

Tip of the Iceberg:

*Weekend Work and Penalty Pay
in 108 Australian Industries*

By Jim Stanford
Centre for Future Work at the Australia Institute

May 2017

About The Australia Institute

The Australia Institute is an independent public policy think tank based in Canberra. It is funded by donations from philanthropic trusts and individuals and commissioned research. Since its launch in 1994, the Institute has carried out highly influential research on a broad range of economic, social and environmental issues.

Our Philosophy

As we begin the 21st century, new dilemmas confront our society and our planet. Unprecedented levels of consumption co-exist with extreme poverty. Through new technology we are more connected than we have ever been, yet civic engagement is declining. Environmental neglect continues despite heightened ecological awareness. A better balance is urgently needed.

The Australia Institute's directors, staff and supporters represent a broad range of views and priorities. What unites us is a belief that through a combination of research and creativity we can promote new solutions and ways of thinking.

Our Purpose – 'Research That Matters'

The Institute aims to foster informed debate about our culture, our economy and our environment and bring greater accountability to the democratic process. Our goal is to gather, interpret and communicate evidence in order to both diagnose the problems we face and propose new solutions to tackle them.

The Institute is wholly independent and not affiliated with any other organisation. As an Approved Research Institute, donations to its Research Fund are tax deductible for the donor. Anyone wishing to donate can do so via the website at <https://www.tai.org.au> or by calling the Institute on 02 6130 0530. Our secure and user-friendly website allows donors to make either one-off or regular monthly donations and we encourage everyone who can to donate in this way as it assists our research in the most significant manner.

Level 5, 131 City Walk
Canberra, ACT 2601
Tel: (02) 61300530
Email: mail@tai.org.au
Website: www.tai.org.au

About the Centre for Future Work

The Centre for Future Work is a research centre, housed within the Australia Institute, to conduct and publish progressive economic research on work, employment, and labour markets. It serves as a unique centre of excellence on the economic issues facing working people: including the future of jobs, wages and income distribution, skills and training, sector and industry policies, globalisation, the role of government, public services, and more. The Centre also develops timely and practical policy proposals to help make the world of work better for working people and their families.

www.futurework.org.au



Table of Contents

Summary.....	4
Introduction.....	6
Part I: The Prevalence of Weekend Work in 108 Australian Industries	9
Part II: The Economic Importance of Penalty Pay for Weekend Work	16
Conclusion: The Tip of the Iceberg	24
References	26
Appendix.....	28

Summary*

Australians continue to debate the Fair Work Commission's recent decision to reduce Sunday and holiday penalty rates for retail and hospitality workers. This report investigates the prevalence of weekend work in other sectors of Australia's economy – and confirms the overall economic importance of extra income generated by weekend penalty rates, not just in retail and hospitality.

The analysis is based on detailed new data on employment on Saturdays and Sundays in 108 different Australian industries. It finds that weekend work is common in almost all sectors of the economy: with an average of 2.75 million Australian employees on the job on a typical weekend. The extra income generated by penalty rates and related provisions for that weekend work is estimated to add over \$14 billion per year to the pay packets of weekend workers.

So while the retail and hospitality sector may be the most visible examples of weekend work, the practice extends far beyond those two sectors. And if reductions in penalty rates are eventually applied in other sectors of the economy, as seems likely, the economic impact on Australian workers will be severe.

Legal experts have suggested that the same arguments invoked to justify the reduction in penalty rates for retail and hospitality workers will be used to support similar demands in other sectors, and employers in other sectors have already begun to argue that their penalty rates should be cut, too.

Across all of the 108 sub-industries considered in the study, an average of 27.6 percent of employees (not including independent contractors and owner-managers) worked at least one day on a typical weekend. And since many Australians only occasionally work weekends, the total number of employees affected by weekend work is even greater. In 34 of the sectors considered, over one-third of the total workforce worked on weekends.

Penalty rates for Sunday work were estimated to supplement employees' incomes by \$8.5 billion per year, while penalties for working on Saturdays added another \$5.5 billion. This estimate includes the direct penalty rates paid to workers covered under

** The author thanks Thea Baines for excellent research assistance. The author also thanks (without implication) Sara Charlesworth, Richard Denniss, David Peetz, and David Richardson for helpful input.*

the Modern Award system, but also the income supplements indirectly received by workers under enterprise agreements and individual contracts (whose terms must match or exceed the minimums specified in the relevant awards).

In the context of Australia's record-slow pace of wages growth, income generated by penalty rates takes on added macroeconomic importance – in addition to its traditional function as compensation for the inconvenience and hardship of working on weekends. Indeed, at current rates of wage growth, it would take five years of regular wage increases for aggregate labour income in the economy to regain the loss if weekend penalties were abolished altogether. Given Australia's weak macroeconomic conditions and the precarious state of household indebtedness, a policy change that removes billions of dollars of income from weekend workers would seem especially damaging.

Introduction

The Fair Work Commission recently decided that penalty rates should be reduced for work on Sundays and public holidays, for workers covered by four Modern Awards in the retail and hospitality sectors (Fair Work Commission, 2017a). Weekend work is common in retail and hospitality businesses. It is not surprising, therefore, that employers in those large industries have campaigned actively for many years to reduce penalty wages for weekend work. Now the Fair Work Commission has accepted employer arguments that working on Sundays no longer poses the same individual or familial inconvenience as previously. Under its decision, Sunday penalties would decline by about half (by 25 to 50 percentage points of base wages in the various awards). The Commission also reduced penalties for working on public holidays.

The Commission did not alter penalty rates for Saturday work, and this decision does not apply to other sectors where weekend work is common. Nevertheless, employer organisations are already extending the argument for lower penalty rates to other sectors, and other times of work. For example, the Fair Work Commission is already considering employer demands to reduce penalty rates for work on Saturdays; and employers are invoking very similar arguments about the supposed decline in the personal and social significance of the “weekend.” And the general argument used by the Fair Work Commission to justify its decision on penalty rates in retail and hospitality – namely, that the importance of freedom from work on Sundays and holidays has somehow receded – would certainly seem to apply to other industries, as well. Indeed, legal experts believe that employers in other sectors will use the same rationale to push for parallel reductions in weekend penalty rates in other sectors (Karp, 2017; Gardner and Leikina, 2017). Some employers (including in the café and restaurant sector, which was not affected by this Commission decision) are already demanding an expansion in the application of the new rates (see, for example, Han, 2017).

The “weekend” only exists as a socially recognised institution because workers in the past campaigned collectively to insulate this space in their lives from the demands and dictates of paid work. Struggles to win recognition that workers can have decent and predictable time away from work – for unpaid home and family work, for leisure, and for community activities – form a vital chapter in the history of labour relations and labour law in Australia, and elsewhere. Australia’s system of penalty rates is a unique

and important reflection of that historical and cultural legacy.¹ The concerted effort over many years by employer organisations to reduce weekend penalties in particular industries, and to normalise weekend work as no different from work on any other day of the week, reflects an ongoing effort to push back those historic gains. Given the long-standing desire of employers for a fully flexible employment system, in which labour can be mobilised whenever and wherever it is most profitable to do so, with minimum protections for workers (in terms of stability of schedules or work-family balance), it is inevitable that employer demands for normalising and cheapening weekend work will be encouraged by this decision. Workers in other industries should prepare themselves to confront parallel demands to reduce weekend pay penalties, and thus move toward an unlimited culture of “24-7” work.

This report considers the potential economic consequences, if the recent Fair Work Commission decision does indeed spread to other sectors and to Saturdays, as legal experts have warned is likely. Workers in most sectors in the economy would be affected by the erosion of the general principle that working on a weekend requires additional compensation. Part I reports customised new data on the prevalence of weekend work across 108 different sub-industries in Australia’s economy. It finds that 27.6 percent of Australian employees are at work on Saturdays, Sundays, or both during a typical weekend. (A larger share of Australian workers work weekends at least *some* of the time, so this aggregate number underestimates the total number of Australians who are affected by weekend penalty rates.) Many other industries rely on weekend work to a comparable extent as the retail and hospitality sectors (including many health care, transportation, construction, resource, and public service activities). It is in those sectors that the push to extend the Fair Work Commission’s decision will likely be initially focused; but workers in every part of the economy can expect that employer demands to eliminate extra pay for weekend work will become stronger.

Part II of this paper estimates the overall value of penalty pay received by weekend workers, on the basis of the minimum penalty rate benchmarks specified under the Modern Awards system. Using very conservative assumptions regarding minimum pay rates and hours of work, it is estimated that penalty pay for regular-hours work on Saturdays and Sundays² contributes over \$14 billion to the annual incomes of Australian employees. That represents over 2.5 percent of total economy-wide employee wages; in weekend-intensive sectors, penalty payments equal over 5

¹ In most other developed countries, alternative but comparable policy tools are used to limit weekend work, such as regulatory limits on weekend work in many industries, collective agreements limiting weekend work or prescribing higher wages for weekend work, and others.

² This report does not consider the impact of additional wages received for long hours or evening work on weekends, nor does it consider the value of penalty rates for public holidays.

percent of industry-wide wages.³ If the reduction in Sunday pay rates for retail and hospitality workers does indeed spark similar measures in other industries and for Saturdays, Australian workers across the economy will experience a significant financial loss – in addition to the personal, familial, and social costs they already incur as a result of working on weekends. And given the unprecedented stagnation in overall wages in the Australian economy, and the acknowledged impact of that stagnation on macroeconomic performance and household financial stability, this loss of income would be all the more damaging.

³ This report considers only paid employees, excluding self-employed contractors and other owner-managers.

Part I: The Prevalence of Weekend Work in 108 Australian Industries

To fully describe the prevalence of weekend work across the breadth of Australia's economy, the Centre for Future Work commissioned a custom set of unpublished data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics, based on a special analysis of its detailed quarterly Labour Force survey. This quarterly series (running from 2002 through to the February quarter of 2017) provides historical detail on the number of employees working on weekends in 108 specific sub-industries.

The data cover paid employees only (not self-employed contractors and other owner-managers⁴). The data report the number of employees working on Saturday only, Sunday only, and both Saturday and Sunday on the reference week in which the survey was conducted (along with the number of employees who did not work on the weekend at all).

Like other Labour Force survey data, these statistics capture a snapshot of who actually worked on which days in the specific reference week for which the survey was conducted. It can thus be considered as an indicator of the ongoing or "typical" level of weekend work in the economy: while the individuals who worked on the weekend in the specific reference week may not do so every week of the year, there are other individuals who often or regularly work weekends but did not do so during the reference week. The total number of Australians who work weekends at least *sometimes* (and hence receive at least some of their income from weekend penalty pay) will thus be significantly larger than the numbers reported here.

The ABS conducts this more detailed labour force survey four times per year. To minimise fluctuations associated with sampling variability (especially important given the small sample size of some of the smaller sub-industries considered), the data is averaged over the most recent four quarterly reference weeks surveyed: running from May 2016 through February 2017.

Table 1 summarises the aggregate total level of weekend employment in Australia across the 108 sub-industries, on average over the most recent four quarters of data. An average of 1.263 million employees worked on Saturday only, while 644,000 more

⁴ Since owner-managers are not typically paid wages or salaries, but rather are compensated from the net profits of their enterprises, the issue of extra pay for weekend work is more complicated – although many do charge extra for performing their services on weekends.


Table 1	
Incidence of Weekend Work	
<i>Average of Four Reference Weeks, May 2016 to February 2017</i>	
	Number of Employees (Thousands)
Worked Saturdays Only	1,263
Worked Sundays Only	644
Worked Saturdays and Sundays	838
Total Weekend Workers	2,745
Total Employees	9,937
Proportion of Employees Working on the Weekend	27.6%
Total Employees Working on Saturdays ¹	2,102
Total Employees Working on Sundays ¹	1,482
Source: Authors' calculations from Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Customised Data Request, quarterly data, employees only. Four-quarter average May 2016 through February 2017.	
1. The total number of weekend workers does not equal the sum of those working on Saturday plus those working on Sunday, since some workers work both days of the weekend.	

worked Sunday only. Another 838,000 Australian employees worked both Saturday and Sunday. On average, a total of 2.75 million employees worked at some time during a typical weekend. Almost 2.1 million were employed on Saturday, and almost 1.5 million were employed on Sunday.⁵ Relative to average total paid employment (employees only) of just under 10 million over the same period, an average of 27.6 percent of Australian employees worked on a typical weekend during the last year.

It is interesting to note that the incidence of weekend work (as a proportion of total employment) has been relatively stable over the past 15 years. Figure 1 illustrates the proportion of all employees who work on weekends, from 2002 through 2017 (calendar-year averages). The data do not suggest any long-run secular rise in the importance of weekend work. In fact, to the extent there is a visible pattern in Figure 1, it suggests the impacts of macroeconomic cycles more than ongoing cultural changes. The prevalence of weekend work *declined* modestly during the strong labour market conditions of the mid-2000s. In this context, workers felt more confident demanding regular weekday schedules from employers, and employers encountered more challenges recruiting labour for anti-social shifts (including weekends). This

⁵ The total number of weekend workers does not equal the sum of Saturday employment and Sunday employment, because many workers work both days.

Figure 1
Employees Working Weekends as Share Total



Source: Author's calculations from Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Customised Data Request, quarterly data, employees only. Calendar-year averages 2002 through 2016; February data only for 2017.

decline was reversed, and then some, following the global financial crisis in 2008 and the weak labour market conditions which have prevailed ever since. In the context of chronic job shortages, workers are more willing to accept any shifts they can find – and employers take advantage of this desperation by adjusting their staffing rosters for maximum flexibility and profitability.⁶

However, even in the current context of sustained labour market weakness and desperation, there is no secular trend in the proportion of employees who work on weekends, which has remained stable (at between 27 and 28 percent of employees) over the last decade. This is consistent with other findings that the relative importance of weekend work has been stable (see, for example, Venn et al., 2016, Table 2). This contradicts the common claim that weekend work is becoming ubiquitous, and hence is somehow a normal, accepted part of worklife that no longer

⁶ Chronically weak labour market conditions also help to explain the growth of other forms of precarious or non-standard work, including temporary, casual, labour hire, and irregular arrangements.

deserves additional pay. In fact, most Australian employees (almost three-quarters) do not work on a typical weekend, and that proportion has not significantly changed in recent history. The “weekend” therefore still carries important social significance as a period of time when most people can be free from the demands and constraints of paid work.

Table 2	
Ten Sub-Industries With Most Weekend Employees	
Sub-Industry	Number of Employees Working On Weekend (Thousands)
Food and Beverage Services	406.0
Other Store-Based Retailing	261.4
Food Retailing	210.0
Hospitals	120.2
Residential Care Services	102.4
Medical and Other Health Care Services	93.2
Construction Services	84.7
Personal and Other Services	74.7
Public Order, Safety and Regulatory Services	71.6
Professional, Scientific and Technical Services (Excl. Computer System Design & Related Services)	67.9
Top Ten Sectors Total	1492.2
All Sectors Total	2745.2
Source: Authors’ calculations from Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Customised Data Request, quarterly data, employees only. Four-quarter average May 2016 through February 2017. Includes employees working Saturday, Sunday, or both during the reference week.	

Table 2 provides a listing of the top ten sub-industries based on the number of employees who worked either Saturdays, Sundays, or both. As expected, the retail and hospitality sectors top the list. The three largest sub-industries for weekend work were food and beverage services, other store-based retailing,⁷ and food retailing. Between them, these three sectors employed around 875,000 employees per

⁷ “Other store-based retailing” is an ABS residual category which includes retail store operations other than the main categories specifically broken out in its data (motor vehicles and parts; fuel; and food).

weekend. Given the scale of weekend work in these sub-industries, it is not surprising that employer organisations in those sectors have led the charge for reduced penalty rates for weekend work: they have the largest economic stake in the issue. However, those three sub-industries account for less than one-third of average total weekend employment. Over two-thirds of weekend workers are employed in other industries. And in 34 of the 108 sub-industries covered in the analysis, weekend workers constitute one-third or more of total employment. This confirms that if reductions in penalty rates do indeed spread to other workplaces, millions more Australian workers will be affected.⁸

The broader health care sector is the next biggest employer of weekend workers. Three specific health-related sub-industries – hospitals, residential care facilities, and medical and other health care services – take up the next three spots on the list of largest weekend employers, employing over 310,000 weekend workers between them. The final four sub-industries listed on Table 2 reflect a wide range of economic activities which also utilise substantial inputs of weekend employment: construction services; personal and other services; public order, safety and regulatory services; and professional, scientific and technical services. Again, this attests to the broad potential impact of changes in weekend penalty pay. Together, these top ten weekend employers accounted for over half of the total number of weekend employees (with just under 1.5 million weekend employees between them).

The *relative intensity* of weekend employment (as opposed to the *absolute number* of weekend employees) is described in Table 3. This table lists the ten sectors with the highest proportion of total employees, who worked one or both days of the weekend.⁹ Food and beverage services again tops the list, with almost 62 percent of all employees working at some time during a typical weekend. The rest of the list, however, confirms that weekend employment is an important feature of many other sub-industries – which may not have the same visibility as the retail and hospitality sectors, but which impose similar demands on their workforces. Resource, accommodation, and recreation sub-industries also use weekend workers with very high intensity. Across these ten high-intensity sectors, more than half of all employees are required to work on weekends – an intensity about twice as high as in the economy as a whole.

⁸ Keep in mind, as well, that the Fair Work Commission’s recent decision on penalty rates do not cover all of the workers in those three leading sub-industries highlighted in Table 2: the four awards affected by that decision constitute only a portion of employment in those three food and beverage and store-based retail groupings. In that regard, therefore, the potential for “contagion” from the recent decision is even greater.

⁹ The table does not include some of the sub-industries covered in the dataset with very small sample sizes (such as “not further defined” residual sub-industries), since the reliability of those particular employment estimates is inadequate.

Table 3	
Ten Sectors With Greatest Intensity of Weekend Employment	
Sub-Industry	Proportion of Employees Working On Weekend (percent)
Food and Beverage Services	61.8%
Fishing, Hunting and Trapping	58.9%
Gambling Activities	58.2%
Food Retailing	55.5%
Metal Ore Mining	54.2%
Accommodation	52.6%
Coal Mining	51.8%
Non-Metallic Mineral Mining and Quarrying	50.5%
Sports and Recreation Activities	49.3%
Other Store-Based Retailing	47.2%
Top Ten Sectors Total	54.7%
All Sectors Total	27.6%
Source: Authors' calculations from Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Customised Data Request, quarterly data, employees only. Four-quarter average May 2016 through February 2017. Includes employees working Saturday, Sunday, or both during the reference week. Excludes sectors defined "nfd" due to small sample size.	

The appendix to this report lists the average number of employees working at some point during a typical weekend (in both absolute terms, and as a share of total employment) for each of the 108 sub-industries covered in the ABS database.

It is worth repeating that these estimates of the average number of employees working on a particular weekend, are lower than the number of Australians who work at least *some* weekends each year (and hence who would also be affected by an erosion of penalty pay for weekend work). Other surveys have found that in excess of 30 percent of Australian employees "usually" or "regularly" work weekends (see, for example, Daly, 2015, and Venn *et al.*, 2016). The Productivity Commission also estimated that over 30 percent of employees work weekends (2015, Table F.1). In fact, if people who "sometimes" or "rarely" work weekends are included, then over two-thirds of Australian workers experience at least *some* weekend work (Charlesworth and Macdonald, 2015, Appendix 3). In this context, our estimate of the

prevalence of weekend work should be considered a lower bound: the number of Australians who would experience at least *some* income loss as a result of the erosion of weekend penalty pay benchmarks is much greater.

Part II: The Economic Importance of Penalty Pay for Weekend Work

The detailed sector-specific data on the prevalence of weekend work described in Part I of this report, provides a basis upon which the economic importance of penalty rates and related compensation for weekend work can be considered. This section will generate estimates of the additional labour income which is received as a result of penalty pay for weekend work on the basis of the following methodology:

Employment on each day of the weekend is calculated on the basis of the commissioned ABS Labour Force data reported above. As before, the analysis utilises a four-quarter average of employment for each of the 108 defined sub-industry groupings, covering the four reference weeks sampled from May 2016 through February 2017. This data cover employees only (not self-employed contractors or other owner-managers).

For each of those sub-industries, an appropriate Modern Award is selected, from the Fair Work Commission's inventory of awards (Fair Work Commission, 2017b). In each case, an award is chosen on the basis of broadest applicability to the sub-industry grouping in question; in cases where more than one award could potentially be broadly relevant, the lower-wage award was chosen. Each award specifies minimum hourly wage rates, along with minimum hourly rates paid for straight-time work on Saturdays and Sundays (incorporating the relevant penalty rates for weekend work that apply in each sector).¹⁰ We do not consider the impact of penalty rates for holidays, long hours, or night work. The analysis utilises the *lowest wage category* within each award; this approach thus provides a very conservative benchmark for minimum hourly pay in each sub-industry, and the size of weekend penalties.

Data regarding average weekly hours of work in each industry were then obtained from the Australian Bureau of Statistics' Catalogue 6306.0. This publication reports hours of work by industry at only the two-digit level (not the more detailed sub-industry disaggregation utilised above for employment levels). Therefore, these

¹⁰ Normal daytime wage rates are utilised for both Saturday and Sunday pay in order to separate out the impact of long-hours or night-work penalties.

broader industry-wide figures for working hours are applied to all sub-industries falling within each respective industry.¹¹

To estimate the aggregate value of penalty pay for weekend work, an estimate of the average number of hours worked each weekend day is also required. Detail on hours worked per day is not reported in ABS data. Average hours of work per weekend day are therefore estimated as follows. For full-time workers (35 hours or more per week, as defined by the ABS), it is assumed that each employee works five days per week (and hence daily hours equal weekly hours divided by five). For part-time workers, it is assumed that lower weekly hours result equally from *fewer days* of work and *shorter shifts* of work. Hours per day thus equal one fifth of an adjusted weekly hours figure, calculated as the average of 35 hours per week (the threshold for full-time work) and the actual average hours per week for that sector.¹² This formula is applied to each entire sub-industry (based on whether its average weekly hours of work exceed the 35-hour threshold or not).

The total penalty pay for weekend work performed in each sub-industry can therefore be calculated as the product of the number of employees working on a weekend day, the hourly penalty paid for that work (in dollars per hour, equal to the difference between the Saturday or Sunday minimum award wage and the regular minimum wage), and the average number of hours worked per day. This calculation is performed separately for Saturdays and Sundays (since data on employment, and variable penalty rates, are available separately for each day).

Table 4 provides a summary of the estimated additional income which weekend employees receive per year, as a result of the minimum hourly pay penalties for weekend work reflected in the respective awards for the 108 different sub-industries. In aggregate, we estimate that weekend employees receive at least \$14 billion per year in additional income resulting from weekend work.¹³ Most of this income (over 60 percent, or over \$8.5 billion) is generated by Sunday penalties: while fewer individuals work on Sundays than on Saturdays, the wage penalties in most sectors are larger for Sundays, and this generates more income. Even the more modest penalties

¹¹ For example, all retail sub-industries are assumed to experience the same average weekly hours of work as reported in ABS Catalogue 6306.0 for the entire retail sector.

¹² This approach is conservative, as it is likely that workers assigned to Saturday and Sunday shifts work longer shifts than other part-time workers, given the concentration of their hours on those days. According to Daly (2014), for example, about 60 percent of employees who work weekends, *only* work on weekends (while the remaining 40 percent also work on one or more weekdays); this suggests that average daily hours of work may be more concentrated for weekend workers, and hence higher than the average for the corresponding sector as a whole.

¹³ Again, these reflect only daytime weekend penalties, not any additional penalties workers on Saturdays and Sundays might also receive due to long hours or night shifts.

Table 4 Penalty Pay for Weekend Work	
	\$ Billion per year
Penalty Pay for Saturday Work	\$5.490
Penalty Pay for Sunday Work	\$8.549
Penalty Pay Attributable Directly to Awards	\$3.476
Penalty Pay Received Indirectly	\$10.563
Total Weekend Penalty Pay	\$14.039
As Proportion Total Cash Employee Compensation	2.5%
Source: Authors' calculations as described in text from Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Customised Data Request; Fair Work Commission (2017b); and Australian Bureau of Statistics Catalogue 6306.0.	

attracted by Saturday work, however, generate another \$5.5 billion in additional pay for employees.

Relative to estimated total cash compensation paid to employees of \$555 billion in 2016,¹⁴ this conservative estimate of weekend penalty pay represents 2.5 percent of the total cash compensation of all employees in Australia. This does not include reduced superannuation contributions tied to that lost income (which would reduce compensation by at least another \$1.5 billion per year). In industries which rely more intensively on weekend employment, the relative importance of penalty pay is much larger. In other store-based retail, for example, weekend penalty income accounts for over 5 percent of total employee wages and salaries, and in food and beverage services over 7.5 percent.¹⁵

It is worth reviewing that this estimate of the aggregate value of total penalty pay for weekend work is very conservative, on several grounds:

¹⁴ Authors' calculation from employment and weekly earnings reported in ABS Catalogue 6306.0, Data Cube 4, Table 1.

¹⁵ Weekend penalties are larger in these sectors relative to total labour income because of the greater proportion of employees who are employed on weekends, but also because average weekly earnings in those sectors are low to start with. Authors' calculations based on industry weekly earnings data reported in ABS Catalogue 6306.0, Data Cube 2, Table 4.

- It covers paid employees only, not self-employed contractors and other owner-managers.¹⁶
- It is based on penalty rates prescribed in the lowest wage category of the lowest-wage award broadly relevant within each sub-industry.
- It assumes that the average weekend shift (even for part-time workers) is no longer than the average shift during the week.
- It does not include additional penalty income received for working long hours or nights on a weekend, nor penalty rates for working on holidays.

For all these reasons, therefore, the estimates in Table 4 likely underestimate the full aggregate value of income generated by weekend wage penalties.

Keep in mind that the Fair Work Commission’s rulings regarding penalty rate provisions in awards apply directly only to workers who are employed under the terms of those minimum awards. The number of weekend workers in each sub-industry compensated under the award system can be estimated on the basis of average award coverage for broad two-digit industry groupings (reported in ABS Catalogue 6306.0, Data Cube 5, Table 4). As with the weekly hours of work data reported above, data on award coverage is not available at the detailed sub-industry level; hence broader two-digit industry ratios are applied to all sub-industries within each broader industry grouping.¹⁷ Within each sub-industry, an estimate of the income that results *directly* from the Fair Work Commission’s penalty rate schedules is calculated as the product of the total penalty income paid, and the proportion of workers covered by relevant awards. Across the economy as a whole, we estimate that about \$3.5 billion in penalty pay (one-quarter of the economy-wide total) is received directly by workers employed under the conditions of an award. This proportion reflects the share of workers covered by awards, as well as the fact that award-covered workers are concentrated in industries which pay below-average wages. This estimate of the direct effects of weekend penalty rates is conservative, because generally it is the least senior employees (hence those least likely to be covered by an enterprise agreement or individual contract) who are assigned to work weekends – precisely because of the extra inconvenience of those shifts.

¹⁶ Many contractors and other owner-managers do charge extra for work on weekends, reflecting the implicit social understanding that weekend work involves extra sacrifice.

¹⁷ The most recent ABS data on award coverage, from Catalogue 6306.0 for employment in May 2016, suppressed award coverage ratios for the mining and financial industries; estimated award coverage in those industries was therefore based on previous ABS data (the same catalogue for 2014). Award coverage for waged employees in agricultural industries is also not reported in this publication; for those sub-industries, award coverage is assumed to equal the economy-wide average (24.5 percent).

However, this direct impact is certainly not the full extent of the influence of prescribed penalty rates on the terms and conditions of weekend work. After all, the award system is designed to establish minimum benchmarks for all employees. Workers covered by enterprise agreements or individual contracts may have terms and conditions which vary from those specified in their relevant awards; but the overall compensation they receive must be at least as preferable as they would have received, working the same hours on the same days, under the relevant award. In that regard, minimum penalty rates governing weekend work are indirectly embodied in the terms of both enterprise agreements and individual contracts.

This relationship between the minimum standards set in the modern awards, and the terms of alternative arrangements, is confirmed by Stewart *et al.* (2016, p. 462):

“Under the FW [Fair Work] Act, it is once again necessary for any reduction in the overtime or penalty rates fixed by awards to be offset by some compensating benefit, in order to pass the BOOT [Better Off Overall Test]. This is true whether the change is effected through an enterprise agreement or an individual flexibility arrangement.”

Even workers who are paid annual salary, without reference to specific hours of work, must be compensated at least as well as, or better than, workers performing the same work under the terms of the awards. For workers regularly scheduled to work on weekends, therefore, the penalty rate benchmarks set under the awards system must be ultimately reflected within the alternative compensation package. In other words, enterprise agreements and individual contracts for employees who are required to work on weekends will embody compensation for that work that is at least as generous as specified by the corresponding awards, or else those arrangements would fail the Better Off Overall Test (BOOT) – and would not likely be accepted by the relevant employees in any event. Potential changes in penalty rates specified in awards immediately affect the ability of any alternative arrangement (whether collective or individual) to pass the BOOT. They will thus ultimately be reflected in changes in compensation for those workers – perhaps through changes in explicit weekend penalty rates (where those are defined in enterprise or individual agreements), or perhaps through changes in other facets of compensation. Even workers whose incomes are significantly higher than the minimums prescribed in the awards (and hence whose arrangements could presumably pass the BOOT test easily) will still be affected by changes in the penalty rate system. After all, the extent to which their compensation exceeds the award minimums is dependent on other relevant factors (such as skill or productivity premiums; occupational supply and demand conditions; bargaining power; and others). The erosion of the system of penalty rates – an important feature of the overall minimum benchmark which sets

the floor for collective or individual negotiations – will be reflected, other factors remaining equal, in a reduction in the extent to which those workers can successfully maintain their absolute compensation position (over and above the minimum benchmark, as it moves backward). If superior productivity, strong bargaining power, or tight demand conditions explain why some workers are able to negotiate superior compensation (relative to the minimum benchmark), then even if those factors continue to exert their positive influence, they now act relative to a lower minimum standard – an economic reality which sooner or later will be reflected in an erosion of compensation levels and norms.

More broadly, penalty rates reflect a social expectation that work on weekends *deserves* extra compensation. That expectation clearly influences the bargaining (explicit or implicit) that determines the terms of employment, even for employees who are not directly paid weekend penalties. Penalty rates are an important regulatory reflection of the principle of extra pay for weekend work; as they are eroded, the socio-cultural significance of the “weekend” will be increasingly challenged. This will be reflected in the explicit or implicit bargaining that determines compensation for workers covered by enterprise agreements and individual contracts. Consider, for example, the process of negotiating enterprise agreements: it becomes immediately more difficult for unions to defend both the principle and the level of penalty rates for weekend work, if that benefit is taken away from many other workers in the economy, and if the regulatory enshrinement of the principle disappears.¹⁸ The same impact will be felt (directly or indirectly) on the parameters (including employer and employee expectations) that determine the outcome of individual contract negotiations.

For all these reasons, it is appropriate to consider the impact of penalty rate changes on the incomes of workers who are not directly covered by a Modern Award, but whose compensation is nonetheless supported by the regulatory and socio-cultural expectation that weekend work attracts penalty pay. We estimate that workers under enterprise and individual contracts receive in excess of \$10 billion per year in extra pay for weekend work.

¹⁸ This mechanism has already been demonstrated in the controversy surrounding specialty retailer kikki.k, whose recently approved enterprise agreement contained a provision directly mirroring the Fair Work Commission’s reduction in Sunday penalty rates under the general retail award. While the retailer in question has backed away from this provision in the face of public pressure (and revelations that it was underpaying staff in the first place), the reality remains that weekend pay arrangements in enterprise agreements will face immediate and sustained downward pressure if the underlying award penalty rate structure is eroded. See Marin-Guzman (2017).

If anything, the methodology described above likely underestimates the indirect impact of penalty rates on the weekend pay received by employees under enterprise agreements or individual contracts. We have estimated the aggregate value of extra pay on the basis of the absolute hourly penalties paid for weekend work in each sub-industry under the awards, for workers paid at the lowest minimum rate. For many workers under enterprise agreements and individual contracts, however, penalty pay for weekend work will be determined as a percentage of their (higher) hourly base wages. In that case, non-award employees receive even more income in weekend penalties than direct award-covered work, and hence the previous analysis underestimates the overall value of weekend penalties.¹⁹ Moreover, the other conservative methodological assumptions described above also reinforce the cautious nature of our estimate.²⁰

Finally, Table 5 provides a list of the ten sub-industries with the largest total payouts of weekend penalty pay. This list largely mirrors the list of the largest weekend employers provided in Table 2, but with some differences (resulting from differences across industries in both the base hourly wage rate and the proportionate impact of weekend penalties). The “big three” retail and hospitality employers (food and beverage services, other store-based retailing, and food retailing) each pay out over \$1 billion per year (directly and indirectly) in weekend penalty pay. Three other sectors (residential care facilities, construction services, and hospitals) pay out over one-half billion dollars annually. The top ten sectors listed in Table 5 together account for exactly half of total estimated weekend penalty pay across the Australian economy. The Appendix reports estimates of total weekend penalty payouts for each of the 108 sub-industries covered in the analysis.

¹⁹ In terms of the logic described above, that the terms of enterprise or individual contracts must pass a BOOT test relative to the corresponding award, it is appropriate that the absolute hourly wage differential (not the percentage difference) be utilised to estimate the value of penalty pay received directly or indirectly by non-award workers. Despite this, however, many non-award workers will, in practice, receive weekend penalties that are in fact larger.

²⁰ As noted, we selected the lowest minimum rate in the lowest-wage award in each sub-industry as the benchmark applied to every employee, we applied the estimate to employees only, and we utilised cautious assumptions regarding the average length of weekend shifts.

Table 5		
Ten Sub-Industries With Greatest Weekend Penalty Incomes		
Industry	Estimated Extra Pay for Work on Saturdays and Sundays (\$m)	Share Lost Directly via Award Wages¹ (%)
Food and Beverage Services	\$1,427	42.7%
Other Store-Based Retailing	\$1,139	34.5%
Food Retailing	\$1,014	34.5%
Residential Care Services	\$658	28.8%
Construction Services	\$545	19.7%
Hospitals	\$524	28.8%
Public Order, Safety and Regulatory Services	\$464	18.1%
Road Transportation	\$442	13.4%
Social Assistance Services	\$413	28.8%
Professional, Scientific and Technical Services (Excl. Computer & Related)	\$392	9.3%
Top Ten Sectors Total	\$7,018	29.9%
All Sectors Total	\$14,039	24.8%
Source: Authors' calculations as described in text from Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Customised Data Request; Fair Work Commission (2017b); and Australian Bureau of Statistics Catalogue 6306.0.		
1. Assumed equal to proportion of employees covered under award.		

Conclusion: The Tip of the Iceberg

The “weekend” is still a real feature of Australian economic, social, and family life. Most Australians do not work weekends. And most Australian families still organise their personal and familial routines, to an important degree, around weekends: they provide a time for recreation, household tasks, family care, community engagement, and more.²¹ Despite the supposed advent of a “24-7” culture, weekends are still important. Careful peer-reviewed research confirms that being required to work on weekends still imposes significant personal, social, and health costs (see Charlesworth and Macdonald, 2015; Daly, 2015; Skinner et al., 2012; and Dixon et al., 2011 for recent summaries).

Weekend employment in the retail and hospitality sectors is the largest and most visible manifestation of weekend work in Australia today – and it has understandably attracted the most attention from employers anxious to reduce the extra labour costs they incur as a result of their widespread weekend operations. However, these sectors account for a minority (less than one-third) of all weekend employment across the economy. Some 2.75 million Australian employees work on a typical weekend. Their penalty pay – whether dictated directly under the award system, or embedded within enterprise or individual contracts – reflects the sacrifice that they incur to perform this work when most Australians are free to enjoy regular time free from work. We estimate, on the basis of very conservative assumptions, that this aggregate penalty pay totals at least \$14 billion per year across the economy (or over 2.5 percent of total employee cash compensation paid out in the entire economy), and likely more.

The Fair Work Commission’s decision to significantly reduce penalty rates for Sunday work in retail and hospitality sectors is important and damaging, but just the tip of the iceberg if the process of “normalising” weekend work continues. Our estimate suggests that merely cutting Sunday penalty rates in half (as the Fair Work Commission’s recent decision does for permanent retail, pharmacy, and fast food employees) would ultimately reduce cash compensation for Sunday workers by over \$4.25 billion per year. That represents around 30 percent of total weekend penalty income, confirming that this decision represents a major departure from traditional practice. But the total loss, if weekend penalty pay disappears altogether (surely the

²¹ One dimension of this continuing reality, very relevant to the current debate over penalty rates, is that schools and group child care facilities operate on Monday to Friday schedules. This is just one of many factors which make weekend work both inconvenient and expensive for families, reinforcing the principle behind penalty rates.

ultimate goal of employer organisations) would be much larger, and would be experienced throughout all sectors of the economy.

In the context of widespread wage stagnation and growing household indebtedness, the additional income generated by weekend pay penalties becomes all the more important. For comparison purposes, consider that the most recent ABS data indicates a slowing of growth in average weekly earnings for Australian workers to an annualised rate of less than 0.5 percent per year.²² This implies that the loss of weekend penalties would reduce employee incomes by an amount equivalent to *five years' annual wage increases*. It would also impose substantial losses in government revenues and damage fiscal balances, experienced both through the loss of pay-as-you-earn tax revenue and increases in welfare payments (Denniss, 2017).

The Fair Work Commission's decision to reduce penalty rates for Sunday work by retail and hospitality workers cannot be understood as an isolated adjustment to the particular terms of work in these two high-profile sectors. It reflects a major shift in the long-standing debate within society regarding the legitimate expectations that can be placed on workers to be available any day of the week – and the ongoing struggle between employees and employers over how much of life should be subject to the disciplines and rigours of paid work. Indeed, that struggle is as old as the institution of wage labour itself. The erosion of penalty rates for weekend work is one important indication that employers have seized the upper hand.²³ If this decision is implemented, and the precedent spreads to other sectors of the economy and other times of work, the costs to Australian workers, their families, and national macroeconomic performance will be severe.

²² Authors' calculations from ABS Catalogue 6302.0, Table 2, all employees, seasonally adjusted, annualised rate experienced in May-November 2016.

²³ There are other ways in which employers are successfully rolling back historical efforts to limit the dominance of work over personal and family time, including reductions in access to annual leave; see Henderson (2016).

References

Charlesworth, Sara, and Fiona Macdonald (2015). "Expert Report to the Shop Distributive and Allied Employees Association, Four Yearly Review of Modern Awards – Penalty Rates AM2014/305," Centre for Sustainable Organisations and Work, RMIT.

Craig, Lyn, and Abigail Powell (2011). "Non-Standard Work Schedules, Work-Family Balance and the Gendered Division of Childcare," *Work, Employment and Society* 25(2), pp. 274-291.

Daly, Tony (2014). *Evenings, Nights and Weekends: Working Unsocial Hours and Penalty Rates* (Adelaide: Centre for Work + Life, University of South Australia), 29 pp.

Denniss, Richard (2017). *The Impact of Penalty Rate Cuts on Personal Tax Revenue and Welfare* (Canberra: The Australia Institute), 14 pp.

Dixon, Jane, *et al.* (2013). "Contemporary Contestations over Working Time: Time for Health to Weigh In," *BMC Public Health* 14, pp. 1-8.

Fair Work Commission (2017a). "Summary of Decision: 4 Yearly Review of Modern Awards – Penalty Rates," February 23, <https://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/sites/awardsmodernfouryr/2017fwcfb1001-summary.pdf>.

Fair Work Commission (2017b). *Modern Awards List*, <https://www.fwc.gov.au/awards-and-agreements/awards/modern-awards/modern-awards-list>.

Gardner, Philip, and Marina Leikina (2017). "Penalty Rates Decision Sets an Alarming Precedent," Ryan Carlisle Thomas Legal Blog, February 23, <https://rctlaw.com.au/legal-blog/2017/penalty-rates-decision-sets-an-alarming-precedent>.

Han, Misa (2017). "Holy Confusion: Wage Cut Creates Two Classes of Doughnut Sellers," *Australian Financial Review*, Feb. 25-26, p.6.

Henderson, Troy (2016). *Hard to Get Away: Is the Paid Holiday Under Threat in Australia?* (Canberra: Centre for Future Work at the Australia Institute), 32 pp.

Karp, Paul (2017). "Penalty Rate Cuts Could Set Precedent for Other Industries, Union Advice Says," *The Guardian Australia Edition* (March 10).

Marin-Guzman, David (2017). "Kikki.k in First Retail Agreement to Cover Sunday Penalty Cuts," *Australian Financial Review*, April 9, <http://www.afr.com/news/kikkik-in-first-retail-agreement-to-cover-sunday-penalty-cuts-20170409-gvh1in#>.

Productivity Commission (2015). *Workplace Relations Framework: Draft Report* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia).

Skinner, Natalie, Claire Hutchinson, and Barbara Pocock (2012). *The Big Squeeze: Work, Home and Care in 2012* (Adelaide: Centre for Work + Life, University of South Australia), 90 pp.

Stewart, Andrew, Anthony Forsyth, Mark Irving, Richard Johnstone, and Shae McCrystal (2016). *Creighton and Stewart's Labour Law* (Annandale: Federation Press).

Venn, Danielle, Gemma Carey, Lyndall Strazdins and John Burgess (2016). "What Explains Trends in Australian Working-Time Arrangements in the 2000s?," *Labour and Industry* 26(2), pp. 138-155.

Appendix

Weekend Work in 108 Sub-Industries <i>May 2016 – February 2017</i>			
Sub-Industry	Average Weekend Employees (thousand)¹	Share of Total Employees	Estimated Penalty Pay (\$m/yr)
01 Agriculture	44.3	37.7%	\$283.9
02 Aquaculture	2.6	41.9%	\$8.2
03 - Forestry and Logging	1.2	17.1%	\$3.8
04 - Fishing, Hunting and Trapping	1.7	58.9%	\$13.0
05 - Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing Support Services	3.6	21.8%	\$21.4
A0 - Agriculture, nfd	1.5	75.5%	\$9.5
06 - Coal Mining	24.1	51.8%	\$208.5
07 - Oil and Gas Extraction	7.7	36.7%	\$71.1
08 - Metal Ore Mining	39.6	54.2%	\$343.0
09 - Non-Metallic Mineral Mining and Quarrying	4.7	50.5%	\$33.6
10 - Exploration and Other Mining Support Services	27.4	45.8%	\$234.4
B0 - Mining, nfd	5.6	51.2%	\$43.6
11 - Food Product Manufacturing	47.5	25.5%	\$284.8
12 - Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing	7.4	23.1%	\$52.5
13 - Textile, Leath, Clothing and Footwear Manufacturing	2.6	10.6%	\$23.9
14 - Wood Product Manufacturing	5.3	16.8%	\$29.6
15 - Pulp, Paper and Converted Paper Product Manufacturing	3.2	20.7%	\$18.8
16 - Printing (including the Reproduction of Recorded Media)	3.2	9.7%	\$22.8
17 - Petroleum and Coal Product Manufacturing	2.3	40.0%	\$18.0
18 - Basic Chemical and Chemical Product Manufacturing	7.7	16.3%	\$43.7
19 - Polymer Product and Rubber Product Manufacturing	5.3	16.5%	\$28.8
20 - Non-Metallic Mineral Product Manufacturing	8.1	27.3%	\$41.3
21 - Primary Metal and Metal Product Manufacturing	11.4	18.9%	\$59.6

22 - Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing	9.5	16.2%	\$46.8
23 - Transport Equipment Manufacturing	9.8	14.8%	\$47.2
24 - Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing	14.3	13.4%	\$70.3
25 - Furniture and Other Manufacturing	6.4	15.0%	\$28.6
C0 - Manufacturing, nfd	3.7	15.9%	\$24.6
26 - Electrical Supply	8.5	14.8%	\$55.2
27 - Gas Supply	3.1	23.5%	\$16.9
28 - Water Supply, Sewerage and Drainage Services	3.5	12.9%	\$26.3
29 - Waste Collection, Treatment and Disposal Services	6.4	21.7%	\$44.1
D0 - Electricity, Gas, Water and Waste Services, nfd	0.6	29.8%	\$4.2
30 - Building Construction	43.0	23.1%	\$287.0
31 - Heavy and Civil Engineering Construction	16.9	26.5%	\$130.7
32 - Construction Services	84.7	21.1%	\$545.2
E0 - Construction, nfd	3.5	27.2%	\$25.9
33 - Basic Material Wholesaling	15.1	20.1%	\$69.4
34 - Machinery and Equipment Wholesaling	14.3	15.9%	\$87.0
35 - Motor Vehicle and Motor Vehicle Parts Wholesaling	4.2	20.4%	\$20.6
36 - Grocery, Liquor and Tobacco Product Wholesaling	10.2	19.7%	\$56.6
37 - Other Goods Wholesaling	6.7	11.5%	\$39.5
38 - Commission-Based Wholesaling	2.3	31.5%	\$12.7
F0 - Wholesaling, nfd	1.4	12.3%	\$10.4
39 - Motor Vehicle and Motor Vehicle Parts Retailing	32.6	36.7%	\$127.8
40 - Fuel Retailing	14.8	47.0%	\$83.9
41 - Food Retailing	210.0	55.5%	\$1,013.8
42 - Other Store-Based Retailing	261.4	47.2%	\$1,139.2
43 - Non-Store Retailing and Retail Commission-Based Buying/ Selling	2.3	25.5%	\$12.6
G0 - Retail Trade, nfd	12.5	39.2%	\$58.9
44 - Accommodation	50.4	52.6%	\$192.4
45 - Food and Beverage Services	406.0	61.8%	\$1,427.2
46 - Road Transport	66.5	33.0%	\$442.0
47 - Rail Transport	15.7	39.6%	\$116.9
48 - Water Transport	2.9	38.5%	\$30.7
49 - Air and Space Transport	23.6	42.8%	\$188.3
50 - Other Transport	1.7	29.1%	\$15.6

51 - Postal and Courier Pick-up and Delivery Services	10.1	15.4%	\$65.5
52 - Transport Support Services	15.7	27.8%	\$113.1
53 - Warehousing Storage Services	12.9	24.2%	\$77.5
10 - Transport, Postal and Warehousing, nfd	1.1	18.1%	\$7.4
54 - Publishing (except Internet and Music Publishing)	3.5	15.5%	\$7.5
55 - Motion Picture and Sound Recording Activities	7.7	36.3%	\$66.9
56 - Broadcasting (except Internet)	5.3	20.0%	\$48.0
57 - Internet Publishing and Broadcasting ²	nm	nm	nm
58 - Telecommunications Services	9.2	10.6%	\$40.4
59 - Internet Service Providers, Web Search Portals & Data Processing	2.1	23.4%	\$13.8
60 - Library and Other Information Services	3.6	27.1%	\$18.6
62 - Finance	16.1	7.7%	\$87.4
63 - Insurance and Superannuation Funds	7.3	8.8%	\$45.1
64 - Auxillary Finance and Insurance Services	7.8	8.4%	\$48.5
K0 - Financial and Insurance Services, nfd ²	nm	nm	nm
66 - Rental and Hiring Services (except Real Estate)	10.8	33.4%	\$48.3
67 - Property Operators and Real Estate Services	35.7	28.4%	\$171.7
69 - Professional, Scientific and Technical Services (Except Computer System Design and Related Services)	67.9	11.9%	\$391.5
70 - Computer System Design and Related Services	16.5	10.2%	\$101.7
72 - Administrative Services	32.4	17.6%	\$137.5
73 - Building Cleaning, Pest Control and Other Support Services	26.2	21.3%	\$151.8
75 - Public Administration	61.3	10.9%	\$321.6
76 – Defence ⁵	2.7	9.9%	\$18.2
77 - Public Order, Safety and Regulatory Services	71.6	37.3%	\$463.6
80 - Preschool and School Education	56.2	10.6%	\$323.6
81 - Tertiary Education	28.3	12.3%	\$163.5

82 - Adult, Community and Other Education	28.5	23.1%	\$134.4
P0 - Education and Training, nfd	1.9	14.8%	\$10.0
84 - Hospitals	120.2	33.4%	\$523.7
85 - Medical and Other Health Care Services	93.2	22.5%	\$334.7
86 - Residential Care Services	102.4	44.7%	\$657.8
87 - Social Assistance Services	67.2	18.2%	\$412.5
Q0 - Health Care and Social Assistance, nfd	1.1	51.8%	\$8.4
89 - Heritage Activites	8.1	25.6%	\$13.8
90 - Creative and Performing Arts Activities	5.3	41.8%	\$28.4
91 - Sports and Recreation Activites	51.8	49.3%	\$179.9
92 - Gambling Activites	14.2	58.2%	\$77.7
R0 - Arts and Recreation Services, nfd	0.9	56.5%	\$6.1
94 - Repair and Maintenance	26.3	17.7%	\$148.9
95 - Personal and Other Services	74.7	40.4%	\$164.9
96 - Private Households Employing Staff / Own Use	0.7	17.3%	\$2.3
<p>Source: Authors' calculations as described in text from Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Customised Data Request; Fair Work Commission (2017b); and Australian Bureau of Statistics Catalogue 6306.0.</p> <p>1. Four-quarter average of reference weeks, May 2016 through February 2017.</p> <p>2. Sample size too small to meaningfully interpret estimates of weekend work and income.</p> <p>3. Civilian employment only.</p>			