewing such administrative decisions means that the typical Federal Rule 56 summary judgment standard does not apply. *See Citizens for Appropriate Rural Roads, Inc. v. Foxx*, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1217, 1228 (S.D. Ind. March 31, 2014) (Barker, J.) (citing *Cronin*, 919 F.2d at 445); *see also Sierra Club v. Mainella*, 459 F.Supp.2d 76, 89–90 (D. D.C. 2006). Instead, in APA cases, “[t]he factfinding capacity of the district court is thus typically unnecessary to judicial review of agency factfinding [C]ourts are to decide, on the basis of the record the agency provides, whether the action passes muster under the appropriate APA standard of review.” *Florida Power & Light Co.*, 470 U.S. at 744–74.

ARGUMENT

Plaintiff raises several challenges to FTISB’s classification decision. As discussed below, FTISB conducted a thorough examination of the ERAD, and fully disclosed the findings supporting its decision. FTISB’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious, but is supported by the facts as presented in the administrative record, and is a reasonable interpretation of the statute. Defendant is entitled to judgment in its favor on all of the Plaintiff’s claims.

A. ATF’s Decision Is Not Arbitrary and Capricious.

A machinegun is defined in part as any weapon that shoots “automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger.” 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b). The term also includes any “combination of parts designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun.” *Id.* In the definition of machinegun, neither the National

Firearms Act nor the Gun Control Act further define the phrase “single function of the trigger.” The test firing of Plaintiff’s prototype—an AR-15 semi-automatic rifle (Bushmaster Model XMI150E2S) with an integrated ERAD grip—demonstrated that, once the grip button was pulled (activating the motor) concurrent with constant rearward pressure being applied to the trigger extension (which Plaintiffs refer to as the “reset bar”), the weapon fired more than one shot without manual reloading and without any additional action on the shooter’s part. Indeed, the weapon fired continuously until the shooter stopped applying rearward pressure to the trigger extension, or the ERAD’s ammunition supply was exhausted. (AR at 79, 47 (demonstration video).) Additionally, when equipped with the ERAD, the weapon fired at a very high rate of speed, discharging up to 500 rounds per minute. (AR 0047.) Thus, the nature and mechanics of the ERAD support FTISB’s finding that it converted the semiautomatic firearm to a machinegun.

FTISB’s conclusion is consistent with the National Firearm’s Act’s legislative history, in which the drafters equated “single function of the trigger” with “single pull of the trigger.” *See* National Firearms Act: Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Means, H.R. Rep. No. 9066, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., at 40 (1934) (“Mr. Frederick.[] The distinguishing feature of a machine gun is that by a single pull of the trigger the gun continues to fire as long as there is any ammunition in the belt or in the magazine. Other guns require a separate pull of the trigger for every shot fired, and such guns are not properly designated as machine guns. A gun, however, which is capable of firing more than one shot by a single pull of the trigger, a single function of the trigger, is properly regarded, in my opinion, as a machine gun.”); *see also* George C. Nonte, Jr., *Firearms Encyclopedia* 13 (1973) (the term “automatic” is defined to include “any firearm in

which a single pull and continuous pressure upon the trigger (or other firing device) will produce rapid discharge of successive shots so long as ammunition remains in the magazine or feed device – in other words, a machinegun”).

FTISB’s decision is also consistent with the ordinary meaning of the term “function,” which includes “any of a group of related actions contributing to a larger action.” Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 498 (1986); *see also* Random House Thesaurus College Edition, 297 (1984) (a synonym of function is “act”). Here, the action, or act, is pulling the trigger, which leads to the automatic firing.

Courts have also interpreted “function” as the action of pulling the trigger. *See Staples v. United States*, 511 U.S. 600, 600 (1994) (“The National Firearms Act criminalizes possession of an unregistered ‘firearm,’ 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), including a ‘machinegun,’ § 5845(a)(6), which is defined as a weapon that automatically fires more than one shot with a single pull of the trigger, § 5845(b).”); *see also id.* at 602 n.1 (“As used here, the terms ‘automatic’ and ‘fully automatic’ refer to a weapon that fires repeatedly with a single pull of the trigger. That is, once its trigger is depressed, the weapon will automatically continue to fire until its trigger is released or the ammunition is exhausted. Such weapons are ‘machineguns’ within the meaning of the Act.”).

In *United States v. Fleischli*, 305 F.3d 643, 655-56 (7th Cir. 2002), the Seventh Circuit held that a “minigun” was a machinegun even though it was “activated by means of an electronic on-off switch rather than a more traditional mechanical trigger.” Despite Fleischli’s arguments that the minigun was not a machinegun because it was not fired by pulling a traditional trigger, but rather was fired using an electronic switch, the court found to the contrary: “Fleischli’s

electronic switch served to initiate the firing sequence and the minigun continued to fire until the switch was turned off or the ammunition was exhausted. The minigun was therefore a machine gun as defined in the National Firearms Act.” *Id.* (superseded by statute on other grounds); *see also United States v. Oakes*, 564 F.2d 384, 388 (10th Cir. 1977) (rejecting defendant’s argument that because he had constructed a weapon with two triggers, it would not fire by a single function of the trigger, finding “it is undisputed that the shooter could, by fully pulling the trigger, and it only, at the point of maximum leverage, obtain automation with a single trigger function. We are satisfied the gun was a machine gun within the statutory definition both in law and fact.”)

Similarly here, the ERAD is a component that, when attached to a rifle, causes the rifle to function automatically. The ERAD allows the firing sequence to be initiated by a single pull of the primary trigger, which is continually engaged as long as the shooter maintains rearward pressure on the trigger and the motor continues to push the shooter’s finger forward. (AR 0073; 79-80.) Because the ERAD is a combination of parts designed and intended for use in converting a semiautomatic firearm into weapon which shoots automatically more than one shot by a single action—the pull of the trigger—it is a machinegun. ATF’s decision is not arbitrary or capricious, but is consistent with the facts based on a thorough examination and testing of the ERAD’s functionality.

B. ATF’s Classification is Consistent with Public Policy.

Because of their rapid rate of fire, machineguns have long been considered inherently dangerous and are therefore strictly regulated and generally unlawful to possess. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 922(o); *United States v. Brock*, 724 F.3d 817, 824 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Congress has grouped together sawed-off shotguns, machineguns, and a variety of dangerous explosive devices for

stringent restrictions on possession and strict registration requirements for those that can be possessed lawfully.”); *United States v. Brazeau*, 237 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The point is that most firearms do not have to be registered-only those that Congress found to be inherently dangerous.”); *United States v. Kruszewski*, No. 91-0031P, 1991 WL 268684, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 10, 1991) (“The categories of firearms covered by U.S.C. Title 26 include only particularly dangerous weapons such as machineguns In *District of Columbia v. Heller*, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008), the Supreme Court discussed a machinegun (M-16), and recognized a “limitation on the right to keep and carry arms” that includes “dangerous and unusual weapons.” *See also United States v. Spires*, 755 F.Supp. 890, 892 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (“Congress believed these particular weapons, as opposed to firearms in general, are extremely dangerous and serve virtually no purpose other than furtherance of illegal activity.”).

The device at issue in this case – the ERAD grip – enables a firearm to produce automatic fire with a single pull of the trigger, and therefore makes an otherwise semiautomatic firearm into one of the “dangerous and unusual weapons” recognized by the *Heller* court.. A rifle with the ERAD will continue to fire automatically once the trigger is pulled and remains depressed, with no further action by the shooter required. The widely-available Bushmaster Model XMI150E2S fires at a rate of one shot per trigger pull and up to 120 rounds per minute.⁴ When

⁴ Although there are no official documents establishing a maximum firing rate, it is thought that 120 rounds per minute would be a ceiling. Obviously, the rate of fire depends on how fast the shooter can pull and release the trigger. The Department of the Army has published 45 rounds per minute as the maximum effective rate of fire for AR-type weapons, meaning the number of shots that allow the shooter to effectively engage the intended target. *See* Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-22.9, Rifle Marksmanship M16-/M4-Series Weapons, Ch. 2-1 (Characteristics of M16-/M4-Series Weapons), Aug. 2008, available at <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwixkfTlRzTAhUKwiYKHf9iA30QFggnMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fusacac.army.m>

the ERAD device is attached to it, however, the same rifle is capable of firing at a rate of up to 500 rounds per minute. (AR 0047.) This unhindered automatic firing capability is the very danger that the National Firearms Act was intended to protect against. *See* 149 Cong. Rec. H2944-02, H2950 (Apr. 9, 2003) (“these weapons ... are inherently dangerous”); *United States v. Newman*, 134 F.3d 373 (6th Cir. Jan. 21, 1998) (unpublished) (“Although the National Firearms Act is ostensibly a revenue-generating statute enacted under Congress’s taxation power, it is clearly designed to regulate the manufacture, transfer, and possession of dangerous weapons. Although the means by which Congress advanced its objectives are somewhat roundabout, close analysis of the relevant provisions reveals an unmistakable intent to prohibit possession of any machine gun the manufacture or importation of which was not explicitly authorized by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms.”). Nor is such easy transformation to an automatic firearm consistent with the prohibition imposed by section 922(o) of the Gun Control Act. *See United States v. Haney*, 264 F.3d 1161, 1168 (10th Cir. 2001) (“banning possession of post 1986 machine guns is an essential part of the federal scheme to regulate interstate commerce in dangerous weapons.”). Accordingly, ATF’s assessment of the functionality of the ERAD grip, including its ability to convert a firearm into an automatic weapon, support ATF’s finding that the ERAD is properly classified as a machinegun.

C. Freedom’s “Reset Bar” Terminology Does Not Alter the Outcome

Freedom argues that FTISB’s analysis is flawed because the ERAD’s “reset bar” is not a “trigger.” Freedom specifically claims that, “the trigger finger reset bar is not the trigger, nor

il%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fmisc%2Fdoctrine%2FCDG%2Fcdg_resources%2Fmanuals%2Ffm%2Ffm3_22x9.pdf&usg=AFQjCNEzIuwG-XuAHAhI5HSuun3SGVrZxg&sig2=5AF-YguyuZCKe4rELoibbQ.

can it activate the firing sequence. Only the shooter's conscious and deliberate pull of the reset bar that subsequently engages the trigger that causes the weapon to fire and the ERAD cannot be made to function any other way." (Docket No. 24 at 8.) To this end, Freedom admits it has created a device that incorporates the traditional firearm trigger as another intermediate component in the firing mechanism.

Nevertheless, Freedom's position has been rejected by ATF before, and this rejection has been upheld in court. As discussed above, in *United States v. Fleischli*, 305 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2002), the Seventh Circuit rejected the appellant's argument that an electronic switch did not meet the traditional definition of a trigger, holding as follows:

This is a puerile argument, based on hyper-technical adherence to literalism. We are not surprised to learn that Fleischli is not the first defendant to make such a brazen argument, although he appears to be the first to do so in this circuit. We join our sister circuits in holding that a trigger is a mechanism used to initiate a firing sequence. *United States v. Jokel*, 969 F.2d 132, 135 (5th Cir. 1992) (commonsense understanding of trigger is mechanism used to initiate firing sequence); *United States v. Evans*, 978 F.2d 1112, 1113–14 n. 2 (9th Cir.1992), *cert. denied*, 510 U.S. 821, 114 S.Ct. 78, 126 L.Ed.2d 46 (1993) (trigger is anything that releases the bolt to cause the weapon to fire). Fleischli's definition "would lead to the absurd result of enabling persons to avoid the NFA simply by using weapons that employ a button or switch mechanism for firing." *Evans*, 978 F.2d at 1113–14 n. 2. The dictionary definition of "trigger" includes both the traditional ("a small projecting tongue in a firearm that, when pressed by the finger, actuates the mechanism that discharges the weapon") and the more general ("anything, as an act or event, that serves as a stimulus and initiates or precipitates a reaction or series of reactions."). See Webster's Unabridged Dictionary Of The English Language (2001). Fleischli's electronic switch served to initiate the firing sequence and the minigun continued to fire until the switch was turned off or the ammunition was exhausted. The minigun was therefore a machine gun as defined in the National Firearms Act.

Id. at 655–56.

Similarly, in *United States v. Carter*, 465 F.3d 658 (6th Cir. 2006), the Sixth Circuit opined on the definition of a "trigger" under the National Firearms Act. There, Carter appealed

a conviction for illegal possession of a machine gun and other parts designed or intended for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun. *Id.* at 660. Carter argued that the jury instruction on the definition of “trigger” was faulty because the indictment “did not mention a trigger mechanism among the parts he was alleged to have possessed” and thus the indictment failed to state a charge pursuant to the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c)(1) because “the definition of ‘machinegun’ given at 26 U.S.C. § 5845 specifically includes a trigger.” *Id.* at 661.

According to the testifying expert, the weapon was complete except for a trigger mechanism. Thus “[a]fter inserting a magazine with three rounds of ammunition, he said, he was able to make the gun fire all three rounds consecutively by pulling the bolt back and releasing it by hand.” *Id.* at 661-62. The court held that, even in the absence of a traditional trigger, the weapon fell within the definition of a “machinegun.”

The reasoning adopted by other circuits, as well as simple logic, compels the conclusion that the district court’s instruction was proper and not an abuse of discretion. A trigger is generally “anything, as an act or event, that serves as a stimulus and initiates or precipitates a reaction.” Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary 2021 (2nd ed.1997). Within the realm of firearms, it is commonly understood as “a small projecting tongue in a firearm that, when pressed by the finger, actuates the mechanism that discharges the weapon.” *Id.* However, the latter definition is obviously a context-specific articulation of the former. According to the testimony of the government’s expert, the manipulation of his hands on the assembled weapon initiated a reaction, namely the firing of the gun and two automatic successive firings. This manual manipulation constituted a trigger for purposes of the weapon’s operation. The district court’s “trigger” instruction to the jury was not an abuse of discretion.

Id. at 665.

Finally, in *United States v. Camp*, 343 F.3d 743 (5th Cir. 2003), the defendant modified a semiautomatic rifle by adding an electrically operated trigger mechanism, which operated as follows:

When an added switch behind the original trigger was pulled, it supplied electrical power to a motor connected to the bottom of a fishing reel that had been placed inside the weapon's trigger guard; the motor caused the reel to rotate; and that rotation caused the original trigger to function in rapid succession. The weapon would fire until either the shooter released the switch or the loaded ammunition was expended.

Id. at 744.

An ATF expert testified that a true trigger activating devices, although giving the impression of functioning as a machinegun, are not classified as machineguns because the shooter still has to separately pull the trigger each time he/she fires the gun by manually operating a lever, crank, or the like. To this end, the court stated:

We reject Camp's contention that the switch on . . . his firearm was a legal "trigger activator". As discussed, those activators described by the ATF Agent require a user to separately pull the activator each time the weapon is fired. Camp's weapon, however, required only one action – pulling the switch he installed – to fire multiple shots.

Camp, 343 F.3d at 745.

Similarly here, even though Freedom refers to its ERAD as a "trigger reset assistance device," a firearm fitted with the ERAD does not require separate, mechanical pulls of the trigger (*i.e.*, pull and release) to discharge more than a single round. The trigger is moving at such a rapid rate that the shooter's finger does not pull the trigger each time to fire each shot, but instead pulls the trigger once and then remains stationary, resisting forward pressure, as the motor causes the weapon to function automatically, and continue to fire rounds. It is undisputed that when the shooter's finger remains connected to the "reset bar," and an electric motor is activated, the "reset bar" functions as a trigger in and of itself, and controls the pace of the firing sequence. The only action required by the shooter is that of continued rearward pressure. To this end, the ERAD is capable of firing at a rate of 500 rounds per minute and does not require

any additional act by the shooter after the motor is turned on and the shooter pulls the “reset bar” (or what FTISB describes as the “primary trigger”) once without releasing pressure. (AR 0047.)

Accordingly, in spite of its branding and terminology, the ERAD meets the definition of a machinegun.

D. The ERAD Is Not The Same As “Bump Fire” or “Slide Fire” Stock.

Freedom also argues that its ERAD is similar to “bump fire” or “slide fire” stock, which has been found not to be machinegun technology. (Pl.’s Br. at 24 (citing AR at 231 and Pl.’s Exhibits A, B, and C, Docket Nos. 24-1, 24-2, 24-3).) “Bump firing” is the process of using the recoil of a semi-automatic firearm to fire in rapid succession, simulating the effect of an automatic firearm when performed with a high level of skill and precision by the shooter. Bump firing requires the shooter to manually and simultaneously pull and push the firearm in order for it to continue firing. (See Pl.’s Ex. A, Docket No. 24-1 at 3-4; Pl.’s Ex. B, Docket No. 24-3 at 4-5.) The shooter must use both hands to pull the trigger rearward - and the other to push the firearm forward to counteract the recoil - to fire in rapid succession. While the shooter receives an assist from the natural backfire of the weapon to accelerate subsequent discharge, the rapid fire sequence in bump firing is contingent on shooter input, rather than mechanical input, and thus cannot shoot “automatically.” (Pl.’s Ex. A, Docket No. 24-1 at 3-4; Pl.’s Ex. B, Docket No. 24-3 at 4-5.)

Conversely, the ERAD does not require any such skill or input from the shooter. A rifle equipped with the ERAD will utilize a battery-powered motor to continue to fire automatically once the trigger is pulled and remains depressed, with no other action by the shooter required. Indeed, in its classification letter, FTISB noted that the AR-type trigger functions as a

“secondary trigger” in that “it merely becomes a part of the firing sequence.” (AR at 0071.) Freedom argues that the ERAD allows the shooter to make a “conscious decision to apply or not apply rearward pressure to fire the weapon by initiating a trigger function,” (AR at 47 (demonstration video)). This argument is technically correct to the extent the shooter may make a purposeful choice to cease applying rearward pressure to the reset bar/primary trigger. In fact, this is true of any machinegun—a shooter makes a conscious decision to pull and release the trigger. What is misleading, however, is any assertion that the shooter may make a conscious choice to pull and release the trigger for *each individual, subsequent shot*. In accepting this argument, the shooter would presumably be able to control the precise number of shots he intends to fire. For example, he could intend to fire a precise number of rounds of ammunition, such as 263 rounds, and actually expel that exact number of rounds. With the ERAD engaged, however, the number of rounds fired is the result of automatic functioning so long as the shooter is applying pressure on the “reset bar,” and therefore the number of rounds expelled cannot accurately be characterized as conscious or deliberate. (AR 0047; 0073.)

In contrast, bump firing requires the shooter to manually pull and push the firearm in order for it to continue firing. Generally, the shooter must use both hands—one to push forward and the other to pull rearward—to fire in rapid succession. While the shooter receives an assist from the natural recoil of the weapon to accelerate subsequent discharge, the rapid fire sequence in bump firing is contingent on shooter input in pushing the weapon forward, rather than mechanical input, and is thus not an automatic function of the weapon.

Freedom also argues that FTISB’s decision regarding the ERAD is inconsistent with its decision regarding the Akins Accelerator, which was an accessory attached to firearm that

accelerated rate of fire. *Akins v. United States*, 312 F. App'x 197 (11th Cir. 2009). On the contrary, ATF's decision is entirely consistent with its decision regarding the Akins Accelerator and ATF Ruling 2006-2.⁵

To operate the Akins Accelerator, the shooter pulled the trigger one time, initiating an automatic firing sequence, which in turn caused the rifle to recoil within the stock, permitting the trigger to lose contact with the finger and manually reset (move forward). *Akins*, 312 F. App'x at 199. Springs then forced the rifle forward in the stock, forcing the trigger against the finger, which caused the weapon to discharge the ammunition until the shooter released the constant pull or the ammunition is exhausted. Put another way, the recoil and the spring-powered device caused the firearm to cycle back and forth, impacting the trigger finger, which remained rearward in a constant pull, without further input by the shooter, thereby creating an automatic firing effect. *Id.* The advertised rate of fire for a weapon with the Akins Accelerator was 650 rounds per minute. *Id.*

The Eleventh Circuit found that ATF properly classified the Akins Accelerator as a machinegun because:

[a] machinegun is a weapon that fires "automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger." 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b). The interpretation by the Bureau that the phrase "single function of the trigger" means a "single pull of the trigger" is consonant with the statute and its legislative history. After a single application of the trigger by a gunman, the Accelerator uses its internal spring and the force of recoil to fire continuously the rifle cradled inside until the gunman releases the trigger or the ammunition is exhausted. Based on the operation of the Accelerator, the Bureau had authority to "reconsider and rectify" what it considered to be a classification error. That decision was not

⁵ Initially ATF classified the Akins Accelerator as a non-machinegun, but after a subsequent test fire, it was determined the Akins Accelerator converts a semiautomatic rifle into a weapon capable of firing automatically by a single function of the trigger and was therefore in fact a machinegun. Thus, ATF overruled its earlier classification.

arbitrary and capricious.

Id. at 200.

Pursuant to ATF Ruling 2006-2, any device that is truly analogous to the Akins Accelerator - *i.e.*, a device that allows a weapon to fire automatically when the shooter pulls the trigger - is properly classified as a machinegun. (AR at 630-32.) Specifically, the Rule provides that a firearm with the following functionality constitutes a machinegun:

A shooter pulls the trigger which causes the firearm to discharge. As the firearm moves rearward in the composite stock, the shooter's trigger finger contacts the stock. The trigger mechanically resets, and the device, which has a coiled spring located forward of the firearm receiver, is compressed. Energy from this spring subsequently drives the firearm forward into its normal firing position and, in turn, causes the trigger to contact the shooter's trigger finger. Provided the shooter maintains finger pressure against the stock, the weapon will fire repeatedly until the ammunition is exhausted or the finger is removed. The assembled device is advertised to fire approximately 650 rounds per minute. Live-fire testing of this device demonstrated that a single pull of the trigger initiates an automatic firing cycle which continues until the finger is released or the ammunition supply is exhausted.

(AR at 631.)

Like the Akins Accelerator, the ERAD requires a single pull of the trigger to activate the firing sequence, which continues until the shooter's finger is released, or the firearm depletes its ammunition supply. (AR at 354-68, 395-97.) Because the ERAD is a part designed and intended for use in converting a semiautomatic firearm into weapon which shoots automatically more than one shot by a single action—the pull of the trigger—it is a machinegun. Thus, ATF's decision is not arbitrary or capricious, but is consistent with the facts based on a thorough examination and testing of the ERAD's functionality.

With regard to Plaintiff's Exhibit B (Docket No. 24-3), the 3MR reset trigger device submitted to ATF was an internal mechanism, which operated to push the shooter's finger

forward. It does not run on a motor, and although the mechanism assists in manually resetting the trigger, the shooter is still required to release the trigger to fully reset the trigger. Thus, during inspection, ATF determined that the weapon could not be fired automatically. The item was tested by seven individuals at ATF prior to the classification, and no individual was able to generate automatic fire. Because the reset trigger required a release of the trigger and subsequent pull before another round was expelled, the 3MR was not classified as a machinegun.

Based on the foregoing, FTISB has not rendered inconsistent decisions, but has inspected and analyzed each prototype or device presented to it by Freedom for classification, and has issued its decisions based on the unique characteristics of each. Accordingly, ATF's classification of the ERAD device as a machinegun is not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise inconsistent with the applicable law.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court must enter judgment in favor of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives as to all of Plaintiff's claims against it.

Respectfully submitted,

JOSH J. MINKLER
United States Attorney

By: s/ Shelese Woods
Shelese Woods
Assistant United States Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that I have served a copy of the foregoing upon the Plaintiff herein by electronically filing a copy thereof through the Court's CM/ECF system, which will transmit a copy electronically to the following on the 27th day of July, 2017:

Brent R. Weil
KIGHTLINGER & GRAY, LLP
bweil@k-glaw.com

Timothy R. Rudd
Scott Braum
SCOTT L. BRAUM & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
trr@braumlaw.com

s/ Shelese Woods
Shelese Woods
Assistant United States Attorney
10 West Market Street
Suite 2100
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204

Exhibit 26

(*hogan 7 m16.wmv*)

Exhibit 27

(Testimony of ATF Senior Analyst Richard Vasquez)

Page 73

1 Q Martin. So is it fair to say Mr. Martin's
2 and Mr. Spencer's participation was at a fairly high
3 level more or less reviewing and approving and not
4 actively participating in the decision?
5 A Are you meaning high level like their
6 superior ranking or --
7 Q Well, I was more getting at they reviewed
8 the final product, maybe made changes, maybe didn't
9 and approved it without getting into the substantive
10 details of the decision.
11 A That would be correct.
12 Q Okay.
13 MR. MONROE: Let's take one more break.
14 (Thereupon, a brief recess ensued at
15 approximately 11:43 a.m. and the proceedings
16 subsequently resumed at approximately 11:50
17 a.m. with all parties present).
18 BY MR. MONROE:
19 Q In Exhibit 1 which are the operating
20 procedures that you wrote, there's a reference to
21 two rulings, 82-8 and 83-5, do you recall that?
22 A Do I recall the rulings or the reference?
23 Q Well, first of all the reference.
24 A Yes.
25 Q Do you recall the ruling?

Page 74

1 A Yes.
2 Q 82-8 if I remember had to do with some
3 devices that were determined to be machine guns but
4 that the ones manufactured before a particular date
5 were not I guess treated as machine guns for
6 purposes of transfer and possession; is that right?
7 A Let me find it. (Reviews document).
8 Correct.
9 Q What is the proper treatment of one of
10 those firearms under that ruling if it's ... I mean,
11 I guess ATF considers it to be a machine gun but
12 it's freely transferable without even a Form 4 if I
13 understand it; is that right?
14 A If it was manufactured before that date as
15 an open bolt pistol, then ATF said we're not going to
16 apply the machine gun classification to it.
17 Q So I guess the conclusion is that means
18 there's a, I don't know about the sizes, but there's
19 some bucket of firearms that are machine guns that
20 aren't registered, don't have to be registered and
21 are freely transferable without a Form 4; is that
22 right?
23 A Well, that is correct but they are no longer
24 allowed to be manufactured.
25 Q I understand. So we're only talking about

Page 75

1 ones that were manufactured before a particular
2 date?
3 A That's correct.
4 Q But whatever number of those there are,
5 they're out there?
6 A Yes.
7 Q Now, based on your inspection and
8 observations of the defendant, did you conclude
9 whether it was intended to be installed on a
10 particular firearm blower?
11 A Can you say that again?
12 Q I mean, did you come to any conclusion of
13 what the purpose of the defendant was?
14 A What the intention of the manufacturer was?
15 Q Yes.
16 A Or what our interpretation of what the
17 defendant weapon was?
18 Q What the intention of the manufacturer
19 was.
20 A Yes. And it's indicated that there's a
21 portion of a MAC upper welded inside the receiver.
22 Q And so what did you conclude the purpose
23 of the manufacturer was in manufacturing the device?
24 A The purpose of the manufacturer in
25 manufacturing the device is that he wanted to install

Page 76

1 it on to a MAC receiver.
2 Q And then what would that accomplish?
3 A Well, with our classification, that would be
4 the classification of two machine guns, the registered
5 MAC or -- would be a machine gun, or if it was a
6 semiautomatic MAC, that would be converting the
7 semiautomatic MAC into a machine gun. And since we
8 classified the upper as a machine gun, that would also
9 be a machine gun in and of itself.
10 Q And the caliber of the defendant is what,
11 do you know?
12 A Of the defendant weapon?
13 Q Yes.
14 A 7.62X54.
15 Q And that's not the caliber of a MAC; is
16 that right?
17 A Correct.
18 Q So the result would be a MAC that shoots
19 7.62X54; is that right?
20 A Yes.
21 Q There was some discussion in the responses
22 to our third discovery request about the possibility
23 of returning the defendant to the claimant for
24 modification, do you recall that?
25 A Yes.

Exhibit 28

(*Bump Stock Analytical Video*)