

Notes

1. John Keane, *The Life and Death of Democracy* (W. W. Norton, 2009), 308–9, 475.
2. Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution: 1789–1848* (Abacus, 1977), 136.
3. Jacques-Guillaume Thouret, *Report on the Basis of Political Eligibility* (1789), from <https://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/282/>.
4. William Doyle, *The Oxford History of the French Revolution* (Oxford University Press, 1989), 124, 318–19, 420; Josep M. Colomer, *Political Institutions: Democracy and Social Choice* (Oxford University Press, 2001), 54–6.
5. Keane, *Democracy*, 249, highlights how tax and representation were commonly linked centuries before the American Civil War.
6. Colomer, *Political Institutions*, 47, 50–2.
7. <http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/04/republican-voting-rights-supreme-court-id>, <http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/26/gutting-the-landmark-civil-rights-legislation/>.
8. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Commonwealth* (Harvard University Press, 2009), 4.
9. Bernard Manin, *The Principles of Representative Government* (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 102–7.
10. Keane, *Democracy*, 292 (footnote).
11. Manin, *Principles*, 97; Colomer, *Political Institutions*, 44–50.
12. Keane, *Democracy*, 189.
13. Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’ in *The National Interest*, Summer 1989; <https://ps321.community.uaf.edu/files/2012/10/Fukuyama-End-of-history-article.pdf>.
14. China’s constitution was accessed here: <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html>; Iran’s here: <http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-info/government/constitution-1.html>; and North Korea’s here: <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un-dpadm/unpan045234.pdf>.
15. In a *Guardian Weekly* review of Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson’s *Why Nations Fail* (Crown Business, 2012), Paul Collier says: ‘China has been widely interpreted, especially by African elites, as demonstrating the benefits of autocracy’ (13 April 2012).
16. Robert A. Dahl, *On Democracy* (Yale University Press, 1998), 69.
17. Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914–1991* (Abacus, 1995), 58; and Keane, *Democracy*, 889, note 7, for recent instances of dictators claiming to be ruling democratically.
18. Anthony King, *Who Governs Britain?* (Pelican, 2015), 76; Keane, *Democracy*, 758; and, for example, <http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/2818/Doctors-are-most-trusted-profession-politicians-least-trusted.aspx>; <http://www.ipsos-mori.com/Assets/Docs/Polls/Veracity2011.pdf>; <http://www.edelman.com/insights/intellectual-property/2014-edelman-trust-barometer/>; <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/13/guardian-icm-europe-poll-2011>.

19. <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/11/04/politics/midterm-exit-polls-1/>.
20. King, *Britain*, 77.
21. King, *Britain*, 39.
22. Stuart Wilks-Heeg, Andrew Blick and Stephen Crone, *How Democratic is the UK? The 2012 Audit* (Executive Summary), 13, 16, 17: <https://democraticaudituk.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/exec-summary.pdf>; see also Paul F. Whiteley, 'Is the Party Over? The Decline of Party Activism and Membership Across the Democratic World', *Party Politics*, 2011, Vol. 17, No. 1, 21–44; Keane, *Democracy*, 753–4.
23. Barack Obama, <https://twitter.com/potus/status/684158987185614849>.
24. 'Embassy Posts go to Obama's Big Donors', *Guardian Weekly*, 19 July 2013; and 'Obama Ambassadors Court Controversy', *Guardian Weekly*, 21 January 2014.
25. Keane, *Democracy*, 841.
26. Russell Dalton, *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Oxford University Press, 2004), 47.
27. Christopher H. Achen and Larry M. Bartels, *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government* (Princeton University Press, 2016), 4–6.
28. Keane, *Democracy*, 752.
29. 'Two-fifths of Political Donations Made by Just 76 People', *Guardian Weekly*, 19 June 2015; 'Here is the Real Billion-dollar Question: When will the United States Repair its Damaged Democracy?', *Guardian Weekly*, 9 October 2015.

and ‘an era of unparalleled triumph’?²¹ Why are we so ambivalently attached to this form of governance – loathing politicians, lobbyists and their ilk, yet horrified at the thought of the still-common alternatives of single-party dictatorship or military junta?

It is far easier to document *what* happened than to determine *why* it happened. Many people have tried to answer the latter question, and the inherent difficulties and controversial nature of historical analysis should not be doubted. With this caveat in mind, the next chapter attempts to trace the roots and sporadic growth of democracy to enable us to better appreciate the remarkable domination of this idea. A clearer understanding of the origins of the problems of modern representative democracy will then provide inspiration for potential solutions.

Notes

1. See Freedom House, and its regular reports on the state of democracy – for example, *Freedom in the World 2012 Report*, http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW_2012_Booklet_0.pdf. It should be pointed out that less than half the nations of the world (comprising less than half the global population) were rated as ‘free’ in this report.

2. But see Keane, *Democracy*, 78–272, who spends nearly 200 pages following the narrow and twisting trail of power-sharing assemblies into Europe and out into the Muslim world and then back into Europe again, through the Church’s struggles and structures, to the appearance of parliaments in the Iberian Peninsula and later ‘aristocratic democracy’ in the Netherlands and Poland in the 15th century.

3. Keane, *Democracy*, 861: ‘It goes without saying that the principle of the equality of people has always been fundamental to the democratic ideal’, although see also 687: ‘single-minded, a priori definitions of democracy lost their meaning [after 1945]’.

4. Manin, *Principles*, 11–12, 29–31. Not that the Athenians of the time would have thought in terms of probabilities.

5. For definitions of democracy, see: Anne Phillips, *The Politics of Presence* (Oxford University Press, 1995), 27, 30–1; Dahl, *Democracy*, 37–8; Keane, *Democracy*, 166, 553–4; and for a conception ‘against the conventional view’, see Clarissa Rile Hayward, ‘Making Interest: On Representation and Democratic Legitimacy,’ in Ian Shapiro, Susan C. Stokes, Elizabeth J. Wood and Alexander S. Kirchner (eds), *Political Representation* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 111–35; and that the purpose of government is to ‘multiply and challenge governmental claims to represent the people’, in Bryan Garsten, ‘Representative Government and Popular Sovereignty’ in Shapiro *et al.* (eds), *Representation*, 91. Note that the claim that democracies ensure the equal right to stand for office is often unfounded; for example, in the US, citizens under 30 years of age do not

have the right to stand for many offices, such as president, and the courts, when challenged, have denied that standing for office is a democratic right.

6. Dahl, *Democracy*, Chapter Four. Freedom House's *Freedom in the World 2012 Report* says freedom entails far more than universal suffrage; a free country 'is one where there is open political competition, a climate of respect for civil liberties, significant independent civic life, and independent media' (http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW_2012_Booklet_0.pdf).

7. John S. Dryzek with Simon Niemeyer, *Foundations and Frontiers of Deliberative Governance* (Oxford University Press, 2010), 21. The 'continued dispute over the key components of what democracy means is actually integral to the very idea of democracy itself'.

8. For a list of works that attempt this, including work by Michael Coppedge and Wolfgang H. Reinicke, Freedom House, and the polity database, see Dahl, *Democracy*, Appendix C, 'On Counting Democratic Countries'. The Economist Intelligence Unit (<https://www.eiu.com/>) also publishes a regular Democracy Index.

9. Dahl, *Democracy*, 197.

10. This data is taken from <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm> (specifically the file <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4v2011.xls>). The population data used for Figure 3 is from the International Database of the US Bureau of Census (<http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/>).

11. Various sub-national entities introduced some minimal franchise of women before this, but here we restrict ourselves to elections to national assemblies of nation states. Note that in New Zealand women could not stand for parliament at this time, so an alternate starting date for full suffrage is Finland in 1906. In the UK, some propertied women achieved the right to vote in 1918, but equality with men was only granted in 1928. It can also be convincingly argued that universal adult suffrage only occurred in the US in 1965 (after the Civil Rights Act of 1964), and in Switzerland it did not occur until 1971. National suffrage rights for all non-citizen permanent residents remain exceptionally rare, with New Zealand since 1975 being a notable exception, although in the EU, suffrage for EU and local elections for non-citizen permanent residents exists. If legitimacy is indeed based on the ideal that every permanent resident of a place obligated by the laws of that place should have input into who formulates those laws, then why are many, such as immigrants, still excluded from this right?

12. Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire: 1875–1914* (Abacus, 1994), 23.

13. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); see also Keane, *Democracy*, 671–5, for an outline and strong criticism of this narrative.

14. Hobsbawm, *Revolution*, 136.

15. Keane, *Democracy*, 503–4; Colomer, *Political Institutions*, 44–54.

16. Hobsbawm, *Revolution*, 140.

17. Keane, *Democracy*, 367 and 378; Hobsbawm, *Empire*, 32, 57–8.

18. Hobsbawm, *Extremes*, Chapter Four, particularly 109–12, 135–6.

19. Dahl, *Democracy*, 145; Hobsbawm, *Extremes*, 141.

20. Keane, *Democracy*, 653–4; 161, 674; and 659: 'the rejuvenation of democracy [in Latin America in the 1980s] came as a grand surprise to almost everyone'. In 2010, just before the outbreak of democratic struggles across

significant parts of North Africa and the Middle East, the Economist Intelligence Unit published the report *Democracy in Retreat* (<http://www.eiu.com>).

21. Freedom House, Inc., *Democracy's Century: A Survey of Global Political Change in the 20th Century* (2003); Dahl, *Democracy*, 180.

Notes

1. Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, sixth edition (Unwin, 1987), 284–5.
2. Keane, *Democracy*, 90–5, 111–24. These assemblies were in no way democratic, of course; the people had virtually no say whatsoever.
3. Keane, *Democracy*, 45; and quote attributed to Pericles on 66.
4. David Van Reybrouck, *Against Elections: The Case for Democracy* (Bodley Head, 2016), 64.
5. Manin, *Principles*, 8, 15, 17–18, 22, 25.
6. Keane, *Democracy*, 153: ‘Muslims effectively built a political bridge that linked the ancient assemblies of Syria-Mesopotamia, Phoenicia and Greece with the coming world of representative democracy.’ See also 170: ‘The first parliament was born of despair’ at the seemingly invincible advance of Muslims into Europe via southern Spain. The role of Christian institutions is detailed on 207, 218, 221, 226–7, including this: ‘Without Jesus, there would have been no representative government, or representative democracy.’ On the Netherlands and Poland, see 242, 257, 467–9: the Dutch philosopher Spinoza (1632–77) was one of the first modern writers to use the term ‘democracy’ in a positive light.
7. Hardt and Negri, *Commonwealth*, 51.
8. Ellen Meiksins Wood, *Democracy against Capitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism* (Cambridge University Press, 1995), 231.
9. Dahl, *Democracy*, 103; Keane, *Democracy*, 184. The undemocratic nature of these parliaments is highlighted on 181–2, 184, 187.
10. Dahl, *Democracy*, 21.
11. Madison quoted in Dunn, *Democracy*, 74–5, 79 (original ‘exclusion’ quote can be found here: <http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch4s27.html> or [http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Federalist_\(Dawson\)/62](http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Federalist_(Dawson)/62)).
12. Madison quoted in Dunn, *Democracy*, 78.
13. Charles Francis Adams, *The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States*, Volume 6 (Boston, 1851), 483–4.
14. See Dunn, *Democracy*, 120, regarding ‘ostentatiously aristocratic’; and Manin, *Principles*, 1: ‘Rousseau saw an immense gulf between a free people making its own laws and a people electing representatives to make laws for it’; and 4: ‘In the late eighteenth century, then, a government organized along representative lines was seen as differing radically from democracy’; and 44: ‘the presence of these considerations in the works of authors whose influence is beyond doubt shows that the contrast between the two methods of appointment [lot and election] retained a measure of importance in the political culture of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries... The cultivated elites that established representative government were certainly aware of them’; and see also 63, 79.
15. Aristotle quoted in Manin, *Principles*, on 43. For the original, see Aristotle, *Politics*, 1294b – for example, <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0058:book=4:section=1294b>.
16. Montesquieu and Rousseau are quoted in Manin, *Principles*, 70, 74, 77.
17. Manin, *Principles*, 43.

18. Madison quoted in Manin, *Principles*, 123; Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire* (Penguin, 2005), 244–5; and Hardt and Negri, *Commonwealth*, 4–20.
19. Quoted in Manin, *Principles*, 109–10, 113.
20. Dunn, *Democracy*, 72; see also Keane, *Democracy*, 83–4.
21. Meiksins Wood, *Democracy*, 225.
22. Keane, *Democracy*, 83; see also 163, 275–7, 200–3, 290.
23. Keane, *Democracy*, 477.
24. Quoted in Andrew Jainchill, *Reimagining Politics After the Terror: The Republican Origins of French Liberalism* (Cornell University Press, 2008), 43.
25. Manin, *Principles*, 98, 100; Colomer, *Political Institutions*, 54.
26. Michel Vovelle, *The Fall of the French Monarchy 1787–1792* (Cambridge University Press, 1984) 208; see also <http://www.open.edu/openlearn/ocw/mod/oucontent/view.php?printable=1&id=1683>.
27. Dunn, *Democracy*, 92, 97, 101.
28. Dahl, *Democracy*, 94; and Meiksins Wood, *Democracy*, 216–17.
29. Adams, *The Works of John Adams*, vol. 6, 462.
30. Keane, *Democracy*, 168, 410–11 lists several examples where the franchise narrowed, and argues against any notion of a Law of Evolutionary Expansion of the Franchise.
31. Dunn, *Democracy*, 72.
32. Keane, *Democracy*, 503–4 and 554–5.
33. Hardt and Negri, *Commonwealth*, 40, 45, 51.
34. Anarchists: Dunn, *Democracy*, 153–4. Emma Goldman's essay 'Woman Suffrage' in *Anarchism and Other Essays* (1917) also states: 'Are we to assume that the poison already inherent in politics will be decreased, if women were to enter the political arena?... Is woman [in places where she can vote] no longer considered a mere sex commodity?'; Victor Hugo, *Les Misérables* (Penguin, 1862, translated by Norman Denny 1982), 890.
35. Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital: 1848–1875* (Abacus, 1997), 91.
36. Dunn, *Democracy*, 154.
37. Hobsbawm, *Empire*, 86; and Hobsbawm, *Capital*, 90–3.
38. Colomer, *Political Institutions*, 49. The 1884 and '85 Acts extended the geographical reach of the Reform Act of 1867.
39. Keane, *Democracy*, 393–4.
40. Manin, *Principles*, 97, 130.
41. Hobsbawm, *Empire*, 86.
42. Hobsbawm, *Extremes*, 139.
43. Keane, *Democracy*, 753.
44. Keane, *Democracy*, 407.
45. Referred to in Manin, *Principles*, 206–8.
46. Keane, *Democracy*, 294–302, 327–41.

47. Keane, *Democracy*, 298.

48. Keane, *Democracy*, 369–71.

49. Keane, *Democracy*, 371, 375, 805–7. Echoes of this justification for war can still be heard today – for example, George W. Bush’s ex post facto portrayal of the war in Iraq (after ‘weapons of mass destruction’ were not found) as part of a ‘global democratic revolution’ (<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A7991-2003Nov6.html>). Many (typically western) commentators also claimed that the ‘Arab Spring’ revolutions of 2010 onwards were driven by the demand for democracy. However, the popular cry on the streets of Egypt was firstly for bread. Similar claims were made at the time of the disintegration of the USSR, although a case can be made that hunger had much to do with it – for example, Hobsbawm, *Extremes*, 492: ‘Hunger and shortage lie behind everything that happened in the last two years of the USSR.’

50. Colomer, *Political Institutions*, 54.

51. See Keane, *Democracy*, 524–9, on the secret ballot, but see 913, note 35: sometimes the secret ballot made vote-buying even easier! The arrival of ‘Progressivism’ and various mechanisms to clean up politics is detailed in 345–7 and 354–6.

52. Hobsbawm, *Empire*, 146, but see also 105–7, 148.

53. Keane, *Democracy*, 771.

54. Hobsbawm, *Empire*, 150.

55. Hobsbawm, *Empire*, 149.

56. See also Keane, *Democracy*, 558–65, on the rise of nation states and nationalism, and 569 on its undermining of democracy: ‘the deadliest forces were nationalism’.

57. Hobsbawm, *Empire*, 88.

58. Hobsbawm, *Empire*, 87–8.

59. Bruce Bimber, *Information and American Democracy: Technology in the Evolution of Political Power* (Cambridge University Press, 2003).

60. Hobsbawm, *Extremes*, 111.

61. Keane, *Democracy*, 451–4, 573–8.

62. Keane, *Democracy*, 457, 567–72.

63. Hobsbawm, *Extremes*, 110, 113, 127, 135, 138, 141. That our rulers continued to hold democracy largely in contempt was made obvious by the repeated overthrow (direct or via proxies) of ‘unfriendly’ democracies such as in Iran in 1953 and Chile in 1973 by the US and its allies (Dahl, *Democracy*, 57–8). The audible nervousness with which the 2012 election of members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was greeted, and the acquiescence in their subsequent overthrow, and the outright rejection of the 2006 democratic win by Hamas in Palestine, attests to the realpolitik whereby the desire for allies and stability often trumps that of democracy.

64. Keane, *Democracy*, 729.

65. Keane, *Democracy*, 570–4, and 659 on the ‘grand surprise’ of the rejuvenation of democracy (in Latin America).

rent problems, and conceive of the next step towards a better democracy, only exists because of its past success.

Notes

1. Dahl, *Democracy*, 58; but see Keane, *Democracy*, 796–8, for a scathing critique of this view.
2. Friedrich A. Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom* (University of Chicago Press, 1944), 16.
3. Milton Friedman, *Capitalism and Freedom* (University of Chicago Press, 1962).
4. S. M. Amadae, *Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: The Cold War Origins of Rational Choice Liberalism* (University of Chicago Press, 2003), 188, quote is from 22.
5. Amadae, *Rationalizing*, 159, 17, 175.
6. Amadae, *Rationalizing*, 155.
7. Amadae, *Rationalizing*, 137, 139, 181.
8. Amadae, *Rationalizing*, 31.
9. Michael Sandel, *A New Citizenship*, Lecture 4: ‘A New Politics of the Common Good’ (BBC Reith Lecture, 2009). Transcript: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/rmhttp/radio4/transcripts/20090630_reith.pdf.
10. Amadae, *Rationalizing*, 155.
11. Dahl, *Democracy*, 166, 167, 178.
12. Hobsbawm, *Extremes*, 129, 136–7.
13. Keane, *Democracy*, 412.
14. Even though she probably never said it: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Let_them_eat_cake.
15. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egyptian_Revolution_of_2011: ‘The revolution’s main demands chanted over and over in every protest are: Bread [livelihood], Freedom, Social Justice, Human Dignity.’ And see, for example, <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2013/02/28/54579/the-arab-spring-and-climate-change/>.
16. http://necsi.edu/research/social/food_crises.pdf.
17. Dahl, *Democracy*, 170.
18. Keane, *Democracy*, 728–40, 656.
19. Keane, *Democracy*, 688–93, 706, but see 708: ‘monitory democracy is [not] mainly or “essentially” a method of taming the power of government’. For the network structure, see 697–9, 745.
20. Hobsbawm, *Extremes*, Chapter Nine; see also Hobsbawm, *Capital*, Chapter Two, to note a similar outcome from ‘The Great Boom’ of 1848 to the 1870s.
21. Hobsbawm, *Empire*, 181.

22. Dunn, *Democracy*, 160–70, also 186.
23. Dunn, *Democracy*, 160.
24. Dahl, *Democracy*, 10, 158.
25. Dunn, *Democracy*, 155.
26. Amadae, *Rationalizing*, 31.
27. Keane, *Democracy*, 64.

ican democracy has been hacked... The US Congress... is now incapable of passing laws without permission from the corporate lobbies and other special interests that control campaign finances.⁷³ Who pays the piper, calls the tune, it is said. In Britain, even David Cameron claimed: 'The far too cosy relationship between politics, government, business and money has tainted our politics for too long.'⁷⁴ Admittedly, he was in opposition at the time and trying to score political points.

Unsurprisingly, anti-corruption and populist (anti-elite) movements have proved popular in such an environment. The Five Star Movement in Italy gained around 25 per cent of the vote in the 2013 national elections by calling for existing MPs to 'Pack your bags!'. Claudia Chwalisz, in *The Populist Signal*, postulates that the recent surge in support for parties such as UKIP in the UK is a direct response to anti-elite sentiment and widespread feelings of political disenfranchisement.⁷⁵ The 2016 'Brexit' vote for Britain to leave the EU has been interpreted by many in a similar light. In India, anti-corruption movements and hunger strikes by social activist Anna Hazare in the last two decades have led to the Common Man Party winning 40 per cent of the seats in the 2013 Delhi state assembly election. The rise of such groups has many established parties rattled.

Politics has been captured by corporations, the media, the powerful and the wealthy. Or, rather, it has remained captured, for the claim that it is now captured implies that there was a previous time when it was not, and even the most cursory glance at the history of democracy shows that there never was such a time. The profound shift (in the West at least) of the last 200 years from aristocratic rule to the hesitant appearance and consolidation of representative democracy dismantled hereditary privileges and replaced them with the privilege of wealth. We might not be living in a so-called democracy if this was not so.

It is no wonder that 'politician' regularly ranks as one of the least respected professions in our society.

Notes

1. Philip Pettit, 'Varieties of Public Representation', in Shapiro *et al.* (eds), *Representation*, 66.

2. Pettit, 'Varieties', in Shapiro *et al.* (eds), *Representation*, 69.

3. Pettit, 'Varieties', in Shapiro *et al.* (eds), *Representation*, 71.
4. Phillips, *Presence*, 24–5.
5. Phillips, *Presence*, 5.
6. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS>.
7. Phillips, *Presence*, 23. Also Chapter Four and 31, 62, 40, 175.
8. Hayward, 'Making Interest', in Shapiro *et al.* (eds), *Representation*, 114.
9. Hayward, 'Making Interest', in Shapiro *et al.* (eds), *Representation*, 117.
10. Hayward, 'Making Interest', in Shapiro *et al.* (eds), *Representation*, 118.
11. Hayward, 'Making Interest', in Shapiro *et al.* (eds), *Representation*, 120.
12. Phillips, *Presence*, 78.
13. Hayward, 'Making Interest', Shapiro *et al.* (eds), *Representation*, 119–20.
14. Even if King in *Who Governs Britain?* details 'the collapse of the classic two-party system' in the UK (93). His 'collapse' is the increase to approximately one-third of voters who do not vote for either of the two main parties. However, these votes translate into only around 15 per cent of the seats in parliament (see figure 4).
15. See Dahl, *Democracy*, Appendix A, for more details and other references. There are also semi-proportional systems, and within these main groupings of electoral systems the number of differing permutations is impressive.
16. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), *Voter Turnout in Western Europe* (IIDEA, 2004), 8. See also Rafael López Pintor and Maria Gratschew, *Voter Turnout Since 1945: A Global Report* (IIDEA, 2002).
17. Arend Lijphart, 'Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma', *American Political Science Review*, 1997, Vol. 91, No. 1, 1–14; and Jan E. Leighley and Jonathan Nagler, 'Socioeconomic Class Bias in Turnout, 1964–1988: The Voters Remain the Same', *American Political Science Review*, 1992, Vol. 86, No. 3, 725–36; 'voters are of higher socioeconomic status than nonvoters'. IIDEA, *Voter Turnout in Western Europe*, 19: 'the level of education and average income... is associated with increased electoral participation'.
18. See, for example, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/11/04/us/politics/2014-exit-polls.html?_r=1#us/2014 'Education', 'Income' and 'Race'. Ed Pilkington, 'Key US States Launch Fresh Assault on Voting Rights', *Guardian Weekly*, 3 August 2012.
19. IIDEA, *Voter Turnout in Western Europe*, 15.
20. And not to mention even more radical proposals, such as representatives to speak on behalf of future generations, or on behalf of our natural assets, famously proposed by Christopher Stone in *Should Trees Have Standing?* (Originally published by University of Minnesota, 1972, revised edition by Oxford University Press, 1996).
21. Council Directive 94/80/EC for the municipal elections and Council Directive 93/109/EC for elections to the European Parliament – for example, http://circa.europa.eu/irc/opoce/fact_sheets/info/data/citizen/eligibility/article_7176_en.htm.
22. Richelle Harrison Plesse, 'Paris Gets to Vote on its Pet Projects', *Guardian Weekly*, 17 October 2014.

23. Although these are potentially disingenuous statistics, it makes the point quite sharply. Out of an estimated population of 314 million in the US in 2012, 215 million were eligible to vote (about 68 per cent of the population), of which only 153 million reported to be registered to vote and 129 (133 reported) million actually voted in the presidential election. Of these, 65.9 million voted for the president (21 per cent of the population). Data from <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2012/2012presgeresults.pdf> and <http://www.census.gov/data/tables/2012/demo/voting-and-registration/p20-568.html>. For the EU we assume a turnout of 50 per cent of the approximately 70 per cent of people of voting age, divided by, say, two to three primary candidates.

24. <http://www.constitution.org/jadams/thoughts.htm>.

25. Of those Europeans polled, 55 per cent thought that the gender ratio in parliament should be addressed 'urgently': Gender Equality in the EU in 2009, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_326_en.pdf; 31 per cent of the EU parliament are women, 24 per cent of national parliaments and 11 per cent of the boards of the largest listed EU companies: *Women in European Politics – Time for Action* (2009), <http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=2052&langId=en>; of the top 250 grossing films in the US domestic market in 2011 only 5 per cent were directed by women: http://womenintvfilm.sdsu.edu/files/2011_Celluloid_Ceiling_Exec_Summ.pdf; Sex and Power: Who Runs Britain?, <http://fawcettsociety.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Sex-and-Power-2013-FINAL-REPORT.pdf>.

26. *Women and Men in Decision-making 2007: Analysis of the Situation and Trends* (2008), <http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=2034&langId=en>; and <http://www.ipu.org/wmm-e/world.htm>.

27. <http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/speakers-conference/7824.pdf>.

28. Lazar Stankov, 'Aging, Attention, and Intelligence', in *Psychology and Aging*, 1988, Vol. 3, No. 1, 59–74; and Alan S. Kaufman, *IQ Testing 101* (Springer, 2009).

29. Phillips, *Presence*, Chapter Four: 'Race-conscious Districting in the USA'.

30. <http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/ali-meyer/food-stamp-beneficiaries-exceed-46000000-38-straight-months>

31. Phillips, *Presence*, 171.

32. And we could continue. We could look at the prior occupations of our representatives (they are disproportionately lawyers) or at the genetic pool from which they are selected (in the UK, even this is startlingly narrow), <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/jan/11/commons-mp-expenses-equality-women>; and the Speaker's Conference on Parliamentary Representation recommendations: <http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/speakers-conference/7824.pdf>.

33. King, *Britain*, 48; see also 170, 277, 289.

34. King, *Britain*, 58.

35. <http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/may/04/donald-trump-hillary-clinton-general-election-analysis>; and <http://www.gallup.com/poll/193376/trump-leads-clinton-historically-bad-image-ratings.aspx>.

36. Achen and Bartels, *Democracy for Realists*, 12, 14.

37. Achen and Bartels, *Democracy for Realists*, 3, 11.

38. Achen and Bartels, *Democracy for Realists*, 18.
39. Larry M. Bartels, *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age* (Princeton University Press, 2010), 5; Martin Gilens, *Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America* (Princeton University Press, 2014).
40. Bartels, *Unequal*, 27.
41. Bartels, *Unequal*, 256.
42. Bartels, *Unequal*, 257, 245.
43. Bartels, *Unequal*, 27; see also 161: 'it [is] equally important to bear in mind the extent to which many ordinary citizens fail to translate their broad values and ideological impulses into consistent views about specific policy issues'.
44. Bartels, *Unequal*, 253–4.
45. Gilens, *Affluence*, 70.
46. Gilens, *Affluence*, 81.
47. Gilens, *Affluence*, 83.
48. King, *Britain*, 140, but see 82–7, where he claims that politicians 'are exceedingly sensitive to the state of public opinion'.
49. Bartels, *Unequal*, 252, 279–82.
50. Dahl, *Democracy*, 74, for a list of arguments against guardianship: 'An advocate of Guardianship confronts a host of formidable practical problems...'
51. Hobsbawm, *Extremes*, 305–6, 334–8: 'The cultural revolution of the late twentieth century can thus best be understood as the triumph of the individual over society.'
52. <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-02-26/china-s-billionaire-lawmakers-make-u-s-peers-look-like-paupers>; and 'China's Princelings Storing Riches in Caribbean Haven', *Guardian Weekly*, 31 January 2014; see also articles in 30 March 2012 and 2 November 2012 editions.
53. Dahl, *Democracy*, 113; see also 117 and 178.
54. Gilens, *Affluence*, 234.
55. Bartels, *Unequal*, 287.
56. John Ferejohn and Frances Rosenbluth, 'Electoral Representation and the Aristocratic Thesis', in Shapiro *et al.* (eds), *Representation*, 273–4. And more on 281: 'the distinctive slack in political agency is what makes room for the aristocratic hypothesis'.
57. Dunn, *Democracy*, 154.
58. Hobsbawm, *Empire*, 96.
59. Keane, *Democracy*, 527.
60. 'Embassy Posts go to Obama's Big Donors', *Guardian Weekly*, 19 July 2013.
61. Hobsbawm, *Extremes*, 581.
62. Manuel Castells, *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Volume 1: The Rise of the Network Society*, second edition (Blackwell, 2000), 507.

63. IIDEA, *Voter Turnout in Western Europe*, 19.
64. Manin, *Principles*, 219. See also 220, 232 on his theory that the rise in importance of media skills signifies a change in the type of elite that can win office.
65. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/leveson-inquiry/9227491/David-Camersons-five-secret-meetings-with-Rupert-Murdoch.html>.
66. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/tony-blair/8740530/Tony-Blair-is-godfather-to-Rupert-Murdochs-daughter.html>; King, *Britain*, Chapter Eight.
67. <http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/07/09/revealed-the-93m-city-lobby-machine/>.
68. <http://corporateeurope.org/lobbycracy>.
69. <http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/index.php>; claim made by Politico website reported in *Guardian Weekly*, 26 October 2012.
70. The Serious Fraud Office closed a corruption investigation into a series of arms deals citing “national and international security” and the “public interest” as reasons (<https://www.theyworkforyou.com/lords/?id=2006-12-14d.1711.2>). The Atlantic Bridge scandal resulted from Liam Fox’s use of a registered charity to pursue political activities, which is illegal. See: <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/oct/15/liam-fox-atlantic-bridge>.
71. Keane, *Democracy*, 636; ‘Poll Donations Ban in Brazil’, *Guardian Weekly*, 25 September 2015.
72. George Monbiot, ‘The Rich Worlds Veto’, <http://www.monbiot.com/2002/10/15/the-rich-worlds-veto/>.
73. Al Gore, ‘The Future: Six Drivers of Global Change’, quoted in the *Guardian Weekly*, 15 March 2013.
74. David Cameron, quoted in the *Guardian Weekly*, 26 July 2013. For a list of other scandals see *Guardian Weekly*: ‘Peers and MP Caught up in Lobbying Allegations Scandal’ (7 June 2013); ‘Revolving Door is Revealed as Military Officers Join Arms Firms’ (19 October 2012); ‘US “Dark Money” Funds Climate Sceptics’ (22 February 2013), which details conservative billionaires funding climate denial by funnelling funds through the Donors Trust; ‘Party Donors Dominate as New Peers Announced’ (9 August 2013). Silvio Berlusconi, ex-prime minister of Italy, has faced 33 trials and was sentenced to four years in jail, but it is unlikely he will ever see the inside of a prison cell.
75. Claudia Chwalisz, *The Populist Signal: Why Politics and Democracy Need to Change* (Rowman & Littlefield International, 2015).

tural and technological transformations of its times: first, the spread of railways and the telegraph, and the emancipation of serfs and peasants and rise of the city and factory; then radio and television and the arrival of a mass consumer culture; and finally the mushrooming of the service and financial sectors of the developed world's economies that accompanied the information-technology revolution.

Society continues to change, perhaps even more rapidly than before. Something profound is happening. The Age of the Spectacle – with its strict divisions between performer and audience, producer and consumer, politician and voter – is coming to an end. The traditional one-to-many transfer of information, typical of television, radio and the hierarchical command structures of business, is being superseded by many-to-many and peer-to-peer exchange between autonomous nodes in a network. Social media is challenging mainstream media, the digital (and real-life) sharing economy is transforming individual ownership, and collaborative creation is pushing aside passive consumption. Participation is becoming the new norm. The information technology that first rose to prominence in the 1970s now permeates nearly every facet of modern existence; new businesses and business models are sprouting and the media landscape is experiencing an earthquake as the new age – the Network Age – is born. It is an age of collaboration, of participation, of openness and transparency. How goods are produced, how profit is extracted, how ideas and culture are dispersed, and how we work, live, play and socialise are all changing rapidly. Part Two focuses on this revolution, before exploring what it may mean for a real democracy better suited to life in the 21st century.

Notes

1. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *On the Social Contract*: 'Were there a people of Gods, their government would be democratic. So perfect a government is not for men.' See, for example, <http://www.bartleby.com/168/304.html>.
2. Dahl, *Democracy*, 60.
3. Keane, *Democracy*, xxii; Dahl, *Democracy*, Chapter Fifteen, and 99.
4. Hobsbawm, *Extremes*, 585.
5. Keane, *Democracy*, 823.
6. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Harvard University Press, 2000); Robert C. Paehlke, *Democracy's Dilemma: Environment, Social Equity, and the Global Economy* (The MIT Press, 2004).

mons is one of the best illustrations of network collaboration made easy. Its procedures, processes and decisions are open and transparent, and it is deliberately and emphatically participatory.¹⁷ Anyone with Internet access can click ‘edit’ and contribute to a Wikipedia article. Anyone can look at the ‘talk’ page to see why certain sentences and facts made it into an article and why others did not – and then he or she can also easily contribute to the debate.

Yet it pays to be wary. As a phenomenally successful project, Wikipedia is often used as evidence for a wide variety of theses. A good anecdote will trump the facts every time – as journalists and story-tellers well know – so it is with a degree of healthy scepticism that Wikipedia is introduced as the prime example of a network. One tree does not make a forest, and one website does not make an information revolution.

Wikipedia does, however, share many similarities with open-source software development, (ideal) academic practice and many other online ‘Web 2.0’ processes. The ideals are, of course, often approached imperfectly, especially outside these realms. Corporations and institutions will adopt some of the behaviours while trying to limit others, or will pay lip service to the ideals while in practice undermining them.

The important point, as far as democracy is concerned, is that the several important, overlapping core characteristics common to the most successful, productive peer networks can be interpreted positively. Autonomy can imply freedom and tolerance for diversity; peer can imply respect and equality; participation can imply belonging and deliberation can imply moral outcomes.

These outcomes are, however, far from automatic. As will be shown, networks are not always or necessarily progressive – indeed, they also, almost paradoxically, lead to inequality in closed, biased and hierarchical groups. Further exploration of these common features, and their positive and negative aspects, is warranted. How to structure a network to mesh the positive qualities with good deliberative processes, and achieve legitimate democratic decision-making, is the challenge addressed in Part Three.

Notes

1. Dave Karpf, *The MoveOn Effect: Disruptive Innovation within the Interest*

Group Ecology of American Politics, <https://davekarpf.files.wordpress.com/2009/03/moveon.pdf>. This was later expanded into a book.

2. <https://www.avaaz.org/page/en/>.

3. Quote is from Andy Beckett's book review of Paul Mason's *Why It's Kicking Off Everywhere*. See: <https://www.theguardian.com/books/2012/jan/11/kicking-off-everywhere-paul-mason-review>.

4. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Declaration* (Kindle e-book edition, 2012), 4.

5. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/pdf/int_naomiklein.pdf. 'Alter-globalisation' is a term used by protestors who reject the label 'anti-globalisation': they do not demand a halt to globalisation but want a different kind of globalisation.

6. Hardt and Negri, *Multitude*, 217.

7. Benoît Derenne *et al.*, *G1000 Final Report: Democratic Innovation in Practice* (2012), 95, http://www.g1000.org/documents/G1000_EN_Website.pdf.

8. The point here is that a physical object bearing the message no longer had to be transported from one place to another. All communication – even radio and wireless internet – of course relies on some medium (such as electromagnetic waves), but the 'decoupling' refers to how messages were no longer constrained by the need to transport an object physically.

9. Hobsbawm, *Capital*, 48: 'the telegraph... finally represented the means of communication adequate to modern means of production'; and 216: 'Three types of agrarian enterprise were under particular pressure: the slave plantation, the serf estate, and the traditional non-capitalist peasant economy'.

10. Hobsbawm, *Extremes*, Chapter Seventeen, and 513.

11. Castells, *Information*, vol. 1, 40.

12. The invention of fast-charging, lightweight batteries was also a crucial part of this development.

13. Shirky, *Everybody*, 149.

14. Ha-Joon Chang, *23 Things They Don't Tell You About Capitalism* (Allen Lane, 2010), 37.

15. Castells, *Information*, vol. 1, 382.

16. Searching for 'information revolution' (in quotes) on <http://www.google.com>, and in the book section of <http://amazon.com>, performed on 8 November 2015.

17. This is an overly simplistic outline of how Wikipedia works. For more details, including the various levels of privilege and access bestowed on certain users, see Phoebe Ayers, Charles Matthews and Ben Yates, *How Wikipedia Works: And How You Can Be Part of It* (No Starch Press, 2008).

dethroned, but they have been replaced by the new digital behemoths of Google and Facebook, which have a far more pervasive, and potentially pernicious, access to the details of our lives. Advertising revenue is flooding to these channels, and what constitutes news is also being redefined: truth and quality are being sacrificed to virality – digital business models are based on the number of clicks a story gets, which has little to do with accuracy, relevance or importance.¹³ It is open to debate whether drowning in attention-absorbing clickbait stifles dissent less than authoritarian regimes' typical preference for restricting access to it.¹⁴

Sharing networks such as Airbnb and Uber may be cheap and convenient, but they are making a profit by undermining industries where workers have fought hard for rights, benefits and minimum wages. The 'workforce' of people driving for Uber or cleaning Airbnb apartments are probably not members of any union. In fact, they are not employees but contractors – with no holiday pay, no sick leave or maternity leave, or any other typical worker benefits (although this is being challenged in the courts). 'In modern times we have been mis-educated to believe that consumer choice is all-powerful, but the idea that consumers exercising their sovereign right to choose will always lead to the best outcomes is obviously in the interests of corporations seeking to escape official regulation,' says Steven Poole, reviewing Tom Slee's book *What's Yours is Mine: Against the Sharing Economy*.¹⁵ Networks are not democratic, and network production is not necessarily progressive.

Equality does not arise spontaneously in a network; the reverse is probably true, since networks seem predisposed to inequality and imbalances in power. Not that equality and networks are mutually exclusive either. As will be shown in Part Three, it is *not* difficult to construct a network of equals. However, to institute such a network form of democracy it should be anticipated that the network will necessarily be a highly artificial one – tightly constrained to induce and enforce democratic equality.

Notes

1. Castells, *Information*, vol. 1, 165. See also, for example, David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Basil Blackwell, 1989), especially Chapter Nine, 'From Fordism to Flexible Accumulation'.

2. Shirky, *Everybody*, 40–2; Hobsbawm, *Capital*, 254–5.
3. ‘Fordism’ is named after Henry Ford (1863–1947), the founder of the Ford Motor Company, who was one of the first to introduce assembly lines in the mass production of cars.
4. Castells, *Information*, vol. 1, 257.
5. Jill Treanor, ‘Record Fines for Forex Rigging’, *Guardian Weekly*, 21 November 2014.
6. Castells, *Information*, vol. 1, 302.
7. Castells, *Information*, 295–6.
8. Castells, *Information*, 165, but see also 166–87.
9. Shirky, *Everybody*, 23.
10. Hardt and Negri, *Multitude*, xii. This was the principal point of their book, *Empire*. Or, more awkwardly, in Keane, *Democracy*, 781: ‘joined-up global government’.
11. Hardt and Negri, *Multitude*, 65–6.
12. Dryzek with Niemeyer, *Foundations*, 119, 123, and indeed most of Chapter Six, ‘Governance Networks’.
13. Katharine Viner, ‘Technology’s Disruption of the Truth’, *Guardian Weekly*, 22 July 2016.
14. Hardt and Negri, *Declaration*, 14.
15. Steven Poole, ‘Winners and Sharers’, *Guardian Weekly*, 29 April 2016.

Wikipedia. In an interesting example of self-reference, Wikipedia collaboration is itself governed by multiple policies specifying the ‘rules of operation’ that are themselves other Wikipedia pages subject to similar deliberative, collaborative processes as the ‘article’ pages.²⁰ If you think a Wikipedia policy should be different, you can propose changes, argue your point and participate in the same way as with the articles.

Policy development on a wiki has also been attempted within at least one political party. The Green Party of Western Australia set up a wiki prior to the 2008 Western Australian state election, open to any member of the party, and used it for several years thereafter to develop and discuss state party policy.

It is reasonably easy to dismiss the objection that the intricate legal language of laws and their complex interdependence would render any WikiLaw project infeasible. In the current parliamentary system, although laws are ultimately written by teams of legal experts, this is theoretically a largely technical process. These lawyers are tasked with translating the wishes and desires of the government of the day into legal jargon – it is the detailed outline of policy positions (in widely comprehensible terms) that could be captured by such a wiki-process.

The principal objection to such a process stems directly from the inequalities of power inherent in networks mentioned above. Those with time, energy, technical expertise and the passion and motivation could easily dominate such processes. As already stated, inequalities will generally be exacerbated in an open network. So what kind of participation would a democratic network creating immaterial laws require? It is to this question that we now turn.

Notes

1. Castells, *Information*, vol. 1, 30, 70–1, 78.
2. Charles Arthur, ‘The Dangers of Big Data’, *Guardian Weekly*, 30 August 2013.
3. Castells, *Information*, vol. 1, 31.
4. Hardt and Negri, *Multitude*, 311.
5. Google’s core service, its search engine, makes the ‘crowd’ of websites navigable through the application of its immaterial algorithms (such as its famous patented PageRank algorithm). Even traditional bricks-and-mortar companies, such as Walmart, now sell life insurance and develop projects, such as the ‘Social

Genome Project' of @WalmartLabs, which mines data from Facebook and other social media sites to better target products and advertising. For Walmart, see http://www.huffingtonpost.com/al-norman/the-walmartfacebook-socia_b_1714802.html.

6. Castells, *Information*, vol. 1, 13, 14, 29.

7. Castells, *Information*, 218–26 refers to the 'myth' of the post-industrial society. See also Chang, *23 Things*, 92, 93, 96; and Hobsbawm, *Extremes*, 302–4.

8. Castells, *Information*, vol. 1, 77.

9. It was the development of the technologies of transactions that virtually eliminated transaction costs in finance, making the high-frequency trading by algorithms commonplace, and allowing capital to flow around the planet with exceptional ease – capital mobility being a major source of the higher returns reaped by holders of immaterial financial assets. 'Throughout the 1980s there was a massive technological investment in the communications/information infrastructure that made possible the twin movements of deregulation of markets and globalization of capital,' says Castells, *Information*, vol. 1, 97; see also 102 and especially Table 2.6. The industry has further created an impressive array of immaterial financial products, such as derivatives and credit default swaps, which can only exist because computers can price, track and manage them. Tax havens play a crucial role in the industry: companies transferring high-value intangible assets, such as brands and intellectual property rights, to tax havens have been targeted by campaigners and governments alike. See also Patrick Wintour and Simon Bowers, 'G20 Backs Radical Action on Tax Evasion', *Guardian Weekly*, 26 July 2013.

10. Hardt and Negri, *Multitude*, 174. See also 54, 81 for more on networks, communication, collaboration and interaction; 108 about affective labour; 113 about how the control and production of information has become dominant; and 114 for the growing importance of intellectual property rights and other evidence.

11. Hardt and Negri, *Multitude*, 65–6. See also 107–8 for an elaboration on hegemony as a tendency and more on the characteristics of immaterial labour; and 114–15 for a 'reality check' for evidence of this hegemony.

12. Castells, *Information*, vol. 1, 17: 'Informationalism is oriented [its 'performance principle' or measure of success]... toward the accumulation of knowledge and towards higher levels of complexity in information processing'.

13. Many other transformations are rippling through academia: the 'open science' movement has called for a shift from the public publication of academic results to the open publication of results, often in free online journals such as those of the Public Library of Science. From medicine to astronomy, researchers are heeding the call for 'open data for open science' and sharing raw data freely; OpenCourseWare, the free online publication of university course material for anyone to peruse, and Open Universities (the first of which appeared in the UK), with little to no restrictions on admissions to undergraduate courses, are enabling easier access to education. 'Peer instruction' entails students discussing 'concept tests' in small groups to collectively develop understanding, and Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) extend this concept online. Interactive classes that use peer review and assessment, like those of EdX, have attracted hundreds of thousands of students to individual courses (even if typically far fewer complete the course). At this level of participation, it is impossible for a lecturer to assist students to develop understanding, or undertake the task of assessment: networks of students do both. See, for example, the Public Library of Science: <http://www.plos.org/>; Michael Nielson, *Reinventing Discovery: The New Era of*

Networked Science (Princeton University Press, 2011); Ian Sample, 'DNA Data to be Shared Worldwide for Medical Research', *Guardian Weekly*, 21 June 2013; <http://crts.caltech.edu/> – Astronomers released the entire dataset from their Catalina Sky Survey, stating: 'In the era of an exponential data growth, it is silly to be data-selfish: not any one group can do it all on their own. Sharing data is good.' Eric Mazur, *Peer Instruction: A User's Manual* (Prentice Hall, 1997).

14. Tim Adams, 'Galaxy Zoo', *Guardian Weekly*, 30 March 2012. See also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galaxy_Zoo quotes of the 2 August 2007, Galaxy Zoo newsletter. See also <http://www.zooniverse.org/>.

15. Shirky, *Everybody*, 119, 139.

16. Jim Giles, 'Internet Encyclopaedias Go Head to Head', *Nature*, 2005, Vol. 438, 900–1.

17. Castells, *Information*, vol. 1, 31.

18. Hardt and Negri, *Multitude*, 200.

19. Beth Simone Noveck, *Wiki Government: How Technology Can Make Government Better, Democracy Stronger, and Citizens More Powerful* (Brookings Institution Press, 2009).

20. See, for example, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Policies_and_guidelines.

have participated in a political meeting, then the answer is probably yes. What about everyone else? Would you consider a randomly selected group of people – which included someone your age and gender, with your educational level and from your area – to be a participatory gathering or an exclusive one? Would it make a difference if you knew that you had had an equal chance of being selected?

The key question is one of legitimacy. Perhaps splitting hairs over the meaning of ‘participatory’ is a distracting side issue. In any case, Part Three will address these topics further.

Notes

1. Charles Leadbeater, ‘We are Born to Co-operate’, *Guardian Weekly*, 16 March 2012; see also Richard Sennett, *Together: The Rituals, Pleasures and Politics of Cooperation* (Yale University Press, 2012); and Owen Jones, ‘Inequality is Not a Human Instinct’, *Guardian Weekly*, 28 November 2014.

2. Hardt and Negri, *Commonwealth*, 162.

3. <http://radio-weblogs.com/0110772/2002/10/09.html>.

4. Shirky, *Everybody*, 20, 159.

5. For example, <http://www.crikey.com.au/2013/08/16/newspaper-circulation-results-shocker-the-contagion-edition/>; and http://www.iab.net/about_the_iab/recent_press_releases/press_release_archive/press_release/pr-060313.

6. Marc Andreessen, ‘Why Software is Eating the World’, *Wall Street Journal*, 20 August 2011, see: <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424053111903480904576512250915629460>.

7. Shirky, *Everybody*, 66.

8. See Barry Ritholtz, ‘Smart Investors are Tweeps’, *Guardian Weekly*, 26 April 2013, for the effect of Twitter on journalism and investor trading; Unbound.co.uk is a crowd-funding platform for book publishing.

9. Austin Weber, *Outsourcing the Line*, <http://www.assemblymag.com/articles/84382-outsourcing-the-line>.

10. The open-source operating system, Linux, runs over 90 per cent of mainframes and supercomputers, and although closed-source operating systems dominate the desktop and laptop market (probably around 95–98 per cent), tablets and smartphones present a complicated picture. Android, the most popular mobile phone operating system, is open-source (based on a Linux kernel), and Apple uses a free and open-source operating system (Darwin) underneath many of its most successful products. See, for example, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_content_management_system, and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Usage_share_of_operating_systems.

11. There are many examples listed on <http://p2pfoundation.net/>. For bitcoins and blockchains, see Don Tapscott and Alex Tapscott, *Blockchain Revolution* (Portfolio, 2016), and for the drug reference, see Mike Power, *Drugs*

2.0: *The Web Revolution That's Changing How the World Gets High* (Portobello, 2013). In mental health, see Mike Slade, 'It Helps if You've Been There', *Guardian Weekly*, 9 March 2012.

12. Michel Bauwens, Nicolas Mendoza and Franco Iacomella, *et al.*, *A Synthetic Overview of the Collaborative Economy*, <http://p2p.coop/files/reports/collaborative-economy-2012.pdf>; Rachel Botsman and Roo Rogers, *What's Mine Is Yours: The Rise of Collaborative Consumption* (Harper Business, 2010).

13. Cass R. Sunstein, *Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge* (Oxford University Press, 2006), 19. This book is surely, at least in part, subject to this problem!

14. John Naughton, 'Our Tools Are Failing Us', *Guardian Weekly*, 16 August 2013.

15. Eli Pariser, 'In Our Own Little Internet Bubbles', *Guardian Weekly*, 26 June 2011.

16. <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/apr/17/boaty-mcboatface-wins-poll-to-name-polar-research-vessel>.

erative processes to collaborate and decide on important matters together.

We must, however, be careful. It should be clear by now that there are many pitfalls and risks lurking within peer-to-peer networks. The challenge is to seize upon the positive aspects while being wary of the inherent inequalities and potential difficulties associated with network processes. It will be important to learn together in transparent ways that are respectful of diversity. As will be seen in Part Three, examples already exist whereby networks are constructed to be representative, and deliberative processes can be utilised to incorporate the ideals of equality, participation and mutual respect.

Our laws, governmental policies and societal priorities can be legitimately determined through new participatory mechanisms using processes and skills fast becoming not only commonplace but ubiquitous. Once we realise this, where does it leave our current version of representative democracy? Modern democracy emerged at a time when the telegraph was the best long-distance means of communication, when networks were costly to establish and maintain, and when sending an elected representative to the capital to promote the interests of a constituency seemed like the only option.

This seems no more than a remnant of a past age. We are moving on, and fortunately we have working models of exactly what a real democracy would look like. The communication revolution has made it possible to govern ourselves; the only question is: are we scared of that much freedom?

Notes

1. Melvin Kranzberg, 'Technology and History: "Kranzberg's Laws"', *Technology and Culture*, 1986, Vol. 27, No. 3, 544–60.
2. Todd Davies and Seeta Peña Gangadharan (eds), *Online Deliberation: Design, Research, and Practice* (Center for the Study of Language and Information, 2009).
3. Vincent Price, 'Citizens Deliberating Online: Theory and Some Evidence' in Davies and Gangadharan (eds), *Online Deliberation*, 43.
4. It would appear that the quote is actually a paraphrase by one of his friends; see, for example, <http://apennings.com/uncategorized/we-shape-our-tools-and-thereafter-our-tools-shape-us/>.
5. Shirky, *Everybody*, 105–6, 159 and 67 respectively.
6. Hardt and Negri, *Multitude*, 336, 339.

ate the problems through training or direct intervention. Indeed, the general problem when deliberation is done by self-selecting participants is that the ‘rule of the reasoners (not of reason) is likely to compound existing social inequalities. According to some critics, we can expect a preponderance of the economically advantaged, or men, or those otherwise possessed of cultural capital and argumentative confidence.’³⁶ This issue is surely recognised by all who have attended an open, public forum – and is precisely what random selection can help avoid.

The broad sweep of arenas and processes where citizens’ voices are sought in government decision-making supports the claim made in the OECD’s *Focus on Citizens* that: ‘We are currently living through an interesting period of intense [democratic] experimentation as we strive to create new solutions, fit for the citizens of the new millennium.’³⁷ Even given the imperfect nature of many forays into participatory practices, calls for *less* participation by citizens in the development of governmental policy are today rarely heard.

Notes

1. Dryzek with Niemeyer, *Foundations*, 155.
2. King, *Britain*, 114–15.
3. King, *Britain*, 16.
4. Anwar Shah (ed.), *Participatory Budgeting* (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2007), 5–6. According to The Worldwatch Institute’s *State of the World 2007: Our Urban Future* (W. W. Norton & Company, 2007), 180–1: ‘Between 2000 and 2006, the total number of cities with participatory budgets grew from 200 to roughly 1,200.’
5. <http://www.participedia.net/en/cases/icelandic-national-forum-2010>; <http://g1000.org/en>; <http://www.wethecitizens.ie/>; and see still more examples here: <http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/briefings/snpc-04482.pdf>.
6. Jonathon Franklin, ‘Battle Lines Set as Protestors Press for an Overhaul of Chile’s Political System’, *Guardian Weekly*, 5 July 2013.
7. Alta Fölscher, ‘Participatory Budgeting in Asia’, in Shah (ed.), *Participatory Budgeting*, 244, 246. See also Shah, *Participatory Budgeting*, 45.
8. Quoted on <http://www.participedia.net/en/cases/participatory-budgeting-porto-alegre>. See also Graham Smith, *Democratic Innovations* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), Chapter Two.
9. Smith, *Innovations*, 77.
10. <http://www.participedia.net/en/cases/icelandic-national-forum-2010>.

11. Although 95 per cent of the participants supported the final referendum proposal, and it achieved a 58 per cent approval rating at the referendum, the legislation stipulated that a vote of 60 per cent would be required to change the electoral laws, and therefore no change was made.

12. <http://www.brainscienceeurope.org/>; <https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/book/1856.pdf>; <http://participedia.net/en/cases/european-citizens-consultation-2009>.

13. Dryzek with Niemeyer, *Foundations*, 156.

14. See, for example, Lyn Carson, <https://griffithreview.com/articles/dilemmas-disasters-and-deliberative-democracy/>.

15. Dryzek with Niemeyer, *Foundations*, 27.

16. Peter Reason and Hilary Bradbury (eds), *Handbook of Action Research*, second edition (Sage Inc., 2007), 336. See also <http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/briefings/snpc-04546.pdf>.

17. See <http://climateandenergy.wvviews.org>; and a prior event in 2009: <http://globalwarming.wvviews.org>.

18. <http://participate.melbourne.vic.gov.au/10yearplan>.

19. James Fishkin, *When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation* (Oxford University Press, 2011).

20. See <http://www.circap.org/uploads/1/8/1/6/18163511/eu09executivesummary.pdf>. See also a similar event, Tomorrow's Europe, held in 2007: <http://cdd.stanford.edu/polls/eu/2007/eu-dpoll-release.pdf>.

21. OECD, *Focus on Citizens*, 85.

22. The link between cognitive (or discourse) diversity and socio-economic diversity is not necessarily straightforward, and is explored both in Scott E. Page, *The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools and Societies* (Princeton University Press, 2007), 13, 14, 299, 325; and Dryzek with Niemeyer, *Foundations*, 35–41.

23. Smith, *Innovations*, 81. See also 80–3 for more on this topic.

24. Dryzek with Niemeyer, *Foundations*, 176.

25. John Parkinson and Jane Mansbridge (eds), *Deliberative Systems: Deliberative Democracy at the Large Scale* (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1.

26. John Parkinson and Jane Mansbridge (eds), *Deliberative Systems: Deliberative Democracy at the Large Scale* (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1.

27. OECD, *Focus on Citizens*.

28. For example, <http://www.involve.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/From-Fairy-Tale-to-Reality.pdf>; John Gastil and Peter Levine (eds), *The Deliberative Democracy Handbook: Strategies for Effective Civic Engagement in the 21st Century* (Jossey-Bass, 2005). This paragraph in effect summarises 272–3.

29. A prominent dissenter from the rosy picture of deliberation painted here is Sunstein, *Infotopia*, 12, 55–7, 70, 184; he argues, repeatedly referring to the same three examples, that deliberation can polarise attendees, or sometimes lead to ‘groupthink’. The relevance of his findings to randomly selected deliberative forums is questioned in Dryzek with Niemeyer, *Foundations*, 161. Sunstein’s claim that decisions can be ‘correct’ or ‘accurate’ also presupposes a mythical best outcome from deliberation; most interesting political questions are the result of

complex situations and legitimate alternate policy decisions will exist depending on priorities.

30. Gastil and Levine, *Deliberative Democracy*, 279.
31. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, *Why Deliberative Democracy?* (Princeton University Press, 2004), 179.
32. Fölscher, 'Participatory', in Shah (ed.), *Participatory Budgeting*, 246–7.
33. Smith, *Innovations*, 23, 169; see also 18.
34. http://www.iap2.org/associations/4748/files/IAP2_Spectrum_vertical.pdf.
35. Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright (eds), *Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance* (Verso, 2002). Quote below is from 25.
36. Fung and Wright, *Deepening*, 245.
37. OECD, *Focus on Citizens*, 300.

the next five years. The citizen lottery would become a major event that transformed the lives of the several hundred people selected every year to replace the outgoing portions of various local, regional and national parliaments. These people would suddenly be thrust into the political spotlight; how to deal with this would need serious and careful consideration.

Political parties would become just another civil society group, like existing lobbying and interest groups. Electoral campaigns spending millions of dollars and saturating advertising channels (in countries where this is allowed) would cease. There would be no such thing as donations to parties and candidates, or job offers upon retirement. The representatives would not need to court the media behemoths for favourable coverage. And it would be simple to ensure that one parliamentarian comes from each electoral seat so that there is a continuing connection between one member of parliament and a specific constituency (where this is currently the case).

Not that change of this magnitude will come easily. There are many important arguments to be had, addressed below, and, moreover, political battles to be won and alliances to be built. Furthermore, most ordinary people, if selected to govern, would most likely be decidedly nervous about their new position. If a citizen-legislator takes her or his responsibility seriously, then legislating would most likely be a difficult and stressful few years. No one should assume that governing is easy.

This is a very preliminary sketch of a general idea, the precise details of which will be very important – although one notable bonus of sortition is that the idea is relatively easy to communicate. The remainder of this book fleshes out the claims and evidence in support of the legitimacy and viability of sortition, and addresses the moral, practical and strategic implications entailed by such a change.

Notes

1. Fishkin, *People*, 119; see also <http://participedia.net/en/methods/deliberative-polling>.

2. Sean Gray, *Deliberative Polling*, <http://participedia.net/en/methods/deliberative-polling>.

3. From www.AmericaSpeaks.org (now closed down). But see, for example, <http://www.bancroftandcompany.com/weekly-column/resolving-the-budget-deficit-will-take-more-than-just-cuts.html>.

4. Fishkin, *People*, 112.
5. Harm van Dijk and Jerphaas Donner, private communication.
6. Chwalisz, *Populist*, 90.
7. Matthew Flinders, Katie Ghose, Will Jennings, *et al.*, *Democracy Matters: Lessons from the 2015 Citizens' Assemblies on English Devolution* (<https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/file/2717/download?token=dcPseSyF>), 40. See also <http://citizensassembly.co.uk/>.
8. Gutmann and Thompson, *Deliberative Democracy*, 129.
9. Dahl, *Democracy*, 113 (emphasis in original).
10. Gutmann and Thompson, *Deliberative Democracy*, 114.
11. Quoted in Smith, *Innovations*, 73.
12. Smith, *Innovations*, 73. See also Lyn Carson and Brian Martin, *Random Selection in Politics* (Praeger, 1999) and David Van Reybrouck, *Against Elections: The Case for Democracy* (The Bodley Head, 2016).
13. Gutmann and Thompson, *Deliberative Democracy*, 7, 3, 101, 116.
14. Gutmann and Thompson, *Deliberative Democracy*, 80.
15. Phillips, *Presence*, 40.
16. Keane, *Democracy*, 18, 29.
17. Aristotle, *Politics*, 1294b – for example, <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0058:book=4:section=1294b>.
18. López Pintor and Gratschew (eds), *Voter Turnout*, 92.

made in the late 1990s by the UK think-tank Demos for reform of the House of Lords. The new Democracy Foundation suggests a similar change for the Australian Senate, and Erik Olin Wright has, in *Envisioning Real Utopias*, made a comparable proposal for the US.⁵⁷ This may make sense strategically, as a first step, so that people can experience sortition and gain confidence that it works. But it should not be the end point. Why only allow ordinary people to ‘keep the bastards honest’, as the long-lived slogan of the Australian Democrats, who had members in the Australian Senate for 30 years, claimed?⁵⁸ Let us get rid of ‘the bastards’ altogether and let the people decide. That is what democracy originally entailed, and in the 21st century we have the technology and capacity to achieve it on the scale of nations and beyond. In a truly representative system, no senate is required – although if its purpose is to protect the rights of individual states in a federation, and people continue to consider this important, then a randomly selected senate could also be instituted. Another option would be for a ‘double check’ to be carried out, whereby vote counts in a unitary legislative chamber include a second count to ensure that a majority of representatives from each state agree.

If it is true, as Churchill famously claimed, ‘that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried’, then our principal measure of the efficacy of sortition over electoral democracy is not if it would be perfect, but if it would be less bad.⁵⁹ Sortition is not a panacea, but the freedom of random selection should drastically reduce the capture and distortion of our political system by powerful groups. Money and the need for donations would cease to disrupt the selection process. Political parties would become mere lobby groups. If half of parliament were composed of women, had many young adults and was dominated by people from working-class backgrounds, it would produce very different legislation. Policy would progress along moral lines instead of ideological ones. Difficult issues would be addressed, and sorted out, with sortition.

Notes

1. Dahl, *Democracy*, 71.
2. Hardt and Negri, *Declaration*, 70.
3. Manin, *Principles*, 137.

4. Anthony King and Ivor Crewe, *The Blunders of our Governments* (Oneworld, 2013).
5. Fölscher, 'Participatory', in Shah (ed.), *Participatory*, 248.
6. Manin, *Principles*, 32, 10.
7. Flinders, Ghose, Jennings, *et al.*, *Democracy Matters*, 3.
8. Dryzek with Niemeyer, *Foundations*, 158. See also Lyn Carson, *Ignorance and Inclusion, Mr Jefferson, Might be Good for Democracy* (Working Paper series – United States Studies Centre, University of Sydney, Australia, 2009).
9. Flinders, Ghose, Jennings, *et al.*, *Democracy Matters*, 56.
10. Yves Sintomer, 'Random Selection, Republican Self-Government, and Deliberative Democracy', *Constellations*, 2010, Vol. 17, No. 3, 472–87.
11. Page, *Difference*, 10, 137, 328.
12. Page, *Difference*, 335.
13. Hélène Landemore, *Democratic Reason: Politics, Collective Intelligence, and the Rule of the Many* (Princeton University Press, 2012), 1, 7.
14. Landemore, *Democratic Reason*, 117.
15. Dahl, *Democracy*, 69.
16. Alex Zakaras, 'Lot and Democratic Representation: A Modest Proposal', *Constellations*, 2010, Vol. 17, No. 3, 462; and Manin, *Principles*, 85.
17. Dryzek with Niemeyer, *Foundations*, 21, and Chapter Two in general presents a clear outline of the issue of legitimacy.
18. Smith, *Innovations*, 6, and Chapter Two, especially 12–14.
19. This is but a tiny sample of the analysis: <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/explaining-the-vote-for-brexit/>;
<http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/brexit-theresa-may-when-article-50-why-did-people-vote-wages-housing-market-young-people-a7141206.html>;
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/fe5c6b4e-32f8-11e6-bda0-04585c31b153.html#axzz4JkQmFooP>;
<http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/staggers/2016/07/four-ways-anti-immigration-vote-won-referendum-brexit>;
<http://www.resolutionfoundation.org/publications/the-important-of-place-explaining-the-characteristics-underpinning-the-brexit-vote-across-different-parts-of-the-uk/>.
20. Jonathan Freedland, 'A Day of Complete Despair for the 48%', *Guardian Weekly*, 1 July 2016.
21. King, *Britain*, 241–50, quotes are from 250 and 245.
22. Hayward, 'Making Interest', Shapiro *et al.* (eds), *Representation*, 120.
23. Phillips, *Presence*, 156–60 has an interesting discussion on accountability, legitimacy and the connection of a politics of presence with deliberative democracy.
24. Phillips, *Presence*, 56, 80, 149, 163–4.
25. Smith, *Innovations*, 191, also 92.
26. On punishing and rewarding, see the discussion of the 'agency problem' in politics in Ferejohn and Rosenbluth, 'Electoral Representation', in Shapiro *et al.* (eds), *Representation*, 273–7.

27. <http://www.theage.com.au/comment/fearful-leaders-cant-see-voters-see-truth-20130902-2t10i.html>.
28. King, *Britain*, 75.
29. Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (Beacon Press, 1964). See, for example, <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/marcuse/works/one-dimensional-man/ch01.htm>.
30. For example, Obama's 2012 slogan, 'Change we can believe in', and the accompanied chant of 'Yes we can'. Or in Australia, Howard's, and later Abbott's, 'Turn back the boats' in regards to the supposed wave of refugees coming by boat to Australia.
31. Achen and Bartels, *Democracy for Realists*, 15.
32. Achen and Bartels, *Democracy for Realists*, 16.
33. Achen and Bartels, *Democracy for Realists*, 18.
34. See references Chapters Six to Eight.
35. See references in Chapter Three.
36. Dryzek with Niemeyer, *Foundations*, 15, 11.
37. Paul Collier, *Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places* (Bodley Head, 2009).
38. John Parkinson, *Deliberating in the Real World: Problems of Legitimacy in Deliberative Democracy* (Oxford University Press, 2006), 80, quoted in Smith, *Innovations*, 97–8 (emphasis in original).
39. Derenne *et al.*, *G1000*, 14, 7.
40. Hardt and Negri, *Commonwealth*, 191; and Hardt and Negri, *Multitude*, 212.
41. For example, <http://yourview.org>, <http://liquidfeedback.org> (used by various EU Pirate Parties), and many others.
42. Chang, *23 Things*, 244.
43. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/23/magazine/dont-blink-the-hazards-of-confidence.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
44. Quoted in Sintomer, 'Random Selection', 482.
45. Lyn Carson, 'Investigation of (and Introspection on) Organizer Bias', in Lyn Carson, John Gastil *et al.* (eds), *The Australian Citizens' Parliament and the Future of Deliberative Democracy* (Penn State University Press, 2013).
46. Phillips, *Presence*, 162.
47. Smith, *Innovations*, 84, 87–8, and 146 for the 'theme team' in AmericaSpeaks events.
48. Flinders, Ghose, Jennings, *et al.*, *Democracy Matters*, 39.
49. Dahl, *Democracy*, 105, 116–17. See also Gutmann and Thompson, *Deliberative Democracy*, 31 for a discussion on 'the disadvantages of direct democracy'.
50. Keane, *Democracy*, 585, 676.
51. <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-13/white-share-of-u-s-population-drops-to-historic-low.html>.

52. Hardt and Negri, *Multitude*, 237–8.
53. King, *Britain*, 176, but see also 165, 169, 174–9.
54. Keane, *Democracy*, 890. Note 19 gives many details about this executive in ancient Athens.
55. <http://web.archive.org/web/20070704030028/http://www.makeitanissue.org.uk/OmPolitical.pdf>.
56. Derenne *et al.*, *G1000*, 97; see also assignment by lot: 95.
57. Anthony Barnett and Peter Carty, *The Athenian Option: Radical Reform for the House of Lords* (Imprint Academic, 2008); <http://www.newdemocracy.com.au/alternatives/structural/item/98-a-citizens-senate>; Erik Olin Wright, *Envisioning Real Utopias* (Verso, 2010).
58. In Argentina ‘*Que se vayan todos!*’ (‘Throw them all out!’) was a popular chant after the 2001 debt crisis.
59. Quoted in Keane, *Democracy*, 581.

ties cease, other than those who feed or work in the zoo of our current political system, or benefit inordinately from its persistence?

Will professional career politicians disappear, and the term ‘politician’, like the term ‘scribe’, become an artefact, to be studied in history departments?

We can only hope.

Or more: we can actively strive to make it happen.

Notes

1. Phillips, *Presence*, 83.
2. Keane, *Democracy*, 867.
3. Keane, *Democracy*, 856 (emphasis in original).
4. Hardt and Negri, *Commonwealth*, 372.
5. Shirky, *Everybody*, 59.
6. Shirky, *Everybody*, 66.
7. Shirky, *Everybody*, 292.
8. Flinders, Ghose, Jennings, *et al.*, *Democracy Matters*, 41.
9. Derenne *et al.*, *G1000*, 104; OECD, *Focus on Citizens*, 304 and 17 (bold emphasis in the original).

or manager. After serving a five-year term, she or he will go back to normal life, and – who knows? – maybe you will be selected to serve next. This should not be a recipe for increased levels of apathy. Even as it removes the act of voting, it replaces it with something sorely lacking in politics: the possibility of empathy.

There will still be decisions people disagree with. Civil society will continue to flourish. Uproar, outrage and protest will continue to occur. It will still be up to all of us, and an active civil society and independent media, to scrutinise decisions and work to guarantee moral outcomes that address and correct injustices. In our current climate, this is an urgent necessity.

Notes

1. Keane, *Democracy*: this is his favourite phrase for describing the fundamental purpose of democracy – for example, xii, 109, 120, etc.
2. Hardt and Negri, *Commonwealth*, 376.
3. Gutmann and Thompson, *Deliberative Democracy*, 91, 94, 123, 126–7, 131. See also 152 for a description of reciprocity; and 57 for the moral and political provisionality of decisions.
4. Manin, *Principles*, 91.
5. Amadae, *Rationalizing*, 137.
6. Václav Havel, http://www.vaclavhavel.cz/showtrans.php?cat=projevy&val=285_aj_projevy.html&typ=HTML.

participatory and empowered workplaces are possible. Within families, courses such as Parent Effectiveness Training (which began in the 1960s) strive to plough a middle path between authoritarian and permissive parenting – between total command and anything goes. Their principal technique is ‘active listening’, and the justifying and giving of mutually acceptable reasons and probable consequences – or deliberation by any other name.²¹ In the book *Deliberative Systems* (edited by Parkinson and Mansbridge), deliberative democracy is said to be based on ‘the intuition that being pressured into doing something and being persuaded into it are different. Deliberation is about genuine persuasion, not pressure.’²² George Lakoff, in *The Political Mind*, outlines a direct analogy between mental models of idealised families and mental models of idealised national life, contrasting a Strict Father Model of appeals to authority and obedience with a Nurturing Parent Model appealing to explanation, care and restitution.²³ The parallels of the latter model with deliberative democracy are striking. If corporal punishment of children is taken as a primary example of strict authoritarian parenting, then every step away from it is hopefully a small step towards reasoned deliberation.

Not that anyone should expect a deliberative society to be an inevitable outcome of the emerging peer-to-peer network culture. The seed may have been planted, but it will need protection and nurturing to germinate. Deliberative democracy is more than a set of rules or procedures; it is a cultural disposition, and thus it is potentially a generational project. As stated above, it must bloom at home, at work and in our schools – a deliberative society will be created when we treat our children, our partners and our students, and bosses treat their employees, deliberatively.

Each time a parent, teacher, guardian or manager refuses to command, or refuses to reply to a ‘Why?’ with a ‘Because I said so’, and instead takes the time to offer intelligible justifications for decisions and listen to the responses – only then will the cultural change be well and truly under way. Only then will we be ready to legislate for ourselves.

Notes

1. Chris Rose, *How to Win Campaigns: Communications for Change*, second edition (Oneworld, 2010), 6.

2. The quote is from an extract from the book:
<http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/29/why-elections-are-bad-for-democracy>.
3. Van Reybrouck, *Against Elections*, 104.
4. Keane, *Democracy*, 759–61, lists several jokes and satirical election campaigns. Darth Vader campaign is here: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/10/30/yes-darth-vader-ran-for-office-in-ukraine-unfortunately-its-no-joke/>.
5. Keane, *Democracy*, 813.
6. Keane, *Democracy*, 866.
7. Lyn Carson and Ron Lubensky, ‘Appointments to Boards and Committees Via Lottery, a Pathway to Fairness and Diversity’, *Journal of Public Affairs*, 2009, Vol. 9, 87–94.
8. Quoted in Keane, *Democracy*, 817.
9. Quoted in Hardt and Negri, *Commonwealth*, 310.
10. <http://www.publicdeliberation.net/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1238&context=jpd>.
11. <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/mar/09/climate-fight-wont-wait-for-paris-vive-la-resistance>.
12. Erik Olin Wright, *Envisioning Real Utopias* (Verso, 2010), 20.
13. Wright, *Envisioning*, 370.
14. T.M. Thomas Isaac and Patrick Heller, ‘Democracy and Development: Decentralized Planning in Kerala’, in Fung and Wright (eds), *Deepening Democracy*; and <http://quod.lib.umich.edu/j/jii/4750978.0016.203/-participatory-democracy-in-ecuador?rgn=main;view=fulltext>.
15. Saul Alinsky, *Rules for Radicals* (Random House, 1971), quoted in Rose, *Campaigns*, 6.
16. The first quote is from President Obama: <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/14/us/politics/obama-state-of-the-union-republicans-democrats.html>.
17. <http://www.the23million.com.au/> (now closed down).
18. Keane, *Democracy*, 727.
19. Gutmann and Thompson, *Deliberative Democracy*, 35.
20. Carole Pateman, *The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism, and Political Theory* (Stanford University Press, 1989), 222.
21. Thomas Gordon, *Parent Effectiveness Training: The Proven Program for Raising Responsible Children* (Harmony, 2000).
22. Parkinson and Mansbridge, *Deliberative Systems*, 18.
23. George Lakoff, *The Political Mind: A Cognitive Scientist’s Guide to Your Brain and Its Politics* (Penguin, 2009).

Notes

1. John Boswell, Simon Niemeyer and Carolyn Hendriks, 'Julia Gillard's Citizens' Assembly Proposal for Australia: A Deliberative Democratic Analysis', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 48, No. 2, 164–78.
2. John Boswell, Simon Niemeyer and Carolyn Hendriks, 'Julia Gillard's Citizens' Assembly Proposal for Australia: A Deliberative Democratic Analysis', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 48, No. 2, 164–78.
3. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/uk/brett-hennig/irish-citizens-assembly-on-abortion-democratisation-or-dodging-responsibility>.
4. See, for example, Bill Moyer's *The Movement Action Plan* (second edition, 1986) for a model of popular social change – for example, from [http://www.turning-the-tide.org/files/Moyers Movement Action Plan.pdf](http://www.turning-the-tide.org/files/Moyers%20Movement%20Action%20Plan.pdf).
5. R. T. Pierrehumbert, 'Climate Change: A Catastrophe in Slow Motion', *Chicago Journal of International Law*, 2006, Vol. 6, No. 2.
6. Naomi Klein, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism* (Penguin, 2008).
7. Milton Friedman, *Capitalism and Freedom: Fortieth Anniversary Edition* (University of Chicago Press, 2009), xiii–xiv.
8. Hardt and Negri, *Declaration*, 99–100.

redistribution of wealth to its current pitiful levels, and underfunding access to health, clean water and education for much of humanity, is a necessary evil if our own national economies are to continue thriving and our standard of living is to be maintained?

The increased legitimacy of sortition will lead to more justice and more equality. It is time for ordinary people to deliberate together, with experts informing them and independent facilitators helping them to arrive at the moral crux of decisions, and from there to decide what the best policies are to guide us collectively. Let us harness the ideals of the information revolution and use the power of networks to realise the remarkable promise of democracy whispered in the ear of society throughout the ages: that we can decide what the good life is, together, as equals.

Notes

1. Fung and Wright (eds), *Deepening Democracy*, Chapter Four.
2. Hardt and Negri, *Declaration*, 100.
3. Fung and Wright (eds), *Deepening Democracy*, 26.
4. Michael I. Norton and Dan Ariely, 'Building a Better America – One Wealth Quintile at a Time', *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 2011, Vol. 6, 9; also see the related YouTube video: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPKKQnijnsM> that had over 16 million views by January 2015.
5. Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, *The Spirit Level: Why Greater Equality Makes Societies Stronger* (Bloomsbury Press, 2010), 232.
6. Wilkinson and Pickett, *The Spirit Level*, 229.
7. <http://www.ipsos-mori.com/Assets/Docs/Polls/ipsos-mori-rss-kings-perils-of-perception-topline.pdf>. However, there are some strange figures in these results: 24 per cent declined to guess how many immigrants there are in the UK, while the second-largest category (12 per cent) guessed that more than 51 per cent of the population were not born in the UK.
8. <https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/3466/Perceptions-are-not-reality-10-things-the-world-gets-wrong.aspx>.