OUR FUTURE
OUR CHOICE

YOUNG PEOPLE & BREXIT
by Flavia Williams, Dominic Brind, and Thomas Peto
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Our Future, Our Choice
Millbank Tower,
Millbank,
Westminster,
London SW1P 4QP

www.ofoc.co.uk

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Our decision to leave the EU is one of the most divisive policies in British history. *Our Future, Our Choice* sets out with great clarity the implications for young people, and I commend it warmly.

Brexit has divided the component parts of the UK, placing England and Wales (as “Leavers”), in opposition to Scotland and Northern Ireland.

It has divided our mainstream political parties; business and commerce; communities; friends — and even families. In many cases, these scars run deep.

People who voted for Brexit did so with high hopes — most of which will be unrealised.

We were told that we would keep the advantages of the Single Market. We will not. That we would be better off. We will not. That we would get cash back to fund the National Health Service. We will not. That the Irish border would present no problem. But it is — and it will.

The British public was offered pipe-dreams, not realities. The industrialist, the financier, the fisherman and the farmer will all come to realise that; as will the health worker, the scientist, the businessman/woman – and the family member who guards the household purse.
We were told there were “no downsides” to Brexit. Reality checks from expert opinion were dismissed as fear-mongering by the “elite”.

Yet, under every scenario that has been independently modelled – even by our own British Government – the UK will be poorer and weaker, and the poorest regions and the least well-off will suffer the most.

It is hard to believe that the most ancient Parliament in the world could find itself voting for a policy that makes our country weaker, our public services less well-funded, and the British people facing a harder future.

As negotiations have proceeded – and the downsides become ever more clear – the inevitable question arises: how could the UK have voted to enact such a policy of self-harm? And how can the fervent Brexiteers remain so deaf, dumb and blind to every single warning – even when those warnings seem ever more likely to be true?

History may well judge that – for a time – the world’s most pragmatic of nations took leave of her senses.

This report is poignantly entitled Our Future, Our Choice but, of course, it was never the choice of the young – who voted overwhelmingly to “remain” in the EU, while their elders voted to “leave”.

Moreover, although the referendum result is cited as being “the will of the people” it was, more accurately, the will of only 37% of the people; while 63% either voted to stay “in” the EU, or expressed no view at all.

Since June 2016, there are nearly 2 million more young people eligible to vote. It is only right that they have a say in their nation’s future.

One final point upon the fateful vote. The referendum was an “advisory” one – and known to be such – before the risks of leaving were apparent. As the facts become known, Parliament – our ultimate sovereign power – will need to decide whether the deal presented to them meets the promises made to the British people. If it does not, I believe Parliament should order a “binding” referendum.

Such a further – and final – referendum would be controversial, most especially among those who fear they may lose it. But the moral – and democratic – case for voting upon proven facts rather than peddled fiction is rock solid.

Once more, as so often in the past, we must look to Parliament to safeguard our interests and, in pursuit of that aim, I would urge every Parliamentarian to read and absorb the findings of this report.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report analyses the ways in which young people will be affected by the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union. It considers a range of policy areas that particularly affect young people’s lives, or have been shown by polling to be considered especially important to them.

AN OUTWARD-LOOKING GENERATION
A review of existing polling data and analysis of referendum results shows that for young people, membership of the European Union is part of a wider socially liberal and international outlook. They are strongly pro-immigration and agree that they are ‘citizens of the world.’ This was reflected in their heavily Remain vote in the 2016 referendum. Indeed, the fact that 47% of young reported in a poll that they cried or felt like crying when they heard the result suggests EU membership is a highly emotive subject. The degree of correlation between remain voting and socially liberal opinions further shows how Brexit reflected the identities and fundamental political outlook of many young people. In her introduction to this section, Dr Manmit Bhambra of the LSE writes of how a ‘liberal and inclusive outlook’ and sense of Britishness informed young people’s reaction to the Brexit vote in her introduction to this section.

THE PRICE OF BREXIT
Research commissioned for the report from Tommy Peto, an economic researcher at the University of Oxford, found that Brexit could have a serious toll on the lifetime prospects of young people.

Using Government leaked analysis (the Cross Whitehall Briefing), the impact of Brexit on accumulated lifetime earnings was calculated. The civil service analysis predicted an economic hit under all models of Brexit, and the research estimated the following losses in accumulated income for young people:

- A WTO-terms Brexit would cost young people around £76,000 each in lost earnings by 2050, and could cost up to £108,000 in a worst case scenario. The best case scenario would be £44,000 of lost wages.
- An FTA-style Brexit would cost around £51,000 (the model predicted a range £30,000 - £72,000).
• Under an EEA-style Brexit, young people would lose around £20,000 in accumulated lost earnings from now to 2050 (range between £7,000 in a best case scenario and £32,000 in a worst case scenario)

The governmental model sits in the middle of the range of optimistic and pessimistic forecasts.

The analysis applied a study produced by LSE academics and the NIESR to young people. Weighting the results by the sectors young people predominately work in, it found that:

• The immediate term loss of income from a Chequers style Brexit would be around £400 a year for 18-21 year olds, and around £500 a year for 22-29 year olds, compared to a soft Brexit.
• Under a WTO-deal, 18-21 year-olds would lose around £675 a year, and 22-29 year olds £830 a year, compared to a soft Brexit.

There is a large body of research that suggests the wages of young people entering the workforce during a recession never catch up with their counterparts who enter during buoyant times. Many studies predict a recession in the event of a no-deal chaotic Brexit. Therefore, even if any Brexit recession is relatively short, it could mean young people earn less for a substantial portion of their careers.

Brexit also poses a threat to a number of policy areas that directly affect young people. These will be outlined below.

THE YOUTH OPPORTUNITY: EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT

Brexit risks removing many opportunities for young people. The end of the transition period could signal the end of the numerous EU initiatives which have contributed to youth education, training and employment. Erasmus+ has taken students across the world and made living and working abroad a reality for thousands. Its inclusive approach has impacted people from all levels of education, including schoolchildren and students with special needs. However, its future is unpredictable and the UK could end up footing the bill without securing ongoing access to its benefits. Moreover, the corresponding influx of EU students to the UK using both Erasmus+ and the right to free movement itself has a broader effect on the education sector and the resulting economic lift to the wider economy. Restrictions on EU students after Brexit and a loss of university funding could hit the resulting grants, jobs and incomes.

The EU has also been an important prop for youth opportunity within the UK. The EU’s Youth Employment Initiative has helped individuals from the highest youth unemployment regions secure their futures after the financial crash. With over €461 million going to the UK so far, there remains the question of who will plug the gap after Brexit. There has been no guarantee from the UK government that funding will continue. Any move to combat the disproportionately high unemployment rates among 16-24 year-olds compared to older groups will be entirely dependent on government policy.

CHILDREN AND BREXIT

Brexit poses a number of threats to children in the UK. Families could be divided if the UK leaves the EU: existing immigration law specifies a minimum income threshold beneath which UK nationals cannot bring foreign spouses or children into the country. If this is applied to EU nationals, international families could be separated. Furthermore, the EU coordinates cross-border divorce law, ensuring that decisions around child custody are enforced across the bloc. With no replacement for the relevant EU instruments, tackling international child abduction and ensuring the best interests of children in international divorces could be harmed. Child poverty could also be
worsened: research into price inflation as a result of the fall in the value of the pound and potential tariffs levied on EU imports in a WTO scenario has shown that households with children would be hit the hardest. Funding for youth-specific training schemes from the EU may not be replaced. Finally, protections for child legal rights enshrined in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights may be lost. The UN’s Convention on the Rights of the Child only has specific applicability in the UK as a result of EU membership, and protections like the right of a child to be heard during a court hearing on child custody could be lost.

SECURING DATA AFTER BREXIT

Brexit could significantly disrupt online life: it will be both less safe and less usable. This will particularly affect a generation who have grown up online. The data protection rights afforded by Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights will be lost. Contrary to the government’s assurances, it does not have any direct equivalent in domestic law and the rights contained in it will be watered down. As such, Brexit exposes data users and subjects to a higher degree of risk. Remedies will also be lost and victims of a breach may no longer be entitled to the financial compensation that the Charter offers. This would be a significant step back for data privacy in the UK.

The legal status of the businesses and bodies who transfer personal data is also uncertain. 75% of the UK’s international transfers go through the EU in some way but these transfers will become illegal unless a new agreement is negotiated. The offshoot implications for supply chains, consumer buying, innovation and access to talent could be significant, especially for SMEs.

Disruptions to the free flow of data will also impact the security services, crime prevention and law enforcement, especially as the UK will be excluded from the agreements between the EU and the UK. Therefore, without a comprehensive deal on data there will be many threats to online safety and activity after Brexit.

PROTECTING YOUNG WORKERS

The rights which protect young workers could be diluted if the UK leaves the EU. Although UK law offers strong safeguards for many workers, youth employment is concentrated in the areas which the UK has often resisted protecting. Young people increasingly work in The five sectors which collectively employ over three-fifths of 21-30 year olds typically offer zero-hours contracts and low paid roles, and increasingly agency and temporary employment: those aged 16-34 account for over 40% of those who have been in agency work for over a year. However, the UK opposed bringing in the Directive which gave agency workers the same rights as employees for years, securing a 12-week qualifying period opt-out. Young people are most in need of the protections the government were unwilling to give. These laws are consequentially the most at risk of repeal after Brexit. EU legislation for the equal treatment of part-time workers have benefitted approximately 400,000 employees. However, the UK strongly also resisted legislating the Directives which protect part-time and temporary workers. This leaves such laws vulnerable to repeal or dilution in the long run. A number of prominent Brexites have called for these to be reduced, such as Secretary of State for Exiting the EU Dominic Raab calling for under-21s working for small businesses to be excluded from minimum wage rules.

THE ENVIRONMENTAL COST

The environment is one of the areas most affected by EU membership and EU institutions: DEFRA has estimated that 95 items of secondary legislation will be needed to ensure there is no gap in the law on exit day. Leaving the EU with adequate environmental protections is an even bigger task. Furthermore, there will be fewer mechanisms in place to ensure that the UK adheres to
environmental protections. The EU plays an important supervisory role which includes setting standards, collecting reports and hearing environmental court cases against the UK in the Court of Justice. Polling shows that this is an area that young people care heavily about, and so their wishes could be under threat from inadequate protections.
AN OUTWARD LOOKING GENERATION

INTRODUCTION BY DR. MANMIT BHAMBRA,
London School of Economics and Political Science

Brexit continues to shape socio-political debates and public discourse. The vote to leave the European Union has demonstrated the different outlooks and subsequent voting behaviour of different demographic groups, and reaching a settlement that addresses all of these concerns continues to be a challenge. The Referendum result has uncovered a range of divides within the United Kingdom: some based on geography, others on socio-economics and access to resources, but most often on a combination of these and many other factors.

Britain’s generational divide, the substantial difference in voting between older and younger people, continues to spark discussion and debate. There are many reasons why younger people are more pro-European in their outlook; certainly theirs too is an intersectional outlook that takes into account the above mentioned issues of socio-economics, jobs, and so forth, but evidence also shows that young people also have a more open, multicultural, internationalist, inclusive outlook, which also impacts their voting behaviour.

Young people continue to mobilise around the future they want and the rights they want to preserve; they are concerned about the way that Brexit will impact their lives in the future. There is however a more identity and outlook-focused element to their voting, which has explanatory power for this ‘generational divide’. My on-going research into the identity orientations of young people in the United Kingdom shows a generation who have grown up in a multicultural environment; they have diverse networks of friends and social contact and relationships with people from different...
backgrounds, different faiths and cultures. They want to protect the open, multicultural, and diverse social environment they have grown up in. This liberal and inclusive outlook has impacted their voting behaviour and is surely part of many young people’s dissatisfaction with the outcome of the Referendum.

Young people are of course not a homogenous group, and to treat them as such would be to essentialise them and their political choices. Yet overall, it is sufficient to say that most young people have more international outlook, and have a more civic, inclusive sense of Britishness. This outlook is one where equality and inclusiveness are protected and the United Kingdom remains as much openness as possible, even outside of the European Union.

**YOUNG PEOPLE’S OPINIONS**

All polling data and analysis shows that young people are overwhelmingly pro-European and internationalist in their outlook.

Polling from the time of the referendum all showed very strong youth support for Remain. YouGov’s weighting of their final poll to take account of the actual result estimated that 71% of 18-24 year olds voted remain (YouGov, 2016). Lord Ashcroft’s election day poll estimated a remain vote of 73% among that age group (Lord Ashcroft Polls, 2016). British Election Study analysis found that 66.4% of millennials voted Remain (Kingman, 2017). Polling since the referendum has shown that they have become yet further pro-EU: excluding those who did not know or would not vote, a YouGov poll for the People’s Vote campaign in August 2018 found that 79% of young people would now vote remain (YouGov, 2018). YouGov polling from September 2018 found that 18-20 year olds were even more pro-remain than older young people, with 84% backing remain (Cecil, 2018).

More general polling of young people shows that they have a generally open and outward looking conception of the world. Polling commissioned by the Global Future think tank from Populus showed young people hold a global sense of identity. 81% of 18-24 year-olds agreed with the statement ‘we are all citizens of the world, as well as being citizens of our own country’ (Populus, 2018). 76% agreed that immigrants make a significant positive contribution to the UK, and 71% concurred that free movement is a ‘great positive achievement’ of the EU (Populus, 2018). A survey from after the referendum found that 78% of young people would miss the right to live across the bloc, and 77% would miss the right to live or work across the continent. It also found that 47% of young people cried or felt like crying after hearing the referendum result, suggesting that the EU referendum was an emotive matter important to their identity (Helm, 2016). Polling conducted by Ipos Mori for a British Council report in 2017 found that 56% of young people would be interested in working in the EU at some stage. Their analysis shows how this global outlook was linked to European Union membership: 41% of young people thought that Brexit would pull people living in the UK apart, compared to 19% who thought the opposite (Wybron et al., 2017).

Analysis of the voting behaviour of millennials in the EU referendum has emphasised the role of social values in how young people voted. The Intergenerational Commission’s analysis looked at how different groups of millennial voters behaved, emphasising the role of social values. Their report argued for the existence of a group of ‘left wing pro-europeans,’ constituting just under a third of millennials. While they have high rates of dissatisfaction with UK democracy and have a high rate of perceiving themselves to be at risk of poverty, they nevertheless voted heavily to remain. Those millennials grouped as eurosceptics were not significantly materially less well off than their remain voting counterparts. However, they were significantly less likely to have attended university and they had vastly different social attitudes: for example, 87% of the group favoured
lower immigration. The report argues that this shows ‘Brexit was motivated by more than just the socio-economic disadvantages facing a particular section of the population’ (Kingman, 2017).

Wider research on the economic position of younger people supports this conclusion. The Intergenerational Commission at the Resolution Foundation has catalogued the various ways in which young people find themselves in an increasingly economically precarious situation as a generation (Resolution Foundation, 2018). This does not fit the narrative that those for whom the social contract had ceased to function voted Leave to register a protest at it. For example, London voted 60% to stay in the EU, with Inner London boroughs having an even higher proportion of remain votes (Electoral Commission, 2016). However, London suffers from higher rates of poverty than the nation as a whole: in 2017, 27% of Londoners were living in poverty after accounting for housing which is significantly higher than the wider rate of 21% in England as a whole (Trust for London, 2017). This would suggest that more than simple material deprivation and levels of affluence determined how people voted during the referendum. Indeed, observations in articles making the case for the ‘left behind’ theory show that London and Scotland behave somewhat differently to other regions in this regard, and have lower leave votes than they ‘should’ given the age and educational profiles of the areas (Goodwin and Heath, 2016a). This suggests that social values played a significant role alongside economic factors in determining referendum voting patterns.

Individual-level analysis further shows the role played by wider social values in determining support for Leave. Of those in favour of the reintroduction of the death penalty, a typical culturally conservative policy, 76% supported leave. This is compared to only 20% of those who were against capital punishment. The fact that it is not an especially prominent live political issue shows how it reflects underlying social views (Kaufmann, 2016). It has been argued that such social views correlate closely with education levels and age, and are thus a symptom of the ‘left behind’ thesis (Goodwin and Heath, 2016b). However, other analysis of BES data examined the probability of an individual voting Leave if they held a certain social view and found that support for the death penalty was a key indicator of voting Leave irrespective of social class (Kaufmann, 2016). While economic class and social views can never be entirely disentangled, it is clear that individual socially liberal or conservative views played a major role in whether an individual voted Leave or Remain.

Therefore, it is clear that the referendum result reflected social attitudes, which for many are closely aligned to their age. While economic factors were of course relevant and correlated to a degree to social liberalism, analysis shows that, especially among young people, personal social attitudes were more relevant in determining how people voted. Furthermore, the generally liberal, multicultural, and internationalist outlook of young people contributed significantly to their heavily Remain vote.
THE PRICE OF BREXIT
Tommy Peto, University of Oxford

MAIN SUMMARY

- We use the LSE model (Dhingra, Machin, et al., 2017) to assess the immediate impact of Brexit across different age groups.
- In cash terms, the immediate impact of a Chequers-style deal would be a loss of around £400 per year for the weighted average of sectors worked in by 18–21-year-olds and around £500 per year for 22–29-year-olds compared to a soft Brexit.
- The immediate impact of a WTO-style deal would be a loss of around £675 per year for the weighted average of sectors worked in by 18–21-year-olds and around £830 per year for 22–29-year-olds compared to a soft Brexit.
- We use HMG’s Cross Whitehall analysis (HMG, 2018) to estimate the long-run accumulated losses faced by young people under different Brexit scenarios.
- An EEA-style Brexit will cost young people around £20,000 in accumulated lost income between now and 2050 compared to remaining in the EU, with losses between £7,000 (best case scenario) and £32,000 (worst case scenario).
- An FTA-style Brexit would cost an accumulated £51,000 per individual (between £30,000 and £72,000).
- A WTO-style Brexit would cost an accumulated £76,000 per individual (between £44,000 and £108,000).
- We analyse the effects of a potential post-withdrawal recession on young people entering the labour market during that recession.
- Even if a recession is relatively short-lasting, and the UK economy returns to growth afterwards, that recession could mean young people have permanently lower lifetime earnings, with wage losses persisting for 10 – 20 years.

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1 Work commissioned by Our Future, Our Choice. With thanks to Dominic Brind for helpful research assistance in compiling the employment database.
INTRODUCTION

In this briefing, we model the economic impact of Brexit on young people and Brexit’s distributional impact by age. Whilst there are studies that break down the impacts of Brexit by sector, geographic region, income, gender and ethnicity, we are unaware of any which focus on the impact on the young in particular (Armstrong et al., 2016; Breinlich et al., 2016; Clarke et al., 2017; Dhingra, Machin, et al., 2017; Morris, 2018). This briefing does three things. First, by examining the employment patterns of young people, it estimates the relative impacts of various Brexit scenarios on different age groups, and estimates the lost GDP per capita by age group, using the methodologies of Dhingra, Machin, et al. (2017) and Morris (2018). Second, by extrapolating the government’s forecasts (HMG, 2018) into the future, it estimates a range for the accumulated lost GDP per capita up to 2050 under three different Brexit scenarios. Finally, it examines the literature on the effects of a post-Brexit recession on young people entering the labour market during that recession.

I. IMMEDIATE SECTORAL IMPACT

First, we investigate the impacts of Brexit on young people by looking at employment patterns. To do this, we use the analysis by LSE (Dhingra, Machin, et al., 2017) of the impact of a ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ Brexit on the GVA (gross value added) of different sectors of the UK economy. Dhingra, Machin, et al. (2017) take a ‘soft Brexit’ to be a Norway-style Brexit in which the UK joins a free trade area such as EFTA, meaning tariffs remain at zero but non-tariff barriers increase. They take a ‘hard Brexit’ scenario to be one in which the UK and the EU are not part of a free trade agreement, meaning that goods crossing the UK-EU border face WTO Most-Favoured-Nation tariffs and face larger non-tariff barriers. Using these definitions, they calculate the GVA impact on different sectors in the economy. We then use those sectoral impacts to calculate the impact of a soft and a hard Brexit on young people. Our methodology here follows the methodology used by Dhingra, Machin, et al. (2017) in their study on the local economic effects of Brexit and also used by the IPPR (Morris, 2018) to analyse the equality implications of Brexit. We weight the LSE’s estimated sectoral impacts using ONS data on the employment patterns of different age groups (ONS, 2017). The weighted average then shows the impact of Brexit on each age group. Although there is some uncertainty in the LSE model over the effects of Brexit on specific sectors, it is possible to have more confidence in the age group results, because the ‘employment share weighting will help ‘wash out’ some of the sector-specific errors’ and give a more accurate prediction of the group-level impacts of Brexit (Dhingra, Machin, et al., 2017, p. 2). Figure 1 shows the GVA impacts of soft and hard Brexits on different age groups. Exact numbers are shown in the Annexe.

2 See Dhingra et al. (2016) and Dhingra, Huang, et al. (2017) for full details for the model used.

3 Formally, the age-group shock is calculated as: $\text{Shock}_g = \sum_s \text{Employment Share}_{sg} \times \text{National Shock}_s$, where $s$ stands for sector and $g$ stands for age group.
Figure 1 shows us the relative impact of different Brexits on different age groups. In absolute terms, however, the LSE dynamic model’s predictions of the impact of Brexit on the UK economy is, broadly speaking, on the more pessimistic side of the various existing estimates. To make our estimate of lost income more conservative, and to look specifically at the government’s Chequers proposal, we can use NIESR’s latest analysis (Kara et al., 2018) of the impact of various Brexit scenarios. NIESR’s model makes a core prediction based on a soft Brexit scenario, and then compares that to its forecasts of the government White Paper (the ‘Chequers Deal’) and of a no-deal Brexit in which the UK trades with the EU under WTO rules. The NIESR model shows the loss in GDP per capita per year under the Chequers deal and under a WTO deal compared to a soft-Brexit. Using the GVA numbers from table 5, we can see how much more/less different age groups are impacted by Brexit than the average, and then see what their losses are under NIESR’s (Kara et al., 2018) estimates of the effects of different Brexit deals. The results for young people are shown in table 2. The full results for each age group are shown in the annexe.

Loss of GDP per person per year (£) compared to a Soft Brexit scenario*

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Chequers Deal</th>
<th>WTO Deal</th>
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<tr>
<td>18-21</td>
<td>£405</td>
<td>£675</td>
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<td>22-29</td>
<td>£495</td>
<td>£830</td>
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*Numbers show the weighted average effect within the sectors worked in by each age group.

There are five reasons to be careful in interpreting these numbers.

First, the LSE’s analysis of sectoral impacts does ignore certain specific sectors, such as ‘arts, entertainment and recreation’ and ‘personal service activities’, meaning our analysis ignores people working in those sectors. However, looking just at the sectors covered by the LSE’s GVA analysis, we get coverage of 93% of 18–21-year-olds, 96% of 22–29-year-olds, and between 95 and 100% for every other age group, meaning our analysis covers the vast majority of employees.

Second, there remains a question about how losses within a sector are distributed amongst those within a sector. Will all the lost growth fall on the lowest earners (who are likely to be younger)? Or will they fall on the highest earners? It is not possible to answer this question fully without doing a firm-level analysis that is beyond the scope of this briefing (see also (Morris, 2018, p. 7)). However, as discussed further in Section III, hard economic times generally tend to fall disproportionately on
younger workers (Schwandt et al., 2017, p. 1), meaning the figures in table 1 may be an underestimate. Tables 1 and 2 (and tables 4 and 5 in the annexe) merely show the average effect within the sectors worked in by each age group.

Third, the relative impact on young people might be an underestimate because the LSE model focuses on the impacts of international trade on different sectors of the economy. It therefore underestimates losses in certain sectors. One reason 18–21-year-olds fare relatively better than other age groups in figure 1 is that a significant proportion of them work in restaurants and hotels (24%, compared to 3–5% for over-30s), a sector which the LSE model predicts will not be directly affected by soft Brexit and barely affected by hard Brexit. But if, for example, at the end of free movement it becomes relatively more difficult for EU citizens to holiday in the UK than in other EU states, then hotels and restaurants would be more affected than the LSE model suggests, and young people will be more affected by Brexit.4

Fourth, the absolute estimate of income losses (in table 2) might overestimate the effects on young people. This is because we have calculated those numbers based on falls in GDP per capita, which represent the average fall in income for each member of the population. But while young people’s income is likely to be higher than, say, children, their income is lower than the average, meaning they will make up a smaller proportion of the absolute falls in income than the average. As mentioned above, tables 1 and 2 merely show the average GDP per capita effect within the sectors that young people work in.

Finally, this number only shows the more immediate impacts. As time passes, we would expect people to move out of those sectors hardest hit by Brexit; and as people get older, they start taking different jobs. Over time, we would expect young people to revert to the mean long-run losses compared to a soft Brexit predicted by the NIESR model, namely, £500 per person per year under the Chequers deal, £800 per person per year under a WTO deal (Kara et al., 2018, p. 13).

II. THE LONG RUN

Next, we estimate the accumulated loss that young people will face into the long run. This analysis uses the HMG analysis which became public in March 2018 (HMG, 2018). That analysis projects 15 years into the future, making it one of the more long-term models (and longer-term than the NIESR analysis (Kara et al., 2018) mentioned above). The HMG analysis examines three Brexit scenarios based on existing trade models: (i) an EEA-type scenario; (ii) an FTA-type scenario; and (iii) a WTO-type scenario. The government’s proposed Chequers deal seems to be most like the FTA-type scenario (Kara et al., 2018, p. 12). For full details of the model, see HMG (2018). We have simulated the HMG model to find the GDP per capita each year under the three Brexit scenarios compared to a baseline scenario in which the UK does not leave the EU. The HMG model itself provides estimates for the loss in cumulative % change in GDP per capita over 15 years. We used this to find the accumulated GDP per person lost under each scenario compared to a non-Brexit baseline. The results are shown in table 3.

| Accumulated loss of GDP per person per year (£) over 15 years in each Brexit scenario |
|-----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Brexit Scenario                              | EEA-type                     | FTA-type                      | WTO-type                      |

4 On the flip-side, a weakening of sterling may make the UK more attractive a holiday destination, and boost hotels and restaurants. The general point is that there is more to the economic impacts of Brexit than straightforward barriers to trade.

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Table 2
*numbers in brackets show the loss in cumulative % growth in GDP per capita over the 15 years, as estimated by HMG (2018).

The numbers in table 2 show the accumulated loss of GDP per capita over the entire 15-year period. The numerical ranges have been produced using the government’s estimate of the ranges of the loss of growth in GDP per capita in each Brexit scenario. The numbers in the table show the average accumulated loss experienced by each individual over the next 15 years.

We then extrapolated the HMG model forward to 2050, and performed the same calculation for accumulated loss in GDP per capita. The results are shown in table 3.

Accumulated loss of GDP per person per year (£) up to 2050 in each Brexit scenario

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<th>EEA-type</th>
<th>FTA-type</th>
<th>WTO-type</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core Analysis</td>
<td>£20,000</td>
<td>£51,000</td>
<td>£76,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best case</td>
<td>£7,000</td>
<td>£30,000</td>
<td>£44,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worst Case</td>
<td>£32,000</td>
<td>£72,000</td>
<td>£108,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3

We can take those numbers to be, roughly, the accumulated loss that the average young person will incur as a result of each Brexit scenario compared to a no-Brexit scenario. Loss in GDP per capita represents the average GDP lost per person. Young people (roughly, those between the ages of 21 and 35) will be part of the working population over the total lifetime of that forecast, meaning that today’s average young person will, over the lifetime of that forecast, be the average person. So the average loss per person (shown by loss in GDP per capita) will be the average loss faced by today’s young people. This reflects the fact that young people are affected by Brexit for longer than other cohorts. In fact, these numbers are likely to be an underestimate, since young people’s income, as members of the working population, will be higher than for retirees or children, meaning today’s young people are likely to suffer greater absolute losses in their income over that period than the average represented in table 3.

The large difference between the ‘best case’ and ‘worst case’ scenarios shown in table 3 is explained by the necessary degrees of uncertainty when forecasting into the long-run. The fan charts (figs 2–5
below) show the expected accumulated lost GDP per capita over the whole period, with the darker shades indicating more likely outcomes and lighter shades indicating less likely outcomes. Figure 4 does show some overlap in the possible losses under the different Brexit scenarios. But the order of the three scenarios in terms of economic growth is consistent: a WTO-type deal would impact young people the most and an EEA-type deal would impact them the least.
It is worth noting that in the fan charts above the losses have been smoothed out over the entire period. Economic adjustments resulting from Brexit may happen, as in those charts, as smooth, reduced growth rates over several years, but they could be front-loaded (if there is short-term post-Brexit disruption) or back-loaded (if supply chains take a long time to unwind) (HMG, 2018). Like the HMG analysis, we do not take a position on the time-profile of the losses.

Are these numbers optimistic or pessimistic? A number of different organisations have modelled the long-run effects of different Brexit scenarios. Those estimates of the comparative costs of different Brexit scenarios do, of course, vary, with that variation reflecting uncertainties around Brexit and around long-term macroeconomic forecasting. But the HMG estimates of the illustrative trade models sit broadly in the middle of the range, between the pessimism of Rabobank and the LSE dynamic model, and the optimism of Open Europe and Economists for Free Trade. So the numbers here can be considered neither optimistic nor pessimistic.

Figure 5. Source: HMG (2018), Author’s Calculation.

Figure 6. Source: (HMG, 2018)
III. POST-BREXIT RECESSION

Finally, we examine the impact of a post-Brexit recession. A Brexit which leads to a post-withdrawal recession is likely to have significant and long-term effects on young people and their lifetime earnings, even if growth recovers within a few years of withdrawal. There is extensive evidence that people who enter the labour market during a recession fare much worse in the long-run compared to their luckier counterparts who enter a strong labour market (Kahn, 2010; Oreopoulos et al., 2012; Oyer, 2006, 2008; Schwandt et al., 2017). First, we show that there is at least some risk of a post-withdrawal recession. Second, we summarise the findings that young people who enter the labour market during a recession experience lower wages for 10 – 20 years and experience permanently lower lifetime earnings. We conclude that there is a chance of significant and persistent effects to young people’s earnings as a result of Brexit, even if growth returns to normal relatively quickly following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.

A post-withdrawal recession is most likely in the case of a no deal, or chaotic, Brexit in which the UK leaves the EU with no agreement on trade or withdrawal issues. In such circumstances a ‘severe recession, while not inevitable, is clearly a possibility’ (Barnard et al., 2018, p. 11). NIESR finds that if the UK and the EU fail to reach a deal on future trade, and so moves to a WTO-style trading relationship on exit, that this would cause a ‘mild recession’ within one year (Hantzsche et al., 2018; Kara et al., 2018). Governor of the Bank of England Mark Carney observed that, following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, “there’s a range of possible scenarios…which could possibly include a technical recession” (Carney, 2016). And Capital Economics has warned that no deal would deal a ‘reasonable blow to GDP growth next year’ with recession possible (Redwood, 2018). Even in scenarios where the UK forms a trade deal with the EU, it is possible, as the HMG (2018a) analysis points out, that the long-run lost growth could be front-loaded: if there were such short-term disruption, this could plunge the UK into a recession. There is therefore some risk of a recession under any Brexit scenario, and a real risk of recession in a no deal scenario. These outcomes are, however, by no means certain.

If such a recession were to occur then, even though it may only be a short-term recession, it could have long-term consequences for the young who will be entering the labour market then. The immediate disadvantage of graduating from university or secondary school during a poor economy is obvious: it is harder to find a job, and those who successfully get a job are more likely to have a low-quality or low-wage job (Kahn, 2010, p. 303). But such individuals also fare significantly worse in the long-run: they get trapped in low-wage jobs and, given the importance of the first few years of one’s career to career progression, this can hinder career progression and earnings growth over the long term. Here we summarise three papers showing that young people who enter the labour market during a recession face significant and persistent effects on their earnings.

Oreopoulos et al. (2012) did a major study using longitudinal data on university graduates in Canada. They find that ‘the average worker graduating college in a recession faces earnings losses that are very persistent’ (Oreopoulos et al., 2012, p. 26). Such graduates earn lower wages over 10 years, with much larger losses for those earning less to begin with. They find that a typical recession ‘implies an initial loss in earnings [to recent graduates] of about 9 percent that halves within 5 years and finally fades to zero by 10 years’ (Oreopoulos et al., 2012, p. 3). This shock is almost exclusive to those who had entered the labour market within the previous year. They also find that those in the lower part of the income distribution suffer larger earnings losses for longer: the lowest earning graduates see a decrease of earnings by about 18% in their first year in the labour market; and graduates at the bottom of the skill distribution are permanently downgraded to lower-paying employers and sectors. Oreopoulos reports that ‘a significant fraction of graduates are permanently affected’ and even those who aren’t ‘do come off quite worse over the lifetime’ (Tong, 2018).
Second, Kahn (2010) examines data from the US from 1979 to 1989. Her results suggest that ‘the labor market consequences of graduating from college in a bad economy are large, negative and persistent’ (Kahn, 2010, p. 303). Kahn finds ‘an initial wage loss of 6 to 7% for a 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate’ for recent graduates, and ‘even 15 years after college graduation, the wage loss is 2.5%’ (Kahn, 2010, p. 304). Wage losses range from 1% to 20% each year and young people graduating from college during a severe recession will earn approximately 17.5% less per year over 17 years when compared to comparable peers graduating in better labour markets.

Kahn (2010) and Oreopoulos et al. (2012) focus on male college graduates, but Schwandt et al. (2017)’s study of the US also investigates women and people with less than a full university education (e.g. only high school education). They find that for a typical increase in unemployment from the peak to trough of the business cycle there is an initial reduction of earnings for all new labour market entrants of approximately 11%, and there is still a 2.6% reduction of wages ten years after graduation. Hence, a recession leads to a reduction of earnings by approximately 6% every year for 10 years after entering the labour market. Smaller increases in unemployment, without a recession, can also have large effects: Schwandt et al. (2017) estimate that ‘a one-point rise in the initial unemployment rate reduces cumulated earnings by approximately 20% of an average annual earnings’ over ten years. They also find that, while all groups suffer persistent effects from entering the labour market in adverse conditions, the effects are especially large for non-white workers, high school dropouts, and those with only a high school education.

To quantify some of these results: students who graduate during a recession can end up earning $60,000 to $100,000 less over a lifetime compared to those who graduate during better times (Greenstone et al., 2010; Nguyen, 2018). A Goldman Sachs report found there was a ‘lost generation’ from the Great Recession, with those who graduated during the recession earning 6% less per year over 10 years than they would have done otherwise (quoted in Nguyen, 2018). For the average US college graduate during the Great Recession, that translated into $70,000 over the decade following the Great Recession (Greenstone et al., 2010).

The UK economy currently faces the risk of a post-withdrawal recession, especially if there is a no deal Brexit. If there is a short-term post-Brexit recession, or even just an increase in unemployment, this could lead to permanently lower lifetime earnings for young people entering the labour market. The effect on their wages could persist 10 or 20 years into the future, with the effects most severe for those who already have lower earnings, lack university degrees, and are members of ethnic minorities. Therefore, while the economy as a whole would suffer from a post-withdrawal recession, it is the young who are just entering the labour market who will be most affected over the long run.

CONCLUSION

The impacts of Brexit are likely to be negative across all age groups. The weighted average of sectors that employ young people is likely to be less impacted than sectors that employ older workers. However, young people are likely to feel much of the impact of hard economic times: in the short run, businesses feeling the impact of lower growth tend to freeze hiring and cut jobs and wages for their most inexperienced workers. And even if the negative impact from Brexit is short-lived, the young could feel the effects of its impact on their wages and employment prospects many years into the future. In fact, under most models of the various Brexit scenarios, the UK economy will suffer reduced growth compared to remaining the EU. This briefing has shown that under the HMG’s forecasts, young people are likely to face significantly lower lifetime earnings, even if there
is no immediate Brexit recession. Young people, because of their vulnerable position in the labour market, and because they will live in a post-Brexit UK the longest, will feel many of the impacts of Brexit the hardest.

ANNEXE

Weighted average of sector impacts by age for Soft and Hard Brexit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Soft Brexit</th>
<th>Hard Brexit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 – 21</td>
<td>-0.95%</td>
<td>-1.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 – 29</td>
<td>-1.16%</td>
<td>-2.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 – 39</td>
<td>-1.19%</td>
<td>-2.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 – 49</td>
<td>-1.20%</td>
<td>-2.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 – 59</td>
<td>-1.18%</td>
<td>-2.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>-1.10%</td>
<td>-2.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4

Loss of GDP per person per year (£) by age compared to a Soft Brexit scenario*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Chequers Deal</th>
<th>WTO Deal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 - 21</td>
<td>£405</td>
<td>£675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 - 29</td>
<td>£495</td>
<td>£830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 – 39</td>
<td>£510</td>
<td>£835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 – 49</td>
<td>£515</td>
<td>£810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 – 59</td>
<td>£510</td>
<td>£780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>£470</td>
<td>£730</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5

*Numbers show the weighted average effect within the sectors worked in by each age group.
YOUTH OPPORTUNITY: EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT

The EU supports youth education, training and employment through a number of financial and social initiatives. Brexit could have an adverse on youth opportunity as a whole if no guarantee is given for the thousands of current and future young people who would benefit from membership of the EU. There is no assurance that UK participation will continue after Brexit, or that the UK will implement domestic replacements.

THE YOUTH EMPLOYMENT INITIATIVE:

The Youth Employment Initiative (YEI) was established in 2013 by the European Commission in response to high numbers of NEETs (young people not in education, employment or training) across the EU following the financial crisis. The YEI allocates funding to areas with youth unemployment rates of over 25% or where youth unemployment was more than 20% with an increase of more than 30% during 2012 (House of Lords European Union Committee 2014). The YEI is designed to complement the work of member states by supporting initiatives aimed at assisting individuals into work, education or further training. England has received over €461 million in support from the ESF and the YEI during the initiative’s lifetime (Department for Work and Pensions, 2017). The UK has relatively low youth unemployment compared to the EU as a whole. A House of Commons Library paper estimates that in the UK the youth unemployment rate was 11.7%, compared to 15.6% for the European Union as a whole (House of Commons Library 2018). However, youth unemployment rates remain higher than for older groups. According to research by UNISON, from February to April 2016, 27.7% of 16-17 year olds and 11.9% of 18-24
year olds were unemployed, compared with 4.7% of 25-34 year olds and 3.2% of 35-49 year olds (UNISON, 2016).

Five areas in the UK qualified for funding under the YEI in 2012: Merseyside, the West Midlands, Tees Valley and Durham, South West Scotland and Inner London (House of Lords European Union Committee, 2014). For example, the Tees Valley programme has provided communication skills courses, careers advisors, and a fund for travel, clothing, and equipment expenses. Liverpool in Work is a programme part-funded by the YEI which utilises staff with specialist knowledge of the local labour market to assist young people into employment. One of the strengths of the YEI is this focus on local knowledge: the same House of Lords report acknowledged the benefits of using ‘EU funds for specific tasks which complement action at national level, such as kick-starting structural changes.’ The impact of the YEI has been positive and youth unemployment has decreased during the programme’s lifetime. Nevertheless, the West Midlands and the North East continue to have higher youth unemployment compared to the rest of the country (ONS, 2018c).

Without EU funding, there is no assurance that these successful initiatives will continue. While future governments could of course continue to fund projects in these areas, this is not guaranteed: a house of commons cited by the Labour Party shows that youth services have been cut by 52% in real terms (the Labour Party, 2018). The Education Maintenance Allowance has been cut, and 600 youth centres have closed since 2012 (Unison, 2016). Leaving the European Union leaves youth services at greater risk.

ERASMUS+

The UK receives 7.2% of the Erasmus+ annual budget, the 5th largest amount of any member state participating in the student mobility programme (Aguilar, 2018). According to a House of Commons Library Briefing Paper, the total value of all Erasmus+ projects funded in the UK has increased in each year from €112 million in the 2014 call to €143 million in 2017 (House of Commons Library, 2018). The programme aims to provide opportunities for over 4 million individuals over the 2014 to 2020 period (House of Lords European Union Committee, 2014). While mainly thought of as a university programme, Erasmus+ funds benefit young people more widely: higher education institutions only account for 16% of applicants for funds in the UK (Aguilar, 2018). Erasmus+ funds are received by young people pursuing vocational studies, work placement, non-formal learning, as well as students with special needs. Moreover, their effect is felt throughout all educational tiers with approximately 40% of the UK’s applications for funds coming from schools offering both general and vocational curriculums (Aguilar, 2018).

The benefits of Erasmus+ extend well beyond the financial. It facilitates youth mobility: the UK sends the fifth most students abroad of any participating country (European Commission, 2014). This could be halted by Brexit. The government’s published guidance in the event of a no-deal scenario indicates that the UK may continue to fund the programme without any guarantee of receiving its benefits (HMG, 2018c). The furthest the guidance goes is that the government will ‘seek to ensure UK participants can continue with their planned activity.’ The UK may have to make concessions beyond continuing to pay into the programme if it wants to continue participating. These may include subscribing to freedom of movement more widely, which the government has repeatedly ruled out.

Erasmus+ offers young people more than just the immediate benefits of the time spent abroad. It makes living and working abroad a reality in the long term and it is an important gateway for the 56% of 18-24 year olds who want to work abroad in the future (Wybron et al.). While the UK’s
participation in the programme could continue after Brexit, it is clear that it is under threat, in particular in the case of a no-deal outcome.

SECONDARY IMPACT

Membership of the EU has a more widespread impact on education than just Erasmus+. The EU was the source of £836 million or 14.2% of UK University research grants and contracts (Kelly, 2016). These have a subsequent boost on the wider economy. According to a Universities UK report modelling the impact of EU grants, 19,054 full-time jobs were consequently created in the academic year 2014/15 (Kelly, 2016).

EU students also brought significant financial benefits to the UK universities. In the 2016-17 academic year, nearly 135,000 EU students enrolled in UK universities: 5.8% of the UK’s total enrolments (HESA, 2017). They make a significant contribution to universities and the economies around them. A 2015 Universities UK report estimated that higher education accounted for £10.71 billion of export earnings, approximately 10% of the UK’s total exports of services (Universities UK, 2017). Moreover, higher education has a huge impact on local economies with significant contributions to employment and tourism (Mayhew, 2017). There is insufficient clarity on the status of EU students in the UK after Brexit but it is highly likely that EU students would be deterred from applying if faced with high international student fees, especially without continued access to loans from the Student Loan Company. These are matters of government not university policy and intersect with wider negotiations about freedom of movement as a whole (Mayhew, 2017). If the possibility of remaining in the UK to work after studying is removed, the attraction of a UK education may be lessened. This could harm the university sector and remove a significant boost to the UK economy.

Overall, leaving the EU, particularly in a no-deal scenario, could have severe consequences for the UK education sector. Young people could lose access to the Erasmus+ scheme, and the wider economic benefits to the university sector could be lost.
CHILDREN AND BREXIT

Brexit poses a number of risks specific to children. This section will analyse concerns related to EU national children and cross border family law, child poverty, and child legal rights.

EU NATIONAL CHILDREN

Many concerns have been raised about outcomes for EU nationals living in the United Kingdom. Their right to reside here is based on EU free movement of people, which will lapse if Britain leaves the EU. The House of Commons Library, using ONS data, estimates that in 2017 there were 3.7 million European citizens living in the UK (House of Commons Library, 2018).

In 2017, the most recent year for which statistics are available, there were 71,472 births in the England and Wales to EU national mothers. This is 10.5% of all births that year. Of these, 15,511 (2.3% of total births) were to EU-born mothers and UK born fathers. There were an additional 9,157 (1.3%) children born to EU-born fathers and UK-born mothers (ONS, 2018b). These citizens and children have the right to live in the UK as a result of their EU citizenship, that will lapse when the UK leaves the EU. Although in August 2018 the UK government said that they would unilaterally guarantee their position if the UK leaves the EU without a deal, there remains doubt about the future. Concerns have been raised about the app the Home Office is producing to register migrants, with Nicolas Hatton, founder of the campaign group the3million saying in response in February 2018: ‘What will happen if the app rejects you, what will happen if you don’t have a computer, if you are disabled? What will happen if the Home Office makes a mistake?’ (O’Carroll, L., 2018). Even if the system for registration is well executed, the longstanding doubt over status and the very fact that EU citizens will be required to register is comparatively less convenient and more expensive for them. The scheme will cost £32.50 for under-16s, half the fee for adults (HMG, 2018e). However the issue is resolved, there has been sustained uncertainty for these individuals as a result of the government’s Brexit policy because they would lose the right of residence that comes with EU citizenship.

There are also a number of concerns about the separation of families that could come with leaving the EU. UK immigration rules introduced in 2012 currently require a minimum combined income...
of £18,600 a year before a UK national can bring in a non-UK or non-EU national spouse. In addition, applicants must prove an additional £3,800 of income for a first child and £2,400 for subsequent children who are not EU or UK nationals (HMG, 2018e). To bring in a spouse and two children, the household would therefore need to earn £24,800. The median household income in the UK is £27,300, so this threshold bars a significant proportion of the population from bringing in a foreign spouse and family (ONS, 2018a). While the government are yet to announce their plan for post-Brexit immigration, there are few reasons to think that they would not include a similar provision, or that immigration policy would proceed in a substantially different direction to its existing course.

Concerns were raised in 2015 by the Children’s Commissioner for England about the impact on families separated by these laws. Their research estimated that at least 15,000 children had been separated from one of their parents in the three years since the introduction of the policy. Given that it was adopted as part of a package of measures to reduce overall levels of immigration, it was expressly designed to separate families. Their report surveyed families who were affected by the policy. They found stress and anxiety common around the families and a number of behavioural problems were reported in children separated from a parent. Some children were struggling at school, and in addition a number blamed themselves for the absence of a parent. A mother of a six-year-old wrote: ‘[My son] went from a bubbly little boy to very reserved in the first few months of the separation, he was angry at us both but couldn’t understand why Dad won’t want to live with him. He would go from angry kicking out to long periods of cry and thought Dad didn’t love him. They are still working at rebuilding their relationship and trust.’ The report recommended a series of mitigations to the policy, including accounting for regional variations and potential earnings of the non-resident partner when assessing income (Wray et al., 2015).

If free movement ends, it is likely that this policy would be applied to new marriages and families of British and EU nationals. A significant number of future families and children could be separated as a result of Brexit, with the potential for developmental harm for growing children and difficulties in their parental relationships.

A substantial number of EU nationals who have migrated to the UK have had families with UK nationals. In cases of family breakup, the EU enforces and facilitates issues that may arise. If Britain leaves the EU without a deal continuing such arrangements, there could be serious negative consequences for families and children. EU policies include the recognition and enforcement of child custody and protection decisions across the entire bloc. The Brussels II bis regulation ensures that decisions made in one country about custody or family arrangements apply across all member states without the need for a declaration of enforceability (Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003). For example, if a German mother and a British father have a child in Britain and subsequently separate, decisions around custody and access made by a British court would apply in Germany as well. The regulation also ensures fast-track decisions are made on international child abduction cases, forcing courts to reach a judgement within six weeks. Furthermore, it also ensures the child’s right to be heard through proceedings: for example, article 41 states that no decision can be made on access unless the child concerned has been heard (Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003). If Britain leaves the EU, the legal basis for this cooperation will no longer exist. In a no-deal scenario cooperation and automatic recognition of decisions would end, with potentially serious consequences. An option of full reciprocity would be difficult, given the government’s repeated statements to leave the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), and would be a politically difficult option for the government to pursue. Unilateral recognition and transposal of CJEU case law into UK law would enshrine some of the process-related rights of the regulation into UK law, but would not have recognition in the remainder of the EU for UK court decisions. The Children’s Rights Alliance warned that a reliance on bilateral arrangements under the
Hague convention could result in rights being ‘watered down’ for children (Brexit and Children Coalition, 2017).

**CHILD POVERTY**

According to the DWP, in 2016-17, 4.1 million children were in relative poverty after accounting for housing costs (DWP, 2017). Unison warned that almost a third of under-18s were at risk of falling into poverty (Unison, 2016). There are several ways in which this could be affected by Britain leaving the European Union.

The inflationary pressures from Brexit have the potential to push more children into poverty. Furthermore, a study has shown an inflationary impact of Brexit, due to the fall in the pound (Clarke et al. 2017). It also models the tariffs that would be levied under a no-deal scenario where the UK trades on Most Favoured Nation terms with the EU. In the first six months from June 2016, households with children were affected more than others but since then other households have been affected more, and the inflation on different households only varies within 2.7-2.9%. The authors point out that working age households with income from wages or working age benefits have not had earnings growth to match this, unlike pensioner households benefitting from the ‘triple lock’ on state pensions. The inflationary pressures produced since the Brexit referendum are likely to have increased the risk for many of child poverty.

This research also modelled the effects of a ‘No Deal’ scenario without a trade agreement with the EU on the cost of living. Tariffs would be levied on EU imports that had been previously tariff free. They concluded that most households would experience an increase in living costs of between 0.5 and 1.5%. In addition, 8% of households bought more imported goods and would face an increase in the cost of living of 2-4.7%. They applied this model onto ONS data on the goods different households buy, concluding that families with children were among the worst hit. The authors write that ‘[t]his may seem a small number, but in a country in which the real incomes of ordinary families have been stagnant for several years, a loss of this order would have a significant effect on welfare.’

Their methodology was a conservative estimate: they did not account for changes in the prices of services, or wider economic disruption, among other factors. In addition, they did not model changes in tariffs on trade with countries in FTAs with the EU, with whom the UK would lose preferential access to in a WTO scenario. While this is dependent on the decisions of the UK government in setting tariff levels, it is not possible under WTO rules to have a separate rate of tariffs for the EU and other countries. Brexit related inflation is therefore likely to have a significant impact on the quality of life of many people across the country, with the impact disproportionately heavily falling on families and children.

In addition, EU funding supports a number of programmes aimed at equipping children and young people with skills to enable them to succeed in the workplace. EU education and training schemes do not just apply to students and young people over 18 (see below). Investment from the European Social Fund is concentrated in the most deprived areas of the country, such as Wales, the North East, and Northern Ireland. Wales is set to receive £2 billion in funding in the 2014-20 funding round (Brexit and Children Coalition, 2017). A significant proportion of this is targeted at young people and children. Much Erasmus+ funding goes to schools as well as university students, while training programmes can target children. For example, the Enterprising Newcastle package, part funded by the European Regional Development Fund, offers enterprise training to 14-19 year olds (Bonnet, O., 2016). In the absence of this funding, outcomes for children could be imperiled. The government has not guaranteed funding for such schemes beyond the current EU budget period to
2020. While there may well be some form of regional funding to replace this, it would likely be lower than that guaranteed by 6 year EU budget programme. Local authority funding has been cut very heavily under austerity, with the local government association warning of a £5.8 billion budget black hole by 2020 and claiming that three-quarters of direct central government funding will be cut between 2015 and 2020 (Local Government Association, 2017). At the very least, there is significant cause to suggest that outcomes could be significantly worse for children.

There are a number of ways in which Brexit could worsen child poverty, through raising prices of goods and withdrawing funding to the most deprived areas of the country.

**CHILD RIGHTS**

Concerns have been raised about children’s legal rights post-Brexit. Article 24 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights affirms and enhances children’s right to care and protection, to express themselves freely and to a relationship with their parents unless contrary to their best interests (2000/C 364/01). The Charter also enshrines rights found in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and protects children through other articles such as the freestanding Article 27 right not to be discriminated. The Withdrawal Bill provides that the Charter will not be incorporated into UK domestic law after Brexit and the removal of this layer of legal protection poses a specific risk to children. In the government’s Right by Right analysis, it is claimed that such rights are general principles of EU law and so in some way protected (HMG 2017b). However, these principles will only affect the interpretation of retained EU law and will not be enforceable as rights in domestic courts. Therefore, an individual will not be able to rely on them directly. Although the CJEU has decided that the UNCRC is an instrument for the protection of human rights which is taken account of when applying the principles, this is a weak use of the treaty. Since the UK has taken no steps to legally incorporate the UNCRC, it does not have direct effect (CRAE et al., 2017). The government claims that the UNCRC is reflected in domestic law but does not detail exactly how and where (HMG 2017b). Furthermore, there has been no pledge to protect the sources that are defined, including the Children Acts 1989 and 2004, the Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995 and the Cooperation in Children’s Services Act (Northern Ireland) 2015 after Brexit.
SECURING DATA AFTER BREXIT

Brexit poses a threat to the online lives of young people. Data protection rights as well as the international data flows that underpin life online are at risk. 900 million people have international connections on social media, and 360 million take part in cross-border e-commerce (McKinsey, 2016). With 95% of 16-24 year olds shopping online, young people also depend on the free flow of personal data (ONS, 2018). Brexit could make data both less secure and less transferable, leaving young people with fewer rights and opportunities online.

It is essential that both data privacy and data flows are guaranteed after Brexit to ensure that businesses can operate and individuals are protected. However, impediments to the free and safe flow of data can have much wider implications. Professionals in the technology sector have warned that ‘barriers to the free flow of personal data constrain growth, impede innovation, undermine data protection standards and reduce public outcomes on welfare, health and security’ (techUK and UK Finance, 2017). The EU data protection and sharing framework has 4 elements: the GDPR, the Law Enforcement Directive, the EU-US umbrella agreement and the EU-US Privacy Shield. The GDPR is a legal provision for the protection of consumers, citizens, donors and individuals who provide data; the LED protects the personal data of those involved in criminal proceedings; the umbrella agreement is a framework for law enforcement cooperation between the EU and the US; and the privacy shield ensures data transfer cooperation between the EU and the US for commercial purposes. All of these measures ensure that data is shared responsibly and that data subjects are safe in the digital economy.

ARTICLE 8 OF THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

Article 8 of the Charter affords citizens substantial data protection rights. However, the Charter will not be retained after Brexit. The UK Government’s Right by Right analysis states that ‘[a]lthough Article 8 of the ECHR is distinct from Article 8 of the Charter and Article 8 of the Charter has no direct equivalent in the ECHR, Article 8 of the ECHR has been held to encompass personal data protection’ (HMG, 2017b). However, there is no direct equivalent in existing UK law to the far-reaching scope of this right, which also encompasses data access and rectification and the right to
have reference to a supervisory authority. The Charter enshrines data protection as a fundamental right which can be relied upon to challenge legislative and governmental decision-making. The remedies for a violation of a Charter right are more comprehensive than offered by alternative domestic legislation: one legal remedy is the disapplication of incompatible domestic legislation which is unavailable for a breach in the common law or under the Human Rights Act 1998. Therefore, the current data privacy rights guaranteed to UK citizens under the Charter will not continue in their entirety after Brexit. As Professor of Law, Andrew Murray, argues ‘these rights will not be retained as rights post Brexit’ (Murray, 2017). All that will be retained is the shadow of the right to data protection through the UK’s implementation of the GDPR.

FREE FLOW OF DATA
The cross-border free flow of personal data is essential to the UK’s economy due to the dependence of the trade in services on such transfers. Approximately 75% of the UK’s international data transfers go through the EU in some way (Campion, 2017). However, the automatic legal framework which allows for this free flow of personal data will be lost after Brexit. Unless another agreement is negotiated, the UK will become a third party after Brexit and data transfers to third parties are forbidden by the EU. While data transfers would continue in some way, there would be increased investigation and regulatory barriers to the free flow of data. There are also likely to be significant disruptions in existing supply chains, consumer buying, access to workers, skilled data talent and innovation.

Businesses can use a number of methods to satisfy the 8th principle that personal data should not be transferred to a country out of the EEA unless that country guarantees adequate protection for the rights and freedoms of data subjects. The European Commission can decide that certain sets of Standard Contractual Clauses are sufficient to guarantee a certain level of protection and yet, hundreds of contracts may be needed to cover transfers between all parties. Alternatively, multinational corporations can seek authorisation for Binding Corporate Rules which can provide a framework for an array of intra-group transfers but are also subject to a strict authorisation process. Codes of Conducts, Derogations permitted by law and Certification Schemes are all other potential avenues for corporations to pursue. However, these options would incur significant administrative costs and could be highly exclusionary to SMEs who may be unable to cope with the financial burden.

The UK Government recognises that the best solution is the adequacy decision model whereby the European Commission certifies that domestic law provides equivalent data protection (HMG, 2017a). As a joint report by Dentons, techUK and UK Finance clarified ‘the adequacy standard does not require a point-to-point replication of EU rules. Rather, the test lies in whether, through the substance of privacy rights and their effective implementation, enforceability and supervision, the foreign system concerned as a whole delivers the required high level of protection’ (techUK and UK finance, 2017). It is based on common high standards and creates a foundation for a shared best practice of progress and transparency. Crucially, an adequacy decision is not dependent on the compliance of individual businesses but the effectiveness of the regulator (House of Lords, 2017b). However, in the absence of an agreement, it may be difficult to avoid a so-called “cliff edge” when the UK leaves the EU because an adequacy decision is made with a third party and the UK will not be a third party before March 2019.

The process of obtaining an adequacy decision is arduous, subject to review every 4 years and by no means guaranteed. The government assumes this should be straightforward because ‘the UK starts from an unprecedented point of alignment with the EU’ (HMG, 2017a). However, there have been a number of instances in which domestic law concerning data has conflicted with EU law. The Data
Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 was repealed on 31st December 2016 after the ruling of the 21st December 2016 by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the joined cases of Tele2 Sverige AB v Post-och telestyrelsen and Home Secretary v Watson MP & Ors in which it was decided that the Act was unlawful. Moreover, the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 which replaced the Act still enables significant government surveillance and data retention which may not be in accordance with Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. There are also substantial questions over whether the Data Protection Act fully and sufficiently incorporates the data protection elements set out in the Charter. In particular, the UK’s use of the national security exemption from the GDPR, the retention of data and bulk powers granted to security services and the onward transfer of this data to third country security partners such as the ‘Five Eyes’ partners between Britain, the USA, Australia, New Zealand and Canada (Gutheil, Liger et al., 2018). These barriers all preclude an adequacy decision being concluded before Brexit actually takes place. Therefore, it is likely that the legal basis for the majority of UK business data transferences will be lost overnight.

The UK may also be excluded from the transfer of security data across the EU for the enforcement of law and the monitoring of criminal activity. The data-sharing tools which the UK may lose access to include the Europol Information System (EIS) as the central database of criminal information, the Schengen Information System (SIS II) for wanted individuals, missing people and stolen objects, the European Criminal Records Information Exchange System (ECRIS) and the Prüm Convention for the exchange of DNA, fingerprints and vehicle registration. Elizabeth Denham, the UK Information Commissioner, stated to a Lords Select Committee that ‘harmonising the data protection rules for the law enforcement sector, including the rules about transferring personal data for criminal justice and law enforcement, and having cross-border co-operation, is a fundamentally important area for the public’ (House of Lords, 2017a). However, the adoption of available fallback options to share data and information would result ‘in a substantial reduction in the level of cooperation when compared to the current situation’ (Gutheil, Liger et al., 2018).

Transatlantic transfers comprise the largest movement of data in the world and the UK’s data transfers with the US are enabled by two agreements negotiated between the US and the EU: the Privacy Shield and the Umbrella Agreement (techUK and UK finance, 2017). The onward transfer of data beyond the EU will also be disrupted after Brexit if no agreement is concluded.

Therefore, especially in case of a no-deal Brexit, there are a number of threats to data transfers which underpin many aspects of cross-border online activity.

MOBILE DATA ROAMING

Mobile roaming charges could be reinstated for UK phone package holders after Brexit if no deal is agreed. They were abolished in the EEA on 15th June 2017 but may be reinstated for UK citizens. The government’s guidance on mobile roaming in a no-deal situation states that the position will be a ‘commercial question’ decided by mobile operators and ‘leaving without a deal would not prevent UK mobile operators making and honouring commercial arrangements with mobile operators in the EU - and beyond the EU - to deliver the services their customers expect, including roaming arrangements.’ (HMG 2018d). However, the decision is not dependent on UK operators but EU operators because they will no longer be barred from enforcing a roaming surcharge to the UK as a third country. Moreover, the fact that free data roaming will be a commercial matter and not a legal matter offers little assurance. The potential for a host of different rules for different providers and packages means that individuals may be unaware of their status and unknowingly incur excess charges. There are additional concerns for Northern Ireland. In many areas the signal from the Republic is stronger, and so users could be charged for ‘inadvertent roaming’ without even going
abroad. Brexit, and in particular a no deal scenario would end an automatic entitlement to free data roaming, with an especially serious impact in Northern Ireland.
PROTECTING YOUNG WORKERS

The EU ensures a number of employment protections for workers. Young people benefit disproportionately from these rights. This is because of the types of jobs young people do and the UK’s domestic approach to those areas of employment. Five sectors collectively employ over three-fifths of 21-30 year olds: education, health and social care, hospitality, real estate and renting, and wholesale and retail (TUC, 2018b). Jobs in these sectors are characterised by zero-hours contracts and low paid roles, and increasingly agency and temporary employment.

Employment protections in the UK predated EU law in a number of areas, including equal pay and disability. However, EU law had and still has a significant impact on many elements of working life. For example, it touches on working time, pay, dismissal, discrimination in selection and working conditions. Although the UK has never failed to implement an EU employment directive, there are a number of employment law areas advanced by the EU which the UK strongly resisted legislating. Among these are protections for agency workers and atypical workers, of which a significant proportion are young people (Ford, 2016). As such, Brexit poses a particular risk to young workers.

PART-TIME WORKERS:

The Part-time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000 and the Fixed Term Employees (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000 significantly improved pay, conditions and job security for part-time and temporary workers. In fact, it is estimated that approximately 400,000 part-time employees benefitted from such equal treatment rights (TUC, 2016). These two regulations in part implement the Fixed-Term Work Directive (1999/70/EC) and the Part-time Work Directive (97/81/EC). The latter Directive has far-reaching application after O’Brien v Ministry of Justice decided that it applied to all “workers” and only excluded the self-employed. Although EU-derived employment laws will be retained in the immediate aftermath of Brexit, such laws are vulnerable to repeal or dilution in the long term. This will depend on government policy but the UK’s reluctance to put such protections in place from the outset make this a particularly weak area of legislation. Michael Ford QC, a barrister specialising in labour law, acknowledges in an opinion the threat of preferences for a ‘flexible’ labour market to such protections. He stated ‘Brexit would breathe new life into the deregulatory agenda with which
the Regulations are in tension’ (Ford, 2016). Workers’ rights will not have any privileged status after Brexit and those affecting young people are potentially the most at threat.

AGENCY WORKERS:
According to a TUC report, over 40% of all those who have been in agency work for over a year are aged between 16 and 34 (TUC, 2018a). Therefore, young people have benefitted the most from The Temporary Agency Work Directive 2008 which guarantees those working through employment agencies equal conditions, treatment and pay (2008/104/EC). Article 6 confers a further duty on member states to improve agency workers’ access to training and childcare facilities to improve their overall employability (2008/104/EC).

This is another area of employment law where UK domestic rights have not been as comprehensive as those advanced by the EU. The Agency Workers Regulations 2010 are unpopular with employers because they require that agency workers must receive the same working terms and conditions as permanent employers after 12 weeks (SI 2010/93). The UK opposed the 2002 draft of the Directive because the equal treatment provisions would reduce the availability of flexible working opportunities for businesses and contradict the government’s desire to maintain a ‘balance between flexibility and protection’ (DTI, 2002). As such, the compromise of a 12 week qualifying period was included only as a compromise with the UK government after pressure was applied by trade unions (Asac, 2014). As a result, the former Department for Business, Innovation and Skills estimated in 2010 that this specific caveat would mean that half of agency workers would be unaffected by the changes (Biggs and Toms, 2015). The UK’s reluctance to implement in full the equal treatment legislation for agency workers makes such protections, disproportionately important to young people, more vulnerable after Brexit.

WORKING TIME:
The government has made repeated assurances that workers’ rights would be ‘protected and enhanced’ after Brexit, such as in Theresa May’s 2016 party conference speech (May, 2016). However, there has been no guarantee that the 48 hour working week will be preserved after Brexit. As well as this time limit, the Working Time Directive also requires regular rest breaks, a daily rest period of 11 consecutive hours and a weekly rest period of 24 consecutive hours. Although individuals can opt-out of the weekly time cap, there are now 700,000 fewer employees working more than 48 hours a week compared to 1998 when the directive was implemented in the UK (Ford, 2016). This Directive has also improved access to holiday pay. TUC analysis from April 2016 shows that more than 7 million workers have gained an average of 13 days more paid annual leave each with 4.2 million part-time workers experiencing an increase in their paid holiday entitlement (TUC, 2016). In a statement following the European Council meeting in December 2017, Theresa May faced repeated questions from MPs about whether she could guarantee that the Directive would be preserved. She replied that ‘These rights are enshrined in EU law at the moment. They will be brought forward into UK law in the EU withdrawal Bill.’ This reply did not guarantee the long term future of the rights enshrined in the directive (Hansard, 2017). The Withdrawal Bill White Paper does detail workers’ rights as an area that will be specifically protected. Furthermore, it states that the interpretation of EU-derived laws will still be made with reference to relevant CJEU case law. This means that areas which have expanded in definition and scope as a result of the EU will be partly protected after Brexit. CJEU case law has expanded holiday pay specifically to mean that workers must accumulate holiday during sick leave and that holiday pay should include particular variable elements of pay, such as commission and overtime. However, the laws would have no privileged status after Brexit, and the UK government would be able to depart from them further from the point of exit.
THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

Workers’ rights will be affected by the provision in the Withdrawal Bill that stipulates that the Charter will not be incorporated into UK law after Brexit. Beyond adding and clarifying individual rights, the Charter prompts member states to legislate for individual rights in domestic law. This impact can be seen in regard to Article 27 which protects the ‘workers’ right to information and consultation within the undertaking’. This is a provision which does not confer directly enforceable rights on an individual but determines that national law and Union law must guarantee this. Therefore, it puts a duty on the member state to pass legislation to guarantee them. Article 28 of the Charter protects the ‘right of collective bargaining and action’. Similarly, the exact details and specifications relating to modes of collective action, such as strike action, remains within the scope of national law. Nevertheless, it currently acts as an important prompt to legislators and this impetus will be removed after Brexit.

RISKS AFTER BREXIT

Many prominent Brexit-supporting politicians have long criticised EU employment protections. Dominic Raab, Secretary of State for Exiting the EU, wrote a report in 2011 for the Centre for Policy Studies entitled ‘Escaping the Straightjacket’ (Raab, D, 2011a). This called for the exclusion of small businesses and start-ups from having to pay the minimum wage to under-21s which would have had a profound impact on young workers. It also suggested abolishing the 1998 working time regulations which he described as a piece of ‘costly, anti-jobs legislation’ and the Agency Workers Regulation which, as discussed above, disproportionately affects young people (Raab, D, 2011a). In an accompanying article for Conservative Home he wrote that such ‘red tape’ on small businesses was a ‘social injustice’ (Raab, D, 2011b).

Many leading Brexiers have spoken out against EU regulation through their political careers. In a speech during the referendum campaign, leading Leave campaigner Priti Patel said that “If we could just halve the burdens of the EU social and employment legislation we could deliver a £4.3bn boost to our economy and 60,000 new jobs” (Clark, E, 2016). Liam Fox, now Secretary of State for International Trade, in 2005 warned that the ‘EU can exacerbate economic problems—for example, through the social chapter’ (Hansard, 2005). Former Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, David Davis referred in 1996 to the ‘job-destroying social chapter’ (They Work For You, 1996). The ability to remove EU protections on employment law have been advocated as a benefit of leaving by Brexit-supporting politicians, and so Brexit would provide an opportunity to implement such a policy. There is thus a clear potential threat to young people’s employment protections if the UK leaves the European Union.
THE ENVIRONMENTAL COST

The environment is one of the policy areas most affected by membership of the EU. Furthermore, it is of much significance to young people. According to polling commissioned by the think tank Bright Blue, it is consistently one of the most important policy considerations for young people (Bright Blue, 2017). These concerns become even more important as the UK is faced with the situation in which the EU will no longer set and regulate the environmental standards implemented by the government.

A report by the UK Environmental Law Association (UKELA) highlights the legal vulnerability of the environment because there is often no clearly defined individual or party with interests to protect and so ‘in this sense the environment can all too easily die in silence’ (UKELA, 2017). It is essential that there is a legal framework protecting and improving the environment post Brexit.

EU environment policy is derived from Articles 11, 191, 192 and 193 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU 2012/C 326/01). It details the EU’s policy commitment to:

- preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment;
- protecting human health;
- prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources; and
- promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems, in particular combating climate change.

Moreover, the EU applies the “precautionary principle” which aims to ensure to employ preventative measures and decision to avoid the potential of risk (TFEU 2012/C 326/01).

The current government has expressed a commitment to maintaining high environmental standards (HMG 2018b). However, it is not clear how the government plans to deliver this. The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) has published estimates that 95 items of secondary legislation are necessary to incorporate the relevant EU law into domestic law on exit day (National Audit Office, 2017). This is set against the fact that 80% of DEFRA’s responsibilities are framed by EU law. Moreover, many existing departmental processes are dependent on EU institutions, such as the European Environment Agency (EEA) and the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA). The government’s white paper proposes to make “non-regression provisions” to ensure that current standards are upheld. However, a House of Commons Library Briefing notes that this is
subject to negotiation and neither the UK nor the EU have given any details as to the nature of those “provisions” (Priestly and Smith, 2018).

A report commissioned by Friends of the Earth evaluates the risks to the environment under various Brexit scenarios (Burns et al., 2018). Overall, it states that ‘there is insufficient detail about future plans, and where detail has been provided it indicates a lower level of ambition than currently provided under EU law.’ Habitats and birds are the most vulnerable category and are at ‘very high risk’ in all potential Brexit trade deals. In the context of a no-deal scenario, agri-environment, fish and marine life, nitrates, birds and habitats, climate and energy are all deemed to be at very high risk. In the event of a no-deal Brexit, there are additional environmental issues that could arise. In particular, if lorry parks were to be required in Kent due to congestion at the Port of Dover, there could be significant effects on local air quality (Barnard et al., 2018).

The European Commission and the European Court of Justice (CJEU) currently act in supervisory roles to the UK’s environmental programme. The UK has a good history of transposing EU legislation but a poor history of actually implementing the law. The CJEU has heard 34 environmental cases against the UK and 30 have resulted in judgment against the UK (UKELA, 2017). The European courts will lose this enforcement role after Brexit and there will be fewer methods of holding the government accountable. As a member state, the UK is required to submit impact reports to the Commission and the citizen’s complaint procedure enables individuals to report straight to the Commission. The domestic process of judicial review has strict requirements determining which individuals have standing and so can bring a challenge to governmental decision-making. This can significantly reduce its availability. Moreover, UKELA has questioned ‘whether the process can in itself replicate the more systematic supervision hitherto conducted by the European Commission’ (UKELA, 2017). The Commission has the flexibility to decide whether formal proceedings or informal methods such as negotiation are most appropriate. These EU mechanisms of legal and political accountability are important in the context of the executive’s conflicting policy priorities and constrained budgets. A think tank, UK in a Changing Europe, has also warned that there could be effects on monitoring and enforcement of environmental issues, as the Government has yet to create institutions or structures to replace EU monitoring capacities. The government has proposed to fill this supervisory gap with an independent watchdog but ministers will only be legally required to “have regard to” its core principles.

Therefore, there are a number of threats to the enforceability of environmental protection legislation as a result of Brexit. An issue significant to young people, it could have serious impacts for the country as a whole.
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TFEU 2012/C 326/01


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