1 2 3 4 5 6 7	BENBROOK LAW GROUP, PC BRADLEY A. BENBROOK (SBN 177786) STEPHEN M. DUVERNAY (SBN 250957) 400 Capitol Mall, Suite 2530 Sacramento, CA 95814 Telephone: (916) 447-4900 Facsimile: (916) 447-4904 brad@benbrooklawgroup.com steve@benbrooklawgroup.com Attorneys for Petitioners and Plaintiffs	
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9	SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA	
10	COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO	
11	MAURO CAMPOS;	Case No.:
12	SKYLER CALLAHAN-MILLER; FIVE FIVE SIX INC., dba FIREARMS	VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF
13	UNKNOWN; DIMITRIOS KARRAS;	MANDATE AND COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY, INJUNCTIVE, AND
14	PWGG L.P., dba POWAY WEAPONS & GEAR & PWG RANGE;	OTHER RELIEF
15	JOHN PHILLIPS; SAN DIEGO GUN OWNERS PAC;	
16	CALIFORNIA GUN RIGHTS FOUNDATION; SECOND AMENDMENT FOUNDATION;	
17 18	FIREARMS POLICY FOUNDATION; and FIREARMS POLICY COALITION, INC.,	
19	Petitioners and Plaintiffs,	
20	v.	
21	XAVIER BECERRA, Attorney General of	
22	California;	
23	BRENT E. ORICK, Director of the California Department of Justice Bureau of Firearms; and	
24	CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,	
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26	Respondents and Defendants.	
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Petitioners and Plaintiffs Mauro Campos; Skyler Callahan-Miller; Five Five Six, Inc., dba Firearms Unknown; Dimitrios Karras; PWGG L.P., dba Poway Weapons & Gear and PWG Range; John Phillips; San Diego Gun Owners PAC; California Gun Rights Foundation; Second Amendment Foundation; Firearms Policy Foundation; and Firearms Policy Coalition, Inc. complain of Respondents and Defendants and allege:

INTRODUCTION

- 1. Defendants and Respondents Attorney General Xavier Becerra, California Department of Justice ("DOJ"), and Bureau of Firearms ("Bureau") Director Brent E. Orick (collectively, the "Defendants") have used the DOJ's Dealer Record of Sale ("DROS") Entry System ("DES") and the COVID-19 pandemic as an opportunity to undermine and restrict citizens' access to firearms in violation of California's statutes and regulations governing firearm transactions. Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit to challenge the Defendants' current policy and practice of delaying firearm transfers beyond what is authorized by law. By impermissibly delaying the ability of responsible, law-abiding Californians to take possession of firearms, Defendants have failed to perform their duties, violated California law, and violated the rights of legally eligible California firearm purchasers and transferees.
- 2. California law imposes a 10-day waiting period on most firearm transactions. Penal Code §§ 26815(a) & 27540(a). The period is imposed (in part) so that state authorities can conduct a background check before a firearm is delivered.
- 3. The law further requires that a dealer keep a register or record of each electronic or telephonic transfer. *See* Penal Code § 28100, *et seq*. As part of that process, dealers utilize DOJ's DES system, a web-based system that, inter alia, transmits firearm transaction applications to DOJ for review and tells dealers when they can deliver a firearm to a transferee.¹
- 4. DOJ implemented 11 CCR § 4230 ("Section 4230") in January 2014 to govern firearms dealers' use of and DOJ's management of DROS and DES.

Cal. Dep't of Justice, *DROS Entry System Log On*, https://des.doj.ca.gov/login.do.

- 5. As part of the regulatory scheme, DOJ assigns a "status" in the DES system to a proposed firearm transaction. For the purposes of this challenge, the relevant ones are: 1) Pending, 2) Approved, 3) Delayed, and 4) Denied. When an application is submitted to DOJ for review, it is marked "Pending" in the DES. Section 4230 requires that "[a] 'Pending' status shall be designated when the purchaser's eligibility is under review during the 10-day waiting period." 11 CCR § 4230(b)(2)(A).
- 6. If the DOJ "determines the firearm purchaser/transferee/loanee is not prohibited by state or federal law from purchasing or possessing firearms, *immediately following the conclusion of the 10-day waiting period*, the status of the DES transaction record status will change from 'Pending' to 'Approved.'" 11 CCR § 4230(a) (emphasis added). Approved purchasers are entitled to take possession of their firearm at the end of the 10-day waiting period. *Id*.
- 7. Section 4230(b)(2)(C) requires that "[a] 'Denied' status shall be designated when the Department reviews an application to purchase a firearm based on information provided by the applicant (e.g., name, date of birth, etc.) without fingerprint comparison and the applicant information is denied after the Department's review of matching state and/or federal records."
- 8. If, during the 10-day waiting period, DOJ is unable to determine the purchaser's eligibility, the transaction may be assigned a "Delayed" status. 11 CCR § 4230(b)(2)(B). But the statutory scheme allows DOJ to delay delivery of a firearm beyond the 10-day waiting period *only* if a background check conducted within the initial 10-day window affirmatively shows that the purchaser might be prohibited from possessing a firearm based on their mental health record, Penal Code § 28220(f)(1), their criminal record, *id*. (f)(2), or because they have already purchased a handgun in the previous 30 days.² *Id*. (f)(3). In that case, DOJ has up to 30 days from the date of application to resolve the background check; the transferee is entitled to take possession of the firearm as soon as their background check is complete (and DOJ assigns it a "Approval after Delay" status), or at the end of 30 days, whichever is sooner presuming they are not prohibited

² California law generally prohibits citizens from purchasing more than one handgun in a 30-day period. Cal. Penal Code § 27535(a). *But see Doe v. Becerra*, 20 Cal.App.5th 330 (2018).

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from possessing firearms under state or federal law. *Id.*, subd. (f)(4). DOJ has no authority to delay firearm transactions for reasons not specified in the statute.

- 9. Thus, DOJ's regulations, in harmony with state statutes, require Defendants to allow dealers to transfer a firearm immediately following the conclusion of the 10-day waiting period, absent an affirmative determination that the person is prohibited from possessing firearms under state and federal law *or* that the transaction may be delayed based on one of the three expressly enumerated statutory criteria outlined in Penal Code section 28220(f)(1)-(3).
- 10. In early April 2020, DOJ released a statement claiming that Section 28220 gave it general authority to expand the statutory 10-day waiting period for all firearm transactions, up to 30 days. Citing reduced staffing due to the COVID-19 pandemic during a time when the pandemic had likewise led to an increase in firearms transactions DOJ advised that background checks may no longer be performed during the initial 10-day waiting period. In the ensuing weeks, as civil unrest and riots have spurred more citizens to purchase firearms to defend themselves, Defendants have failed to conduct background checks within the initial 10-day period as required, and they have delayed transactions beyond the 10-day waiting period due to claimed administrative burden not one of the bases authorized by Section 28220. At Plaintiff Firearms Unknown, Defendants' policy and practice has delayed hundreds of transactions beyond the 10-day waiting period. Based on the experience of Plaintiffs, the true number of delays is certainly in the tens of thousands statewide.
- 11. California law provides a method for suspending laws based on emergencies like the COVID-19 pandemic. Governor Newsom has relied on the Emergency Services Act, Government Code § 8550, et seq., to suspend many laws and impose emergency orders based on the exigencies associated with the pandemic. But the Governor did not suspend Penal Code section 28220, likely because it would have invited a wave of litigation over whether an extended 30-day (or more) delay violates the Second Amendment.³

California's 10-day waiting period is the second-longest in the

California's 10-day waiting period is the second-longest in the country; only Hawaii imposes a longer delay (14 days). Haw. Rev. Stat. § 134–2(e); see Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 945 & nn.1–2 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).

- 12. In any event, Section 28220 remains intact, but DOJ is proceeding as if it has the power to suspend the law. It does not. "An administrative agency has only those powers conferred on it by statute, and may not exceed them." *Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies v. Quackenbush*, 52 Cal.App.4th 599, 605 (1997); *see also Cal. Dui Lawyers Ass'n v. Cal. Dep't of Motor Vehicles*, 20 Cal.App.5th 1247, 1264 (2018) ("[a] governmental agency that acts outside of the scope of its statutory authority acts ultra vires and the act is void") (citation omitted).
- 13. DOJ's policy and practice of using DES to maintain applications in a "pending" status after the statutory 10-day waiting period has expired, without having approved, delayed, or denied the application, violates 11 CCR § 4230 and Penal Code section 28220. Plaintiffs seek declaratory, injunctive, and writ relief to invalidate Defendants' challenged policy and practice, enjoin its application, and compel them to follow the State's statutes and their own regulations.

THE PARTIES

- 14. All individual Plaintiffs herein are natural persons, citizens of the United States, taxpayers of the State of California, and current residents of the State of California, in the counties specified below. Each individual Plaintiff is a member of each of Plaintiff organizations California Gun Rights Foundation, Second Amendment Foundation, Firearms Policy Foundation, and Firearms Policy Coalition, Inc.
- 15. Petitioner and Plaintiff Mauro Campos is a California resident who is not prohibited under state or federal law from possessing, receiving, owning, or purchasing a firearm. Campos possesses a current DOJ-issued certificate of eligibility⁴ to possess and purchase firearms. He is a veteran of the United States Marine Corps who served three combat tours in Iraq between 2004 and 2008. Campos is certified by DOJ as a firearms safety certificate instructor. Campos is a

A "certificate of eligibility" ("COE") is a "certificate," issued by the Department of Justice, "which states that the Department has checked its records and the records available to the Department in the National Instant Criminal Background Check System and determined that the applicant is not prohibited from acquiring or possessing firearms pursuant to Penal Code sections 18205, 29800, 29805, 29815 through 29825, and 29900, or Welfare and Institutions Code sections 8100 and 8103, or Title 18, sections 921 and 922 of the United States Code, or Title 27, Part 478.32 of the Code of Federal Regulations at the time the check was performed and which ensures that a person who handles, sells, delivers, or has under his or her custody or control any ammunition, is eligible to do so pursuant to Penal Code section 30347." 11 CCR § 4031(d).

resident of the County of San Diego, California, and has, within the past year, paid taxes to the State of California and/or for its benefit.

- 16. Petitioner and Plaintiff Skyler Callahan-Miller is a California resident who is not prohibited under state or federal law from possessing, receiving, owning, or purchasing a firearm. Callahan-Miller possesses a current certificate of eligibility (issued by the DOJ) to possess and purchase firearms. Callahan-Miller is a resident of the County of San Diego, California, and has, within the past year, paid taxes to the State of California and/or for its benefit.
- 17. Petitioner and Plaintiff Five Five Six Inc., doing business as Firearms Unknown ("Firearms Unknown") is a California corporation that operates a firearms dealership in Oceanside, California. Firearms Unknown is listed as a firearms dealer in DOJ's Centralized List of Firearms Dealers. Firearms Unknown is located in the County of San Diego, California, and has, within the past year, paid taxes to the State of California and/or for its benefit.
- 18. Petitioner and Plaintiff Dimitrios Karras is a California resident who is not prohibited under state or federal law from possessing, receiving, owning, or purchasing a firearm. Karras is an employee of Firearms Unknown and an individual licensee associated with the dealership. Karras is a resident of the County of San Diego, California, and has, within the past year, paid taxes to the State of California and/or for its benefit.
- 19. Petitioner and Plaintiff PWGG L.P., doing business as Poway Weapons & Gear and PWG Range ("PWG") is a California limited partnership that operates a firearms dealership in Poway, California. PWG is listed as a firearms dealer in DOJ's Centralized List of Firearms Dealers. PWG is located in the County of San Diego, California, and has, within the past year, paid taxes to the State of California and/or for its benefit.
- 20. Petitioner and Plaintiff John Phillips is a California resident who is not prohibited under state or federal law from possessing, receiving, owning, or purchasing a firearm. Phillips is an employee of PWG and an individual licensee associated with the dealership. Phillips is a resident of the County of San Diego, California, and has, within the past year, paid taxes to the State of California and/or for its benefit.

- 21. Petitioner and Plaintiff San Diego County Gun Owners PAC ("SDCGO") is a local political organization whose purpose is to protect and advance the Second Amendment rights of residents of San Diego County, California, through their efforts to support and elect local and state representatives who support the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. SDCGO's membership and donors consist of Second Amendment supporters, people who own guns for self-defense and sport, firearms dealers, shooting ranges, and elected officials who want to restore and protect the right to keep and bear arms in California. The interests that SDCGO seeks to protect in this lawsuit are germane to the organization's purposes, and, therefore, SDCGO sues on its own behalf, and on behalf of its members, including individual Plaintiffs herein.
- 22. Petitioner and Plaintiff California Gun Rights Foundation ("CGF") is a nonprofit foundation incorporated under the laws of California with its principal place of business in Sacramento, California. CGF serves its members, supporters, and the public through educational, cultural, and judicial efforts to defend and advance Second Amendment and related rights. CGF has thousands of members and supporters in California, including members in Defendants' jurisdiction and the individual Plaintiffs herein. The interpretation and enforcement of the California firearms law directly impacts CGF's organizational interests, as well as the rights of CGF's members and supporters, and other firearm buyers who reside in California. CGF has expended and diverted resources, and has been adversely and directly harmed, because of Defendants' laws, policies, practices, and customs challenged herein. CGF brings this action on behalf of itself, its members, supporters who possess all the indicia of membership, and similarly situated members of the public.
- 23. Petitioner and Plaintiff Second Amendment Foundation, Inc. ("SAF") is a nonprofit educational foundation incorporated under the laws of Washington with its principal place of business in Bellevue, Washington. SAF seeks to preserve the effectiveness of the Second Amendment through education, research, publishing, and legal action programs focused on the Constitutional right to possess firearms, and the consequences of gun control. SAF has over 650,000 members and supporters nationwide and thousands of members in California, including the individual Plaintiffs in this case. SAF brings this action on behalf of itself and its members.

- 24. Plaintiff Firearms Policy Foundation ("FPF") is a non-profit organization that serves the public through charitable and educational purposes, with a focus on advancing constitutional rights with a particular focus on laws relating to firearms and affecting the fundamental right to keep and bear arms. FPF has members in the State of California, including the individual and retailer Plaintiffs in this case. FPF represents its members and supporters who include California gun owners, individuals in California who wish to acquire firearms and ammunition, licensed California firearm retailers, and others and brings this action on behalf of itself, its members, supporters who possess all the indicia of membership, and similarly situated members of the public. FPF has expended and diverted resources, and is adversely and directly harmed, because of Defendants' laws, policies, orders, practices, and customs challenged herein.
- 25. Petitioner and Plaintiff Firearms Policy Coalition, Inc. ("FPC") is a nonprofit organization incorporated under the laws of Delaware with a place of business in California. The purposes of FPC include defending and promoting the People's rights especially but not limited to First and Second Amendment rights advancing individual liberty and restoring freedom. FPC serves its members and the public through legislative advocacy, grassroots advocacy, litigation and legal efforts, research, education, outreach, and other programs. FPC has members in the State of California, including the individual and retailer Plaintiffs in this case. FPC represents its members and supporters who include gun owners, individuals who wish to acquire firearms and ammunition, licensed California firearm retailers, shooting ranges, trainers and educators, and others and brings this action on behalf of itself, its members, supporters who possess all the indicia of membership, and similarly situated members of the public. FPC has expended and diverted resources, and is adversely and directly harmed, because of Defendants' laws, policies, orders, practices, and customs challenged herein.
- 26. Respondent and Defendant Xavier Becerra is the Attorney General of the State of California. The Attorney General is the chief law enforcement officer of the state, and it is his duty to ensure that California's laws are uniformly and adequately enforced. The Attorney General is the head of the DOJ. The DOJ and its Bureau of Firearms regulate and enforce state law related to the sales, ownership, and transfer of firearms. Attorney General Becerra is sued in

his official capacity. The Attorney General maintains an office in San Diego.

- 27. Respondent and Defendant Brent E. Orick is the Chief of the DOJ Bureau of Firearms. He is sued in his official capacity.
- 28. Respondent and Defendant California Department of Justice and its Bureau of Firearms regulate and enforce state law related to the sales, ownership, and transfer of firearms. DOJ maintains an office in San Diego.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 29. This Court has jurisdiction over this action and authority to issue declaratory relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1060 and Government Code section 11350. Statutory interpretation "is a particularly appropriate subject for judicial resolution," and "judicial economy strongly supports the use of declaratory relief to avoid duplicative actions to challenge an agency's statutory interpretation or alleged policies." *Cal. Sch. Bds. Ass'n v. State of Cal.*, 192 Cal.App.4th 770, 790 (2011) (citations omitted). This Court has jurisdiction to enter injunctive relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 526 and 527, et seq.
 - 30. Venue is appropriate in this Court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 401.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

- A. California's Statutes And DOJ's Own Regulations Require DOJ To Conduct Background Checks Within The First 10 Days Following A Firearm Transfer Application And The Firearm To Be Released Absent a Permissible Delay or Denial.
- 31. California imposes a 10-day waiting period before a buyer, transferee, or loanee can take possession of their firearm. Penal Code §§ 26815(a); 27540(a). The waiting period is implemented by restricting firearms dealers' authority to deliver a firearm.
- 32. This waiting period is imposed (in part) so that state authorities can conduct a background check before a firearm is delivered. *See Silvester v. Harris*, 843 F.3d 816, 823–24 (9th Cir. 2016).⁵ Firearms purchase applications are processed through the DOJ's Dealer Record of Sale Entry System, or "DES" the computerized, point-of-sale application system that firearms dealers use to submit firearm transaction applications to the Bureau.

DOJ's multi-step, acronym-heavy background check process is reviewed in detail in *Silvester v. Harris*, 41 F.Supp.3d 927, 947–52 (E.D. Cal. 2014).

- 33. In California, all non-exempt individuals i.e., ordinary State citizens, like individual plaintiffs herein must purchase or otherwise transfer and receive firearms through a licensed firearms dealer. Penal Code §§ 27545, 28050. Whether a proposed acquisition involves a purchase or transfer, the person seeking to acquire a firearm is subject to a background check conducted by the DOJ. *See* Penal Code § 28220. However, the background check need not be completed in order for the firearm to ultimately be transferred. *See* Penal Code § 28220(f)(4).

 34. When DOJ receives a DROS application, it is required to review state and federal
- 34. When DOJ receives a DROS application, it is required to review state and federal databases to determine whether a prospective buyer is prohibited from possessing, receiving, owning, or purchasing a firearm. Penal Code § 28220(a)-(b). The background check focuses on the purchaser's criminal record and mental health history (to determine whether they are *prohibited* from possessing a firearm under state or federal law). *See id.* In addition, DOJ checks for a purchaser's compliance with California's one-handgun-every-30-days limitation (to determine whether they are *ineligible* to purchase an additional handgun). *Id.* (citing Penal Code § 25735(a)). A significant percentage of background checks are complete within the first day (20% are automatically approved within an hour or two), and the overwhelming percentage of applications over 99% are ultimately approved. *Silvester v. Harris*, 41 F.Supp.3d 927, 953, 954 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (finding that over 99% of applications were approved each year during the period 2010-2014).
- 35. California law specifies the conditions allowing DOJ to delay a firearm transfer or restrict delivery of a firearm beyond the 10-day period after the DROS application is submitted. Under Section 28220(f), DOJ has authority to delay a firearm transaction beyond the 10-day waiting period *only* in three limited and expressly enumerated circumstances where its background check reveals potentially disqualifying information and DOJ is "unable to ascertain" whether the purchaser is actually prohibited or ineligible before the waiting period concludes:

The department shall immediately notify the dealer to delay the transfer of the firearm to the purchaser if the records of the department, or the records available to the department in the National Instant Criminal Background Check System, indicate one of the following:

(i) The purchaser has been taken into custody and placed in a facility for mental health treatment or evaluation and may be a person described in Section 8100 or

8103 of the Welfare and Institutions Code and the department is unable to ascertain whether the purchaser is a person who is prohibited from possessing, receiving, owning, or purchasing a firearm, pursuant to Section 8100 or 8103 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, prior to the conclusion of the waiting period described in Sections 26815 and 27540.

- (ii) The purchaser has been arrested for, or charged with, a crime that would make him or her, if convicted, a person who is prohibited by state or federal law from possessing, receiving, owning, or purchasing a firearm, and the department is unable to ascertain whether the purchaser was convicted of that offense prior to the conclusion of the waiting period described in Sections 26815 and 27540.
- (iii) The purchaser may be a person described in subdivision (a) of Section 27535 [who has purchased a handgun in the prior 30-day period], and the department is unable to ascertain whether the purchaser, in fact, is a person described in subdivision (a) of Section 27535, prior to the conclusion of the waiting period described in Sections 26815 and 27540.

Penal Code § 28220(f)(1)(A).

- 36. When DOJ's background check uncovers specific, potentially prohibiting information, it is required to "immediately notify the dealer" of the reason for the delay and inform the purchaser about the delay. *Id.*, subds. (f)(1)(A), (f)(1)(B), (f)(2). If DOJ subsequently determines a purchaser is not prohibited, it is required to "immediately notify" the dealer so it can transfer the firearm to the purchaser. *Id.*, subd. (f)(3)(A). If DOJ is "unable to ascertain the final disposition of the arrest or criminal charge, or the outcome of the mental health treatment or evaluation, or the purchaser's eligibility to purchase a firearm" within 30 days from the date of purchase, it must "immediately notify" the dealer that it can transfer the firearm. *Id.*, subd. (f)(4).
- 37. In short, Section 28220 allows the DOJ to delay the transfer of a firearm beyond the 10-day waiting period only if the background check conducted in those first 10 days reveals that a purchaser may be prohibited or ineligible, and that total period cannot exceed 30 days from the date of purchase. DOJ does not have authority or discretion to delay transfers beyond the 10-day waiting period for any other reason.
- 38. Consistent with this statutory requirement, DOJ's own regulations provide that, when a dealer submits a firearm transaction through DROS, the DES transaction record is set to "Pending" while DOJ conducts a background check. 11 CCR § 4230(a). And "[a] 'Pending' status shall be designated when the purchaser's eligibility is <u>under review during the 10-day waiting period</u>." *Id.* at (b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Further, "[a] 'Delayed' status shall be

designated when the Department is unable to determine the purchaser's eligibility within the 10day waiting period." *Id.* at (b)(2)(B) (emphasis added).⁶

- 39. Section 4230 further commands that, "[i]f the Department determines the firearm [purchaser] is not prohibited by state or federal law from purchasing or possessing firearms, immediately following the conclusion of the ten-day waiting period, the status of the DES transaction record will change from 'Pending' to 'Approved.'" 11 CCR § 4230(a) (emphasis added).
- 40. In sum, there is no basis for Defendants to leave an individual in a "Pending" status after the expiration of the 10-day waiting period and prevent licensed dealers from transferring a firearm. And the only basis for Defendants to delay a transaction, and assign it a "Delayed" status in DES, is DOJ's determination, after performing the background check within the first 10 days, that it is unable to determine whether a proposed purchaser or transferee is prohibited or ineligible based on specific, identifiable information that meets limited, concrete, statutorily defined circumstances. Through the policy challenged in this lawsuit, however, Defendants are violating these statutes and regulations.

B. DOJ Seizes On The COVID-19 Pandemic To Suspend Section 28220 And Use The DES System To Extend The Waiting Period For Up To 30 Days.

- 41. In early April 2020, DOJ and the Bureau of Firearms announced that they were, in essence, suspending Section 28220. Because of the pandemic, they said, DOJ may or may not conduct background checks within 10 days of receiving a firearm transaction application as required under Section 28220, and DOJ would take up to 30 days to process transactions.
- 42. In a notification sent to firearms dealers through the DROS system and published on the Bureau of Firearms website, Respondents/Defendants claimed that Section 28220(f) gives them the authority to delay a firearm transaction up to 30 days for any reason (or no reason at all). The ostensible reason for this policy is the administrative burdens imposed by the COVID-19

DOJ may be unable to make this determination for a variety of reasons. For example, DOJ analysts may need to investigate the disposition of a criminal arrest or review mental health records to determine whether a purchaser is eligible to own and possess a firearm. *See Silvester*, 41 F.Supp.3d at 951–52.

pandemic coupled with increased public demand for firearms. The notification states:

Under Penal Code section 28220(f)(4), the Department of Justice (DOJ) has up to 30 days to complete background checks on purchasers of firearms and ammunition. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, DOJ typically completed these checks within Penal Code Section 26815(a)'s 10-day waiting period. COVID-19 protective measures have impacted the ability to increase the personnel resources in the DROS unit to address the recent sustained increase in firearms and ammunitions transactions without compromising the health and safety of our employees and the community. As a result, firearms and ammunition dealers and purchasers should know that as DOJ employees continue to perform the statutorily required background checks throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, circumstances may compel that background checks are completed after the expiration of the 10-day waiting period. DOJ will continue to strive to provide the best service and complete these checks in the shortest time possible.

Cal. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Firearms, *Firearms and Ammunition Purchaser Information*, https://oag.ca.gov/firearms.

42. Contrary to DOJ's statement, Penal Code Section 28220(f)(4) does not bestow an unbridled authority to expand the statutes and their terms, but rather provides:

If the department is unable to ascertain the final disposition of the arrest or criminal charge, or the outcome of the mental health treatment or evaluation, or the purchaser's eligibility to purchase a firearm, as described in paragraph (1), within 30 days of the dealer's original submission of purchaser information to the department pursuant to this section, the department shall immediately notify the dealer and the dealer may then immediately transfer the firearm to the purchaser, upon the dealer's recording on the register or record of electronic transfer the date that the firearm is transferred, the dealer signing the register or record of electronic transfer indicating delivery of the firearm to that purchaser, and the purchaser signing the register or record of electronic transfer acknowledging the receipt of the firearm on the date that the firearm is delivered to him or her.

(emphasis added).

- 43. As shown above, however, the review "described in paragraph (1)" of Section 28220(f) must occur in the initial 10 days following submission of a proposed firearms transaction, not any time within the first 30 days. DOJ may only extend this period if the background check performed within the first 10 days gives DOJ specific reason to believe that the purchaser may be prohibited or ineligible due to one of Section 28220's three enumerated disqualifiers. Then, *and only then*, may DOJ utilize up to the full 30 days to continue its background check process.
- 44. Section 28220(f)(4) does not provide DOJ authority or discretion to extend the period in which to conduct background checks because it may be short-staffed. Since issuing this statement, however, Defendants have failed to conduct background checks within 10 days as

required by Section 28220 and, rather than changing the transaction from "Pending" to "Approved," it has kept purchasers in a "Pending" status – preventing the dealer from transferring the firearm to the recipient – until DOJ gets around to conducting the check it was supposed to conduct in the first 10 days and eventually changing the status. In doing so, DOJ has unlawfully delayed delivery of firearms to law-abiding, responsible Californians who are eligible – and constitutionally entitled – to possess firearms under state and federal law.

- 45. Defendants have used the DES system to delay transactions by preventing dealers from delivering firearms to purchasers. Dealers are not allowed to deliver a firearm until DOJ "releases" a transaction in the system either because it affirmatively approved the transaction or the purchaser's status remains "undetermined" after 30 days under section 28220(f)(4). 11 CCR § 4230(b)(1); see also 11 CCR § 4230(b)(2) ("If the status is 'Pending[]' . . . the firearm shall not be delivered"). And so long as a transaction's status is "Pending," the DES system does not provide the dealer with an option to "Deliver Gun" the transaction remains stalled. When DOJ releases a transaction, the DES system allows the dealer to select a button to "Deliver Gun" and complete delivery of the firearm.
- 46. DOJ is using the DES system to delay transactions by leaving them in limbo.

 Defendants have left transactions "Pending" beyond the 10-day waiting period while background checks remain unperformed, which blocks dealers from delivering the firearm.
- 47. On April 10, 2020, Plaintiff Mauro Campos submitted an application to purchase a handgun and a rifle through Firearms Unknown. Defendants know⁷ that Campos is not prohibited from purchasing a firearm: He holds a current and valid certificate of eligibility from DOJ, he is a DOJ-certified firearms safety instructor, and he has firearms registered in the State's Automated Firearms System (or "AFS"). Campos' transaction was delayed until April 28 (18 days), when DOJ permitted Firearms Unknown to release the firearms through the DROS system. Prior to the change in status which allowed Firearms Unknown to release the firearm, Campos' status

Defendants have access to, and indeed are required to compile and maintain, many databases relevant to individuals' criminal history and firearms eligibility. *See*, *e.g.*, Penal Code §§ 11105, 11106.

remained "Pending" after the expiration of the 10-day waiting period. DOJ did not contact Campos or Firearms Unknown to notify them that the transaction would be delayed past the 10-day waiting period, or otherwise inform Campos or Firearms Unknown of the reason for the delay as DOJ was required to do under Section 28220.

- 48. On April 9, 2020, Plaintiff Skyler Callahan-Miller submitted an application to purchase a handgun through Firearms Unknown. This was Callahan-Miller's first handgun purchase; he bought the firearm to defend the home he shares with his wife, who currently serves in the United States Marine Corps. Callahan-Miller's transaction was delayed until April 25 (16 days), when DOJ permitted Firearms Unknown to release the firearm through the DROS system. Prior to the change in status which allowed Firearms Unknown to release the firearm, Callahan-Miller's status remained "Pending" after the expiration of the 10-day waiting period. DOJ did not contact Callahan-Miller or Firearms Unknown to notify them that the transaction would be delayed past the 10-day waiting period, or otherwise inform Callahan-Miller or Firearms Unknown of the reason for the delay as DOJ was required to do under Section 28220.
- 49. These delays are just a snapshot of transactions processed by Firearms Unknown over the past several months. Defendants have delayed firearm transactions for hundreds of Firearms Unknown's customers. For the first two months after the policy was announced, the majority of the dealership's firearms transactions were delayed for multiple days, and many delays stretched for weeks. More than four months later, the delays continue. Because Defendants have failed to perform their duties and comply with the law, Firearms Unknown must review the DES system daily to determine which "Pending" transactions have been approved for transfer.
- 50. PWG and its customers have also suffered delays related to firearms transactions. For the first two months after the policy was announced, the majority of the dealership's firearms transactions were delayed. Many delays stretched for multiple weeks. PWG has hired additional staff to answer customer calls regarding the status of their transactions due to the number of delays. Because Defendants have failed to perform their duties and comply with the law, PWG must review the DES system daily to determine which "Pending" transactions have been approved for transfer.

C. DOJ's Suspension Of Section 28220 And Its Policy and Practice of Preventing Dealers From Transferring Firearms After the Conclusion of the 10-Day Waiting Period and Leaving Transactions In A "Pending" Status Is Unlawful.

- 51. Defendants have violated California law by imposing delays that prevent lawabiding, responsible Californians from taking possession of their firearms in violation of the state's waiting period laws and DOJ's own regulations. As set forth above, DOJ is required to change the status of a "Pending" application to "Approved" *immediately after the expiration of the 10-day waiting period* absent a determination that the individual is prohibited by state or federal law from purchasing or possessing firearms.
- 52. If, during the 10-day waiting period, the "records of the department, or the records available to the department in the National Instant Criminal Background Check System, indicate one of the" three specifically enumerated circumstances, Penal Code § 28220(f)(1)(A) – i.e., that 1) the purchaser was taken into custody and placed in a facility for mental health treatment or evaluation and may be prohibited under §§ 8100 or 8106; 2) the purchaser was arrested for, or charged with, a crime that would make him or her, if convicted, a person who is prohibited by state or federal law from possessing, receiving, owning, or purchasing a firearm, and the department is unable to ascertain whether the purchaser was convicted of that offense prior to the conclusion of the waiting period described in Sections 26815 and 27540; or 3) the purchaser may be a person described in subdivision (a) of Section 27535, and the department is unable to ascertain whether the purchaser, in fact, is a person described in subdivision (a) of Section 27535, prior to the conclusion of the waiting period described in Sections 26815 and 27540 – then, and only then, the DOJ may delay the transaction and change their DES status to "Delayed," which allows for a total of 30 days from the initial acceptance of the application to investigate further and determine the eligibility of the purchaser.
- 53. DOJ's authority to delay transactions is *based solely* on meeting the three criteria outlined in Penal Code § 28220(f)(1)(A). Defendants' practice of leaving individuals in a "Pending" status after the 10-day waiting period has expired violates the statutory scheme detailed above, as well as DOJ's own regulations.

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- 54. Because Defendants do not have the authority to alter or amend a statute, or enlarge or impair its scope, it is this Court's obligation to strike down Defendants' practice of delaying firearm transfers by holding transactions hostage in a "Pending" status after the expiration of the 10-day waiting period. *See Morris v. Williams*, 67 Cal.2d 733, 748 (1967). "An administrative agency has only those powers conferred on it by statute, and may not exceed them." *Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies v. Quackenbush*, 52 Cal.App.4th 599, 605 (1997).
- authority acts ultra vires and the act is void." *Cal. Dui Lawyers Ass'n v. Cal. Dep't of Motor Vehicles*, 20 Cal.App.5th 1247, 1264 (2018) (citation omitted). *See also, e.g., Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Dep't of Developmental Servs.*, 38 Cal.3d 384, 391 (1985) ("Administrative action that is not authorized by, or is inconsistent with, acts of the Legislature is void."); *Dep't of Parks & Recreation v. State Pers. Bd.*, 233 Cal.App.3d 813, 824 (1991) (any action taken by an agency "in excess of, or in violation of, the powers conferred upon it" is "void"); *accord Slocum v. State Bd. of Equalization*, 134 Cal.App.4th 969, 974 (2005) ("[A]gencies do not have discretion to promulgate regulations that are inconsistent with the governing statute, or that alter or amend the statute or enlarge its scope.").
- 56. An actual and judicially cognizable controversy exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants regarding whether Defendants' policy and practice of leaving individuals in a "Pending" status after the expiration of the 10-day waiting period violates California law. Plaintiffs desire a judicial declaration of their rights and Defendants' duties regarding the validity of the policy and practice.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(Writ of Mandate – Code of Civil Procedure § 1085)

- 57. Petitioners and Plaintiffs incorporate here by reference paragraphs 1 through 56, *supra*, as if fully set forth herein.
- 58. Mandamus relief is appropriate to compel Respondents and Defendants to comply with the waiting period laws by permitting firearms dealers to deliver firearms to purchasers and

transferees after 10 days except where Respondents comply with the procedures to extend the 10-day waiting period under Penal Code section 28220 or make an affirmative determination the individual is prohibited under state or federal law from possessing firearms.

- 59. A writ of mandate "may be issued by any court . . . to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station" Code Civ. Proc. § 1085 (a). To obtain such a writ, the petitioner must show (1) a clear, present, ministerial duty on the part of the respondent; and (2) a clear, present, and beneficial right in the petitioner to the performance of that duty. *Santa Clara Cty. Counsel Attys. Ass'n v. Woodside*, 7 Cal.4th 525, 539–40 (1994).
- 60. Petitioners are entitled to writ relief because the waiting period laws create a clear and present duty on the part of Respondents to permit firearms dealers to deliver firearms to purchasers at the end of 10-days except where Respondents have affirmatively delayed a transaction under Penal Code section 28220 or affirmatively determined that an individual is prohibited from possessing firearms. Furthermore, Petitioners are entitled to writ relief because the regulations *require* that a firearm transaction be approved after the expiration of the 10-day waiting period, absent a status of "Denied" or "Delayed." By abdicating their duty to follow the law and regulations and impermissibly using DES to prevent the transfer of firearms after the expiration of the 10-day waiting period, absent a status of "Denied" or "Delayed," Respondents have affirmatively violated their duty under the law and regulations. Petitioners, as firearms dealers and purchasers, have a clear, present and beneficial right to the performance of that duty by Respondents.
- 61. Petitioners have no alternate plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(Declaratory Relief – Code of Civil Procedure § 1060)

62. Petitioners and Plaintiffs incorporate here by reference paragraphs 1 through 56, *supra*, as if fully set forth herein.

63. An actual and judicially cognizable controversy exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants regarding whether Defendants' practice of delaying firearm transactions violates California law. Specifically, under Section 28220, DOJ must conduct a background check within 10 days of receiving a firearm transaction application. At the conclusion of that 10-day period, DOJ's own regulation provides for only three possible outcomes – the application is approved, denied, or delayed. 8 11 CCR § 4230(b). "A 'Pending' status shall be designated when the purchaser's eligibility is under review during the 10-day waiting period." 11 CCR § 4230(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). If the DOJ determines the firearm purchaser is not prohibited by state or federal law from purchasing or possessing firearms, immediately following the conclusion of the ten-day waiting period, the status of the DES transaction will change from "Pending" to "Approved." 11 CCR § 4230(a). "A 'Denied' status shall be designated when the DOJ reviews an application to purchase a firearm . . . and the applicant information is denied after the Department's review of matching state and/or federal records." 11 CCR § 4230(b)(2)(C). And "[a] 'Delayed' status shall be designated when the Department is unable to determine the purchaser's eligibility within the 10-day waiting period." 11 CCR § 4230(b)(2)(B) (emphasis added). But Defendants have unlawfully defied the governing statutes and their own regulation by creating a fourth option – the extension of the "Pending" status beyond the 10-day waiting period. This fourth option is not provided for in either 11 CCR § 4230 or in Section 28220, and runs contrary to the requirements set forth in each. Defendants' policy, pattern, and practice of delaying the delivery of firearms by extending the "Pending" status beyond the 10-day waiting period violates California law and DOJ's own regulation. Defendants have relied on the DES system to enforce this policy and practice by leaving transactions "Pending" beyond the 10-day waiting period while background checks remain unperformed, which blocks dealers from delivering a firearm, even though purchasers or transferees are otherwise entitled to take possession of their property by law. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants' practice violates California law.

The other two statuses, "DMV Reject" and "30-day Reject" are immaterial to this analysis.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Waste) – Code of Civil Procedure §§ 526, 526a)

- 64. Plaintiffs incorporate herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 56 as if fully set forth herein.
- 65. Defendants' ongoing conduct, which violates California law and the DOJ's own regulations, is an illegal and improper expenditure of public funds that results in waste of government money, time, and resources that otherwise would only be utilized for the public benefit through lawful agency or government action. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 526, 526a.
- 66. DOJ's ongoing conduct, which violates California law and the DOJ's own regulations, affects all citizens of California whose taxpayer dollars are being used or have been used for this invalid regulatory scheme, or who are being deprived, have been deprived, or would be deprived of the beneficial programs, policies, or activities that would otherwise be pursued or implemented with the same money, time, and resources. Specifically, the Waiting Period Laws impose a nondiscretionary duty on Defendants to conduct a background check within the 10-day period and to permit firearms dealers to deliver firearms to purchasers at the end of 10 days, except where Defendants have affirmatively delayed a transaction under Penal Code section 28220 or affirmatively determined that an individual is prohibited from possessing firearms. Defendants' conduct is illegal and a waste under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a.
- 67. Plaintiffs and other similarly situated individuals have a beneficial interest in preventing this illegal expenditure of public funds and other resources, as well as in procuring the proper enforcement and execution of the public duties of Defendants to manage and expend the public funds and resources in a lawful manner and not to impair or defeat the purpose of valid laws and regulations. Thus, all such persons have proper standing to seek such a remedy through a judicial action for declaratory and injunctive relief, and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. For the same reasons, Plaintiffs are beneficially interested in preventing any further implementation or enforcement of this invalid regulatory scheme and in procuring the proper discharge of the public duties of Defendants concerning the implementation of such regulatory schemes, and they have no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore, Petitioners and Plaintiffs pray for judgment as follows:

- 1. For a writ of mandate directing Respondents to cease their policy and practice of delaying firearm transactions beyond the 10-day waiting period, including but not limited to the use of the DROS Entry System, and directing Respondents to approve applications after the expiration of the 10-day waiting period, absent a statutory basis to deny or delay the application as permitted by Penal Code sections 26815(a), 27540(a), and 28220.
- 2. For a writ of mandate directing Respondents to cease their policy and practice of delaying firearm transactions beyond the 10-day waiting period, and directing Respondents to permit firearms dealers to deliver firearms to purchasers and transferees after 10 days, except where Respondents comply with the statutes to extend the 10-day waiting period under three specific and enumerated circumstances set forth in Penal Code section 28220(f)(1)(A).
- 3. For a writ of mandate directing Respondents to "immediately notify the dealer" of the reason(s) for any delay and inform the purchaser about the delay as required by Penal Code section 28220 subdivisions (f)(1)(A), (f)(1)(B), (f)(2).
- 4. For a declaratory judgment that Defendants may not use the DROS Entry System to leave an individual in a "Pending" status after the expiration of the 10-day waiting period under Penal Code section 28220 and 11 CCR section 4230.
- 5. For a declaratory judgment that Defendants may not delay firearm transfers beyond the initial 10-day waiting period except in the three specific and enumerated circumstances set forth in Penal Code section 28220(f)(1)(A).
- 6. For a declaration that Defendants' practices challenged herein are invalid, in whole or in part, insofar as their implementation, and enforcement have resulted in government waste as alleged herein, and, on that basis, the Defendants and any others who are or may be charged with the management, disbursement, and/or allocation of such funds are hereby preliminarily and permanently enjoined from continuing to do so.

VERIFICATION

I, Mauro Campos, declare:

I have read the foregoing Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint of Declaratory, Injunctive, or Other Relief and know the contents thereof. I am a party to this action. The factual matters concerning my experience stated in the foregoing at Paragraphs 15 and 47 are true of my own knowledge. The remaining matters are stated on information and belief, and, as to those matters, I believe them to be true.

Executed August <u>Z7</u>2020.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California and the United States that the foregoing is true and correct.

Mauro Campos

VERIFICATION

I, Skyler Callahan-Miller, declare:

I have read the foregoing Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint of Declaratory, Injunctive, or Other Relief and know the contents thereof. I am a party to this action. The factual matters concerning my experience stated in the foregoing at Paragraphs 16 and 48 are true of my own knowledge. The remaining matters are stated on information and belief, and, as to those matters, I believe them to be true.

Executed August 27, 2020.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California and the United States that the foregoing is true and correct.



Skyler Callahan-Miller

VERIFICATION

I, Dimitrios Karras, declare:

I am an agent of Five Five Six Inc. and a Responsible Person associated with its Federal Firearms License. I am authorized to make this verification on its behalf. I have read the foregoing Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint of Declaratory, Injunctive, or Other Relief and know the contents thereof. The factual matters concerning the organization's experience stated in the foregoing at Paragraphs 17 and 47–49 are true of my own knowledge. The remaining matters are stated on information and belief, and, as to those matters, I believe them to be true.

Executed August 8/27/2020.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California and the United States that the foregoing is true and correct.

Five Five Six Inc.

By:

Dimitrios Karras, Authorized Agent

VERIFICATION

I, Dimitrios Karras, declare:

I have read the foregoing Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint of Declaratory, Injunctive, or Other Relief and know the contents thereof. I am a party to this action. The factual matters concerning my experience stated in the foregoing at Paragraph 18 are true of my own knowledge. The remaining matters are stated on information and belief, and, as to those matters, I believe them to be true.

Executed August^{8/27/2820}.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California and the United States that the foregoing is true and correct.

DoesSigned by

Dimitrios Karras

VERIFICATION

VERIFICATION

I, John Phillips, declare:

I am the Founder and Managing Partner of PWGG, L.P., and am authorized to make this verification on its behalf. I have read the foregoing Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint of Declaratory, Injunctive, or Other Relief and know the contents thereof. The factual matters concerning the organization's experience stated in the foregoing at Paragraphs 19 and 50 are true of my own knowledge. The remaining matters are stated on information and belief, and, as to those matters, I believe them to be true.

Executed August 26, 2020.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California and the United States that the foregoing is true and correct.

PWGG, L.P.

By: _

John Phillips, Founder and Managing Partner

VERIFICATION

I, John Phillips, declare:

I have read the foregoing Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint of Declaratory, Injunctive, or Other Relief and know the contents thereof. I am a party to this action. The factual matters concerning my experience stated in the foregoing at Paragraph 20 are true of my own knowledge. The remaining matters are stated on information and belief, and, as to those matters, I believe them to be true.

Executed August <u>4</u>, 2020.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California and the United States that the foregoing is true and correct.

John Phillips

VERIFICATION

I, Michael A. Schwartz, declare:

I am the Executive Director of San Diego Gun Owners PAC, and am authorized to make this verification on its behalf. I have read the foregoing Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint of Declaratory, Injunctive, or Other Relief and know the contents thereof. The factual matters concerning the organization's experience stated in the foregoing at Paragraphs 1–13, 21, 29–46, and 51–56 are true of my own knowledge. The remaining matters are stated on information and belief, and, as to those matters, I believe them to be true.

Executed August <u>26</u>, 2020.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California and the United States that the foregoing is true and correct.

San Diego Gun Owners PAC

By: How

Michael A. Schwartz, Executive Director

VERIFICATION I, Alan Gottlieb, declare: I am Executive Vice President of the Second Amendment Foundation, and am authorized to make this verification on its behalf. I have read the foregoing Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint of Declaratory, Injunctive, or Other Relief and know the contents thereof. The factual matters set forth in Paragraphs 1–14, 23, 26–46, and 51–67 are true and accurate based on the organization's experience. The remaining matters are stated on information and belief, and, as to those matters, I believe them to be true. Executed 8/26/2020 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California and the United States that the foregoing is true and correct. Second Amendment Foundation DocuSigned by: Alan Gottlieb, Executive Vice President

VERIFICATION

VERIFICATION I, Jon Jensen, declare: I am Vice President of the Firearms Policy Foundation, and am authorized to make this verification on its behalf. I have read the foregoing Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint of Declaratory, Injunctive, or Other Relief and know the contents thereof. The factual matters set forth in Paragraphs 1–14, 24, 26–46, and 51–67 are true and accurate based on the organization's experience. The remaining matters are stated on information and belief, and, as to those matters, I believe them to be true. Executed August 26, 2020. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California and the United States that the foregoing is true and correct. Firearms Policy Foundation Jonathan D Jensen Jon Jensen, Vice President

VERIFICATION

VERIFICATION I, Brandon Combs, declare: I am President of the Firearms Policy Coalition, and am authorized to make this verification on its behalf. I have read the foregoing Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint of Declaratory, Injunctive, or Other Relief and know the contents thereof. The factual matters set forth in Paragraphs 1–14, 25–46, and 51–67 are true and accurate based on the organization's experience. The remaining matters are stated on information and belief, and, as to those matters, I believe them to be true. Executed August 26, 2020. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California and the United States that the foregoing is true and correct. Firearms Policy Coalition Brandon Combs, President