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Annex UU to  
3350-Op LASER OPERATIONS ORDER 002  
8 April 2020

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

References: A. 2018 CAF/DND Info Ops Policy, 3 April 2018  
B. 3350-Op LASER 20-01 Op O-002, 3 April 2020  
C. Annex XX to Op LASER 20-01 CJOC Op O 002, 3 April 2020  
D. Annex X to Op LASER 20-01 CJOC Op O 002, 3 April 2020  
E. Chief of Defence Intelligence Functional Directive: Framework for the Conduct of Intelligence Activities Using the Internet, March 2017  
F. CFJP 3-9 Canadian Forces Joint Targeting, 12 December 2014  
G. Privacy Act of Canada

SITUATION

1. General. As the CAF continues to plan support to civil authorities in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, Canadian public perception of the CAF will be largely grounded in recent domestic operations including the military's supporting role in assisting home-bound Canadians during severe weather in Newfoundland and Labrador, provincial flood response in Ontario, Quebec and Manitoba and the repatriation and isolation of Canadians under Op GLOBE. Under both Op GLOBE and Op LENTUS, the CAF has experienced substantial outpouring of support, gratitude and compassion from Canadians. Further, due to the scale of the CAF mobilisation and the de-centralized nature of many of the probable CAF tasks, Op LASER represents an important opportunity not just for the CAF to assist Canadians at a time of crisis, but also to grow and define the relationship between Canadians and their military. This will potentially shape the Canadian national dialogue on military and security culture into the future.

2. Threat. In Op LENTUS, Op GLOBE and domestic operations overall, the Information Environment (IE) can generally be characterised as uncontested. Under Op LASER, there has been no confirmed targeted adversarial information activities that specifically seek to undermine, weaken, disrupt or degrade GC response to the crisis. However, the existence of mis/disinformation in the IE constitutes what may be characterized as a contested IE, where unofficial actors and sources of information have and will continue to emerge to compete with the attention, focus and understanding of Canadians. Such efforts are not currently attributable to foreign powers or any malign intent, but their adverse effects must be mitigated none the less. Further, the nature of this pandemic and the measures taken across the globe and in Canada have increased population levels of anxiety, stress, fear and distrust. Measures such as self-isolation and physical distancing have resulted in a real and perceived loss of freedom and personal agency from individual Canadians. This disempowerment and general context of anxiety will lead to increases in irrational behaviour which may run counter the overall response effort and public wellbeing. The CAF must support GC in mitigating this overall perspective of fear and anxiety to promote and enable a rational, fact-based response to this crisis.

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3. Countering Mis/Disinformation. CAF must support GC, OGDA partners and civil authorities in pro-actively mitigating the effects of mis/disinformation which exist in the IE regardless of their provenance or intent. Critically, this must be enabled while also balancing the individual rights of Canadians as well as the overall role of CAF in a domestic response. Conditions which may need to be mitigated to enable CAF activity include:

- a. Perception that CAF will import or spread COVID-19 through its activities;
- b. Perception that CAF is depriving local stockpiles of critical resources such as PPE, testing kits or access to healthcare.
- c. Limited precedent of CAF conducting ALEA operations and overall concerns about increased militarization. Strong successes exist in Ops CADENCE and PODIUM, but the Oka Crisis may be the example many Canadians will use as a reference to form their opinions if there is the potential for an ALEA RFA; and
- d. CAF members' individual fear for their own wellbeing on being ordered into an area with confirmed COVID-19 cases.

4. Limitations.

- a. Public information will be open, honest, factual and transparent and will take into account OPSEC, PERSEC and the *Privacy Act*.
- b. All public communications or internal communications will be coordinated with Public Affairs (PA) staffs at the appropriate HQ level;
- c. At this time, no authorities have been issued for the conduct of psychological operations (PSYOPs). Similarly, loudspeaker operations require specific ROE. These activities will not be conducted without explicit prior approval;
- d. Overall communications and information disseminating activities will be conducted through a Commander's ability to communicate with own troops, civil liaison, and normal Public Affairs activities; and
- e. There will be no intelligence collection activities targeting Canadians in support of Influence Activities or Public Affairs on Op LASER. Information used to drive development, analysis, design and assessment of information activities and products will be collected in an ethical manner and remain limited to that information that is necessary to ensure Canadians are protected from the adverse effects of the COVID-19 crisis. Particular attention will be paid to respecting the privacy of Canadians, ensuring information is kept as anonymized and protected as possible in accordance with Ref G (*Privacy Act*).

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5. MISSION. CJOC will project forces to support Government of Canada objectives and requests for assistance while mitigating the potential impacts of the COVID-19 virus on DND/CAF personnel in order to preserve operational capabilities.

EXECUTION

6. Strategic Alignment. Information for dissemination by any means will be aligned with Annex XX – StratCom and Annex X – Public Affairs. As well, in line with the principle of conscious action, manoeuvre elements must plan conventional defence activities in a way that aligns with and supports the overall operational narrative, themes and messages. Every action, message and image sends a message.
7. Guiding Principles. The following principles will inform the overall CAF information approach:
- a. Exploitation: Visible defence activity must be communicated. The appropriate balance must be struck between capitalizing on CAF successes and letting CAF actions speak on their own in accordance with Annex XX;
  - b. Flexibility: Tasks will come that the CAF has potentially not foreseen. Access to Information Related Capabilities (IRCs) may be inconsistent and communication responsibilities might fall to dispersed junior leaders on the ground to enact the desired effects in this annex;
  - c. Perspective: Canadians' perception and interaction with the CAF will be highly specific to the affected region. Self-assessed successes are irrelevant to how CAF activity will be perceived by Canadians;
  - d. Coordination & Synchronisation: Seemingly unrelated events might all happen concurrently and have cascading effects on one another in a different region of the country; and
  - e. Plan to Assess: adaptation will only happen from observing reactions and results. Information enablers will be particularly positioned to support overall operational assessments and in particular IE assessments. These frameworks are currently under development by CJOC J5, CJAT and JOE.
8. Concept of Information Support. The JTF-LR Effects cell will consist of info ops, PA and IA staffs. These staffs will be coordinated by JTF-LR Chief Effects to ensure an overall consistent and coherent approach to the IE.
- a. Intent. As a domestic operation, Op LASER information support will leverage Public Affairs as the primary means for facilitating communications with Canadians on a large scale. CIMIC, PSYOPs and other IRCs will be leveraged in support and as enabling capabilities to enhance PA and OGDAs communications capability and capacity. The concept of info support is superimposed over the



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phasing from Op LASER OPORD 002, where Ph 1 will be conceived as Shaping, Ph 2 will be conceived as Enabling the Execution and Ph 3 will be Exploitation and Mitigation for each RFA or task as they emerge. As conventional CAF assets conduct activity across these phases for the delivery of support to Canadians, information practitioners will ensure the relevant information considerations are incorporated into planning and operations. Appendix 1 contains an Objectives, Effects, and Tasks matrix illustrating the logical chain of operational intent mapping all the way down to tactical tasks. At Appendix 2 is an example Concept of Information Support for a notional mission which may emerge from an RFA. It is illustrative of some exemplar details and considerations in a template format which will inform the development of such a CONOP for each activation.

- b. Communication Platforms. Mass digital communications are the optimum solution for spreading information as quickly and widely as possible, though they are also the easiest to ignore. The same information transmitted differently will prompt different reactions, and the selection of media or platforms as well as the agent (or spokesperson) delivering the message may be modified to change how the message is received. Individuals or audiences will more readily act on information if it is perceived as urgent or immediate, but at the same time collateral effects such as fear or panic must be mitigated.
- c. Main Effort. The main effort for information operations is to enable CAF Freedom of Manoeuvre in the IE by equipping the Commander with analysis, understanding and recommendations for action in the IE, especially as it pertains to countering mis/disinformation.
- d. End State. The GC no longer requires CAF in support of COVID19 pandemic and disaster-related response activities.

9. Groupings and Tasks. Tasks conducted across the country under Op LASER are anticipated to occur concurrently, repeatedly and disparately across the four LOEs. As such most tasks are assigned on a 'be prepared to' basis but will be leveraged for each activation under Op LASER. Anticipated Shaping, Enabling and Exploiting/Mitigating activities may also occur outside or across phases as conditions dictate. They will also require coordination across great distances within and between RJTF JOAs. As each individual effort is activated, information practitioners will support through the following phasing:

- a. Common to all Phases.
  - (1) Force Generators. Where possible, ensure that personnel holding qualification and experience in an IRC be prioritised for employment in that role.
  - (2) JTF-LR Effects.



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- (a) Coordinate and synchronise Influence Activities in support of the overall information effort;
  - (b) Support and enable PA and OGDAs collection, analysis, product design, production and dissemination;
  - (c) Ensure that OPSEC, PERSEC and the *Privacy Act* are observed in the development and dissemination of all information products.
  - (d) Ensure that all information dissemination activities are developed in alignment with the narratives, themes and messages contained in Annex XX – Strategic Communications and Annex X – Public Affairs;
  - (e) Collect or sub-task collection of assessments information to enable assessment of info activities; and
  - (f) Ensure the readiness of tactical information dissemination capabilities listed at Para 11.
  - (g) Coordinate and synchronise JTF-LR IA-enabled activities with ADM(PA) as well as OGDAs communication stakeholders at the tactical level IAW Annex X – Public Affairs.
- (3) JTF-LR HUMAN SECURITY/Gender Focal Point
- (a) In coordination with JTF-LR J9, leverage GBA+ and other frameworks, ensure that populations which are differently affected by the COVID-19 or subsequent crisis are considered in the planning of CAF response, including those that will access aid differently. It is highly likely that this operation will create an elevated degree of stress amongst the affected populations. As such, it is critical that the CAF is, and is seen to be, culturally sensitive to the needs of the population. These considerations will be factored into the presence, profile and presentation (PPP) of CAF members. Particular attention will be paid to First Nations communities possessing limited organic support as well as homeless populations in urban settings to gain a better understanding of contextualized needs and considerations; and
  - (b) BPT support liaison between CAF, OGDAs and differently affected populations and civil society groups.

b. Phase 1 – Request for Effect – Info Shaping

(1) JTF-LR Effects

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- (a) BPT leverage IA assets to enable increased awareness in communities across Canada including conducting Community Assessment Mapping, Village Assessment and identification of key stakeholders (leadership, media, civil society and NGOs);
- (b) BPT to support or conduct identifying, sourcing and contracting of resources in affected communities ISO overall CAF or OGDA effort (e.g. identifying and securing facilities, RSOM);
- (c) BPT employ IA assets to communicate with communities and with key stakeholders of pending CAF activity that will affect them;
- (d) BPT to disseminate PA or OGDA communications products to affected communities; and
- (e) BPT establish CONOPs for information support for each CAF activation with associated assessment framework.
- (f) BPT disseminate preparatory and informative products across relevant CAF communications platforms;
- (g) BPT liaise with OGDA communication's stakeholders at the provincial and local level;
- (h) BPT employ PA assets to communicate into communities and with key stakeholders regarding pending CAF activity that will affect them;
- (i) BPT ensure affected populations understand the conditions and constraints of CAF support in domestic response;
- (j) BPT disseminate messaging mitigating affected population's concerns, particularly as it pertains to COVID-19 spread and use of local resources (testing, PPE, accommodations); and
- (k) BPT disseminate messaging which reassures Canadians of CAF readiness to support them.

c. Phase 2 – Employment – Info Enabling

- (1) Common to all:

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- (a) Report and escalate all instances of mis/disinformation directed at the CAF or mis/disinformation impeding GC/civil authorities' efforts to respond to the crisis. Employ the frameworks at Appendix 3 to ascertain appropriate level of reaction; and
- (b) Counteract mis/disinformation in a timely manner, following extant protocols, primarily using narratives and themes at Annex XX.

(2) JTF-LR Effects

- (a) BPT support or conduct content capture during conduct of CAF activities to ensure exploitation materials;
- (b) BPT support or conduct tactical dissemination of information in support of Op LASER activities;
- (c) BPT support PA in informing key leaders, influencers and communicators of imminent change to CAF support or enable Engagement for same effect;
- (d) BPT provide broadcast capability (e.g. Radio-in-a-box) to OGDAs where infrastructure is lacking;
- (e) BPT leverage IA assets to conduct liaison and facilitate Engagements in order to facilitate the overall assigned task; and
- (f) De-conflict tasking of Combat Camera capability with CA IA capabilities to ensure optimal use of content capture resources.
- (g) BPT conduct media liaison to ensure local media is poised to inform affected Canadians; and
- (h) BPT ensure that key leaders, influencers and communicators, are informed of imminent change to CAF support.

d. Phase 3 – Redeployment of Forces – Info Exploitation/Mitigation

- (1) Common to all. Ensure appropriate signalling and communication of imminent CAF movements as they affect populations.
- (2) JTF-LR Effects
  - (a) Coordinate with PA to ensure that captured content is forwarded to appropriate entity for further exploitation; and



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- (b) Where possible, continue to monitor IE after main body departure to assess follow-on impacts, unintended effects or further exploitation opportunities.
- (c) If terminating or subsiding communications, ensure that any audience cultivated during specific CAF tasks is directed to appropriate official information source;
- (d) Coordinate collation of content for production of info products; and
- (e) Develop and disseminate information/communication products on CAF platforms which showcases the work of CAF members.

10. Coordinating Instructions

- a. Information related capabilities (IRCs) The IRCs employed in descending priority on OP LASER will be:
  - (1) Manoeuvre Elements. As each individual CAF member is a representative of the Force, it is assumed that the PPP including the sequencing of forces, force composition and disposition of our own members is our strongest means of communicating directly to Canadians. PPP considerations and deliberate modifications to convey a message to Canadians will be balanced against PPE requirements at Annex J (PPE Requirements).
  - (2) PA. PA is the CAF's premier mechanism for facilitating communications with Canadians on a large scale as well as availability and openness with Canadian media. This will be done through preparation of relevant spokespersons and the preparation of communications products. PA will be considered the information lead for JTF-LR.
  - (3) Engagements. Informed by the careful and deliberate employment of manoeuvre forces, one-on-one engagements are the most direct form of communication the CAF can achieve. Devising engagements must be targeted towards a desired effect, be that informing a given audience, attaining new information or shaping a future relationship. In planning engagements, subordinate units will consider the following potential lenses for Engagement:
    - (a) Key Leader Engagement (KLE);
    - (b) Member-level Engagement;

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- (c) Religious Leader Engagement; and
    - (d) Technical/SME Engagement.
  - (4) CIMIC. Civil-Military Cooperation operators possess key skills to aid GC in assessing need within communities, identifying and establishing key relationships and enabling direct dissemination of approved information. These skills will also be leveraged in support of Human Security/Gender Focal Point activities including mapping civil society networks for differently affected populations and enhanced military planning considerations.
  - (5) CYBER. As per Annex QQ, only defensive cyber operations (DCO) are authorized on Op LASER at this time. With regards to decentralized commercial communications and tele-working, Op LASER units are encouraged to consult the following general guidance on cybersecurity:
    - (a) <http://admin-smagi.mil.ca/en/security/policies-standards/security-guide-for-teleworking.page>; and
    - (b) <https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/considerations-when-using-video-teleconference-products-and-services>
  - (6) PSYOPs. PSYOPS is not authorized, however the underlying skillsets of PSYOPs operators may be leveraged in support of PA and OGDAs collection, planning, analysis, production, design and dissemination.
- b. Analysis. Collation and preliminary analysis will be supported by all levels. At this time, collation and analysis will be integral to current IRC channels pending further direction.
- c. Reporting. Given that various reporting chains are quickly becoming onerous and potentially confusing, info ops paras will be integral to the overall report from the relevant headquarters until reporting construct is better defined. This will ensure info-related reporting does not become burdensome but is also integrated into the overall COP. CJOC Joint Operational Effects (JOE) continue the daily teleconference with JTF-LR Effects/J9 team IOT to coordinate and synchronise CAF information efforts at the operational level. This event will address considerations from the following stakeholders:
- (1) JTF-LR Chief Effects (J9);
  - (2) JTF-LR SPAO;
  - (3) JTF-LR Human Security/Gender Focal Point and

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(4) Optional: JTF-LR Padre.

SERVICE SUPPORT.

11. While various capabilities are not approved for IA use, IA assets must ensure the appropriate readiness of various tactical dissemination capabilities in support of PA, GC and civil authorities. This includes the testing, maintenance, sourcing and staging with intent to eventual mobilization of:

- a. Print production facilities including mounting, cropping and finishing;
- b. Digital production suites;
- c. Portable displays (televisions, projectors, screens);
- d. Content capture platforms (still, video, audio);
- e. Radios-in-a-box (RIAB); and
- f. Loudspeakers.

COMMAND AND SIGNALS

12. Points of Contact. CJOC is operating on an alternating Blue Team/Gold Team construct as part of business continuity planning. If the individual you are trying to reach is unavailable, it may be their counterpart on duty.

<u>Position</u>	<u>Team Gold</u>	<u>Team Blue</u>
Dir JOE	Col C. Henderson, (613) 945-2903	LCol J. Lutz, (613) 998-4847
Chief Effects	Maj C. Carter, (613) 990-4471	LCol E. Deneau, (613) 945-2903
Chief PA	Maj S. Hawken, (613) 993-6984	LCol A. Thomson, (613) 945-2903
Chief StratCom	LCol B. Golbeck, (613) 945-2537, 613-462-2093 (cell)	
Human Security	LCol J. Lutz, (613) 998-4847	

Appendices:

Appendix 1 – Objectives, Effects and Task Matrix  
Appendix 2 – Example Concept of Info Support  
Appendix 3 – Mis/Disinformation Drills



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# Appendix 1 to Annex UU CJOC Joint Operational Effects – Op LASER Info Ops Objectives, Effects and Tasks

This OET matrix informs the priorities of IRCs in supporting CAF/GC activities at a given phase. It is not an exhaustive list of effects or tasks but indicates the core action areas for enabling FoM in the Information domain on Op LASER by phase. Effects and tasks here do not constitute orders to conduct these activities in the absence of formal direction.

Op LASER Objectives	Effects		
	Vulnerable populations and communities are <b>PROTECTED</b>	Essential government services are <b>SUPPORTED</b>	Civil Order is <b>MAINTAINED</b>
Probable or Illustrative Tasks	<b>SHAPING</b>	<b>ENABLING</b>	<b>EXPLOITING/MITIGATING</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>[Canadian Public]'s trust in official sources of information is <b>STRENGTHENED</b></li> <li>CAF's roles, limitations and its operating construct is <b>UNDERSTOOD</b> by [Canadian Public]</li> <li>[Civil Authorities] are <b>REASSURED</b> of CAF support</li> <li>Cooperation/liaison with [Civil Authorities] <b>ESTABLISHED</b> and <b>MAINTAINED</b></li> <li>CAF role in support to law enforcement is <b>UNDERSTOOD</b> by [Canadian Public] and [Canadian Media]</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CAF and local [OGDA] communications/themes are <b>ALIGNED</b></li> <li>[OGD] Freedom of Movement is <b>MAINTAINED</b></li> <li>[Canadian Public] is <b>DETERRED</b> from participating in Civil Disobedience</li> <li>[Canadian Public] compliance with suppression measures is <b>REINFORCED</b></li> <li>[Canadian Media] is <b>INFORMED</b> regarding CAF activities</li> <li>[CAF members] are <b>REASSURED</b> of CAF Force Health Protection posture</li> <li>CAF role in support to law enforcement is <b>UNDERSTOOD</b> by [Canadian Public] and [Canadian Media]</li> <li>[Canadian Public]'s anxiety and fear <b>REDUCED</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>[Canadian Public] trust in official sources of information is <b>MAINTAINED</b></li> <li>[Canadian Public] trust in CAF is <b>MAINTAINED</b></li> <li>CAF operational successes are <b>UNDERSTOOD</b> by [Canadian Public]</li> <li>CAF activities are <b>UNDERSTOOD</b> by [Canadian Public] as a reflection of WoG effort</li> <li>[Canadian Public] perception of CAF discipline and professionalism is <b>STRENGTHENED</b></li> </ul>
Common to all phases and assets	Probable or Illustrative Tasks		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>SUPPORT</b> OGDA planning, collection, analysis, product design, production and dissemination for communications</li> <li><b>CONDUCT</b> Community Assessment Mapping and Village Assessments to support overall awareness</li> <li><b>IDENTIFY</b> and <b>COORDINATE</b> with key stakeholders and key communicators</li> <li><b>IDENTIFY</b> specific local considerations pertaining to CAF relations, activity, reputation and history</li> <li><b>DISSEMINATE</b> approved info products to shape arrival of CAF main body</li> <li><b>SUPPORT</b> identifying, sourcing or contracting potential resources in support of GC effort (secondary facilities, RSOM)</li> <li><b>DISSEMINATE</b> preparatory information to affected population</li> <li><b>INFORM</b> national audiences of CAF intent to intervene</li> <li><b>EMPLOY</b> IA and Combat Camera assets to amplify CAF and GoC narrative and themes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>CONDUCT</b> content capture of CAF activities to enable exploitation</li> <li><b>CONDUCT</b> tactical dissemination of approved supporting information (F2F, posters, handbills, digital)</li> <li><b>CONDUCT</b> media liaison to ensure local media is poised to inform affected Canadians</li> <li>Actively <b>COORDINATE</b> and <b>LIAISE</b> with relevant OGDA communicators</li> <li><b>DISSEMINATE</b> information preliminarily to signal imminent CAF departure</li> <li><b>COORDINATE</b> and <b>LIAISE</b> with local key communicators to reassure population</li> <li><b>FACILITATE</b> KLE with civilian leadership</li> <li><b>CONDUCT</b> and <b>SUPPORT</b> media availabilities ISO OGDAs or CAF leaderships</li> <li><b>BPT PROVIDE</b> broadcast capability (e.g. RIAB) where infrastructure is lacking</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>SHARE</b> captured content to appropriate entity for product development</li> <li><b>SUPPORT</b> or conduct development of products highlighting CAF activities</li> <li>Publish or forward for publishing finished products on CAF platforms</li> <li>If ceasing active communications, <b>DIRECT</b> audiences to official channels of information</li> </ul>
Common to all phases and assets	Common to all phases and assets		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>IDENTIFY</b> and <b>REPORT</b> instances of mis- or disinformation targeting the CAF or impeding GC crisis response overall</li> <li><b>IDENTIFY</b> and <b>REPORT</b> authentic concerns of Canadians as they pertain to CAF activity</li> <li><b>CONTRIBUTE</b> to collection of assessment information in support of information environment assessment as well as operational assessments</li> <li><b>ENSURE</b> all information activities align with Annex XX – StratCom</li> <li><b>ENSURE</b> tactical alignment with OGDA and other official communicators</li> </ul>		



## Appendix 2 to Annex UU

### Example CONOP

## Concept of Info Support

**Mission:** Specific task coming from RFE

**Intent:**

**End State:**

**Main Body SoM:**

### Enabling Effects by phase:

- ① CAF understanding of local civil env is ENHANCED  
CAF understanding of local TAs is INCREASED
- ② General public (Local) is INFORMED of CAF activities  
General public (Local) is INFORMED how to access aid
- ③ General public (National) is INFORMED of CAF activities

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Mission graphic (map, relevant facility, etc.)

<p>RFA Rx</p> <p>★</p> <p>Prod</p> <p>CIMIC</p> <p>Recce</p>	<p>KLE</p> <p>PA</p> <p>TPT</p> <p>Main Body - Employment</p>	<p>Completion criteria met</p> <p>★</p> <p>Prod</p> <p>PA</p> <p>Main Body - Redeployment</p>
<p>Ph 1 – RFE Received <u>Information Shaping</u></p> <p>CIMIC det to deploy with Recce element to conduct CAM/VA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-identify media landscape</li> <li>-support to RSOM planning</li> </ul> <p>IA Prod cell to produce products for enabling early liaison and shaping by recce element/TCT</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-handbills with phone tree</li> <li>-public safety info products on RFA process</li> </ul>	<p>Ph 2 – Employment <u>Information Enabling Execution</u></p> <p>TPT deploys to conduct imagery capture and enhance civil SA (atmospherics, assessments etc)</p> <p>PAO coord to facilitate media availability with main body Comd and municipal leaders</p>	<p>Ph 3 – Redeployment <u>Information Exploitation/Mitigation</u></p> <p>Captured content forwarded to ADM(PA) or organic IA capability for collation and product development</p> <p>Relevant PA to disseminate on CAF/GC platforms</p>




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# Appendix 3 to Annex UU – Mis- and Disinformation Drills

## CJOC Joint Operational Effects

### Harmful Information Response Drill

*Harmful Information as opposed to a Hostile Propaganda Spot Report or SCAME which typically analyse adversary propaganda, this tool is to be used to assess mis- or disinformation that is either targeting the CAF or is otherwise degrading the overall Cc response to the crisis.*



★	Point of Entry	The sensor (RJTF J/G/N/A2, Flash Report, PAO, LNOs) completes a SCAME Analysis with support from Effects/J9 branch.
2	IO Assessment	At-level Effects Team/J9 conducts an assessment based on Severity/Significance, supported by J3, J2, PAO as required to determine if a response is required
3	IOWG	IF a response is required, an Information Operations Working Group is conducted to design the response (Comd engagement, Media engagement, CIMIC action, etc)
4	Effects Approval Board	Chaired by the appropriate engagement authority or their delegate to validate the requirement for the engagement and approve the type of engagement
5	Effectiveness	May use one or more capability (PAO, CIMIC, Comd engagement, Outreach etc)

SCAME Analysis	
Source	I.e. Tweet, account owner, number of followers, and probable location (may be amplification of coordinated messaging)
Content	Statement that ...or Incident description
Audience	Specific population and news language
Media	I.e. Twitter post Potentially supporting coordinated messaging Including web media
Effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Dissemination platforms used</li> <li>2. Number of retweets and likes</li> <li>3. Significant media attention</li> </ul>

**CJOC**  
OPERATIONAL RELEVANCE



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## Appendix 3 to Annex UU – Mis- and Disinformation Drills

# CJOC Joint Operational Effects Incident Assessment Methodology

Risk in the IE is a function of the severity and the significance of a threat posed by an activity or incident. This assessment provides the basis of Info Ops support to Comd decision-action through the triage of IE activity.

**Information Environment:** The Information Environment (IE) encompasses all information available to decision-makers and all actions which seek to impact the decision-making cycle of adversary, friendly, and neutral actors.

**Threat:** Any real or potential condition that can cause injury, illness or death of personnel or damage to, or loss of, equipment, property or lead to mission degradation. In the context of JTF-LR, this also includes OGDAs actions which could positively/negatively threaten CAF. Threats to equities include anything that can damage perception, confidence or credibility of an equity.



**Severity:** Severity in the IE is the potential degree to which an activity can cause mission degradation. In the context JTF-LR, this would include any loss of ability to complete the mission, including any damage to stakeholder credibility or legitimacy, or damage to cohesion or unity of Op LASER.

**Significance:** Significance in the IE is the degree of importance of the activity as derived from the frequency of the activity or the importance of the source or medium. In the context of Op LASER, significance would range from an unknown to LOW to HIGH.

The dotted line at the threshold between the "Low Risk" and "Moderate Risk" levels on the graphic represents what is colloqually referred to as "the Evening News test". This subjective evaluation of risk is key for determining whether an IOWG and EAB are required before responding to an activity.

### ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY CRITERIA

The following are input factors to be considered when determining the severity and significance of an IE activity in the context of risk assessment. Each input factor is to be viewed on a spectrum, not a binary. The risk assessment is a holistic process that considers a number of factors, no one factor determines the level of risk. This list is by no means exhaustive.



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
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# Appendix 3 to Annex UU – Mis- and Disinformation Drills

## CJOC Joint Operational Effects

### Inaccurate Reporting Assessment Framework



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