Achieving Space Security

A Preliminary Action Inquiry for a Canadian Campaign to Prevent the Weaponization of Space

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This report has been prepared by the Polaris Institute for the Secure World Foundation.

The purpose of this preliminary action inquiry is to gather information required to inform the development of a campaign action plan

(i) to prevent Canada from weaponizing space by contributing or participating in the research, development, testing or deployment of space-based weapons; and

(ii) to encourage the Canadian government’s nascent efforts to address space weaponization internationally, and encourage it to adopt a strong leadership role to prevent or discourage other countries from weaponizing space.

This inquiry examines the issue from a number of angles with an eye to developing effective strategies to address three campaign spheres: political, communications and organizing.

The research was conducted from October 2004 to January 2005 through personal interviews; a written survey of civil society organizations; a literature review of recent reports, journal articles and conference proceedings; and an Internet-based investigation of space security actors in Canada, the United States, and internationally.
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**Weapons in Space: Issue Overview**

In January 2001, the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, led by Donald Rumsfeld, warned of the possibility of a “Pearl Harbor in space” if the U.S. government did not take measures to protect U.S. space satellites and ensure that the nation’s reliance upon space could not be threatened.

The Rumsfeld Commission, as it was dubbed, paved the way for the U.S. military to begin developing space warfare technologies. The U.S. president should “have an option to deploy weapons in space to deter threats to, and if necessary, defend against attacks on U.S. interests,” said the report.

Subsequently Donald Rumsfeld became the Bush administration’s Defense Secretary, where he was in a position to implement his agenda to “transform” the U.S. military to a high-tech war-fighting machine suitable to defend and project the interests of the world’s sole remaining superpower.

The terrible terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, cleared away political obstacles for a range of Bush administration initiatives — not the least of which was the establishment of a continental missile shield and the military exploitation of the ultimate high ground: space.

Subsequent budgets allocated spending to the research and development of weapons capable of waging warfare in space — intercepting missiles, attacking satellites, and possibly even launching attacks against the ground from space. These programs, such as the NIFIRE satellite, have been the source of debate and political wrangling in Congress, but most observers agree that the trend toward weaponizing space will continue.

Internationally, space-faring nations have held to the position that space should remain free of weapons of combat. While space serves passive military purposes through orbiting observation, communication and navigational satellites (the militarization of space), the overwhelming majority of states have agreed that an arms race in space must be avoided and no weapons should be placed in space (the weaponization of space).

The annual United Nations resolution on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Space (PAROS) passes each year without opposition — demonstrating the powerful international norm in support of maintaining space for peaceful purposes. Only the United States, Israel and a handful of U.S. client states — for example, Palau and Haiti — abstain from supporting the resolution.

The 1967 Outer Space Treaty serves as the international legal foundation for a strong global standard against the weaponization of space, the full realization of which requires a global implementation treaty (or series of treaties).

The Outer Space Treaty declares the legal status of outer space to be a territory beyond national jurisdiction, the use and exploration of which shall be “carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries” and “shall be the province of all mankind” (Article 1).

Article IV specifically prohibits the placement of weapons of mass destruction in orbit or installed on celestial bodies, and declares that the moon and other celestial bodies are to be used “exclusively for peaceful purposes.”

Article IX establishes a positive duty of co-operation among states parties in the exploration and use of Outer Space, including a requirement by any state considering activities that “would cause potentially harmful interference” with other states’ peaceful activities to undertake appropriate consultations. It also provides that states that are concerned about potentially harmful activities of others “may request consultation concerning the activity or experiment.”
Many legal experts believe that the Outer Space Treaty (with its key principles of exclusively peaceful uses, common heritage of mankind and duty to co-operate), combined with the practice of the overwhelming majority of states party to the treaty (including passage of the annual PAROS resolution), have created a strong international legal standard against the weaponization of space.

Others disagree, particularly U.S. government officials, and contend that the treaty only explicitly prohibits the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction in space.

Herein lies the need for further steps to assert the peaceful uses of space, whether it be through the immediate negotiation of a new treaty, or interim measures such as unilateral declarations by states pledging no first deployment, international rules of conduct, requests for clarification of potentially dangerous activities or experiments, or a United Nations General Assembly resolution on the correct interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty.

The aim of such interim measures would be to preserve the sanctity of outer space as a weapons-free environment and to prepare the ground for the negotiation of a global treaty giving full force and effect to the international legal regime for outer space envisaged by the Outer Space Treaty.

Movement on space security would properly be carried out by the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament. However, the body remains hopelessly deadlocked because the United States has been able to use the consensus rule to prevent any substantive work on PAROS, despite the expressed support for such a treaty by Russia and China.

Meanwhile, the Bush administration continues to move forward with its plans to develop space weapons. According to the Center for Defense Information, the Missile Defense Agency received $10.6 million in 2005 to initiate technology development and testing of advanced, lightweight space-based interceptor components.

The Near-Field Infrared Experiment, or NFIRE, is a potential space weapon that received $68 million in funding in 2005. It is scheduled for deployment by the Missile Defence Agency in 2006. The NFIRE satellite is designed to include a "kill vehicle" that could be tweaked to provide an anti-satellite capability. ABC News quoted a senior U.S. government official as saying that with NFIRE, "We are crossing the Rubicon into space weaponization."

Thus the need for immediate measures to prevent the weaponization of space is giving rise to a new international movement of organizations, researchers, public servants and politicians to prevent the weaponization of space. It is clear that both an "inside" and "outside" strategy are needed — that is, efforts within the U.S. must be reinforced by efforts internationally.

The political situation in Canada provides fertile ground for initiating a campaign on preventing the weaponization of space. In his largely unsuccessful effort to sell Canadian participation in the U.S. missile shield to the electorate, Prime Minister Paul Martin has repeatedly pledged his government's implacable opposition to the weaponization of space. And senior officials have repeatedly testified before parliamentary committees that they have made this opposition clear to their American counterparts time and again.

Like no other country, a national debate over missile defence and its implications for the weaponization of space has arisen in Canada. Civil society organizations have mounted a strong public education campaign on missile defence and space weaponization, and as a result at the time of writing the Canadian government has not been able to politically endorse the U.S. missile defence program for more than a year.

With a strong Canadian policy against space weaponization and a well-informed civil society and public, the seeds have been sown for Canada to take a lead role internationally for steps toward strengthening the prohibition against the weaponization of space.
Canada could provide the international counterweight to U.S. plans for space weaponization. This does not mean there are not challenges. The debate over Canadian participation in the U.S. missile defence shield will confound government for the near future, and a decision either way will affect Canada's ability to show leadership on the issue. As well, there is a great gap between the rhetoric of government policy and a detailed understanding of the problem, and a roadmap to its solution.

However, at the commencement of any campaign there will be unknown variables and challenges that have no immediate solution. What is important is assessing whether or not the political environment provides a reasonable expectation of success.

The Canadian Political Landscape

At the commencement of research for this report, two factors emerged that would influence its findings:

• a Canadian government decision on participation in the U.S. missile defence system, and
• the outcome of the November 2, 2004 U.S. presidential election.

The debate on missile defence hinged to a great degree on whether or not the U.S. missile shield would involve space weapons as the original Strategic Defence Initiative did. Opponents of missile defence cited many concerns, of which space weaponization was only one. However, Paul Martin and his ministers defended their interest in participation in the U.S. system by countering that missile defence had nothing to do with space weapons and that critics were merely scare-mongering.

To prove the point, the Prime Minister answered critics of his interest in missile defence by loudly proclaiming his opposition to the weaponization of space — mixing the two issues in the minds of journalists and voters. Later in September, he used his first speech to the United Nations General Assembly to call for a treaty banning the weaponization of space — a message targeted as much at Canadian views as it was at UN delegations.

The government strategy on the missile defence file has largely been one of delay. Recently disclosed documents revealed that prior to the June 2004 election campaign the Martin government was prepared to join the U.S. missile defence program, but opted instead to delay announcing their decision until after the election, fearing it would be a “vote-loser” for the Liberals.

The election went poorly for the Liberals, who barely managed to emerge with a minority government and now depend on one of the three opposition parties to carry a majority of votes in the House. To make matters worse, two of the opposition parties: the New Democratic Party and the Quebec-based Bloc Québécois, campaigned on platforms opposed to joining the U.S. missile defence system, and of course the weaponization of space. The Liberals lost seats to both of these parties, especially in Quebec, where the Bloc Québécois had made record gains at the expense of the Liberals.

Faced with time pressure as the U.S. administration moved toward declaring their continental system operational in the fall of 2004, the Canadian government satisfied what was arguably the chief U.S. interest in Canadian participation and permitted in August the exchange of missile warning and assessment information from NORAD to the U.S.-only Northern Command, the body responsible for operating the ground-based missile interceptors.

The move was clearly a bet on Democrat John Kerry winning the U.S. election. With a more moderate and multi-lateralist Kerry administration, Martin predicted that most Canadian opposition to the U.S. missile defence plan in Canada would fall away. This analysis was based on the assumption, borne out by polling, that much of the resistance to participation in the program (and any other U.S. initiatives) is driven by the overwhelming public dislike of President George W. Bush and his administration's aggressive policies.
Of course Paul Martin's hopes for a Kerry win were dashed with everyone else's. Martin faced growing public opposition to missile defence; successive polls show a majority opposed to it, and his own caucus was deeply divided. On the other hand, his corporate supporters were becoming more fervent in their appeals for him to join the program, and the news media, dominated by missile defence supporters, berated him for "dithering" too long over a decision.

But any remaining political space for Martin to move forward on the issue collapsed when, during his summit in Ottawa and Halifax in December, President Bush unexpectedly and publicly called on the Canadian government to join the U.S. missile defence program.

Bush's remarks answered any question we might still have had about the United States' expectation of Canada's political endorsement of the program (as the NORAD change the previous summer was all that the U.S. technically required to mount their system as planned). The result was that Prime Minister Martin was forced to put out a series of “markers” on Canadian participation where he once again committed Canada to refuse to participate in space weaponization, among other conditions such as no financial or territorial contributions.

At the time of writing, the government continues to send mixed signals on missile defence. Officially, the government continues to "study" the issue, but government political appointments and Canadian military participation in missile defence training and space war games indicate a definite movement in the direction of co-operation with the U.S.

Meanwhile, in the coming weeks the Liberal Party will hold its convention in Ottawa, where the party's membership has submitted at least twenty resolutions opposed to missile defence. Liberal insiders expect the final anti-missile defence resolution will pass with a strong majority, though it will be non-binding on the government.

Procedurally, the government has committed itself to a debate and a non-binding vote in Parliament before a final decision is made by the Cabinet (this condition was forced upon the government by opposition parties in order to pass the Throne Speech). This debate will be held following the Liberal convention, likely sometime in late March or April. Following that, the government will have met its commitments, paving the way for a final decision on Canadian participation in missile defence.

Environmental Scans

As part of this inquiry we conducted scans of political, media and civil society environments within which the space weapons campaign will be organized.

**The political environment**

As we have seen, the Prime Minister has made it clear that it is the government's policy to oppose the weaponization of space. In his speech to the United Nations on September 22, 2004, Prime Minister Martin said:

Space is our final frontier. It has always captured our imagination. What a tragedy it would be if space became one big weapons arsenal and the scene of a new arms race.

In 1967, the United Nations agreed that weapons of mass destruction must not be based in space. The time has come to extend this ban to all weapons.
While the Prime Minister’s comments against space weaponization have provided cover for the government’s apparent willingness to join the U.S. missile defence program, most observers agree that this position is not merely rhetorical, but does reflect his view on the issue.

To date, government policy on the issue goes no further than the Prime Minister’s various statements. There is no formal plan detailing the government’s strategy to prevent the weaponization of space, and the file is divided between the Department of National Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

Within the Department of Foreign Affairs, the International Security Research and Outreach Programme (ISROP) is participating in the Space Security Index (SSI) to provide an analytical framework to assess global space security, using several indicators. The project engages academics and other experts in an annual survey to produce a report on the state of space security.

The work of ISROP provides critically important information and intelligence which could form the basis for governmental efforts to seek a ban on space weapons. The work is supported by the upper levels of the department. However, it remains underfunded and, according to some observers, unprotected by political authorities.

To compound these problems, the government’s ambition to join the U.S. missile defence program — especially within the Department of National Defence — often conflicts with space security work. In fact, the DND was nearly successful in prohibiting the publication of the SSI’s 2003 report for fear of offending the Pentagon.

What is needed is pressure on the government to move the stated policy into action. Opposition members need to be encouraged to hold the government to its commitments and urgently press for a new international initiative to prevent the weaponization of space.

The two parties opposed to missile defence, the New Democratic Party and the Bloc Québécois, have been arguing that the U.S. missile defence program will lead to the weaponization of space, and hence government moves to participate in the program would violate its stated policy. Therefore the issue of space weaponization and space security, given the current political situation, will be linked to missile defence by missile defence opponents.

This provides both opportunities and challenges. Certainly it gives the issue of space weaponization tremendous political currency, and so every statement by a U.S. military official or the release of a space planning document makes headlines in Canada.

The challenge is that discussions of space security will be viewed through a partisan lens, and any effort by the Liberals on the prevention of space weaponization will be criticized by opposition parties as being inconsistent with the government’s intentions in joining the U.S. missile defence system, thereby precluding any possibility of cross-party support for space security initiatives.

Nevertheless, these shoals can be navigated and the missile defence issue can be developed into a discussion of space security. For example, U.S. Ambassador Jonathan Dean was invited to appear before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade to discuss the links between missile defence and space weaponization. His testimony was well received by members of the committee (where the Liberals do not hold a majority), and the ensuing media coverage generated more than twenty newspaper articles and live television coverage of his remarks.1

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1 Ambassador Dean’s visit to Ottawa was organized by the Polaris Institute and Physicians for Global Survival, with the financial support of the Arsenault Family Foundation.
The space security issue benefits from the fact that unlike in the United States, there is little or no lobby within Canada for the weaponization of space (unlike the well-organized defence lobby for missile defence and related contracts). The no-space weapons policy is viewed as a threat by the defence lobby only insofar as it impacts Canadian participation in missile defence.

An eventual decision on Canadian participation missile defence will affect the impact of the public debate over space weaponization in Canada. Should Canada join there will be inside pressure to drop space weaponization concerns, particularly from the Department of National Defence and Canadian industry, but on the other hand the government will be forced to do its utmost to demonstrate that it is not supporting weapons in space. The U.S. program and Canadian government actions will come under closer scrutiny for evidence that Canadian policy on space weapons is being violated.

If the government makes the surprising decision to not join the U.S. missile defence program, the government will try to avoid further worsening of what will no doubt be, for a time, a chilling of relations between Ottawa and Washington.

But as we have seen recently, the NORAD amendment will continue to drag Canada into missile defence and U.S. space warfare developments, provoking a political reaction at home. In addition, the public education that has already occurred has ensured that the issue will remain a subject of interest for a great number of Canadians. In either scenario, it will depend heavily on the ability of public pressure to push the government to take action on space weaponization.

The Media Environment

As in most great political debates, the Canadian media have played an active role in the missile defence debate both positively and negatively.

It is difficult to name even a single newspaper in Canada that editorially has not supported Canada's joining missile defence. Even the left-leaning Toronto Star has joined both the Globe and Mail and not surprisingly, the National Post in calling for Canada's participation. In fact, much of the pressure on the Canadian government has come from the defence lobby, the broader corporate lobby, and the editorialists and columnists of the Canadians news media. Contrast these views with the broad public opposition to missile defence and one can see that the issue touches upon the very democratic decision making of the government itself.
To the degree that the government sends mixed messages on missile defence, we can expect the missile defence lobby will become bolder in their arguments by even questioning Canadian opposition to space weaponization. Recently an *Ottawa Citizen* editorial said:

> Many Canadians condemn military activities by the United States in outer space, but no one has yet made a clear case for why we should be more concerned about Earth’s orbit than we are about its land, sea and air.

There might be reasons to oppose particular doctrines, policies or weapons systems . . . clinging to romantic ideas about space that our potential enemies might not share, however, is simply misguided.

On the positive side, however, the Polaris Institute and others have built relationships with a handful of journalists associated with several newspapers, radio and, to a lesser extent, television stations. News reports have provided some counter arguments against the plethora of pro-missile defence columns and editorials. Having even one newspaper reporter prepared to conduct some investigative journalism on the issue has generated many important news articles with demonstrable political impact. In the last year especially, opponents of missile defence have enjoyed more success in placing op-ed articles. In addition, presentations to Members of Parliament and media work by a succession of foreign experts — Prof. Ted Postol, Lt Gen Robert Gard (Ret), Alan Simpson MP, Ambassador Jonathan Dean — have generated a great deal of media coverage. In fact, the *Toronto Star* in January 2005 noted that, “more and more, it is the opponents who are getting their message out.”

**The civil society environment**

Civil society organizations are vital in building public pressure on the Canadian government to move forward on preventing the weaponization of space. Citizen-based groups and non-governmental research organizations can move quickly within the political environment, generate media coverage, and conduct public education. Leveraged at the right moment, the combination of communications, lobbying and public pressure can make it difficult for the government to retreat from its policy and can even move the government in a desired direction.

**SPACE WEAPONIZATION SURVEY**

To assess the capabilities and interest in mounting a space security campaign within Canada, the Polaris Institute conducted personal interviews with civil society leaders and distributed a 24-question survey through its networks. The Space Weaponization Survey was distributed directly to key organizations, individuals and academics involved in the missile defence campaign. In some cases, the survey was supplemented with personal interviews.

The survey comprised three sections:

1. Personal Information
2. Interest in Space Security / Weaponization of Space
3. Campaign
1. Personal Information

We received thirteen completed surveys which provided us with a sufficient sampling of large and small organizations, individuals, academics and representatives from every region of the country.

2. Interest in Space Security / Weaponization of Space

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description (some chose &gt; 1 category)</th>
<th>Regional Representation:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-governmental</td>
<td>11 North 1 (Yukon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>2 West 2 (Victoria, Vancouver)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy</td>
<td>3 Prairies 3 (Edmonton x2, Winnipeg)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>1 Ontario 4 (Toronto x3, Ottawa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1 Quebec 2 (Trois Riviers, Quebec City)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Atlantic 1 (Halifax)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most organizations described themselves as volunteer-based and without paid staff. It is noteworthy, however, that several of the groups described their organization’s mandate as being entirely devoted to the missile defence / space weaponization issue. But like most other groups they were based on volunteers and had few resources.

2.2 Prioritization

Respondents clearly placed the space weaponization as a high priority. All respondents expected that the issue would continue to be a “high” or “extremely high” priority for them, or increase in importance in the future for them personally or for their organizations. In a few cases the issue held a higher priority for the individual than their organization; however, no respondent described space weaponization as either a low priority or not a priority at all.

2.3 Human and Financial Resource Allocation

The survey asked for estimates of organizational discretionary spending that would be devoted to space weapons campaigns over the coming year. Replies ranged from “none” to a few hundred dollars. Typically, organizations have little or no funds at all to devote to campaign spending on materials, etc. Where a few organization did have staff, the number of staff hours devoted to space security work was very low, representing a very small percentage of the employee’s workload. Undeterred by a lack of resources, respondents had high expectations for the range of activities

![Likely Activities in the Next Year](chart.png)
they hope their organization will be undertaking in the next year on space weaponization, ranging from writing publications to educating MPs. Emphasis was clearly placed on public education efforts and written materials, while conducting their own research and raising funds were not priorities for most. It is noteworthy that nearly every respondent said that “networking with other organizations” on a space weapons campaign would be likely in the coming year. But this was not without limits, as less than half indicated that “joining a coalition” or “initiating a campaign” would be likely.

This seems to indicate that most groups favour a loose working relationship with others, rather than entering more formal arrangements which may be viewed as too cumbersome or a duplication of efforts.

3. Campaign

Respondents had very well developed ideas about possible goals and objectives for a campaign. They were also well aware of the obstacles, but the successful missile defence campaign that most people have been involved with clearly buoys the spirits of those people willing to move on toward a space weapons campaign.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Possible Goals</strong></th>
<th><strong>Obstacles</strong></th>
<th><strong>Opportunities</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Connect BMD to space weapons</td>
<td>Lack of funds</td>
<td>Strong networks built on missile defence and Iraq war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target corporations and profiteers</td>
<td>Overstretched volunteers</td>
<td>Good coverage of missile defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support international and U.S. groups</td>
<td>Public apathy or hopelessness</td>
<td>Celebrities who have endorsed the campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevent Canada from joining missile defence</td>
<td>Canada joining BMD</td>
<td>NDP and minority government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raise public awareness</td>
<td>Too futuristic and sci-fi</td>
<td>The PAROS resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work with NDP, Bloc Québécois and dissident Liberals</td>
<td>UFO and conspiracy theories</td>
<td>A growing peace movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote the Space Preservation Treaty</td>
<td>Lack of NGO agreement on strategy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2 Research

Respondents showed a strong need for research on the topic that they could use for public education, especially in describing the problem and providing basic information about the issue. In terms of research tools, resource lists and media communication templates were also seen as desirable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What research needs to be undertaken on this topic to support your work?</th>
<th>What research needs to be undertaken on this topic for policy makers, journalists, civil society etc.?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Layman’s terms — impact on global stability</td>
<td>Briefings for journalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of existing research</td>
<td>Press releases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Careful monitoring of U.S. and others’ budgets</td>
<td>Resource lists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk to commercial uses of space</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health effects</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3 Messaging

The survey asked respondents to select three messages from a list that would be most appropriate for their organization’s target audience (the public, membership, policy makers, etc.).

Not surprisingly, the messages chosen aligned with similar messages being used on missile defence. As an aside, there is a strong trend to characterize the negative aspects of space weaponization in terms of its global impact above its impact on Canada or other regional tensions.

\[
\text{Most Effective Messages}
\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Message</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adversely affect global security</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start a new arms race</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violate Int’l norm</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tie Canada to U.S.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversely affect Canada’s security</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too costly</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pollute space</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threaten commerce</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reverse CDN policy</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worsen tensions</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moving Forward

Strategies at the Multilateral Level

From our interviews with experts and a literature review, it is clear that there is no consensus on a plan of action at this time. Therefore, any campaign plan adopted must be able to incorporate the simultaneous pursuit of several strategies, rather than prescribing a single strategy above all others.

What follows are strategies whose aim is to achieve a negotiating mandate in the United Nations Conference on Disarmament (CD) to implement the international legal regime for Outer Space envisaged by the Outer Space Treaty, or to create sufficient momentum for a treaty negotiation outside the CD.

- **Intensified informal work in the CD**, particularly in relation to the elaboration of a Code of Conduct, and parallel work to maintain the status quo of non-weaponization through moratoria and declarations of no first deployment.

Note that this is essentially what Canada is doing in the CD. The new element would be to systematically and rigorously relate these efforts to the international legal regime envisaged by the Outer Space Treaty (the Wolter view).

- A step closer to the establishment of an Ad Hoc PAROS Committee would be a **Committee of Technical Experts** (as was established with respect to the CTBT, long before a negotiating mandate was ever agreed on) to clarify legal issues, verification issues and so on. Next would be agreement on the **Ad Hoc Committee** itself, albeit with a non-negotiating mandate to examine issues relevant to the subject of the prevention of an arms race in outer space (the 1985 mandate). Since consensus is required for any type of Committee to be formally established, the U.S.A. can and likely will block such efforts, but they are worthwhile nonetheless to demonstrate that every reasonable effort is being made to move forward and to help build a coalition.
of like-minded states across traditional boundaries working to this end. (The aim would be to build a New Agenda Coalition-type\textsuperscript{2} configuration — but this time in Canada.)

- A \textbf{General Assembly resolution} declaring the “peaceful uses” interpretation of the treaty. This can be done as soon as a majority of states parties are agreed on the Wolter interpretation (or a variation thereof) and, therefore conceivably could be accomplished at the next session of the GA. Leadership must be found to carry this process forward and recourse to the Legal Sub-Committee of COPOUS and/or the Legal (Sixth) Committee of the GA avoided, since traditionally they work by consensus.

- A \textbf{reference to the International Court of Justice (ICJ)} on an urgent basis seeking an Advisory Opinion on the obligations created by the Outer Space Treaty. (Like the General Assembly resolution, the initiation of a reference is determined by a majority resolution, not by consensus. It is a lengthy process, however, unless innovative ways can be found to expedite it.)

- In addition, states parties concerned about potentially harmful activities by other states (for example, the U.S.A. research into space weapons) could \textbf{request a consultation} as provided in Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty. This is essentially a bilateral procedure but the results of the consultation are of interest to all states parties and so could be reported on in the CD. (The U.S.A. might well refuse consultations but the process would still be useful in drawing attention to the obligation in the Outer Space Treaty for States Parties to avoid potentially harmful interference with the peaceful exploration and use of space by other States Parties.)

Any or all of the above approaches would need to be supported by a strong public information and advocacy campaign, not least in order to build support for leadership roles to be undertaken by one or more western states as a first step to building a broad coalition of like-minded states.

**Strategies in Canada**

The scans of the political, media and civil society environments indicate that the conditions in Canada support the establishment of a campaign for space security. In each of the three there are challenges, but previous success in the missile defence campaign indicates that there is potential to make advances. In the political environment, the government’s oft-stated opposition to the weaponization of space along with its minority status opens the opportunity to push the government further toward taking action. In the media environment, opinion-leaders have not closed ranks on the space weapons issue as they have on missile defence, and the state of play on missile defence ensures that space weapons will continue to receive media attention. Finally, the survey of civil society organizations indicates that there is an interested (if not wealthy) base of groups prepared to take action on these issues — especially in terms of public education and putting pressure on local political representatives.

**POLITICAL STRATEGY**

- Opposition parties need to use Question Period to push the government to \textbf{articulate a plan} to prevent space weaponization.

- \textbf{Promote the Space Security Index} and its participating policy experts and academic experts to parliamentarians through informal meetings and briefings.

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\textsuperscript{2} In an effort to reinvigorate the drive for nuclear disarmament in the face of retrograde steps on nuclear weapons policy by NATO, the New Agenda Coalition was launched in Dublin in June 1998, with a Joint Declaration by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden.
• The Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (FAAE) should be encouraged to hold hearings on space security, calling expert witnesses from within the department, academics, and civil society organizations.

COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY
• Build upon links made with journalists in the missile defence campaign to introduce space security concepts and improve the level of background knowledge on the issue.

• Link current events to space security concerns, develop new op-eds and be prepared to initiate interventions (such as on C-25, the satellite control legislation).

• Make use of new research or publications, visits by space security experts, and other opportunities to generate media coverage.

CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZING STRATEGY
• Build upon the successful networks and organizing for the missile defence campaign to engage organizations in the natural follow-on: a space weapons campaign.

• Establish a secretariat to coordinate organizations participating in the campaign and to provide a contact point for journalists, interested organizations, policy-makers, and the public.

• Raise the level of expertise and interest within civil society on space security through popular materials, briefings, etc.

• Work with membership-based organizations such as unions and church groups to develop their own space security policies and corresponding programs of education and action to build strong citizen commitment to these principles.

• Work with students, especially those who have been organizing new campus groups around the issues of missile defence and space weaponization.

Postscript, March 2005

On February 24, 2005 the Canadian government announced that it was not joining the U.S. missile defence program. Missile defence opponents have won an important public policy victory, but cannot become complacent. The strong negative reaction of the pro-missile defence lobby indicates that the issue of military aerospace operations will continue to be a hot issue within Canada.

For example, only days after the announcement newspapers reported on a proposal to place an X-band radar installation on Canada’s east coast. The radar, the same type planned for Alaska as part of the missile defence system, would have the dual function of space monitoring and NORAD support operations — no doubt contributing to missile defence.

A Canadian campaign on space security/space weapons could have the dual role of ensuring that the Canadian government does not contribute further to missile defence “through NORAD’s back door” while pushing the government forward on international measures to prevent the weaponization of space.
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