Engaging with the Enemy?
Underlying Costs of EU Defence Integration

Dr Lee Rotherham
Foreword by Rear Admiral Richard Heaslip CB
## Contents

About the author ................................................................. 3  
Acknowledgement ........................................................................ 3  
Foreword ..................................................................................... 4  
Executive Summary .............................................................. 5  
Introduction ............................................................................... 6  
A history of EU defence integration ......................................... 8  
The current situation ............................................................... 13  
Cost ......................................................................................... 14  
Merging of Defence Industries: First Steps ............................ 16  
The European Defence Agency (EDA) .................................... 19  
Case history in procurement .................................................. 21  
Space ....................................................................................... 23  
EU defence structures ............................................................ 25  
EU defence groupings ............................................................. 27  
EU flagged ops ......................................................................... 30  
Concerns and alternatives ..................................................... 32  
Système D ................................................................................ 34
About the author

**Dr Lee Rotherham** is a graduate of the University of London and holds an MPhil and PhD from the University of Birmingham. Dr Rotherham is one of the most experienced researchers on EU issues working in British politics, having been a researcher for the “Westminster Group of Eight” Eurorebels and an adviser to three successive Shadow Foreign Secretaries, a role part-based within the European Parliament. This expertise led to his appointment as Chief of Staff to the Rt Hon David Heathcoat-Amory MP, British parliamentary delegate to the Convention on the Future of Europe. Dr Rotherham played a central role assisting delegates opposing the European Constitution, and the drafters of the Minority Report. A reservist with service in both Iraq and Afghanistan, he has been extensively published internationally.

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank the esteemed Richard Heaslip, Rear Admiral CB for his foreword to this paper.
Foreword

There are disturbing signs that the Government may turn to a supposed nirvana whereby cooperation with the EU, both operationally and in defence procurement, may solve its pressing problems. This is a chimera. British defence interests differ too much from those of our neighbours. The more developed EU nations are free from a threat of land invasion for the first time in recorded history and defence is a low priority for them. Britain and France differ in having extensive overseas interests, contacts and opportunities, but these interests are not always the same - indeed as often as not we are in competition.

Moreover the history of "savings" from pooled EU defence procurement is a sorry tale. Destroyers expensively overdesigned to meet each nation's pet needs and then only the UK ends up building them; fighter aircraft purchased in unneeded numbers solely to satisfy international agreements and industrial criteria - the list goes on.

The author's extensive EU experience enables him to take the reader through the widely differing EU perspectives on defence and is a sobering antidote to any who see this route as a potential salvation.

To Lee Rotherham's compelling analysis I would only add that defence procurement, roughly 50% of the total defence budget, is in my view a prime route to long term defence economies. Presently a dysfunctional battleground between the Treasury, starry eyed service operational requirement officers and growth oriented defence companies, it is an area long overdue for root and branch reform. My own experience in this arena leads me to believe that the US gets more bang for the buck by letting industry make more of the running but keeping them honest by rigorous trials before embarking on purchase or production.

I commend this timely and realistic paper by an author who not only understands the EU better than most but has our pockets as well as our defence interests in mind.

Richard Heaslip, Rear Admiral CB
Executive Summary

This paper provides both an historical and a contemporary perspective on EU defence integration. As such it is a companion paper to the TPA paper on EU Diplomats,¹ which looked at the emerging integration of foreign services. Both are part of a policy of removing EU states’ ability to individually protect their national interest in the face of parochialism and non-interventionism amongst their allies.

In the context of UK defence cutbacks, increased British participation in EU-level defence activity provides a dangerous economy. The EU has a twenty year history of an accelerated programme in defence integration behind it. That long-term ambition poses a threat to sovereign Defence capabilities.

The estimated bill for the EU having incorporated defence into its treaties is currently running at around €932 million per annum (£777 million), in addition to direct national military expenditure. That equates to around £80 million a year from UK taxpayers. The inclusion of defence procurement directly into the EU treaties prefigures increased subsidies, especially support for ‘grand projects’ and failing major defence companies in the future.

Given that there are now 7,141 flagged EU personnel deployed on 13 missions overseas, 3,212 in khaki, a de facto EU standing army already exists. British participation in the European Defence Agency is a threat to national identity and defence capability. Conservative policy to withdraw from the EDA is correspondingly the right one. It need not preclude manufacturers reaching appropriate partnerships of their own, either strategically or for individual contracts. The expansion of EU defence integration also threatens Britain’s very particular technological privileges arising from its relationship with the United States.

Senior service personnel have already publicly expressed their own concerns (see appendices). The United Kingdom should extricate itself from EU defence integration, and rely more on a NATO framework, ongoing Commonwealth associations, and bilateral arrangements. Short of surrendering control over equipment, more cooperation should be carried out with France in expeditionary capability where there are areas of common global interest, leaving Paris to continue to concentrate on the Berlin axis for strictly continental defence.

¹ Available online here: http://www.taxpayersalliance.com/EUDiplomats.pdf
Introduction

Britain’s defence establishment is having a tough time of it at the moment. The department’s budget has not been ring-fenced; it will need to include spending to renew the strategic asset of the nuclear deterrent; a major deployment continues in Afghanistan. All that means massive cuts may be required.

A traditional outlet for cost cutters has been to rely on the pooling of defence with allies. The existence of the NATO alliance certainly allowed many European states to reduce their military spending commitments to a point where their independent capabilities are now nugatory, and indeed their contributions were questionable even while the USSR existed. While such countries no longer fear a land war with their neighbours thanks to the changing politics of the European continent, a similar reliance for a country with global trading interests today (such as the UK) carries major risks.

A financial overreliance on any alliance to protect the national interest is dangerous. That applied in the past to cutting the nation’s share of the NATO burden, as much as expecting individual NATO allies to support operations out of area. The counterpart threat today is the growth of a shared European defence force, which carries with it the added risk of subservience of the national interest to a federal one.

A better approach would therefore consist of:

- Maintaining the NATO alliance and Britain’s place within it, an alliance which is much more asset-rich than a grouping just comprising residents of the European land mass.
- Developing a series of bilateral arrangements with key powers, to encourage interoperability with partners we are most likely to deploy with in areas of common concern and interest.
- Retaining sufficient ability to deploy a range of UK assets in order to convince hostile powers that there is a sufficiently high price tag to their action that force is not the favoured option.
- Not putting at risk the very real mutual advantages enjoyed by UK-US bilateral relations. These may today fall below that of constituting a ‘Special Relationship’, but it remains a highly privileged one.

This paper does not include a number of other measures that could make the military more cost-effectiveness which relate to the EU or European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), including:
Introducing a military caveat to the British signature of the ECHR now that the Court has developed a liberal social agenda, so that the armed forces are exempt - as originally provided for French forces.

Tackling the impact on the MoD (and other departments) on the consequential claims culture.

Injecting common sense into Health and Safety provision, especially basic training and administrative obligations.

Providing new direction on the application of costly EU-sourced legislation, for instance relating to regulations covering driving hours, and issuing minibus qualifications (which have led to an absurd shortage of eligible drivers and a needlessly costly and time-demanding conversion course).

We will look at those issues in another forthcoming study.

We will also avoid aspects of defence policy which are more unilateral in nature even if the area of operations may be multinational. Those proposals are matters of individual deployment policy rather than strategic alliance.

2 An example of this would be a low-scale but highly publicised deployment of individual sections of Royal Marines on vessels flying the Red Ensign in areas of high levels of piracy, coupled with a robust set of Rules of Engagement, which could be part-funded by a levy lifted following lower insurance premiums and part from the increased state revenue accruing from the increase in British-flagged shipping.
A history of EU defence integration

Post war European integration began with a series of alliances intended to counter Germany if ever it became a resurgent threat. The Cold War changed the pre- eminent danger, while containing the existing one.

The failure in 1954 to establish a continental Western European army, an approach intended to circumvent hostility to German rearmament, led to a far broader geographical solution encompassing North America and Turkey (less radical if one considers how the existence of remaining European colonies still at the time provided an international context to European politics). But failure also ensured that it would be another generation before the purely European approach would be tried again.

The collapse of the Warsaw Pact changed the rules. The French were hurriedly forced into a new appraisal of their ancient though historically understandable obsession of how to counterpoise Germany. Just as economic and social integration accelerated after Maastricht, defence issues also speedily began to find themselves as chits added to the negotiating basket.

Timeline

1945 De Gaulle nurses an enduring grudge over UK support for Syrian independence, though Britain does facilitate the French return to Indo-China.

1947 Anglo-French Treaty signed at Dunkirk, targeted at future German aggression.

1948 Treaty of Brussels expands membership of the Anglo-French Treaty, leading to the Western Union Defence Organisation.

1949 NATO formed.

1950 Pleven Plan mooted for a supranational European defence system (common forces, defence budget and armaments industry) incorporating Germany.

1954 Proposal for a European Defence Community rejected by French National Assembly. Germany allowed to enter the WEDO (becoming the WEU), and focus in European integration shifts to economic issues.

1956 Suez Crisis. Anglo-French military cooperation ends in fiasco, different strategic appreciations of the American military alliance, and divergence.
1960 Fouchet Plan proposes wider cooperation on issues including defence and foreign policy, a more intergovernmental approach and outside of the EEC. Rejected. Major pause in European defence integration, to last three decades.

1966 France withdraws from NATO's integrated command.

1967 Following a British proposal, NATO forms the EUROGROUP committee to improve coordination of the continent’s members.

1984 WEU relaunched in order to improve NATO cooperation with neutral states.

1986 Westland Affair, essentially over forming a European trade barrier for military helicopters.

1988 Kohl and Mitterand agree in principal to closer defence structural cooperation.


1991 Franco-German Security and Defence Council becomes operational.


Maastricht Treaty clauses on Common Foreign and Security Policy: a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence. Includes provisions for enhanced co-operation in the field of armaments, with a European armaments agency as a proposal to be examined further. EMU criteria place further demands on defence budgets.

War in Bosnia. Alternating WEU/NATO-flagged Adriatic blockade begins.

Council of the WEU sets out Petersburg tasks, effectively putting the WEU at the service of EC policy decisions.

1993 British and French airborne and marine elements ‘twinned’.

WEU sets up Western European Armaments Group.

1994 Franco-British Air Group formed.

Eurocorps parades in Paris.
1995 Ad hoc EU working group on a European Armaments Policy first formed (POLARM).

1996 OCCAR formed (see below).

Franco-German summit at Nuremburg declares, “In the European Union our two countries will work together with a view to giving concrete form to a common European defence policy and to WEU’s eventual integration into the EU.” It also pledges that Germany would be consulted before French nuclear weapons were used. Very badly received by the President of the Assemblée Nationale.

1997 France’s Europe Minister calls for the extension of the Franco-German “common concept” on security and defence to the whole of the EU.

Amsterdam Treaty formalises the role of the WEU previously agreed, and adds “peace-making” to the treaties. Principle of QMV attached.

Royal Ordnance closure at Bridgwater after a takeover by a French company removes the last British manufacturer of high explosive. An attempt by GEC to take over Thomson-CSF on the other hand is blocked.

European Commission highlights aerospace industry (including electronics and missiles) as a target for consolidation and restructuring in the face of US competition.

1998 First common Code of Conduct on Arms Exports.

Poertschach meeting: UK endorses separate European defence activity, but British policy is uncertain and ambiguous: “Cela reste a décoder.”

St Mâlo summit. Anglo-French bilateralism advanced, but at the cost of lifting the UK veto on EU defence integration. Contemporary reports explain the decision as a deliberate British concession in the context of the retreat from a commitment on joining the Euro.

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3 Concept commun franco-allemand en matière de sécurité et de défense.
5 Jack Dromey as spokesman for the MoD Defence Unions observed, “The implications of giving up this strategic capability are enormous. We will be dependent on the whims of French lorry drivers, farmers and fishermen not to be blockading supply routes at a moment of crisis.” Sunday Telegraph 28 September 1997. The French Government, unlike the British, had perceptively required their closures under the deal to be reversible in time of emergency.
6 Lionel Jospin at the Assemblée Nationale, 27 October 1998. The indecision can probably be ascribed to Tony Blair being not entirely convinced by the Foreign Office line supporting more eager British participation; the MoD line was less leaked. Alastair Campbell’s statement after the meeting quite contrarily declared, “If we tell people where we do want to work more closely together, they will be less worried that [the] EU is going to take over aspects of national life which none of us really intend such as provision of health care, education, personal income tax, national defence.”
1999 Cologne Council: “We [...] are resolved that the European Union shall play its full role on the international stage. To that end, we intend to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence.”\(^7\) As part of the “maintenance of a sustained defence effort” forces will adapt – particularly intelligence, strategic transport, and command and control – with more harmonisation of defence planning and procurement as states declare “We are now determined to launch a new step in the construction of the European Union.” Standing EU bodies authorised. Countries asked to ‘pre-identify’ deployable assets.

Colvin paper in the Commons on WEU options identifies six possible ways forward.\(^8\)

Helsinki Council establishes the target of a combined ‘hatted’ (but not standing) resource of 60,000 men to achieve EU military policy. A Political and Security Committee, Military Committee, and Military Staff are also formed.

2000 WEU formally incorporated into EU structures, including its satellite centre.

Feira Council: 5,000 deployable Gendarmes added to the asset list.

MEPs call for AWACS and carrier groups to be added, and a European Security College to be founded to “foster a common culture”, coupled with a specific information policy to sell this to the public in the EU and neighbouring states.\(^9\)

Prodi gaffe: “If you don't want to call it a European Army, don't call it a European Army. You can call it ‘Margaret’, you can call it ‘Mary-Anne’, you can find any name, but it is a joint effort for peace-keeping missions”.

2001 EU Institute for Security Studies established.

2002 European Convention first inserts Space into draft Community competences.

Berlin Plus agreement creates mechanisms for EU to access NATO assets.

2004 European Defence Agency founded.

EUFOR takes over from NATO in Bosnia.

\(^7\) Annex III.

\(^8\) Presented to the EDG/CDU backbench working group by (sadly, shortly afterwards the late) Michael Colvin MP; copy obtained at the time through personal correspondence. The least-favoured option was ultimately chosen.

\(^9\) Resolution A5-0340/2000, 30 November.
Anglo-French agreement on sharing Caribbean naval patrolling duties.

**2007** Treaty of Velsen sets up a European Gendarmerie.

**2009** Lisbon Treaty expands upon EU defence institutions especially in procurement, introduces what amounts to a mutual defence clause, and greatly boosts the post and profile of the CFSP manager (currently Lady Ashton).
The current situation

Under the terms of the existing treaties, the EU now has a more robust remit to use military force.\(^{10}\) Key elements of this include:

- Incorporating CFSP within the context of the basic EU treaty rather than operating as a more intergovernmental side element
- A continuing commitment to the gradual framing of a common defence policy, which may in time lead to a common defence
- The use of enhanced cooperation principles, i.e. go-ahead groups
- “Peace-making,” which can be interpreted to mean war fighting
- Civilian assets can be used in support
- Military forces to be generated from defined loanable assets, particularly the Battlegroups
- A European Defence Agency
- EUFAST, a planned standby force for humanitarian deployment
- QMV applies once a structured mission has been approved
- A new mutual assistance clause and a mutual solidarity clause relating to terrorism or a man-made disaster.

Denmark – a keen Atlanticist nation that has deployed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan – notably has resolved (unlike Britain) to retain an opt out.

\(^{10}\) A comprehensive legal summary in terms of the treaty bases can be found here: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/expert/displayFtu.do?language=en&sid=74&ftulId=FTU_6.1.3.html
Cost

The following budget lines are connected with the EU defence budget. Costs are included where they can clearly be tied to defence integration, as opposed to other priorities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budget Line</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>02 03 01 (partial)</td>
<td>Operation and development of the internal market, particularly in the fields of notification, certification and sectoral approximation - payments due to transfers of defence-related products</td>
<td>Share not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04 02 09 (partial)</td>
<td>Completion of previous EU initiative programmes (prior to 2000) - payments relating to Defence Conversion (Konver)</td>
<td>Share not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 02 01 (partial)</td>
<td>Implementation and development of the Internal market - includes development of a unified area for security and defence, with action working towards the coordination of public procurement procedures for these products at Union level; appropriations may cover devising studies and awareness-raising measures regarding the application of the legislation adopted</td>
<td>Share not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 03 07 (partial)</td>
<td>Completion of earlier programmes — Community initiatives (prior to 2000) (Konver)</td>
<td>Share not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 03 01</td>
<td>Monitoring and implementation of peace and security processes</td>
<td>€35,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 03 02</td>
<td>Non-proliferation and disarmament</td>
<td>€15,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 03 03</td>
<td>Conflict resolution and other stabilization measures</td>
<td>€163,424,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 03 04</td>
<td>Emergency measures</td>
<td>€30,550,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 03 05</td>
<td>Preparatory and follow-up measures</td>
<td>€6,550,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 03 07</td>
<td>Police missions</td>
<td>€76,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 06 02 02</td>
<td>Preparatory action — Reduce nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and small arms</td>
<td>Nil this year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 06 02 03</td>
<td>EU policy on combating the proliferation of light arms</td>
<td>Nil this year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 06 02 07</td>
<td>Galileo running costs per year divided over lifespan of 25 years (official estimate only)</td>
<td>€560,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUSC</td>
<td>€16,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EDA (administration)</td>
<td>€25,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUISS</td>
<td>€4,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Many costs are borne by the national governments and therefore not included in this table. At the same time it does not show associated diplomatic, aid, and gendarmerie costs that are closely connected to defence integration. But this does show that EU defence integration is already creating significant costs.
With many of the budget lines above only legal or necessary under the more aggressively internationalist clauses of the Lisbon Treaty - the deployment of armed gendarmerie for example, taking the place of combat troops - it does seem reasonable to ascribe an EU defence bill roughly in the order of €932 million, overwhelmingly due to the satellite budget (and therefore from the viewpoint of several EU countries a duplication of capability). That implies a bill to the UK of around €90 million per annum, based on 10 per cent of gross contributions.
Merging of Defence Industries: First Steps

The pooling of defence procurement has proven the vanguard of European defence integration. In as far as this followed a coordinated plan, it was a logical approach for European politicians to pursue, as economies and economics have similarly driven European integration in other fields. However, it also provides us with a warning of what political pitfalls to expect with cutbacks in the defence budget and further integration.

The Westland Crisis was not simply an issue about the UK’s strategic links with other EEC members. It also encompassed issues relating to global free trade; national preference versus value for money in the defence budget; trade protectionism; state interference in decisions reached by company boards; jobs in constituencies; generational capabilities in technology; and as much as anything else Margaret Thatcher’s style of leadership and indeed the leadership itself. But it did fit solidly into the context of the development of the Single Market. The Westland debate put down the marker for what was to follow.

The Organisation Conjointe de Cooperation en Matière d’Armement (OCCAR – in English, also less successfully known as the Quadrilateral Defence Agency, or the Joint Armaments Cooperation Structure/JACS) was set up in 1996 on the back of a Franco-German agreement. It expanded the arrangement to bring together the Defence ministers of the UK, Italy, Germany and France.

How this passed into UK law provides a case study for the British Government’s persistent failure to understand and follow the mechanisms of European integration.

There was no statement to the Commons. Instead, there were minor references to the institution during Defence debates and in written questions. In the Statement on Defence Estimates 1996 there were five paragraphs that suggested a successor to the WEU’s West European Armaments Group was under discussion demonstrating “the Government's commitment to play a full role in European defence collaboration at both the political and industrial level.”

MPs were concerned that this policy was piggy backing on an original Franco-German policy agreement, which included this statement:11

“Greater Franco-German armaments co-operation is not just in our bilateral interest since it also meets the objective of building a European

11 Paragraph 4.3 of the Defence Concept Document
armaments policy. It must in particular be the mainspring of a European solution to the general rationalisation of the European armaments sector. It will thus constitute an essential component of the common foreign and security policy and the common defence policy called for by the Maastricht treaty and a significant step towards the emergence of a European security and defence identity. The most economical solution must be resolutely sought for the requirements expressed by the armed forces and the establishment of a competitive European defence technological and industrial base. This necessitates common rules in the CFSP framework for the procurement and transfer of defence equipment within the European Union and for exports to non-EU states.”

British accession did not go entirely unchallenged, with John Wilkinson MP challenging the Government at least to send a representative to the Despatch Box for a short end-of-day debate.12 In response, the minister pointed to Tornado as the sort of cooperative project that was intended through the new body. “The OCCAR offers a channel for a worthwhile and meaningful coalescence of view and practice,” he explained, adding that “Membership of the four-nation agency represents no change in the United Kingdom's procurement policy.” It may not have represented a change in his policy as a minister; but it did act as a key step in the development of the OCCAR policy.

OCCAR provides a structure for cooperation in programmes where there is some common interest, even if not all countries decide to buy the end product. A subsequent treaty in 2001 gave the body legal form. Its staff currently number 240 (it was 30 in 1997), with six participating states and six associated ones.

Already by September of 1997, the French Prime Minister was saying of OCCAR that it “prefigures the future European armaments agency”, and that while a policy of ‘Europe first’ was not unanimously endorsed, it had made some headway. Anti-American protectionism drove its development.13

OCCAR was not an isolated development. On 20 April 1998, the Secretary of State for Defence produced a joint statement with counterparts from France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden. This concluded that harmonisation of requirements, co-operative solutions, and cutting unnecessary duplication was needed.

12 5th March 1997. The author of this paper provided technical assistance to Mr Wilkinson and was present in the Gallery during the debate, which was extremely thinly attended in all quarters.
13 Speech of Lionel Jospin at the Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale, 4 September 1997
It came with a political sting. On 6 July 1998 the statement translated into a Letter of Intent “concerning measures to facilitate the restructuring of the European defence industry” (note the use of the singular). This declared that, on the proviso that there was a guarantee of security of supply, “the Participants will accept mutual interdependence and the possibility of abandoning industrial capacity,” and to achieve this, set out the basic terms through which this should be legally obligated. There was also a pledge that “the Participants will reinforce their co-operation and promote convergence in the field of conventional arms exports,” as well as setting up other mechanisms to facilitate the growth of European defence multinationals.

Significantly, there is also a declaration that the signatories would review their military capabilities with a clear objective: “Proceeding from identified capabilities of common interest, the Participants should identify areas in which harmonisation is considered possible.”
The European Defence Agency (EDA)

In 2004, ministers turned to the structures of the EU and away from an intergovernmental approach. With the establishment of the European Defence Agency, OCCAR seems doomed to follow in the wake of the WEU and become formally integrated; in many respects it is already redundant. The EDA is fully part of the CFSP package, with Baroness Ashton as the Chairman.

The European Constitution authorised the development of the EDA, but with no fewer than three failed referenda lying ahead, that treaty would take four years to agree. Activity over the period 2004-8 was therefore both presumptuous and on highly shaky legal ground.

When the Lisbon Treaty was finally ratified, the EDA was formally assigned the tasks of:

- Identifying the Member States' military capability objectives and evaluating observance of the capability commitments given by the Member States
- Promoting harmonisation of operational needs and adoption of effective, compatible procurement methods
- Proposing multilateral projects to fulfil the objectives in terms of military capabilities
- Ensuring coordination of the programmes implemented by the Member States and management of specific cooperation programmes
- Supporting defence technology research, and coordinating and planning joint research activities. The study of technical solutions needed to meet future operational needs
- Contributing to identifying and, if necessary, implementing any useful measure for strengthening the industrial and technological base of the defence sector and for improving the effectiveness of military expenditure.

This provides it with more than simple responsive administrative role in oversight. The EU now has a say in pre-emptive procurement planning, designing research programmes for future projects, monitoring how governments “observe” their “capability commitments”, and even authorizing the Commission potentially to spend hundreds of millions of Euros of other EU budget lines to subsidise areas that support the Defence industry, however ineffectively. The precedents of ongoing state subsidies authorized to support uncompetitive coal, steel and airline companies on the continent, and failing French big business are extremely worrying.
The EDA’s key success to date has been to bring defence procurement more into the Single Market and to open up the advertising of contracts. However, this comes at a major cost.

Industries that might be deemed to be strategically vital nationally will no longer be supported as the shift takes place from what could be needed by an individual state at war, to the collective interest of a number of trading partners some of which are forced through the ending of preferential treatment to allow those interests to fail. The classic example of the problems that can create is the refusal of the Belgian Government to sell the UK Government ammunition during a time of war.

The corollary is that with a more integrated continental system for Britain comes more of a military dependence upon the EU, and a weakening of privileged ties with the United States. A key example here has been the severe reticence of the US Congress to include hi tech material in aircraft sales to the UK on the grounds that the technology was deemed likely to end up in Chinese hands – via the UK’s increasingly formalised European ties.

It has been suggested that with such a comparatively small cost attached to UK membership, UK withdrawal is pointless. This is missing the point entirely. The Czechoslovak contribution to the running costs of the Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact was nugatory. The issue is really one of the broader political context and ambition.

Had the EDA been developed outside of the framework of the EU, it may have had a reasonable purpose. But by including it within the structures of Brussels, the baggage of the EU’s military aspirations leaves it less cost-effective.

14 http://www.eda.europa.eu/
Case history in procurement

Economically, of course it makes sense for British defence contractors to team up with competitors/partners in order to put together bids and then successful packages. It’s certainly a bonus that OCCAR has succeeded in getting signatory states to agree to the principle of investing funds without demanding proportionate share in where the money gets spent, which naturally drives up prices.

Establishing a purely European framework is not entirely sensible, though. In April 1997, when OCCAR was becoming operational; the United Kingdom was involved in 51 defence equipment collaborative projects. Of these, 29 included non-EU partners (with details on a possible thirtieth withheld on security grounds).  

But even without the political ramifications of the EDA, defence procurement in Europe has too often just looked like the old national defence procurement disasters on a supranational scale. Examples have included:

- Eurofighter
- METEOR missile to equip the above, which has faced similar procurement delays, order cuts and cost rise
- A400M, with issues of expense, deliverability and indeed getting Italian tanks simply to fit on board
- Horizon Frigate, which ended up designed at twice the projected price to accommodate the wrong missile system, and from which the UK embarrassingly withdrew. Computer-aided design systems in shipyards were not compatible.
- The airborne VCBI which had weight issues
- Multi-Role Armoured Vehicle, already massively overpriced
- Trigat helicopter missile, from which the UK withdrew following failures
- Type 45 Destroyers launched lightly armed due to French failures in the joint missile system

In summary, it therefore makes perfect sense for British Defence ministers to take a solid step back away from the European Defence Agency. The EDA threatens British access to American technology; comes from a traditional tendency to increase costs beyond affordability; encourages protectionism in the industry without protecting UK-

15 Hansard 19 February 1998, col 830
16 Highly commended in this specific area is http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com
based industry (dockyards being a major case in point); encourages status spending on projects intended to compete with US technologies even where there is currently no EU competitor; and above all, encourages the establishment of a corporate European defence identity in which the interests of individual or even small groups of nation states protecting their interests are not served. In sum, its priorities are all wrong.
Space

Not all shaky defence procurement has been carried out under the military rubric. With the inclusion of Space into the competences of the Union in the Lisbon Treaty (indeed, years before the ink on the final signatures was even applied), the EU was soon involved in the Galileo fiasco.

Galileo provides a GPS system that duplicates existing US satellites.

The jury is still out on the costs. The current budget up to 2014 is running at €3.4 billion, and considered to be insufficient. One option under review is to reduce the number of deployed satellites, also reducing the accuracy of the system, which was the central argument for having it in the first place. The real motive was to supply Europe and contributor states (which at one point included China) with navigational capacity in the event the United States switched off its GPS assets.

As this would realistically only be in time of war (in which case NATO mutual defence clauses would also likely be activated), and the ability to carry out this function is being degraded up to 2013, Galileo will be redundant even before it is operational. In any event, even by 2008 the 25 year running costs were estimated at coming to €14 billion/£9.7 billion.17 This included cost overruns already standing at €1.76 billion for the roughly one third of the budget then allocated.

The Commons committee that damningly reviewed the programme further warned that the benefits projections put forward by the Commission appeared “fanciful”, not least now that China, originally a partner, was itself engaged on its own programme. The report critically observed, “We fear that Galileo’s status as a flagship grand projet is clouding the judgement of some in relation to its true, realistic and proven merits.”

As far as can be ascertained, the principle advantage in funding Galileo is one of subsidising the European space industry. But then, it might as meaningfully have been employed in launching concrete into orbit. At least with Airbus there is a competitive service industry using the product.

That Galileo happened at all is in key part the result of the Lisbon Treaty, and in particular the clause inserted by former French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing. Space is a most recent innovation amongst the competences of the EU, even though European cooperation on space dates back much further.

17 House of Commons Transport Committee, Session 2007-08, Galileo: Recent Developments
If Galileo is the procurement disaster, the European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC) is becoming the military installation. Based near Madrid, it was founded in 1992 as a WEU institution, and incorporated as an EU agency ten years later. Its central task is to provide technical support, especially ‘GEOINT’ imagery, to the Common and Foreign Security Policy. The Director is a career diplomat.

The European Space Agency by contrast remains an intergovernmental institution (to some extent dominated by France), and as its military applications are peripheral, remains outside the scope of this paper.

EU defence structures

Procurement is just one aspect of the new EU defence institutional network. There are others.

The Political and Security Committee (PSC) is an ambassadorial-level working group that carries out preparatory and regular operational work for ministers.

The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) is the highest military body within the Council, comprising the Chiefs of Defence of member states, typically represented by their permanent military representatives (MilReps, typically a three star post). It provides military advice to the PSC through its Chairman.

The European Union Military Staff (EUMS) are the military and civilian personnel seconded to the Council in a ‘green’ role. They carry out early warning tasks, strategic planning, and situation assessment, and act as advisors to Baroness Ashton. It has an Intelligence Directorate, INTDEF.

As of 2007, the EUMS possesses an EU Operations Centre in Brussels capable of acting as a battlegroup-scale HQ. This is in addition to the national operational HQs nominated for loan by several countries.

The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) provides parallel non-uniformed advice. Coupled with this is the Council’s permanent element known as the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC).

An inheritance from Xavier Solana’s days, and of increasing importance, is the Joint Situation Centre (SitCen). This monitors and assesses events and situations worldwide (tellingly, on a 24-hour basis) with a focus on potential crisis regions, terrorism and WMD-proliferation. The SitCen is divided into three units: the Civilian Intelligence Cell (CIC), civilian intelligence analysts working on political and counter-terrorism assessment; the General Operations Unit (GOU), providing 24-hour operational support, research and non-intelligence analysis; and the Communications Unit, handling communications security issues and running the council’s communications centre (ComCen).

The initial focus was on strategic intelligence-based assessments on counter-terrorism matters in support of current policy discussions. It has since become involved in wargaming. It has been described by the Head of its Operations Unit as an intelligence

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19 Hansard, 27 June 2005, col 1249
All Source Cell. While INTDEF (above) is linked to defence intelligence organisations, SITCEN has links to external intelligence organisations in Member States and internal security organisations. All told, there are at present reportedly around 100 SitCen staff, though bizarrely the figure itself is classified.

Beyond Brussels there is the European Security and Defence College (ESDC). This was set up as a network for existing national training establishments, to share expertise but also to “further enhance the European security culture”. Its modules have focused heavily on explaining EU policy to people about to be posted into the EU environment, and a Media Ops course on how the EU press office does business. It is closely linked to the EUISS (see below). Planning has also included activity around an Erasmus-inspired plan to exchange young officers between countries, and a gender equality seminar.

The European Group on Training (EGT) meanwhile provides the kernel institution for the civilian aspects of crisis management. Like the ESDC, the EGT is in relatively early stages and a more formalised and permanent structure will likely develop over time.

The EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) is the EU’s Chatham House. Based in Paris, its objectives are “to find a common security culture for the EU, to help develop and project the CFSP, and to enrich Europe’s strategic debate.” Founded in 1990 under the WEU flag, the EU took it over in 2001, and its board is now chaired by Baroness Ashton. The EUISS had nine permanent research fellows, plus three assistants, “complemented by an extensive network of external researchers”. There are also Senior Visiting Fellows, students on short-term bursaries, Associate Fellows temporarily on loan from other institutions, and interns.

Clearly, as a sponsored arm of the CFSP, it cannot realistically be called academically neutral when it is intended to guide the direction of that institution. It issues policy notes, plans workshops, provides staff, briefs officials, and appears in the media. Its material is distributed gratis to three thousand key opinion formers globally.

20 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldeucom/43/09012106.htm
22 http://www.iss.europa.eu
EU defence groupings

Outside of the EU’s structures, there are the elements that have been created between EU member states to accelerate the process of creating European force structures.

The Chartres Anglo-French summit in 1994 announced the intent to build a Franco-British European Air Group (FBEAG), with the possibility of including later signatories. Its HQ is based at RAF High Wycombe. The FBEAG Steering Group is a committee made up of the Chiefs of Air Staff, together with senior personnel from the ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs. Seven nations are now members of what is in effect a European air force with permanent staff, working on interoperability. The Garlic Lemon Technical Instructions, for instance, provide valuable bilateral assistance in RAF-FAF access to their counterpart’s low level flight system. However, FBEAG is also increasingly supporting the work of both the EDA and EUMS.

Navies are represented by the European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR, or EMF). This was from the outset a more Europeanised venture. In 1995, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain agreed to set up a naval component to the European Defence identity. EU tasks are prioritised for this Latin navy, which may yet take in Greece and Turkey, demonstrating its area of primary geographic focus.

Army integration has included the development of EUROFOR, the European Operational Rapid Reaction Force. Originally set up under the remit of the WEU, this has now shifted into the EU’s remit even if its membership is constrained to the same participants as EUROMARFOR. It mainly comprises a divisional HQ in Florence for a FAWEU (Force Answerable to the EU), with contributing states committed to supplying a brigade when required.

The major moves in land forces integration have taken place through Eurocorps (formerly the Franco-German Brigade. Its aspiration when it was being expanded into a more European unity was that it should contain 800 MBTs, 1000 APCs, 350 artillery pieces, 600 AT missiles, and around 60,000 soldiers.23 The French separately were also briefing that it should have an associated commitment of 150-300 combat aircraft, the same amount again of other aircraft, 15 major warships, plus everything from NBC to EW assets, UAVs, and satellites.24 As a result, an inventory demand went out to each contributing state. Initially, these were to be viewed as loans from the integral national armies, but planners were foreseeing a shift from 2005 onwards towards a more

23 Source: personal briefing at Eurocorps HQ, 15 March 2000 (U)
24 Defence Minister Alain Richard, Brussels 15 Nov 1999, also Le Monde 24 Nov 1999
properly integrated force and a more formalised brigade structure. These measures correspondingly pre-empted the development of the EU Battlegroups.

Eurocorps’ HQ support battalion was already subject to standardisation as early as 1999.25 Heavy trucks were German and Spanish; light trucks and light cross-country vehicles French; buses and minivans Belgian; assault rifles French; machine guns German, and pistols Belgian. Working languages were French and German, with a requirement that NATO’s working language (English) play a central role.

Franco-German naval cooperation has not yet achieved anything like this level of result, for instance with the Franco-German airlift command, which was aimed at bringing in the UK at a later stage. The failure in these areas may prove to be key to understanding how EU defence cooperation might develop despite conflicting French and German priorities, and the role the United Kingdom may play in providing an alternative focus for EU countries with expeditionary armed forces. In other words, the French and Germans for different reasons are preoccupied with basic land army cooperation on the continent of Europe; other elements of the French armed forces may well prove receptive to British moves for bilateral or more ad hoc multilateral forms of deployments, outside of EU structures that carry political aspirations and baggage.

In addition to the above, there is also the quasi-military (or in some cases, formally military) aspect. EUROGENDARMERIE is the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) that unites six countries’ armed police. This detail is one of several reasons that makes it hard for the UK to participate, another being the decentralised nature of the county policing system, a third that unarmed forces are prohibited from participating (PSNI, and RMP units, correspondingly might). Headquartered in Vicenza, the EGF is designed to give policing support in peacekeeping situations. Primarily intended for EU deployment, its direction then falls to the EU’s PSC.

The process of identifying assets available for Petersberg Tasks ended up by identifying a large range of units and equipment that could be used in pooled operations. The most tangible result of this lies in the form of the EU Battlegroup (BG) system. Since 2007, the EU has had the capability to launch two simultaneous BG deployments. These formations are also subject to “quality control testing”, encouraging interoperability and increased training between member states that share contributions to a particular BG. It has to be suggested that some of the BG coalitions seem to lend more to tokenism rather than practical considerations: the cost to Sweden of setting up its BG was estimated at €100 million, and aspirations to deploy it on a peacekeeping mission went unfulfilled.26

25 Press office briefing note
26 http://euobserver.com/9/28627 - other reports suggest a considerably higher bill, for a unit smaller than a brigade.
While these groupings have been set up, another has expanded outwith national governments. EUROMIL is the European Organisation of Military Associations and Trade Unions. First set up in 1972, it combines a remarkable assortment of representatives from countries from Ireland to Russia, Finland to Malta. The British Armed Forces Federation joined in 2008. As well as exchange of best practice via its head office in Brussels: 27

“The organisation, moreover, strives to secure and advance the human rights, fundamental freedoms and socio-professional interests of soldiers by monitoring and advocating in multinational negotiations on the European level. EUROMIL supports the inclusion of military personnel into social legislation by the European Union.

EUROMIL has participatory status at the Council of Europe and is accredited as a lobbyist with the European Parliament. It upholds contacts with the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the European Security and Defence Assembly (formerly the Assembly of the WEU).

EUROMIL has a co-operation agreement with the European Trade Union Confederation since 1998.”

It remains, however, funded by membership fees rather than EU grants and takes pains to underline its associations “neither condone or support insubordination and mutiny”. Notwithstanding those caveats, the existence of such a lobby in Brussels provides a reminder of the broader issues arising from EU Membership and other European legal obligations.

27 http://www.euromil.org/
EU flagged ops

The scale of the EU’s activity in international operations with a military angle can perhaps best be appreciated from this list, with starting date, and personnel (pax) numbers where known. Italics indicate commitments that are currently ongoing, while an asterisk indicates a military deployment:

- *ARTEMIS RD Congo (2003, 1800 pax)
- *CONCORDIA (FYROM, 2003)
- EUPM (Bosnia, 2003, 284)
- *EUFOR ALTHERA (Bosnia, 2004, 1950 pax)
- EUJ UST THERMIS (Georgia, 2004-5)
- EUJ UST LEX (Iraq/Brussels, 2005, 42 pax)
- EUBAM (Rafah, 2005, 21 pax)
- EUSEC RD Congo (2005, 44 pax)
- EUPOL Kinshasa RD Congo (2005-7)
- *Support to AMIS II (Sudan/Darfur, 2005-6)
- AMM Monitoring Mission (Aceh, 2005-6)
- EUPOL COPPS (Palaestinian Territories, 2006, 85 pax)
- EUPAT (FYROM, 2006)
- *EUFOR RD Congo (2006, 2300 pax)
- EUPOL AFGHANISTAN (2007, 459 pax)
- EUPOL RD Congo (2007, 60 pax)
- EUMM GEORGIA (2008, 405 pax)
- *EUNAVFOR – ATALANTA (Indian Ocean, 2008, 1144 pax)
- EUSSR Guinea-Bissau (2008, 24 pax)
- EULEX KOSOVO, 2008, 2764)
- *EUFOR Chad/RCA (2008-9, 3700 pax)
- EUBAM (Moldova, Ukraine, 2010, 200 pax)
- *EUTM SOMALIA (2010, 118 pax)
This means that there are currently 13 EU missions ongoing around the world, predominantly in ‘broader Europe’ or in Africa, involving 7,141 flagged EU personnel. Of these, at least 3,212 are fully-speaking military personnel deployed on an armed mission. In this respect, claims that there is no EU standing army are no longer accurate.

This trend is highly likely to accelerate with the increasing prominence of the High Representative for the CFSP. It is likely that this will begin with demands on that post holder in relation to deploying staff to assist in natural disasters (including, potentially, within member states thanks to the civil disaster clauses of the Lisbon Treaty). Reactions to Baroness Ashton’s low profile during the aftermath of the Haiti earthquake provide a clear example of the pressures likely to grow over time.
Concerns and alternatives

The obvious concerns that arise from the above are

- Increasing threat of duplication of resource
- Illusory multi-hatting, leading to a reduction in actual capacity only revealed in a crisis
- The weakening of NATO in favour of the European defence identity
- Consequential reduction in actual European capability (and our interest is predominantly in the UK's own)
- State support wasted in pursuit of attempting to generate a currently non-existent industry in competition with the US.

From a British perspective, the weakening of the NATO dimension is neither cost-effective nor strategically sensible.

Therefore, it may prove more sensible to view Britain’s optimal defence strategy from a perspective of UK interoperability. At its pinnacle is the degree of cooperation that is both the most strategic and the most inter-personal. The first tier would continue with the AUSCANUKUS level of integration, linking the Old Commonwealth and the United States, centred on intelligence, integrated command structures and preferential technological treatment. Britain does well out of this deal and it would be remarkably foolhardy to allow involvement in EU schemes to jeopardise it.

The next tier includes those nations and forces with which the UK has begun to integrate with on a bilateral basis in the field. In the United Kingdom’s case, this applies particularly to Scandinavian nations, the Baltic states, and the Netherlands for instance; countries where forces have integrated well at the brigade level thanks to a commonality of ethos.

Then there is the example of association with forces that have a sizeable, capable but divergent deployable capability where cooperation is perhaps most logically set at divisional level. Italy and (currently) France provide cases here. A successful policy of bilateral cooperation with France should aim to bring that power into the tier above through more collaborative ventures at battalion level.

As for the rest, co-deployability may more appropriately fall at Coalition Army level. There are a range of differences that make field integration more difficult with other units, for instance Romanians or Germans, including professionalism, training, technology, supply, and/or Rules of Engagement.
The answer cannot be to attempt create a level of EU integration where every element is expected to operate at the level of instant integration. The EU battle group system has at least recognised that some partnerships are better fits than others, with defence ministries picking partners as if from a playground line up. But it does not address the other failings for the UK in signing up, particularly the threat to the independence (or even existence of) the nuclear deterrent, the reality of the UK’s UN role, and the threat arising from the associated common diplomacy policy in the shape of the European External Action Service or EEAS (on which, more in our past papers).
Système D

Noting the reality (while disapproving) of the Treasury cutbacks in Defence, one solution mooted is to increase cooperation with the French. This is something that has already been pursued over the past few years. In 1993, British and French airborne and marine elements were ‘twinned’. In 1994, a Franco-British Air Group was formed.

The real leap came at St Mâlo with the following objectives:

- Pursue close cooperation on the ground
- Carry out a “harmonisation of policies”
- Pursue an EU Common position on human rights, good governance and rule of law
- Attach particular importance to tackling problems of debt and maintenance of significant level of development assistance
- Intensified exchange of diplomatic reporting and other diplomatic collaboration, especially where one country has no representation
- Experiment in 2 countries where one country is not represented that the other should act as its representative (nothing more is known of how this provision was enacted)
- Explore possibility of co-location of embassies
- Joint heads of mission conferences at sub-regional level
- Meetings of relevant ministers, and joint visits to Africa
- Encourage sub regional Commonwealth/Francophonie cooperation

Excluded, however, were cooperative ventures in the areas of intelligence sharing, ethical foreign policy, and issues around arms supplies to governments in exile.28

We do know one example of how this developed. Franco-British meetings of foreign ministers with African ministers (Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Nigeria, and Kenya) took place in New York on 22 September 1999.

In Defence terms, this reportedly led to increased activity in:

- Joint exercises
- Planning for non-combatant evacuation operations

28 Hansard 20 January 1999, col 483
- Improved links between operational headquarters
- Coordination of naval deployments
- Information exchanges on peacekeeping activities
- Y2K computer problems
- Logistics
- Arrangements for dealing with the media.\(^{29}\)

Specifically, this meant:

- Posting of liaison officers into operational HQs
- Attachment of RN vessels to the French FOCH Carrier Task Group in the Adriatic during the Kosovo crisis
- On 25 June 1999, the joint signing of an MOU at New York of forces available to UN operations
- Cooperation on media handling during the Kosovo conflict\(^{30}\)

Notwithstanding a 2004 Anglo-French agreement on sharing Caribbean naval patrolling duties, such ventures seem to have fizzled out. The suspicion is that the Foreign Office and to a lesser extent the MoD lost the initiative and allowed the development of an EU defence commitment to sap the bilateralism that was beginning to grow.

If that is the case, it is an immense shame, though still one that could be redressed. The years 1904-1956 marked a long period of Anglo-French military cooperation. Even if in peacetime the attachments were never entirely warm, the Entente Cordiale remains a potentially useful avenue for the military to explore. France may continue to seek a military accord with Germany to guarantee the Rhine; but if she is to expand on her global aspirations, it is Britain alone which has to be her key partner. Two caveats must be enforced to make it work. Any agreements would have to be treated as a distinct venture firewall from the EU; and in the second instance it should not be seen as another excuse for further Treasury cut backs under the illusion that there is a guarantee for half of a shared resource in the event of a crisis.

A new Entente must be bilateral, but it need not be unique. There have been moves to improve bilateral arrangements with other European powers with some smaller ability to project power around the world. A British-Italian summit over 19-20 July 1999 set out a joint approach to EU defence activity, taking a national rather than supranational

\(^{29}\) Hansard 28 June 1999, col 10
\(^{30}\) Hansard 14 July 1999, col 228
direction. It is perhaps not entirely coincidental that an Italian brigade served in a UK-led division in Iraq. Here however, unlike with France, political personalities may count more than the continuing apparatus in establishing enduring cooperation.

There may be some role for continental European cooperation. Geography of itself suggests that there exist some threats that are special cases. There may be some sense in developing a European ballistic missile defence, provided it does not develop the way of Galileo, and corresponds to NATO’s broader requirements. There is the potential for defence and civil cooperation on EM pulse and solar protection. There is the CBRN threat, and the possibility of nodal targets for terrorists.

However, US compatibility should be paramount. It is no coincidence that of the 124 military exercises undertaken by British forces outside of Europe in 1997, only 6 included cooperating with another European power, compared with 25 with the United States, and 11 with Australia.31

We are under no illusions that British and American interests never diverge – that is one reason to seek further alliances elsewhere. Even George Washington, in his farewell address, warned of the dangers of a smaller state being too closely aligned to a more powerful one. But the balance in the main has proven positive, even if common sense dictates it deserves occasional review.

Britain’s trading interests span the world. It has a privileged position with the United States that other EU states lack. It has a public that, despite recent adventurist policies, is still broadly supportive of the expeditionary concept. It has a defence industry capable of surviving through its own international cooperative ventures. Its commitments are no longer focused on the Maginot line. If the nation’s defence capabilities are to be cut over the short term, then the EU is not the solution; it is part of an even bigger problem. Far better to stick with a trusted ally and superpower, while exploring anew a distinct cooperation with Europe’s only other country capable of deploying around the world in any force.

31 Hansard, 16 February 1998, cols 483-4
Appendix 1: Joint Letter of French and British Service Staff to the Daily Telegraph, 12 June 2001

SIR - The United Kingdom and France are the two countries in Europe with global reach and influence. We both enjoy permanent seats in the UN Security Council, both carry the responsibilities of acting as nuclear powers with global projection and a global role. While close co-operation should quite rightly take place, common cause does not mean that we should dilute our forces in a common army, navy or air force. As former Servicemen, we wish to voice our concerns at the manner in which the ability of our nations to protect our vital interests is being whittled away.

First, by penny-pinching, cutbacks in procurement and in force strength. Second, by overstretch, by committing reduced forces to increased global peacekeeping commitments, with disastrous effects on retention and morale. Third, and most important, by forging a common pseudo-identity in EU defence and foreign policy.

Our two countries have differing views on the future role and shape of Nato. But we can build on our distinctiveness if our armed forces remain under national flags. A common Euro army is incompatible with both of our approaches to this issue.

The actions of federalist politicians and technocrats playing at armchair generals, building a fictitious paper army, will only serve to weaken even further our national capabilities to the detriment of our own security and world stability. They should beware: paper tigers burn.

For the sake of our two countries and for Europe as a whole, we would counsel throwing the scheme into the dustbin of history before the fires begin.


This letter was on the following day endorsed by further correspondence from Admiral Sir John Woodward and Vice-Admîl Sir John Roxburgh, whose approval of the initial letter had arrived too late for their signatures to be appended by the coordinator (this author).
Appendix 2: Joint Submission of Senior British Diplomats and Military Personnel to the Convention on the Future of Europe

The EU in Arms: An Aspect of European Nationhood

A submission to the Convention on the Future of Europe from:

- David Heathcoat-Amory, MP, National Parliament Delegate (Conservative)
- Sir Oliver Wright, Ambassador to West Germany 1975-81, Ambassador to Washington 1982-6
- Sir Antony Acland, Permanent Under Secretary FCO 1982-6, Ambassador to Washington 1986-91
- General Sir John Akehurst, DSACEUR (Deputy Supreme Commander Europe) 1987-90
- Admiral Sir John Woodward, Senior Task Group Commander in the South Atlantic 1982

Europe’s states have usually spoken and acted on the international stage with many different voices. On comparatively rare occasions (for instance, the Boxer Rebellion in China), fleeting unity of purpose may emerge, but even here countries elected to demonstrate their support to greater or lesser degrees, and ever over the short term.

Recent events in the Middle East and in the mountains of Central Asia merely confirm the inescapable fact of Europe’s diversity: that the governments and peoples of Europe think differently, and that any attempt to create a common foreign policy – let alone a common defence – is unlikely to succeed. To go further and give it legal force would be more likely to result in no action rather than commonly-agreed action, and deny legality to actions by member states.

There is no common demos; there is (as Eurostat polls prove) no single European public opinion. Yet it is now proposed that important decisions about Foreign Policy and Defence shall be decided by Majority Voting, so countries could be forced to support decisions that are domestically controversial and unpopular. Nor is there any commonly-identified threat to all European nations which could justify any such alliance. And if there were, that threat would easily be presented in a manner more likely to divide the European Alliance (as it could be called) than unite it.

We should not be surprised by this difference in viewpoints. While common policies and actions are no doubt desirable, each country’s history and geography lend it a particular
perspective of the world around it. Some countries have unique historical involvement in certain parts of the world, and ties of language, trade or blood. Others carry memories of the past which shape their ambitions today. Some states have developed a desire for neutrality, others participate to differing degrees in NATO, and two states in particular maintain today a global military reach and the tradition of action. These distinctions will only increase with enlargement.

In the case of the United Kingdom, we also have a longstanding and privileged working relationship with the United States, which benefits Europe as a whole, certainly benefits the United Kingdom, and which is gravely threatened by the proposals under discussion.

Therefore, we invite the Convention to reject the draft on the table as not being in the interests of either the Governments of the European Union, or of its citizens. They are a further step towards a hypothetical and unrealisable European Federation as an extension of the EU, which will define itself first and foremost in its competition with and opposition to the United States.

In their articles on the defence agency, these proposals set out the means by which (through the pooling of procurement) nation states will further lose their ability to arm themselves independently, could put jobs at risk, and cut certain industrial sectors adrift from their current partnership agreements with the United States - which is in many fields a generation ahead of its European competitors. At the same time, the history of politically-driven European joint procurement (Eurofighter; A400M; Horizon Frigate; METEOR BVRAAM; Multi-Role Armoured Vehicle etc) demonstrates that such projects are seldom automatically the cheapest or most efficient and are never delivered on time. The change of OCCAR from an arms management to a full procurement agency is therefore fraught with difficulty.

The new EU Foreign Minister, now proposed by the draft EU Constitution, is at the same time democratically unaccountable. Worse, the draft shows he will have immense power of initiative and implementation when backed by the Commission (of which he will be a member). All of this could be enforced by the European Court of Justice.

This new Foreign Affairs and Defence mechanism comes at a heavy cost: nation states will increasingly lose their ability for independent action, on any area where a joint policy has been established by qualified majority. The proposals will also give to the new Union the exclusive right to negotiate internationally on areas where domestic policies (such as health, transport, and aspects of trade) overlap into the international arena. This removes from domestic control issues of vital importance to the electorate.
Ordinary citizens, on the other hand, will be utterly incapable of doing anything about it – other than registering ineffectual demonstrations outside the shell of a national parliament.

This is a far remove from the Laeken Mandate which set up this Convention, which requires it to restore democracy to the EU, and bring it “closer to its citizens”.

The draft Constitution is the next step on a long road. The slow establishment of the prerequisites of a European army, begun at the Cologne Council, continues: to the Political and Security Committee (PSC), EU Military Committee (EUMC) and EU Military Staff (EUMS), has already been added nominated units for a large Rapid Reaction force. This includes aircraft carriers, submarines, Special Forces, Patriot Missile batteries, armoured brigades, NBC units, strike aircraft, assault landing vessels – making it far more than a simple peacekeeping unit. Coupled with ongoing plans for a Euro-Sandhurst, the military rationale behind the Galileo GPS system, and the proposals from the latest European Parliament (Morillon) report, the trend is obvious. Thus, Defence has already begun to slip from national parliamentary control, even before the Constitution’s proposals were revealed. The current treaties talk of a possibility of a common defence: this now becomes an objective, with the putative means to achieve it in due course.

In Defence at least, provisions for opt-outs remain, key to the sensible application of force in the national interest. Their continued and solid existence must be a precondition to any future approval of a “European Force” concept.

But overall, the draft is flawed. We therefore call upon the Convention to reject these proposals as unworkable and undemocratic. They are dangerous to world peace, national democracy, internal political stability, and the Atlantic Alliance – which remains today the bedrock of the safety of the West.

Postscript

This postscript from Sandy Woodward was added to the submitted paper when the document was included in a compilation of papers after the Convention.

It does seem to me that in the welter of argument and counter-argument, there is danger that we lose sight of what ‘Alliances’ are intended to do for the signatories, together with what those signatories should have in common. It may seem so obvious as not to require re-statement, yet to many laymen, the question of Euro Defence can appear more a matter of politics than plain kindergarten commonsense.
Somewhere in our statement, I would have thought we ought to have started with a short piece on why a nation embarks on an alliance in the first case. Some while ago, I wrote myself an essay on the subject. It ran [with a few recent amendments] as follows…

Bearing in mind that ‘[military] alliance’ equates to ‘[commercial/political] partnership’ at the same time, the basic motive for any voluntary alliance must be mutual advantage across the board. They are formed to conduct wars, defensive or offensive, military or economic. Historically, alliances are made by nations of like interests and maintained only as long as those mutual interests continue. Perception of advantage will vary over time and in nature for each member. It follows that no alliance is likely to be for ever, or even necessarily for long. Alliances should be frequently examined to see if they remain relevant and changed or left if they are not. You should not volunteer to enter another unless you perceive clear advantage from doing so. Even more important, you must preserve your right to end it, when inevitably, it no longer remains to your advantage. This last point is fundamental and directly contrary to the present proposals which appear to deny members the right to leave.

Use the rules of the school playground to help you in your first steps to choice, they will not be a bad guide. As you go up the scale towards international relations, the playground rules get a bit less relevant but remain fundamental. With minor modification, let’s try them:

1 Choose the ally whose broad culture and general behaviour is most nearly in line with your own - you will be more comfortable in the long run: this obviously implies considerable knowledge of his previous behaviour.
2 Choose an ally who is both sufficiently distant to allow you a fair degree of freedom to do as you please internally, but is sufficiently close to help you when you need him.
3 Choose as an ally one that can demonstrably contribute positively and safely to the health, wealth and strength of your particular interest.
4 If the options for choice in your alliance include some who are markedly larger, stronger and all round more powerful than you, choose the one most likely to listen to you when you disagree – the one with whom you have the most political, economic and military attitudes in common.
5 Choose an ally that likes and respects you.

It will not always be an easy choice. Nor can we necessarily hope to meet all the requirements in making our choice. Sometimes there will be no choice at all. There probably isn’t now. Europe presently only partially satisfies the third rule confined to our economy and even that is arguable. By stark contrast, the United States of America satisfies them all and builds on a long term relationship which remains healthy.
So that is probably too long and perhaps too naively simplistic for higher management, yet it is no more and no less than the essential motivations for the likes of any large organisation from the Mafia, via clubs and affiliations, to NATO and the UN. NATO was clearly enough originally formed to match/meet a perceived threat from the USSR. There is little need for it on that basis today and except as a large international military organisation capable of acting on behalf of the United Nations, I have to doubt the need for its continued existence as a military alliance though economic and political factors may seem sufficient reason to keep it going, for lack of anything better.

We are probably therefore witnessing the first moves towards the dissolution of NATO – unsurprisingly led by France, backed by a united-Germany and Russia. This move is likely to produce a fair degree of chaos in its early days, as we are already seeing over Iraq. From my personal kindergarten, I see my interests lying more with the USA than with some loose alliance of central European nations formed for little other reason than to mount some long term challenge to the USA.

But maybe I am being short-sighted.