OUTWARD TO THE WORLD

HOW THE LEFT’S FOREIGN POLICY CAN FACE THE FUTURE

Foreword by Hilary Benn MP, Introduction by Mark Leonard  Fabian Ideas 641
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Outward to the World
How the left’s foreign policy can face the future

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About the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

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In the 1950s, as Labour struggled to recover from the defeat of Clement Attlee’s post-war government, Richard Crossman observed that the party had lost its way not only because it lacked a map, “but because it thinks maps unnecessary for experienced travellers.”

As Labour seeks again to find its sense of direction following two humbling election defeats, there is now no more important area for clear and fresh thinking than in our approach to foreign affairs. Some take the view that it doesn’t matter too much what oppositions say about the world beyond our shores: there are ‘no votes in foreign policy’. I profoundly disagree. In this parliament, foreign policy is at the forefront of political debate. If Labour is to become the party of government again, voters need to be clear that we will stand up for British interests and our values abroad.

The party is now rightly having a wide-ranging debate on foreign and defence policy. It will examine some difficult issues – like the nuclear deterrent – that are crucial to the party’s long-term renewal, but it also needs to look at the changing world around us.

First, we must apply Labour’s values to the world of today. Labour played a huge role in creating the rules-based international order after the second world war, and we must remain committed to the UN, NATO, and other global institutions and to remaining in the EU. The forthcoming EU
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referendum will be the biggest choice the British people have faced about our place in the world for 40 years; are we going to turn inwards or remain an outward-facing nation?

Interdependence defines the condition of humankind today more clearly than at any other time in human history. Our task is to balance the necessity for international co-operation – whether on climate change or financial regulation or peace and security – with the thirst that people have for power to be devolved to local communities so that they can take more decisions for themselves. There are voices for isolationism in British and European politics. Labour should resist them.

Second, British foreign policy over the last decade has been conducted in the long shadow of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Our foreign policy must learn the lessons of that conflict, but not be shackled by it. It should not be a reason to retreat from the world and our responsibilities in it, or to rely on others to fight for us.

Third, we face a host of new and emerging challenges – from cyber-attacks to migration and from global warming to the threat of Daesh. To address them we to need to look outwards to the new global powers and emerging economies while reinforcing our relationship with existing allies.

The Conservative party’s approach to foreign policy has diminished Britain in the eyes of the world. Defined by inward-looking nationalism and isolationism, it has reduced our standing with friends and allies. David Cameron has retreated from European co-operation, reversed his promise to show leadership on climate change, and has too often seen foreign policy as a sales opportunity.

This is why it is more critical than ever that the British left sets out a forward-looking plan for Britain’s role in the world based on: democracy, human rights, development and the fight against poverty. And we need to inspire the country
and the world by showing how change can happen: to be, as Labour’s 1945 manifesto put it, “practical-minded men and women”.

That is the task we face and I hope that these essays will play an important part in encouraging that debate and developing Labour’s foreign policy at a critical time for our party and our country.
Today’s headlines read like a catalogue of the drawbacks of globalisation: an uncontrolled wave of people fleeing their homes, terrorist attacks, the travails of the Chinese economy and the eurozone, the threat of cyber attacks.

But while British politics is increasingly shaped by these forces, the left is neither able nor willing to shape the public debate. After shrinking its horizons to ‘one nation’ under Ed Miliband, the Corbyn era has seen foreign policy emerge as the key battleground in a proxy war between two tribes. The British left is increasingly torn between escapist identity politics on one side and sullen declarations that there is no alternative on the other.

What is too often lost is a sense of idealism or an account of the future to which the political left should be an answer. Even before Michael Young penned the 1945 manifesto, the idea of facing the future was part of the Labour party’s DNA. But for over 10 years, Labour’s internal foreign policy debate has been defined more by the ghosts of yesterday than the challenges of tomorrow.

Two events have cast long shadows: the electoral defeat of 1983 and the Iraq war of 2003. Most of the Labour establishment are traumatised by Labour’s last period in opposition: the fate of a party that met the public with a manifesto of unilateral nuclear disarmament, EEC withdrawal, pacifism
and anti-Americanism. When the establishment speaks it can sometimes sound to party members as if it is guided less by conviction than by a sense that membership of NATO and the EU and the renewal of Trident are electoral necessities rather than principled strategies argued for from first principles.

The trauma of the new members and supporters is related to Labour’s time in power rather than opposition. They still recoil from the disaster of the Iraq war and Tony Blair’s cosy-ing up to George W Bush. That relationship poisoned the legacy of his ‘ethical foreign policy’ which had persuaded the left to swap pacifism for humanitarian intervention, and euroscepticism for European-style social democracy. But rather than trying to influence the conduct of global affairs to advance these values, the left are at their happiest chanting the slogan of the Stop the War campaign – ‘not in my name’. This ‘clean hands’ doctrine of the post-Iraq camp sees geopolitics as a spectator sport.

Long after the bipolar world of 1983 and the unipolar one of 2003 have become chapters in history books, their legacies continue to shape the British left’s debates. But neither prism does much to help us understand the dilemmas in the global disorder of 2015.

The world of today

This collection of essays is designed to do just that. Rather than wallowing in the recent past, it tries to recognise the challenges of the future and draw the outlines of a practical but progressive foreign policy from first principles. There are three major themes which run through these essays.

First, we need to come to terms with a new world in which a multitude of powers are competing with each other through hybrid wars, economic sanctions and naval manoeuvring. For the first time in decades, the United States
is not in the lead in providing a solution to the chaos of the European neighbourhood.

Washington has withdrawn from Iraq and Afghanistan and an Islamist state is being carved out of Iraq and Syria under its nose. Local powers such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey – coupled with Russian airpower – are more important to a region whose post-colonial borders are violently dissolving than anything dreamt up in Washington.

And while Russian special forces destabilise Ukraine, it is Angela Merkel and François Hollande rather than Barack Obama who lead the negotiations with Vladimir Putin. Europeans are struggling not just with the need to respond to Russia’s illegal annexation of Ukraine, but to rethink the idea of European order now that Putin has buried the assumption that an ever-expanding EU and NATO could replace the rule of power with a single law-based community that spans the continent.

This situation makes a nonsense both of the Labour establishment’s traditional Atlanticism and the knee-jerk anti-Americanism of the Corbynistas. Instead of obsessing about how closely to associate with Washington, we need to think both about how to focus American attention on issues we care about, while trying to develop our own policies through new relationships with the middle powers that are making the weather in the regions we care about the most. In the Middle East, that means working among Europeans to de-escalate the sectarian war between Iran and Saudi Arabia while recasting our relationship with a Turkey that is increasingly central to managing the refugee crisis.

The major challenge in Eastern Europe is not to turn Russia into a country like us, but to develop a structure for European order that produces a Russia we can live with. There are some useful lessons that Europe can learn from how the US manages its relationship with China – combining a mixture
of balancing, engaging and shaping. Our membership of NATO and our energy policies will be critical for deterrence and providing security guarantees for the territorial integrity of its member states and outspoken defence for the territorial integrity of states on the European continent. We should continue to engage with Russia on issues of joint interest such as Iran and Syria. But there should also be an attempt to shape Russia’s future behaviour by nurturing pan-European institutions that can act as a constraint, for example by recognising and collaborating with the Eurasian Economic Union.

The second big change is the fact that economic globalisation is powered by Chinese as much as western capital. Africa emerged as a testing ground for Chinese banks, construction companies and other enterprises looking for business, markets or raw materials – but now even advanced nations like Britain kow-tow to Beijing in the hope of attracting investment. In a brilliant account of China’s role in Africa, the journalist Howard French claims that “China is increasingly writing its own rules, and reinventing globalisation in its own image, gradually jettisoning many of the norms and conventions used by the United States and Europe throughout their long and hitherto largely unchallenged tutelage of the third world.”

Britain must prepare for a world of economic competition where size and power matter, where state capitalist economies such as China will seek to exploit their enormous markets and political power. The EU is the platform on which Britain must base its plan to thrive in an integrated global economy – both by providing a critical home market and by giving social democrats more influence on the world stage.

The British left should go along with the growth and economic reform agenda of extending the single market and signing new trade deals, but it will be hard to build a consensus for liberalisation without complementing it with specific policies to compensate the losers of liberalisation and
help low and middle income families. Without this, there is a
danger that the European reform agenda will become a front
of populist resistance from both left and right. The left could
push all EU states to come to a political agreement to intro-
duce a national minimum wage worth at least 60 per cent of
median pay in their country. It could work to strengthen the
EU’s power to ensure that multinationals like Amazon and
Starbucks pay their taxes. It could try to change the debate
about TTIP, by developing a policy which removes problem-
atic elements such as investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)
– which allows multinational companies to sue governments
which threaten their interests – and the application of competi-
tion policy to public services.

Migration has emerged as one of the most important
issues on the British political agenda – and a central issue
in the debate around Europe. Free movement within the
EU has benefited Britain economically and culturally and
will continue to do so. EU migration is a two way street,
with currently around 1.8m Britons living in other EU states
and an estimated 2.3m EU citizens living in the UK. The
largest immigrant communities in the UK are from Poland,
Germany, and France; UK citizens predominantly move to
Spain, France and Germany.

However, the benefits of free movement have not been
distributed fairly and many sectors of the economy and
some communities are feeling pressure on wages and public
services as a result of large movements of population. A
social democratic agenda in Britain would involve acting
unilaterally to make it the best country in the EU to be a
worker in – combining a flexible labour market that maxim-
ises employment with strong measures to make work pay
and protect British citizens from exploitation.

This could include measures to safe-guard immigrants
(and UK workers) from exploitation, standing strong against
benefit abuse or fraud and reforming the rules on benefits. And in order to manage the flows, the left should campaign for a migration adjustment fund. This can provide support to municipalities and cities particularly affected by migration to address the challenges they face, including increased pressures on schools, housing, public health systems as well as integration programmes, language classes as well as other qualification measures.

A third change is the way the international system is gridlocked and fragmenting.

British foreign policy makers have clung to some heroic assumptions about the power of multilateral institutions to socialise emerging powers. It is vital to hang on to the values and strategy of promoting a world bound by law rather than power, but the tactics will need to be revised. From the United Nations to the G20, a pattern seems to be emerging where China and Russia’s multilateral diplomacy is making the institutions of the global order less effective at regulating the behaviour of their member states.

The west cannot adapt the existing world order to meet China and Russia’s aspirations to be left alone on human rights, climate change or the role of state subsidies. But nor do western powers have enough control of universal institutions to reshape them to its own ends. As a result, emerging powers are increasingly gridlocking the universal institutions whilst simultaneously developing their own friendship clubs that do not contain liberal values such as the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, the Silk Road Fund or the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. So rather than accepting the compromises to core values required by Beijing and Moscow or the blockages of the status-quo, western countries should increasingly develop a third strategy: the idea of routing round China and Russia, in order to change them from the outside.
In the economic realm, TTIP could provide a model. But there have been parallel developments in the security realm. For example, when it comes to international interventions, the west has increasingly relied on regional organisations such as the Arab League to get things done without hitting Chinese and Russian vetoes.

Of course, the ultimate goal should be to deepen and unblock the universal institutions such as the UN Security Council, the G20, IMF, World Bank and others. But rather than viewing these as a kindergarten for responsible stakeholders that will socialise China, these should be seen as forums to manage differences or deal with crises – like North Korea – where there are common interests. The west should focus on making progress in this transactional way in these forums, rather than hoping they will prove transformative.

A new internationalism

The world around us is in flames but the left is using current affairs to relitigate old battles. Today’s Labour movement needs to reunite around a new internationalism informed by its values but curious about the new world and interested in adapting to it. It is impossible to develop a programme of social democracy in one country and no Labour government will be electable unless it develops a story about the changes in the world – and a programme to respond to them. The building blocks of this are contained in this pamphlet: a new account of globalisation, a reinvention of the European security order, a political vision for de-escalation in the Middle East, a different account of what multilateralism means in the world.

Rather than narrowing the conversation about the left’s foreign policy to familiar discussions about using force in the Middle East, there needs to be a common debate about the future of the world – and a sense of what tools Britain can
deploy to advance its interests and values. As Jean Seaton writes in this collection, at its best, the Labour tradition was internationalist and respected the utility of force but saw it embedded in something wider: “It was based on principles, but hard won ones”. If it wants to have a claim to shape the future of this country by making decisions – as opposed to passing a running commentary on policy made by others – the left will need to rediscover the pragmatic idealism on foreign policy that so often defined the Labour governments of the past.
Choices about China are as much about future visions of the entire international system as they are about a bilateral relationship. Talking about China ‘policy’ at all is therefore to start in the wrong place – the question is rather how China is changing the landscape for a progressive foreign policy.

The UK’s China policy is not in a good place. David Cameron’s second term in office has seen the government deepening its proclivity to see the relationship with Beijing through a near-exclusively commercial prism. The problem is not simply that this is out of line with other like-minded states’ attempts to find a balance between economic, political, strategic and human rights priorities in their dealings with China. It actively undermines their efforts to defend universal values and diminishes collective leverage over basic economic and security concerns. The ramifications go well beyond what has been dubbed the “very special relationship” with China. The UK’s efforts to position itself as China’s “best partner in the west” have reinforced the impression among the UK’s traditional allies of a country increasingly adrift from any residual sense of a responsible global role.

An alternative approach does not require that much rethinking. Recalibrating towards a China policy that views commercial ties as a function of normal economic logic,
rather than a byproduct of political favour-currying. Treating human rights concerns as a matter of basic principle, rather than a chit to be traded off. Coordinating fully with partners on important strategic decisions about China, rather than being explicitly competitive with them. These would all be helpful steps, bringing the UK back into the European and G7 mainstream.

But they are still inadequate. The one thing that the Conservative government gets right in its approach is to take the long-term choices posed by China’s rise seriously. In Europe, China tends to exist in the category of the “important” but never “urgent”. European politicians may concede that China’s rise is likely the most transformative force facing the global order in the coming decades. Day-to-day, however, a rolling series of crises, from refugees to Russia, Greece to the Paris attacks, has ensured that the strategic questions at stake are permanently crowded out. Over the coming year, the EU will be going through a rare review of its China policy. It is unlikely to receive the sustained attention it merits. The last EU foreign affairs council convened on Asia saw ministers spending more of their time ducking out to talk to the visiting Iranian foreign minister than sitting through the deliberations. In major European capitals, China takes up very little of the oxygen.

London, however briefly, has been an exception. In their recent dealings with China, Cameron and Osborne have made a distinct and quite bold choice: hug them close. This is not just a short-term play for Chinese cash, as it may have appeared a few years back. The argument underpinning the Conservative government’s approach is that, whatever reservations one might have about the Chinese Communist Party, the sustained cultivation of a country that will be ever more central to the UK’s economic interests in the decades ahead is a matter of good sense. China’s importance,
argument runs, now transcends its role as a trading hub and production base to encompass outbound investment, capital markets, infrastructure, energy and the role of London in the global financial system. The UK should be in the optimal position to benefit from this transition. And in the longer term, ensuring a strong – even a privileged – relationship with an emerging superpower will be vital to British interests. The trade-offs involved are, the argument contends, relatively modest. There is little progress that the UK can really make on human rights issues and pleasing Beijing with the symbolism of a trip to Xinjiang won’t do much harm. Militarily speaking, British commitments in Asia are very modest, and few in the region expect the UK to be involved directly in the competitive security dynamics that are emerging. And the United States is not quite the power that it was – if there is some collateral damage to the transatlantic relationship in developing a deeper set of ties with Beijing, they quietly believe that may be a price worth paying. Among Chinese officials, this is generally seen as good old British pragmatism about the new power realities, which others – particularly other Europeans – would do well to learn from.

The question is whether this kind of thinking marks the wave of the future for European policies towards China or a brief aberrant exception. Unlike, say, the bipartisan consensus that largely exists on many fundamentals of US China policy, the UK’s China initiative still has the quality of political freelancing rather than reflecting a settled national course of action. In Washington and other European capitals, there is some expectation that it will just fall apart – that the new demands that it invites from Beijing will become too much to put up with; that the economic rewards will look little different from what would have been received anyway; and that if London were to face any genuinely sharp choices, there is
no deep-rooted commitment to throw the UK’s lot in with China. But there is an alternative scenario too – that Beijing plays its cards smartly, finding ways to demonstrate that “the Osborne doctrine” pays dividends; that the security situation in East Asia remains far enough below crisis levels to obviate the need for any hard choices; and that Cameron and Osborne stick around long enough to entrench the China play as a strategic orientation rather than just a temporary gambit.

If so, the temptation in other European capitals to follow a similar orientation is liable to grow. Most likely not during the tenures of Merkel and Hollande, who have pursued balanced China policies, despite the accusations thrown in Berlin’s direction each time Germany and China hold a ‘joint cabinet meeting’. And European views on China have certainly generally become far more sober in the decade since the debates around the lifting of the EU arms embargo. But there is a significant strand of thinking in Europe that simply wants to keep out of great power battles in Asia, take advantage of Chinese investment and commercial opportunities, and do no more than the tokenistic minimum on human rights. The UK’s ‘new golden age’ policy – isolated as it is for now – tips the balance of the debate further in this direction, and makes it harder for others in Europe to hold a firm line.

The first step in any alternative approach to China then is simply to do a serious job of opposing the present policy. Its roots are shallow and its flaws – from a progressive perspective – are largely obvious. But China is an area of foreign policy that draws little sustained scrutiny and even less passion, lacking the visceral immediacy for the left of the Middle East or Africa. Were it not for the pomp and scale of Xi Jinping’s state visit, it is unlikely that the policy would have attracted a great deal of attention at all and it has quickly faded from view again in the aftermath. Yet much as the Labour party’s handling of the Syria parliamentary vote
in 2013 had ramifications well beyond the UK’s borders, this, in slower motion, is genuinely a potentially important juncture for British foreign policy and for the liberal international order, and should be treated as such.

There is a danger at present, however, that a ‘progressive China policy’ ends up being reduced to ‘get tougher on steel imports, and raise human rights issues more prominently’, as if little had changed since the 1990s. Nowadays, choices about China are as much choices about future visions of the entire international system as they are about a bilateral relationship. In that sense, talking about China ‘policy’ at all is to start in the wrong place. The question is rather how China is changing the landscape for a progressive foreign policy. Europe, and the UK, now have a set of multi-faceted interactions with Beijing across virtually every international issue. These include some problematic areas, some areas where co-operation can expand considerably, and other areas where China’s rise simply means that policy needs to be done differently. The take-off of Chinese investment in Africa virtually blew up the old aid and conditionality model. Fear of China, and Beijing’s own unwillingness to compromise, was one of the main reasons the WTO’s Doha round collapsed, fragmenting global trade talks into the current patchwork of bilateral and plurilateral negotiations. The Copenhagen climate talks were a relative failure because of China – the relative success of the Paris talks likewise. China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea is not just a challenge to the international rules-based order but raises the question of whether the long peace, in a region that is central to Europe’s economic future, will endure. Conversely, China has proved to be a helpful new factor in areas ranging from peacekeeping in Mali to peacemaking in Afghanistan.

As these developments accelerate, it is arguably more important to think more about what precepts should inform
progressive policy in the context of China’s rise than a static China ‘policy’ that is liable to look outdated very quickly. Here are a few suggestions.

First, defending values is not a solo task. The perversity of the UK’s current retreat from both Europe and the transatlantic relationship is that China’s rise makes close coordination with other like-minded countries all the more important if universal values – and shared interests – are going to be defended. When Hu Jintao visited the UK in 2005, China was comparable in size to a major European economy – now it has surpassed the United States in terms of purchasing power. The additional leverage that China gains, almost year-on-year, means that from UN human rights votes to freedom of navigation to trade defence measures, it is becoming a vastly more challenging environment for liberal democracies to pursue a number of their goals. Intensified co-operation through the EU, the G7 and other bodies is becoming a basic precondition for any effective set of policies.

Second, standing up for rules and laws means doing something when they’re broken. A progressive policy in Asia – still the most important theatre in which China is testing out the international response to its militarily assertive behaviour – means taking clear lines on principles, and calling out violations when they occur. Geographical distance is no barrier to the region’s economic importance for Europe, and it shouldn’t lead to difference-splitting neutralism either. The very fact that Europe is not seen as directly engaged in the region’s power struggles is why its stance on these issues matters all the more to the maintenance of universal rules and norms. In extremis, the EU – the region’s largest trading partner – is likely to be called into play for the application of sanctions well before any military conflict breaks out, and should be politically prepared for what that will entail.
Third, China can provide global public goods too. Much of the progressive agenda has traditionally been decided between the G7, the EU and a handful of other countries. In many respects China is a challenger to that agenda, and to aspects of the liberal order. But in a host of areas, China is also becoming a creative contributor. The fear that China was going to subvert the basic structures of the international system looks overblown, and initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank are partly intended to improve on some of its failings. In thinking through what a progressive foreign policy should look like, the China factor needs to be incorporated far more expansively than it has been in recent years. Chinese financing, Chinese military contributions and Chinese diplomatic brokering are more and more often going to be the new factors that can be brought to bear on many problems. The instinct to defend important aspects of the current system shouldn’t ossify into a failure to update, and even overhaul it, as China – and other powers – come to the table.

Finally, a relationship with China and a relationship with the Chinese Communist Party are not the same thing. Europe and the UK need to be positioning themselves for a set of long-term relationships in China that include, but also transcend, the Chinese Communist Party. Deepening the warmth of the embrace of the Chinese government just as civic space in China is further squeezed and the political climate is even chillier than usual is not necessarily the best way to go about doing that. But neither is an approach that is disconnected from the everyday concerns and long-term aspirations of the general Chinese public – the environment, land seizures, corruption, internet freedom, and a litany of other issues should feature alongside some of the other more familiar political causes. It is equally possible to criticize the Chinese government’s restrictions on Uighur
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religious freedom in Xinjiang while condemning the mass stabbings of Han Chinese in Kunming railway station as an act of terrorism. Progressive thinking about China has to get outside the box of bilateral relationship – but it also has to be far more deeply engaged with the political and social forces that are shaping the country’s future, and the rest of the world with it.
A new relationship can be established with Russia by truly understanding its history, culture, interests and foreign policy objectives. This should form the basis of a new doctrine – ‘respect-based realism’ – through which two deeply damaging conflicts that can only feasibly be resolved through dialogue with Russia might be tackled: Ukraine and Syria.

I remember that first flight to St Petersburg in May 2005 as clearly as if it were yesterday. I was on my way to take up my post as director of the British Council’s operations in St Petersburg & North-West Russia, and was feeling a palpable sense of hope, combined with a healthy dose of trepidation. I was looking forward to some language training and getting settled into my new life in St Pete, before formally starting the job in September. But I was also wondering what the coming years held in store for me, given the parlous state of the bilateral relationship.

Equally memorable, but for very different reasons, was that last flight out of St Petersburg, in January 2008. Relations between the British and Russian governments had gone into deep freeze following the assassination of Alexander Litvinenko, tit-for-tat expulsions had ensued, and the British Council had become a political football in a truly unpleasant grudge match between the Kremlin and Number 10. A sustained campaign of various acts of intimidation by
the Russian authorities eventually forced us to close our St Petersburg office. Although I was keen to stay on in order to oversee the orderly closure of our operations and the security of our Russian employees, British Council senior management felt that it was time for me to get out of town as quickly as possible.

In spite of the aggression and unpleasantness that came to dominate the relationship between the British Council and the Russian authorities, Russia will always hold a special place in my heart. It’s a fascinating country of contradictions, extremes, suffering and joy, and I will never forget my time there. A wise person once said that “you can leave Russia, but it will never leave you”, and I can certainly confirm the truth of that statement.

‘Russia cannot be understood with the mind alone’
— Fyodor Tyutchev

Being in the eye of this diplomatic storm enabled me to see at first-hand the extent to which Russian politics is underpinned by emotion, instinct, psychology and history. Rational analysis and objective assessment of the facts are important, but they almost always play second fiddle to more visceral impulses. Russia is a proud nation, and its people are deeply attached to the concept of уважаниye – respect. The national psyche is rooted in a sense that no Russian should ever be treated as second-rate, and anchored by the suspicion that Mother Russia is constantly being disrespected and destabilised by malevolent external forces. This potent combination of pride and paranoia lies at the heart of every big political decision that has ever been made in Russia: it is the iron thread that connects the Tsars to Stalin and Putin. Every Russian ruler, with the genius exception of Gorbachev and the shambolic eccentricity of Yeltsin, has exploited it relentlessly.
'The most basic, most rudimentary spiritual need of the Russian people is the need for suffering, ever-present and unquenchable, everywhere and in everything’ – Fyodor Dostoevsky

The identity, instincts and mind-set of the Russian people are shaped by geography. Inhabitants of a vast land mass with borders so long that they are almost impossible to defend, the Russians have always suffered from ‘encirclement anxiety’. Their world-view is shaped by the conviction that those who seek to exploit and undermine nasha Rodina – the Motherland – are constantly hovering on her doorstep, and their default position is therefore to strike first, subjugate their neighbours, and from this platform to build a sphere of influence. From the empire-building of Peter the Great, to the establishment and extension of the Soviet Union, to the Russians’ furious opposition to the expansion of NATO, through to Putin’s adventurism in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria, the narrative of encirclement provides the backdrop to every chapter of Russia’s turbulent history.

It is absolutely essential that our approach to Russia is informed by an in-depth understanding of this Russian reality. It has long been recognised but too rarely applied in practice. We must acknowledge that we can keep shouting at the Kremlin about democracy, pluralism and ‘good’ international behaviour, but the fact is that the inhabitants of that iconic Moscow fortress will simply ignore us unless we demonstrate that we comprehend and respect the narrative of encirclement that defines the Russian political psyche. If we can make comprehension of this fundamental truth the new point of departure for relations with Russia, then it is possible that new channels of engagement can be created without deference or concession to Russian external ambitions, or compromising our values.
Having established some common ground for dialogue, the next step would be to reset our relationship with Russia on the basis of a new doctrine of *respect-based realism*, structured around the following three pillars:

**Pillar 1:** Commit to UK membership of NATO and support further sanctions against Russia in response to further aggression against Ukraine, but never promote the eastward expansion of NATO

Clearly, should the people of Ukraine (or any other country for that matter) wish to hold a referendum on possible membership of NATO, it is their sovereign right to do so. However, it should be unambiguously stated that the UK has no plans or desire to encourage such a development. The further expansion of NATO would not serve any military or strategic objective. Ukraine’s dilapidated military capability is certainly not going to add any tangible value to NATO’s firepower, and the strategic disadvantages of Ukraine joining NATO far outweigh the potential benefits. The Russians already know that NATO will step in to protect Ukraine if there were to be any further incursions by Russian forces into Ukrainian territory, regardless of the fact that Ukraine is not formally a member of NATO. Encouraging Ukraine to join NATO at this point in time would therefore constitute an unnecessary and futile provocation.

**Pillar 2:** Respect the rule of law and conventions of international diplomacy and intelligence-sharing, as long as Russia does

London is the Russian elite’s destination of preference when it comes to keeping their assets safe and off-shoring their capital, with Cyprus and Latvia also attracting vast deposits.
For a variety of reasons, existing EU regulations on money-laundering are, however, inconsistently applied and policed in the UK. Those regulations must be tightened and enforced, and the capacity of HMRC rebuilt in the face of recent weakening by the government. Respect must be a two-way street, and we will simply not accept the exploitative way in which corrupt Russian officials and oligarchs are using the UK as a repository for their often ill-gotten fortunes.

Following the Metrojet disaster on 31 October 2015, David Cameron made a very public proclamation on 4 November that the British government had received credible information suggesting that the Russian flight out of Sharm El Sheikh was downed by an on-board bomb. His decision to make that public statement without first sharing that intelligence with the Russian authorities was a crass act of grandstanding. It was perceived to be deeply insulting to the families of the 224 people who lost their lives in that tragic incident, and the Russian government expressed “shock” at the failure to share information with them. This is the wrong way to behave and, in the event of such atrocities, information must always go to the most affected countries before public statements are made.

Pillar 3: Always practice what you preach

Russian politicians and opinion formers see the British as arch hypocrites, preaching the gospel of democracy, human rights and the rule of law whilst conducting illegal invasions of sovereign countries and selling arms to Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, President Putin has no qualms about interfering in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries, with the 2008 war against Georgia and the annexation of Crimea being the most salient examples. Moreover, the standards of democracy, respect for human rights, freedom of speech and
the operation of the rule of law in Russia are patently less than perfect. This is the context in which we should state clearly that we wish to establish a genuine reset with Russia. The left are not conscientious objectors, and we reserve the right to deploy military force as a last resort. However, we will never mobilise our armed forces because of the superficial desire to be seen to be ‘doing something’, especially when NATO or other Treaty obligations do not require such deployment. Our actions will always be driven by long-term strategic aims rather than short-term tactics, and we will always seek negotiated solutions, secured through active diplomacy.

Having made authentic efforts to re-set relations on the basis of respect-based realism, the next step will be to apply this new doctrine to tackling the crises in Ukraine and Syria, two deeply damaging conflicts that can only feasibly be resolved through dialogue with Russia.

Ukraine: pulling the economic levers

Russia’s geo-political influence and substantial military clout stand in stark contrast to the small size and fragile state of its economy. In 2013 Russia’s economy ($2.1tn) was roughly the size of Italy’s, and considerably smaller than Germany’s ($3.7tn). Russia is grossly over-reliant on hydrocarbons, with approximately 70 per cent of its GDP linked to the oil and gas industries. With the price of a barrel of oil plummeting to $50 – $60, the value of the rouble tumbling, sanctions biting and poor economic policy decisions compounding these problems, the Russian economy is facing a perfect storm.

It is against this backdrop that sanctions as a foreign policy tool are ultimately likely to have real effect. The sectoral sanctions imposed by the EU in the wake of the shooting down of flight MH17 by Russian-made missiles in July 2014 have certainly led Russia to tread more carefully in terms of
incursions into eastern Ukraine, and there is some evidence to suggest that President Putin is not actively seeking to up the ante there.

The way forward is therefore to continue to support asset freezes, visa bans and economic sanctions against Russia, until such time as the terms of the Minsk ceasefire agreement have been fully implemented. Minsk is far from ideal, but it represents the only hope for stability and peace. If there were to be any attempt by Russia to ramp up hostilities in Ukraine, the UK should commit to support the training and equipping of Ukrainian forces.

A key source of tension is the EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), but Russian concerns about the DCFTA are simply not credible and it should be implemented in full. Ukraine is a sovereign country, and therefore free to sign international agreements as it sees fit, and Russia is negotiating from a position of relative economic weakness.

Beyond this, the completion of the EU Energy Union is crucial. The EU’s fragmented energy market and infrastructure cause several EU member states (including Germany) to be more reliant than necessary on Russian oil and gas, which in turn gives Russia disproportionate influence in its dealings with the EU. By investing in inter-connectors and integrating the energy trading market, the EU would fundamentally re-balance its relationship with Russia.

Eastern Ukraine will eventually become a ‘frozen conflict’, joining Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh as troubled regions characterised by a perpetual stand-off between Russia and its neighbours. We may simply have to accept that outcome for the foreseeable future, but in doing so we must also strengthen our resolve to provide the strongest possible political and economic support to the government in Kiev, and we must also offer Ukraine a roadmap to member-
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ship of the European Union. Such a course would not be pursued to provoke or to offer false hope, but rather as a basic, rational response to the fact of Ukrainian sovereignty.

Syria: winning the game of shadows

Syria is a proxy war, with Iran and Russia supporting the Assad regime, and Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar backing the opposition. What all parties want above all else is stability, and in particular to avoid the contagious anarchy that would follow a forced regime change in Damascus. This pre-eminent desire for stability presents the only feasible opportunity for the durable resolution of the Syria crisis. It also offers the only possibility that Iran and Russia could potentially be prepared to abandon Assad in exchange for a stable Syria under a Government of National Unity. If this opportunity is to be exploited both Vladimir Putin and the Iranian regime must now be engaged in the co-creation of the roadmap to peace and stability, and both must be offered firm incentives to do so.

There is no doubt that the Kremlin recognises the limitations of its Syria strategy – and that those limitations are tightening. Militarily over-stretched by its campaign in eastern Ukraine, economically weakened for the reasons outlined above, and – because it is seen as revenge for Russia’s Syrian engagement – politically damaged by the downing of flight 9628 over the Sinai, it is starting to become apparent that the grandiose edifice of Russian foreign policy is built on decidedly shaky foundations. Interestingly, in a recent poll only 14 per cent of Russians expressed support for military intervention in Syria. These factors offer a real opportunity for some give-and-take that can lead to substantive diplomatic progress.
The 13 November atrocities in Paris have further strengthened the resolve of the international community, including Russia, to secure the comprehensive military defeat of Isis. It will be important to ensure that this strengthened resolve is combined with recognition of the fact that successfully securing the post-Assad transition plan has to *precede* the defeat of Isis.

As a starting point, President Assad must bear responsibility for the vast majority of the 250,000 deaths and millions of displaced people that have been caused by this horrific war, and so it follows that the strategic aim must now be to secure peace and stability in Syria through the establishment of a post-Assad Government of National Unity (GNU) in Damascus. The first step in that direction would be a conference of all the parties, but moderate Syrian opposition groups will only come to the table for peace talks on the basis of a guarantee that President Assad will step down, as part of the transition to a GNU.

A roadmap to peace and stability is therefore required. President Assad must commit to stepping down at some point along the timeline, as a pre-condition for the conference of all the parties to take place. However, he should be invited to participate in the initial meetings, as this will facilitate the transition.

The GNU would have to be based on a balanced and equitable combination of the moderate opposition and the current regime, with ministerial appointments approved by both sides. The formation of the GNU must be pragmatic, and based on learning from the catastrophic attempt to de-Baathify Iraq.

Aerial bombardment may serve to hinder or disrupt the advance of Isis, but it cannot secure the defeat of the terrorising insurgency. Isis can only ever be comprehensively defeated through a ground offensive by effective forces. Therefore it will only be possible to defeat Isis in Syria
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through a sustained military campaign that is led by the GNU and materially supported by an international coalition that should comprise the US, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Russia, France and the UK.

The twin tragedies of flight 9628 and Paris have provided the international community with an opportunity to co-create a roadmap to peace and stability, in partnership with Moscow and Tehran. Let us hope that the chance to build something positive from these terrible events is not squandered.

Conclusion: engage with Russia as it is, not how we would like it to be

“I don’t think Russia will follow the United States’ way. I don’t think Russia will follow the French way. I’m sure that Russia will find its own way” – Anatoly Chubais

My abiding memory of my time in Russia was of a burgeoning sense of polarisation between society and state. I saw and heard the values, instincts and hopes of growing numbers of young, well-educated and internationally-minded Russians contrasting sharply with an increasingly reactionary and authoritarian governing elite. Support for Putin was (and still is) relatively strong and widespread, but it is also brittle. He derives his legitimacy from the fact that people are prepared to trade the rule of law, pluralism, transparency and freedom of speech for security, stability and economic growth. However, when Russian holiday jets are being blown up in response to military adventurism, and when recession and inflation become the dominant features of the Russian economy, then many more Russians will start to draw the conclusion that their president is failing to keep his side of the bargain.
But change in Russia will not come any time soon. President Putin will probably run for a fourth term in 2018, and if he does he will almost certainly win. For the time being he can still count on the support of the majority of Russian voters, with the only notable exception to that general rule being the growing middle-class in Moscow and St Petersburg.

Let us therefore engage with Russia as it is, and not how we would like it to be. Let’s demonstrate through our words and deeds that we truly understand the history, culture, interests and foreign policy objectives of this vast nation with its huge potential. And let’s also acknowledge that business-as-usual is not working, and that a new approach is urgently needed if we are to achieve a transition from suspicion to comprehension, and from sabre-rattling to mutual respect.
The crises of the Middle East and North Africa will dominate foreign affairs for years to come. The response requires patience along with a detailed understanding of the region that has often been sorely lacking. The UK must work with its European and other allies, as well as key regional players, to show creative political leadership on entrenched problems and new conflicts alike.

Few foreign policy issues will suck up as much energy, oxygen and angst in the coming period as our relations with and approach to the Middle East and North Africa. The conflicts, crises and chaos ricocheting around the region are unlikely to abate in the near future.

More realistically they will intensify and spread – in particular the struggle within Sunni Arab Islam, which poses some of the hardest dilemmas and tests that a country’s foreign policy could face. The struggle that has been evolving ever-more violently in recent years is multi-tiered and has deep and varied roots, not least in the destabilising effects of the ill-conceived Iraq war launched in 2003. We are almost certainly witnessing a religious, ideological and state contestation of an intensity and duration that will guarantee its outcomes and consequences echo for generations.

That kind of a thing takes time to play itself out, so our first test is one of patience. There is a natural and often healthy
urge to want to do something, especially when one of the features of this turmoil is its appalling toll in human devastation and suffering. Humanitarian assistance, including opening our doors to asylum seekers fleeing this carnage, should be expansively pursued. Assistance to dramatically impacted frontline states, notably Lebanon and Jordan, should also be expanded. Beyond that there is a question as to how far the UK can or should want to go in taking ownership of these conflicts and what options we can pursue that will end up being helpful rather than counter-productive.

The liberal interventionist instinct should always face a high threshold in making its case, but especially in this part of the world. Given past experience, the bar of doing more good than harm should be rigorously applied. There will need to be a military component to addressing these crises, but there is no military option that will provide a solution or panacea. What’s more, western military action in particular carries its own cultural codes and complications, risks and blowback potential.

So how can Britain constructively engage in a region whose conflicts directly impact our own security at home, as well as our domestic politics and intercommunal relations?

It is a region in which the UK has strong traditional allies and bilateral relations – but with states who are just as problematic in the context of the current turmoil as are our traditional adversaries, and who tend to be very prickly regarding criticism. For progressives, the tragic reality is that this is a region bereft of like-minded social forces that are politically empowered. This is of course in the context of the dramatic recent popular upheavals – the so-called Arab Spring – the scorecard of which to date has been a knockout victory for catastrophic war and chaos alongside authoritarian retrenchment. Only the Tunisian candle of hope remains flickering in the wind. That this is a region of long-standing unsolved
conflicts and in which Britain has a rich colonial history hardly makes matters easier.

The UK therefore needs to work with its European and other allies, as well as key regional players, to show creative political leadership both on entrenched problems and new conflicts whose chaos is reverberating across the globe.

New balance in old conflicts

Of course, not all of today’s challenges in the Middle East and North Africa are new ones. On some issues, it will be more about recalibrating and finding new balance than fundamental re-positioning. In most instances, the UK will be better off anchoring its positions within a European setting and common approach. That obviously can bring additional heft to the table, and often other Europeans face similar dilemmas. It also provides another angle on managing fraught bilateral relations with regional allies, as long as Westminster is lending weight to a push from Brussels rather than undermining it.

Managing our ties to authoritarian and undemocratic governments is hardly a new challenge for policy in the Middle East or indeed hardly a challenge unique to that region of the world. It is a challenge always exacerbated when those governments are considered long-standing allies with whom we often have deeply inter-woven relations, including at the security level and when we derive economic benefit from those relations. Britain’s ties to the Gulf would most prominently feature in this category but the issue is relevant also when one thinks of Egypt and to a certain extent Algeria, Morocco and other states in the region.

Some of our so-called partners in the region did not themselves experience the upheaval of recent years, but have nonetheless been impacted and also feed into the turmoil. Others have witnessed authoritarian retrenchment. The Gulf minus
Bahrain are examples of the former, Egypt of the latter. That turmoil makes a return to the status quo a bad choice.

The absence of political space, representative politics or a viable social contract between those governing and those being governed, is one of the drivers of instability, conflict and extremism. But governments cannot operate like mega NGOs, eschewing relations with problematic state structures in favour of a set of exclusive relations with civil society. Realpolitik is legitimate, as is the pursuit of a broad range of security, economic and other state to state relations.

But we should be able to walk and chew gum at the same time – to maintain relations while also knowing when to draw a line (on the export of sensitive technology, arms or crowd control equipment for instance), how to be critical when necessary, and to desist from endorsing sham reform agendas or counter-productive crackdowns. The political reforms that we are right to encourage should not be reduced to a technical box-ticking exercise of which we become enablers. And we should not shirk from supporting those actors within civil society committed to advancing the opening of political space via for instance free media, gender equality, legal reform and trade unions.

There should be circumstances under which we are ready to sustain setbacks to our bilateral state-to-state relations, and we should not be easily intimidated – most of our relationships in the region are mutually beneficial not one-way streets. We will be in a stronger position to find that balance and push back when necessary if we can do so in concert with the EU and its member states.

The unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict is another issue that predates the current turmoil. Redressing Palestinian disenfranchisement and the denial of their basic rights and freedoms as well as guaranteeing security for Israelis and Palestinians alike has been somewhat pushed to the regional
back burner. It remains though an issue that resonates greatly and is still often exhibit ‘A’ in western policy malfeasance, which drives grievances and animus to the west and provides the recruitment backdrop for extremists. It is also an issue that continues to resonate greatly in the UK and is something policy makers are called upon to address with great frequency.

After almost 50 years of Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories and the massive and illegal relocation of Israelis to settlements dotted across the Palestinian landscape, the prospects of a sustainable two state outcome are dim indeed. The Oslo peace process, itself now of 20 plus years’ vintage, has become more a part of the furniture of the Israeli management and control system than an antidote to it.

That is not something Brits or Europeans alone can fix. American policy is too hamstrung by domestic politics, Israeli policy has shifted further in the direction of the radical right and is ever more truculent towards the Palestinians, while Arab state policy has its own interests and distractions and faces little pressure from the Palestinians. Game-changing shifts will probably only come when there is a Palestinian leadership and reunified national liberation movement offering a new strategy that more meaningfully challenges the status quo.

In the meantime there is much that Britain, especially in concert with the EU, can do to prevent further deterioration, to signpost what is needed in the future, and to keep the prospect of non-violent change alive. Britain under the last Labour government was an early mover in legally differentiating between Israel and its settlements, by setting guidelines for the labelling of settlement products. That has now been adopted Europe-wide and the gamut of EU-Israel relations should be brought in line with this distinction, both a legally correct move and a way of signaling to Israelis that there are
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consequences for their illegal activity. Indeed if Israel continues to be treated with impunity, we cannot expect a change in policy.

There should be support for holding Israel and the Palestinians accountable for their actions, including at the International Criminal Court, and practical encouragement should be given to much-needed Palestinian national reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah. Recognition of the state of Palestine is something that is happening too late, rather than too early.

Nevertheless, and despite Palestinian ineffectiveness in leveraging recognition, it does send the correct signal if one remains committed to a two state outcome. This should be accompanied by clear articulation of what is needed to make the Palestinian state viable as well as the alternative to two states; namely equal rights for all living under Israeli control and non-acquiescence in what former Israeli PM’s Ehud Olmert and Ehud Barak have described as a creeping apartheid. Israelis must also be reminded that Britain and Europe are committed to their security, wellbeing and rights, just not at the permanent expense of the Palestinians.

Navigating new challenges

But what about those new challenges? What should our guiding touchstones be in relating to what is likely to be ongoing chaos and contestation in the region?

Britain’s participation in the coalition airstrikes on Isis will not change the fundamental dynamics of the conflict in Syria. The only way to both de-escalate that devastating crisis and to have enough of the key actors focusing on Isis as a priority, rather than on each other, will be via the diplomatic political track and the reaching of some kind of a compromise accommodation of power-sharing guaranteed by external parties.
Throughout the crisis Britain has failed to demonstrate political leadership. More active, bold, inclusive and creative diplomacy will be needed for some time in the region and that heavy lifting cannot always be left to the Americans. The Vienna convening of an International Syria Support Group (ISSG) starting in October 2015 came late in the day. But once it was formed, Europe showed strong engagement and a quarter of the participating states and institutions were European.

Europeans have been punching below their weight in this conflict. More can be done at the level of cajoling allies – it is often the regional actors with whom we have better relations, for instance in the Gulf and Turkey, who need to be nudged towards accepting realistic compromises.

We could also be better leveraging our reset relations with Iran in pushing inclusive diplomacy. Britain has a particular history with Iran; those relations will take time to develop and we should not be flipping allegiances. But with more balanced relations, we can be more active initiators of ideas – for instance regarding what a political horizon in Syria could look like. We could offer detailed proposals for the horizontal and vertical devolution of power away from the presidency to a government and new parliament and away from Damascus to the regions. In short, we have not seen the kind of forward-leaning and intense diplomatic shuttling that the circumstances so sorely require.

And this does not just apply to Syria. On Libya and Yemen, the story has again mostly been one of not particularly benign neglect. Britain was a key part of the military intervention in Libya, but took its eye off the ball. In Libya too, the hard diplomatic slog of achieving power-sharing will be necessary and while this is not a job exclusively for the UK, we should be more present than absent. This is also the case in Yemen, given Britain’s history and current chairing of the Friends of
Yemen group. A policy that simply backs the Saudi-led coalition as the country descends into ever-greater destruction and dismay is hardly a calling card to be proud of.

Which brings back into view the bumpy road ahead with our historical allies in the region. A progressive policy for Britain needs to avoid the pitfalls of moral hazard, whereby we provide cover for our allies as they engage in pursuits which do not accord with our own interests and are often counter-productive for themselves. The Saudi-led war in Yemen would be a case in point. It applies also to the challenge of dampening down the flames of the current religious and sectarian conflict in the region that is spilling over into our continent.

Certainly Saudi Arabia is threatened by Isis and is taking its own counterterrorism and other security measures in response. But the Saudis and others have their own responsibilities regarding how the state interacts with its domestic clerical class, what interpretations of Islam are being promoted, what is being funded and how can sectarian narratives be countered rather than fostered.

We should be guided too by a degree of humility and acknowledge that mostly this war is not ours or about us. Yes we should be pushing diplomacy, pushing ideas and pushing de-escalation. But we should be guided by an overarching goal of encouraging greater local and regional ownership of solutions and outcomes. Our consistent message to the region should be of the need for them to be problem solvers not suppliants. That messaging is primarily still a role for the US and it is something the current Obama administration has encouraged. It is an approach the UK (and indeed France) should be fully behind and encouraging rather than – as at times seems to have been the case – undermining. After Obama we might need to be making the case for this approach to a new administration.
Finally, we should be looking at how to advance and contribute to a nascent institutional and security regional architecture to bring the different parties together. That may seem a far cry from today’s reality, but it is a region of weak to non-existent collective institutions and this is a gap that needs addressing. There are models for this, such as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ regional forum. Furthermore, our military bases in the region could become part of the initial mix that would be needed to thread together a structure that should begin modestly.

Conclusion

The policy challenges generated by developments in the Middle East and North Africa will be played out just as much at home as they will be in the region. Our cardinal challenge may well be that of developing sufficient national resilience in the face of ongoing crises, with their security implications at home, to not fall into the trap of enhancing the appeal of the violent extremists by overreacting both at home and abroad. That requires resilience in the face of domestic Islamophobia, resilience in maintaining our open society and civil liberties, and maintaining an openness to the world in making a real contribution in the face of such a monumental refugee crisis.

We can neither own nor ignore the turmoil in this region. Calibrating our response will require the application of a degree of analytical rigour to our understanding of the region that has often been sorely lacking and that will continue to fall short if our lens is primarily one of a global war on terror re-visited. The attraction of our story line in a battle of ideas with extremist, sectarian and authoritarian narratives cannot be taken for granted and that, along with where we direct
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our aid, trade, militaries and political endorsements will be a determining arena for our effectiveness. Just tinkering with our existing approaches to problems old and new is insufficient to the challenge at hand.
In 1933 Labour was essentially a pacifist party, before the realities of international affairs transformed the party and changed the course of British history. This tradition of Dalton, Morrison, Bevin, Attlee and Foot was realistic and pragmatic, strategic and knowledgeable, and based on principles that were hard won. It does not make decisions any easier in a multipolar world, but it does ask us to consider the politics of force.

On a muggy summer’s day trooping round an unconvincing army exhibition in Leicester in 1969 I was brought up short. I recognised that I was not a pacifist. I was there with a group of students prospecting for a demo. We were bookish, earnest and argumentative young people who did our essays, produced ‘radical’ mags and organised talk-ins, film-ins and sit-ins. Some of us were in the process of inventing a new wave of feminism. As anti-imperialists abroad (in a somewhat ill-informed way), and agitators for reform at home we believed soldiers to be agents of repression and were sure that the Vietnam war was a terrible thing – for America and Vietnam. It certainly provided a lot of material to demonstrate about.

Of course, in a wider way I had been against ‘war’, like any proper self-absorbed teenager. The Cuban missile crisis in 1962 had been, for a child living in Battersea in the centre of London, a surreal introduction to mortality. It had induced a
weirdly precise sense that I might be annihilated on a Tuesday night as we went to bed not knowing whether the Russians or the Americans might stand down as they faced each other off – or alternatively Britain be cindered by nuclear Armageddon. Personally I was rather resentful that stupid old men had nearly got me blown away. But in the exhibition I had a sudden and queasy moment as people around me denounced soldiers and guns. I turned heels and left.

What had happened? I had stumbled on a contradiction: none of us would be there without soldiers. My parents saw the second world war as the defining event of their lives when they, along with everyone else, had played a part in defeating fascism. I had been born out of the hopeful moment of national and international remaking after that war. I recognised, a little shame-facedly, that the blithe luxury of protesting, as we did, without taking any risks at all, had been secured for me by other people – soldiers – fighting. Sacrifice and force were, it appeared, sometimes necessary and indeed right.

I felt giddy with new responsibility. I realised that although I was against ‘war’ I had to be in favour of some wars. Yet being willing to fight was not a carte blanche for any and all wars. The world had become more complicated. I had a duty to try and make discriminating judgements. Getting things right is far harder than avoiding choices and stroking your virtue self-satisfiedly.

Indeed, as I later discovered, there was a principled, hard-nosed, realist tradition in the Labour movement and party concerned with defence and security. It has always been dominant when Labour has been effective. It had its roots in the 1930s. In 1933 Labour was a basically a pacifist party: the apparent futility of the first world war had led many to denounce war as a capitalist plot to exploit workers and further owners’ profits, and the carnage of the conflict had
instilled a deep and abiding pacifism in parts of the Labour movement. The emergence of a legitimate acceptance of conscientious objectors, the leadership of Quakers (and their noble willingness to go into the front line to save others medically) were rightly seen as marks of civilisation in a movement that was still informed by chapel and kirk. The settled view was that the Labour party stood for multilateral disarmament, with security provided by a League of Nations Covenant. Unofficially, most of the Labour movement were opposed to the use of force in any circumstances.

Yet, by 1937 the Labour party had been transformed and become bitterly opposed to appeasement. It demanded armed deterrence and fought for the re-arming of the nation. As Michael Foot, a passionate anti-appeaser, later observed, ‘the greatest deficiencies arise from some people’s failure to understand or appreciate the history of the party. The history of the party is very great, you see. At the most critical moments in the century, the Labour party saved the country.’

Where did this epic shift come from? It came from a perception that hypothetical dangers were becoming real. It was based on knowledge not ideology. The Labour politicians who helped lead this change faced facts and wanted to know everything. It came from a respect for and reorganisation of the Labour party. It came from analysis and a desperately serious concentration on the developing crisis. A passionate attention and intelligence that has all too often been missing in our foreign policy recently.

When Hitler came to full power in Germany in March 1933, Hugh Dalton – a principal architect of the change in the Labour party’s positon, later a key minister in the wartime coalition and a radical chancellor during the 1945 government – cancelled a lecture tour to Germany on the grounds that he did not want to exercise freedoms of speech denied to Germans. He was an Etonian; oh, for a new crop of Etonians
who devote their lives to equality not inequality. Instead of lecturing, he went to Germany anyway, inquiring from and listening to economists, public officials, academics and lawyers. Dalton’s foreboding was fuelled by a despairing sense that Hitler could have been stopped earlier if the allies had acted more seriously. But the visit deeply alarmed him. Ben Pimlott, his biographer (and later a chair of the Fabians) said he “acquired an overpowering sense of a vulgar aban-
donment of reason in Germany”.

Yet every step between 1933 and 1937 had to be fought. As war galloped towards the unprepared nation, Stafford Cripps, then a Labour idealist, made speeches of Jacobin fervour which delighted Labour activists, advocating emergency powers to protect workers from capitalists and opposing sanctions against Germany. Dalton observed in his diary that Cripps “has become very vain and seems to think that only he and his cronies know what socialism is or how it should be preached”. He denounced Cripps’s anti-sanctions policy as pro-fascist and pro-war. George Lansbury, the 76-year-old lifelong pacifist, attempted to wrest the party back to appeasement. He made a moving and popular paci-
fist speech at the 1935 Labour party conference “This is our faith and this is where we will die,” he said to an enthusiastic party. Yet Ernest Bevin in a savage attack turned the mood again. He said that Lansbury was guilty of failing to alert the party to the intentions of the “Nazi Monster”. Hitler’s destruction of the trade unions in Germany and Austria showed that you could not appease dictators. Lansbury, said Bevin, so far from “principled” was naïve, dangerous, and inexcusably dishonourable.

By 1938 on the Conservative side appeasement had turned from a predilection and a style into official policy. Dalton, Bevin, Morrison and Attlee’s views about the tactical and strategic dangers of what Morrison called the “imbecility”
of appeasement hardened. They wanted to stop war by every possible means but this imperative changed under the pressure of international realities: the danger became the likelihood of defeat.

Their view of international affairs was accompanied by a re-engineering of the Labour party. The unions had been used to having control and despite electoral defeat the party had grown. The constituency parties then represented a different more middle-ground of national opinion and they were organising and wanted a voice. The careful respect for and reform of the party machine also mattered. If anti-appeasers sided with the unions against the pacifists on defence they were against the unions and with the local parties on reform of the constitution and party democracy. This was a delicate balance but the anti–appeasers took the party with them. They also had their eye on the nation. Cripps wrote dismissively to his aunt, Beatrice Webb, that Dalton seemed “to want only to be in government!” He was quite right.

As war approached there had been other shifts on the left. George Orwell wrote in 1940 “I don’t quite know in what year I first knew for certain that the present war was coming. After 1936, of course, the thing was obvious to anyone except an idiot. For several years the coming war was nightmare to me, and at times I even made speeches and wrote pamphlets against it.” Orwell was no pacifist and went to fight in Spain, and in doing so learnt at first-hand the threat of communism. But the Nazi-Soviet pact finally changed his view. He wrote “There is no real alternative between resisting Hitler and surrendering to him”. In pre-war Labour and Conservative anti-appeaser meetings the Labour members had rejected any formal common front with the Conservatives. Dalton (who loathed Churchill, a feeling vividly reciprocated) nevertheless kept returning to Churchill’s words that “It is not enough to be brave, we have to be victorious”.

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The Labour anti-appeasers changed the course of British history. When war eventually came Neville Chamberlain the appeasing prime minister fell from office not because the Tories were dissatisfied with him, but because Labour adamantly refused to work with him. Labour’s refusal to serve in a coalition with any appeaser was steely.

This Labour tradition that respected the utility of force was embedded in something wider. Force was not a shibboleth, but the argument for its realistic use was involved in a deep understanding of international affairs embedded in profound commitment to domestic politics and the nation. It is a tradition that is empirical and brutally honest. It distrusted the communists in Spain, but thought it mad to open a ‘principled’ war against Stalin before we had begun to survive one against Hitler. It kept us in the cold war, but out of Vietnam. It did keep American bases here. Denis Healey said “NATO’s nuclear strategy is an essential part of that balance [between east and west]. To threaten to upset it by refusing to let America base any of her nuclear weapons in Britain would make war more likely, not less likely.” It recognised that the Falklands was a silly war, stumbled into by an incompetent government but that once engaged it had to be won. It knew when solidarity with allies was the vital element in affairs. This long tradition in the Labour movement: Dalton, Morrison, Bevin, Attlee, Foot – through blood lines to Gaitskell, Wilson, Healey, Callaghan and Jenkins – was realistic and pragmatic and above all strategic and knowledgeable. It was based on principles, but hard won ones not the comfortable rhetoric of peace.

It was a way of thinking tragically squandered by Tony Blair in Iraq. Seduced by success in Kosovo and Sierra Leone, and what then looked like success in Afghanistan, he took Britain to war on a false prospectus in Iraq in 2003, and Labour has not recovered. A remarkable reforming domestic
government, with the British public behind it, used force because of an idea, not because it really mattered or because the tough calculation of interests had been done ruthlessly. It misunderstood how much force was needed, it did not think about politics in the region enough, it failed to support the civil society on which a new Iraq would have to be built. It produced a revulsion in the Labour party. Which has led us to where we now are.

Yet the realist tradition has always been part of Labour competence. Labour brought that to the nation. It is a strand based on knowledge. It is careful and consumed by the urgency of calculating strategically. It never, ever, thought that force was the only thing that mattered, it cared about the battles in people’s heads. Force, is of course more attractive as a policy option perhaps for men and women who see it abstractly. But getting force right and keeping it useful is part of the inheritance of the Labour party and the wider left that we ought to own. It does not make any of the decisions easier internationally in a multipolar world. It does direct one to ask in whose interest is this force being used, but with what effect on whom? What are the politics of force? But it is a sobering tradition, fit for a sombre moment.
It is right that today’s political leaders should examine past decisions to understand how they may have contributed to the problems that they face today. But rather than rewinding the clock, the role of a responsible power, such as the UK, is to confront current international problems and to see what it can do to help the collective effort to address them.

The Labour government’s decision to take part in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 produced a trauma for both the country and the party. It played a central role in bringing Tony Blair’s premiership to an end, overshadowing his many other achievements. The subsequent absence of the weapons of mass destruction, used as the main justification of the invasion, contributed to the wider erosion of public trust in government and politicians. The shadow of this policy failure also helped to explain why – 10 years later – Labour withheld support from the Conservative government’s proposal to launch limited air strikes against the Assad regime in Syria.

Even if Saddam had still possessed some chemical weapons (as western intelligence agencies genuinely believed at the time), the intervention would have been misguided. Within months, it triggered widespread sectarian conflict, leading to millions of Iraqis fleeing their homes, and precipitating Sunni rebellions that proved to be fruitful recruiting
grounds for Al Qaeda and, subsequently, for Isis. In contrast, the 2001 US intervention in Afghanistan (with UK support) had removed Al Qaeda’s main safe haven, led to a period of relative internal peace under a new government, and improved living conditions to such an extent that millions of Afghans returned to their homes from abroad.

Experience in both countries has also demonstrated the limits to how far outside powers can reshape other societies through a ‘comprehensive’ approach of state transformation, even when massive military and financial resources are applied to the effort. At times, intervening forces got the balance wrong between diplomatic, military and developmental interventions. Their lack of understanding of local history and political culture was often laughable, and the international effort helped to fuel an explosion in levels of local corruption. Even if all these problems had been addressed, however, it is doubtful whether western forces could have achieved the hubristic objectives which they had set themselves.

While these failures have been a graphic reminder of the limits of recent campaigns, however, they do not mean that military intervention, per se, has no value. Rather they show that success depends, most of all, on the ability of local actors – supported by key regional powers – to reach a sustainable political settlement. Thus the ability of the west to succeed in its campaign against Isis continues to be undermined by the reality that none of the other key external actors (Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey), nor the governments of Syria and Iraq, are prepared to make the destruction of Isis their top priority. Even without recruiting at least some of these parties to its campaign, western military action is still contributing to worthwhile second-order objectives (for example, defending the Kurds against Isis in Iraq and Syria today). In the absence of being prepared to provide an occupation force, the western
powers cannot achieve their primary objective – replacing Isis on the ground with a more moderate Sunni Arab alternative – without support from others.

The US and UK are right to reject the invasion option in the case of Syria. But they would be wrong to rule out ‘boots on the ground’ altogether. Capable ground forces can still have an important role to play where there is a sustainable political settlement that they can help police. UK forces can, for example, play a useful role in supporting UN peacekeeping forces in Africa. Over the coming period, American and European preparedness to contribute to peace enforcement could play a useful role in helping to guarantee a political settlement in Syria or Libya.

The auld alliance

The Iraq experience has also thrown light on the nature of the UK’s relationship with the US. This is sometimes wrongly characterised as being subordinate or even slavish in nature. In reality, this ‘special relationship’ is much more robust and dynamic than its critics claim. It has been the central feature of UK security policy for more than 70 years, not because of illusions or conspiracies, but because both states have similar fundamental security interests.

The UK’s strategic culture remains dominated by the lessons that it drew from fighting the second world war. When the country faced the prospect of possible extinction in the summer of 1940, all its major political parties joined forces to lead the struggle for national survival. In contrast to the experience of neighbouring countries, support for the armed forces is rooted in public appreciation of the central role that they played in preventing invasion at that time.

The history of the 1940s also showed how important the US was to European, and British, security. Without US
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intervention, Europe – and probably in time also the UK – would have fallen to Nazi or Soviet tyranny. Once victory was won, the UN was not an alternative to the special Anglo-American relationship for those who met for the first meeting of the UN in Westminster Central Hall in January 1946. Rather, close co-operation between the US and the UK was the key to the creation of the post-war liberal international order. It was the two western victor powers who led the way in creating the international institutions – the UN, the World Bank, what became the WTO, and NATO – that remain central to global and European international society to this day.

Within the broad convergence of interests between two states, however, there have often been issues – economic, social, environmental, ideological and political – where the two countries have taken different views, and where the US relationship has been a focus of controversy in the UK.

One of the most important areas of divergence, during the cold war, was in relation to US military interventions in (what was then often called) the third world. Despite its economic dependence on the US during a time of budget crisis, the Wilson government in the 1960’s refused repeated calls from President Johnson to send a token contingent of UK forces to Vietnam. Many Labour politicians were deeply opposed to the US’s cold war involvement in overthrowing democratically elected leaders, most notoriously in Iran (1953) and Chile (1973).

When Labour returned to power in 1997, it appeared that the wounds from this period had healed. In opposition, Labour leaders had been vocal in their criticism of the failure to intervene more decisively in Bosnia and Rwanda. When they subsequently entered government, Robin Cook and Tony Blair were united in their commitment to use British armed forces as a ‘force for good’ in preventing massive human rights abuses and defending democracy. Blair was at the forefront of
European efforts to persuade a reluctant President Clinton to threaten the use of ground forces in order to force Serbia out of Kosovo. The new government also successfully used military force, or the threat of its use, to support humanitarian goals in Sierra Leone, Macedonia and East Timor. Not least, the Labour government was united in support of the US-led mission to overthrow the Taliban government in Afghanistan, after it refused to give up Osama bin Laden in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US.

Yet President Bush’s subsequent determination to invade Iraq broke the consensus within the Blair cabinet, leading to resignations from Clare Short and then Robin Cook. Tony Blair believed that going to war to overthrow Saddam Hussein was the right thing to do, as much for humanitarian reasons as for WMD-related ones. But his closeness to President Bush through this crisis, and his close association with the US-led ‘war on terror’ was too much for many party members and MPs. As the situation on the ground in Iraq worsened, party and public support for the war eroded further.

Policing the rules

The Labour party and the British left has always had a strong internationalist tradition, with a particular focus on the central role of the UN and other global institutions, support for strong action against human rights abuses and a consistent commitment to high levels of aid spending.

Yet the post-1945 rules-based international order is not automatically self-preserving. The destructive forces of the past could reassert themselves, whether in the form of civil wars within weak states, a revival of aggressive militarism, or the failure of European co-operation when faced by the political challenges posed by economic stagnation and the subsequent rise of extreme nationalism as a political force.
One does not need to buy into the narrative that we live in a uniquely dangerous period of history – we do not – to understand that the international order, in Europe and more broadly, needs to be nurtured and maintained. Most of that maintenance involves economic and political work, the hard graft involved in negotiations over trade, environmental regulation and new legal instruments. But sometimes – when there is no realistic alternative – hard security measures are needed. If the international system is to be maintained, the community of responsible states, both in Europe and more broadly, needs to be prepared to provide the hard security instruments – the intelligence services, diplomats and armed forces – that are needed to reassure allies and deter potential foes, as well as to fight when necessary. The UK’s history, together with its role as the west’s second military power (and also the world’s second largest aid donor), gives it a particular importance in shaping European approaches to security and in the maintenance of global order. If the UK were now to walk away from international responsibilities, slashing its defence and aid budgets and refusing to take part in any military operations beyond purely national protection, it would leave other allies more dependent on the US. Given the unpredictability of US domestic politics, this would be most unwelcome to the UK’s allies, especially those in north-western Europe with whom it has particularly close relationships. It would also remove from the field a country that is better than most others in recognising the complementary roles of development resources and defence power in foreign policy.

The UK’s relative power has declined significantly since the glory days of empire. But it is much more secure than it was in the 1920s or 1930s. It no longer has to hold onto a worldwide empire, threatened by multiple rebellions and revisionist powers. All its neighbours are close allies and
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friends, as is the world’s single military superpower. Its economy derives considerable benefit from access to relatively open international markets and talent.

Not least, the UK is not alone. The strong European institutions created after 1945 – NATO and the European Union – continue to play a key role in supporting the international rules-based order. They create predictability and solidarity between European states, and have contributed to a significant denationalisation of security. While individual European states can achieve relatively little on their own in foreign policy, in combination they possess persuasive capabilities comparable to those of the US and China. While it is not always easy to achieve foreign policy consensus between the UK, France and Germany, they yield real international influence when they are able to do so, especially when they are able to bring the rest of the EU along with them. Good recent examples are recent negotiations with Iran on its nuclear programme, which started with European outreach to Tehran, and the united European response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, where the UK played an important role in building support for EU sanctions.

Conclusions

An internationalist foreign policy has served the UK well since 1945. It needs to be adapted to cope with new threats and challenges, and to the opportunities created by the growing importance of rising powers in the international system. But the fundamentals of this ‘grand strategy’ – based on close institutionalised co-operation with both the US and our European neighbours – have proven the test of time.

In the aftermath of the worst economic recession since the 1940s, the temptations of a more inward-looking approach are strong in the UK, on both the right and the left of the
political spectrum. It is a debate that will intensify as we approach the EU referendum, when the advocates of continuing membership will not find it straightforward to make the case for the compromises involved in co-operation when faced with the nationalist appeal of those who want the UK to leave. Yet, just as walking away from the EU would pose major – if extremely uncertain – risks to the UK’s security and prosperity, the abnegation of the UK’s role in international security could also have unpleasant consequences, unsettling European security at a moment when close co-operation is even more important.

It is right that today’s political leaders should examine past decisions – including the invasion of Iraq in 2003 – to understand how they may have contributed to the problems that they face today. But the world does not allow politicians, at least if they aspire to national office, the luxury of rewinding the clock of history. Rather, the role of a responsible power, such as the UK, is to address the current problems that the international community confronts, and to see what it can do to help the collective effort to address them. There are not many international problems which the UK, acting on its own, can resolve. But it does have sufficient weight – not least as one of Europe’s leading defence and development powers – to shape international responses in a way that reflects the UK’s values and interests. When decisions are made on whether, and how, future interventions should take place, the world would still benefit from a strong and separate British voice.
Foreign policy has become inextricably linked with European and domestic policies and it is clear that nation states cannot act in isolation. The EU has proved itself as a foreign policy actor with the brokering of the Iran nuclear deal. Progressives must now develop a strategic and coherent European foreign policy that addresses the many entangled challenges we face.

There have always been conflicts in the world but, since the end of the second world war, the majority of countries in the European Union and its citizens have not been directly affected. We should still be ashamed that when there was conflict in our own backyard, in the Balkans, we failed to act immediately. Although, it did at least result in the EU strengthening its capacity in the area of common foreign and security policy, this capacity has seldom been realised. However, war in Syria, the millions of people on the move either fleeing conflict or from fragile states in search of a better life, and the attacks perpetrated by Isis, are all having a real impact on the EU and should be a catalyst for co-operation and action.

It is time to address the root causes of the crises. Yet the EU appears to be part paralysed and part addicted to hastily convened councils which result in piecemeal actions rather than a coherent strategy. There must of course be global solutions to the war in Syria and the unspeakable violence and
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depravity of Isis, and both the UN resolution and the Vienna talks are crucial steps. But the EU has earned its seat at the table in these international negotiations.

The agreement between Iran and the international powers to control nuclear development in the country demonstrated the too often unexploited potential of the EU in the world of foreign diplomacy. Europe, first with Cathy Ashton at the helm and then Federica Mogherini, was instrumental in securing the agreement, moving beyond its primary role as a mediator to becoming a formidable actor with a coherent doctrine of multilateralism. It is thanks to this historic action that Iran has, for the first time, become an active participant in the dialogue on Syria’s future.

I recently visited the Shatilla camp in Beirut, Lebanon – now home to Syrian refugees as well 25,000 Palestinians who retain the hope and expectation that they will be able to return to their homes. The ongoing attacks in Palestine and Israel are a constant reminder of the need to keep working for the latter to be safe and secure within its borders as well as a self-governing state for the former. But talking to young Palestinians, despairing of their future, made me think that as democratic socialists with friends in both Israel and Palestine we should be doing more in both to find a solution to a seemingly intractable problem.

There is so much more that the EU could and should be doing. As progressives, whilst we do not have power in many member states or the majority in council, commission or parliament, we do have influence. It is our duty to not only make the case for partnership and multilateralism in a European context but to use our influence and advocacy to be a catalyst for action and steer the policies of the EU. With the river of refugees, the atrocities in Paris and terror alerts, foreign policy has become inextricably linked with European and domestic policies. It is clear that nation states cannot act
in isolation. These are cross-border, common problems that require common solutions on which our stability and security depend. That is increasingly clear – even to the people of the UK.

As progressives we should be developing policies and making the case for action in three areas, all of which are intertwined.

Firstly, investment. Peace in Syria and the defeat of Isis are paramount. However, the flow of refugees and migrants is not going to cease for some time, from either Syria or its neighbouring countries, or indeed Africa. We have to deal with the root causes. Instability, hunger, and lack of hope are driving people north. Who can blame them? If we were living in abject poverty in a failing state with little or no respect for human rights, we too might become the prey of people smugglers and brave the perilous journey to Europe.

The summit for European and African leaders in Malta hosted by the EU was positive and the £1.3bn pledged for the countries of Africa was welcome, but it was a drop in the ocean. The EU alone cannot provide the necessary investment and capacity-building in Africa, rebuild the fragile states or instil respect for human rights. These are global responsibilities. When we do provide money however, as under the Khartoum process to tackle human smuggling from the Horn of Africa, we must ensure that there are monitoring mechanisms and transparency. This will stop it disappearing into the coffers of governments who themselves abuse human rights.

So we need to urge long-term global investment and action in Africa. Perhaps by exploring the possibility of strategic partnerships with China which, in its insatiable quest for energy and minerals, has built invaluable infrastructure in some countries. But for the Middle East and North Africa, we should at the very least be making the case for a new
Marshall Plan: a global response to a global crisis. More humanitarian aid is needed in Jordan and Lebanon – a beautiful country but one where the political system is paralysed, where economic growth has stalled but which has provided refuge for more than two million people. As it stands, only 50 per cent of the funds required are available.

In the medium and long term, real economic investment is critical for the region. All the countries of the Arab Spring, whose citizens rose up to demand dignity, freedom and human rights, and where progress has retreated (apart from in Tunisia whose fragile democracy is underpinned by a strong constitution), need the same kind of injection of funds that western European countries received under Marshall. The young people who fought heroically for free and equal societies must have hope for the future. They also need to know that the activists, journalists and trade unionists in the crucible of the Arab world still have our support and that their struggles were not wasted.

Secondly, our relationship with Turkey – a country that is pivotal in many respects and could play a key role in promoting stability in the region. But Turkey has conflict and instability on its borders, internal instability having abandoned the peace process with the Kurdish militants the PKK, and is coping with 2.3 million refugees. Only a small proportion of those who want to seek asylum in the EU are stopped at the Turkish border and the route from and to Europe of jihadists is seemingly unhindered. At the same time the weakening of the ‘EU anchor’ over the last few years – where the accession process drives momentum for reform – has had huge implications for the independence of its institutions and respect for fundamental freedoms. Critical reforms meanwhile, in relation to education, tax reform, the labour market and procurement have gone into reverse with a huge impact on the economy.
Chancellor Merkel persuaded the EU to consider a deal with Turkey that would slow the flow of migrants into the EU whilst providing €3bn aid and re-energising Turkey’s application for EU membership. The urgency of coming to such an agreement is understandable, especially when so many refugees go to Germany, but this should be an opportunity for the EU and Turkey to reset its relationship. Turkey embarked on its accession negotiations in 2005 but EU membership is still but a distant prospect, not least because of the views of EU citizens – the people who vote governments into office.

For the time being, the left should be looking at ways of strengthening our relationship with Turkey, whilst encouraging it to embed democratic freedoms and strengthen its institutional capacity. In Britain, we should also be using our experience of the peace process in Northern Ireland to help the Turkish government and the PKK find a similar solution.

The left should be exploring a new and deeper relationship with Turkey, but it should also re-evaluate its wider neighbourhood policy. The accession process has been instrumental in fostering change in countries that aspire to membership but we must find new ways of establishing meaningful associations without the promise of becoming full members of the EU.

Third, in the Balkans, the accession process must be completed. It is not an annex to Europe but an integral part of Europe, and it is essential for the peace and prosperity of our continent that they join the EU. As progressives we strongly believe that there cannot be security without respect for democratic principles and the rule of law – cornerstones of the Copenhagen criteria, which define whether a country is eligible to join the EU and must be respected.

But there are many difficulties and tensions in the Balkans. The progress made in terms of tolerance and fundamental
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freedoms seems to be spiralling backwards with, for example, attacks on political activists and curbs on freedom of expression in Bosnia and Macedonia. This cannot be ignored. Whilst they have recent experience of conflict, of both being and supporting refugees, the current flow of people from the south is challenging and likely to become more difficult if borders were to be closed. They need help on their journey to EU accession, but in supporting them we have to ensure respect for fundamental values and rights.

The left has the values of social justice and equality that are our bedrock and an inherent desire to deal with inequalities. We, therefore, have a special responsibility to ensure that when foreign policy impacts on our own communities – for example, when refugees arrive in our countries – we do all that we can to foster social cohesion. When there is a failure of integration, when people do not feel that they have a stake in society, seeds of radicalisation and extremism are sown and can grow. When young people feel included and valued in the wider community, when they have a role and a sense of purpose, they are not tempted by the literalist and fundamental theology that Isis follow.

Under the auspices of the Party of European Socialists, the Westminster Foundation for Democracy and organisations like the Fabians, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or the Olaf Palme International Centre, progressives have the opportunity to develop a strategic and coherent European foreign policy that addresses the many entangled challenges we face.

Too often, the daily demands of government or opposition means that party policies are focussed on national solutions in a European context rather than European ones which will provide solutions at both national and European level. We also have the opportunity to work with people in the Balkans and in the Middle East to build their governance capacity, to strengthen their institutions, to learn the skills of opposition
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and government, and to nurture civil society. We should use these possibilities to ensure that as we look outward to the world we are helping our partners to develop. By doing so, we will help them deal better with instability in their own countries whilst respecting fundamental freedoms and values.
It is time for the left to rethink Trident from first principles, with Britain’s security needs as the sole frame of reference. Too often the nuclear question has become a cipher for internal struggles that have little or nothing to do with the issue at hand. The left must clear away the ideological debris of the past and focus on the security challenges of the present.

Labour has launched a defence review, the main conclusion of which will be a decision on whether to maintain support for the renewal of Britain’s Trident nuclear deterrent or adopt a policy of unilateral disarmament favoured by its new leader. The fact that this issue has been reopened after so many years is for many people an uncomfortable reminder of Labour’s last period of opposition, when its stance on nuclear defence often put it at odds with itself and the electorate. It might equally be argued that the left’s reluctance to think deeply about the issue since Labour abandoned unilateralism in 1989 made this inevitable. Policy based on a taboo is always likely to unravel under pressure.

It is time for the left to rethink Trident from first principles, with Britain’s security needs as the sole frame of reference. Too often in the past the nuclear question has become a cipher for internal struggles that have little or nothing to do with the issue at hand. It will only be able to develop a policy that makes sense to voters if it is prepared to clear away the
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ideological debris of the past and focus on the security challenges of the present.

Fallacies of left and right

Across the left there has been a tendency to cling to unhelpful shibboleths when thinking about nuclear weapons. The main error of the Labour right has been to make a false link between nuclear possession and national prestige. When Tony Blair argued that scrapping Trident would be “too big a downgrading of our status as a nation” he was echoing Ernest Bevin more than half a century before. The equation is groundless. There is no real link between nuclear status and permanent membership of the UN Security Council, for example. Two of the countries best placed to get permanent seats of their own – Germany and Brazil – base their claims on economic strength. This is a far more important measure of global status, and likely to remain so.

A related fallacy is to see nuclear weapons as an eternal test of the left’s fitness to govern. Labour won a majority in 1964 on a platform of opposition to an independent deterrent and public opinion has until recently been highly sceptical of the need for Trident renewal. The British people take an unsentimental, cost-benefit view of nuclear weapons and expect their political leaders to do the same.

The moral abhorrence that is naturally felt for the idea of nuclear warfare has led the radical left to a different set of errors. One has been to deny that deterrence has any utility. This flies in the face of historical experience. Nuclear weapons have only been used twice; on both occasions by a country that possessed them against a country that didn’t. Deterrence clearly does work. The only question is whether it is likely to work in relation to the kind of security challenges Britain faces today.
A second mistake is to see nuclear possession as the problem rather than as a symptom of the problem, and therefore to pursue disarmament as an end in itself. Nuclear weapons can be a destabilising factor and their elimination should certainly be pursued as a matter of priority. But one-sided disarmament does not in itself reduce the risk of conflict and may even increase it in the wrong circumstances; the 1930s being a case in point. The preferred solution should be mutual and balanced disarmament within a confidence-building framework that addresses the underlying security concerns driving nations to arm.

It would be a mistake to support Trident renewal for reasons of national vanity or political expediency, just as it would be to advocate its abandonment without reference to the wider security implications. It is on the defence case alone that the argument needs to focus.

Rationales for a British nuclear deterrent

Various rationales have been advanced to justify the retention of a British nuclear capability. The often-repeated argument that Trident provides vital insurance against the risks of living in an uncertain world should be dismissed at the outset. All countries live in an uncertain world and share the risks associated with it. As an argument for nuclear possession it is tantamount to a call for universal proliferation. The case for Trident stands or falls on the basis of identifiable security threats that nuclear weapons might plausibly help to mitigate. Of these, four deserve consideration: threats to the territorial integrity of the UK and our NATO allies, the emergence of rogue states, terrorist attacks involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the risk of nuclear blackmail.
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(i) Territorial threats to the UK and NATO
The development of NATO’s nuclear doctrine was shaped very much with this threat in mind. Throughout the cold war the balance of conventional military power in Europe overwhelmingly favoured the Soviet Union and NATO saw nuclear weapons as a ‘force equaliser’ capable of deterring the threat of invasion. That threat no longer exists in its old form. On paper, at least, NATO now enjoys conventional superiority over Russia. Although there are justifiable concerns about the effectiveness and preparedness of those conventional forces, the military threat to Britain’s territorial integrity is greatly reduced.

The same cannot be said for all of the NATO countries with which Britain shares a collective defence commitment under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Baltic states, in particular, remain the target of aggressive actions by Russia, including cyber attacks and energy supply cut-offs. In the wake of the Ukraine crisis, Russian foreign policy doctrine asserts a right to intervene on behalf of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in neighbouring countries. While many of the security challenges this raises will have no nuclear component, there are circumstances in which nuclear weapons may prove to be a decisive factor. These will be discussed below.

(ii) Rogue states
The spectre of rogue states armed with nuclear weapons or other WMD has become a popular argument for nuclear retention since the end of the cold war. In reality, North Korea is the only state commonly labelled ‘rogue’ to have developed a nuclear capability. Others have either failed or given up. The Geneva Agreement extends Iran’s breakout period to at least a year, but even if it decided to revive its nuclear programme, it is a long way from developing a missile system capable of threatening the British mainland.
Some posit an Islamist takeover of nuclear-armed Pakistan as a serious risk. As with all rogue state scenarios, it is far-fetched to imagine a conflict with a Taliban-controlled Pakistan in which British nuclear forces would play a unique and decisive role. In any case, it is a myth to assert that only nuclear weapons can deter nuclear use. The certainty of regime destruction achieved by conventional means would be enough to affect rogue state calculations.

(iii) Terrorism using WMD
The desire of certain terrorist groups to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction is well documented. Unless one of these groups managed to get its hands on a functioning nuclear device, the threat is more likely to come in the form of a radiological bomb (also known as a ‘dirty bomb’), or possibly chemical or biological attack. Nuclear weapons are obviously ineffective in deterring such attacks. Even in cases of state-sponsored terrorism, the prospect of regime removal through conventional force is just as likely to deter as the threat of nuclear retaliation; perhaps more so, because the threat would have greater credibility than an indiscriminate response.

(iv) Nuclear blackmail
The case for Trident would be strengthened if there were reasonable grounds to fear that a non-nuclear Britain might become vulnerable to nuclear threats made by another state. This is one area where the calculus of risk can be said to have changed in a negative direction. Over the past two years, nuclear intimidation, both stated and implied, has become a regular feature of Russian diplomacy. In summer 2014 President Putin said: “Russia’s partners... should understand it’s best not to mess with us... I want to remind you that Russia is one of the leading nuclear powers.” The
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following spring, Russia threatened to target Denmark with nuclear weapons if it participated in NATO’s missile defence system. In March 2015 a group of retired Russian security officials was asked by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to convey a private warning to American officials attending a meeting of the Elbe Group that Russia would be prepared to use force, including nuclear weapons, if the west built up its presence in the Baltic states, armed Ukraine or attempted to restore Ukrainian control over Crimea.

Russia’s force dispositions are intended to buttress these intimidatory messages. Russian nuclear bombers have resumed patrols of UK airspace, nuclear-capable Iskander missiles have been deployed in Kaliningrad and Russia has started testing a new generation of cruise missiles in breach of the INF Treaty. Russia’s 2009 Zapad military exercise included a simulated nuclear strike on Poland. The implications of this for British defence policy should be carefully considered.

New military risks

One conclusion to draw from the analysis above is that threat scenarios in which British nuclear forces might become a significant factor are geographically specific. Britain is not a power in the Asia-Pacific region and it is difficult to envisage a confrontation with China in which an independent British deterrent would have a role to play. Likewise, Britain remains beyond the missile range of any rogue state likely to acquire nuclear weapons or other WMD in anything other than the long-term. It is in Europe that Britain’s fundamental security interests are engaged to an extent that might justify Trident renewal.

Historically those interests have been pursued through efforts to maintain a stable balance of power. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 they have been closely tied to the
The left’s nuclear choice

creation of a European security order based on the rule of law, the renunciation of power politics, the right of self-determination and respect for the sovereign equality of all states. The threat of a continental war between ideologically antagonistic blocs has receded and the vision of a “Europe, whole and free” has been substantially advanced. Yet there are at least two senses in which the assumption that the post-cold war European security environment is safer and more benign needs to be qualified.

The first is that the all-encompassing American security guarantee that covered European members of NATO for 40 years has been progressively scaled back. A US military deployment in Europe that by the early 1980s totalled 350,000 troops and 6000 tactical nuclear warheads has been reduced to 65,000 troops and 200 warheads today. American financial and political priorities have changed and are now focussed on a rising China and the prospect of strategic rivalry in the Pacific. President Obama’s ‘Asian pivot’ is an expression of this new reality. Even America’s reduced commitment to Europe cannot be taken for granted. Opinion polls show isolationist sentiment among the American public at a 50-year high. Russian policy makers have more reason than ever to believe that the goal of decoupling America from Europe is achievable.

In this context the case for a ‘second centre’ of nuclear decision-making within the Atlantic Alliance becomes more relevant, not less. This was the doctrine developed by Denis Healey as defence secretary in the 1960s as a way of providing additional credibility to NATO’s deterrence posture. The idea was that the ability of a European NATO member to deploy nuclear weapons independently would discourage an aggressor from gambling that the US might stay out of a European war for fear of exposing American cities to nuclear attack. A British nuclear capability meant that the aggressor
Outward to the world could face unacceptable retaliatory damage even if American willpower faltered.

The second reason for concern is that Russia under Vladimir Putin has evolved into precisely the sort of aggressive, risk-taking adversary the ‘second centre’ doctrine was intended to deter. In relative terms, the Soviet Union was a fairly cautious foreign policy actor. It was willing to use force to maintain control over its satellite states, but avoided direct conflict with the west and refrained from crude nuclear blackmail, especially after the Cuban missile crisis. President Putin has no similar inhibitions. He is prepared to dismantle the post-cold war security order, re-arrange borders by force and threaten nuclear use in order to impose what he regards as Russia’s legitimate sphere of influence on the countries around him.

Critics of Trident argue that it did nothing to prevent Russian aggression against Ukraine. It would be more accurate to note that no real effort was made to deter Russia by either conventional or nuclear means. In any case, the argument for a British nuclear capability isn’t only about our ability to deter Putin; it is also about his ability to deter us. We can easily imagine a scenario in which Russia decided to launch a new offensive across the Minsk II ceasefire line towards Odessa, Kharkiv or possibly even Kiev itself. One response might be to give Ukraine the lethal defensive equipment needed to fight off an attack, something President Obama has refused to do. If Britain decided to arm Ukraine on its own, Putin might repeat the threat he conveyed privately in March 2015. As things stand, Britain could afford to brush such a threat aside. A non-nuclear Britain would probably have reason to take a different view. In other words, we would be deterred, giving Russia a free hand to dismantle Ukraine as an independent state.
A similar situation could be replicated in the Baltic states where Britain has Article 5 defence commitments. Russian covert forces and local proxies could seize parts of those countries and invite the regular Russian army in to protect them. Fulfilling our treaty obligations would involve the deployment of British troops to expel Russian forces or at least stop them from advancing. Again, with first-mover advantage, Russia would be well placed to deter a conventional military response from a non-nuclear Britain. In reality, it is unlikely that the US would fail to honour its own Article 5 commitments, but Russia might be tempted to test that proposition, especially at a moment when the US was distracted by a crisis in another part of the world. Any signal that encouraged Russia to take that chance would heighten the risk of conflict.

Conclusion

In 2009, President Obama announced his support for the vision of a nuclear free world. At that time there was reason to be optimistic about disarmament and even cold war veterans like Henry Kissinger and George Shultz were arguing that ‘global zero’ was a realistic long-term goal. There was an arguable case that Trident was becoming irrelevant. The intervening years have not been kind to that hope. As the crisis in Ukraine has shown, deep divisions remain over the structure of European order with Russia prepared to use military force to assert a dominant role over the countries around it. It would be a mistake to believe that these tensions are the product of a misunderstanding that might therefore be amenable to a diplomatic solution. They arise, instead, from a fundamental clash of values and the unwillingness of Russia’s current leadership to accept the principle of sovereign equality in relations between states.
The left should aim to create the conditions in which a nuclear free world once again becomes a realistic goal. But we cannot pretend that those conditions currently exist. For the time being we live in a Europe threatened by the return of armed conflict. It is dangerous to assume that disarmament in all circumstances is a step towards peace. To those with aggressive intent, it can also be taken as a signal to act. Vladimir Putin has shown himself to be an aggressive risk-taker with no respect for international law or Russia’s treaty commitments. The last thing Britain should do is give him or his successors additional reasons to miscalculate. Whatever the intentions, a decision to scrap Trident now would be the wrong signal at the wrong time.
8: A NEW PROGRESSIVE INTERNATIONALISM

Jo Cox MP

In recent years, Britain has withdrawn from the world. On Syria, on Europe, on Ukraine this government has been on the periphery: all victim of the same lack of long-term strategic thinking about British foreign policy and the absence of a moral compass. It is time for the left to revive its ethical foreign policy and carve out a new long-term narrative that puts human rights and the protection of civilians centre stage once again.

There is much to be proud of in the left’s internationalist past. Many from our movement made the ultimate sacrifice fighting Franco’s fascism during the Spanish civil war. We were unequivocal in our opposition to Apartheid in South Africa, led action to protect civilians in Kosovo and Sierra Leone. And we put this country firmly on the road to fulfil our historic commitment to spend 0.7 per cent of GDP on aid – an act of solidarity that has seen millions more children in school and many more women surviving childbirth.

However, this active internationalist approach is not inevitable. It has been, and is still, contested across the political spectrum. It is threatened by an increasingly nationalist and isolationist right, by a government that has withdrawn from global leadership. And it is threatened by those on the left who might show great personal solidarity with international causes but tend to think the British state has no role to play.
As such, I believe the left is now in a fundamental fight about our future approach to international affairs: one where we decide whether to channel UK resources, diplomatic influence and military capability in defence of human rights and the protection of civilians; or one where we stand on the sidelines frozen by our recent failures.

I believe it’s time for the left to revive its ethical foreign policy and in particular, rebuild the case for a progressive approach to humanitarian intervention.

The willingness to intervene to protect civilians was strongly championed by Labour’s former foreign secretary, Robin Cook. In his 1999 Labour conference speech, he made the case for the Labour government not to “turn a blind eye to how other governments behave and a deaf ear to the cries for help of their people”.

Cook had six principles to guide the international community in any intervention, which were a precursor to the eventual adoption in 2005 of a new UN doctrine. His thinking helped to build a global consensus that: “where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state of failure, and the state is unwilling or unable to halt or advert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the responsibility to protect.”

However, in the midst of this fragile and evolving international commitment to humanitarian intervention came Labour’s darkest hour. After the horror of 9/11 ‘interventionism’ was increasingly expressed through the paradigms of ‘security’ or ‘counter terrorism’, rather than being grounded firmly in the protection of civilians. And then Labour’s support for military action in Iraq distorted a worthy principle with such devastating impact. The legacy of Iraq – an intervention I was wholly opposed to because it was not fundamentally about protecting civilians – still hangs over us. But Labour can no longer be paralysed by Iraq. We need
to learn from its many lessons without forgetting the equally important lessons of Bosnia or Rwanda.

For those who needed a reminder about what non-intervention looks like, Syria has been a stark illustration. President Assad dropped chemical weapons on school children and the world stood by. He rained down barrel bombs and cluster munitions on hospitals and homes and we did not respond.

For too long, the UK government let the crisis fester on the ‘too difficult to deal with’ pile. There was no credible strategy, nor courage or leadership – instead we had chaos and incoherence, interspersed with the occasional gesture. It’s been a masterclass in how not to do foreign policy and a shameful lesson on what happens when you ignore a crisis of this magnitude.

Only now, following the creation of Isis, the attacks on Paris and Tunisia, and the worst refugee crisis since the second world war has the prime minister started to set out the bones of a strategy. Although belated, this marks a step forward. But whereas he could have led on the development of a comprehensive plan with the protection of civilians at its core, instead he went for an ‘Isis-first’ approach which has already failed for 18 months in Syria.

Whilst, of course, the protection of UK citizens is our primary responsibility, unless we act to end the slaughter of civilians in Syria by President Assad, Isis will continue to find a steady stream of recruits from the Syrian Sunni population driven to desperation and radicalisation. In this context no amount of military action against Isis will be able to eradicate them. Moreover, moderate forces on the ground – the much discussed 70,000 – continue to be the primary target of the Syrian regime and Russian attacks. As long as these attacks persist these forces will not be able to focus – as many want to – on freeing their country from the cancer of Isis.
Unless, and until, UK strategy on Syria is grounded in the protection of civilians, including crucially through the Vienna process, efforts to secure a durable political settlement will struggle, as will the campaign to defeat Isis.

Our marginal role in the Syrian crisis has served to highlight the broader story of Britain’s withdrawal from the world. On Syria, on Europe, on Ukraine this government has been on the periphery: all victim of the same lack of long-term strategic thinking about British foreign policy and the absence of a moral compass. This flawed approach has not only damaged our ability to have an impact but also limits our capacity to be a force for good. The recent and sudden pivot in our relations with China (and the shame of being congratulated for not raising human rights), our relationship with Saudi Arabia, the rebadging of UK embassies as trade outposts and the lack of a comprehensive vision on a crisis the magnitude and complexity of Syria; all feel ill thought through and incoherent.

In addition, this flawed approach does not do justice to our status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, our role as a leading member of NATO and the EU, or the fact that we have one of the best military and diplomatic services in the world.

In this context, the left should carve out a new long-term narrative about British foreign policy: one that puts human rights and the protection of civilians centre stage again. And one that reasserts our commitment to the responsibility to protect those most at risk of mass atrocity crimes.

This isn’t really about being pro or anti-military intervention. Rather it’s a call to redefine the principles that will guide the decisions we take, as well as a commitment to then honour them.

Sadly, there is currently no explicit UK policy on the prevention of mass atrocities or on the UN’s responsibility to protect (RtP) norm. There is also currently no mechanism
in the UK that supports and monitors the government’s commitment to, and implementation of RtP. As a result, UK thinking is confused and often late, and the UK lags behind countries such as the US where the Atrocity Prevention Board brings together key players to facilitate earlier and coordinated responses to RtP threats.

For example, the Central African Republic (CAR) has long been of concern as a country at risk of genocide. Yet the UK government’s risk matrix, published in April 2013, didn’t even feature the CAR. Just one year later, the UN’s Commission of Enquiry into the CAR stated that 99 per cent of the Muslim population of Bangui had been forcibly displaced or killed. Crimes committed by the anti-Balaka are widely considered to constitute a ‘policy of ethnic cleansing’ against CAR’s Muslims. Had the UK had applied a ‘mass atrocity lens’ in its planning, CAR would most certainly have been identified as being at risk and UK policy could have been shaped appropriately.

One initiative that could have made a transformative difference, both in the CAR and in Syria, is the establishment of a cross-party special adviser on mass atrocity prevention, and a mechanism across Whitehall to integrate their thinking. This focal point inside government would perhaps have catalysed earlier, and more effective, life-saving action in both these tragic crisis.

The left should now ensure that clearly defined principles on human rights and the prevention of mass atrocities are at the centre of our foreign policy thinking and action. If we do, then as Robin Cook said in his first press conference on becoming foreign secretary in May 1997, “Britain will once again be a force for good in the world.” And if we don’t reclaim this ground I fear that British foreign policy will become increasingly commercially driven, tactical and chaotic rather than principled, strategic and coherent.
After years in which the disruptive effects of globalisation were deemed untouchable, the left urgently needs to revisit its approach to the international economy. In the aftermath of the financial crash, there is a newfound intellectual and political courage to change the rules in order to achieve greater stability, prosperity, fairness and a space for democratic control over economic arrangements.

“I hear people say we have to stop and debate globalisation. You might as well debate whether autumn should follow summer. They’re not debating it in China and India. They are seizing its possibilities, in a way that will transform their lives and ours.”

Accepting the slings and arrows of globalisation was a central part of New Labour’s social contract. Globalisation was a fact, not an option. It presented huge opportunities which Britain had to embrace. The disruptive effects of globalisation – on patterns of work, traditional industries, flows of capital and people – were neither negotiable nor reasons to resist it. Instead, embracing free trade, flexible labour markets, the single European market and lightly regulated financial services was the route to prosperity. And that prosperity was essential to finance investment in public services, support for the least advantaged and rising incomes.
10 years and one global crash later, the left needs to revisit its approach to globalisation. As David Clark and Duncan Weldon wrote for the Fabian Society in the last parliament: “the laissez-faire globalisation of the pre-crash era produced a ruinous mix of squeezed living standards, growing imbalances in trade and finance, sub-optimal growth, de-industrialisation and unsustainable speculative bubbles”. New Labour rightly made its peace with the market economy, both at home and internationally. But as Dani Rodrik observed, globalisation went “hyper” when it became orthodoxy that any restrictions on the flow of goods and capital across borders should be resisted because they would undermine efficiency and growth.

For all its extraordinary achievements, New Labour showed little interest in shaping the terms of global economic integration. Under Ed Miliband there was an attempt to revisit the shape of Britain’s economy at home, but not that of the international economy. It is now imperative that the left takes that agenda seriously, for many reasons. Firstly, the structural problems in the global economy that were behind the 2008 crash continue to pose threats to economic stability and prosperity. Secondly, the search for justice between nations must have the terms of economic trade between countries as a core concern. And thirdly, because the left needs to show there is a political alternative to fatalism in the face of globalisation. If we want to stop British voters being drawn to the siren calls of those who want the UK to retreat into protectionism, unilateralism and euroscepticism, we must develop credible policies to improve the rules governing international economic cooperation.

The good news is that this is a fertile time for new thinking about how to improve global economic governance. The era of the irresistibility of the Washington Consensus is over, both in the developing and the developed world. In the after-
math of the crash, there is a newfound intellectual and political courage to change the rules of the international economy in order to achieve greater stability, prosperity, fairness and a space for democratic control over economic arrangements. There are five areas where the left should lead the call for reform to the terms of globalisation.

1. Promoting trade on fair terms

The sharp drop-off in world trade since 2008 has slowed down global recovery from the crash. For 14 years the Doha round of multilateral trade talks has been staggering on without progress, despite numerous efforts to revive it, and in its place has come a wave of trade bilateralism – most notably the current effort to establish a US-EU transatlantic trade deal (TTIP).

Championing the revival of world trade should be at the heart of Britain’s foreign economic policy. But the terms of trade should no longer be as divorced from progressive values as they once were. In particular, World Trade Organisation rules currently pay no regard to labour standards in member states. The requirement to observe basic workers’ rights – freedom of association, freedom to bargain collectively, eliminating workplace abuse and measures to block discrimination – should be hard-wired into these rules, not least as an incentive for member governments to improve working conditions as global trade recovers.

The most pressing trade issue facing Britain is TTIP. In the absence of progress on a world trade deal, bilateral deals with major partners can be beneficial, provided they don’t explicitly or inadvertently erect trade barriers with other nations. But political consent for TTIP should point the left towards challenging provisions in the emerging deal that put constraints on national decision-making. Specifically,
governments should reserve the power to exclude key public services (such as the NHS) from market access; and dispute mechanisms between foreign investors and national governments must not allow corporations to overturn the sovereign decisions of elected governments. These provisions are essential to demonstrate that free trade does not come at the expense of governments’ ability to run their own countries and manage their own economies.

2. Correcting global imbalances

Seven years on from the 2008 crash, the world economy is still suffering from major structural imbalances. Many economists talk of a ‘global savings glut’, yet developing countries remain short of investment for desperately needed long-run infrastructure projects. While some surplus countries maintain large current account surpluses at the expense of growth, other countries (most recently China, Vietnam and Kazakhstan) have engaged in currency wars through devaluations in the search for competitive advantage.

This is an area that calls for new rules and new institutions, in the name of the collective good of greater global growth. Given the failure of the world’s capital markets, we should welcome initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank that seek to funnel capital into investment opportunities. But there are bolder ideas in the ether. Five years ago US Treasury secretary Tim Geithner sensibly proposed that G20 countries pledge to limit their current account surpluses and deficits over a period, and agree to correct imbalances if they drift from agreed targets. Within the EU, we should be leading the friendly pressure on Germany to reduce its own current account surplus, which depresses growth inside the eurozone and shifts the burden of adjustment to deficit countries such as Greece and Portugal.
3. Improving global financial stability

The process of improving financial regulation in the wake of the 2008 crash continues, slowly, both at national level and internationally through the Basel accords. But there remains scope for more ambitious reforms that reduce risk further. One idea whose time may well have come is the financial transactions tax (FTT). While it is true that an FTT would raise significant revenue, its main appeal is that it would serve as a brake on unnecessary high frequency trading that can cause significant financial market volatility. Although ideally an FTT should be introduced across global financial markets, Jeremy Corbyn is right to back an FTT across the European Union.

Another area of financial fragility is sovereign debt restructuring. The cases of Argentina, Greece and Ukraine show how debilitating the process of restructuring can be, creating widespread public resentment at the perception that creditors not governments run their country. Just as domestic bankruptcies proceed according to the rule of law, so should national bankruptcies. An international debt restructuring code should, as Joseph Stiglitz has argued, ensure that no country is asked to sign away its sovereignty to meet its debts. And he makes a strong case for why such a code should be anchored in the United Nations, rather than an IMF that is seen by many as an organisation representing creditors’ interests.

4. Ending tax injustice

One area in which a cross-national consensus is building is on the issue of international taxation: ensuring that tax arrangements are transparent and fair, and tax is paid in the country where income is earned. Efforts should start
with tax havens. The total sum estimated to be hidden in low-tax, low-regulation jurisdictions worldwide is around $21tn: as much as the annual economic output of the USA and Japan combined, according to Forbes. Tax havens should provide publicly accessible registers to show who profits from the companies registered, and face penalties if they fail to comply.

The OECD’s recent report on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting is a big step forward in insisting on the ‘country-by-country’ tax principle – that transnational companies disclose how much profit they declare in each country where they operate, so that they can be taxed appropriately. As well as pushing for this principle to become a global norm, the left should argue for national governments to be able to restrict cross-national corporate mergers motivated solely by the desire to avoid tax (‘tax inversions’). In addition, the Franco-German case for a minimum corporate tax rate across the EU should be explored, to prevent member states seeking competitive advantage through race-to-the-bottom tax cuts.

5. Supporting local economies

The recent closure of three foreign-owned steel plants has resurfaced the issue of what UK governments can do to protect local economies and their workers. The answer is: quite a lot. For one thing it requires government to be sharper-elbowed: for example, short-term support for the steel industry to compensate for high energy costs should be introduced pre-emptively, in advance of final EU state aids approval, rather than waiting months for the green light from Brussels.

In the longer-run, there is scope for a more strategic approach to supporting local economies, especially through government procurement. The billions of pounds spent
on government contracts with companies currently come with very little conditionality. The left should argue for a community benefit obligation in major contracts to advantage local companies in bidding for infrastructure contracts. Similarly, procurement could be used to drive up research and development, training and other activities that improve the competitiveness of important industries. We also need to think imaginatively about how to promote sustainable growth (especially outside of London). Why not explore giving local governments powers to promote local growth and regeneration by allowing them to borrow against the consequent uplift in land values?

But the real step-change requires the left to be prepared to embrace a modern industrial policy. The countries that are succeeding in David Cameron’s ‘global race’ are not doing so through practising laissez-faire, but through active government involvement in the economy – in strategic partnership with business, and directing public investment, often through sovereign wealth funds. Labour needs to stop being imprisoned by the political folk memory of 1970s ‘corporatism’ and establish a high-level body with business to think about the long-term needs of the British economy in 2020 and beyond. We should be unapologetic about using public money to back activity that tilts our economy towards a higher-tech, higher-skill and higher-wage future.

What unites these proposals politically is the need to challenge the view that globalisation is shrinking the space for politics and undermining the ability of governments to steer their economies. Politics since the 2008 banking crisis has not been kind to the left across the developed world. But if there is a silver lining to the crash, it is that we should now feel liberated to challenge the laissez-faire orthodoxy that dominated both economic and political thought for so long.
Migration strategy must engage with the world as it is, where the movement of people is a fact of life. Rather than endlessly seeking to restrict and shelter, progressives must think about the powerful forces which drive migration and how they can be shaped in the pursuit of wider goals.

Forecasting migration has always been a difficult task. But five years ago it seemed possible to make a straightforward prediction: that the combination of a deep recession with rising levels of unemployment, and a more restrictive migration policy environment would bring about a reduction in the numbers of migrants coming to the UK. It didn’t. The net migration figure for the year ending June 2015 was 336,000, a record for the UK.

Freedom of movement in Europe has been part of the explanation, particularly since the euro crisis. For many young people from southern and eastern Europe, the choice has been between no job, and an insecure job in the UK (for which they are most often over-qualified). But this is only part of the story.

Against all the odds, the numbers of non-EU migrants entering the UK in 2015 was larger than it was in 2014. This is despite the fact that the UK’s immigration policy has become one of the most hard-line in the developed world. From student migration to family reunion, restrictionism permeates every aspect of immigration policy.
Record net migration figures are unrelated to the current refugee crisis. Despite the large numbers travelling to Europe, asylum seekers still remain one of the smallest groups of migrants entering the UK from outside the EU (just under 4 per cent). To put this into perspectives, while 200,000 people landed in Greece and 110,000 in Italy during the course of 2015, only 5,000 have reached Calais. Recent net migration figures reveal that, even in the wake of this summer’s events, numbers of refugees reaching the UK remain very low. While the UK has among highest rates of inward migration in Europe (a higher per capita figure than Germany), the per capita numbers of refugees are one-eighth to those in Sweden (closer to rates in Poland).

The fact that non-EU migration remains stubbornly high in the face of government’s concerted efforts to restrict it carries with it an important lesson. It has exposed the limits of government policies in the face of the powerful forces which make people leave their homes behind – from the aspiration which drives growing numbers of international students to further their careers in the UK, to the bonds of love and kin which make families want to be reunited against all odds and the increasingly powerful influences of global communication and social media. One of the most striking images of the boat landings over the past months has been the fact that so many desperate refugees carry with them a mobile phone.

Sheltering the UK from these forces is possible. But restrictionism is becoming a very costly business. The UK’s higher education system has warned repeatedly that it will become unviable without the large number of international students whose fees have filled the void of cuts to government subsidy. Cutting off the supply of health and constructions workers will make it impossible to sustain the NHS and ambitious home building programmes. Most recently, the care sector has raised alarms. Further limits to what is
already the strictest family reunion regime in the developed world risks separating indefinitely the growing number of British families who have links elsewhere.

Restrictionism at any price also comes with a heavy cost diplomatically. Nothing illustrates this better than the way in which the current endeavour to limit access to welfare for EU citizens has alienated one of Britain’s staunchest allies in the EU: Poland. Recent state visits by Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping showed that maintaining a positive relationship with India and China will be conditional on treating citizens from these countries fairly via our visa system. Restrictionism at any price would put us at odds with multilateral institutions across the piece, not just the EU and the UN Refugee Agency but the World Bank and the WTO.

While ensuring that the existing immigration system functions effectively and that immigration laws are enforced is critical, tightening UK immigration policy indefinitely could become a game of diminishing returns. The evidence suggests that many policies are generating perverse incentives: more people may have moved in order to pre-empt future barriers (not least EU citizens) or decide to settle when previously they would have come and gone. Costs of control will balloon, people smugglers will benefit and integration will suffer.

So what is the alternative?

A strategy which aims to engage with the world as it is – in other words, a world where the movement of people is a fact of life – will need objectives and aspirations to match. Progressives are by definition much better placed to grapple with these questions. But to do this they will need to engage with a range of complex questions.

For example, is preventing migration a desirable goal for international development? This is a legitimate question, not
Outward to the world

just in light of the public’s desire to see migration reduced (alongside growing scepticism about the feasibility of ring-fenced aid budgets at a time of constrained public finances). But it is important given the complex interplay between migration and development. On the one hand, it seems apparent that draining poorer countries of their most talented people is likely to undermine development and good governance in the future (as argued by critics such as Paul Collier). But the evidence also suggests that migrants carry with them potential for contributing to international development. This can be the case either through direct financial transfers and remittances or through the more indirect effects which living in a developed country can have on attitudes, not least to issues such as gender equality or free speech. Such influences should not be underestimated in the context of growing numbers of international students arriving from countries like China, Saudi Arabia or Nigeria, for example.

Complex questions also arise domestically. For example, remaining open to a mobile and diverse workforce is desirable on the basis that it can stimulate growth and drive economic vibrancy. But how do we make this compatible with the need to promote cohesiveness in communities and integration? Squaring this would require us to think much more carefully about the purpose of immigration policies, and challenge the notion that policies should be designed solely to maximise economic advantages at the expense of greater integration. Given the current government’s emphasis on ensuring that migrants find it hard to settle in the UK, the left could find fruitful territory in championing settlement and integration. The objective could be to be to move away from a situation whereby we talk hard about migration but tolerate it on the basis that it brings with it an economic dividend, to a focus on the conditions necessary to ensure that migrants make an active contribution not just economically, but also socially
and politically. In others words, to ensuring that the policies are in place to enable integration. It should be noted that in October 2015 the Canadian Liberals achieved this seemingly unachievable feat – winning a majority on a pro-migration (pro-integration) platform – on precisely this offer.

In the short-term, restrictionism is no doubt the better strategy electorally. However, the experience of the past five years suggests that it may have reached its limits. Any further tightening is likely to cause substantial damage to our prosperity and Britain’s standing in the world. Furthermore, such effort may not even lead to desired reductions. The time may have come to raise our sights above the business of counting heads, to thinking about powerful forces which drive migration and how we can shape them to ensure that we harness their potential both domestically and in the pursuit of wider goals.
How to use this Discussion Guide

The guide can be used in various ways by Fabian Local Societies, local political party meetings and trade union branches, student societies, NGOs and other groups.

- You might hold a discussion among local members or invite a guest speaker – for example, an MP, academic or local practitioner to lead a group discussion.

- Some different key themes are suggested. You might choose to spend 15–20 minutes on each area, or decide to focus the whole discussion on one of the issues for a more detailed discussion.
A discussion could address some or all of the following questions:

1. Can Labour develop a vision of a UK that is ‘outward to the world’ – in contrast to its opponents’ inward-looking nationalism and isolationism – and what place should this have in the party’s wider political renewal?

2. How should progressives carve a distinctive position on the key foreign and security policy challenges facing Europe, especially with respect to instability among near neighbours?

3. How should the left remake the case for partnership and multilateralism in foreign policy, particularly in a European context?

Please let us know what you think

Whatever view you take of the issues, we would very much like to hear about your discussion. Please send us a summary of your debate (perhaps 300 words) to debate@fabians.org.uk.
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Outward to the World
How the left’s foreign policy can face the future

With Russia flexing its muscles, Isis a rising threat and a refugee crisis caused by failed states and civil war, international affairs are at the top of the political agenda. But the left’s foreign policy debate has been defined more by the battles of the past than the challenges of the future.

It is more important than ever that the left sets out a forward–looking vision of Britain’s role in the world. ‘Outward to the World’ maps out a practical but progressive foreign policy from first principles, developing the building blocks of a practical idealism: a new account of globalisation, a reinvention of the European security order, a political vision for de-escalation in the Middle East, a different account of what multilateralism means in the world.

Today’s left needs to reunite around a new internationalism – which develops a story about the changes in the world and a programme to respond to them, informed by its values.

Foreword by Hilary Benn MP
Introduction by Mark Leonard

With chapters by Malcolm Chalmers, David Clark, Jo Cox MP, Phoebe Griffith, Stephen Kinnock MP, Daniel Levy, Baroness Jan Royall, Jean Seaton, Andrew Small, Lord Stewart Wood

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